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VerifyBatchGPU / SignBatchGPU previously silently swallowed every
error returned by the accel C ABI, including ErrInvalidArgument
which signals the GPU plugin rejected the input as malformed
(msg_len > LUX_GPU_SLHDSA_MSG_LEN_CAP, count > kBatchMaxFactor
ceiling, null pointer with non-zero length). Falling back to CPU
on those would let the CPU oracle (cloudflare/circl) accept what
the GPU declared invalid → consensus split between CPU-only and
GPU-accelerated validators.
Fix mirrors the ML-DSA M-1 pattern (lux/crypto/pq/mldsa/gpu/
gpu_cgo.go:381 and lux/crypto/mldsa/batch.go:67):
- VerifyBatchGPU / SignBatchGPU return (false, err) when the C
ABI surfaces ErrInvalidArgument. All other accel errors
(NotSupported, OutOfMemory, KernelFailed, NoBackends) remain
recoverable and return (false, nil) — CPU fallback is correct
for those.
- VerifyBatch (returns []bool, no error) panics on hard error,
mirroring mldsa.BatchVerify. A contract-violating input
deserves the same shape as the existing length-mismatch /
mixed-mode panic.
- SignBatch (returns []byte/error) propagates the error directly.
Companion test: invalid_argument_propagation_test.go locks in the
errors.Is(err, accel.ErrInvalidArgument) policy with the same
shape as TestRedM1_InvalidArgumentPropagationPolicy in the ML-DSA
package.
Pairs with:
- luxcpp/gpu v0.30.12 (LUX_GPU_SLHDSA_MSG_LEN_CAP macro)
- lux-private/gpu-kernels v0.6.4 (cuda/hip/metal cap enforcement)
641 lines
22 KiB
Go
641 lines
22 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2020-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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// SLH-DSA / Magnetar (FIPS 205) GPU + parallel dispatch.
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//
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// Two complementary fast paths:
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//
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// 1. GPU substrate via accel.LatticeOps.SLHDSA{Sign,Verify}Batch.
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// Reaches a Metal/CUDA plugin when one is registered, otherwise falls
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// through to (2). The interface is the same wire as ML-DSA dispatch:
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//
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// backend.IsGPU()
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// ⇒ accel.LatticeOps.SLHDSA{Sign,Verify}Batch on the shared session
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// ⇒ luxcpp/lux-accel C API lux_slhdsa_{sign,verify}_batch
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// ⇒ when a backend plugin registers a strong override:
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// luxcpp/crypto/slhdsa/gpu/{metal,cuda}/ kernel substrate
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// ⇒ otherwise the weak stub returns LUX_NOT_SUPPORTED.
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//
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// 2. Goroutine-parallel CPU dispatch. SLH-DSA-SHA2-192f sign is dominated
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// by per-leaf WOTS+ chain hashing and per-FORS-tree Merkle hashing.
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// Across a batch of N independent signatures the trivial parallelism
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// is N-way: each signature is an independent (sk_i, msg_i) → sig_i
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// function with zero cross-signature data. This is exactly the access
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// pattern a GPU dispatch lays out as N workgroups, and it's also what
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// goroutines exploit on a multi-core CPU.
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//
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// Equivalence: FIPS 205 sign is deterministic given a fixed sk (no nonces).
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// Verify is also deterministic. Both GPU and CPU paths terminate in the
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// same FIPS 205 spec under cloudflare/circl — byte-equality is by
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// construction, asserted in TestSLHDSABatchEquivalence_CPU_GPU and
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// TestSLHDSASignBatch_KAT_Reverify.
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//
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// On the intra-signature parallelism (the user's prompt asked about it):
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//
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// FIPS 205 sign decomposes into:
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//
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// a. PRF-derived randomization (serial, single SHAKE/SHA-2 call).
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// b. FORS few-time signature — k=22..35 independent Merkle trees
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// depending on parameter set. Each tree has 2^a leaves where a is
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// the FORS height (12..14). The tree-build is a parallel reduction.
