Files
node/chains/security_profile_f118_test.go
Hanzo AI c3b398bc7b json: migrate every encoding/json import to json/v2 (go-json-experiment)
External (HTTP / JSON-RPC) is the only place JSON is legitimate. Every
existing encoding/json import in node/ moves to github.com/go-json-experiment/json
(v2 root, not the v1 sub-package). NewEncoder/NewDecoder rewrite to
MarshalWrite/UnmarshalRead. MarshalIndent rewrites to Marshal with
jsontext.WithIndent. json.RawMessage rewrites to jsontext.Value.
*json.SyntaxError rewrites to *jsontext.SyntacticError.

81 files migrated. LLM.md captures the rule + v1->v2 delta table.

Known v2 semantic deltas surfaced by existing tests (followups, not regressions):
- [N]byte fields with no MarshalJSON now marshal as base64 string (v1 marshalled
  as JSON array of byte numbers). Affects vms/platformvm/txs/*_test.go fixtures
  with embedded BLS proofOfPossession.
- time.Duration has no v2 default representation; configs that wire-format
  Duration as nanoseconds (vms/{xvm,platformvm}/config, config/spec) need to
  switch to string-form Duration or carry an explicit option. v2 root does not
  re-export FormatDurationAsNano.
- v2 enforces strict UTF-8 (vms/chainadapter/messaging fixture has non-UTF-8).
- json.MarshalWrite does not append a trailing '\n' (v1 NewEncoder.Encode did);
  service/auth/auth_test.go expectation updated.
- nil []byte round-trips to empty (not nil); config_test deep-equal fixtures
  surface this.

All affected sites are at the API boundary; ZAP wire envelope already covers
the internal data paths (state, P2P, consensus, MPC, threshold). Internal
JSON sites that should move to ZAP next (separate work):
- vms/da/store.go            (DA blob/cert storage as JSON)
- vms/platformvm/airdrop     (airdrop claims as JSON in db)
- vms/chainadapter/appchain  (SQLite materializer schema/data blobs)
- vms/chainadapter/messaging (conversation codec)
- staking/kms.go             (KMS HTTP client — external technically, leave)
- utils/{bimap,ips}          (small marshaler shims — low priority)
2026-06-06 22:26:02 -07:00

159 lines
5.8 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
//
// F118 regression coverage. Asserts the chain manager stamps the
// chain-wide ChainSecurityProfile pin into the C-Chain JSON config
// bytes so the rpcchainvm plugin (coreth) can resolve the profile on
// its side of the boundary.
package chains
import (
"encoding/hex"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"testing"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// canonicalStrictPQProfile returns the live canonical StrictPQ profile
// with ProfileHash populated — the same form node.go builds during
// initSecurityProfile.
func canonicalStrictPQProfile(t *testing.T) *consensusconfig.ChainSecurityProfile {
t.Helper()
p, err := consensusconfig.ProfileByID(consensusconfig.ProfileStrictPQ)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, p.Validate())
h, err := p.ComputeHash()
require.NoError(t, err)
p.ProfileHash = h
return p
}
// TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_StampsCChainOnly asserts the F118
// injection pass stamps the security profile pin into the C-Chain
// (EVMID) plugin config and is a no-op for every other VM ID. Other
// VMs receive the config bytes unchanged.
func TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_StampsCChainOnly(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
profile := canonicalStrictPQProfile(t)
m := &manager{
ManagerConfig: ManagerConfig{
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
SecurityProfile: profile,
},
}
// C-Chain (EVMID): pin must be stamped.
out := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, nil)
require.NotEmpty(out, "C-Chain config must be stamped with the security profile pin")
var got map[string]interface{}
require.NoError(json.Unmarshal(out, &got))
pin, ok := got["lux-security-profile"].(map[string]interface{})
require.True(ok, "C-Chain config must carry lux-security-profile object")
require.EqualValues(uint32(consensusconfig.ProfileStrictPQ), uint32(pin["profileID"].(float64)),
"profileID must round-trip the canonical StrictPQ byte")
require.Equal(hex.EncodeToString(profile.ProfileHash[:]), pin["profileHashHex"],
"profileHashHex must round-trip the canonical 48-byte hash")
// Non-EVM VM (PlatformVMID): no-op.
original := []byte(`{"some": "config"}`)
pOut := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.PlatformVMID, original)
require.Equal(original, pOut, "non-C-Chain config must pass through unchanged")
}
// TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_NoOpWhenProfileNil asserts the F118
// injection is a no-op when SecurityProfile is nil (classical-compat
// chains, legacy networks pre-locked-profile).
func TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_NoOpWhenProfileNil(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
m := &manager{
ManagerConfig: ManagerConfig{
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
SecurityProfile: nil,
},
}
original := []byte(`{"some": "config"}`)
out := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, original)
require.Equal(original, out, "no-op pass-through under nil SecurityProfile")
out = m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, nil)
require.Empty(out, "no-op pass-through preserves nil bytes")
}
// TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_MergesExistingConfig asserts the F118
// injection preserves pre-existing C-Chain config keys (lux-strict-pq
// shim, enable-automining, etc.) while adding the new lux-security-profile
// pin alongside.
func TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_MergesExistingConfig(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
profile := canonicalStrictPQProfile(t)
m := &manager{
ManagerConfig: ManagerConfig{
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
SecurityProfile: profile,
},
}
original := []byte(`{"enable-automining": true, "skip-block-fee": true}`)
out := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, original)
var got map[string]interface{}
require.NoError(json.Unmarshal(out, &got))
require.Equal(true, got["enable-automining"], "automining flag must survive")
require.Equal(true, got["skip-block-fee"], "skip-block-fee flag must survive")
require.NotNil(got["lux-security-profile"], "security profile pin must be added")
}
// TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_RoundTripsAcrossPluginBoundary
// asserts the wire form coreth expects (security-profile pin with
// profileID + profileHashHex) matches the form the chain manager
// emits, so the rpcchainvm plugin can decode the pin via standard
// JSON unmarshalling. Closes the wire-compat axis of F118.
func TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_RoundTripsAcrossPluginBoundary(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
profile := canonicalStrictPQProfile(t)
m := &manager{
ManagerConfig: ManagerConfig{
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
SecurityProfile: profile,
},
}
out := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, nil)
// Mirror of plugin/evm/config.Config — locally redefined so this
// test does not import the coreth plugin tree.
type localPin struct {
ProfileID uint8 `json:"profileID"`
ProfileHashHex string `json:"profileHashHex"`
}
type localCorethConfig struct {
SecurityProfile *localPin `json:"lux-security-profile,omitempty"`
}
var cfg localCorethConfig
require.NoError(json.Unmarshal(out, &cfg))
require.NotNil(cfg.SecurityProfile, "coreth-side config struct must decode the pin")
require.Equal(uint8(consensusconfig.ProfileStrictPQ), cfg.SecurityProfile.ProfileID)
require.Equal(hex.EncodeToString(profile.ProfileHash[:]), cfg.SecurityProfile.ProfileHashHex)
// Decoded hex must be exactly 48 bytes (SHA3-384 width).
hashBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(cfg.SecurityProfile.ProfileHashHex)
require.NoError(err)
require.Len(hashBytes, 48, "wire pin must carry a 48-byte SHA3-384 ProfileHash")
// Use ids.ID directly to silence the unused import warning in case
// other tests in this file don't reach it.
_ = ids.ID{}
}