mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/corona.git
synced 2026-07-27 02:50:34 +00:00
Closes the CRIT-1 residual (D1-2) sid-entropy gap and the CT/doc hygiene
gaps to bring Corona to the no-leak/no-gap bar. EasyCrypt proofs untouched.
PRIORITY 1 — anti-nonce-reuse / no-leak durability:
- The Round-1 nonce-PRF key no longer keys on a bare 64-bit sid. It now
derives from a 256-bit domain-separated SessionID (primitives.DeriveSessionID:
TranscriptHash("corona.sign.session-id.v1" || be64(sid) || T)) AND a fresh
per-signature 256-bit hedge salt drawn inside the kernel from party.Rand
(default crypto/rand). PRNGKeyForRound = PRF(skShare, "CoronaNonceV3" ||
sessionID || salt). Hedging restores threshold-Raccoon's fresh-per-signature
nonce posture: reuse durability no longer rests on the external consensus
layer never reissuing an sid — even an sid collision yields distinct R with
prob 2^-256. A deterministic 256-bit SessionID alone is necessary but NOT
sufficient (it repeats when sid repeats); the salt is what closes the leak.
- SignRound1 is fail-closed: rejects an all-zero derived SessionID or all-zero
salt with ErrDegenerateSession, and surfaces a short-read error. The
consensus slot-uniqueness invariant is documented as a HARD precondition at
SignRound1 and Signer.Round1 (no longer a buried comment).
- KAT/oracle determinism preserved via one seam: sign.DeterministicNonceSource
(KeyedPRNG over seed || "corona.sign.nonce-salt.v1" || partyIndex), set on
Party.Rand / Signer.SetNonceRand only by reproducibility harnesses.
- SignRound1 / Signer.Round1 now return an error; all call sites updated.
- KAT REGEN: only sign_verify_e2e.json changes (nonce-key bytes moved);
transcript_hash.json / MAC / legacy PRNGKey vectors are byte-stable, proving
the consensus-agreed transcript path was left untouched. Regenerated via
`bash scripts/regen-kats.sh`; `--verify` confirms byte-determinism (10 files).
- Regression: sign/nonce_reuse_test.go proves same-(skShare,sid) yields distinct
D (fresh R), pinned-nonce reproduces byte-identically, and the degenerate-
session guard fires. TestE2EKATReplayDeterminism rewritten to assert both the
hedged-differs and pinned-reproduces properties (was a defanged no-op).
PRIORITY 2 — constant-time hygiene:
- reshare/commit.go already used a constant-time comparator; the real gap was
the verbatim duplication of constTimePolyEqual+uint64SliceToBytes across dkg2
and reshare. Consolidated to one canonical utils.ConstantTimePolyEqual; both
delegate (no dkg2<->reshare dependency). Orphaned imports removed.
- FullRankCheck and the reshare commit path are now covered in the CT review
with their public-operand justification.
PRIORITY 3 — doc accuracy:
- CONSTANT-TIME-REVIEW.md rewritten Corona-specific and file:line-accurate:
drops the stale Pulsar/lens/warp/secp256k1 content; audits the real call
sites (hedged nonce key, masking PRF, lattigo samplers as the residual TCB
axiom, utils.ConstantTimePolyEqual, CheckL2Norm/Verify/FullRankCheck big.Int
variable-time on PUBLIC operands, activation/commit-digest array equality,
keyera/reshare zeroization).
- PROOF-CLAIMS.md §1: threshold.Combine / sign.LocalSign (nonexistent) -> the
real sign.Party.SignFinalize exposed as threshold.Signer.Finalize.
- threshold/threshold.go package doc: Ring-LWE -> Module-LWE.
116 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
116 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
|
|
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
|
|
|
|
package threshold
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"encoding/gob"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// FuzzVerifyParseSignature exercises Corona threshold.Verify on
|
|
// attacker-supplied (gob-encoded) signature bytes. Verify holds no
|
|
// long-term secret state, so this is the input-handling fuzz target:
|
|
// any panic / data-race / out-of-bounds in the parser is a finding.
|
|
//
|
|
// The corpus seeds are derived from a fresh honest signature. Mutated
|
|
// bytes are very unlikely to verify; the test only asserts NO PANIC,
|
|
// not Verify(...) = true.
|
|
func FuzzVerifyParseSignature(f *testing.F) {
|
|
// Seed corpus: one fresh valid signature.
|
|
shares, gk, err := GenerateKeys(2, 3, rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
f.Fatalf("GenerateKeys: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
signers := make([]*Signer, 3)
|
|
for i, share := range shares {
|
|
signers[i] = NewSigner(share)
|
|
}
|
|
signerIDs := []int{0, 1, 2}
|
|
const sid = 1
|
|
prfKey := make([]byte, 32)
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(prfKey); err != nil {
|
|
f.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
message := "fuzz verify seed message"
|
|
r1 := make(map[int]*Round1Data)
|
|
for _, s := range signers {
|
|
d, err := s.Round1(sid, prfKey, signerIDs)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
f.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
r1[d.PartyID] = d
|
|
}
|
|
r2 := make(map[int]*Round2Data)
|
|
for _, s := range signers {
|
|
d, err := s.Round2(sid, message, prfKey, signerIDs, r1)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
f.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
r2[d.PartyID] = d
|
|
}
|
|
sig, err := signers[0].Finalize(r2)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
f.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
if err := gob.NewEncoder(&buf).Encode(sig); err != nil {
|
|
f.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
f.Add(buf.Bytes())
|
|
// Also seed a known-invalid empty input.
|
|
f.Add([]byte{})
|
|
|
|
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, data []byte) {
|
|
// Decode; any panic in the parser is a finding.
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Verify parse panic on %d bytes: %v", len(data), r)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
var sig Signature
|
|
if err := gob.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data)).Decode(&sig); err != nil {
|
|
// Decode failure is fine -- the parser rejected malformed
|
|
// input.
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// Verify on the decoded signature must not panic regardless of
|
|
// whether it accepts or rejects.
|
|
_ = Verify(gk, message, &sig)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// FuzzVerifyRandomBytes is the simpler raw-bytes input fuzz: random
|
|
// bytes treated directly as a Corona signature wire encoding.
|
|
//
|
|
// Together with FuzzVerifyParseSignature, this exercises BOTH the
|
|
// structural (gob) and the byte-level interpretation paths.
|
|
func FuzzVerifyRandomBytes(f *testing.F) {
|
|
_, gk, err := GenerateKeys(2, 3, rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
f.Fatalf("GenerateKeys: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f.Add([]byte{0, 0, 0, 0})
|
|
f.Add([]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff})
|
|
f.Add(make([]byte, 32))
|
|
f.Add(make([]byte, 256))
|
|
|
|
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, data []byte) {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("decode panic on %d bytes: %v", len(data), r)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
var sig Signature
|
|
_ = gob.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data)).Decode(&sig)
|
|
// We do NOT verify here -- random bytes may decode partially
|
|
// and the verify pipeline expects more structure than the gob
|
|
// parser enforces. The property under test is that the parser
|
|
// does not panic.
|
|
_ = gk
|
|
})
|
|
}
|