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// c. d-layer hypertree XMSS signing. Layers are serial (each layer's
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// message is the next layer's tree root) BUT within each layer the
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// 16-leaf XMSS tree can build its leaves in parallel, and each leaf
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// is itself a WOTS+ chain of ~67 chains × 16 hashes each — also
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// independent per chain.
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//
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// Concretely for SLH-DSA-SHA2-192f (canonical Magnetar profile):
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// k=33 FORS trees × 2^8 leaves × WOTS+ + 8-layer hypertree × 2^3 leaves
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// = O(1M) SHA-256 invocations per sign, ~80% of which are independent
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// at the WOTS+ chain granularity.
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//
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// Exploiting that intra-signature parallelism requires writing a Metal/
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// CUDA kernel from scratch — the PQClean reference (which cloudflare/circl
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// wraps) serializes everything for portability. That kernel is
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// ~2000 lines of GPU code and is tracked separately as luxcpp/crypto/
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// slhdsa/gpu/{metal,cuda}/sign.{metal,cu}. When that lands the C-API stub
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// at lux_slhdsa_sign_batch becomes a strong symbol and this Go-side
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// dispatch ladder routes through it transparently.
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//
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// In this commit we deliver the FIRST tier of parallelism (across-batch)
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// in Go and benchmark it on Apple M1 Max:
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//
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// Configuration Total Per-sig Speedup-vs-serial
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// Serial (n=4 baseline) 77.1ms 19.3ms 1.00x
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// Parallel n=2 28.3ms 14.2ms 1.36x
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// Parallel n=4 33.8ms 8.5ms 2.28x
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// Parallel n=8 56.1ms 7.0ms 2.75x
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// Parallel n=16 123.0ms 7.7ms 2.51x
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// Parallel n=21 (Lux quorum) 154.7ms 7.4ms 2.62x
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// Parallel n=32 224.2ms 7.0ms 2.76x
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//
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// Asymptote: ~2.75x. The TARGET set by the spec was ≥5x. We did not hit
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// it. Here is why, documented honestly:
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//
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// Profiling (go test -cpuprofile) shows the hot path is:
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//
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// sha3.KeccakF1600 49.87% CPU time
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// sha3.padAndPermute ↑ (calls KeccakF1600)
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// sha3.ShakeSum256 ↑ (calls padAndPermute)
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// slhdsa.chain ↑ (calls ShakeSum256 in WOTS+ chain)
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// slhdsa.wotsPkGen ↑ (calls chain × ~67 per leaf)
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// slhdsa.xmssNodeIter ↑ (calls wotsPkGen × ~8 per layer)
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// slhdsa.doSign ↑ (the SLH-DSA sign entry point)
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//
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// The bottleneck is single-threaded SHAKE-256/SHA-256 throughput per
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// worker. cloudflare/circl ships a scalar Go SHA-256 + SHAKE-256 — no
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// AVX2 / NEON intrinsics. With 8 perf cores + 2 efficiency cores on
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// M1 Max, the memory bandwidth saturates at ~3 parallel workers
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// because every worker's SHA-256 working set is in L1 but the per-
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// worker permutation state is bouncing through L2.
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//
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// Routes to break 5x (tracked separately, NOT in this commit):
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//
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// 1. Replace cloudflare/circl SHA-256 with the Sloth fork (~3-10x
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// single-thread, AVX2/SHA-NI on x86, NEON on arm64). Per-sign
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// cost drops from ~7ms to ~1ms, batch speedup then approaches
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// true linear ⇒ ~9x measured speedup at n=10.
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// 2. Metal/CUDA kernel substrate (luxcpp/crypto/slhdsa/gpu/
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// {metal,cuda}/sign.{metal,cu}). One workgroup per WOTS+ chain;
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// FORS trees as 33 parallel workgroups; hypertree layers serial.
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// Estimated 30-50x speedup over CPU single-thread for n=21 at
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// moderate device cost (Metal command-buffer submission is the
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// only serial overhead at ~50µs which is invisible at >1s sign).
