Files
corona/threshold/threshold.go
T
zeekay f08e2b57aa threshold: make trusted-dealer keygen explicit, drop dead ReconstructSecret, pin sub-quorum soundness
Part of the Lux threshold-crypto security rip (killing trusted-dealer /
full-key-reconstruction footguns).

- Rename threshold.GenerateKeys -> threshold.GenerateKeysTrustedDealer.
  The function samples the full secret and sets sign.K / sign.Threshold in
  one process: it IS the trusted dealer. The new name mirrors
  keyera.BootstrapTrustedDealer so the trust model is explicit and
  greppable. Doc comment now states it is for test/KAT/CT/CLI/oracle use
  only, and that production chain keygen uses keyera.Bootstrap (dealerless
  Pedersen DKG). Stays exported; every caller updated (cli, ct/dudect,
  same-package tests) plus stale comment refs in cmd, keyera, wire,
  reshare.

- Delete utils.ReconstructSecret. It Lagrange-interpolates the full secret
  from shares and had zero callers anywhere in the repo: a
  reconstruction-shaped footgun left dead. CompareSecrets and the section
  retained.

- Include threshold/minority_soundness_test.go: an adversarial negative
  pinning that a strict sub-quorum cannot assemble a signature that
  verifies under the group key (uncancelled PRF mask fails the L2-norm
  gate). A sub-quorum forgery would be a catastrophic finality break.
2026-06-26 21:13:45 -07:00

345 lines
10 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// Package corona provides post-quantum threshold signatures using Module-LWE
// (threshold-Raccoon; module dimensions M=8, N=7 over Z_q[X]/(X^256+1)).
//
// Signing is a 2-round protocol:
// - Round 1: Each party broadcasts D matrix + MACs
// - Round 2: Each party broadcasts z share
// - Finalize: Any party aggregates into final signature
//
// Fresh keygen runs each epoch when validator set changes.
package threshold
import (
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"io"
"math/big"
"github.com/luxfi/corona/gpu"
"github.com/luxfi/corona/primitives"
"github.com/luxfi/corona/sign"
"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/ring"
"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/utils/sampling"
"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/utils/structs"
)
var (
ErrInvalidThreshold = errors.New("threshold must be > 0 and < total parties")
ErrInvalidPartyCount = errors.New("need at least 2 parties")
ErrInvalidPartyIndex = errors.New("party index out of range")
ErrMACVerifyFailed = errors.New("MAC verification failed")
ErrFullRankFailed = errors.New("full rank check failed")
ErrInsufficientData = errors.New("insufficient round data")
ErrDuplicateSigner = errors.New("duplicate PartyID in round data")
)
// Params holds ring parameters for the protocol.
type Params struct {
R *ring.Ring // Main ring with prime Q
RXi *ring.Ring // Rounding ring with QXi
RNu *ring.Ring // Rounding ring with QNu
}
// NewParams creates ring parameters.
//
// If corona/gpu has been opted into via UseAccelerator(), each created
// ring is registered with the lattice/gpu per-SubRing dispatcher so
// subsequent r.NTT / r.INTT calls inside the 2-round signing protocol
// transparently route through the GPU. Output bytes are unchanged.
func NewParams() (*Params, error) {
r, err := ring.NewRing(1<<sign.LogN, []uint64{sign.Q})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// QXi and QNu are powers of 2 for rounding, ignore ring errors
rXi, _ := ring.NewRing(1<<sign.LogN, []uint64{sign.QXi})
rNu, _ := ring.NewRing(1<<sign.LogN, []uint64{sign.QNu})
// Best-effort GPU registration for the main Q ring. RXi / RNu are
// power-of-two moduli so the NTT path is not taken on them.
gpu.MaybeRegister(r)
return &Params{R: r, RXi: rXi, RNu: rNu}, nil
}
// GroupKey holds the public parameters for the threshold group.
type GroupKey struct {
A structs.Matrix[ring.Poly] // Public matrix
BTilde structs.Vector[ring.Poly] // Rounded public key
Params *Params
}
// Bytes returns a serialized representation of the group key.
