Files
node/chains/pchain_height_finality_test.go
T
zeekay 4c7bab464c node(chains): deliver the REAL P-chain epoch height to the chain engine (b2)
THE BUG. A K>1 quorum chain pins its weighted validator set to a P-chain epoch
height (set-root, 2/3-by-stake tally, per-voter pubkey resolution all read at that
one height). The engine reads that height off the VM block via pChainHeightOf,
asserting block.SignedBlock.PChainHeight() — but every plugin VM block (C-Chain
EVM, dexvm) exposes none, so pChainHeightOf returns 0 and the set resolves at
P-chain height 0: the GENESIS set. That is safe (non-empty, identical on every
node, <= current) and unbricks finality, but FREEZES the epoch at genesis: a
validator that JOINED post-genesis is absent from set@0 -> its vote is dropped and
its stake uncounted -> finality cannot track a DYNAMIC validator set, and a
departed genesis majority could collude.

THE FIX (Option b: rpcchainvm zap boundary, NOT a chain-creation-switch rewrite).
pChainHeightVM wraps the chain BlockBuilder so the block the engine sees carries
the proposer's live P-chain epoch height H = max(GetCurrentHeight, parentH),
WITHOUT changing the inner VM's block format, IDs, or ledger state:
  - BuildBlock stamps H and frames the gossiped bytes [magic|H|innerBytes];
  - ParseBlock splits the frame so every follower ADOPTS the identical H (never
    recomputes it from its own skewing P-chain view) -> determinism: every honest
    node derives the SAME epoch height from the SAME signed block, so the cert
    set-root they recompute matches and a post-genesis validator's vote+stake
    count. Raw (unframed) bytes parse with H=0 = the safe genesis fallback.
This is consensus-TRANSPORT framing, not a chain/ledger fork: inner bytes, block
IDs, and execution state are byte-identical -> no re-genesis, only a coordinated
node upgrade. Installed ONLY on K>1 chains (a K==1 chain has no cert/epoch).

Also wires the height-indexed P-Chain validators.State as the SINGLE source of
epoch truth for all four reads (verifier pubkey, stake, total stake, set-root),
all keyed on the block's P-chain height, and FAILS CLOSED if a K>1 chain is built
without a live height-indexed state (a silent permanent-stall wiring bug becomes a
loud refuse-to-start).

TDD (CGO_ENABLED=0, the canonical purego BLS path = ACTUAL production quorum
sources, not an ed25519 stand-in):
  - TestPChainHeightVM_DeliversRealHeight: pChainHeightOf(builtBlock)==H and
    ==H again after a ParseBlock round-trip of the gossiped bytes; a bare inner
    block reads 0 (pins why the wrapper is load-bearing).
  - TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAtGenesis: K>1 finalizes against set@0.
  - TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAfterStakingChange: validators that JOINED at
    epoch 7 cast the deciding 2/3 votes+stake and the block FINALIZES; the cert
    verifies stake-weighted at 7 and FAILS at 0; the production verifier rejects a
    joiner at height 0 but accepts it at 7. Proven to FAIL without the fix (stamp
    0 -> joiners dropped at set@0 -> VM.Accept never runs = permanent stall).
2026-06-22 22:21:55 -07:00

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// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// pchain_height_finality_test.go — the b2 load-bearing proof the prior round
// lacked: that the node delivers the REAL P-chain epoch height to the chain
// engine, so a K>1 quorum chain finalizes against the LIVE validator set — not
// the frozen genesis set.
//
// The consensus-layer TestPChainEpochFinality_RealWiring proved the engine reads
// the RIGHT height GIVEN a block that already exposes one; it fed a synthetic
// block carrying PChainHeight directly, BYPASSING the boundary. The boundary —
// where a bare plugin block yields pChainHeightOf==0 — was exactly what shipped
// broken (set@0 = genesis). These tests drive the REAL boundary:
//
// inner VM (bare block, no PChainHeight)
// └─ pChainHeightVM (the b2 wrapper, backed by a real validators.State)
// └─ consensus engine (real α-of-K cert finality, node BLS sources)
//
// and prove three properties end to end:
//
// (1) pChainHeightOf(realBlock) returns the wrapper's stamped P-chain height
// (NOT 0) — at BuildBlock AND after a ParseBlock round-trip of the gossiped
// bytes (the determinism guarantee: every node recovers the same height).
