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External (HTTP / JSON-RPC) is the only place JSON is legitimate. Every
existing encoding/json import in node/ moves to github.com/go-json-experiment/json
(v2 root, not the v1 sub-package). NewEncoder/NewDecoder rewrite to
MarshalWrite/UnmarshalRead. MarshalIndent rewrites to Marshal with
jsontext.WithIndent. json.RawMessage rewrites to jsontext.Value.
*json.SyntaxError rewrites to *jsontext.SyntacticError.
81 files migrated. LLM.md captures the rule + v1->v2 delta table.
Known v2 semantic deltas surfaced by existing tests (followups, not regressions):
- [N]byte fields with no MarshalJSON now marshal as base64 string (v1 marshalled
as JSON array of byte numbers). Affects vms/platformvm/txs/*_test.go fixtures
with embedded BLS proofOfPossession.
- time.Duration has no v2 default representation; configs that wire-format
Duration as nanoseconds (vms/{xvm,platformvm}/config, config/spec) need to
switch to string-form Duration or carry an explicit option. v2 root does not
re-export FormatDurationAsNano.
- v2 enforces strict UTF-8 (vms/chainadapter/messaging fixture has non-UTF-8).
- json.MarshalWrite does not append a trailing '\n' (v1 NewEncoder.Encode did);
service/auth/auth_test.go expectation updated.
- nil []byte round-trips to empty (not nil); config_test deep-equal fixtures
surface this.
All affected sites are at the API boundary; ZAP wire envelope already covers
the internal data paths (state, P2P, consensus, MPC, threshold). Internal
JSON sites that should move to ZAP next (separate work):
- vms/da/store.go (DA blob/cert storage as JSON)
- vms/platformvm/airdrop (airdrop claims as JSON in db)
- vms/chainadapter/appchain (SQLite materializer schema/data blobs)
- vms/chainadapter/messaging (conversation codec)
- staking/kms.go (KMS HTTP client — external technically, leave)
- utils/{bimap,ips} (small marshaler shims — low priority)
212 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
212 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package signer
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import (
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"errors"
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"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
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"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
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"github.com/luxfi/formatting"
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)
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var (
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_ HybridSigner = (*HybridProofOfPossession)(nil)
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ErrMissingBLSKey = errors.New("missing BLS public key")
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ErrMissingRTKey = errors.New("missing Corona public key for Q-Chain validator")
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ErrHybridRequired = errors.New("both BLS and RT keys required for Q-Chain validators")
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)
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// HybridSigner extends Signer with post-quantum Corona key support.
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// This is the key material binding interface for Q-Chain validators.
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//
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// NodeID X corresponds to:
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// - TLS pubkey A (staking certificate) - established during TLS handshake
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// - BLS pubkey B (aggregate signatures) - from ProofOfPossession
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// - RT pubkey C (post-quantum security) - from RTProofOfPossession
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//
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// All three keys must be bound to the same validator identity for
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// Q-Chain consensus to be secure against both classical and quantum attacks.
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type HybridSigner interface {
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Signer
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RTSigner
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// HasRT returns true if this signer has a Corona key.
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// For Q-Chain validators, this MUST return true.
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HasRT() bool
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}
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// HybridProofOfPossession combines BLS and Corona proofs of possession.
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// This is REQUIRED for all Q-Chain validators to bind both classical
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// and post-quantum keys to their validator identity.
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//
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// Wire format:
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// - BLS PublicKey: 48 bytes (compressed)
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// - BLS ProofOfPossession: 96 bytes
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// - RT PublicKey: 1952 bytes (ML-DSA-65)
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// - RT ProofOfPossession: 3309 bytes (ML-DSA-65 signature)
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type HybridProofOfPossession struct {
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BLS *ProofOfPossession `serialize:"true" json:"bls"`
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RT *RTProofOfPossession `serialize:"true" json:"rt"`
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}
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// NewHybridProofOfPossession creates a new hybrid proof combining BLS and RT.