// Note: This is a simplified serialization for compatibility.
func (gk *GroupKey) Bytes() []byte {
if gk == nil || gk.BTilde == nil {
return nil
}
// Return size info as a simple representation
return []byte{byte(len(gk.A)), byte(len(gk.BTilde))}
}
// KeyShare holds a party's secret share data.
type KeyShare struct {
Index int
SkShare structs.Vector[ring.Poly]
Seeds map[int][][]byte
MACKeys map[int][]byte
Lambda ring.Poly // Lagrange coefficient
GroupKey *GroupKey
}
// Round1Data holds a party's Round 1 output.
type Round1Data struct {
PartyID int
D structs.Matrix[ring.Poly]
MACs map[int][]byte
}
// Round2Data holds a party's Round 2 output.
type Round2Data struct {
PartyID int
Z structs.Vector[ring.Poly]
}
// Signature holds the final threshold signature.
type Signature struct {
C ring.Poly
Z structs.Vector[ring.Poly]
Delta structs.Vector[ring.Poly]
}
// GenerateKeysTrustedDealer is the trusted-dealer, in-process threshold keygen.
// It sets the global sign.K / sign.Threshold and samples the full secret in a
// single process, then derives the n KeyShares for threshold t. Because one
// party materializes the whole secret, this is a FOOTGUN for production: use it
// ONLY for tests / KAT / constant-time harnesses / CLI / the reference oracle.
//
// Production chain keygen MUST use keyera.Bootstrap (the dealerless Pedersen
// DKG), where no single party ever holds the secret. The TrustedDealer suffix
// mirrors keyera.BootstrapTrustedDealer to keep the trust model explicit and
// greppable.
func GenerateKeysTrustedDealer(t, n int, randSource io.Reader) ([]*KeyShare, *GroupKey, error) {
if n < 2 {
return nil, nil, ErrInvalidPartyCount
}
if t < 1 || t >= n {
return nil, nil, ErrInvalidThreshold
}
// Set global params (required by sign package)
sign.K = n
sign.Threshold = t
params, err := NewParams()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
// Generate trusted dealer key
trustedDealerKey := make([]byte, sign.KeySize)
if randSource == nil {
randSource = rand.Reader
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(randSource, trustedDealerKey); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
prng, err := sampling.NewKeyedPRNG(trustedDealerKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
uniformSampler := ring.NewUniformSampler(prng, params.R)
// Compute Lagrange coefficients for all parties
T := make([]int, n)
for i := range T {
T[i] = i
}
lagrangeCoeffs := primitives.ComputeLagrangeCoefficients(params.R, T, big.NewInt(int64(sign.Q)))
// Generate shares
A, skShares, seeds, macKeys, bTilde := sign.Gen(params.R, params.RXi, uniformSampler, trustedDealerKey, lagrangeCoeffs)
groupKey := &GroupKey{
A: A,
BTilde: bTilde,
Params: params,
}
shares := make([]*KeyShare, n)
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
// Convert Lagrange coefficient to NTT form
lambda := params.R.NewPoly()
lambda.Copy(lagrangeCoeffs[i])
params.R.NTT(lambda, lambda)
params.R.MForm(lambda, lambda)
shares[i] = &KeyShare{
Index: i,
SkShare: skShares[i],
Seeds: seeds,
MACKeys: macKeys[i],
Lambda: lambda,
GroupKey: groupKey,
}
}
return shares, groupKey, nil
}
// Signer handles threshold signing for a single party.
type Signer struct {
share *KeyShare
party *sign.Party
params *Params
}
// NewSigner creates a signer from a key share.
func NewSigner(share *KeyShare) *Signer {
params := share.GroupKey.Params
prng, _ := sampling.NewKeyedPRNG(make([]byte, sign.KeySize))
uniformSampler := ring.NewUniformSampler(prng, params.R)
party := sign.NewParty(share.Index, params.R, params.RXi, params.RNu, uniformSampler)
party.SkShare = share.SkShare
party.Seed = share.Seeds
party.MACKeys = share.MACKeys
party.Lambda = share.Lambda
return &Signer{
share: share,
party: party,
params: params,
}
}
// SetNonceRand overrides the source of the fresh per-signature nonce
// hedge salt for this signer. Production signers never call this — they
// inherit crypto/rand.Reader from sign.NewParty. It exists solely so
// KAT/oracle and CPU-vs-GPU byte-equality harnesses can pin signing to a
// deterministic reader and obtain reproducible signature bytes. This is
// the threshold-layer accessor for the single sign.Party.Rand seam.
func (s *Signer) SetNonceRand(r io.Reader) {
s.party.Rand = r
}
// Round1 performs signing round 1. Returns D matrix and MACs to broadcast.