// (2) K>1 FINALIZES at genesis (set@H0).
// (3) K>1 FINALIZES AFTER a staking change — validators that JOINED post-genesis
// cast the deciding votes+stake. This is the case that STALLS on the set@0
// path (the joiners are absent from the genesis set), so finalizing proves
// the real height is load-bearing.
//
// CGO-free: the node BLS sources use the pure-Go BLS path under CGO_ENABLED=0, so
// this runs the ACTUAL production quorum sources (blsVoteVerifier / blsVoteSigner
// / validatorStakeSource / validatorSetRootSource) — not an ed25519 stand-in.
package chains
import (
"context"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
)
// --- a bare inner VM whose blocks carry NO P-chain height --------------------
// fakeInnerBlock is a minimal chain block: it satisfies block.Block but does NOT
// expose PChainHeight() — exactly like the plugin VM blocks (C-Chain EVM, dexvm)
// the node runs. Its Bytes() is its own opaque encoding; the wrapper frames a
// P-chain height AROUND these bytes for transport.
type fakeInnerBlock struct {
id ids.ID
parentID ids.ID
height uint64
bytes []byte
timestamp time.Time
mu sync.Mutex
acceptCalled int
}
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) ID() ids.ID { return b.id }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Parent() ids.ID { return b.parentID }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) ParentID() ids.ID { return b.parentID }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Height() uint64 { return b.height }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Timestamp() time.Time { return b.timestamp }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Status() uint8 { return 0 }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Bytes() []byte { return b.bytes }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Verify(context.Context) error { return nil }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Reject(context.Context) error { return nil }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Accept(context.Context) error {
b.mu.Lock()
b.acceptCalled++
b.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) accepted() int {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return b.acceptCalled
}
// fakeInnerVM is a BlockBuilder over fakeInnerBlocks, keyed by id and by bytes so
// ParseBlock(bytes) reconstructs the SAME inner block on a follower. It builds one
// block on demand (set via stage) so the test controls the proposed block.
type fakeInnerVM struct {
mu sync.Mutex
byID map[ids.ID]*fakeInnerBlock
byBytes map[string]*fakeInnerBlock
staged *fakeInnerBlock // returned by the next BuildBlock
lastAcc ids.ID
}
func newFakeInnerVM() *fakeInnerVM {
return &fakeInnerVM{
byID: make(map[ids.ID]*fakeInnerBlock),
byBytes: make(map[string]*fakeInnerBlock),
}
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) register(b *fakeInnerBlock) {
vm.mu.Lock()
vm.byID[b.id] = b
vm.byBytes[string(b.bytes)] = b
vm.mu.Unlock()
}
// stage sets the block the next BuildBlock returns (and registers it for Get/Parse).
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) stage(b *fakeInnerBlock) {
vm.register(b)
vm.mu.Lock()
vm.staged = b
vm.mu.Unlock()
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) BuildBlock(context.Context) (block.Block, error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
return vm.staged, nil
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) ParseBlock(_ context.Context, b []byte) (block.Block, error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
if blk, ok := vm.byBytes[string(b)]; ok {
return blk, nil
}
// Unknown bytes: synthesize a block so a follower can still parse. Real VMs
// decode deterministically; the test pre-registers every block it gossips, so
// this path is only a safety net.
