Files
corona/hash/sp800_185.go
T
Hanzo AI c77969ea67 pulsar: lattice threshold kernel with key-era lifecycle + Pulsar-SHA3 + Nebula binding
Forked from github.com/luxfi/corona @ d09b2c2. Pulsar inherits the
2-round signing math byte-equal but adds blockchain-grade key
lifecycle and a SHA3-based domain-separated hash profile for
permissionless validator-set rotation.

Inherits from upstream Corona (byte-equal):
  - Sign1/Sign2/Combine 2-round signing math
  - Lattice ring R_q = Z_q[X]/(X^256+1), q = 0x1000000004A01
  - Module-LWE / Module-SIS hardness
  - NTT, Discrete-Gaussian Ziggurat, MAC layer

Replaces from upstream:
  - Broken Feldman-style DKG (pseudoinverse-recoverable). Replaced
    with: (a) one-time foundation MPC ceremony / trusted-dealer
    Bootstrap; (b) Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, dkg2/) hiding
    under MLWE on B / binding under MSIS on [A | B].
  - Trusted-dealer-per-epoch lifecycle (wrong shape for permissionless
    rotation). Replaced with Verifiable Secret Resharing (VSR) every
    epoch under the persistent group public key.

Key-era lifecycle (KeyEraID / Generation / RollbackFrom):
  - KeyEraID bumps only at Reanchor (rare governance event)
  - Generation bumps every Refresh / Reshare under the same GroupKey
  - RollbackFrom records prior generation reverted from (0 = forward)
  - Activation cert (QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1) gates new generations
    under the unchanged GroupKey

Pulsar-SHA3 hash profile (NIST FIPS 202 / SP 800-185):
  - Hc:        cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HC-v1", transcript) → challenge
  - Hu:        cSHAKE256("PULSAR-HU-v1", transcript) → XOF stream
  - TranscriptHash: TupleHash256("PULSAR-TRANSCRIPT-v1", parts...)
  - PRF:       KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-PRF-v1")
  - MAC:       KMAC256(key, msg, "PULSAR-MAC-v1")
  - Pairwise:  KMAC256(kex, encode(...), "PULSAR-PAIRWISE-v1")
  - Default suite is Pulsar-SHA3; Pulsar-BLAKE3 retained as optional
    non-normative fast profile. HashSuiteID is bound into transcripts.
  - Implementation at pulsar/hash/ with HashSuite interface.
  - All KATs regenerated under SHA3 profile; vectors in
    luxcpp/crypto/pulsar/test/kat/.

Nebula root binding (TranscriptInputs + ActivationMessage canonical
bytes, all bound under TupleHash256):
    chain_id, network_id, group_id,
    key_era_id, old_generation, new_generation,
    old_epoch_id, new_epoch_id,
    old_set_hash, new_set_hash,
    threshold_old, threshold_new,
    group_public_key_hash,
    nebula_root,
    hash_suite_id,
    implementation_version,
    variant.

Packages:
  primitives/   Shamir over R_q, Lagrange, hash helpers
  sign/         2-round sign math (byte-equal upstream)
  threshold/    GroupKey, KeyShare, Signer types
  reshare/      VSR kernel — Refresh (HJKY97 zero-poly), Reshare
                (Desmedt-Jajodia), commit (Pedersen R_q), complaint,
                transcript, pairwise KEX, activation cert
  hash/         HashSuite interface; PulsarSHA3 (default), PulsarBLAKE3
  dkg2/         Pedersen DKG over R_q (research, reference only)
  keyera/       Lifecycle wrapper: Bootstrap → Reshare → Reanchor
  papers/       LP-073-pulsar paper (sections + bibliography)
  cmd/*_oracle/ KAT generators (Go ↔ C++ byte-equal validation)

DESIGN.md is the single source of truth:
  - The Pulsar metaphor (rotating beam over persistent body)
  - Vocabulary stack per LP-105: Nebula / Photon / Lumen / Beam /
    Pulsar / Pulse / Prism / Horizon / Quasar
  - Pulsar ≠ Lumen (PQ stream is separate, planned)
  - Pulsar / Lens / LSS three-layer architecture
  - Bootstrap Dealer vs Signature Coordinator
  - No-slashing failure ladder (timeout → retry → rollback → reanchor)
  - MVP VSR vs Robust VSR phasing
  - Borrowed-brand terms ("X-Wing" used casually) replaced with
    "hybrid KEM" / "Hybrid Lumen Handshake"; X-Wing cited only as
    the IETF combiner primitive name where exact reference matters.