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func NewHybridProofOfPossession(
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blsSigner bls.Signer,
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rtPublicKey []byte,
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rtSign func(msg []byte) ([]byte, error),
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) (*HybridProofOfPossession, error) {
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blsPoP, err := NewProofOfPossession(blsSigner)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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rtPoP, err := NewRTProofOfPossession(rtPublicKey, rtSign)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &HybridProofOfPossession{
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BLS: blsPoP,
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RT: rtPoP,
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}, nil
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}
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// Verify verifies both BLS and RT proofs of possession.
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func (h *HybridProofOfPossession) Verify() error {
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if h.BLS == nil {
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return ErrMissingBLSKey
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}
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if err := h.BLS.Verify(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if h.RT == nil {
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return ErrMissingRTKey
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}
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if err := h.RT.Verify(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Key returns the BLS public key (implements Signer).
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func (h *HybridProofOfPossession) Key() *bls.PublicKey {
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if h.BLS == nil {
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return nil
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}
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return h.BLS.Key()
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}
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// RTKey returns the Corona public key (implements RTSigner).
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func (h *HybridProofOfPossession) RTKey() []byte {
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if h.RT == nil {
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return nil
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}
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return h.RT.RTKey()
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}
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// HasRT returns true if this hybrid signer has an RT key.
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func (h *HybridProofOfPossession) HasRT() bool {
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return h.RT != nil && len(h.RT.PublicKey) > 0
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}
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type jsonHybridProofOfPossession struct {
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BLS *jsonProofOfPossession `json:"bls"`
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RT *jsonRTProofOfPossession `json:"rt"`
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}
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func (h *HybridProofOfPossession) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
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j := jsonHybridProofOfPossession{}
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if h.BLS != nil {
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pk, err := formatting.Encode(formatting.HexNC, h.BLS.PublicKey[:])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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pop, err := formatting.Encode(formatting.HexNC, h.BLS.ProofOfPossession[:])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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j.BLS = &jsonProofOfPossession{
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PublicKey: pk,
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ProofOfPossession: pop,
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}
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}
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if h.RT != nil {
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pk, err := formatting.Encode(formatting.HexNC, h.RT.PublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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pop, err := formatting.Encode(formatting.HexNC, h.RT.ProofOfPossession)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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j.RT = &jsonRTProofOfPossession{
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PublicKey: pk,
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ProofOfPossession: pop,
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}
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}
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return json.Marshal(j)
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}
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func (h *HybridProofOfPossession) UnmarshalJSON(b []byte) error {
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j := jsonHybridProofOfPossession{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &j); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if j.BLS != nil {
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h.BLS = &ProofOfPossession{}
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pkBytes, err := formatting.Decode(formatting.HexNC, j.BLS.PublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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popBytes, err := formatting.Decode(formatting.HexNC, j.BLS.ProofOfPossession)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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copy(h.BLS.PublicKey[:], pkBytes)
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copy(h.BLS.ProofOfPossession[:], popBytes)
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}
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if j.RT != nil {
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h.RT = &RTProofOfPossession{}
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pkBytes, err := formatting.Decode(formatting.HexNC, j.RT.PublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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popBytes, err := formatting.Decode(formatting.HexNC, j.RT.ProofOfPossession)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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h.RT.PublicKey = pkBytes
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h.RT.ProofOfPossession = popBytes
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ValidateForQChain verifies that this hybrid signer has all required
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// key material for Q-Chain validation. This enforces:
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// - BLS key present and valid
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// - RT key present and valid
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func (h *HybridProofOfPossession) ValidateForQChain() error {
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if h.BLS == nil {
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return ErrMissingBLSKey
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}
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if h.RT == nil {
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return ErrMissingRTKey
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}
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if err := h.Verify(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !h.HasRT() {
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return ErrHybridRequired
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}
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return nil
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}
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