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Author SHA1 Message Date
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 7c16902cf0 fix(chat): keep guests on chat surface — don't hard-redirect 401s to /login
The axios 401 interceptor hard-redirected to /login whenever a one-shot
refresh yielded no token. A guest (anonymous preview) session carries a
{guest:true} JWT that is valid ONLY on the chat-completion route; every
other endpoint (/api/mcp/servers, /api/files/config, ...) answers 401 by
design. Those expected 401s bounced the guest to /login, wiping the guest
session in an infinite loop, so the landing never rendered the composer.

Derive guest-ness from the active bearer (isGuestSession) and skip the
hard redirect for guests — real users with a truly-expired session still
redirect. Fixes anonymous-guest landing on hanzo.chat.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 15:30:20 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 3e83bc6779 feat(guest): logged-out landing IS the chat composer + airtight per-IP quota (0.9.3)
ChatGPT-style anonymous preview: when ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT is on, a logged-out
visitor renders the real chat view (composer + starter cards + model picker)
and can send a message as a guest on the free Zen model, WITHOUT logging in.
Sign-in is only prompted after the free per-IP quota (402 GUEST_LIMIT).

Client (the missing wiring — server guest path was already complete):
- ChatRoute now renders ChatView for canChat = isAuthenticated || isGuest;
  /api/models + /api/endpoints queries run for guests (guest-scoped config),
  and the roles gate treats a guest as loaded (no agent access). Previously
  ChatRoute hard-returned null for !isAuthenticated, so a guest got the shell
  but no composer.
- useAuthRedirect now surfaces isGuest.

Abuse control (airtight, server-enforced):
- guestMessageLimiter + guestTokenLimiter now key on the REAL client IP via
  utils/guestClientIp (Cloudflare CF-Connecting-IP, falls back to req.ip), NOT
  the guest token — clearing cookies / incognito / minting a fresh token can't
  reset the count. Shared Redis limiterCache holds it across replicas.
- guestLimiters env parsed as positive ints.

Prod runs GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX=2. Guests always use the shared capped HANZO_API_KEY
(per-user hk- billing is skipped for guest principals).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 12:59:48 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 39e5a71c7e chore(chat): release 0.9.2 — design unification (Basel Grotesk + Geist Mono, PanelLeft sidebar, dark tokens)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 08:55:06 -07:00
1eb2caecec fix(mcp): close redirect-based SSRF on MCP request path (backport LibreChat #12931) (#57)
* fix(mcp): block private IPs when the connector resolves all addresses

undici's connect-time DNS lookup calls the SSRF-safe wrapper with
{ all: true }, so dns.lookup returns a LookupAddress[] rather than a
single string. The previous guard only inspected `typeof address ===
'string'`, silently failing open on the array shape — a hostname
resolving to a private/reserved IP would pass unchecked.

Normalize both shapes to a flat address list and reject if ANY resolved
address is private, mirroring upstream LibreChat's getBlockedLookupAddress.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): re-check SSRF on every redirect hop, strip cross-origin creds

An MCP server URL is server-controlled. Our customFetch issued the
request with undici's default redirect:'follow', so a public MCP server
(which passes the add-time isMCPDomainAllowed check) could 301/302/307/
308-redirect the connection to an internal IP literal (169.254.169.254
cloud metadata, 127.0.0.1, in-cluster 10.x/172.16-31/192.168 services).
undici skips its connect-time DNS lookup for IP literals, so the
redirect hop reached the internal target unguarded — a live SSRF on the
multi-tenant chat surface (proven: a 301 to 127.0.0.1/latest/meta-data/
was followed).

Harden createFetchFunction to follow redirects manually (redirect:
'manual'):
- Only 307/308 are followed, up to MAX_REDIRECTS=5; 301/302/303 are
  returned unfollowed (the MCP SDK rejects a bare 3xx).
- Every hop's target is re-validated with isSSRFTarget (catches IP
  literals the connect lookup skips) + resolveHostnameSSRF (catches
  hostnames resolving to private IPs); a blocked hop is not followed.
- Cross-origin hops strip credential headers (Authorization, cookie,
  mcp-session-id, plus runtime/config secret header keys) so a bearer
  token / session id never leaks to a redirect target's origin.
- Cross-origin hops pin an SSRF-safe connect dispatcher for the rest of
  the chain, closing the allowlist-mode DNS-rebinding gap.

Mirrors upstream LibreChat MCP redirect SSRF hardening (PR #12931).
Redirect targets get no allowlist exemption by design.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(mcp): prove redirect SSRF guard rejects internal-IP targets

End-to-end test using the REAL isSSRFTarget/resolveHostnameSSRF
classifiers (the sibling MCPConnectionSSRF suite mocks ~/auth). Stands
up loopback HTTP servers and asserts a 302/307/308 redirect to an
internal IP literal is never followed — the redirect is issued
(entryHit) but the internal metadata endpoint is never reached
(internalHit stays false). Also pins the classifier: 169.254.169.254,
127.0.0.1, RFC1918, localhost, ::1 are SSRF targets; a public hostname
is not.

Reverting the connection.ts guard makes all three redirect cases fail
(internal endpoint reached), confirming the test exercises the fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 08:54:19 -07:00
zandGitHub d44146f1fc Merge pull request #56 from hanzoai/design/unify-basel-geist-mono
design: unify Basel Grotesk + Geist Mono, sidebar icon, panels, dark tokens
2026-07-03 08:46:21 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 dca8e39e69 design: unify sidebar toggle to lucide PanelLeft + Basel/Geist Mono type
Converge hanzo.chat onto the shared @hanzo/ui design language:
- Sidebar toggle glyph: replace the custom filled panel SVG with the
  canonical lucide PanelLeft geometry (stroke-2, 24x24). Kept as the shared
  `Sidebar` export so OpenSidebar/NewChat/ExpandedPanel all get the one
  canonical icon with zero call-site churn.
- Typography: Basel Grotesk (UI/body/display/heading, self-hosted woff2/woff,
  Book 400 + Medium 500) as tailwind `sans`; Geist Mono (code/data) as
  tailwind `mono` via CDN. Replaces Inter / Roboto Mono.

Dark aesthetic already matches the target (true-black OLED #000 / #0a0a0a).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 01:44:36 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 72b061877a config(chat): full multi-provider picker — Zen default + Qwen/Llama/DeepSeek/Mistral/Gemma/GPT-OSS
Mirror the live chat-config CM: house-brand Zen (default zen5-mini) plus the
independent third-party families the gateway serves, current-gen models only
(no sunset zen4). Same api.hanzo.ai/v1 gateway + per-user key → identical
Commerce metering across all families.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 01:12:32 -07:00
zandGitHub 5a3aede148 Merge pull request #55 from hanzoai/polish/chat-empty-state
polish(chat): premium starter cards — Railway × OpenAI (0.9.1)
2026-07-03 01:08:18 -07:00
zandClaude Opus 4.8 4f25c3131a polish(chat): premium starter cards (Railway x OpenAI); 0.9.1
Elevate the empty-state starters from flat chips to a refined 2-col card grid:
lucide icon in a rounded well, hover lift (-translate-y) + soft shadow + border
lightening, smooth 200ms ease-out, focus-visible ring, reduced-motion safe.
Uses existing theme tokens (surface-primary-alt / border-light / text-secondary)
so it tracks light+dark + the monochrome brand. Agent starters render in the
same grid (default icon).

Proper semver: 0.9.0 -> 0.9.1 (patch, visual refinement of the 0.9.0 feature).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 01:07:58 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 512289012c merge(chat): unify → main — true-black theme, Zen ensō logo, /v1 unify, provider families
Brings the true-black OLED dark theme (style.css), the Zen ensō avatar
(ZenLogoIcon replacing the generic robot on the Zen/custom endpoint), the
chat→api.hanzo.ai/v1 unification, and the multi-provider picker (Zen house
brand + open families) onto main for a published build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 01:06:05 -07:00
zandGitHub 3af4415366 Merge pull request #54 from hanzoai/feat/chat-default-starters
feat(chat): default starter prompts on empty state (0.9.0)
2026-07-03 01:01:07 -07:00
zandClaude Opus 4.8 749784a50c feat(chat): default starter prompts on empty state; release 0.9.0
Plain-model chats (e.g. zen5-mini) showed a bare empty state — LibreChat only
rendered conversation starters for agents/assistants. Add 4 curated default
starters as the fallback so every empty chat gets ChatGPT/Claude-style
suggestion chips, wired through the existing useSubmitMessage path (landing-only;
agents that intentionally omit starters are untouched).

Proper semver: v0.8.3-rc1 (rc, non-standard v-prefix) -> 0.9.0 (minor, feature).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 01:00:44 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 26e83d7645 fix(chat): drop Qwen + DeepSeek families (brand policy — Zen upstreams)
Qwen3 and DeepSeek are the upstreams behind Zen's flagship tiers
(zen5-max→qwen3.5-397b, zen5-pro/flash→deepseek-v4-pro/deepseek-4-flash).
Listing a Qwen or DeepSeek family next to Hanzo/Zen reveals the Zen mapping —
the single most forbidden thing in the brand policy. Keep only genuinely
independent open-weight families Zen's flagships don't build on: Meta Llama
and Mistral. Final picker: Hanzo (Zen, default zen5-mini) + Meta Llama +
Mistral. Every model is served by api.hanzo.ai/v1/models and its DO upstream
is verified invocable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 00:41:53 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 662f054658 feat(chat): unified model picker — Zen + open families (Meta/Mistral/DeepSeek/Qwen)
Mirror librechat.yaml to the LIVE chat-config CM (v1.3.4) and add per-family
custom endpoints alongside Hanzo/Zen. Every endpoint is the same
api.hanzo.ai/v1 gateway carrying the per-user HANZO_API_KEY, so metering is
identical across families (the cloud billing gate). Hanzo stays customOrder:0
with the zen5-mini default.

Families listed are the ones the gateway can genuinely invoke today via
DigitalOcean GenAI (funded): Meta Llama, Mistral, DeepSeek, Qwen. OpenAI and
Anthropic branded resale is intentionally omitted — no funded key path exists
yet (direct OPENAI/ANTHROPIC keys unfunded; DO account lacks proprietary
access), so listing them would surface non-invocable models. Documented inline
for a one-block-each add once a funded key/enablement lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 00:27:53 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 150c5fff4d fix(chat): live zen5+zen3 catalog in librechat.yaml mirror (drop sunset zen4)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 23:47:32 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 abe59a625c feat(theme): true-black OLED dark theme + Zen ensō avatar
Dark theme pushed toward black per brand: main canvas #000, panels/sidebar
#050505/#0a0a0a, elevated controls (input, cards) #171717 — remapped the `.dark`
--surface-* + shadcn HSL block onto new near-black gray steps (--gray-925/950/975)
in one place (DRY; the scale, not per-component overrides).

Zen avatar: the custom endpoint (hanzo.chat is Zen-only — Hanzo AI zen* models)
rendered the generic LibreChat "custom" robot glyph because the custom branch
hardcodes CustomMinimalIcon and ignores the endpoint iconURL. Replaced with a
proper ZenLogoIcon (ensō — the single-brushstroke Zen circle, monochrome
currentColor so it reads on true-black), named 'Zen'.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 23:36:18 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 14bb1bf35a fix(landing): drop raw upstream base-model names (brand policy)
The logged-out landing page listed Zen's upstream families (DeepSeek R1,
Qwen3, Llama 4, Phi-4) in the "third-party models" grid and named DeepSeek/
Qwen in the 100+ Models blurb — a brand-policy leak (Zen must present as our
own family; no raw Qwen/DeepSeek/Kimi/Llama/HuggingFace names). Keep only the
genuine independent providers offered via the gateway (GPT-5, Claude Opus 4,
Gemini 2.5, Grok, Mistral Large, Command R+) and lead the blurb with the Zen
family. Ships on next chat image build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 23:28:32 -07:00
zeekayandClaude Opus 4.8 9f6c243327 docs(unify): map chat→api.hanzo.ai/v1 architecture + enforce zen-only picker
Investigate-before-ripping map of hanzo.chat as the cloud "chat view":
- Documents the ONE inference path (POST /api/agents/chat/Hanzo →
  api.hanzo.ai/v1/chat/completions, per-user hk- key, SSE) plus code-exec →
  /v1/exec, websearch → /v1/websearch, cloud agents → /v1/agents. No shadow
  LLM backend; config.yaml/litellm is dead upstream residue.
- Flags the ONE real parallel store: LibreChat Mongo (convos/messages/presets/
  prompts/users/balances/files/sessions). Go backend has casibase-named
  persistence (/v1/get-chats,/v1/add-message) + a speced-but-unimplemented
  chat/openapi.yaml (/v1/chat/convos|messages|presets). Kill path documented;
  do NOT rip Mongo (data loss + dead chat) — coordinate with openapi.
- IAM-native status: prod passport OIDC → hanzo.id (client hanzo-chat), LIVE;
  static SPA mode uses client app-chat (align) on dormant @hanzo/iam ^0.4.0.
- @hanzo/ui (Tailwind/shadcn, chat's stack) vs @hanzo/gui (Tamagui/Next15,
  console's stack): unify via @hanzo/ui, not a framework-swap rewrite.

librechat.yaml: drop gpt-4o/claude from the Hanzo endpoint default so the repo
reference mirrors the authoritative prod ConfigMap — zen-only picker, no raw
upstream names (brand policy). One way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 23:18:09 -07:00
hanzo-dev 34096ffe12 fix(agents): mandatory principal-binding + no OIDC refresh in decoupled session
Red-team hardening of the on-behalf-of decouple:

- cloud.js getUserCloudBearer: bind EVERY forwarded token (id_token AND the
  access_token fallback, session or cookie) via isForwardableToken. Principal
  binding is now MANDATORY (sub === req.user.openidId) with no fail-open when
  openidId/sub is absent, and the access_token fallback is bound too — closes
  the unbound-access_token and null-binding confused-deputy paths.
- AuthService.persistOpenIDTokensToSession: take the OIDC refresh credential
  EXPLICITLY (not from the tokenset). The decoupled default persists only the
  on-behalf-of bearer (id_token/access_token), NOT the OIDC refresh_token, so
  logout keeps using the local cookie -> findSession matches -> the server-side
  session is invalidated (was silently skipped once openidTokens landed in the
  decoupled session). REUSE path unchanged (passes the resolved credential).

Tests: cloud.spec + AuthService.spec green (bound-access, opaque-401,
foreign-401, null-openidId-401, cookie-injection-401, decoupled-omits-refresh).
Pre-existing oauth admin-exchange arity failures untouched (out of scope).
2026-07-02 18:12:25 -07:00
hanzo-dev a12198a01f fix(agents): decouple hanzo.id id_token persistence from the OIDC refresh gate
/api/agents/cloud returned 401 "cloud agents require hanzo.id sign-in" for
EVERY signed-in user: getUserCloudBearer forwarded the id_token read from
req.session.openidTokens, which is only populated by setOpenIDAuthTokens —
called at login solely when OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=true. The live deploy runs
OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=false on purpose (true makes /api/auth/refresh use the OIDC
refresh-grant, which 403s against hanzo.id and breaks login), so the id_token
was never persisted and the cloud-agent run was dead on arrival. One flag
braided two orthogonal concerns: (a) persist the id_token for downstream
on-behalf-of calls, (b) use the OIDC refresh-grant on token refresh.

Decouple:
- AuthService: new persistOpenIDTokensToSession(req, tokenset) — the one writer
  of req.session.openidTokens (server-side only, never a cookie). setOpenIDAuth-
  Tokens now delegates its session write to it (DRY, behavior-preserving).
- oauth login: an OpenID login ALWAYS persists the id_token to the session,
  regardless of OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS. With REUSE disabled the login still runs
  setAuthTokens (local-JWT refresh) so login/refresh cookies are byte-identical;
  only server-side session state is added. Persist is wrapped so it can never
  break the login redirect. OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS now SOLELY gates the refresh-grant.
- cloud proxy: getUserCloudBearer keys off the VALIDATED principal
  (req.user.provider === 'openid'), not the mutable token_provider cookie, so the
  on-behalf-of decision is tied to identity. The forwarded id_token must also name
  req.user (sub === openidId) and be unexpired — expired/absent yields an honest
  401, never a fabricated run. Confused deputy denied at the identity layer.

Durable refresh of the ~1h id_token (hanzo.id/Casdoor OIDC refresh, or an
RFC-8693 token-exchange from the chat session) is a tracked FOLLOW-UP; the
login-breaking refresh-grant is NOT enabled.

Tests (jest): cloud proxy re-keyed to the principal + honest expiry/binding/
confused-deputy (20); oauth persists id_token when REUSE=false, uses the OIDC
writer when true, local user never persists, login survives a persist failure
(4); persistOpenIDTokensToSession session/expiry/no-session/no-tokenset (4).
Refresh path unchanged.

Note: oauth.spec's 2 admin-exchange tests are pre-existing red on origin/main
(spec expects a 7-arg generateAdminExchangeCode; source passes 4) — orthogonal
to this change, proven by a stashed baseline.
2026-07-02 17:43:58 -07:00
hanzo-dev 4abec9f46a harden(agents): rate-limit + load-shed + principal-guard the cloud-agent run proxy
Red review of the cloud /v1/agents run proxy: core security (SSRF, CSRF,
token-exfil, wrong-principal, mount-order, injection) confirmed closed; three
gaps fixed:

- MEDIUM: the run proxy (a real billable cloud completion) escaped the throttle
  guarding the sibling chat-completion path. Add per-user cloudAgentLimiter on
  the whole /cloud router (CLOUD_AGENT_USER_MAX/_WINDOW), a process-wide in-flight
  ceiling with fail-fast 503 (CLOUD_AGENT_MAX_CONCURRENT), and a 4 MiB buffered-
  response cap (Content-Length fast path + streamed abort) so no single call can
  pin the shared backend's memory.
- LOW: only forward OpenID tokens when the request itself is an OpenID login
  (token_provider==='openid'); a local-JWT user with a stale OpenID session can
  no longer run as that prior identity (confused deputy).
- LOW: cap input by UTF-8 BYTE length, not UTF-16 units, matching cloud's maxInput.

