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Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.
Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
- Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
- Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
- Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
- NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer
Replaces from upstream:
- Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
- Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
epoch under the persistent group public key.
Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
- KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
- Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
- RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
- Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
under the unchanged GroupKey
Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
- Hc: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
- Hu: cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
- TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
- PRF: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
- MAC: KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
- Pairwise: KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
- Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
- Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
- All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.
Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
chain_id, network_id, group_id,
key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
threshold_old, threshold_new,
group_public_key_hash,
nebula_root,
hash_suite_id,
implementation_version,
variant.
Packages:
primitives/ Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
sign/ 2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
threshold/ GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
reshare/ VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
(Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
hash/ HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
dkg2/ Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
keyera/ Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
papers/ LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)
DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
- The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
- Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
- Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
- Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
- Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
- No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
- MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
- Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
"hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.
Tests: full suite green
hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
all pass.
Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.
Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
112 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
112 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package hash
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// FIPS 202 / NIST SP 800-185 helpers — left_encode, right_encode,
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// bytepad, encode_string — and the TupleHash / KMAC constructions
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// they enable. Vendored here because Go's golang.org/x/crypto/sha3
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// ships cSHAKE128/256 but not TupleHash or KMAC. The implementation
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// is fully covered by the published NIST test vectors (see hash_test.go).
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//
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// All encoders match SP 800-185 §2.3 byte-for-byte. left_encode and
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// right_encode operate on the BIT length, not the byte length.
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import (
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"encoding/binary"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
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)
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// leftEncode returns the SP 800-185 left_encode(x) byte string.
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func leftEncode(x uint64) []byte {
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if x == 0 {
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return []byte{0x01, 0x00}
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}
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var buf [8]byte
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], x)
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i := 0
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for i < 7 && buf[i] == 0 {
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i++
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}
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out := make([]byte, 0, 9-i)
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out = append(out, byte(8-i))
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out = append(out, buf[i:]...)
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return out
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}
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// rightEncode returns the SP 800-185 right_encode(x) byte string.
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func rightEncode(x uint64) []byte {
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if x == 0 {
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return []byte{0x00, 0x01}
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}
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var buf [8]byte
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], x)
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i := 0
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for i < 7 && buf[i] == 0 {
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i++
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}
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out := make([]byte, 0, 9-i)
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out = append(out, buf[i:]...)
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out = append(out, byte(8-i))
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return out
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}
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// encodeString returns left_encode(bit_len(s)) || s.
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func encodeString(s []byte) []byte {
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out := leftEncode(uint64(len(s)) * 8)
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out = append(out, s...)
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return out
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}
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// bytepad pads x with zeros so the result is a multiple of w bytes,
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// prefixed by left_encode(w).
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func bytepad(x []byte, w int) []byte {
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prefix := leftEncode(uint64(w))
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out := make([]byte, 0, len(prefix)+len(x)+w)
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out = append(out, prefix...)
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out = append(out, x...)
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for len(out)%w != 0 {
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out = append(out, 0x00)
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}
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return out
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}
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// kmac256 returns KMAC256(K, X, outLen, S) per SP 800-185 §4.
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func kmac256(key, msg []byte, outLen int, customization string) []byte {
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x := bytepad(encodeString(key), 136)
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x = append(x, msg...)
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x = append(x, rightEncode(uint64(outLen)*8)...)
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h := sha3.NewCShake256([]byte("KMAC"), []byte(customization))
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_, _ = h.Write(x)
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out := make([]byte, outLen)
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_, _ = h.Read(out)
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return out
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}
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// tupleHash256 returns TupleHash256(parts, outLen, S) per SP 800-185 §5.
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func tupleHash256(parts [][]byte, outLen int, customization string) []byte {
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var x []byte
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for _, p := range parts {
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x = append(x, encodeString(p)...)
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}
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x = append(x, rightEncode(uint64(outLen)*8)...)
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h := sha3.NewCShake256([]byte("TupleHash"), []byte(customization))
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_, _ = h.Write(x)
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out := make([]byte, outLen)
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_, _ = h.Read(out)
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return out
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}
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// cshake256Stream is the bare cSHAKE256 XOF: customization S is the
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// only label; N is empty.
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func cshake256Stream(customization string, transcript []byte, outLen int) []byte {
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h := sha3.NewCShake256(nil, []byte(customization))
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_, _ = h.Write(transcript)
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out := make([]byte, outLen)
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_, _ = h.Read(out)
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return out
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}
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