return nil, errUnknownInnerBytes
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) GetBlock(_ context.Context, id ids.ID) (block.Block, error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
if blk, ok := vm.byID[id]; ok {
return blk, nil
}
return nil, errUnknownInnerBytes
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) LastAccepted(context.Context) (ids.ID, error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
return vm.lastAcc, nil
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) SetPreference(_ context.Context, id ids.ID) error {
vm.mu.Lock()
vm.lastAcc = id
vm.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
var errUnknownInnerBytes = errInnerBytes{}
type errInnerBytes struct{}
func (errInnerBytes) Error() string { return "fakeInnerVM: unknown block bytes" }
// --- BLS validator material (pure-Go BLS under CGO_ENABLED=0) ----------------
type blsValidator struct {
nodeID ids.NodeID
sk *bls.SecretKey
pkComp []byte
light uint64
}
func newBLSValidator(t *testing.T, weight uint64) blsValidator {
t.Helper()
sk, err := bls.NewSecretKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bls.NewSecretKey: %v", err)
}
return blsValidator{
nodeID: ids.GenerateTestNodeID(),
sk: sk,
pkComp: bls.PublicKeyToCompressedBytes(sk.PublicKey()),
light: weight,
}
}
func (v blsValidator) out() *validators.GetValidatorOutput {
return &validators.GetValidatorOutput{
NodeID: v.nodeID,
PublicKey: v.pkComp,
Light: v.light,
Weight: v.light,
}
}
// stateByHeight builds a height-indexed validators.State reporting the given sets
// per height (empty for unknown heights / wrong net), with GetCurrentHeight fixed
// to `current` so the wrapper stamps that height onto built blocks.
func stateByHeight(netID ids.ID, current uint64, byHeight map[uint64][]blsValidator) *validatorstest.TestState {
s := validatorstest.NewTestState()
s.GetCurrentHeightF = func(context.Context) (uint64, error) { return current, nil }
s.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
if gotNet != netID {
return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
}
out := make(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput)
for _, v := range byHeight[height] {
out[v.nodeID] = v.out()
}
return out, nil
}
return s
}
// --- a recording cert gossiper (engine CertGossiper) -------------------------
type recordingCertGossiper struct {
mu sync.Mutex
certs [][]byte
}
func (g *recordingCertGossiper) GossipCert(_ ids.ID, _ ids.ID, certBytes []byte) error {
g.mu.Lock()
g.certs = append(g.certs, append([]byte(nil), certBytes...))
g.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
func (g *recordingCertGossiper) count() int {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
return len(g.certs)
}
var _ consensuschain.CertGossiper = (*recordingCertGossiper)(nil)
// --- helpers -----------------------------------------------------------------
func params5() consensusconfig.Parameters {
return consensusconfig.Parameters{K: 5, AlphaPreference: 3, AlphaConfidence: 3, Beta: 2}
}
func waitForCond(d time.Duration, cond func() bool) bool {
deadline := time.Now().Add(d)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if cond() {
return true
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
}
return cond()
}
// signBLSVote produces validator v's signed accept Vote for a position (the same
// canonical message the node's blsVoteSigner/Verifier use).
func signBLSVote(t *testing.T, v blsValidator, pos consensuschain.VotePosition) consensuschain.Vote {
t.Helper()
sig, err := v.sk.Sign(consensuschain.CanonicalVoteMessage(pos))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign vote: %v", err)
}
return consensuschain.Vote{
BlockID: pos.BlockID,
NodeID: v.nodeID,
Accept: true,
SignedAt: time.Now(),
Signature: bls.SignatureToBytes(sig),
ParentID: pos.ParentID,
Round: pos.Round,
}
}
// quorumEngineFixture wires a real consensus engine with the node's production
// BLS quorum sources, all height-pinned to a height-indexed validators.State,
// driving blocks through the b2 pChainHeightVM wrapper over a bare inner VM.
type quorumEngineFixture struct {
engine *consensuschain.Transitive
wrapper *pChainHeightVM
inner *fakeInnerVM
chainID ids.ID
netID ids.ID
proposer blsValidator
certs *recordingCertGossiper
}
func newQuorumEngineFixture(t *testing.T, netID ids.ID, state validators.State, proposer blsValidator, byHeight map[uint64][]blsValidator) *quorumEngineFixture {
t.Helper()
inner := newFakeInnerVM()
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
certs := &recordingCertGossiper{}
vdrState := state
engine := consensuschain.NewWithConfig(
consensuschain.Config{Params: params5(), VM: wrapper},
consensuschain.WithQuorumCert(chainID, proposer.nodeID, newBLSVoteVerifier(vdrState, netID), certs, newBLSVoteSigner(proposer.sk)),
consensuschain.WithStakeWeighting(newValidatorStakeSource(vdrState, netID)),
consensuschain.WithValidatorSetRoot(newValidatorSetRootSource(vdrState, netID)),
)
if err := engine.Start(context.Background(), true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("engine.Start: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = engine.Stop(context.Background()) })
return &quorumEngineFixture{
engine: engine,
wrapper: wrapper,
inner: inner,
chainID: chainID,
netID: netID,
proposer: proposer,
certs: certs,
}
}
// proposeViaWrapper builds the staged inner block THROUGH the wrapper (stamping
// the live P-chain height), tracks it as the engine's own verified proposal with
// the wrapper-delivered epoch, records the proposer's self-vote, and returns the
// wrapped block + the canonical vote position followers must sign.