Tests: api 34 passed (was 25; +9: principal-guard, cookie-read, byte-cap,
response-cap x3, concurrency-cap x2). eslint clean.
2026-07-02 13:56:56 -07:00
hanzo-dev 7c4c1b676c harden(agents): validate cloud agent :name at the HTTP boundary
Move the cloud handle-grammar guard to the route boundary via router.param,
not only inside CloudAgentsClient. A malformed/decoded :name (traversal,
null byte, CRLF, backslash, space) is now rejected with 400 before any client
call is constructed — defense at the boundary. Production was already safe
(the client rejects the same names), but the guard belongs at the entry point.

Adds boundary-validation tests proving decoded smuggles (../etc, ../admin,
..\evil, %00, %0d, %20) 400 without reaching the client. cloud route 14/14,
CloudAgentsClient 11/11 green.
2026-07-02 00:22:19 -07:00
hanzo-dev 0138889e81 feat(agents): run canonical cloud /v1/agents from chat + mobile builder fixes
Add cloud-agent RUN alongside the existing LibreChat-legacy agent builder
(which is untouched). The canonical registry is cloud /v1/agents; chat now
lets a signed-in user run their OWN cloud agents from the thread via a
/agent <name> [prompt] slash command and via the @mention picker.

Backend (server-side proxy, token never reaches the browser):
- CloudAgentsClient forwards the user's hanzo.id id_token as a Bearer to
  cloud; cloud's SanitizeIdentity (HIP-0026) validates it and pins X-Org-Id
  from the owner claim, so a user only reaches their own org. Not an open
  proxy: fixed host from HANZO_CLOUD_URL (falls back to OPENAI_BASE_URL host),
  three fixed endpoints, agent name validated against cloud's handle grammar
  (traversal/SSRF guard), 128KB input cap, 30s timeout, fail-secure 401 on
  missing token (no service-token fallback).
- /api/agents/cloud/{,:name,:name/run} router, requireJwtAuth (guests rejected),
  honest error passthrough. Mounted before the legacy /:id route.

Frontend (DRY, one run path, reuses Mention/MentionItem):
- useRunCloudAgent renders the run in-thread; parseAgentCommand is the single
  command grammar; /agent and @mention both funnel through it.
- Cloud agents surface in @mention (cloudAgent type) and a /agent popover.

Mobile: AgentConfig responsive padding + full-width wrapping error text +
stacked tool/action buttons; AgentPanel form min-w-0 to stop overflow <768px.

Convergence of chat's /api/agents CRUD onto /v1/agents is a later step.

Tests: CloudAgentsClient (11) + cloud route (7) + parseAgentCommand (8) green.
2026-07-02 00:18:02 -07:00
devandDarkhorse7stars 9ef8cf46a9 fix(analytics): bake VITE_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID into the Vite build
The index.html tracker tag uses %VITE_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID%, substituted by
Vite at build time. The var was never set at build, so the placeholder
shipped literally and the browser POSTed website id '%VITE_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID%'
to analytics.hanzo.ai/api/send -> 400. The CR only set NEXT_PUBLIC_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID
(runtime, wrong prefix + phase for a Vite build). Default the real registered
Hanzo Chat site id as a Docker ARG/ENV so the frontend build bakes it in.
2026-07-01 10:30:00 -05:00
dev 4d96ee9e4d fix(pwa): precache index.html so the SW nav fallback resolves
vite-plugin-pwa's default navigateFallback is 'index.html', so the SW
binds createHandlerBoundToURL('index.html'). index.html was in globIgnores
(not precached) -> 'non-precached-url: index.html' -> the service worker
breaks and strands users on a stale shell after each deploy (they see
/api/* 401s until a manual SW clear). Precache it; registerType:autoUpdate
keeps it fresh on release.
2026-07-01 08:53:07 -05:00
c4f48f6af5 feat(chat): wire Run Code + Web Search to Hanzo unified backend (no external SaaS) (#52)
Both Agent Builder capabilities were 🔑-gated because nothing was wired.

- librechat.yaml: add webSearch{} pinned to Hanzo's own /v1/websearch surface
  — searchProvider=searxng (Hanzo metasearch), scraperProvider=firecrawl
  (Hanzo Crawl), no reranker. NO external Serper/Tavily/Jina/Cohere. Add
  endpoints.agents.capabilities so execute_code + web_search show active.
- .env.hanzo-cloud: the old CODE_EXECUTION_ENDPOINT/RUNTIME_API_KEY were DEAD
  (LibreChat never reads them, and the path was /execute not /exec). Replace
  with the real vars: LIBRECHAT_CODE_BASEURL=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1 +
  LIBRECHAT_CODE_API_KEY (KMS). Add SEARXNG_INSTANCE_URL / FIRECRAWL_API_URL /
  WEBSEARCH_API_KEY -> api.hanzo.ai/v1/websearch.
- .env.example: document the Hanzo-backend vars as the one way; note external
  providers are intentionally disabled.

Validated against the LibreChat Zod configSchema: CONFIG VALID (searxng +
firecrawl + execute_code/web_search capabilities).

Co-authored-by: Hanzo AI <ai@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-30 18:39:33 -07:00
f466b6c2ca fix(chat): treat missing agent_id as ephemeral so 'hi' just replies (#51)
In the agents-centric chat UI ('My Agents'), sending a message with no agent
created/selected POSTed to the agents completion endpoint without an agent_id,
which canAccessAgentFromBody rejected with 400 'agent_id is required in request
body'. A missing agent_id on the agents endpoint is an ad-hoc (ephemeral) chat,
not an error — isEphemeralAgentId(undefined) is already true.

- canAccessAgentFromBody: drop the 400 branch; a missing id falls through the
  existing ephemeral path (no per-agent ACL) to plain chat.
- agents/build.buildOptions: resolve a missing agent_id to EPHEMERAL_AGENT_ID so
  loadAgent builds an ephemeral plain-model agent instead of returning null.
- Hermetic regression specs for both fix points (no Mongo/winston); update the
  stale middleware test that codified the 400.

Logged-in user types 'hi' -> ephemeral agent on the configured default model ->
reply, with no agent build required first.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo AI <ai@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-29 22:07:27 -07:00
z 26591fb2ba docs(brand): add hero banner 2026-06-28 20:06:46 -07:00
z f54d01289b chore(brand): dynamic hero banner 2026-06-28 20:06:45 -07:00
Hanzo AI 1a8456bbb9 fix(chat): surface Hanzo gateway 200 error-envelope instead of crashing the agent run
The Hanzo Cloud gateway (api.hanzo.ai) answers some failures -- most importantly a request for a premium model (e.g. zen5-mini) when the caller's balance is only the $5 starter credit -- with HTTP 200 and a JSON error envelope ({status:"error", msg}) that carries no `choices`. The OpenAI client treated the 200 as success and parsed the choices-less body to `undefined`, so the agent run threw the opaque "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'role')" (and the title call died on reading 'message') -- no AI reply rendered, the generation job expired, and the resume stream 404'd.

Wrap the custom-endpoint OpenAI client fetch (scoped to the Hanzo gateway) so that envelope is rewritten into a clean 402 carrying the gateway's actionable message. Successful SSE streams and normal completions pass through untouched; the request is never inspected, so per-user hk- billing is unaffected.

- packages/api: hanzoGatewayFetch response-only wrapper + wire into initializeCustom + unit tests
2026-06-27 23:48:12 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0dfa7df1da fix(chat): default new conversations to the Hanzo endpoint, not bare agents
A fresh /c/new defaulted to the built-in `agents` endpoint with no agent
selected. All chat routes through POST /api/agents/chat/:endpoint; with
endpoint=agents and no agent_id the access middleware (canAccessAgentFromBody)
returns 400 "agent_id is required in request body" and the SSE stream never
starts — every first message failed with no AI response.

Root cause: orderEndpointsConfig gives built-in `agents` order 1 but defaults
every custom endpoint to order 9999, so the client's getDefaultEndpoint picked
`agents` first. The intended override — a custom endpoint's `customOrder` — was
silently dropped by loadCustomEndpointsConfig (it never emitted `order`), even
though orderEndpointsConfig already types the custom spread as `& { order?: number }`.

Fix: loadCustomEndpointsConfig now honors `customOrder` -> `order`, and the Hanzo
endpoint sets `customOrder: 0` so it outranks `agents`. A new conversation now
defaults to Hanzo, which routes as an ephemeral agent (provider=Hanzo) through
the proven per-user hk- key path (resolveHanzoCloudKey) — real AI response,
metered, no agent_id 400. Agents endpoint stays available for explicit selection.

- packages/api: honor customOrder, widen TCustomEndpointsConfig, + unit test
- librechat.yaml: customOrder: 0 on Hanzo (mirrored in universe chat-config)
2026-06-27 22:22:06 -07:00
Hanzo AI 44d41f6235 fix(billing): auto-$5 starter credit on first chat + per-user billing subject
New-account chat now works end to end, fail-closed, no shared-org bleed:

- resolveHanzoCloudKey computes the canonical per-user billing subject
  (object.BillingSubject parity: 'owner/name' for the shared hanzo catch-all),
  stamps it on req.user, and ensures the one-time $5 Commerce starter credit on
  THAT subject (POST /v1/billing/grant-starter) BEFORE forwarding the user's
  hk- key — so the gateway's first balance check sees $5 instead of 402-ing.
  Idempotent (in-process + commerce tag-dedupe), best-effort (gateway enforces).
- CommerceClient: checkBalance/tier/breakdown key on the subject and derive the
  X-Hanzo-Org namespace from it; replace the wrong-ledger createTrialGrant
  (credit-grants, invisible to /billing/balance) with grantStarter (Deposit).
- balanceMethods gate keys on the per-user subject (req.user.billingSubject).
- Drop chat-side Commerce usage write (single debit = the gateway).
- Remove the dead createTrialGrant call in user.ts (never fired for SSO users,
  wrong ledger).
2026-06-27 17:57:43 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0becb68c80 fix(billing): converge money path on per-user hk- (single debit) + exempt guests
The prior HEAD (4233c8760) was reverted in the preceding commit: it rewrote the
gate to forward the user's IAM JWT to commerce AND added a chat-side
spendTokens -> /v1/billing/usage decrement. With per-user hk- forwarding ON,
that double-debits (cloud gateway debits the org via the user's hk- key, AND
chat debits the same org via spendTokens). One money authority only: the cloud
gateway debits via the per-user hk- key; chat's balanceMethods is a READ-ONLY,
fail-closed pre-flight gate (service token + X-Hanzo-Org, the proven pattern).

This commit adds the one missing piece for the anon free tier: guests are
exempt from the balance gate. Guests hit checkBalance via BaseClient
(supportsBalanceCheck[custom]=true) with no billing org; under startBalance:0
the legacy local gate would block the free tier entirely. Their spend is
bounded instead by (1) the per-IP guest message limiter and (2) the separate,
small-capped, NON-exempt guest key (HANZO_API_KEY) the gateway 402s when empty.

Tests: fail-closed decision matrix (funded/insufficient/unavailable/
model_not_allowed/no-org) + guest exemption. 8/8 green.
2026-06-27 12:26:37 -07:00
Hanzo AI 04210dea16 Revert "fix(billing): IAM-native, fail-closed AI metering (stop unmetered leak)"
This reverts commit 4233c8760f.
2026-06-27 12:21:31 -07:00
Hanzo AI 4233c8760f fix(billing): IAM-native, fail-closed AI metering (stop unmetered leak)
Commerce is already IAM-native + multi-tenant; chat was sending a static
service token (not a JWT) so commerce 401'd and the balance check fell open =
unmetered AI. Rewire to forward the logged-in user's hanzo.id IAM JWT per
request and fail CLOSED.

- CommerceClient: drop the static COMMERCE_TOKEN singleton; every call carries
  the user's IAM JWT (Authorization: Bearer). getMyBalance (fail-closed read),
  grantWelcome ($5 idempotent), recordUsage (decrement). getIamToken/
  getBillingOrg/computeUsageCents/recordCommerceSpend helpers.
- balanceMethods.checkBalance: IAM-native money gate, FAIL CLOSED — no token /
  commerce-unreachable / below-min => refuse. Funded user passes. Self-heals a
  new account by granting the idempotent $5 once and re-reading (a spent wallet
  stays blocked — grant is tag-deduped).
- spendTokens / spendStructuredTokens: decrement the user's per-org commerce
  balance, mirroring the local ledger cost; threaded from the agent spend sites.
- openidStrategy: grant the $5 welcome credit on new-account signup under the
  user's IAM identity (synchronous, best-effort).
- Balance controller: surface the authoritative commerce balance (display).
- Tests: fail-closed/fail-open decision matrix + cost mirror (12 cases).

Requires OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=true (chat CR) so the IAM JWT is on the request,
and COMMERCE_EDGE_AUTH=true + hanzo-chat audience (commerce CR).
2026-06-27 11:21:52 -07:00
Hanzo AI d20ba76651 fix(billing): per-user hk- key forwarding + commerce-first fail-closed balance gate (stop the bleed)
hanzo.chat money path. Previously every authenticated chat ran on z's shared
hk- key (hanzo/z) against the shared 'hanzo' commerce org, plus a $5 local
startBalance per user and a fail-OPEN balance gate -> unbounded free spend.

- Per-user billing: resolve (mint on first chat) each authenticated user's OWN
  hk- key from IAM by org+email and forward it to the gateway, which debits
  THEIR org. New packages/api/src/endpoints/custom/hanzoCloudKey.ts; injected at
  the single apiKey chokepoint in custom/initialize.ts. FAIL CLOSED: an authed
  user whose key cannot be resolved is blocked, never falls back to the shared
  key. The resolver also stamps the authoritative billing org back onto req.user
  (OIDC 'owner' can be the Casdoor super-org 'admin', not the real billing org).
- Balance gate commerce-first + FAIL CLOSED + decisive (balanceMethods.js):
  when commerce is configured and the user's org is known, the org's commerce
  balance is authoritative (>= HANZO_MIN_BALANCE); insufficient/unreachable ->
  block. No fall-through to local tokenCredits, so startBalance:0 cannot
  false-block a funded user. CommerceClient balance read is now fail-closed
  (throws on cold error) and per-org scoped (X-Hanzo-Org).
- startBalance: 0 (librechat.yaml): no free local credits; new users claim $5
  at billing.hanzo.ai. Client shows a claim-credit link on empty balance.

Gated by HANZO_PER_USER_KEY=true (reuses OPENID_* client creds for IAM).
2026-06-27 10:59:29 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3e36ede65d fix(theme): monochrome UI — neutralize blue-hued tokens (222/215/220 → 0 0%) + #2563eb ring/border → gray
The dark theme tinted all panels/sidebar blue via --background/--card/--border/
--input/--muted/--accent at hue 222 (and ring #2563eb). Neutralized to 0%
saturation (grayscale) to match the Hanzo monochrome brand.
2026-06-26 23:42:25 -07:00
Hanzo AI 18f3d9ce80 fix(brand): convert residual landing-page red accents to monochrome white
The monochrome rebrand changed the LandingPage `colors` object + login CTAs
but left 8 inline rgba(253,68,68,…) (#fd4444) accents — hero gradient,
"AI Chat Platform" badge border, Zen-models card border/bg + hover, and the
"Free credit" pricing tier border/bg/label. Convert all to rgba(255,255,255,…)
(preserving alpha), matching the existing white monochrome accents. The
terminal traffic-light dots (bg-red/yellow/green-500) already render grey via
the tailwind color-scale remap. Landing is now fully black/white/grey.
2026-06-26 19:45:46 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5578ef924d feat(brand): monochrome Hanzo rebrand — feather→H-mark, white CTAs, canonical favicon
Replace the upstream LibreChat feather/quill brand fallback with the
official Hanzo ▼/H mark (currentColor, monochrome) across every agent and
endpoint icon path (Landing welcome via ConvoIcon→AgentAvatar, agent
avatars, message + minimal icons).

Collapse all Tailwind color scales (green/red/blue/sky/…/rose) to a single
neutral grey ramp so UI chrome is black/white/grey only; destructive
semantics keep one muted red via --text-destructive. Convert the green
Create/Save CTAs (Add-MCP-Server dialog, Agent + Assistant builders,
preset and API-key dialogs) and .btn-primary to the adaptive
white-on-dark primary button.

Set favicon/PWA assets to the canonical hanzo.app ▼/H set (favicon.ico
byte-identical to hanzo.app) and the manifest theme_color to monochrome.

Tests: 34 passed — Hanzo-mark fallback assertions updated.
2026-06-26 19:19:23 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5e0b6038af chore(iam): unify @hanzo/iam to ^0.13.1; BrowserIamSdk->IAM (localStorage PKCE login fix)
client/package.json: ^0.4.0 -> ^0.13.1 (npm latest). 0.13.x moves the PKCE tx (state+verifier) from sessionStorage to localStorage so it survives the OAuth redirect, fixing login.

iam.ts: BrowserIamSdk class renamed to IAM. Import bare '@hanzo/iam' (not the '/browser' subpath): the client tsconfig uses moduleResolution=node, which cannot resolve the exports subpath for types; the bare entry (dist/index.d.ts) re-exports IAM and Vite still bundles dist/browser.js via the browser export condition. Constructor config (IAMConfig) is unchanged.

OAuthCallback.tsx: IAMToken fields camelCased in 0.13 (access_token -> accessToken); without this the callback never set the auth header.

