crypto/p3q/ct/dudect

P3Q constant-time analysis (dudect)

Empirical CT measurement of the P3Q EVM precompile structural gate plus its backend dispatch. Mirrors the Pulsar harness layout (~/work/lux/pulsar/ct/dudect/).

What this harness measures

The P3Q precompile holds NO long-term secret. Wire calldata is public-by-EVM-precompile-ABI. The CT property we test is therefore not confidentiality but SOUNDNESS:

• A timing oracle over magic-mismatch vs length-mismatch lets an attacker probe the chain's structural pre-filter.
• An attacker who can distinguish accept-cycles from reject-cycles on the verification dispatch can use the signal as a consensus-relevant oracle over time.

The harness compares cycle distributions over two populations of STRUCTURALLY VALID inputs (same length, magic header in place, lengths consistent), differing only in proof / pub byte payload. Any timing difference detected is a real content-dependent path in precompile/p3q/contract.go::Run or its cgo dispatch to the backend verifier.

Quick start

./fetch.sh           # one-time: clone dudect.h at pinned commit
make                 # build the harness
./dudect_verify      # smoke run (10000 samples per batch, 4 batches)

Submission-grade run (10^9 samples)

./run-submission.sh

This is the run that closes GATE-3 in ../../CRYPTOGRAPHER-SIGN-OFF.md. Pre-flight checklist is documented in the script header.

Files

File	Purpose
verify_ct.go	cgo bridge exporting setup + invocation symbols to C
dudect_verify.c	C dudect main loop
dudect_compat.h	ARM64 compatibility shim for x86-only dudect intrinsics
Makefile	Build orchestration
fetch.sh	One-time clone of oreparaz/dudect at pinned ref
run-submission.sh	Submission-grade orchestrator (10^9 samples)

CT-population framing

Both classes are STRUCTURALLY VALID inputs:

• Class A — pool[0], byte-identical across all class-A samples (Welch's t-test requires identical class-A inputs).
• Class B — pool[rand % 64], uniformly drawn from the precomputed pool of 64 valid inputs. Each pool entry has the magic header and a randomly-drawn proof / pub byte payload.

The class B varying-but-valid framing is the operationally meaningful CT population: an attacker can submit any number of calldata payloads to the precompile and observe per-block latency. If the precompile's cycle distribution depends on calldata content, that signal is observable.

Interpreting results

dudect prints a verdict every batch:

• not enough measurements (...) — keep running
• For the moment, maybe constant time. — clean batch, run another
• Definitely not constant time — leakage detected, investigate

For submission-grade evidence we want all 10 consecutive 10^8-sample batches to land in the "maybe constant time" verdict with the absolute t-statistic staying below the |t| < 4.5 threshold.

Limitations

dudect is an empirical CT measurement, not a proof. The authoritative CT evidence lives in two places:

1. ../../proofs/easycrypt/lemmas/P3Q_CT.ec — Barthe-Gregoire-Laporte leakage-model obligation, reduced to the backend backend_ct axiom.
2. ../../jasmin/verify.jazz — #[ct = ...]-annotated Jasmin source for the structural gate, statically checkable with jasminc -checkCT verify.jazz.

dudect complements these by exercising the COMPOSED system (Go dispatch + cgo bridge + Rust backend verifier) under realistic calldata loads.