Files
zeekay 67f38f8c9f network: build SchemeGate under the SAME predicate as the PQ handshake
The per-chain peer.SchemeGate is now built under profileRequiresPQHandshake,
not merely SecurityProfile != nil. Load-bearing: the gate's pinned scheme
byte (SigSchemeMLDSA65) only becomes presentable once the application-layer
ML-KEM+ML-DSA handshake establishes the ML-DSA identity. A permissive /
classical-compat profile still presents secp256k1 cert schemes, which
SchemeGate.Classify refuses unconditionally — building a gate there would
refuse every peer with no PQ handshake to recover (the 0-peers / 'TLS
upgrade failed' stall). One axis, one predicate: gate + handshake + ML-DSA
identity are built together or not at all.
2026-06-23 01:43:53 -07:00

232 lines
10 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package network
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/tls"
"net/netip"
"time"
compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
consensustracker "github.com/luxfi/consensus/networking/tracker"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
"github.com/luxfi/node/network/dialer"
"github.com/luxfi/node/network/throttling"
"github.com/luxfi/node/network/tracker"
"github.com/luxfi/utils"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/validators/uptime"
)
// HealthConfig describes parameters for network layer health checks.
type HealthConfig struct {
// Marks if the health check should be enabled
Enabled bool `json:"-"`
// NoIngressValidatorConnectionGracePeriod denotes the time after which the health check fails
// for primary network validators with no ingress connections.
NoIngressValidatorConnectionGracePeriod time.Duration
// MinConnectedPeers is the minimum number of peers that the network should
// be connected to be considered healthy.
MinConnectedPeers uint `json:"minConnectedPeers"`
// MaxTimeSinceMsgReceived is the maximum amount of time since the network
// last received a message to be considered healthy.
MaxTimeSinceMsgReceived time.Duration `json:"maxTimeSinceMsgReceived"`
// MaxTimeSinceMsgSent is the maximum amount of time since the network last
// sent a message to be considered healthy.
MaxTimeSinceMsgSent time.Duration `json:"maxTimeSinceMsgSent"`
// MaxPortionSendQueueBytesFull is the maximum percentage of the pending
// send byte queue that should be used for the network to be considered
// healthy. Should be in (0,1].
MaxPortionSendQueueBytesFull float64 `json:"maxPortionSendQueueBytesFull"`
// MaxSendFailRate is the maximum percentage of send attempts that should be
// failing for the network to be considered healthy. This does not include
// send attempts that were not made due to benching. Should be in [0,1].
MaxSendFailRate float64 `json:"maxSendFailRate"`
// SendFailRateHalflife is the halflife of the averager used to calculate
// the send fail rate percentage. Should be > 0. Larger values mean that the
// fail rate is affected less by recently dropped messages.
SendFailRateHalflife time.Duration `json:"sendFailRateHalflife"`
}
type PeerListGossipConfig struct {
// PeerListNumValidatorIPs is the number of validator IPs to gossip in every
// gossip event.
PeerListNumValidatorIPs uint32 `json:"peerListNumValidatorIPs"`
// PeerListPullGossipFreq is the frequency that this node will attempt to
// request signed IPs from its peers.
PeerListPullGossipFreq time.Duration `json:"peerListPullGossipFreq"`
// PeerListBloomResetFreq is how frequently this node will recalculate the
// IP tracker's bloom filter.
PeerListBloomResetFreq time.Duration `json:"peerListBloomResetFreq"`
}
type TimeoutConfig struct {
// PingPongTimeout is the maximum amount of time to wait for a Pong response
// from a peer we sent a Ping to.
PingPongTimeout time.Duration `json:"pingPongTimeout"`
// ReadHandshakeTimeout is the maximum amount of time to wait for the peer's
// connection upgrade to finish before starting the p2p handshake.
ReadHandshakeTimeout time.Duration `json:"readHandshakeTimeout"`
}
type DelayConfig struct {
// InitialReconnectDelay is the minimum amount of time the node will delay a
// reconnection to a peer. This value is used to start the exponential
// backoff.
InitialReconnectDelay time.Duration `json:"initialReconnectDelay"`
// MaxReconnectDelay is the maximum amount of time the node will delay a
// reconnection to a peer.
MaxReconnectDelay time.Duration `json:"maxReconnectDelay"`
}
type ThrottlerConfig struct {
InboundConnUpgradeThrottlerConfig throttling.InboundConnUpgradeThrottlerConfig `json:"inboundConnUpgradeThrottlerConfig"`
InboundMsgThrottlerConfig throttling.InboundMsgThrottlerConfig `json:"inboundMsgThrottlerConfig"`
OutboundMsgThrottlerConfig throttling.MsgByteThrottlerConfig `json:"outboundMsgThrottlerConfig"`
MaxInboundConnsPerSec float64 `json:"maxInboundConnsPerSec"`
}
type Config struct {
HealthConfig `json:"healthConfig"`
PeerListGossipConfig `json:"peerListGossipConfig"`
TimeoutConfig `json:"timeoutConfigs"`
DelayConfig `json:"delayConfig"`
ThrottlerConfig ThrottlerConfig `json:"throttlerConfig"`
ProxyEnabled bool `json:"proxyEnabled"`
ProxyReadHeaderTimeout time.Duration `json:"proxyReadHeaderTimeout"`
DialerConfig dialer.Config `json:"dialerConfig"`
TLSConfig *tls.Config `json:"-"`
TLSKeyLogFile string `json:"tlsKeyLogFile"`
MyNodeID ids.NodeID `json:"myNodeID"`
// StakingMLDSA / StakingMLDSAPub are this node's persistent strict-PQ
// ML-DSA-65 staking keypair (FIPS 204), mirrored from
// StakingConfig.StakingMLDSA{,Pub} by node.Node so the network layer
// can build the PQ peer-handshake identity WITHOUT generating an
// ephemeral key. They are nil/empty on classical-compat chains.