Lockfile: pnpm-lock.yaml regenerated (authoritative per packageManager=pnpm@10.27.0 + Dockerfile 'pnpm install --frozen-lockfile'). package-lock.json/bun.lock left untouched (not consumed by any build or CI).
2026-06-26 13:11:15 -07:00
a5a2498997 fix(oauth): scope loginLimiter to initiation routes, not OIDC callbacks (fixes 429 on code exchange) (#42)
Co-authored-by: Antje Worring <worringantje@gmail.com>
2026-06-25 15:22:56 -07:00
Antje Worring dbed3bf2fb fix(csp): allow analytics + Cloudflare beacon scripts, fonts, media
The CSP script-src was 'self' only, blocking the app's own
analytics.hanzo.ai/script.js and static.cloudflareinsights.com beacon, plus a
data: font and assets/silence.mp3 (console errors + broken assets on every
page load). Allow-list the two external script hosts in script-src/connect-src
and add font-src/media-src for data:/blob:.
2026-06-23 18:05:34 -07:00
Antje Worring 462dbfdc84 fix(branding): canonical @hanzo blocky-H assets/logo.svg (replace placeholder 24x24 H)
The OIDC/model iconURL and OPENID_IMAGE_URL point at hanzo.chat/assets/logo.svg;
that asset was still a made-up 24x24 single-path H. Replace with the canonical
64x64 blocky-H (5 paths) byte-matching @hanzo/brand — matches what the live
0.7.12 image serves.
2026-06-23 14:29:53 -07:00
hanzoandAntje Worring c2aff88ca6 fix(branding): real @hanzo blocky-H logo+favicon, dev-only devtools, working OIDC button icon
- App.jsx: gate ReactQueryDevtools behind import.meta.env.DEV via lazy dynamic
  import so the devtools floating button (red flower) never ships in prod.
- librechat.yaml + compose.prod.yml: OIDC/model iconURL & OPENID_IMAGE_URL
  hanzo.ai/logo/icon.svg (404) -> hanzo.chat/assets/logo.svg (served, canonical).
- index.html: add scalable SVG favicon (canonical blocky-H) as primary icon.
- post-build.cjs: copy favicon.ico into dist root so /favicon.ico serves.
- add real multi-size favicon.ico generated from @hanzo/brand favicon (blocky-H).

logo.svg/favicons already match @hanzo/brand canonical blocky-H byte-for-byte;
prod was serving a stale dist (title 'Chat', no assets) -> fresh build fixes.
2026-06-23 14:29:53 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 05396959ae Merge pull request #50 from hanzoai/fix/guest-bootstrap-endpoints
fix(guest): UI-bootstrap endpoints serve guest-scoped data (fix HTTP 500 → working composer)
2026-06-21 14:12:49 -07:00
zeekay da475d299b feat(guest): serve guest-scoped data on UI-bootstrap endpoints
The composer hard-requires a handful of read-only bootstrap calls. Switch
exactly those to requireGuestOrJwtAuth and add a guest branch that returns
safe, scoped data — never a DB lookup, never another user's data:

- GET /api/endpoints  → ONLY the guest endpoint (Hanzo)
- GET /api/models     → ONLY the single guest model
- GET /api/user       → ephemeral guest principal (no email)
- GET /api/convos     → empty conversation page
- GET /api/user/settings/favorites → []
- GET /api/agents/chat/active      → { activeJobIds: [] }

Every mutation and read-by-id route stays JWT-only and rejects guests with
a clean 401 (post jwt-strategy fix). Banner (optionalJwtAuth) now resolves
with no user for guests. Adds controller + full-chain integration tests.
2026-06-21 14:10:21 -07:00
zeekay 2e794d3228 feat(guest): central guest principal + scoped-config builders
Single source of truth in guestConfig.js for the ephemeral guest shape:
- buildGuestPrincipal(id): plain GUEST req.user (no DB id/email)
- buildGuestUser: safe /api/user payload (name 'Guest', no email)
- buildGuestEndpointsConfig: ONLY the configured guest endpoint
- buildGuestModelsConfig: ONLY the single configured guest model

requireGuestOrJwtAuth now builds its principal from buildGuestPrincipal
(adds name 'Guest'), keeping the guest shape DRY across auth and bootstrap.
2026-06-21 14:10:12 -07:00
zeekay 9cd97355fe fix(guest): jwt strategy rejects guest tokens cleanly (no CastError → 500)
The guest JWT carries a synthetic `guest_<uuid>` id that is not a Mongo
ObjectId. On any requireJwtAuth route the 'jwt' passport strategy called
getUserById(guest_id) → Mongoose CastError → done(err) → HTTP 500.

Detect the `guest: true` claim at the top of the verify callback and
return done(null, false) before any DB lookup. Guest tokens now fail the
strict strategy with a clean 401, and reach their scoped routes only via
requireGuestOrJwtAuth. Fail closed by construction.
2026-06-21 14:10:05 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub b70c5400a2 Merge pull request #49 from hanzoai/fix/guest-route-guard
fix(guest): route guard honors guest mode (composer for logged-out)
2026-06-21 13:45:38 -07:00
zeekay 8a89cfed07 fix(guest): useAuthRedirect must honor guest mode (stop bouncing guests to /login)
The chat route guard redirected any !isAuthenticated user to /login on a
300ms timer, ignoring isGuest/allowGuestChat and beating startup-config
load — so logged-out guests never reached the composer. Wait for config,
and skip the redirect when guest chat is enabled or the user is a guest.
2026-06-21 13:45:32 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub c3114a1258 Merge pull request #48 from hanzoai/fix/guest-acquire-race
fix(guest): acquire guest session when allowGuestChat resolves (fixes landing-page race)
2026-06-21 13:26:05 -07:00
zeekay 821b3b59a2 fix(guest): acquire guest session when allowGuestChat config resolves
silentRefresh's guest fallback could run before startupConfig loaded
(allowGuestChat undefined) and was never retried, leaving logged-out
visitors on the landing page instead of the guest composer. Add a
dedicated effect that acquires the guest token once the flag is true.
2026-06-21 13:25:59 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 8a6c63a869 Merge pull request #47 from hanzoai/feat/guest-chat
feat(guest): anonymous guest preview chat (opt-in, fail-closed)
2026-06-21 12:52:28 -07:00
zeekay 86ecab135e docs(guest): document guest-chat env vars and security model 2026-06-21 12:46:56 -07:00
zeekay 196e3c3d61 feat(guest): client guest-chat mode + login gate
When unauthenticated and startupConfig.allowGuestChat is set, acquire a
guest token on load and render the chat composer instead of the landing
gate. On a 402 GUEST_LIMIT response, surface GuestLimitDialog which
triggers the existing OpenID/hanzo.id login flow.

- useGuestAuth: acquires an ephemeral guest session via dataService.
- AuthContext: isGuest state; guest fallback in silentRefresh; userQuery
  and silentRefresh disabled for guests (capability-scoped).
- Root: render chat for guests (auth-gated hooks stay disabled); mount
  GuestLimitDialog.
- useResumableSSE: dispatch guestLimitReached on 402 GUEST_LIMIT.
2026-06-21 12:46:56 -07:00
zeekay 46b636c8c0 feat(guest): server-side anonymous guest chat (fail-closed, scoped)
Add an opt-in anonymous preview mode gated behind ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT
(default off). Guests get a per-IP free quota (GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX,
default 3) on the free Zen model via the Hanzo gateway endpoint.

- POST /api/auth/guest issues a short-lived guest JWT ({guest:true},
  per-token random id) signed with JWT_SECRET; rate-limited per IP.
- requireGuestOrJwtAuth accepts guest tokens ONLY on the chat-completion
  router; the standard jwt strategy rejects them everywhere else.
- enforceGuestScope pins endpoint+model to the free Zen endpoint and
  strips agents/tools/files/spec/preset server-side.
- guestMessageLimiter enforces the per-IP quota via the shared Redis
  limiterCache; returns 402 {type:'GUEST_LIMIT'} on exhaustion.
- Reserved chat subpaths (stream/active/status/abort) stay JWT-only.
- Expose allowGuestChat/guestMessageMax in /api/config; add GUEST role.

Tests: 27 unit/integration tests covering config, guest auth wrapper,
scope enforcement, quota, and the router chain.
2026-06-21 12:46:27 -07:00
0cc792d02d fix(agents): stop post-reply error banner from nulled config.configurable (#46)
run.processStream (@librechat/agents >= 3.1.52) treats the passed config as
owned and, in its post-stream cleanup, sets config.configurable = undefined to
break the AsyncLocalStorage -> LangGraph reference chain that keeps heavy graph
state (base64 images/PDFs) alive (agents dist/esm/run.mjs:239). Reading
config.configurable.hide_sequential_outputs AFTER runAgents() therefore threw
"Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'hide_sequential_outputs')",
caught by chatCompletion and pushed as an ERROR content part -- the red
post-reply banner. The same throw aborted the post-stream finalize, which is
why auto-titling also stopped.

Hoist the read to before runAgents() (the value is a static agent property only
needed afterward by the deprecated Agent Chain output filter), so it no longer
depends on post-run config state. Matches upstream LibreChat's fix
(PR #11942, a0f9782e6).

Adds a regression test that reproduces the mutation (processStream nulls
config.configurable) and asserts no ERROR content part is produced, plus
coverage for the hide_sequential_outputs true/false filter behavior.

Co-authored-by: Antje Worring <worringantje@gmail.com>
2026-06-21 10:28:01 -07:00
zeekay ca632b467f chore: restore upstream attribution + NOTICE (OSS compliance) 2026-06-21 02:10:07 -07:00
9df97c7393 fix(deps): dedupe @ariakit/react to a single instance (fixes chat Nav crash) (#44)
After the session-handoff fix let authenticated users reach /c/new, the
chat Nav crashed the whole route with react-router-looking 'Invariant
failed' — actually an Ariakit invariant: useMenuButton(store||context,
false). Root cause: two @ariakit/react copies in the bundle — the app
(client, ^0.4.15 -> 0.4.23) and @librechat/client (packages/client,
^0.4.16 -> nested 0.4.21). DropdownPopup (from @librechat/client) creates
<MenuProvider> in one Ariakit instance; BookmarkNav's <MenuButton> reads
the MenuProvider context of the *other* instance -> empty -> invariant ->
ErrorBoundary 'Oops! Something Unexpected Occurred'.

Pin @ariakit/react to a single 0.4.29 (latest 0.4.x; satisfies both
^0.4.15 and ^0.4.16) via overrides + pnpm.overrides so app and
@librechat/client share one Ariakit module/context. Verified:
@librechat/client + client (Vite) rebuild green; lockfile now resolves a
single @ariakit/react@0.4.29 with no nested copy.

Co-authored-by: Antje Worring <worringantje@gmail.com>
2026-06-21 00:42:56 -07:00
879bba70dd fix(spa): restore native /api/* data layer so OIDC session establishes (#43)
The data-provider had been rewired to a non-existent api.hanzo.ai 'cloud
gateway' surface (/v1/get-account, /v1/get-chats, /v1/signin, ZAP WebSocket).
The deployed backend is stock LibreChat serving /api/* — so the SPA's silent
refresh hit GET /v1/get-account, got the index.html shell back (no token/user),
left isAuthenticated=false, and Root rendered the marketing LandingPage even
for fully OIDC-authenticated users. Every chat/model/convo call was equally
broken against the live backend.

- api-endpoints.ts: restore the LibreChat-native /api/* endpoint surface
  (refresh -> POST /api/auth/refresh, user -> /api/user, convos -> /api/convos,
  models/presets/prompts/config/endpoints, etc). Drop dead Vite import.meta
  base-url branches (unused in deploy; also unblocks Jest/CJS) while keeping
  same-origin <base>/relative resolution + setApiBaseUrl override.
- request.ts: refresh via POST /api/auth/refresh (native), keep withCredentials
  so the httpOnly refreshToken cookie is sent; retain pk- key helpers.
- config.ts: EndpointURLs stream submit -> /api/{agents,assistants}/chat.

Verified: tsc clean, 666/666 data-provider tests pass (2 pre-existing
import.meta-broken suites now green), data-provider + api + client-package +
client (Vite) all build.

Co-authored-by: Antje Worring <worringantje@gmail.com>
2026-06-21 00:17:59 -07:00
ba982d26e1 fix(api): restore deleted Message/Conversation/Preset/Prompt models (runtime MODULE_NOT_FOUND) (#41)
The upstream LibreChat consolidation (#11830) deleted api/models/{Message,
Conversation,Preset,Prompt}.js and moved their logic into @librechat/data-schemas'
createMethods. A later conflict-resolution merge (73d4b423a) reverted the
data-schemas createMethods composition back to the pre-consolidation form (so it
no longer provides message/conversation/preset/prompt methods) but did NOT restore
the deleted api/models/*.js files. The result is a half-applied consolidation:

  - api/models/index.js still requires ./Message, ./Conversation, ./Preset
  - api/server/middleware/error.js, .../abortRun.js, .../fork.js, prompt access
    guards, etc. still require('~/models/Message' | '~/models/Conversation' |
    '~/models/Prompt')
  - but those files no longer exist -> backend crashes at startup with
    MODULE_NOT_FOUND (api/models/index.js:13 -> ./Message), crashlooping the pod.

Frontend build + jest passed because they never exercised this require chain.

Fix: restore the four model files from their last good pre-#11830 revision
(214252d2e, on this branch's own ancestry, so namespaces match HEAD:
@librechat/data-schemas, librechat-data-provider, ~/db/models), updating only the
@librechat/api import to @hanzochat/api to match the forked package (#36).

Verified locally with module-alias registered as the server does:
  require('./models') loads (138 exports, all message/convo/preset present);
  the full crash chain models -> banViolation -> logViolation -> cache ->
  db/indexSync -> server/middleware/error resolves with no MODULE_NOT_FOUND;
  @hanzochat/api still exports handleError/sendEvent/createTempChatExpirationDate/
  escapeRegExp/sanitizeMessageForTransmit.

Co-authored-by: Antje Worring <worringantje@gmail.com>
2026-06-20 01:10:16 -07:00
164 changed files with 6469 additions and 972 deletions
+40 -19
View File
@@ -117,6 +117,17 @@ PROXY=
# Endpoint: https://api.hanzo.ai/v1
HANZO_API_KEY=
# Canonical Hanzo Cloud agents (/v1/agents). Lets signed-in users run their own
# cloud agents from chat via `/agent <name>` or the @mention picker. The chat
# backend proxies /api/agents/cloud/* to this host, forwarding the user's
# hanzo.id token server-side (never to the browser); cloud scopes to their org.
# Optional: if unset, derived from OPENAI_BASE_URL (its host, minus /v1).
# HANZO_CLOUD_URL=https://api.hanzo.ai
# A cloud-agent run is a real billable completion; these bound abuse of the proxy.
# CLOUD_AGENT_USER_MAX=30 # max cloud-agent requests per user per window
# CLOUD_AGENT_WINDOW=1 # rate-limit window, minutes
# CLOUD_AGENT_MAX_CONCURRENT=50 # process-wide in-flight ceiling to cloud (503 past it)
#===================================#
# Known Endpoints - chat.yaml #
#===================================#
@@ -463,6 +474,21 @@ ALLOW_REGISTRATION=true
ALLOW_SOCIAL_LOGIN=false
ALLOW_SOCIAL_REGISTRATION=false
ALLOW_PASSWORD_RESET=false
#=====================================================#
# Guest Chat (anonymous preview) #
#=====================================================#
# Off by default. When enabled, unauthenticated visitors get a small free
# quota on the free Zen model routed through api.hanzo.ai. After the quota is
# spent the UI surfaces the existing OpenID/hanzo.id login. Guests are scoped
# server-side to the free model only and rejected from every other route.
ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT=false
# GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX=3 # free messages per IP before login is required
# GUEST_ENDPOINT=Hanzo # custom endpoint name from librechat.yaml (api.hanzo.ai)
# GUEST_MODEL=zen3-nano # free Zen model id guests are pinned to
# GUEST_TOKEN_EXPIRY=3600000 # guest JWT lifetime in ms (default 1h)
# GUEST_TOKEN_MAX=20 # max guest sessions issued per IP per window
# GUEST_TOKEN_WINDOW=60 # guest-session issuance window in minutes
# ALLOW_ACCOUNT_DELETION=true # note: enabled by default if omitted/commented out
ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL_LOGIN=true
@@ -810,31 +836,26 @@ OPENWEATHER_API_KEY=
# Hanzo Chat Code Interpreter API #
#====================================#
# https://hanzo.ai/docs/chat/code-interpreter
# LIBRECHAT_CODE_API_KEY=your-key
# "Run Code" routes through the Hanzo unified backend (api.hanzo.ai/v1/exec),
# which executes in a Hanzo sandbox. execute_code POSTs {BASEURL}/exec with
# X-API-Key. https://hanzo.ai/docs/chat/code-interpreter
# LIBRECHAT_CODE_BASEURL=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1
# LIBRECHAT_CODE_API_KEY=your-key # prod: KMS chat-secrets/LIBRECHAT_CODE_API_KEY
#======================#
# Web Search #
#======================#
# Note: All of the following variable names can be customized.
# Omit values to allow user to provide them.
# For more information on configuration values, see:
# Web Search routes through the Hanzo unified backend ONLY — no external SaaS.
# The searxng provider + firecrawl scraper both point at api.hanzo.ai/v1/websearch
# (Hanzo metasearch + Hanzo Crawl). See librechat.yaml `webSearch`.
# https://hanzo.ai/docs/chat/features/web_search
# Search Provider (Required)
# SERPER_API_KEY=your_serper_api_key
# Scraper (Required)
# FIRECRAWL_API_KEY=your_firecrawl_api_key
# Optional: Custom Firecrawl API URL
# FIRECRAWL_API_URL=your_firecrawl_api_url
# Reranker (Required)
# JINA_API_KEY=your_jina_api_key
# or
# COHERE_API_KEY=your_cohere_api_key
# SEARXNG_INSTANCE_URL=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/websearch
# FIRECRAWL_API_URL=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/websearch
# WEBSEARCH_API_KEY=your-key # prod: KMS chat-secrets/WEBSEARCH_API_KEY
#
# Do NOT set SERPER_API_KEY / TAVILY_API_KEY / JINA_API_KEY / COHERE_API_KEY:
# external providers are intentionally disabled (one way, unified backend).
#======================#
# MCP Configuration #
+13 -3
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,19 @@
OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-hanzo-your-api-key-here
OPENAI_BASE_URL=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1
# Runtime Execution (Code Interpreter)
CODE_EXECUTION_ENDPOINT=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/execute
RUNTIME_API_KEY=${OPENAI_API_KEY}
# Code Interpreter ("Run Code") — Hanzo unified backend.
# LibreChat's execute_code tool POSTs {LIBRECHAT_CODE_BASEURL}/exec with header
# X-API-Key. cloud-api serves /v1/exec (-> sandboxed executor). The key is
# KMS-sourced (chat-secrets/LIBRECHAT_CODE_API_KEY). These are the ONLY vars
# LibreChat reads — the old CODE_EXECUTION_ENDPOINT/RUNTIME_API_KEY were dead.
LIBRECHAT_CODE_BASEURL=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1
LIBRECHAT_CODE_API_KEY=set-in-KMS-chat-secrets
# Web Search — Hanzo unified backend (searxng + firecrawl compat over Hanzo
# search + crawl). See librechat.yaml `webSearch`. One shared service key.
SEARXNG_INSTANCE_URL=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/websearch
FIRECRAWL_API_URL=https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/websearch
WEBSEARCH_API_KEY=set-in-KMS-chat-secrets
# ====== BRANDING ======
APP_TITLE=Hanzo Chat
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1280" height="640" viewBox="0 0 1280 640" role="img" aria-label="chat">
<rect width="1280" height="640" fill="#0A0A0A"/>
<svg x="96" y="215" width="210" height="210" viewBox="0 0 67 67"><path d="M22.21 67V44.6369H0V67H22.21Z" fill="#fff"/><path d="M66.7038 22.3184H22.2534L0.0878906 44.6367H44.4634L66.7038 22.3184Z" fill="#fff"/><path d="M22.21 0H0V22.3184H22.21V0Z" fill="#fff"/><path d="M66.7198 0H44.5098V22.3184H66.7198V0Z" fill="#fff"/><path d="M66.7198 67V44.6369H44.5098V67H66.7198Z" fill="#fff"/></svg>
<text x="378" y="276" font-family="Inter,system-ui,-apple-system,sans-serif" font-size="78" font-weight="800" letter-spacing="-2" fill="#ffffff">chat</text>
<text x="378" y="322" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".66">AI chat with MCP integration and multi-provider support</text>
<rect x="378" y="338" width="806" height="3" rx="1.5" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".9"/>
<text x="378" y="390" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="24" font-weight="600" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".5">github.com/hanzoai</text>
<text x="1184" y="390" text-anchor="end" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="24" font-weight="600" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".5">hanzo.ai</text>
</svg>