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//
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// The Go-side batch dispatcher in this file is the route that lets the
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// substrate land cleanly: when the C-API gains the strong symbol the
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// dispatch ladder switches tier without code changes here.
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package slhdsa
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"runtime"
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"sync"
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"github.com/luxfi/accel"
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"github.com/luxfi/crypto/backend"
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"github.com/luxfi/crypto/internal/gpuhost"
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)
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// modeToCAPI maps our Mode enum to the integer mode the lux-accel C ABI
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// expects (see luxcpp/crypto/slhdsa/c-abi/c_slhdsa.cpp + luxcpp/lux-accel
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// c_api.h SLH-DSA section). Only the 'f' (fast) variants are wired through
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// GPU dispatch — the 's' (small) variants stay CPU-only since the FIPS-205
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// catalogue lists them as bandwidth-optimised, not throughput-optimised.
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func modeToCAPI(m Mode) (int, bool) {
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switch m {
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case SHA2_128f:
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return 2, true
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case SHA2_192f:
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return 3, true
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case SHA2_256f:
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return 5, true
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case SHAKE_128f:
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return 12, true
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case SHAKE_192f:
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return 13, true
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case SHAKE_256f:
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return 15, true
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default:
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return 0, false
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}
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}
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// SignBatchThreshold is the minimum batch length at which SignBatch tries the
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// GPU substrate before falling back to the goroutine-parallel CPU path.
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var SignBatchThreshold = 8
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// concurrentSignThreshold is the minimum batch length at which the CPU sign
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// path forks into GOMAXPROCS workers. SLH-DSA-192f sign is ~1.6s per signature
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// on M1 Max so the goroutine overhead (~10µs) is dwarfed at any n >= 2.
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var concurrentSignThreshold = 2
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// VerifyBatchGPU verifies a batch of SLH-DSA signatures on the GPU when a
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// GPU backend is present and the parameter set is one of the 'f' variants
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// (see modeToCAPI). Returns (dispatched, error):
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// - dispatched=true, error=nil : GPU produced `out`; len(out) == len(pubs).
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// - dispatched=false, error=nil : GPU is unavailable; caller MUST fall
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// back to per-element CPU verify. `out` is untouched.
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// - dispatched=false, error=accel.ErrInvalidArgument : the GPU C ABI
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// rejected this input (e.g. msg_len > LUX_GPU_SLHDSA_MSG_LEN_CAP,
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// count > kBatchMaxFactor ceiling, or null pointer with non-zero
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// length). Caller MUST propagate the error as a hard contract
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// violation — falling back to CPU here would produce a consensus
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// split between GPU and CPU validators on the same input.
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// This is the Red CRITICAL #176 propagation policy (M-1 pattern,
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// mirrored from ML-DSA at lux/crypto/pq/mldsa/gpu/gpu_cgo.go:381).
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//
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// All inputs MUST share the same Mode. Mixed batches must be partitioned by
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// the caller (the GPU kernel dispatches one mode per launch).
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//
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// This function never panics on a transport-level failure; for transport-
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// only failures (NewSession, tensor alloc, plugin not registered) it
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// returns (false, nil) so the call site falls back transparently to CPU.
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// Shape-inconsistency at the input boundary (len(pubs) != len(msgs))
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// also returns (false, nil) because the same shape error will surface
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// in the CPU fallback. The single signal of a HARD failure is
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// ErrInvalidArgument from the C ABI.
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func VerifyBatchGPU(pubs []*PublicKey, msgs, sigs [][]byte, out []bool) (bool, error) {
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if len(pubs) == 0 {
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return true, nil
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}
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if len(msgs) != len(pubs) || len(sigs) != len(pubs) || len(out) != len(pubs) {
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return false, nil
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}
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if !backend.IsGPU() {
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return false, nil
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}
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sess := gpuhost.Session()
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if sess == nil {
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return false, nil
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}
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// All entries must share the same parameter set.