//
// Why this matters: MyNodeID is derived from StakingMLDSAPub
// (StakingConfig.DeriveNodeID), so the peer handshake MUST sign with
// THIS keypair — not a throwaway one — for a completed handshake to
// prove possession of the validator identity. See
// peer.NewLocalIdentityFromStakingKey and peer.adoptVerifiedPQIdentity.
StakingMLDSA *mldsa.PrivateKey `json:"-"`
StakingMLDSAPub []byte `json:"-"`
MyIPPort *utils.Atomic[netip.AddrPort] `json:"myIP"`
NetworkID uint32 `json:"networkID"`
MaxClockDifference time.Duration `json:"maxClockDifference"`
PingFrequency time.Duration `json:"pingFrequency"`
AllowPrivateIPs bool `json:"allowPrivateIPs"`
SupportedLPs set.Set[uint32] `json:"supportedLPs"`
ObjectedLPs set.Set[uint32] `json:"objectedLPs"`
// The compression type to use when compressing outbound messages.
// Assumes all peers support this compression type.
CompressionType compression.Type `json:"compressionType"`
// TLSKey is this node's TLS key that is used to sign IPs.
TLSKey crypto.Signer `json:"-"`
// BLSKey is this node's BLS key that is used to sign IPs.
BLSKey bls.Signer `json:"-"`
// TrackedChains of the node.
// It must not include the primary network ID.
TrackedChains set.Set[ids.ID] `json:"-"`
Beacons validators.Manager `json:"-"`
// Validators are the current validators in the Lux network
Validators validators.Manager `json:"-"`
// SequencerIDForChain returns the validator-set identity that sequences chainID.
// This allows chains to be sequenced by a different validator set than their own.
// Examples:
// - C-Chain → returns PrimaryNetworkID (sequenced by primary network validators)
// - Zoo chain (self-sequenced) → returns ZooChainID
// - Zoo chain (Lux-sequenced) → returns the Lux network's sequencerID
// Default: returns chainID (self-sequenced).
SequencerIDForChain func(chainID ids.ID) ids.ID `json:"-"`
// GenesisBytes is the raw genesis configuration passed to the node.
// This is used to extract the actual initial stakers for the network,
// rather than relying on canonical genesis configs which may differ
// from the actual genesis used (e.g., in netrunner-generated networks).
GenesisBytes []byte `json:"-"`
UptimeCalculator uptime.Calculator `json:"-"`
// UptimeMetricFreq marks how frequently this node will recalculate the
// observed average uptime metric.
UptimeMetricFreq time.Duration `json:"uptimeMetricFreq"`
// UptimeRequirement is the fraction of time a validator must be online and
// responsive for us to vote that they should receive a staking reward.
UptimeRequirement float64 `json:"-"`
// RequireValidatorToConnect require that all connections must have at least
// one validator between the 2 peers. This can be useful to enable if the
// node wants to connect to the minimum number of nodes without impacting
// the network negatively.
RequireValidatorToConnect bool `json:"requireValidatorToConnect"`
// MaximumInboundMessageTimeout is the maximum deadline duration in a
// message. Messages sent by clients setting values higher than this value
// will be reset to this value.
MaximumInboundMessageTimeout time.Duration `json:"maximumInboundMessageTimeout"`
// Size, in bytes, of the buffer that we read peer messages into
// (there is one buffer per peer)
PeerReadBufferSize int `json:"peerReadBufferSize"`
// Size, in bytes, of the buffer that we write peer messages into
// (there is one buffer per peer)
PeerWriteBufferSize int `json:"peerWriteBufferSize"`
// Tracks the CPU/disk usage caused by processing messages of each peer.
ResourceTracker consensustracker.ResourceTracker `json:"-"`
// Specifies how much CPU usage each peer can cause before
// we rate-limit them.
CPUTargeter tracker.Targeter `json:"-"`
// Specifies how much disk usage each peer can cause before
// we rate-limit them.
DiskTargeter tracker.Targeter `json:"-"`
// SecurityProfile is the chain-wide ChainSecurityProfile this node is
// operating under (resolved at boot from the genesis pin in
// node.Node.initSecurityProfile). When it mandates the application-layer
// PQ handshake (strict-PQ / FIPS — see profileRequiresPQHandshake), the
// network builds a peer.SchemeGate from it AND runs the ML-KEM + ML-DSA
// handshake; the gate and handshake are gated by one identical
// predicate so an ML-DSA identity always exists for the gate to bind.
// A nil profile, or a non-PQ-handshake profile (permissive), leaves the
// cross-axis gate disabled: peers present classical secp256k1 cert
// schemes the gate would refuse unconditionally, so building it there
// would refuse every connection with no PQ handshake to recover. Such
// chains remain accepted by the upgrader's nil-safe path.
SecurityProfile *consensusconfig.ChainSecurityProfile `json:"-"`
}