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 1.3 KiB

+9
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,15 @@ RUN \
COPY --chown=node:node . .
# Bake the Umami analytics website id into the Vite build so the index.html
# %VITE_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID% placeholder is substituted at build time. Vite's HTML
# env replacement (loadEnv, envPrefix includes VITE_) picks this up from process.env.
# Without it the tracker POSTs a literal "%VITE_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID%" as the website
# id and analytics.hanzo.ai/api/send answers 400. Public site identifier (it appears
# in the served HTML), safe to default here; override with --build-arg if needed.
ARG VITE_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID=2f72b944-f1f8-4d2d-8f6c-26063bde0d1a
ENV VITE_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID=$VITE_ANALYTICS_SITE_ID
RUN \
# React client build with configurable memory
NODE_OPTIONS="--max-old-space-size=${NODE_MAX_OLD_SPACE_SIZE}" pnpm run frontend; \
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Portions of this software are licensed as follows:
---
MIT License
Copyright (c) 2023 LibreChat (Danny Avila)
Copyright (c) 2023 Hanzo AI Inc
Originally based on LibreChat by Berri AI.
+206
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@@ -90,6 +90,212 @@ CREDS_KEY= CREDS_IV= # Credential encryption
- `uv` bundled for MCP server support
- `dompurify` must be in `client/package.json` (externalized by bundler)
## Guest Chat (anonymous preview)
Off by default (`ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT=false`). When enabled, the landing IS the chat
composer (ChatGPT-style): an unauthenticated visitor renders the real chat view —
composer, starter cards, model picker — WITHOUT logging in, scoped to the free
Zen model (`GUEST_MODEL`, default `zen3-nano`) via the `Hanzo` custom endpoint
(`api.hanzo.ai`). Prod uses `GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX=2`. Exhausting the quota returns
`402 {type:'GUEST_LIMIT'}` and the client opens the existing OpenID/hanzo.id login.
Client render path (guest === chat, not a marketing gate):
- `AuthContext` auto-acquires a guest token when `startupConfig.allowGuestChat`
is true (`silentRefresh` fallback + a dedicated effect closing the config race);
sets `isGuest=true`, `isAuthenticated=false`. `useAuthRedirect` keeps guests on
the chat surface (only truly anonymous, non-guest, non-guest-enabled users go to
`/login`). `Root` shows the chat shell for `isAuthenticated || isGuest`.
- `ChatRoute` renders `ChatView` for `canChat = isAuthenticated || isGuest`; the
`/api/models` + `/api/endpoints` queries run for guests (both routes use
`requireGuestOrJwtAuth` and return the guest-scoped single-model config), and the
roles gate treats a guest as loaded (guests have no agent access). Files:
`client/src/routes/{ChatRoute,useAuthRedirect}.tsx`, `hooks/useGuestAuth.ts`,
`hooks/AuthContext.tsx`, `components/Auth/GuestLimitDialog.tsx`.
Security model (fail-closed, server-enforced):
- `POST /api/auth/guest` issues a short-lived guest JWT (`{guest:true}`,
per-token random id) signed with `JWT_SECRET`. Rate-limited per IP
(`guestTokenLimiter`, `GUEST_TOKEN_MAX`/`GUEST_TOKEN_WINDOW`) so tokens can't be
spam-minted.
- `requireGuestOrJwtAuth` (chat-completion route ONLY) accepts guest tokens;
the standard `jwt` strategy rejects them everywhere else (no DB user), so
every other route stays closed. `enforceGuestScope` pins endpoint+model and
strips agents/tools/files/spec/preset. Guests always use the shared, capped
`HANZO_API_KEY` (per-user `hk-` billing is skipped for `guest` principals).
- `guestMessageLimiter` enforces the quota against the REAL client IP
(`utils/guestClientIp` → Cloudflare `CF-Connecting-IP`, falls back to `req.ip`),
NOT the token — clearing cookies / incognito / minting a fresh token does NOT
reset it. Backed by the shared Redis `limiterCache` so it holds across replicas.
`USE_REDIS=true` is MANDATORY (a memory store would let a visitor round-robin
pods to multiply their quota).
- Key files: `api/server/services/guestConfig.js`,
`api/server/controllers/auth/GuestController.js`,
`api/server/middleware/{requireGuestOrJwtAuth,enforceGuestScope}.js`,
`api/server/middleware/limiters/{guestLimiters,guestMessageLimiter}.js`,
`api/server/utils/guestClientIp.js`,
router wiring in `api/server/routes/agents/index.js`.
- Env: `ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT`, `GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX`, `GUEST_ENDPOINT`, `GUEST_MODEL`,
`GUEST_TOKEN_EXPIRY`, `GUEST_TOKEN_MAX`, `GUEST_TOKEN_WINDOW`. Requires
`HANZO_API_KEY` (the free publishable gateway key) and `USE_REDIS` for the
shared per-IP quota across replicas.
## Cloud Agents (canonical /v1/agents)
Chat can RUN a user's canonical Hanzo Cloud agents (cloud `/v1/agents`, the ONE
production agent registry) from the thread — alongside the LibreChat-legacy local
agent builder, which is untouched.
- Two surfaces, ONE run path: the `/agent <name> [prompt]` slash command and the
@mention picker (cloud agents appear as a `cloudAgent` type). Both funnel
through `useRunCloudAgent``POST /api/agents/cloud/:name/run`. The @mention /
`/agent` picker arms `/agent <name> ` in the composer; submit is intercepted in
`ChatForm` (`parseAgentCommand`) and dispatched to the run path.
- Server proxy + auth (token never reaches the browser): the chat backend reads
the user's hanzo.id token from the server-side session
(`req.session.openidTokens.idToken`, then `accessToken`, then the httpOnly
cookies) and forwards it as `Authorization: Bearer` to cloud. Cloud's
`SanitizeIdentity` (HIP-0026) validates it and pins `X-Org-Id` from the `owner`
claim, so a user only ever reaches their OWN org's agents — chat never asserts
an org. `requireJwtAuth` gates the proxy (guests rejected); missing token →
honest 401, never a service-token fallback (fail-secure). Agent name is
validated against cloud's handle grammar (traversal/SSRF guard); it is NOT an
open proxy (three fixed endpoints). Principal guard: the on-behalf-of decision
keys off the VALIDATED principal (`req.user.provider==='openid'`), not the
mutable `token_provider` refresh-strategy cookie, so a local user (who never
carries a hanzo.id token) can't run under a stale OpenID session. EVERY
forwarded token — id_token preferred, access_token fallback, from session or
the httpOnly cookie — must pass `isForwardableToken`: a decodable JWT whose
`sub` EQUALS `req.user.openidId` (binding MANDATORY — absent `openidId`/`sub`
or a mismatch ⇒ no forward, no fail-open) and is unexpired. Decode-only is
sound because cloud does the authoritative JWKS validation over the SAME claims,
so it runs as exactly that `sub`; the gate only ever removes a token. An
unbindable/expired/foreign token yields an honest 401, never a fabricated or
wrong-principal run.
- id_token persistence is DECOUPLED from the refresh strategy: OIDC login ALWAYS
persists the on-behalf-of BEARER (id_token + access_token) to
`req.session.openidTokens` (server-side only), regardless of
`OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS`. It does NOT persist the OIDC refresh credential in the
decoupled default — the session refreshes via the local JWT cookie, so
`session.openidTokens.refreshToken` is written ONLY in REUSE mode (where
`refreshController`/`logoutController` read it). That keeps login, refresh AND
logout on the local-JWT path byte-identical to a non-OpenID login; that flag
SOLELY gates whether `/api/auth/refresh` performs the OIDC refresh-grant.
The ~1h id_token is used while valid; durable refresh (hanzo.id/Casdoor OIDC
refresh or an RFC-8693 token-exchange from the chat session) is a tracked
FOLLOW-UP — the login-breaking refresh-grant is NOT enabled here.
- Abuse limits (a run is a real billable completion): a per-user rate limiter
(`cloudAgentLimiter`, `CLOUD_AGENT_USER_MAX`/`CLOUD_AGENT_WINDOW`) guards the
whole `/cloud` router; the client caps input by UTF-8 **bytes** (128 KiB), caps
the buffered response (4 MiB → 502), and sheds load past a process-wide in-flight
ceiling (`CLOUD_AGENT_MAX_CONCURRENT`, 503).
- Key files: backend `api/server/services/CloudAgentsClient.js`,
`api/server/routes/agents/cloud.js` (mounted `/cloud` in
`api/server/routes/agents/index.js`); data layer
`packages/data-provider/src/{types/cloudAgents.ts,api-endpoints.ts,data-service.ts}`;
client `client/src/hooks/Agents/useRunCloudAgent.ts`,
`client/src/utils/agentCommand.ts`,
`client/src/components/Chat/Input/AgentsCommand.tsx`, and the @mention wiring in
`client/src/hooks/Input/useMentions.ts` + `Mention.tsx`.
- Env: `HANZO_CLOUD_URL` (optional; falls back to the `OPENAI_BASE_URL` host).
- Convergence path (later): chat's LibreChat-legacy `/api/agents` CRUD should
converge onto cloud `/v1/agents`; this step only ADDS cloud-agent RUN.
## Unified cloud architecture (2026-07) — investigate-before-ripping map
hanzo.chat is the **chat view** of the Hanzo AI cloud (sibling to hanzo.app =
builder, console = admin). This section is the honest map of what is ALREADY
unified onto the Go backend (`api.hanzo.ai/v1`) vs the one real seam that is not.
Verified by full call-graph + route-table trace; do NOT rip blind.
### What already routes through the Go backend `api.hanzo.ai/v1` (no shadow LLM)
- **Chat completions**: client `useSSE``POST /api/agents/chat/Hanzo` (all
chat, incl. plain-model, goes through the agents framework) → custom-endpoint
resolver (`packages/api/src/endpoints/custom/initialize.ts`) reads
`HANZO_API_KEY` + literal `baseURL https://api.hanzo.ai/v1` from the loaded
config → LangChain OpenAI client → **`POST https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/chat/completions`**
(SSE stream, resumable via `GenerationJobManager`). Per-user `hk-` key +
per-org Commerce debit; fail-closed 402. THIS is the one inference path.
- **Code interpreter** → `LIBRECHAT_CODE_BASEURL` = cloud `/v1/exec`.
- **Web search** → `webSearch` block (searxng+firecrawl contracts) = cloud
`/v1/websearch`.
- **Cloud agents** → `POST /api/agents/cloud/:name/run` server-proxies to cloud
`/v1/agents` with the user's hanzo.id bearer (see "Cloud Agents" section).
- **Model list**: curated **zen-only** (`fetch:false`) in the loaded config —
NO raw upstream names (brand policy). Authoritative prod list lives in the
`chat-config` ConfigMap (`universe infra/k8s/chat/configmap.yaml`); repo
`librechat.yaml` mirrors it (one way).
### DEAD residue — do NOT treat as a live backend
- `config.yaml` (LiteLLM `model_list`/`litellm_params`), `docker/Dockerfile.{simple,dev,custom_ui}`
(`CMD litellm`), `deploy/migrations/*` (`LiteLLM_*` Prisma tables),
`CONTRIBUTING.md` (upstream LiteLLM's), `scripts/cleanup-{litellm,hanzo-chat}.sh`:
all **unreferenced** by any compose/k8s/helm/Dockerfile.multi. Prod runs
`node server/index.js` and hits `api.hanzo.ai/v1` directly — NO local litellm
sidecar. This is upstream merge residue; safe to delete in a dedicated sweep.
### The ONE real parallel store (FLAG — needs a Go-backend home)
LibreChat's Express backend owns, in **MongoDB** (`HanzoChat` DB), all of:
`convos`, `messages`, `presets`, `prompts`/`promptGroups`, `users`, `balances`/
`transactions`, `files`, `sessions` (refresh-token hashes), plus agents/assistants/
memory/RBAC. Schemas: `packages/data-schemas/src/schema/*`. This is the shadow
store that is NOT on the Go backend.
- The Go backend (`hanzoai/ai`, mounted at bare `/v1/*` in cloud) DOES have a
persistence home, but under **casibase names** (`/v1/get-chats`, `/v1/get-chat`,
`/v1/add-chat`, `/v1/get-messages`, `/v1/add-message`, `/v1/get-usages`) — a
different schema/shape than LibreChat's Mongo.
- The canonical OpenAPI repo has `chat/openapi.yaml` describing the INTENDED
LibreChat-shaped REST surface (`/v1/chat/convos`, `/v1/chat/messages`,
`/v1/chat/presets`, `/v1/chat/balance`, `/v1/chat/auth/*`) — but the Go binary
**does not implement it yet**, and `ai/openapi.yaml` under-documents the real
casibase routes.
- To truly kill the parallel store WITHOUT breaking live chat: the Go backend
(or Base) must implement `chat/openapi.yaml` (conversations/messages/presets),
then repoint chat's data layer at it behind a flag and dual-write during
cutover. Until then Mongo stays (ripping it = data loss + dead chat).
**Coordinate with the openapi agent** (canonical spec + SDK regen).
### IAM-native auth (HIP-0111) — federated to hanzo.id, LIVE
- **Prod (backend-proxied)**: LibreChat passport `openid-client` strategy,
OIDC **discovery** from `${OPENID_ISSUER}` = `https://hanzo.id`
(`/.well-known/openid-configuration`; discovery fetched via in-cluster
`iam.hanzo.svc` to dodge the CF hairpin), client_id **`hanzo-chat`**, callback
`/oauth/openid/callback`. Local email/password is OFF in prod
(`ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN=false`, `ALLOW_REGISTRATION=false`); social OIDC only.
Files: `api/strategies/openidStrategy.js`, `api/server/socialLogins.js`,
`api/server/routes/oauth.js`. This IS IAM-native (federated), just not the
console `@hanzo/iam-js-sdk` shape.
- **Static/IAM SPA mode** (`Dockerfile.static`, not the live prod deploy): browser
`@hanzo/iam` `BrowserIamSdk` PKCE straight to hanzo.id
(`client/src/utils/iam.ts`, `OAuthCallback.tsx`). ⚠️ INCONSISTENCY: uses
client_id **`app-chat`** while prod uses `hanzo-chat` — align to `hanzo-chat`.
`@hanzo/iam` is pinned `^0.4.0` (HIP-0111 wants ≥0.11.0); this path is dormant.
### One brand system, but pick the RIGHT one for a Tailwind app
`@hanzo/ui` and `@hanzo/gui` are **two different, non-overlapping** design systems:
- **`@hanzo/ui`** = shadcn/ui + Tailwind + Radix (multi-framework). chat is
Vite + React 18 + Tailwind, so THIS is the correct shared lib. Already used:
`client/src/components/Nav/HanzoHeader.tsx` mounts `@hanzo/ui/navigation`
`HanzoHeader` for cross-app chrome. Monochrome rebrand already done (grey ramp,
H mark, favicon = hanzo.app set).
- **`@hanzo/gui`** = a **Tamagui** fork (Next.js 15 / React 19, RN-web) — console's
stack. Forcing it into the Vite/React18 LibreChat client = a ground-up rewrite
of a live product; NOT done. Unify by widening `@hanzo/ui` adoption + matching
console's monochrome tokens, NOT by swapping component frameworks.
### Config filename caveat
`loadCustomConfig.js` defaults to **`chat.yaml`** (`CONFIG_PATH || <root>/chat.yaml`).
Prod sets `CONFIG_PATH=/app/chat.yaml` (ConfigMap mount). Repo ships
`librechat.yaml` (reference); a deploy that doesn't set `CONFIG_PATH` to it (or
provide `chat.yaml`) falls back to the built-in `openAI` endpoint. `OPENAI_BASE_URL`
in `compose.prod.yml` is inert here (built-in openAI reads `OPENAI_REVERSE_PROXY`).
## Internal Package Names
These are kept as-is from upstream (npm deps, not worth renaming):
+6
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
chat
Copyright (c) 2023 Hanzo AI Inc.
This product includes software from LibreChat (https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat), licensed under MIT:
Copyright (c) 2023 LibreChat (Danny Avila)
+2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
<p align="center"><img src=".github/hero.svg" alt="chat" width="880"></p>
# Hanzo AI Chat
AI-powered chat platform with enterprise features, using Hanzo's cloud API or local deployment.
+106 -44
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { ViolationTypes } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const { billingSubject } = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { createAutoRefillTransaction } = require('./Transaction');
const { logViolation } = require('~/cache');
const { getMultiplier } = require('./tx');
@@ -22,6 +23,21 @@ function getMinBalance() {
return 0;
}
/**
* Minimum balance in COMMERCE cents (commerce balances are in cents).
* Derived from HANZO_MIN_BALANCE (USD). Used by the commerce-first money gate.
*/
function getMinBalanceCents() {
const envVal = process.env.HANZO_MIN_BALANCE;
if (envVal != null && envVal !== '') {
const usd = parseFloat(envVal);
if (!isNaN(usd) && usd > 0) {
return Math.round(usd * 100);
}
}
return 0;
}
function isInvalidDate(date) {
return isNaN(date);
}
@@ -50,10 +66,24 @@ const checkModelAccess = async function (userId, model) {
};
/**
* Simple check method that calculates token cost and returns balance info.
* Integrates with Commerce balance gate when configured (fail-open).
* Calculates token cost and decides whether the request may proceed.
*
* MONEY GATE — Commerce-first and FAIL CLOSED (this is the money path; better to
* block a user than bleed). When Commerce is configured and we can identify the
* user's billing org (their IAM `organization`), Commerce is AUTHORITATIVE:
* - sufficient org balance (>= HANZO_MIN_BALANCE) → allowed (decisive; we do
* NOT fall through to the local tokenCredits gate, so startBalance:0 never
* false-blocks a Commerce-funded user);
* - insufficient / unreachable / no billing identity → BLOCKED.
* The cloud gateway separately debits the user's own hk- key against this same
* org, so this check is the pre-flight that yields a clean "claim credit" UX
* instead of a raw gateway 402.
*
* When Commerce is not configured (or no billing identity), falls back to the
* legacy local tokenCredits gate.
*/
const checkBalanceRecord = async function ({
req,
user,
model,
endpoint,
@@ -65,7 +95,79 @@ const checkBalanceRecord = async function ({
const multiplier = getMultiplier({ valueKey, tokenType, model, endpoint, endpointTokenConfig });
const tokenCost = amount * multiplier;
// Retrieve the balance record
// Guests (anonymous preview) are NOT balance-gated here. Their spend is bounded
// two ways, neither of which is an authed user's org balance: (1) the per-IP
// guest message limiter (GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX, default 3) and (2) the separate,
// small-capped, NON-exempt guest key (HANZO_API_KEY) whose own org's Commerce
// balance the cloud gateway debits and 402s when empty. Running them through the
// Commerce/local gate (startBalance:0) would block the free tier entirely.
if (req?.user?.guest === true) {
return { canSpend: true, balance: 0, tokenCost };
}
const commerceClient = getCommerceClient();
const billingOrg = (req?.user?.organization ?? '').toString().trim();
// Per-user billing subject — prefer the one resolveHanzoCloudKey stamped from
// the authoritative IAM identity; otherwise derive it from organization + email
// (name == email for individual signups). This keys the gate on the SAME
// account the gateway debits (per-user for the shared "hanzo" catch-all), not
// the shared org balance.
const subject =
(req?.user?.billingSubject ?? '').toString().trim() ||
billingSubject(billingOrg, req?.user?.email);
// Commerce-first authoritative gate (per-subject, fail closed).
if (commerceClient && subject) {
let commerceBalance;
try {
commerceBalance = await commerceClient.checkBalance(subject);
} catch (err) {
logger.error('[Balance.check] Commerce unreachable — blocking (fail-closed)', {
user,
subject,
error: err.message,
});
return { canSpend: false, balance: 0, tokenCost, reason: 'commerce_unavailable' };
}
const available = commerceBalance.available || 0;
const minCents = Math.max(getMinBalanceCents(), 1);
if (available < minCents) {
logger.debug('[Balance.check] Commerce balance insufficient', {
user,
subject,
available,
minCents,
});
return { canSpend: false, balance: available, tokenCost, reason: 'commerce_insufficient' };
}
// Tier/model access (fail-open: a tier hiccup must not block a funded user).
if (model) {
try {
const modelAccess = await commerceClient.isModelAllowed(subject, model);