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mode := pubs[0].mode
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capiMode, ok := modeToCAPI(mode)
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if !ok {
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return false, nil
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}
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for i := 1; i < len(pubs); i++ {
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if pubs[i].mode != mode {
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return false, nil
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}
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}
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pkSize := GetPublicKeySize(mode)
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sigSize := GetSignatureSize(mode)
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if pkSize == 0 || sigSize == 0 {
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return false, nil
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}
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n := len(pubs)
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// Find the maximum message width — the batch tensor pads short msgs
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// to the widest entry's length. Width >= 1 so the [N,W] tensor is
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// well-formed even when every input is empty.
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width := 1
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for _, m := range msgs {
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if len(m) > width {
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width = len(m)
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}
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}
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mFlat := make([]uint8, n*width)
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for i, m := range msgs {
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copy(mFlat[i*width:(i+1)*width], m)
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}
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pFlat := make([]uint8, n*pkSize)
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for i, p := range pubs {
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if len(p.publicKey) != pkSize {
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return false, nil
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}
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copy(pFlat[i*pkSize:(i+1)*pkSize], p.publicKey)
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}
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sFlat := make([]uint8, n*sigSize)
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for i, s := range sigs {
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if len(s) != sigSize {
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return false, nil
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}
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copy(sFlat[i*sigSize:(i+1)*sigSize], s)
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}
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mT, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, width}, mFlat)
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if err != nil {
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return false, nil
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}
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defer mT.Close()
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sT, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, sigSize}, sFlat)
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if err != nil {
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return false, nil
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}
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defer sT.Close()
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pT, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, pkSize}, pFlat)
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if err != nil {
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return false, nil
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}
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defer pT.Close()
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rT, err := accel.NewTensor[uint8](sess, []int{n})
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if err != nil {
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return false, nil
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}
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defer rT.Close()
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// Red CRITICAL #176 / M-1 propagation: ErrInvalidArgument from the
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// C ABI is a HARD error — the GPU plugin rejected the input as
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// out-of-contract (msg_len > LUX_GPU_SLHDSA_MSG_LEN_CAP, count
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// overflow, etc). Falling back to CPU here would let the CPU
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// oracle absorb the full input while the GPU has already declared
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// it invalid → consensus split. Other accel errors (NotSupported,
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// OutOfMemory, KernelFailed, NoBackends) are recoverable; fall
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// through to CPU.
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if err := sess.Lattice().SLHDSAVerifyBatch(capiMode, mT.Untyped(), sT.Untyped(), pT.Untyped(), rT.Untyped()); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, accel.ErrInvalidArgument) {
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return false, err
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}
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return false, nil
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}
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bytes, err := rT.ToSlice()
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if err != nil {
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return false, nil
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}
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// Successful C ABI dispatch — the plugin's strong override of
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// lux_slhdsa_verify_batch is resolved. Record this so GetProvenance()
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// can honestly report TierGPUSubstrate instead of the conservative
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// TierAccelCPUFallback default.
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recordPluginStrongSymbol(true)
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for i, b := range bytes {
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out[i] = b == 1
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}
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return true, nil
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}
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// VerifyBatch verifies a batch of SLH-DSA signatures. It transparently
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// dispatches to GPU when available (and the parameter set is a 'f' variant);
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// otherwise it falls back to a per-element CPU loop, parallelised across
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// GOMAXPROCS goroutines for n >= concurrentSignThreshold.
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//
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// Inputs must all share the same Mode; otherwise this function returns the
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// CPU per-element result of each public key verifying against its own mode.
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//
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// Red CRITICAL #176 / M-1 propagation: when VerifyBatchGPU returns
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// accel.ErrInvalidArgument, the GPU C ABI has rejected the input as
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// contract-violating (msg_len > LUX_GPU_SLHDSA_MSG_LEN_CAP, count >
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// kBatchMaxFactor ceiling). The CPU oracle has no such cap and may
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// accept what the GPU has rejected → consensus split between
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// CPU-only and GPU-accelerated validators. Panic here — VerifyBatch
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// returns no error, and a contract-violating input deserves the same
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// shape as the existing length-mismatch shape (returning empty out).
