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Closes the CRIT-1 residual (D1-2) sid-entropy gap and the CT/doc hygiene
gaps to bring Corona to the no-leak/no-gap bar. EasyCrypt proofs untouched.
PRIORITY 1 — anti-nonce-reuse / no-leak durability:
- The Round-1 nonce-PRF key no longer keys on a bare 64-bit sid. It now
derives from a 256-bit domain-separated SessionID (primitives.DeriveSessionID:
TranscriptHash("corona.sign.session-id.v1" || be64(sid) || T)) AND a fresh
per-signature 256-bit hedge salt drawn inside the kernel from party.Rand
(default crypto/rand). PRNGKeyForRound = PRF(skShare, "CoronaNonceV3" ||
sessionID || salt). Hedging restores threshold-Raccoon's fresh-per-signature
nonce posture: reuse durability no longer rests on the external consensus
layer never reissuing an sid — even an sid collision yields distinct R with
prob 2^-256. A deterministic 256-bit SessionID alone is necessary but NOT
sufficient (it repeats when sid repeats); the salt is what closes the leak.
- SignRound1 is fail-closed: rejects an all-zero derived SessionID or all-zero
salt with ErrDegenerateSession, and surfaces a short-read error. The
consensus slot-uniqueness invariant is documented as a HARD precondition at
SignRound1 and Signer.Round1 (no longer a buried comment).
- KAT/oracle determinism preserved via one seam: sign.DeterministicNonceSource
(KeyedPRNG over seed || "corona.sign.nonce-salt.v1" || partyIndex), set on
Party.Rand / Signer.SetNonceRand only by reproducibility harnesses.
- SignRound1 / Signer.Round1 now return an error; all call sites updated.
- KAT REGEN: only sign_verify_e2e.json changes (nonce-key bytes moved);
transcript_hash.json / MAC / legacy PRNGKey vectors are byte-stable, proving
the consensus-agreed transcript path was left untouched. Regenerated via
`bash scripts/regen-kats.sh`; `--verify` confirms byte-determinism (10 files).
- Regression: sign/nonce_reuse_test.go proves same-(skShare,sid) yields distinct
D (fresh R), pinned-nonce reproduces byte-identically, and the degenerate-
session guard fires. TestE2EKATReplayDeterminism rewritten to assert both the
hedged-differs and pinned-reproduces properties (was a defanged no-op).
PRIORITY 2 — constant-time hygiene:
- reshare/commit.go already used a constant-time comparator; the real gap was
the verbatim duplication of constTimePolyEqual+uint64SliceToBytes across dkg2
and reshare. Consolidated to one canonical utils.ConstantTimePolyEqual; both
delegate (no dkg2<->reshare dependency). Orphaned imports removed.
- FullRankCheck and the reshare commit path are now covered in the CT review
with their public-operand justification.
PRIORITY 3 — doc accuracy:
- CONSTANT-TIME-REVIEW.md rewritten Corona-specific and file:line-accurate:
drops the stale Pulsar/lens/warp/secp256k1 content; audits the real call
sites (hedged nonce key, masking PRF, lattigo samplers as the residual TCB
axiom, utils.ConstantTimePolyEqual, CheckL2Norm/Verify/FullRankCheck big.Int
variable-time on PUBLIC operands, activation/commit-digest array equality,
keyera/reshare zeroization).
- PROOF-CLAIMS.md §1: threshold.Combine / sign.LocalSign (nonexistent) -> the
real sign.Party.SignFinalize exposed as threshold.Signer.Finalize.
- threshold/threshold.go package doc: Ring-LWE -> Module-LWE.
322 lines
8.7 KiB
Go
322 lines
8.7 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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// Package corona provides post-quantum threshold signatures using Module-LWE
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// (threshold-Raccoon; module dimensions M=8, N=7 over Z_q[X]/(X^256+1)).
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//
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// Signing is a 2-round protocol:
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// - Round 1: Each party broadcasts D matrix + MACs
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// - Round 2: Each party broadcasts z share
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// - Finalize: Any party aggregates into final signature
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//
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// Fresh keygen runs each epoch when validator set changes.
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package threshold
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"github.com/luxfi/corona/gpu"
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"github.com/luxfi/corona/primitives"
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"github.com/luxfi/corona/sign"
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"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/ring"
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"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/utils/sampling"
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"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/utils/structs"
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)
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var (
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ErrInvalidThreshold = errors.New("threshold must be > 0 and < total parties")
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ErrInvalidPartyCount = errors.New("need at least 2 parties")
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ErrInvalidPartyIndex = errors.New("party index out of range")
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ErrMACVerifyFailed = errors.New("MAC verification failed")
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ErrFullRankFailed = errors.New("full rank check failed")
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ErrInsufficientData = errors.New("insufficient round data")
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)
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// Params holds ring parameters for the protocol.
