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Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.
Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
- Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
- Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
- Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
- NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer
Replaces from upstream:
- Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
- Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
epoch under the persistent group public key.
Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
- KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
- Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
- RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
- Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
under the unchanged GroupKey
Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
- Hc: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
- Hu: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
- TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
- PRF: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
- MAC: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
- Pairwise: KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
- Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
- Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
- All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.
Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
chain_id, network_id, group_id,
key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
threshold_old, threshold_new,
group_public_key_hash,
nebula_root,
hash_suite_id,
implementation_version,
variant.
Packages:
primitives/ Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
sign/ 2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
threshold/ GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
reshare/ VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
(Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
hash/ HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
dkg2/ Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
keyera/ Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
papers/ LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)
DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
- The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
- Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
- Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
- Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
- Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
- No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
- MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
- Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
"hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.
Tests: full suite green
hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
all pass.
Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.
Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
111 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
111 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
package sign
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import (
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"testing"
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"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/ring"
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"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/utils/sampling"
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"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/utils/structs"
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)
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func TestPartyState_Initialization(t *testing.T) {
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r, err := ring.NewRing(256, []uint64{8380417})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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party := NewParty(1, r, r, r, nil)
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if party.ID != 1 {
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t.Errorf("Expected party ID 1, got %d", party.ID)
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}
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if party.Ring == nil {
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t.Error("Expected non-nil Ring")
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}
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}
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func TestSignConstants(t *testing.T) {
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// Test that constants are properly defined
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if LogN == 0 {
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t.Error("LogN should not be zero")
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}
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if Q == 0 {
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t.Error("Q should not be zero")
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}
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if QXi == 0 {
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t.Error("QXi should not be zero")
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}
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if QNu == 0 {
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t.Error("QNu should not be zero")
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}
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if M == 0 {
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t.Error("M should not be zero")
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}
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if N == 0 {
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t.Error("N should not be zero")
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}
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if KeySize == 0 {
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t.Error("KeySize should not be zero")
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}
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}
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func TestCheckL2Norm(t *testing.T) {
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r, err := ring.NewRing(256, []uint64{8380417})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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prng, _ := sampling.NewPRNG()
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sampler := ring.NewUniformSampler(prng, r)
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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size int
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expect bool
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}{
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{
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name: "small vector within bound",
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size: 3,
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expect: true,
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},
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{
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name: "large vector within bound",
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size: 10,
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expect: true,
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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// Create two vectors for testing - Delta and z
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delta := make(structs.Vector[ring.Poly], tt.size)
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z := make(structs.Vector[ring.Poly], tt.size)
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for i := range delta {
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if tt.expect {
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// Use small values for expected to pass
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delta[i] = r.NewPoly()
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z[i] = r.NewPoly()
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// Set small coefficients manually for predictable test
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for j := 0; j < r.N(); j++ {
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delta[i].Coeffs[0][j] = 1
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z[i].Coeffs[0][j] = 1
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}
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} else {
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// Create polynomial with random values
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delta[i] = sampler.ReadNew()
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z[i] = sampler.ReadNew()
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}
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}
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result := CheckL2Norm(r, delta, z)
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// Note: The actual pass/fail depends on the internal bound check
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// We're just verifying it doesn't crash
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if result && !tt.expect {
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t.Log("CheckL2Norm passed when it might have been expected to fail")
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}
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})
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}
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}
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