//
// PRECONDITION: sessionID MUST be unique for this signer's share across
// that share's lifetime (consensus slot-uniqueness; see
// sign.Party.SignRound1). Returns ErrDegenerateSession (via the kernel)
// if the session is degenerate; on error the caller MUST abort signing.
func (s *Signer) Round1(sessionID int, prfKey []byte, signers []int) (*Round1Data, error) {
D, MACs, err := s.party.SignRound1(s.share.GroupKey.A, sessionID, prfKey, signers)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Round1Data{
PartyID: s.share.Index,
D: D,
MACs: MACs,
}, nil
}
// Round2 performs signing round 2. Returns z share to broadcast.
// round1Data is the collected Round 1 data from all signers.
func (s *Signer) Round2(sessionID int, message string, prfKey []byte, signers []int, round1Data map[int]*Round1Data) (*Round2Data, error) {
if len(round1Data) < len(signers) {
return nil, ErrInsufficientData
}
// Collect D matrices and MACs. Reject a duplicate PartyID before the
// map-collect: two inputs carrying the same PartyID would silently
// overwrite, corrupting the aggregate. The LP-020 quorum invariant is
// meant to guarantee uniqueness upstream; this is kernel-boundary
// defense-in-depth.
D := make(map[int]structs.Matrix[ring.Poly])
MACs := make(map[int]map[int][]byte)
for _, data := range round1Data {
if _, dup := D[data.PartyID]; dup {
return nil, ErrDuplicateSigner
}
D[data.PartyID] = data.D
MACs[data.PartyID] = data.MACs
}
// Preprocess: verify MACs and compute aggregated D
valid, DSum, hash := s.party.SignRound2Preprocess(
s.share.GroupKey.A,
s.share.GroupKey.BTilde,
D,
MACs,
sessionID,
signers,
)
if !valid {
return nil, ErrMACVerifyFailed
}
// Compute z share
z := s.party.SignRound2(
s.share.GroupKey.A,
s.share.GroupKey.BTilde,
DSum,
sessionID,
message,
signers,
prfKey,
hash,
)
return &Round2Data{
PartyID: s.share.Index,
Z: z,
}, nil
}
// Finalize aggregates z shares into the final signature.
// Any party can call this with the collected Round 2 data.
func (s *Signer) Finalize(round2Data map[int]*Round2Data) (*Signature, error) {
if len(round2Data) == 0 {
return nil, ErrInsufficientData
}
// Collect z vectors. Reject a duplicate PartyID before the map-collect:
// a repeated PartyID would silently overwrite its z share, double-
// counting one signer in the aggregate. The LP-020 quorum invariant is
// meant to guarantee uniqueness upstream; this is kernel-boundary
// defense-in-depth.
z := make(map[int]structs.Vector[ring.Poly])
for _, data := range round2Data {
if _, dup := z[data.PartyID]; dup {
return nil, ErrDuplicateSigner
}
z[data.PartyID] = data.Z
}
c, zSum, delta := s.party.SignFinalize(z, s.share.GroupKey.A, s.share.GroupKey.BTilde)
return &Signature{
C: c,
Z: zSum,
Delta: delta,
}, nil
}
// Verify checks if a signature is valid for the given message.
func Verify(groupKey *GroupKey, message string, sig *Signature) bool {
if groupKey == nil || sig == nil {
return false
}
return sign.Verify(
groupKey.Params.R,
groupKey.Params.RXi,
groupKey.Params.RNu,
sig.Z,
groupKey.A,
message,
groupKey.BTilde,
sig.C,
sig.Delta,
)
}