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* test(zapserver): fix e2e seed/assert mismatch (secret-value vs sk_live_real) TestConsensusE2E_ValidatorReadsSecret seeded "secret-value" but asserted "sk_live_real" — the E2E read path was correct, the assertion constant disagreed with the seed. Align the seed to the asserted live-secret value so the green test actually guards the consensus read path. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai> * feat(zapserver): expose enveloped secret+sign plane over HTTP /v1/sdk Decomplect the verify->authorize->dispatch core so the ZAP wire and a new HTTP /v1/sdk transport share ONE implementation (Server.dispatch). Add: - POST /v1/sdk/secrets: single RPC endpoint. The op is read from the SIGNED env.Op field, never the URL, so no framing can escalate a read identity into a write. Maps status byte -> HTTP code; replay masked as generic 403 'forbidden' (nonce ledger unprobeable); 4 MiB body cap. - OpSign (0x0050, write/operator) + OpVerify (0x0051, read/validator): deliberate, documented widening of the authorizer. Dispatch to a narrow SignBackend that delegates to luxfi/mpc t-of-n; KMS holds no key material. nil backend -> clear 'signing not configured'. 18 new httptest end-to-end tests: validator read / operator write splits, replay/stale/tamper/oversize/malformed/unknown-op rejection, and sign delegation gated BEFORE the backend (forbidden sign never reaches MPC). All prior authz tests stay green. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai> * feat(sdksign): keys.Manager -> zapserver.SignBackend adapter Sign delegates to the MPC t-of-n cluster (KMS holds no full key). Verify is a local public-key check: ed25519 (corona) via stdlib crypto/ed25519 (real, tested with a live keypair); secp256k1 (bls) returns a precise ErrVerifyBLSDelegated — a documented capability boundary (secp256k1 verification is owned by the chain/precompile layer), not a fake. Tests (CGO=0, no MPC daemon needed): sign routes to the correct wallet per scheme, result propagates; ed25519 valid verifies + tampered sig/message do NOT; bls verify hits the delegated boundary; unknown validator errors. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai> * fix(gomod): realign age@v1.5.0 + keys@v1.1.0 go.sum to re-tagged hashes Both tags were force-moved (vendor/docs sync lineage, per LLM.md); go.sum held the pre-re-tag zip hashes, so any GOWORK=off / clean-cache build (CI) failed 'checksum mismatch' before compiling. Updated the two h1 lines to the authoritative direct-fetch hashes; the GOWORK=off build re-verifies the downloaded bits against these, which is the proof they are correct. Never bypassed the check. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai> * feat(kms): mount /v1/sdk enveloped secrets+sign surface in kmsd Construct the zapserver.Server once from the loaded REK and back BOTH transports with ONE consensus authorizer + ONE nonce ledger: the HTTP /v1/sdk surface (SDK-facing) and the in-cluster ZAP wire. The authorizer and ledger are built whenever the REK is present (fail-closed: refuse to boot without them), independent of ZAP_PORT — so /v1/sdk is available even when the ZAP wire is disabled. Wire the MPC-backed sign/verify via sdksign.New(mgr) when a vault is configured; nil otherwise. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai> * docs(llm): document /v1/sdk enveloped secrets+sign surface Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>