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// Recoverable GPU errors (NotSupported, OutOfMemory, KernelFailed,
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// NoBackends) return (false, nil) and fall through to the CPU tiers.
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// This mirrors mldsa.BatchVerify (lux/crypto/mldsa/batch.go).
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func VerifyBatch(pubs []*PublicKey, msgs, sigs [][]byte) []bool {
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n := len(pubs)
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out := make([]bool, n)
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if n == 0 {
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return out
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}
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if n != len(msgs) || n != len(sigs) {
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return out
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}
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// Tier 1: GPU substrate.
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dispatched, dispatchErr := VerifyBatchGPU(pubs, msgs, sigs, out)
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if dispatchErr != nil {
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// VerifyBatchGPU only returns a non-nil error for
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// accel.ErrInvalidArgument (the M-1 hard-error case). Mirror
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// the panic pattern used by mldsa.BatchVerify so the caller's
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// consensus-critical path fails closed.
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panic("slhdsa.VerifyBatch: GPU dispatch rejected input as malformed: " + dispatchErr.Error())
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}
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if dispatched {
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return out
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}
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// Tier 2: Goroutine-parallel CPU. SLH-DSA verify is ~50ms per signature
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// on M1 Max (faster than sign, ~30x), so the goroutine fork pays off
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// quickly. The concurrent verify is byte-equal to the serial verify by
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// construction.
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if n >= concurrentSignThreshold {
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verifyBatchConcurrent(pubs, msgs, sigs, out)
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return out
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}
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// Tier 3: Serial floor.
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for i := range pubs {
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out[i] = pubs[i].VerifySignature(msgs[i], sigs[i])
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}
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return out
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}
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// verifyBatchConcurrent runs FIPS 205 Verify across GOMAXPROCS goroutines.
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// Pure function per signature, no shared state — same byte-equality contract
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// as the serial path.
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func verifyBatchConcurrent(pubs []*PublicKey, msgs, sigs [][]byte, out []bool) {
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n := len(pubs)
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workers := runtime.GOMAXPROCS(0)
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if workers > n {
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workers = n
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}
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if workers < 2 {
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for i := range pubs {
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out[i] = pubs[i].VerifySignature(msgs[i], sigs[i])
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}
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return
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}
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var wg sync.WaitGroup
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chunk := (n + workers - 1) / workers
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for w := 0; w < workers; w++ {
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start := w * chunk
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if start >= n {
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break
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}
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end := start + chunk
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if end > n {
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end = n
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}
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wg.Add(1)
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go func(lo, hi int) {
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defer wg.Done()
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for i := lo; i < hi; i++ {
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out[i] = pubs[i].VerifySignature(msgs[i], sigs[i])
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}
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}(start, end)
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}
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wg.Wait()
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}
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// ErrBatchLength is returned by SignBatch when the input slice lengths
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// disagree.
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var ErrBatchLength = errors.New("slhdsa: batch input slices have inconsistent lengths")
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// SignBatchGPU dispatches a batch of SLH-DSA signing operations to the GPU
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// substrate when available. See VerifyBatchGPU for the fallback contract.
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//
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// All `privs` MUST share the same Mode. On success, `sigs[i]` is filled
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// with the FIPS 205 signature over `msgs[i]` under `privs[i]`.
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//
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// Because SLH-DSA-SHA2 sign is deterministic (no per-sign randomness), the
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// GPU substrate must produce a byte-equal signature to the CPU reference for
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// any given (sk, msg). KAT vectors exercise this property in
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// TestSLHDSABatchSignKATReverify.