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type Params struct {
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R *ring.Ring // Main ring with prime Q
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RXi *ring.Ring // Rounding ring with QXi
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RNu *ring.Ring // Rounding ring with QNu
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}
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// NewParams creates ring parameters.
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//
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// If corona/gpu has been opted into via UseAccelerator(), each created
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// ring is registered with the lattice/gpu per-SubRing dispatcher so
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// subsequent r.NTT / r.INTT calls inside the 2-round signing protocol
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// transparently route through the GPU. Output bytes are unchanged.
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func NewParams() (*Params, error) {
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r, err := ring.NewRing(1<<sign.LogN, []uint64{sign.Q})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// QXi and QNu are powers of 2 for rounding, ignore ring errors
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rXi, _ := ring.NewRing(1<<sign.LogN, []uint64{sign.QXi})
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rNu, _ := ring.NewRing(1<<sign.LogN, []uint64{sign.QNu})
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// Best-effort GPU registration for the main Q ring. RXi / RNu are
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// power-of-two moduli so the NTT path is not taken on them.
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gpu.MaybeRegister(r)
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return &Params{R: r, RXi: rXi, RNu: rNu}, nil
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}
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// GroupKey holds the public parameters for the threshold group.
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type GroupKey struct {
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A structs.Matrix[ring.Poly] // Public matrix
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BTilde structs.Vector[ring.Poly] // Rounded public key
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Params *Params
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}
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// Bytes returns a serialized representation of the group key.
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// Note: This is a simplified serialization for compatibility.
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func (gk *GroupKey) Bytes() []byte {
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if gk == nil || gk.BTilde == nil {
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return nil
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}
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// Return size info as a simple representation
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return []byte{byte(len(gk.A)), byte(len(gk.BTilde))}
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}
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// KeyShare holds a party's secret share data.
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type KeyShare struct {
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Index int
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SkShare structs.Vector[ring.Poly]
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Seeds map[int][][]byte
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MACKeys map[int][]byte
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Lambda ring.Poly // Lagrange coefficient
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GroupKey *GroupKey
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}
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// Round1Data holds a party's Round 1 output.
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type Round1Data struct {
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PartyID int
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D structs.Matrix[ring.Poly]
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MACs map[int][]byte
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}
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// Round2Data holds a party's Round 2 output.
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type Round2Data struct {
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PartyID int
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Z structs.Vector[ring.Poly]
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}
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// Signature holds the final threshold signature.
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type Signature struct {
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C ring.Poly
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Z structs.Vector[ring.Poly]
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Delta structs.Vector[ring.Poly]
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}
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// GenerateKeys generates threshold key shares for n parties with threshold t.
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// This runs once per epoch when the validator set changes.
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func GenerateKeys(t, n int, randSource io.Reader) ([]*KeyShare, *GroupKey, error) {
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if n < 2 {
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return nil, nil, ErrInvalidPartyCount
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}
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if t < 1 || t >= n {
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return nil, nil, ErrInvalidThreshold
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}
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// Set global params (required by sign package)
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sign.K = n
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sign.Threshold = t
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params, err := NewParams()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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// Generate trusted dealer key
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trustedDealerKey := make([]byte, sign.KeySize)
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if randSource == nil {
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randSource = rand.Reader
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}
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(randSource, trustedDealerKey); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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prng, err := sampling.NewKeyedPRNG(trustedDealerKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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uniformSampler := ring.NewUniformSampler(prng, params.R)
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// Compute Lagrange coefficients for all parties
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T := make([]int, n)
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for i := range T {
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T[i] = i
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}
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lagrangeCoeffs := primitives.ComputeLagrangeCoefficients(params.R, T, big.NewInt(int64(sign.Q)))
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// Generate shares
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A, skShares, seeds, macKeys, bTilde := sign.Gen(params.R, params.RXi, uniformSampler, trustedDealerKey, lagrangeCoeffs)
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groupKey := &GroupKey{
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A: A,
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BTilde: bTilde,
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Params: params,
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}
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shares := make([]*KeyShare, n)
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for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
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// Convert Lagrange coefficient to NTT form
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lambda := params.R.NewPoly()
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lambda.Copy(lagrangeCoeffs[i])
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params.R.NTT(lambda, lambda)
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params.R.MForm(lambda, lambda)
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shares[i] = &KeyShare{
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Index: i,
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SkShare: skShares[i],
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Seeds: seeds,
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MACKeys: macKeys[i],
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Lambda: lambda,
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GroupKey: groupKey,
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}
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}
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return shares, groupKey, nil
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}
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// Signer handles threshold signing for a single party.
