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zeekay df1db68bd0 docs/comments: correct lattice-family label Ring-LWE -> Module-LWE (Corona is Module-LWE)

Corona is Module-LWE (threshold-Raccoon/Ringtail), NOT Ring-LWE. Confirmed in code: sign/sign.go samples A in R_q^{8x7} (sign.go:87 SamplePolyMatrix M=8,N=7), secret s a rank-7 ring vector, b=A*s+e (sign.go:106-107) over R_q=Z_q[X]/(X^256+1) (LogN=8), q=0x1000000004A01 -- rank>1 module structure, not rank-1 ring-LWE. threshold/threshold.go:4-5 already said Module-LWE.

Fixed the family label across README, SPEC, SUBMISSION, NIST-SUBMISSION, PATENTS, LLM, CONTRIBUTING, SECURITY, CHANGELOG, DEPLOYMENT-RUNBOOK, Makefile, AXIOM-INVENTORY, PROOF-CLAIMS, BLOCKERS, CRYPTOGRAPHER-SIGN-OFF, FIPS-TRACEABILITY, TRUSTED-COMPUTING-BASE, AUDIT-2026-05/06, docs/mptc/*, jasmin/README, 3 Go comments + cli help string.

Also corrected the downstream false claim that Corona (Ring-LWE) and Pulsar (Module-LWE) are 'different lattice families' giving 'structural/family diversity': both are Module-LWE, so the Double-Lattice defense is construction/implementation diversity (threshold-Raccoon vs ML-DSA), not hardness-family diversity; a Module-LWE break affects both legs (hash-based Magnetar is the assumption-diversifier). Fixed companion R-SIS -> Module-SIS where it was the module scheme's SIS assumption; added the Langlois-Stehle (DCC 2015) Module-LWE citation alongside LPR 2010.

Delicate artifacts: proof identifiers (rlwe_sign_op, RLWE_Functional theory/file, *_eq_rlwe bridges, CentralRLWESign, RLWESign, rlwe_compute_*) were NOT renamed -- EasyCrypt/jasmin toolchains are absent here so a rename cannot be compile-verified, and .assurance/ gates parse those names. Added clarifying naming notes to the 5 prominent .ec files, proofs/easycrypt/README.md, AXIOM-INVENTORY.md, and jasmin/rlwe/sign.jazz. .assurance/*.txt left untouched (already say Module-LWE/Module-SIS; rlwe tokens are gate-parsed identifiers). Left AUDIT-2026-06.md:463 historical rename-log and the ProtoStar-LWE paper-title substring untouched.

go build ./... and go test ./... green (GOWORK=off; all packages ok).

2026-06-27 16:12:24 -07:00

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Security policy

Reporting vulnerabilities

Please report cryptographic or implementation vulnerabilities privately to security@lux.network — encrypted with the team key listed at https://lux.network/security/key.asc. Public disclosure happens after a fix lands and downstream consumers have had a 14-day private window.

What is in-scope

Corona is production-hardened reference implementation for Module-LWE threshold signing in Quasar consensus, and a NIST MPTC submission package. The following are in-scope for responsible disclosure:

Specification ambiguity that leads to an exploitable verifier behaviour.
Threshold-protocol soundness gaps (forgery, key-recovery, share extraction, rogue-key, adaptive-corruption breaks).
Constant-time violations in code paths that touch a secret share, a Gaussian sample, or a Lagrange-aggregation intermediate.
KAT mismatches between the Go reference and the C++ port at ~/work/luxcpp/crypto/corona/ (cross-runtime byte-equality is a load-bearing invariant).
Pedersen DKG (dkg2/) hiding-blind leakage or commitment binding failures.
Reshare-protocol (reshare/) failures to preserve (A, bTilde) across committee rotation.
Activation-cert (reshare/activation.go) bypass or accept-on- failure paths.
Information leaks via logging, panics on secret-correlated paths, or variable-time equality.
Cryptanalysis of the underlying Boschini et al. ePrint 2024/1113 construction or of Corona's specific parameter set (N = 256, q = 0x1000000004A01).

What is NOT in-scope

Performance or implementation efficiency complaints (file an issue).
DoS attacks against the reference implementation that don't affect the threshold-correctness invariants.
Issues exclusively in the M-LWE sibling at luxfi/pulsar — file there. Corona and Pulsar are independent libraries with no shared types.
Issues in lens-specific code (lens/) — Corona's threshold path does not depend on lens.
Issues in the legacy dkg/ (Feldman VSS without blinding) — documented as broken for public broadcast; replaced by dkg2/ (Pedersen DKG with hiding blinds). Production deployments use dkg2/.

CVE assignment

Corona maintainers will request CVEs for any in-scope vulnerability prior to public disclosure. CVE numbers will be embedded in the ePrint changelog and the release tag's commit message.

NIST MPTC submission disclosures

Findings discovered after the 2026-Nov-16 MPTC package submission deadline will be added to the submission's "known limitations" appendix and disclosed publicly per NIST's MPTC public-analysis process (no embargo window for findings against actively-submitted MPTC packages).

Coordinated disclosure with Pulsar

Corona and Pulsar are independent submissions but share Lux as a common author and overlap in some operational mitigations (e.g., aggregator-host hardening, mlock pinning). A vulnerability that affects both packages will be disclosed to both security@lux.network mailing lists simultaneously to enable coordinated patching.

Disclosure timeline (default)

T+0: Private report received at security@lux.network.
T+5 days: Acknowledgement + initial triage; CVE requested if in-scope.
T+30 days: Fix landed in main; tagged patch release; private disclosure to downstream consumers (Quasar consensus, etc.).
T+44 days: Public disclosure (advisory + CVE published).

Faster disclosure timelines apply for critical findings (immediate exploitability with no mitigation). Slower timelines apply for research-level findings requiring spec consultation with NIST MPTC reviewers.

3.6 KiB Raw Blame History