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func SignBatchGPU(privs []*PrivateKey, msgs, sigs [][]byte) (bool, error) {
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if len(privs) == 0 {
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return true, nil
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}
|
||
if len(msgs) != len(privs) || len(sigs) != len(privs) {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
if !backend.IsGPU() {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
sess := gpuhost.Session()
|
||
if sess == nil {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
mode := privs[0].mode
|
||
capiMode, ok := modeToCAPI(mode)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
for i := 1; i < len(privs); i++ {
|
||
if privs[i].mode != mode {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
skSize := GetPrivateKeySize(mode)
|
||
sigSize := GetSignatureSize(mode)
|
||
if skSize == 0 || sigSize == 0 {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
n := len(privs)
|
||
|
||
width := 1
|
||
for _, m := range msgs {
|
||
if len(m) > width {
|
||
width = len(m)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
mFlat := make([]uint8, n*width)
|
||
for i, m := range msgs {
|
||
copy(mFlat[i*width:(i+1)*width], m)
|
||
}
|
||
skFlat := make([]uint8, n*skSize)
|
||
for i, p := range privs {
|
||
if len(p.secretKey) != skSize {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
copy(skFlat[i*skSize:(i+1)*skSize], p.secretKey)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
mT, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, width}, mFlat)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
defer mT.Close()
|
||
skT, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, skSize}, skFlat)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
defer skT.Close()
|
||
sigT, err := accel.NewTensor[uint8](sess, []int{n, sigSize})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
defer sigT.Close()
|
||
|
||
// Red CRITICAL #176 / M-1 propagation: same as VerifyBatchGPU.
|
||
// ErrInvalidArgument is a HARD contract violation; do not fall back
|
||
// to CPU — a CPU sign over a bound-violating message would produce
|
||
// a signature the GPU would never produce, asymmetric across the
|
||
// validator set.
|
||
if err := sess.Lattice().SLHDSASignBatch(capiMode, mT.Untyped(), skT.Untyped(), sigT.Untyped()); err != nil {
|
||
if errors.Is(err, accel.ErrInvalidArgument) {
|
||
return false, err
|
||
}
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
sigBytes, err := sigT.ToSlice()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
// See VerifyBatchGPU — record strong-symbol resolution so
|
||
// GetProvenance() reports the truth.
|
||
recordPluginStrongSymbol(true)
|
||
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
|
||
sigs[i] = make([]byte, sigSize)
|
||
copy(sigs[i], sigBytes[i*sigSize:(i+1)*sigSize])
|
||
}
|
||
return true, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// SignBatch signs `len(privs)` messages with the same SLH-DSA Mode in
|
||
// parallel. Returns one signature per input.
|
||
//
|
||
// Dispatch ladder:
|
||
//
|
||
// 1. GPU substrate (SignBatchGPU) for n >= SignBatchThreshold.
|
||
// 2. Goroutine-parallel CPU sign for n >= concurrentSignThreshold.
|
||
// 3. Serial CPU sign as the floor.
|
||
//
|
||
// Equivalence: SLH-DSA-SHA2 sign is deterministic, so all tiers produce
|
||
// byte-equal signatures for any given (sk, msg). Per FIPS 205 §10.2 the
|
||
// SignDeterministic entrypoint replaces the per-sign random oracle with a
|
||
// PRF over (sk_seed || msg) — used by Magnetar so that quorum members
|
||
// signing the same block-root produce sigma_i that the aggregator can
|
||
// deterministically dedupe / consensus-anchor.
|
||
//
|
||
// FIPS 205 says nothing about input ordering; the function preserves the
|
||
// per-element ordering of the input.
|
||
func SignBatch(randSource io.Reader, privs []*PrivateKey, msgs [][]byte) ([][]byte, error) {
|
||
n := len(privs)
|
||
if n != len(msgs) {
|
||
return nil, ErrBatchLength
|
||
}
|
||
sigs := make([][]byte, n)
|
||
if n == 0 {
|
||
return sigs, nil
|
||
}
|
||
mode := privs[0].mode
|
||
for i := 1; i < n; i++ {
|
||
if privs[i].mode != mode {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("slhdsa.SignBatch: mixed modes not supported")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Tier 1: GPU substrate. SLH-DSA sign is the canonical Magnetar slow path
|
||
// (>1s per signature for 192f) so threshold n is intentionally low.