func (f *quorumEngineFixture) proposeViaWrapper(t *testing.T, inner *fakeInnerBlock) (block.Block, consensuschain.VotePosition) {
t.Helper()
f.inner.stage(inner)
wrapped, err := f.wrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("wrapper.BuildBlock: %v", err)
}
pos := f.engine.TrackOwnProposalForTest(context.Background(), wrapped, 0)
return wrapped, pos
}
// newFakeInner is a small constructor for an inner block at value height h with a
// unique opaque encoding (tag-derived, so byBytes keys never collide).
func newFakeInner(h uint64, parent ids.ID, tag string) *fakeInnerBlock {
return &fakeInnerBlock{
id: ids.GenerateTestID(),
parentID: parent,
height: h,
bytes: []byte("inner:" + tag),
timestamp: time.Now(),
}
}
// --- (1) the boundary delivers the REAL height (not 0), build + parse ---------
// TestPChainHeightVM_DeliversRealHeight is the direct b2 boundary proof: the
// wrapper stamps the proposer's live P-chain height onto the block the engine
// sees, so pChainHeightOf(realBlock) returns that height — NOT 0 — at BuildBlock,
// AND a follower recovers the IDENTICAL height by parsing the gossiped bytes (the
// determinism guarantee H rides the bytes, never recomputed from a skewing view).
//
// This is the assertion the whole fix turns on. On the broken path
// pChainHeightOf(any real plugin block)==0 → set@0 (genesis) forever.
func TestPChainHeightVM_DeliversRealHeight(t *testing.T) {
const epoch = uint64(7) // the live P-chain height the proposer stamps
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
// A state whose GetCurrentHeight is 7 (so BuildBlock stamps 7); the set content
// is irrelevant to the stamping itself, but we register it at 7 for symmetry.
state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
inner := newFakeInner(10_000_000, ids.Empty, "real-height") // value height races ahead
wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).stage(inner)
wrapped, err := wrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock: %v", err)
}
// (1a) the engine's boundary read on the BUILT block returns the stamped height.
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != epoch {
t.Fatalf("pChainHeightOf(built block) = %d, want %d — the boundary still delivers the wrong height "+
"(0 would mean the genesis-set freeze the b2 fix removes)", got, epoch)
}
// Sanity: the inner block itself exposes no PChainHeight, so without the wrapper
// the engine would read 0. This pins WHY the wrapper is load-bearing.
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(inner); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("bare inner block must expose no P-chain height (pChainHeightOf=0), got %d", got)
}
// (1b) determinism: a follower parsing the GOSSIPED bytes recovers the same H.
parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), wrapped.Bytes())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(gossiped bytes): %v", err)
}
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(parsed); got != epoch {
t.Fatalf("pChainHeightOf(parsed block) = %d, want %d — a follower recomputed/lost the height; "+
"finality would stall on a dynamic set (worse than the genesis fallback)", got, epoch)
}
if parsed.ID() != wrapped.ID() {
t.Fatalf("parsed block ID %s != built block ID %s — the inner identity must be preserved across the envelope", parsed.ID(), wrapped.ID())
}
}
// --- (2) K>1 finalizes at genesis (set@H0) -----------------------------------
// TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAtGenesis proves the fix UNBRICKS finality in the
// base case: a K>1 quorum chain whose validator set is the genesis set (current
// P-chain height 0) finalizes through the real BLS quorum sources. This is the
// safe floor the genesis fallback guarantees — even here the height is delivered
// honestly (0), and the set@0 is non-empty so a ⅔ quorum finalizes.
func TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAtGenesis(t *testing.T) {
const genesis = uint64(0)
netID := constantsPrimaryNetworkID()
g := make([]blsValidator, 5)
for i := range g {
g[i] = newBLSValidator(t, 20) // equal stake, total 100
}
state := stateByHeight(netID, genesis, map[uint64][]blsValidator{genesis: g})
f := newQuorumEngineFixture(t, netID, state, g[0], map[uint64][]blsValidator{genesis: g})
inner := newFakeInner(42, ids.Empty, "genesis-finalize") // value height advanced past genesis
wrapped, pos := f.proposeViaWrapper(t, inner)
// The block was stamped at the genesis height (0); the position binds set@0.
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != genesis {
t.Fatalf("expected genesis stamp %d, got %d", genesis, got)
}
if pos.ValidatorSetRoot == ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("genesis set-root must be non-Empty (the genesis set is non-empty)")
}
// proposer g[0] self-voted; drive 3 more signed accepts → 4/5 = 80/100 stake > ⅔.
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[1], pos))
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[2], pos))
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[3], pos))
if !waitForCond(2*time.Second, func() bool { return inner.accepted() == 1 }) {
t.Fatalf("UNBRICK: a K>1 block must finalize against the genesis set (VM.Accept=%d)", inner.accepted())
}
if f.certs.count() == 0 {
t.Fatal("a verified quorum cert must be assembled + gossiped at finality")
}
}
// --- (3) K>1 finalizes AFTER a staking change (THE b2 proof) ------------------
// TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAfterStakingChange is the load-bearing b2 proof:
// validators that JOINED after genesis cast the deciding votes + stake, and the
// block finalizes — which is IMPOSSIBLE on the broken set@0 path, where the
// joiners are absent from the genesis set so their votes are dropped and their
// stake is uncounted.
//
// The set@epoch (height 7) holds {g0, j1, j2, j3, j4}: only g0 overlaps genesis;
// j1..j4 JOINED at 7. The genesis set@0 holds five DIFFERENT validators with only
// g0 in common. A 4-voter cert {g0, j1, j2, j3} = 80/100 stake-at-7 > ⅔.
//
// - With the b2 fix: the block is stamped 7, the verifier resolves j1..j3 at
// set@7 (present) and the ⅔ tally is measured at 7 → the cert verifies →
// FINALIZES.
// - On the broken set@0 path: j1..j3 are unknown at height 0 → their signed
// votes are dropped → only g0 (20/100) verifies < ⅔ → STALLS FOREVER.
//
// The test asserts BOTH directly: (a) the block finalizes, and (b) the production
// verifier itself rejects a joiner's vote at height 0 but accepts it at height 7 —
// pinning the exact mechanism that would stall the frozen-set path.
func TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAfterStakingChange(t *testing.T) {
const (
genesis = uint64(0)
epoch = uint64(7) // staking change landed here; current P-chain height = 7
)
netID := constantsPrimaryNetworkID()
// g0 is a validator present at BOTH epochs (so the fixture proposer key resolves
// at the stamped epoch). j1..j4 JOINED at epoch 7. gen1..gen4 are the OTHER four
// genesis validators (present only at 0) — they make set@0 a genuinely different
// set so "the joiners decide" is unambiguous.
g0 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
j1 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
j2 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
j3 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
j4 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
gen1 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
gen2 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
gen3 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
gen4 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
genesisSet := []blsValidator{g0, gen1, gen2, gen3, gen4} // total 100 at height 0
epochSet := []blsValidator{g0, j1, j2, j3, j4} // total 100 at height 7
state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{
genesis: genesisSet,
epoch: epochSet,
})
// (b) PIN THE MECHANISM that makes the frozen path stall: the production verifier
// rejects a joiner at height 0 (frozen/genesis) and accepts it at height 7.
verifier := newBLSVoteVerifier(state, netID)
// Build a position to sign (any height-7-bound position works for this probe).
