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Commits
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321f5968b8 |
docs: state the dual-leg diversity claim accurately (not an over-correction)
The prior pass swung too far: it answered "does running both give diversity?"
with a flat "No, both are Module-LWE." That under-credits the real security.
Accurate, layered claim now installed in design-decisions / README / SUBMISSION /
nist-mptc-category:
- Pulsar and Corona are distinct SCHEMES at different PARAMETER regimes
(Pulsar = FIPS-204 ML-DSA deterministic FS-with-aborts, q=8380417; Corona =
Ringtail/Raccoon masked threshold, q=0x1000000004A01, params tuned for
threshold). In AND-mode an adversary must forge BOTH; a cryptanalytic,
parameter-specific, or implementation flaw in one does not transfer — the pair
is strictly stronger than either leg alone ("both have to be cracked").
- What it is NOT: hardness-ASSUMPTION diversity. Both rest on Module-LWE/SIS, so a
fundamental Module-LWE break threatens both lattice legs; assumption-disjoint
diversity is the hash-based Magnetar (SLH-DSA) leg.
Docs-only; go build green; no shims.
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df1db68bd0 |
docs/comments: correct lattice-family label Ring-LWE -> Module-LWE (Corona is Module-LWE)
Corona is Module-LWE (threshold-Raccoon/Ringtail), NOT Ring-LWE. Confirmed in code: sign/sign.go samples A in R_q^{8x7} (sign.go:87 SamplePolyMatrix M=8,N=7), secret s a rank-7 ring vector, b=A*s+e (sign.go:106-107) over R_q=Z_q[X]/(X^256+1) (LogN=8), q=0x1000000004A01 -- rank>1 module structure, not rank-1 ring-LWE. threshold/threshold.go:4-5 already said Module-LWE.
Fixed the family label across README, SPEC, SUBMISSION, NIST-SUBMISSION, PATENTS, LLM, CONTRIBUTING, SECURITY, CHANGELOG, DEPLOYMENT-RUNBOOK, Makefile, AXIOM-INVENTORY, PROOF-CLAIMS, BLOCKERS, CRYPTOGRAPHER-SIGN-OFF, FIPS-TRACEABILITY, TRUSTED-COMPUTING-BASE, AUDIT-2026-05/06, docs/mptc/*, jasmin/README, 3 Go comments + cli help string.
Also corrected the downstream false claim that Corona (Ring-LWE) and Pulsar (Module-LWE) are 'different lattice families' giving 'structural/family diversity': both are Module-LWE, so the Double-Lattice defense is construction/implementation diversity (threshold-Raccoon vs ML-DSA), not hardness-family diversity; a Module-LWE break affects both legs (hash-based Magnetar is the assumption-diversifier). Fixed companion R-SIS -> Module-SIS where it was the module scheme's SIS assumption; added the Langlois-Stehle (DCC 2015) Module-LWE citation alongside LPR 2010.
Delicate artifacts: proof identifiers (rlwe_sign_op, RLWE_Functional theory/file, *_eq_rlwe bridges, CentralRLWESign, RLWESign, rlwe_compute_*) were NOT renamed -- EasyCrypt/jasmin toolchains are absent here so a rename cannot be compile-verified, and .assurance/ gates parse those names. Added clarifying naming notes to the 5 prominent .ec files, proofs/easycrypt/README.md, AXIOM-INVENTORY.md, and jasmin/rlwe/sign.jazz. .assurance/*.txt left untouched (already say Module-LWE/Module-SIS; rlwe tokens are gate-parsed identifiers). Left AUDIT-2026-06.md:463 historical rename-log and the ProtoStar-LWE paper-title substring untouched.
go build ./... and go test ./... green (GOWORK=off; all packages ok).
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ad169a8368 |
docs: bump Go reference 1.26.x → 1.26.4
Workspace-wide sync. luxfi/node already shipped on 1.26.4 in v1.30.6; this prose-doc catch-up keeps the runbook in lock-step with the actual Dockerfile/go.mod pin. |
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bf70b85833 |
audit 2026-06: TEE + GPU + public-permissionless-chain safety + corona->corona sweep
AUDIT-2026-06.md ships the four-dimensional audit:
D1 Permissionless safety: PASSED with two minor open items for v0.7.6.
Rogue-key NOT APPLICABLE (single global (A, bTilde); no per-party pk
in the BLS-aggregation sense). Adaptive corruption documented as
paper-cited only (carryover; GATE-4 target). Slashable equivocation
evidence is cryptographically extractable via signed dkg2.Complaint
and activation-cert non-verification. Front-running: sid IS bound
into PRNG seed / MAC / transcript hash (CRIT-1 fix 2026-05-03), but
plumbed as Go int (64-bit), not 32-byte randomness as threat-model
claims — D1-2 MEDIUM, doc tightening for v0.7.6. D1-3 MINOR: extend
Complaint to signing-round equivocation.
D2 TEE integration: WAS A GAP. Closed by this audit via the new
docs/mptc/tee-integration.md — full per-platform spec for AMD
SEV-SNP (primary Linux path), NVIDIA Confidential Computing
(H100/H200/B200 CC mode) when gpu.UseAccelerator() is used in
production, Intel TDX (alternative), Apple Secure Enclave (local-
only defense-in-depth on Apple Silicon). Intel SGX explicitly NOT
RECOMMENDED. Decomplecting rule held: ZERO Corona kernel code
change required for §3.1, §3.3, §3.4; §3.2 adds one optional
plumbing function (gpu.MaybeRegisterAttested) tracked for v0.7.6.