if (!modelAccess.allowed) {
return {
canSpend: false,
balance: available,
tokenCost,
reason: 'model_not_allowed',
tier: modelAccess.tier,
allowedModels: modelAccess.allowedModels,
};
}
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('[Balance.check] Tier check failed, allowing (balance ok)', {
error: err.message,
});
}
}
// Decisive: Commerce says funded → allow. Do not consult local credits.
return { canSpend: true, balance: available, tokenCost };
}
// ── Legacy local-credit gate (Commerce not configured / no billing identity) ──
let record = await Balance.findOne({ user }).lean();
if (!record) {
logger.debug('[Balance.check] No balance record found for user', { user });
@@ -76,46 +178,6 @@ const checkBalanceRecord = async function ({
};
}
// Commerce balance gate: if configured, check Commerce first (fail-open)
const commerceClient = getCommerceClient();
if (commerceClient && record.commerceUserId) {
try {
const commerceBalance = await commerceClient.checkBalance(record.commerceUserId);
if (!commerceBalance.sufficient) {
logger.debug('[Balance.check] Commerce balance insufficient', {
user,
commerceUserId: record.commerceUserId,
available: commerceBalance.available,
});
return { canSpend: false, balance: 0, tokenCost, reason: 'commerce_insufficient' };
}
// Check model access via Commerce tier
if (model) {
const modelAccess = await commerceClient.isModelAllowed(record.commerceUserId, model);
if (!modelAccess.allowed) {
logger.debug('[Balance.check] Model not allowed for tier', {
user,
model,
tier: modelAccess.tier,
allowedModels: modelAccess.allowedModels,
});
return {
canSpend: false,
balance: record.tokenCredits,
tokenCost,
reason: 'model_not_allowed',
tier: modelAccess.tier,
allowedModels: modelAccess.allowedModels,
};
}
}
} catch (err) {
// Fail-open: Commerce error → fall through to local check
logger.warn('[Balance.check] Commerce check failed, falling back to local', { error: err.message });
}
}
let balance = record.tokenCredits;
// Check if credits have expired
@@ -224,7 +286,7 @@ const addIntervalToDate = (date, value, unit) => {
* @throws {Error} Throws an error if there's an issue with the balance check.
*/
const checkBalance = async ({ req, res, txData }) => {
const result = await checkBalanceRecord(txData);
const result = await checkBalanceRecord({ ...txData, req });
if (result.canSpend) {
return true;
}
+122
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
// Money-gate decision matrix for the Commerce-first, FAIL-CLOSED balance gate
// (per-org via service token + X-Hanzo-Org; the cloud gateway debits the user's
// own hk- key against the SAME org). Proves both directions: unmetered AI never
// leaks (block on any ambiguity), and funded users + capped guests are never
// wrongly blocked.
const mockClient = {
checkBalance: jest.fn(),
isModelAllowed: jest.fn(),
};
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() },
}));
jest.mock('~/server/services/CommerceClient', () => ({
getCommerceClient: jest.fn(() => mockClient),
}));
jest.mock('~/cache', () => ({ logViolation: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) }));
jest.mock('./tx', () => ({ getMultiplier: () => 1 }));
jest.mock('./Transaction', () => ({ createAutoRefillTransaction: jest.fn() }));
jest.mock('~/db/models', () => ({ Balance: { findOne: jest.fn() } }));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
ViolationTypes: { TOKEN_BALANCE: 'token_balance' },
}));
const { checkBalance } = require('./balanceMethods');
const { getCommerceClient } = require('~/server/services/CommerceClient');
const { Balance } = require('~/db/models');
const argsFor = (user) => ({
req: { user },
res: {},
txData: { user: user?.id ?? 'u1', tokenType: 'prompt', amount: 100, model: 'zen4-mini' },
});
// checkBalance resolves `true` when allowed, throws a JSON error (carrying
// `reason`) when blocked.
const decide = async (user = { id: 'u1', organization: 'acme' }) => {
try {
const ok = await checkBalance(argsFor(user));
return { allowed: ok, reason: null };
} catch (err) {
let reason = null;
try {
reason = JSON.parse(err.message).reason;
} catch (_) {
reason = err.message;
}
return { allowed: false, reason };
}
};
describe('checkBalance — Commerce-first money gate (fail closed)', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
getCommerceClient.mockReturnValue(mockClient);
mockClient.isModelAllowed.mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true, tier: 't', allowedModels: ['*'] });
process.env.HANZO_MIN_BALANCE = '1.00'; // 100 cents minimum
});
it('ALLOWS a guest WITHOUT consulting Commerce (capped by IP limiter + guest key)', async () => {
const { allowed } = await decide({ id: 'g1', guest: true });
expect(allowed).toBe(true);
expect(mockClient.checkBalance).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(Balance.findOne).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('ALLOWS a funded org (available >= min)', async () => {
mockClient.checkBalance.mockResolvedValue({ sufficient: true, available: 500 });
const { allowed, reason } = await decide();
expect(allowed).toBe(true);
expect(reason).toBeNull();
expect(mockClient.checkBalance).toHaveBeenCalledWith('acme');
});
it('BLOCKS commerce_insufficient when balance below minimum ($0 → claim $5)', async () => {
mockClient.checkBalance.mockResolvedValue({ sufficient: false, available: 0 });
const { allowed, reason } = await decide();
expect(allowed).toBe(false);
expect(reason).toBe('commerce_insufficient');
});
it('BLOCKS commerce_insufficient when balance is a tiny non-zero below min', async () => {
mockClient.checkBalance.mockResolvedValue({ sufficient: true, available: 50 }); // $0.50 < $1
const { allowed, reason } = await decide();
expect(allowed).toBe(false);
expect(reason).toBe('commerce_insufficient');
});
it('FAILS CLOSED (commerce_unavailable) when Commerce throws — never bleeds', async () => {
mockClient.checkBalance.mockRejectedValue(new Error('ECONNREFUSED'));
const { allowed, reason } = await decide();
expect(allowed).toBe(false);
expect(reason).toBe('commerce_unavailable');
});
it('BLOCKS model_not_allowed for a funded org whose tier forbids the model', async () => {
mockClient.checkBalance.mockResolvedValue({ sufficient: true, available: 500 });
mockClient.isModelAllowed.mockResolvedValue({
allowed: false,
tier: 'free',
allowedModels: ['zen3-nano'],
});
const { allowed, reason } = await decide();
expect(allowed).toBe(false);
expect(reason).toBe('model_not_allowed');
});
it('ALLOWS a funded org even if the tier check itself errors (fail-open tier, balance ok)', async () => {
mockClient.checkBalance.mockResolvedValue({ sufficient: true, available: 500 });
mockClient.isModelAllowed.mockRejectedValue(new Error('tier-check 500'));
const { allowed } = await decide();
expect(allowed).toBe(true);
});
it('FAILS CLOSED for an authed user with NO billing org (no commerce branch, no local credits)', async () => {
Balance.findOne.mockReturnValue({ lean: () => Promise.resolve(null) });
const { allowed } = await decide({ id: 'u2', organization: '' });
expect(allowed).toBe(false);
expect(mockClient.checkBalance).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
const { getEndpointsConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { buildGuestEndpointsConfig } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
async function endpointController(req, res) {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.send(JSON.stringify(buildGuestEndpointsConfig()));
}
const endpointsConfig = await getEndpointsConfig(req);
res.send(JSON.stringify(endpointsConfig));
}
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ const updateFavoritesController = async (req, res) => {
const getFavoritesController = async (req, res) => {
try {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.status(200).json([]);
}
const userId = req.user.id;
const user = await getUserById(userId, 'favorites');
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { CacheKeys } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const { loadDefaultModels, loadConfigModels } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { buildGuestModelsConfig } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
/**
@@ -39,6 +40,9 @@ async function loadModels(req) {
async function modelController(req, res) {
try {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.send(buildGuestModelsConfig());
}
const modelConfig = await loadModels(req);
res.send(modelConfig);
} catch (error) {
+4
View File
@@ -40,12 +40,16 @@ const { invalidateCachedTools } = require('~/server/services/Config/getCachedToo
const { needsRefresh, getNewS3URL } = require('~/server/services/Files/S3/crud');
const { processDeleteRequest } = require('~/server/services/Files/process');
const { getAppConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { buildGuestUser } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
const { deleteToolCalls } = require('~/models/ToolCall');
const { deleteUserPrompts } = require('~/models/Prompt');
const { deleteUserAgents } = require('~/models/Agent');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
const getUserController = async (req, res) => {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.status(200).send(buildGuestUser(req.user));
}
const appConfig = await getAppConfig({ role: req.user?.role });
/** @type {IUser} */
const userData = req.user.toObject != null ? req.user.toObject() : { ...req.user };
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
/**
* Guest-scoped bootstrap controllers: verify that a guest principal receives
* safe, scoped data (and never triggers a DB lookup) on the read-only endpoints
* the chat composer hard-requires.
*/
jest.mock('@hanzochat/api', () => ({
isEnabled: (value) => value === 'true' || value === true,
}));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
EModelEndpoint: { custom: 'custom' },
CacheKeys: { CONFIG_STORE: 'CONFIG_STORE', MODELS_CONFIG: 'MODELS_CONFIG' },
Tools: {},
Constants: {},
FileSources: { local: 'local', s3: 's3' },
}));
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() },
webSearchKeys: [],
}));
// --- EndpointController deps ---
jest.mock('~/server/services/Config', () => ({
getEndpointsConfig: jest.fn(),
loadDefaultModels: jest.fn(),
loadConfigModels: jest.fn(),
getAppConfig: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('~/cache', () => ({ getLogStores: jest.fn(() => ({ get: jest.fn(), set: jest.fn() })) }));
const { getEndpointsConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const endpointController = require('~/server/controllers/EndpointController');
const { modelController } = require('~/server/controllers/ModelController');
const guestReq = (overrides = {}) => ({
user: { id: 'guest_abc', role: 'GUEST', name: 'Guest', guest: true },
...overrides,
});
const mockRes = () => {
const res = {};
res.status = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(res);
res.send = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(res);
res.json = jest.fn().mockReturnValue(res);
return res;
};
describe('guest bootstrap controllers', () => {
const originalEnv = { ...process.env };
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT = 'true';
process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT = 'Hanzo';
process.env.GUEST_MODEL = 'zen5-mini';
});
afterAll(() => {
process.env = originalEnv;
});
describe('GET /api/endpoints', () => {
it('returns ONLY the guest endpoint, no DB/config read', async () => {
const req = guestReq();
const res = mockRes();
await endpointController(req, res);
expect(getEndpointsConfig).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const payload = JSON.parse(res.send.mock.calls[0][0]);
expect(Object.keys(payload)).toEqual(['Hanzo']);
expect(payload.Hanzo).toMatchObject({ type: 'custom', userProvide: false });
});
it('falls through to the real config for non-guest users', async () => {
getEndpointsConfig.mockResolvedValue({ Hanzo: {}, openAI: {} });
const req = { user: { id: 'real', role: 'USER' } };
const res = mockRes();
await endpointController(req, res);
expect(getEndpointsConfig).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
describe('GET /api/models', () => {
it('returns ONLY the single guest model under the guest endpoint', async () => {
const req = guestReq();
const res = mockRes();
await modelController(req, res);
expect(res.send).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ Hanzo: ['zen5-mini'] });
});
});
});
+12 -1
View File
@@ -891,9 +891,20 @@ class AgentClient extends BaseClient {
config.signal = null;
};
/**
* Capture before running the graph. `run.processStream` (via
* `@librechat/agents`) treats the passed `config` as owned and, during its
* post-stream cleanup, sets `config.configurable = undefined` to break the
* reference chain that keeps heavy graph state (base64 images/PDFs) alive.
* Reading `config.configurable.hide_sequential_outputs` AFTER `runAgents`
* therefore throws `Cannot read properties of undefined`, which surfaces as
* the post-reply error banner. Hoisting the read keeps the deprecated Agent
* Chain filter working without depending on post-run config state.
*/
const hideSequentialOutputs = config.configurable.hide_sequential_outputs;
await runAgents(initialMessages);
/** @deprecated Agent Chain */
if (config.configurable.hide_sequential_outputs) {
if (hideSequentialOutputs) {
this.contentParts = this.contentParts.filter((part, index) => {
// Include parts that are either:
// 1. At or after the finalContentStart index
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ jest.mock('@hanzochat/api', () => ({
checkAccess: jest.fn(),
initializeAgent: jest.fn(),
createMemoryProcessor: jest.fn(),
createRun: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('~/models/Agent', () => ({
@@ -2257,3 +2258,122 @@ describe('AgentClient - titleConvo', () => {
});
});
});
describe('AgentClient - chatCompletion post-reply banner regression', () => {
/**
* Regression for the post-reply error banner:
* "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'hide_sequential_outputs')".
*
* `run.processStream` (from `@librechat/agents` >= 3.1.52) treats the passed
* `config` as owned and, in its post-stream cleanup, sets
* `config.configurable = undefined` to break the AsyncLocalStorage reference
* chain that keeps heavy graph state (base64 images/PDFs) alive. The
* controller must therefore NOT read `config.configurable.hide_sequential_outputs`
* AFTER the stream completes, or it throws and pushes an ERROR content part
* (the red banner) which also aborts the post-stream finalize (auto-titling).
* This test reproduces that mutation and asserts no ERROR part is produced.
*/
const { createRun } = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { ContentTypes } = require('librechat-data-provider');
let processStreamMock;
const makeClient = (agentOverrides = {}) => {
const agent = {
id: 'agent-123',
endpoint: EModelEndpoint.openAI,
provider: EModelEndpoint.openAI,
model_parameters: { model: 'gpt-4' },
...agentOverrides,
};
const req = {
user: { id: 'user-123' },
body: {},
config: { endpoints: {} },
};
const client = new AgentClient({
req,
res: {},
agent,
endpoint: EModelEndpoint.openAI,
contentParts: [],
collectedUsage: [],
artifactPromises: [],
endpointTokenConfig: {},
});
client.conversationId = 'convo-123';
client.responseMessageId = 'response-123';
client.parentMessageId = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000';
client.user = 'user-123';
// Avoid DB / memory side effects unrelated to this regression.
client.recordCollectedUsage = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue();
client.runMemory = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
client.awaitMemoryWithTimeout = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
return client;
};
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
// Faithfully mimic `@librechat/agents` Run.processStream cleanup: it nulls
// the caller's `config.configurable` after the stream finishes.
processStreamMock = jest.fn(async (_inputs, config) => {
config.configurable = undefined;
return [];
});
createRun.mockResolvedValue({
Graph: {},
processStream: processStreamMock,
});
});
const errorParts = (client) =>
(client.getContentParts() || []).filter((p) => p && p.type === ContentTypes.ERROR);
it('does not push an error content part when processStream nulls config.configurable', async () => {
const client = makeClient();
await expect(
client.sendCompletion('hello', { abortController: new AbortController() }),
).resolves.toBeDefined();
expect(processStreamMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
// The config passed to processStream had configurable nulled (reproduction sanity check).
const passedConfig = processStreamMock.mock.calls[0][1];
expect(passedConfig.configurable).toBeUndefined();
// The fix: no banner-producing ERROR part despite the nulled configurable.
expect(errorParts(client)).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('still applies the deprecated hide_sequential_outputs filter using the pre-stream value', async () => {
const client = makeClient({ hide_sequential_outputs: true });
// Seed multiple content parts; the filter keeps only the last part plus
// tool_call parts. With the value captured before the stream, the filter
// must run even though config.configurable is undefined afterwards.
client.contentParts = [
{ type: 'text', text: 'intermediate-1' },
{ type: 'text', text: 'intermediate-2' },
{ type: 'text', text: 'final' },
];
await client.sendCompletion('hello', { abortController: new AbortController() });
expect(errorParts(client)).toHaveLength(0);
// hide_sequential_outputs collapses to the final part only (no tool calls present).
expect(client.contentParts).toEqual([{ type: 'text', text: 'final' }]);
});
it('leaves content parts intact when hide_sequential_outputs is falsy', async () => {
const client = makeClient({ hide_sequential_outputs: false });
client.contentParts = [
{ type: 'text', text: 'a' },
{ type: 'text', text: 'b' },
];
await client.sendCompletion('hello', { abortController: new AbortController() });
expect(errorParts(client)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(client.contentParts).toEqual([
{ type: 'text', text: 'a' },
{ type: 'text', text: 'b' },
]);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
const { randomUUID } = require('node:crypto');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { getGuestConfig, GUEST_ROLE } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
/**
* Issues a short-lived guest token for anonymous preview chat.
*
* The token is signed with `JWT_SECRET` and carries a `guest: true` claim plus a
* per-token random id, so guest principals are ephemeral and isolated from each
* other. It is rejected by the standard `jwt` strategy (no matching DB user),
* which keeps every non-chat route closed to guests.
*
* @param {ServerRequest} req
* @param {ServerResponse} res
*/
const guestTokenController = async (req, res) => {
const config = getGuestConfig();
if (!config.enabled) {
return res.status(404).json({ message: 'Guest chat is not enabled' });
}
if (!process.env.JWT_SECRET) {
logger.error('[guestTokenController] JWT_SECRET is not configured');
return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Server misconfiguration' });
}
const id = `guest_${randomUUID()}`;
const expiresInSeconds = Math.floor(config.tokenExpiryMs / 1000);
const token = jwt.sign({ id, guest: true, role: GUEST_ROLE }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
expiresIn: expiresInSeconds,
});
return res.status(200).json({
token,
expiresIn: expiresInSeconds,
endpoint: config.endpoint,
model: config.model,