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type Signer struct {
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share *KeyShare
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party *sign.Party
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params *Params
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}
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// NewSigner creates a signer from a key share.
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func NewSigner(share *KeyShare) *Signer {
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params := share.GroupKey.Params
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prng, _ := sampling.NewKeyedPRNG(make([]byte, sign.KeySize))
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uniformSampler := ring.NewUniformSampler(prng, params.R)
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party := sign.NewParty(share.Index, params.R, params.RXi, params.RNu, uniformSampler)
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party.SkShare = share.SkShare
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party.Seed = share.Seeds
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party.MACKeys = share.MACKeys
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party.Lambda = share.Lambda
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return &Signer{
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share: share,
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party: party,
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params: params,
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}
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}
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// SetNonceRand overrides the source of the fresh per-signature nonce
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// hedge salt for this signer. Production signers never call this — they
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// inherit crypto/rand.Reader from sign.NewParty. It exists solely so
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// KAT/oracle and CPU-vs-GPU byte-equality harnesses can pin signing to a
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// deterministic reader and obtain reproducible signature bytes. This is
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// the threshold-layer accessor for the single sign.Party.Rand seam.
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func (s *Signer) SetNonceRand(r io.Reader) {
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s.party.Rand = r
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}
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// Round1 performs signing round 1. Returns D matrix and MACs to broadcast.
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//
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// PRECONDITION: sessionID MUST be unique for this signer's share across
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// that share's lifetime (consensus slot-uniqueness; see
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// sign.Party.SignRound1). Returns ErrDegenerateSession (via the kernel)
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// if the session is degenerate; on error the caller MUST abort signing.
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func (s *Signer) Round1(sessionID int, prfKey []byte, signers []int) (*Round1Data, error) {
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D, MACs, err := s.party.SignRound1(s.share.GroupKey.A, sessionID, prfKey, signers)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &Round1Data{
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PartyID: s.share.Index,
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D: D,
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MACs: MACs,
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}, nil
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}
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// Round2 performs signing round 2. Returns z share to broadcast.
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// round1Data is the collected Round 1 data from all signers.
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func (s *Signer) Round2(sessionID int, message string, prfKey []byte, signers []int, round1Data map[int]*Round1Data) (*Round2Data, error) {
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if len(round1Data) < len(signers) {
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return nil, ErrInsufficientData
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}
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// Collect D matrices and MACs
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D := make(map[int]structs.Matrix[ring.Poly])
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MACs := make(map[int]map[int][]byte)
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for _, data := range round1Data {
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D[data.PartyID] = data.D
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MACs[data.PartyID] = data.MACs
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}
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// Preprocess: verify MACs and compute aggregated D
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valid, DSum, hash := s.party.SignRound2Preprocess(
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s.share.GroupKey.A,
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s.share.GroupKey.BTilde,
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D,
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MACs,
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sessionID,
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signers,
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)
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if !valid {
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return nil, ErrMACVerifyFailed
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}
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// Compute z share
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z := s.party.SignRound2(
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s.share.GroupKey.A,
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s.share.GroupKey.BTilde,
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DSum,
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sessionID,
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message,
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signers,
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prfKey,
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hash,
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)
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return &Round2Data{
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PartyID: s.share.Index,
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Z: z,
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}, nil
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}
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// Finalize aggregates z shares into the final signature.
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// Any party can call this with the collected Round 2 data.
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func (s *Signer) Finalize(round2Data map[int]*Round2Data) (*Signature, error) {
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if len(round2Data) == 0 {
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return nil, ErrInsufficientData
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}
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// Collect z vectors
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z := make(map[int]structs.Vector[ring.Poly])
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for _, data := range round2Data {
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z[data.PartyID] = data.Z
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}
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c, zSum, delta := s.party.SignFinalize(z, s.share.GroupKey.A, s.share.GroupKey.BTilde)
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return &Signature{
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C: c,
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Z: zSum,
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Delta: delta,
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}, nil
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}
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// Verify checks if a signature is valid for the given message.
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func Verify(groupKey *GroupKey, message string, sig *Signature) bool {
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if groupKey == nil || sig == nil {
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return false
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}
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return sign.Verify(
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groupKey.Params.R,
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groupKey.Params.RXi,
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groupKey.Params.RNu,
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sig.Z,
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groupKey.A,
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message,
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groupKey.BTilde,
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sig.C,
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sig.Delta,
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)
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}
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