The TEE layer sits OUTSIDE the cryptographic math — Corona observes
nothing of TEE state.
D3 GPU acceleration inventory: corona/gpu is a thin SubRing-registration
shim around luxfi/lattice/v7/gpu — no kernels live in corona/.
dkg2_parallel.go is goroutine fan-out (honestly relabelled in
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7ec104b20e |
remove detailed patent-claims docs (relocated to lux-private/patents)
Detailed invention disclosures are sensitive pre-filing material. Moved to lux-private/patents to preserve international filing rights (EU/JP/KR/CN absolute-novelty rule). Cross-ref: github.com/lux-private/patents/bundles/ |
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ed5844a17d | patent-claims: novelty triage drafts (attorney-prep, not filed) | ||
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b9219d13fd |
submission: scaffold NIST MPTC v0.2 submission package mirroring Pulsar template
Adds the NIST MPTC Class N1 + N4 submission package for Corona (R-LWE
threshold signing). Pattern mirrors luxfi/pulsar (M-LWE byte-equal
FIPS 204 path), adapted HONESTLY to Corona's lighter proof tier:
- SUBMISSION.md / NIST-SUBMISSION.md — cover sheet + 1-page exec
summary. Cite Boschini-Kaviani-Lai-Malavolta-Takahashi-Tibouchi
ePrint 2024/1113 (IEEE S&P 2025) as the underlying construction.
Construction-level N1 claim (no FIPS standard target for R-LWE
threshold — Boschini et al. IS the spec). N4 = (A, bTilde)
preserved across reshare within a key era.
- SPEC.md — standalone construction specification consolidating
existing material (papers/lp-073-pulsar/, DESIGN.md). Full
single-doc spec/corona.tex is roadmap v0.6.0.
- PATENTS.md — royalty-free patent grant + defensive termination.
Claim scope EXCLUDES the published Boschini et al. construction;
claims limited to Corona's production lifecycle additions
(Pedersen DKG over R_q, proactive resharing, activation cert
circuit-breaker, constant-time Pedersen slot equality, hash-suite
injection).
- PROOF-CLAIMS.md — HONEST framing. Corona ships NO mechanized
refinement (no EasyCrypt, no Lean, no Jasmin) — unlike Pulsar.
Correctness reduces to code review + KAT cross-runtime byte-equality
+ academic construction analysis + per-path constant-time static
audit. Mechanized refinement is roadmap v0.7.0.
- TRUSTED-COMPUTING-BASE.md — implementation TCB. Structurally
simpler than Pulsar's; no EC/Lean/Jasmin tools in scope.
- DEPLOYMENT-RUNBOOK.md — operator-facing trust-model disclosure.
- LICENSING.md / CONTRIBUTING.md / SECURITY.md — standard NIST-MPTC
artifacts.
- docs/mptc/ — submission-package docs subdir (kept separate from
docs/ Next.js docs site):
- evaluation.md, ietf-draft-skeleton.md, nist-mptc-category.md,
patent-claims.md, design-decisions.md, family-architecture.md,
threat-model.md
- scripts/{build,test,bench,gen_vectors,check-high-assurance,
cut-submission}.sh — submission gates mirroring Pulsar's
orchestrator pattern, adapted to Corona's reality (no EC/Lean/
Jasmin checks because the artifacts do not exist).
- LLM.md + CHANGELOG.md — updated with submission scaffolding
context and v0.5.0 entry. NO fabricated prior history; CHANGELOG
v0.5.0 entry covers only the actual submission documentation.
DOES NOT FABRICATE: no CRYPTOGRAPHER-SIGN-OFF (Pulsar has one;
Corona's lighter proof tier does not yet warrant it — roadmap
v0.7.0+v0.8.0). No AXIOM-INVENTORY or FIPS-TRACEABILITY (Corona is
not anchored to a FIPS standard). No proof claims Corona does not
actually have.
Build/test verification: GOWORK=off go build ./... clean; sign/,
primitives/, hash/ unit tests pass; scripts/build.sh + scripts/
check-high-assurance.sh exit 0.
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c77969ea67 |
pulsar: lattice threshold kernel with key-era lifecycle + Pulsar-SHA3 + Nebula binding
Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.
Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
- Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
- Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
- Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
- NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer
Replaces from upstream:
- Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
- Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
epoch under the persistent group public key.
Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
- KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
- Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
- RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
- Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
under the unchanged GroupKey
Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
- Hc: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
- Hu: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
- TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
- PRF: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
- MAC: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
- Pairwise: KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
- Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
- Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
- All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.
Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
chain_id, network_id, group_id,
key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
threshold_old, threshold_new,
group_public_key_hash,
nebula_root,
hash_suite_id,
implementation_version,
variant.
Packages:
primitives/ Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
sign/ 2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
threshold/ GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
reshare/ VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
(Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
hash/ HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
dkg2/ Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
keyera/ Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
papers/ LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)
DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
- The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
- Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
- Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
- Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
- Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
- No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
- MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
- Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
"hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.
Tests: full suite green
hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
all pass.
Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.
Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
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