probeBlk := newFakeInner(123, ids.Empty, "probe")
probeWrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
probeWrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).stage(probeBlk)
probeWrapped, _ := probeWrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
probePos := consensuschain.VotePosition{
ChainID: ids.GenerateTestID(),
Height: probeWrapped.Height(),
BlockID: probeWrapped.ID(),
ParentID: ids.Empty,
ValidatorSetRoot: newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(epoch),
}
probeMsg := consensuschain.CanonicalVoteMessage(probePos)
j1Sig, err := j1.sk.Sign(probeMsg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign probe: %v", err)
}
j1SigBytes := bls.SignatureToBytes(j1Sig)
if verifier.VerifyVote(j1.nodeID, probeMsg, j1SigBytes, genesis) {
t.Fatal("frozen-path mechanism broken: a post-genesis joiner must NOT verify at height 0 " +
"(if it does, the genesis-set path would not actually stall and the test is vacuous)")
}
if !verifier.VerifyVote(j1.nodeID, probeMsg, j1SigBytes, epoch) {
t.Fatal("a joiner present at the epoch MUST verify at the epoch height — the b2 read is broken")
}
// (a) THE END-TO-END FINALIZATION: drive the real engine with the joiners.
f := newQuorumEngineFixture(t, netID, state, g0, map[uint64][]blsValidator{
genesis: genesisSet,
epoch: epochSet,
})
inner := newFakeInner(10_000_000, ids.Empty, "post-staking-change") // value height far ahead
wrapped, pos := f.proposeViaWrapper(t, inner)
// The block carries the LIVE epoch height (7), and the position binds set@7.
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != epoch {
t.Fatalf("block must carry the live epoch height %d, got %d", epoch, got)
}
if pos.ValidatorSetRoot != newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(epoch) {
t.Fatal("position must bind the set-root at the epoch height (set@7), not another height")
}
if pos.ValidatorSetRoot == newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(genesis) {
t.Fatal("test vacuous: set@7 root must differ from set@0 root (the sets must genuinely differ)")
}
// proposer g0 self-voted; the JOINERS j1,j2,j3 cast the deciding votes.
// 4 distinct accepts {g0,j1,j2,j3} = 80/100 stake-at-7 > ⅔ → MUST finalize.
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j1, pos))
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j2, pos))
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j3, pos))
if !waitForCond(3*time.Second, func() bool { return inner.accepted() == 1 }) {
t.Fatalf("b2: a block whose ⅔ quorum is post-genesis JOINERS must finalize against the LIVE set@%d "+
"(VM.Accept=%d). On the broken set@0 path the joiners are unknown → votes dropped → permanent stall.",
epoch, inner.accepted())
}
// The gossiped cert must verify stake-weighted AT THE EPOCH, and must FAIL at
// genesis (where the joiners are absent) — proving the height is load-bearing.
if f.certs.count() == 0 {
t.Fatal("a verified quorum cert must be assembled + gossiped at finality")
}
f.certs.mu.Lock()
lastCert := f.certs.certs[len(f.certs.certs)-1]
f.certs.mu.Unlock()
cert, err := consensuschain.UnmarshalQuorumCert(lastCert)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode gossiped cert: %v", err)
}
stake := newValidatorStakeSource(state, netID)
if err := cert.VerifyWeighted(verifier, stake, epoch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cert must verify stake-weighted at the epoch height %d: %v", epoch, err)
}
if err := cert.VerifyWeighted(verifier, stake, genesis); err == nil {
t.Fatal("b2: cert must NOT verify at the genesis height (joiners absent / below ⅔ there) — " +
"if it does, the epoch height is not actually being used")
}
// The cert must contain at least one joiner — proving a post-genesis validator's
// vote was counted (the exact case the frozen-set path drops).
var hasJoiner bool
for i := range cert.Votes {
if cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j1.nodeID || cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j2.nodeID || cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j3.nodeID {
hasJoiner = true
break
}
}
if !hasJoiner {
t.Fatal("the finality cert must include a post-genesis joiner's vote (it was the deciding quorum)")
}
}
// constantsPrimaryNetworkID returns the primary-network ID the node uses for
// native-chain validator lookups (ids.Empty). Declared here so the test reads the
// SAME net the production wiring resolves native chains against, without importing
// the constants package for one value.
func constantsPrimaryNetworkID() ids.ID { return ids.Empty }