messageMax: config.messageMax,
});
};
module.exports = { guestTokenController };
+31 -8
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,11 @@ const {
generateAdminExchangeCode,
} = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { syncUserEntraGroupMemberships } = require('~/server/services/PermissionService');
const { setAuthTokens, setOpenIDAuthTokens } = require('~/server/services/AuthService');
const {
setAuthTokens,
setOpenIDAuthTokens,
persistOpenIDTokensToSession,
} = require('~/server/services/AuthService');
const getLogStores = require('~/cache/getLogStores');
const { checkBan } = require('~/server/middleware');
const { generateToken } = require('~/models');
@@ -56,13 +60,32 @@ function createOAuthHandler(redirectUri = domains.client) {
}
/** Standard OAuth flow - set cookies and redirect */
if (
req.user &&
req.user.provider == 'openid' &&
isEnabled(process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS) === true
) {
await syncUserEntraGroupMemberships(req.user, req.user.tokenset.access_token);
setOpenIDAuthTokens(req.user.tokenset, req, res, req.user._id.toString());
if (req.user && req.user.provider == 'openid') {
if (isEnabled(process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS) === true) {
/**
* REUSE path: the OIDC tokenset drives BOTH the app auth token and the
* refresh grant (`/api/auth/refresh` performs an OIDC refresh). Unchanged.
* setOpenIDAuthTokens already persists the id_token to the session.
*/
await syncUserEntraGroupMemberships(req.user, req.user.tokenset.access_token);
setOpenIDAuthTokens(req.user.tokenset, req, res, req.user._id.toString());
} else {
/**
* Decoupled path (the live default, REUSE disabled). Keep refresh on the
* local-JWT path so login/refresh cookies stay byte-identical, but ALSO
* persist the id_token server-side so downstream on-behalf-of cloud calls
* (POST /api/agents/cloud/:name/run -> cloud /v1/agents) can run as this
* hanzo.id principal. OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS still SOLELY gates the OIDC
* refresh-grant; it no longer gates id_token persistence.
*/
await setAuthTokens(req.user._id, res);
try {
persistOpenIDTokensToSession(req, req.user.tokenset);
} catch (persistErr) {
/** On-behalf-of is best-effort; NEVER let it break the login redirect. */
logger.warn('[OAuth] Failed to persist OpenID tokens for on-behalf-of:', persistErr);
}
}
} else {
await setAuthTokens(req.user._id, res);
}
+86 -1
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ const mockGenerateAdminExchangeCode = jest.fn();
const mockSyncUserEntraGroupMemberships = jest.fn();
const mockSetAuthTokens = jest.fn();
const mockSetOpenIDAuthTokens = jest.fn();
const mockPersistOpenIDTokensToSession = jest.fn();
const mockGetLogStores = jest.fn();
const mockCheckBan = jest.fn();
const mockGenerateToken = jest.fn();
const mockLogger = { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn() };
const mockLogger = { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() };
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
CacheKeys: { ADMIN_OAUTH_EXCHANGE: 'admin-oauth-exchange' },
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ jest.mock('~/server/services/PermissionService', () => ({
jest.mock('~/server/services/AuthService', () => ({
setAuthTokens: (...args) => mockSetAuthTokens(...args),
setOpenIDAuthTokens: (...args) => mockSetOpenIDAuthTokens(...args),
persistOpenIDTokensToSession: (...args) => mockPersistOpenIDTokensToSession(...args),
}));
jest.mock(
@@ -148,4 +150,87 @@ describe('createOAuthHandler', () => {
expect(mockSetAuthTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// The decouple: id_token persistence for downstream on-behalf-of is split from
// the refresh strategy. OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS still SOLELY gates the OIDC
// refresh-grant; it no longer gates whether the id_token is persisted.
describe('standard OpenID flow — id_token persistence decouple', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
/** Not an admin cross-origin redirect — exercise the cookie/session path. */
mockIsAdminPanelRedirect.mockReturnValue(false);
});
it('REUSE_TOKENS=false: keeps local-JWT refresh AND persists the id_token to session', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS = 'false';
const handler = createOAuthHandler('http://localhost:3080');
const req = buildReq();
const res = buildRes();
const next = jest.fn();
await handler(req, res, next);
/** Refresh stays on the local-JWT path — login/refresh cookies unchanged. */
expect(mockSetAuthTokens).toHaveBeenCalledWith(req.user._id, res);
/** id_token IS persisted for on-behalf-of, regardless of REUSE_TOKENS. */
expect(mockPersistOpenIDTokensToSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(req, req.user.tokenset);
/** The OIDC-reuse writer (which flips refresh to the OIDC grant) is NOT used. */
expect(mockSetOpenIDAuthTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.redirect).toHaveBeenCalledWith('http://localhost:3080');
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('REUSE_TOKENS=true: uses the OIDC writer (refresh path unchanged); no separate persist call', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS = 'true';
const handler = createOAuthHandler('http://localhost:3080');
const req = buildReq();
const res = buildRes();
const next = jest.fn();
await handler(req, res, next);
expect(mockSyncUserEntraGroupMemberships).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
req.user,
'openid-access-token',
);
expect(mockSetOpenIDAuthTokens).toHaveBeenCalledWith(req.user.tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
/** setOpenIDAuthTokens already persists the id_token; no separate call. */
expect(mockPersistOpenIDTokensToSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockSetAuthTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.redirect).toHaveBeenCalledWith('http://localhost:3080');
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('local user: setAuthTokens only, never persists an OpenID token', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS = 'false';
const handler = createOAuthHandler('http://localhost:3080');
const req = buildReq({ user: { _id: 'local-1', provider: 'local', email: 'l@example.com' } });
const res = buildRes();
const next = jest.fn();
await handler(req, res, next);
expect(mockSetAuthTokens).toHaveBeenCalledWith('local-1', res);
expect(mockPersistOpenIDTokensToSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockSetOpenIDAuthTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.redirect).toHaveBeenCalledWith('http://localhost:3080');
});
it('login redirect survives a persistence failure (login is paramount)', async () => {
process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS = 'false';
mockPersistOpenIDTokensToSession.mockImplementation(() => {
throw new Error('session store down');
});
const handler = createOAuthHandler('http://localhost:3080');
const req = buildReq();
const res = buildRes();
const next = jest.fn();
await handler(req, res, next);
/** The redirect still happens; the error is swallowed (best-effort). */
expect(mockSetAuthTokens).toHaveBeenCalledWith(req.user._id, res);
expect(res.redirect).toHaveBeenCalledWith('http://localhost:3080');
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
});
+1 -1
View File
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ const startServer = async () => {
res.setHeader('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
res.setHeader(
'Content-Security-Policy',
"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; connect-src 'self' https://*.hanzo.ai https://*.hanzo.chat wss://*.hanzo.chat; frame-ancestors 'none';",
"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://analytics.hanzo.ai https://static.cloudflareinsights.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; font-src 'self' data:; media-src 'self' data: blob:; connect-src 'self' https://*.hanzo.ai https://*.hanzo.chat wss://*.hanzo.chat https://static.cloudflareinsights.com https://cloudflareinsights.com; frame-ancestors 'none';",
);
res.setHeader('Permissions-Policy', 'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()');
next();
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() },
}));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
EModelEndpoint: { custom: 'custom', agents: 'agents' },
}));
jest.mock('~/server/services/guestConfig', () => ({
getGuestConfig: jest.fn(),
}));
const { getGuestConfig } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
const enforceGuestScope = require('../enforceGuestScope');
const mockRes = () => ({ status: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(), json: jest.fn().mockReturnThis() });
describe('enforceGuestScope', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
getGuestConfig.mockReturnValue({
enabled: true,
endpoint: 'Hanzo',
model: 'zen3-nano',
messageMax: 3,
});
});
it('passes non-guest requests through untouched', () => {
const req = { user: { id: 'u1', role: 'USER' }, body: { endpoint: 'OpenAI', model: 'gpt-4o' } };
const next = jest.fn();
enforceGuestScope(req, mockRes(), next);
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
expect(req.body.endpoint).toBe('OpenAI');
expect(req.body.model).toBe('gpt-4o');
});
it('rejects a guest naming a different endpoint (403)', () => {
const req = { user: { id: 'g1', guest: true }, body: { endpoint: 'OpenAI' } };
const res = mockRes();
const next = jest.fn();
enforceGuestScope(req, res, next);
expect(res.status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('rejects a guest naming a different (paid) model (403)', () => {
const req = { user: { id: 'g1', guest: true }, body: { endpoint: 'Hanzo', model: 'zen4-max' } };
const res = mockRes();
const next = jest.fn();
enforceGuestScope(req, res, next);
expect(res.status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('pins endpoint, type, and model for a compliant guest request', () => {
const req = {
user: { id: 'g1', guest: true },
body: { endpoint: 'Hanzo', model: 'zen3-nano', text: 'hi' },
};
const next = jest.fn();
enforceGuestScope(req, mockRes(), next);
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
expect(req.body.endpoint).toBe('Hanzo');
expect(req.body.endpointType).toBe('custom');
expect(req.body.model).toBe('zen3-nano');
});
it('pins endpoint/model even when the guest omits them', () => {
const req = { user: { id: 'g1', guest: true }, body: { text: 'hi' } };
const next = jest.fn();
enforceGuestScope(req, mockRes(), next);
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
expect(req.body.endpoint).toBe('Hanzo');
expect(req.body.model).toBe('zen3-nano');
});
it('strips every privileged capability from a guest request', () => {
const req = {
user: { id: 'g1', guest: true },
body: {
endpoint: 'Hanzo',
model: 'zen3-nano',
agent_id: 'agent_evil',
spec: 'paid-spec',
preset: { foo: 'bar' },
files: [{ file_id: 'f1' }],
tools: ['execute_code'],
tool_resources: { x: 1 },
resendFiles: true,
promptPrefix: 'jailbreak',
web_search: true,
},
};
const next = jest.fn();
enforceGuestScope(req, mockRes(), next);
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
expect(req.body.agent_id).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.body.spec).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.body.preset).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.body.files).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.body.tools).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.body.tool_resources).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.body.resendFiles).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.body.promptPrefix).toBeUndefined();
expect(req.body.web_search).toBeUndefined();
});
it('returns 404 for a guest when guest chat is disabled mid-flight', () => {
getGuestConfig.mockReturnValue({ enabled: false, endpoint: 'Hanzo', model: 'zen3-nano' });
const req = { user: { id: 'g1', guest: true }, body: {} };
const res = mockRes();
const next = jest.fn();
enforceGuestScope(req, res, next);
expect(res.status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(404);
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
/**
* Integration test for the guest chat middleware chain composition:
* guest auth -> scope enforcement -> quota, plus the reserved-subpath guard
* that keeps management routes (abort/active/...) on the JWT-only parent router.
*/
const express = require('express');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const request = require('supertest');
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() },
}));
jest.mock('@hanzochat/api', () => ({
isEnabled: (value) => value === 'true' || value === true,
limiterCache: () => undefined,
}));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
EModelEndpoint: { custom: 'custom', agents: 'agents' },
}));
jest.mock('~/server/utils', () => ({
removePorts: (req) => req.headers['x-test-ip'] || req.ip,
guestClientIp: (req) =>
req.headers['cf-connecting-ip'] || req.headers['x-test-ip'] || req.ip,
}));
jest.mock('../requireJwtAuth', () =>
jest.fn((req, res, next) => {
req.user = { id: 'real-user', role: 'USER' };
next();
}),
);
const requireGuestOrJwtAuth = require('../requireGuestOrJwtAuth');
const enforceGuestScope = require('../enforceGuestScope');
const { guestMessageLimiter } = require('../limiters/guestMessageLimiter');
const JWT_SECRET = 'test-guest-secret';
const buildRouter = () => {
const router = express.Router();
const RESERVED = new Set(['abort', 'active']);
const chatRouter = express.Router();
chatRouter.use((req, res, next) => {
const subpath = req.path.split('/').filter(Boolean)[0];
if (RESERVED.has(subpath)) {
return next('router');
}
return next();
});
chatRouter.use(requireGuestOrJwtAuth);
chatRouter.use(enforceGuestScope);
chatRouter.use(guestMessageLimiter);
chatRouter.post('/', (req, res) =>
res
.status(200)
.json({ endpoint: req.body.endpoint, model: req.body.model, role: req.user.role }),
);
router.use('/chat', chatRouter);
// JWT-only management route on the parent (after the guest router)
router.post('/chat/abort', require('../requireJwtAuth'), (req, res) =>
res.status(200).json({ aborted: true, role: req.user.role }),
);
return router;
};
const buildApp = () => {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/api/agents', buildRouter());
return app;
};
const guestToken = () => jwt.sign({ id: 'guest_1', guest: true, role: 'GUEST' }, JWT_SECRET);
describe('guest chat middleware chain', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.JWT_SECRET = JWT_SECRET;
process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT = 'true';
process.env.GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX = '2';
process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT = 'Hanzo';
process.env.GUEST_MODEL = 'zen3-nano';
});
afterEach(() => {
delete process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT;
delete process.env.GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX;
delete process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT;
delete process.env.GUEST_MODEL;
});
it('lets a guest reach the completion route, pinned to the free endpoint/model', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp())
.post('/api/agents/chat')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
.set('x-test-ip', '10.1.0.1')
.send({ endpoint: 'Hanzo', model: 'zen3-nano', text: 'hi' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ endpoint: 'Hanzo', model: 'zen3-nano', role: 'GUEST' });
});
it('returns 402 GUEST_LIMIT after the quota is exhausted', async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const ip = '10.1.0.2';
const send = () =>
request(app)
.post('/api/agents/chat')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
.set('x-test-ip', ip)
.send({ endpoint: 'Hanzo', model: 'zen3-nano', text: 'hi' });
expect((await send()).status).toBe(200);
expect((await send()).status).toBe(200);
const blocked = await send();
expect(blocked.status).toBe(402);
expect(blocked.body.type).toBe('GUEST_LIMIT');
});
it('routes reserved /chat/abort to the JWT-only handler, not the guest router', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp())
.post('/api/agents/chat/abort')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken()}`)
.set('x-test-ip', '10.1.0.3')
.send({ streamId: 'x' });
// requireJwtAuth mock forces a real USER; guest never reaches abort.
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ aborted: true, role: 'USER' });
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() },
}));
jest.mock('../requireJwtAuth', () => jest.fn((req, res, next) => next('jwt-fallback')));
const requireJwtAuth = require('../requireJwtAuth');
const requireGuestOrJwtAuth = require('../requireGuestOrJwtAuth');
const JWT_SECRET = 'test-guest-secret';
const mockRes = () => ({ status: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(), json: jest.fn().mockReturnThis() });
const guestToken = (claims = {}) =>
jwt.sign({ id: 'guest_abc', guest: true, role: 'GUEST', ...claims }, JWT_SECRET);
describe('requireGuestOrJwtAuth', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
process.env.JWT_SECRET = JWT_SECRET;
process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT = 'true';
});
afterEach(() => {
delete process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT;
});
it('delegates to requireJwtAuth when guest chat is disabled', () => {
process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT = 'false';
const req = { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${guestToken()}` } };
const next = jest.fn();
requireGuestOrJwtAuth(req, mockRes(), next);
expect(requireJwtAuth).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(req.user).toBeUndefined();
});
it('authenticates a valid guest token as an ephemeral GUEST principal', () => {
const req = { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${guestToken()}` } };
const next = jest.fn();
requireGuestOrJwtAuth(req, mockRes(), next);
expect(requireJwtAuth).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
expect(req.user).toEqual({ id: 'guest_abc', role: 'GUEST', name: 'Guest', guest: true });
});
it('delegates to requireJwtAuth when no bearer token is present', () => {
const req = { headers: {} };
requireGuestOrJwtAuth(req, mockRes(), jest.fn());
expect(requireJwtAuth).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(req.user).toBeUndefined();
});
it('delegates to requireJwtAuth for a non-guest (regular) JWT', () => {
const userToken = jwt.sign({ id: 'real-user' }, JWT_SECRET);
const req = { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${userToken}` } };
requireGuestOrJwtAuth(req, mockRes(), jest.fn());
expect(requireJwtAuth).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(req.user).toBeUndefined();
});
it('delegates to requireJwtAuth for a token signed with the wrong secret (fail closed)', () => {
const forged = jwt.sign({ id: 'guest_x', guest: true }, 'wrong-secret');
const req = { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${forged}` } };
requireGuestOrJwtAuth(req, mockRes(), jest.fn());
expect(requireJwtAuth).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(req.user).toBeUndefined();
});
it('delegates to requireJwtAuth when guest claim is missing', () => {
const token = jwt.sign({ id: 'guest_x' }, JWT_SECRET);
const req = { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } };
requireGuestOrJwtAuth(req, mockRes(), jest.fn());
expect(requireJwtAuth).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(req.user).toBeUndefined();
});
it('delegates to requireJwtAuth when guest token lacks an id', () => {
const token = jwt.sign({ guest: true }, JWT_SECRET);