Tests: full suite green
  hash 5+/5+, keyera 5/5, reshare 45+/45+, threshold, sign, dkg,
  dkg2, primitives, networking, utils, corona_oracle_v2 KAT —
  all pass.

Honest claim: the crypto primitives are not new (HJKY97,
Desmedt-Jajodia97, Wong-Wang-Wing02, Corona, Hermine, Threshold
Raccoon all exist). The novel contribution is the systems
composition: a permissionless-consensus deployment architecture that
turns static two-round PQ threshold signatures into a dynamic,
leaderless, validator-rotation-tolerant finality layer.

Companion docs: papers/lp-073-pulsar/ (academic paper); LP-073 +
LP-103 + LP-105 in github.com/luxfi/lps; threshold/protocols/lss/
lss_pulsar.go (LSS adapter wrapping this kernel).
2026-03-03 12:00:00 -08:00

112 lines
3.0 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package hash
// FIPS 202 / NIST SP 800-185 helpers — left_encode, right_encode,
// bytepad, encode_string — and the TupleHash / KMAC constructions
// they enable. Vendored here because Go's golang.org/x/crypto/sha3
// ships cSHAKE128/256 but not TupleHash or KMAC. The implementation
// is fully covered by the published NIST test vectors (see hash_test.go).
//
// All encoders match SP 800-185 §2.3 byte-for-byte. left_encode and
// right_encode operate on the BIT length, not the byte length.
import (
"encoding/binary"
"golang.org/x/crypto/sha3"
)
// leftEncode returns the SP 800-185 left_encode(x) byte string.
func leftEncode(x uint64) []byte {
if x == 0 {
return []byte{0x01, 0x00}
}
var buf [8]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], x)
i := 0
for i < 7 && buf[i] == 0 {
i++
}
out := make([]byte, 0, 9-i)
out = append(out, byte(8-i))
out = append(out, buf[i:]...)
return out
}
// rightEncode returns the SP 800-185 right_encode(x) byte string.
func rightEncode(x uint64) []byte {
if x == 0 {
return []byte{0x00, 0x01}
}
var buf [8]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], x)
i := 0
for i < 7 && buf[i] == 0 {
i++
}
out := make([]byte, 0, 9-i)
out = append(out, buf[i:]...)
out = append(out, byte(8-i))
return out
}
// encodeString returns left_encode(bit_len(s)) || s.
func encodeString(s []byte) []byte {
out := leftEncode(uint64(len(s)) * 8)
out = append(out, s...)
return out
}
// bytepad pads x with zeros so the result is a multiple of w bytes,
// prefixed by left_encode(w).
func bytepad(x []byte, w int) []byte {
prefix := leftEncode(uint64(w))
out := make([]byte, 0, len(prefix)+len(x)+w)
out = append(out, prefix...)
out = append(out, x...)
for len(out)%w != 0 {
out = append(out, 0x00)
}
return out
}
// kmac256 returns KMAC256(K, X, outLen, S) per SP 800-185 §4.
func kmac256(key, msg []byte, outLen int, customization string) []byte {
x := bytepad(encodeString(key), 136)
x = append(x, msg...)
x = append(x, rightEncode(uint64(outLen)*8)...)
h := sha3.NewCShake256([]byte("KMAC"), []byte(customization))
_, _ = h.Write(x)
out := make([]byte, outLen)
_, _ = h.Read(out)
return out
}
// tupleHash256 returns TupleHash256(parts, outLen, S) per SP 800-185 §5.
func tupleHash256(parts [][]byte, outLen int, customization string) []byte {
var x []byte
for _, p := range parts {
x = append(x, encodeString(p)...)
}
x = append(x, rightEncode(uint64(outLen)*8)...)
h := sha3.NewCShake256([]byte("TupleHash"), []byte(customization))
_, _ = h.Write(x)
out := make([]byte, outLen)
_, _ = h.Read(out)
return out
}
// cshake256Stream is the bare cSHAKE256 XOF: customization S is the
// only label; N is empty.
func cshake256Stream(customization string, transcript []byte, outLen int) []byte {
h := sha3.NewCShake256(nil, []byte(customization))
_, _ = h.Write(transcript)
out := make([]byte, outLen)
_, _ = h.Read(out)
return out
}