|
||
//
|
||
// Red CRITICAL #176 / M-1 propagation: when SignBatchGPU returns
|
||
// accel.ErrInvalidArgument, the GPU C ABI has rejected the input
|
||
// as contract-violating. The CPU oracle's SignCtx (cloudflare/circl)
|
||
// has no length cap and would produce a signature the GPU would
|
||
// never produce — asymmetric signing across the validator set in
|
||
// deterministic quorum signing (FIPS 205 §10.2 SignDeterministic).
|
||
// Surface the error so the caller fails closed. Recoverable errors
|
||
// (NotSupported, OutOfMemory, KernelFailed) fall through to the
|
||
// CPU tiers below.
|
||
if n >= SignBatchThreshold {
|
||
if _, ok := modeToCAPI(mode); ok {
|
||
dispatched, dispatchErr := SignBatchGPU(privs, msgs, sigs)
|
||
if dispatchErr != nil {
|
||
return nil, dispatchErr
|
||
}
|
||
if dispatched {
|
||
return sigs, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Tier 2: Goroutine-parallel CPU. Each sign is ~1.6s on M1 Max for 192f;
|
||
// goroutine startup (~10µs) is invisible at that latency. We always go
|
||
// concurrent when n >= 2 because the speedup is monotonic in worker
|
||
// count up to min(n, GOMAXPROCS).
|
||
if n >= concurrentSignThreshold {
|
||
return signBatchConcurrent(randSource, privs, msgs)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Tier 3: Serial floor.
|
||
for i := range privs {
|
||
sig, err := privs[i].SignCtx(randSource, msgs[i], nil)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
sigs[i] = sig
|
||
}
|
||
return sigs, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// signBatchConcurrent runs FIPS 205 sign in parallel across goroutines.
|
||
// Same correctness rationale as batchSignConcurrent in mldsa: deterministic
|
||
// per-signature output, no shared mutable state.
|
||
func signBatchConcurrent(randSource io.Reader, privs []*PrivateKey, msgs [][]byte) ([][]byte, error) {
|
||
n := len(privs)
|
||
sigs := make([][]byte, n)
|
||
errs := make([]error, n)
|
||
|
||
workers := runtime.GOMAXPROCS(0)
|
||
if workers > n {
|
||
workers = n
|
||
}
|
||
if workers < 2 {
|
||
for i := range privs {
|
||
sig, err := privs[i].SignCtx(randSource, msgs[i], nil)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
sigs[i] = sig
|
||
}
|
||
return sigs, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// SLH-DSA SignDeterministic doesn't consume randomness; the random source
|
||
// is only used for keygen. The wrapper accepts io.Reader for API symmetry
|
||
// with ML-DSA; pass through unchanged.
|
||
_ = randSource
|
||
|
||
var wg sync.WaitGroup
|
||
chunk := (n + workers - 1) / workers
|
||
for w := 0; w < workers; w++ {
|
||
start := w * chunk
|
||
if start >= n {
|
||
break
|
||
}
|
||
end := start + chunk
|
||
if end > n {
|
||
end = n
|
||
}
|
||
wg.Add(1)
|
||
go func(lo, hi int) {
|
||
defer wg.Done()
|
||
for i := lo; i < hi; i++ {
|
||
sig, err := privs[i].SignCtx(randSource, msgs[i], nil)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
errs[i] = err
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
sigs[i] = sig
|
||
}
|
||
}(start, end)
|
||
}
|
||
wg.Wait()
|
||
|
||
for _, err := range errs {
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return sigs, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// newDefaultRand returns crypto/rand.Reader. Pulled into a helper for symmetry
|
||
// with mldsa and so tests can deterministically replace it.
|
||
func newDefaultRand() io.Reader { return rand.Reader }
|