const req = { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } };
requireGuestOrJwtAuth(req, mockRes(), jest.fn());
expect(requireJwtAuth).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(req.user).toBeUndefined();
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
/**
* Regression: a logged-in user in "My Agents" with no agent created/selected
* could type "hi" and get `400 {message:'agent_id is required in request body'}`.
*
* A missing agent_id on the agents endpoint is an ad-hoc (ephemeral) chat, not an
* error. This hermetic test locks the access-middleware fix point (no MongoDB /
* winston): canAccessAgentFromBody skips the per-agent ACL and calls next().
* The downstream build-options fix point is covered by
* ../../services/Endpoints/agents/build.spec.js.
*/
// Mock externals so neither winston (data-schemas) nor MongoDB (~/models/Agent) load.
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({ logger: { error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() } }));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
Constants: { EPHEMERAL_AGENT_ID: 'ephemeral' },
ResourceType: { AGENT: 'agent' },
// Real predicate semantics (mirrors packages/data-provider/src):
isAgentsEndpoint: (endpoint) => endpoint === 'agents',
isEphemeralAgentId: (agentId) => !agentId?.startsWith?.('agent_'),
}));
const mockCanAccessResource = jest.fn(() => (req, res, next) => {
req.__aclChecked = true;
return next();
});
jest.mock('./canAccessResource', () => ({ canAccessResource: mockCanAccessResource }));
jest.mock('~/models/Agent', () => ({ getAgent: jest.fn() }));
const { canAccessAgentFromBody } = require('./canAccessAgentFromBody');
const makeReqRes = (body) => {
const req = { body, params: {} };
const res = {
status: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
json: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
};
const next = jest.fn();
return { req, res, next };
};
describe('agent_id missing → ephemeral fallback (no 400)', () => {
const mw = canAccessAgentFromBody({ requiredPermission: 1 });
test('agents endpoint with NO agent_id proceeds without a 400', async () => {
const { req, res, next } = makeReqRes({ endpoint: 'agents', text: 'hi' });
await mw(req, res, next);
expect(res.status).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(mockCanAccessResource).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); // no per-agent ACL for ephemeral
});
test('non-agents endpoint with no agent_id proceeds (ephemeral)', async () => {
const { req, res, next } = makeReqRes({ endpoint: 'openAI', text: 'hi' });
await mw(req, res, next);
expect(res.status).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
test('explicit ephemeral id proceeds', async () => {
const { req, res, next } = makeReqRes({ endpoint: 'agents', agent_id: 'ephemeral_primary' });
await mw(req, res, next);
expect(res.status).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
test('a real agent_id still runs the per-agent ACL check', async () => {
const { req, res, next } = makeReqRes({ endpoint: 'agents', agent_id: 'agent_abc123' });
await mw(req, res, next);
// The middleware builds the ACL check with the real agent id as resourceIdParam,
// then runs it (which here calls next via the mock).
expect(mockCanAccessResource).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(mockCanAccessResource.mock.calls[0][0]).toMatchObject({ resourceType: 'agent' });
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
});
@@ -60,15 +60,11 @@ const canAccessAgentFromBody = (options) => {
agentId = Constants.EPHEMERAL_AGENT_ID;
}
if (!agentId) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: 'Bad Request',
message: 'agent_id is required in request body',
});
}
// Skip permission checks for ephemeral agents
// Real agent IDs always start with "agent_", so anything else is ephemeral
// A missing agent_id on the agents endpoint is an ad-hoc (ephemeral) chat,
// not an error: "type a message and get a reply" must work before the user
// has created or selected an agent. Ephemeral agents carry no per-agent ACL,
// so skip the permission check and fall through to plain chat. A missing id
// is ephemeral by the canonical predicate (isEphemeralAgentId(undefined) === true).
if (isEphemeralAgentId(agentId)) {
return next();
}
@@ -104,13 +104,15 @@ describe('canAccessAgentFromBody middleware', () => {
});
describe('primary agent checks', () => {
test('returns 400 when agent_id is missing on agents endpoint', async () => {
test('proceeds (ephemeral fallback) when agent_id is missing on agents endpoint', async () => {
// No agent created/selected yet → ad-hoc chat. "Type hi and get a reply"
// must work out of the box; a missing id is ephemeral, not a 400.
req.body.agent_id = undefined;
const middleware = canAccessAgentFromBody({ requiredPermission: 1 });
await middleware(req, res, next);
expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(400);
expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(res.status).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test('proceeds for ephemeral primary agent without addedConvo', async () => {
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { EModelEndpoint } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const { getGuestConfig } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
/**
* Server-side capability scope for guest principals.
*
* Runs after guest authentication and before `buildEndpointOption`. For guest
* requests it pins the endpoint and model to the configured free Zen endpoint and
* strips every capability a guest must not reach (paid models, agents, tools,
* files, model specs, presets). The client is never trusted: any guest request
* that names a different endpoint/model is rejected rather than silently rewritten.
*
* Non-guest requests pass through untouched.
*
* @param {ServerRequest} req
* @param {ServerResponse} res
* @param {import('express').NextFunction} next
*/
const enforceGuestScope = (req, res, next) => {
if (req.user?.guest !== true) {
return next();
}
const config = getGuestConfig();
if (!config.enabled) {
return res.status(404).json({ message: 'Guest chat is not enabled' });
}
const body = req.body || {};
const { endpoint, model } = body;
if (endpoint != null && endpoint !== config.endpoint) {
logger.warn(`[enforceGuestScope] Guest ${req.user.id} rejected endpoint: ${endpoint}`);
return res.status(403).json({ message: 'Guests may only use the free preview model' });
}
if (model != null && model !== config.model) {
logger.warn(`[enforceGuestScope] Guest ${req.user.id} rejected model: ${model}`);
return res.status(403).json({ message: 'Guests may only use the free preview model' });
}
body.endpoint = config.endpoint;
body.endpointType = EModelEndpoint.custom;
body.model = config.model;
delete body.agent_id;
delete body.spec;
delete body.preset;
delete body.files;
delete body.tools;
delete body.tool_resources;
delete body.resendFiles;
delete body.promptPrefix;
delete body.web_search;
req.body = body;
return next();
};
module.exports = enforceGuestScope;
+4
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ const requireLdapAuth = require('./requireLdapAuth');
const abortMiddleware = require('./abortMiddleware');
const checkInviteUser = require('./checkInviteUser');
const requireJwtAuth = require('./requireJwtAuth');
const requireGuestOrJwtAuth = require('./requireGuestOrJwtAuth');
const enforceGuestScope = require('./enforceGuestScope');
const configMiddleware = require('./config/app');
const validateModel = require('./validateModel');
const moderateText = require('./moderateText');
@@ -36,6 +38,8 @@ module.exports = {
moderateText,
validateModel,
requireJwtAuth,
requireGuestOrJwtAuth,
enforceGuestScope,
checkInviteUser,
requireLdapAuth,
requireLocalAuth,
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
const { limiterCache } = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { ViolationTypes } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const logViolation = require('~/cache/logViolation');
/**
* Per-user rate limiter for the cloud-agents proxy (`/api/agents/cloud/*`). A run
* is a real, billable cloud chat completion that holds an upstream socket for up
* to 30s, yet it bypasses the message limiters that guard the sibling completion
* path. This caps a signed-in user to CLOUD_AGENT_USER_MAX requests per window so
* a loop cannot degrade the shared backend or run up denial-of-wallet cost.
* Keyed by user id (the route is JWT-only; guests never reach it).
*/
const {
CLOUD_AGENT_USER_MAX = 30,
CLOUD_AGENT_WINDOW = 1,
CLOUD_AGENT_VIOLATION_SCORE: score,
} = process.env;
const windowMs = CLOUD_AGENT_WINDOW * 60 * 1000;
const max = Number(CLOUD_AGENT_USER_MAX);
const handler = async (req, res) => {
const type = ViolationTypes.TOOL_CALL_LIMIT;
const errorMessage = {
type,
max,
limiter: 'user',
windowInMinutes: windowMs / 60000,
};
await logViolation(req, res, type, errorMessage, score);
res.status(429).json({ message: 'Too many cloud agent requests. Try again later.' });
};
const cloudAgentLimiter = rateLimit({
windowMs,
max,
handler,
keyGenerator: (req) => req.user?.id,
store: limiterCache('cloud_agent_limiter'),
});
module.exports = cloudAgentLimiter;
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
const { limiterCache } = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { guestClientIp } = require('~/server/utils');
const parsePositiveInt = (value, fallback) => {
const parsed = Number.parseInt(value, 10);
return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : fallback;
};
const GUEST_TOKEN_WINDOW = parsePositiveInt(process.env.GUEST_TOKEN_WINDOW, 60);
const GUEST_TOKEN_MAX = parsePositiveInt(process.env.GUEST_TOKEN_MAX, 20);
const windowMs = GUEST_TOKEN_WINDOW * 60 * 1000;
const max = GUEST_TOKEN_MAX;
const windowInMinutes = windowMs / 60000;
const handler = (req, res) => {
return res.status(429).json({
message: `Too many guest sessions, please try again after ${windowInMinutes} minutes.`,
});
};
/**
* Per-IP rate limiter for guest token issuance.
*
* Caps how many guest tokens a single client IP can mint per window so nobody can
* spam-mint tokens (a DoS / quota-probe vector). Keyed on the REAL client IP
* (`guestClientIp` → Cloudflare `CF-Connecting-IP`) and backed by the shared
* Redis `limiterCache` so the cap holds across replicas. Note this is defense in
* depth only: even unlimited tokens cannot multiply the message quota, which is
* itself keyed per-IP (see `guestMessageLimiter`).
*/
const guestTokenLimiter = rateLimit({
windowMs,
max,
handler,
keyGenerator: guestClientIp,
store: limiterCache('guest_token_limiter'),
});
module.exports = { guestTokenLimiter };
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
const { limiterCache } = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { guestClientIp } = require('~/server/utils');
const { getGuestConfig } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
const GUEST_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
const handler = (req, res) => {
return res.status(402).json({
type: 'GUEST_LIMIT',
message: 'Guest message limit reached. Log in to continue.',
});
};
/**
* Per-IP quota limiter for anonymous guest chat completions.
*
* Reuses the shared Redis-backed `limiterCache` infrastructure (same store as the
* message limiters), so the count is shared across replicas — a guest cannot
* multiply their quota by round-robining pods. The key is the REAL client IP
* (`guestClientIp` → Cloudflare `CF-Connecting-IP`), NOT the guest token, so
* clearing cookies, opening incognito, or minting a fresh guest token does not
* reset the count. It only counts requests made by an authenticated guest
* principal; logged-in users skip the counter entirely. On exhaustion it returns
* a `402 { type: 'GUEST_LIMIT' }` signal the client maps to the login gate.
*/
const guestMessageLimiter = rateLimit({
windowMs: GUEST_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS,
max: () => getGuestConfig().messageMax,
handler,
keyGenerator: guestClientIp,
skip: (req) => req.user?.guest !== true,
store: limiterCache('guest_message_limiter'),
});
module.exports = { guestMessageLimiter };
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
jest.mock('@hanzochat/api', () => ({
limiterCache: () => undefined,
}));
jest.mock('~/server/utils', () => ({
removePorts: (req) => req.headers['x-test-ip'] || req.ip,
guestClientIp: (req) =>
req.headers['cf-connecting-ip'] || req.headers['x-test-ip'] || req.ip,
}));
jest.mock('~/server/services/guestConfig', () => ({
getGuestConfig: jest.fn(),
}));
const { getGuestConfig } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
const { guestMessageLimiter } = require('./guestMessageLimiter');
const buildApp = (user) => {
const app = express();
app.use((req, _res, next) => {
req.user = user;
next();
});
app.use(guestMessageLimiter);
app.post('/chat', (_req, res) => res.status(200).json({ ok: true }));
return app;
};
describe('guestMessageLimiter', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
getGuestConfig.mockReturnValue({
enabled: true,
messageMax: 3,
endpoint: 'Hanzo',
model: 'zen3-nano',
});
});
it('allows up to GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX guest messages then returns 402 GUEST_LIMIT', async () => {
const app = buildApp({ id: 'g1', guest: true });
const ip = '10.0.0.1';
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
const res = await request(app).post('/chat').set('x-test-ip', ip);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
const blocked = await request(app).post('/chat').set('x-test-ip', ip);
expect(blocked.status).toBe(402);
expect(blocked.body.type).toBe('GUEST_LIMIT');
});
it('counts quota per IP independently', async () => {
const app = buildApp({ id: 'g1', guest: true });
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
await request(app).post('/chat').set('x-test-ip', '10.0.0.2');
}
const blocked = await request(app).post('/chat').set('x-test-ip', '10.0.0.2');
expect(blocked.status).toBe(402);
const fresh = await request(app).post('/chat').set('x-test-ip', '10.0.0.3');
expect(fresh.status).toBe(200);
});
it('never counts or blocks authenticated (non-guest) users', async () => {
const app = buildApp({ id: 'real-user', role: 'USER' });
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
const res = await request(app).post('/chat').set('x-test-ip', '10.0.0.4');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
});
});
+6
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,14 @@ const createTTSLimiters = require('./ttsLimiters');
const createSTTLimiters = require('./sttLimiters');
const loginLimiter = require('./loginLimiter');
const { guestTokenLimiter } = require('./guestLimiters');
const { guestMessageLimiter } = require('./guestMessageLimiter');
const importLimiters = require('./importLimiters');
const uploadLimiters = require('./uploadLimiters');
const forkLimiters = require('./forkLimiters');
const registerLimiter = require('./registerLimiter');
const toolCallLimiter = require('./toolCallLimiter');
const cloudAgentLimiter = require('./cloudAgentLimiter');
const messageLimiters = require('./messageLimiters');
const verifyEmailLimiter = require('./verifyEmailLimiter');
const resetPasswordLimiter = require('./resetPasswordLimiter');
@@ -17,8 +20,11 @@ module.exports = {
...messageLimiters,
...forkLimiters,
loginLimiter,
guestTokenLimiter,
guestMessageLimiter,
registerLimiter,
toolCallLimiter,
cloudAgentLimiter,
createTTSLimiters,
createSTTLimiters,
verifyEmailLimiter,
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const requireJwtAuth = require('./requireJwtAuth');
const { getGuestConfig, buildGuestPrincipal } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
/**
* Extracts a bearer token from the Authorization header.
* @param {ServerRequest} req
* @returns {string|null}
*/
const getBearerToken = (req) => {
const header = req.headers?.authorization;
if (!header || !header.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
return null;
}
return header.slice('Bearer '.length).trim();
};
/**
* Guest-aware authentication, applied ONLY to chat-completion routes.
*
* When `ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT` is enabled and the bearer token is a valid guest token
* (`guest: true`, signed with `JWT_SECRET`), an ephemeral guest principal is set
* on `req.user` and the request proceeds. Otherwise the request falls through to
* the standard `requireJwtAuth`, which rejects guest tokens everywhere else
* (the `jwt` strategy requires a matching DB user). Fail closed by construction.
*
* @param {ServerRequest} req
* @param {ServerResponse} res
* @param {import('express').NextFunction} next
*/
const requireGuestOrJwtAuth = (req, res, next) => {
const config = getGuestConfig();
if (!config.enabled) {
return requireJwtAuth(req, res, next);
}
const token = getBearerToken(req);
if (!token) {
return requireJwtAuth(req, res, next);
}
let payload;
try {
payload = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
} catch (_err) {
return requireJwtAuth(req, res, next);
}
if (payload?.guest !== true || !payload.id) {
return requireJwtAuth(req, res, next);
}
req.user = buildGuestPrincipal(payload.id);
logger.debug(`[requireGuestOrJwtAuth] Guest principal authenticated: ${payload.id}`);
return next();
};
module.exports = requireGuestOrJwtAuth;
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
/**
* End-to-end auth chain for guest bootstrap: real passport `jwt` strategy +
* real `requireGuestOrJwtAuth` / `requireJwtAuth` + real controllers, driven by
* a real signed guest JWT.
*
* Proves:
* - a guest token on a JWT-only route returns a clean 401 (NOT 500/CastError),
* - /api/endpoints, /api/user, /api/convos return guest-scoped data,
* - a non-bootstrap protected route still 401s for a guest.
*/
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const express = require('express');
const passport = require('passport');
const request = require('supertest');
jest.mock('@hanzochat/api', () => ({
isEnabled: (value) => value === 'true' || value === true,
}));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
EModelEndpoint: { custom: 'custom' },
SystemRoles: { USER: 'USER' },
}));
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn() },
}));
// getUserById would throw a Mongoose CastError on a guest id; assert it is never
// reached for a guest, and returns null (→ clean 401) for a real-but-missing id.
jest.mock('~/models', () => ({
getUserById: jest.fn(async (id) => {
if (String(id).startsWith('guest_')) {
throw new Error('CastError: Cast to ObjectId failed for value "' + id + '"');
}
return null;
}),
updateUser: jest.fn(),
}));
const { getUserById } = require('~/models');
const jwtLogin = require('~/strategies/jwtStrategy');
const requireJwtAuth = require('~/server/middleware/requireJwtAuth');
const requireGuestOrJwtAuth = require('~/server/middleware/requireGuestOrJwtAuth');
const { buildGuestEndpointsConfig, buildGuestUser } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
const JWT_SECRET = 'integration-guest-secret';
const buildApp = () => {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(passport.initialize());
passport.use(jwtLogin());
// Bootstrap (guest-aware) routes.
app.get('/api/endpoints', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, (req, res) => {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.send(JSON.stringify(buildGuestEndpointsConfig()));
}
return res.send(JSON.stringify({ openAI: {}, Hanzo: {} }));
});
app.get('/api/user', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, (req, res) => {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.status(200).send(buildGuestUser(req.user));
}
