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Hanzo AI c77969ea67 pulsar: lattice threshold kernel with key-era lifecycle + Pulsar-SHA3 + Nebula binding
Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.

Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
  - Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
  - Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
  - Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
  - NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer

Replaces from upstream:
  - Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
    with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
    Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
    under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
  - Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
    rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
    epoch under the persistent group public key.

Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
  - KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
  - Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
  - RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
  - Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
    under the unchanged GroupKey

Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
  - Hc:        cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
  - Hu:        cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
  - TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
  - PRF:       KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
  - MAC:       KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
  - Pairwise:  KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
  - Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
    non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
  - Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
  - All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
    luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.

Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
    chain_id, network_id, group_id,
    key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
    old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
    old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
    threshold_old, threshold_new,
    group_public_key_hash,
    nebula_root,
    hash_suite_id,
    implementation_version,
    variant.

Packages:
  primitives/   Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
  sign/         2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
  threshold/    GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
  reshare/      VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
                (Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
                transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
  hash/         HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
  dkg2/         Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
  keyera/       Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
  papers/       LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
  cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)

DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
  - The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
  - Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
    Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
  - Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
  - Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
  - Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
  - No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
  - MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
  - Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
    "hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
    the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.

Tests: full suite green
  hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
  dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
  all pass.

Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.

Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
2026-03-03 12:00:00 -08:00

111 lines
2.2 KiB
Go

package sign
import (
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/ring"
"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/utils/sampling"
"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/utils/structs"
)
func TestPartyState_Initialization(t *testing.T) {
r, err := ring.NewRing(256, []uint64{8380417})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
party := NewParty(1, r, r, r, nil)
if party.ID != 1 {
t.Errorf("Expected party ID 1, got %d", party.ID)
}
if party.Ring == nil {
t.Error("Expected non-nil Ring")
}
}
func TestSignConstants(t *testing.T) {
// Test that constants are properly defined
if LogN == 0 {
t.Error("LogN should not be zero")
}
if Q == 0 {
t.Error("Q should not be zero")
}
if QXi == 0 {
t.Error("QXi should not be zero")
}
if QNu == 0 {
t.Error("QNu should not be zero")
}
if M == 0 {
t.Error("M should not be zero")
}
if N == 0 {
t.Error("N should not be zero")
}
if KeySize == 0 {
t.Error("KeySize should not be zero")
}
}
func TestCheckL2Norm(t *testing.T) {
r, err := ring.NewRing(256, []uint64{8380417})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
prng, _ := sampling.NewPRNG()
sampler := ring.NewUniformSampler(prng, r)
tests := []struct {
name string
size int
expect bool
}{
{
name: "small vector within bound",
size: 3,
expect: true,
},
{
name: "large vector within bound",
size: 10,
expect: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Create two vectors for testing - Delta and z
delta := make(structs.Vector[ring.Poly], tt.size)
z := make(structs.Vector[ring.Poly], tt.size)
for i := range delta {
if tt.expect {
// Use small values for expected to pass
delta[i] = r.NewPoly()
z[i] = r.NewPoly()
// Set small coefficients manually for predictable test
for j := 0; j < r.N(); j++ {
delta[i].Coeffs[0][j] = 1
z[i].Coeffs[0][j] = 1
}
} else {
// Create polynomial with random values
delta[i] = sampler.ReadNew()
z[i] = sampler.ReadNew()
}
}
result := CheckL2Norm(r, delta, z)
// Note: The actual pass/fail depends on the internal bound check
// We're just verifying it doesn't crash
if result && !tt.expect {
t.Log("CheckL2Norm passed when it might have been expected to fail")
}
})
}
}