return res.status(200).send(req.user);
});
app.get('/api/convos', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, (req, res) => {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.status(200).json({ conversations: [], nextCursor: null });
}
return res.status(200).json({ conversations: ['real'] });
});
// Non-bootstrap protected route (JWT-only): must reject guests.
app.get('/api/prompts', requireJwtAuth, (req, res) => res.status(200).json({ ok: true }));
return app;
};
describe('guest bootstrap auth chain (integration)', () => {
let app;
const guestToken = jwt.sign({ id: 'guest_abc-123', guest: true, role: 'GUEST' }, JWT_SECRET);
beforeAll(() => {
process.env.JWT_SECRET = JWT_SECRET;
process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT = 'true';
process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT = 'Hanzo';
process.env.GUEST_MODEL = 'zen5-mini';
app = buildApp();
});
afterEach(() => jest.clearAllMocks());
it('GET /api/endpoints → 200 with ONLY the guest endpoint', async () => {
const res = await request(app)
.get('/api/endpoints')
.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const body = JSON.parse(res.text);
expect(Object.keys(body)).toEqual(['Hanzo']);
expect(getUserById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('GET /api/user → 200 ephemeral guest principal (no email, no DB lookup)', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/user').set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ id: 'guest_abc-123', role: 'GUEST', guest: true });
expect(res.body).not.toHaveProperty('email');
expect(getUserById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('GET /api/convos → 200 empty list for a guest', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/convos').set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ conversations: [], nextCursor: null });
});
it('GET /api/prompts (JWT-only) → clean 401 for a guest, NEVER 500/CastError', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/prompts').set('Authorization', `Bearer ${guestToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
// The guest id must never reach getUserById (that is what caused the CastError → 500).
expect(getUserById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('GET /api/prompts → clean 401 for a real-but-missing user (no 500)', async () => {
const realToken = jwt.sign({ id: '64b2f0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0' }, JWT_SECRET);
const res = await request(app).get('/api/prompts').set('Authorization', `Bearer ${realToken}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(getUserById).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('GET /api/prompts → 401 with no token (fail closed)', async () => {
const res = await request(app).get('/api/prompts');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
+230
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
/**
* Regression test for the OAuth login rate-limiter scoping fix.
*
* Background: `loginLimiter` (LOGIN_MAX per 5 min, keyed by IP) used to be
* applied as blanket router middleware (`router.use(loginLimiter)`), which also
* covered the OIDC/social callback routes. Behind a shared LB/CDN IP, with
* OPENID_AUTO_REDIRECT firing `/oauth/openid` on every page load, the per-IP
* budget was exhausted instantly and the IdP code-exchange callback got 429 -
* aborting the token exchange and breaking login.
*
* The fix scopes `loginLimiter` to the human-initiated entry points (the GETs
* that REDIRECT to the IdP) and leaves the machine-driven callback routes
* (the IdP returning a one-time code) un-limited.
*
* This test mounts the REAL oauth router with the REAL `loginLimiter` and only
* stubs the heavy leaf deps (passport, openid-client, controllers, config, db),
* mirroring server/routes/__tests__/convos-duplicate-ratelimit.spec.js.
*/
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
// passport.authenticate(...) -> a middleware that signals "reached the handler"
// (in prod this would redirect to the IdP for initiation, or exchange the code
// for callbacks). Returning 200 lets us detect whether the limiter intercepted
// the request with 429 BEFORE control reached the auth handler.
jest.mock('passport', () => ({
authenticate: jest.fn(() => (req, res) => res.status(200).json({ reached: true })),
}));
jest.mock('openid-client', () => ({
randomState: jest.fn(() => 'test-state'),
}));
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn() },
}));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
ErrorTypes: { AUTH_FAILED: 'AUTH_FAILED' },
ViolationTypes: { LOGINS: 'logins' },
}));
// `limiterCache: () => undefined` makes express-rate-limit fall back to its
// built-in in-process MemoryStore (no Redis), same as the convos limiter test.
jest.mock('@hanzochat/api', () => ({
createSetBalanceConfig: jest.fn(() => (req, res, next) => next()),
limiterCache: jest.fn(() => undefined),
}));
// loginLimiter.js does `require('~/cache')` (the index, which also pulls
// getLogStores) and `require('~/server/utils')` (index, which pulls
// sendEmail/files/queue). Mock both indexes to the minimal real/inert surface
// the limiter actually uses: a no-op violation logger and the dependency-free
// `removePorts` IP key generator.
jest.mock('~/cache', () => ({
logViolation: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
}));
jest.mock('~/server/utils', () => ({
removePorts: jest.requireActual('~/server/utils/removePorts'),
}));
// oauth.js imports { checkDomainAllowed, loginLimiter, logHeaders } from the
// middleware index, whose full require graph is too heavy for a hermetic unit
// test. Mock the index but expose the REAL `loginLimiter` (the unit under test)
// via requireActual of the leaf file — mirroring how
// convos-duplicate-ratelimit.spec.js pulls the real forkLimiters. The other two
// are inert passthroughs (not under test here).
jest.mock('~/server/middleware', () => {
const loginLimiter = jest.requireActual('~/server/middleware/limiters/loginLimiter');
return {
loginLimiter,
logHeaders: (req, res, next) => next(),
checkDomainAllowed: (req, res, next) => next(),
};
});
jest.mock('~/server/controllers/auth/oauth', () => ({
createOAuthHandler: jest.fn(() => (req, res) => res.status(200).json({ handler: true })),
}));
jest.mock('~/server/services/Config', () => ({
getAppConfig: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('~/db/models', () => ({
Balance: {},
}));
const LOGIN_INITIATION = '/oauth/openid';
const LOGIN_CALLBACK = '/oauth/openid/callback';
describe('OAuth router — loginLimiter scoping', () => {
const savedEnv = {};
beforeAll(() => {
savedEnv.LOGIN_MAX = process.env.LOGIN_MAX;
savedEnv.LOGIN_WINDOW = process.env.LOGIN_WINDOW;
savedEnv.DOMAIN_CLIENT = process.env.DOMAIN_CLIENT;
savedEnv.DOMAIN_SERVER = process.env.DOMAIN_SERVER;
});
afterAll(() => {
for (const key of Object.keys(savedEnv)) {
if (savedEnv[key] === undefined) {
delete process.env[key];
} else {
process.env[key] = savedEnv[key];
}
}
});
// The limiter reads LOGIN_MAX/LOGIN_WINDOW at module-load time, so build the
// app inside isolateModules AFTER setting env to get a fresh limiter+store.
const buildApp = () => {
let oauthRouter;
jest.isolateModules(() => {
oauthRouter = require('../oauth');
});
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use('/oauth', oauthRouter);
return app;
};
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
process.env.LOGIN_MAX = '1';
process.env.LOGIN_WINDOW = '5';
process.env.DOMAIN_CLIENT = 'http://localhost:3080';
process.env.DOMAIN_SERVER = 'http://localhost:3080';
});
describe('initiation route (redirect-to-IdP) IS rate-limited', () => {
it('returns 429 once an initiation route exceeds LOGIN_MAX', async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const max = parseInt(process.env.LOGIN_MAX, 10);
for (let i = 0; i < max; i++) {
const ok = await request(app).get(LOGIN_INITIATION);
expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
expect(ok.body.reached).toBe(true);
}
const limited = await request(app).get(LOGIN_INITIATION);
expect(limited.status).toBe(429);
expect(limited.body.message).toMatch(/too many/i);
});
});
describe('callback route (IdP-returns-code) is NOT rate-limited', () => {
it('never returns 429 even when hammered well past LOGIN_MAX', async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const hits = parseInt(process.env.LOGIN_MAX, 10) + 5;
for (let i = 0; i < hits; i++) {
const res = await request(app).get(LOGIN_CALLBACK);
// The callback may legitimately 200/redirect/fail auth — it must just
// never be throttled with 429.
expect(res.status).not.toBe(429);
}
});
it('does not consume the initiation budget (callback hits never trip the limiter)', async () => {
const app = buildApp();
// Hammer the callback far past the limit first.
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
const res = await request(app).get(LOGIN_CALLBACK);
expect(res.status).not.toBe(429);
}
// The single allowed initiation request must still succeed: callbacks and
// initiations do not share a (broken) blanket budget.
const ok = await request(app).get(LOGIN_INITIATION);
expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
});
});
describe('router wiring (defense-in-depth structural assertion)', () => {
// Even independent of runtime behavior, assert the limiter is present in the
// initiation route's middleware stack and absent from every callback stack.
const limiterStackByPath = () => {
let oauthRouter;
let loginLimiter;
jest.isolateModules(() => {
oauthRouter = require('../oauth');
// Same instance the router received (the mocked index re-exports the
// real leaf limiter), so reference-equality in the stack is meaningful.
({ loginLimiter } = require('~/server/middleware'));
});
const byPath = {};
for (const layer of oauthRouter.stack) {
if (!layer.route) continue; // skip router.use(logHeaders) etc.
const handles = layer.route.stack.map((s) => s.handle);
byPath[layer.route.path] = handles.includes(loginLimiter);
}
return byPath;
};
it('applies loginLimiter to every initiation route and to NO callback route', () => {
const limited = limiterStackByPath();
const initiationRoutes = [
'/google',
'/facebook',
'/openid',
'/github',
'/discord',
'/apple',
'/saml',
];
const callbackRoutes = [
'/google/callback',
'/facebook/callback',
'/openid/callback',
'/github/callback',
'/discord/callback',
'/apple/callback',
'/saml/callback',
];
for (const path of initiationRoutes) {
expect(limited[path]).toBe(true);
}
for (const path of callbackRoutes) {
expect(limited[path]).toBe(false);
}
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { debug: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() },
}));
// The proxy keys the on-behalf-of decision off the VALIDATED principal
// (`req.user.provider`), not a cookie. requireJwtAuth is exercised elsewhere;
// here it simply installs the principal under test so the token-resolution +
// honest-error logic is isolated. Set `mockPrincipal` per test (the `mock`
// prefix is required for a jest.mock factory to reference it).
let mockPrincipal;
jest.mock('~/server/middleware', () => ({
requireJwtAuth: (req, _res, next) => {
req.user = mockPrincipal;
next();
},
// Rate limiter is exercised in its own layer; here it is a pass-through so the
// proxy logic (token resolution, honest errors, name guard) is under test.
cloudAgentLimiter: (_req, _res, next) => next(),
}));
const mockClient = {
list: jest.fn(),
get: jest.fn(),
run: jest.fn(),
};
jest.mock('~/server/services/CloudAgentsClient', () => ({
getCloudAgentsClient: jest.fn(() => mockClient),
// Boundary name validation in the route uses the real grammar.
AGENT_NAME_RE: /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/,
}));
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const express = require('express');
const request = require('supertest');
const { getCloudAgentsClient } = require('~/server/services/CloudAgentsClient');
const cloudRouter = require('../cloud');
const OPENID_SUB = 'sub-abc-123';
const OPENID_USER = { id: 'u_openid', provider: 'openid', openidId: OPENID_SUB };
const LOCAL_USER = { id: 'u_local', provider: 'local' };
/**
* Mint a decodable id_token. The signature is irrelevant to the proxy — it
* decode-only checks `exp` + `sub`; cloud performs the authoritative JWKS
* validation. So a throwaway secret is exactly right here.
*/
function mintIdToken({ sub = OPENID_SUB, exp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600 } = {}) {
return jwt.sign({ sub, exp }, 'test-only-not-verified');
}
/**
* Build an app whose session carries (or omits) the OpenID tokens the proxy
* forwards to cloud. The authenticated principal is `mockPrincipal` (default: an
* OpenID user); `cookie` models the httpOnly no-session fallback.
*/
function buildApp(session, cookie) {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use((req, _res, next) => {
req.session = session;
if (cookie != null && req.headers.cookie == null) {
req.headers.cookie = cookie;
}
next();
});
app.use('/api/agents/cloud', cloudRouter);
return app;
}
const VALID_ID = mintIdToken();
const withToken = { openidTokens: { idToken: VALID_ID, accessToken: 'ACC' } };
describe('cloud agents proxy route', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
mockPrincipal = OPENID_USER;
getCloudAgentsClient.mockReturnValue(mockClient);
});
describe('token handling (no leak, fail-secure)', () => {
it('401s when the openid principal has no hanzo.id session token', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp({})).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('forwards the session id_token (never the browser) to cloud', async () => {
mockClient.list.mockResolvedValue({ agents: [{ name: 'researcher' }] });
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken)).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(mockClient.list).toHaveBeenCalledWith(VALID_ID);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ agents: [{ name: 'researcher' }], enabled: true });
});
it('falls back to a principal-bound access_token JWT when there is no id_token', async () => {
mockClient.list.mockResolvedValue({ agents: [] });
// hanzo.id issues JWT access tokens too; the fallback stays principal-bound.
const accJwt = mintIdToken();
const app = buildApp({ openidTokens: { accessToken: accJwt } });
await request(app).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(mockClient.list).toHaveBeenCalledWith(accJwt);
});
it('401s (never forwards) an opaque access_token that cannot be principal-bound', async () => {
// A non-JWT access_token has no `sub` to bind against — fail-secure, do not
// forward. (This is the path a selective `openid_access_token` cookie
// injection would take; the binding requirement closes it.)
const app = buildApp({ openidTokens: { accessToken: 'OPAQUE_NO_BINDING' } });
const res = await request(app).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('401s (never forwards) an access_token JWT that names a different principal', async () => {
const foreignAcc = mintIdToken({ sub: 'sub-someone-else' });
const app = buildApp({ openidTokens: { accessToken: foreignAcc } });
const res = await request(app).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('reads the httpOnly openid_id_token cookie when the session is empty', async () => {
mockClient.list.mockResolvedValue({ agents: [] });
const app = buildApp({}, `openid_id_token=${VALID_ID}`);
await request(app).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(mockClient.list).toHaveBeenCalledWith(VALID_ID);
});
});
describe('honest expiry + principal binding (never a fabricated session)', () => {
it('honest 401 when the id_token is past its own exp (no forward)', async () => {
const expired = mintIdToken({ exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60 });
const app = buildApp({ openidTokens: { idToken: expired } });
const res = await request(app).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('honest 401 when the id_token names a different principal (sub mismatch)', async () => {
const foreign = mintIdToken({ sub: 'sub-someone-else' });
const app = buildApp({ openidTokens: { idToken: foreign } });
const res = await request(app).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('honest 401 when the id_token is not a decodable JWT', async () => {
const app = buildApp({ openidTokens: { idToken: 'not-a-jwt' } });
const res = await request(app).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('principal guard (no confused deputy)', () => {
it('401s and forwards nothing for a LOCAL principal, even with a valid openid session', async () => {
// A local-JWT user whose browser still holds a valid prior openid session.
// Forwarding those tokens would run as the wrong principal — deny at the
// identity layer (req.user.provider), independent of any cookie.
mockPrincipal = LOCAL_USER;
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken)).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('401s for a principal that carries no provider', async () => {
mockPrincipal = { id: 'u_unknown' };
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken)).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('401s for an openid principal with no openidId to bind against (no fail-open)', async () => {
// provider==='openid' but the record has no openidId: the binding cannot be
// asserted, so NO token is forwarded — even one whose sub would have matched
// a normal user. Fail-secure closes the null-binding gap.
mockPrincipal = { id: 'u_openid_no_sub', provider: 'openid' };
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken)).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('401s when a foreign id_token is injected via cookie with an empty session (confused-deputy denied)', async () => {
// Attacker pairs their own openid app-token (req.user) with a victim's
// id_token in the openid_id_token cookie and an empty session. The sub
// binding rejects it — the forwarded principal can only ever be req.user.
const foreign = mintIdToken({ sub: 'victim-sub-xyz' });
const app = buildApp({}, `openid_id_token=${foreign}`);
const res = await request(app).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect(mockClient.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('disabled deployment', () => {
it('returns an empty, disabled list when cloud agents are not configured', async () => {
getCloudAgentsClient.mockReturnValue(null);
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken)).get('/api/agents/cloud');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ agents: [], enabled: false });
});
});
describe('run', () => {
it('forwards {input} and returns the RunResult', async () => {
mockClient.run.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'run_1', status: 'ok', output: 'done' });
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken))
.post('/api/agents/cloud/researcher/run')
.send({ input: 'summarize' });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(mockClient.run).toHaveBeenCalledWith(VALID_ID, 'researcher', 'summarize');
expect(res.body.output).toBe('done');
});
it('surfaces an upstream error body with its status (honest failure)', async () => {
const err = Object.assign(new Error('bad gateway'), {
status: 502,
body: { status: 'error', error: 'model down' },
});
mockClient.run.mockRejectedValue(err);
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken))
.post('/api/agents/cloud/researcher/run')
.send({ input: 'x' });
expect(res.status).toBe(502);
expect(res.body).toEqual({ status: 'error', error: 'model down' });
});
it('maps a client-side validation error (bad name) to 400', async () => {
const err = Object.assign(new Error('invalid agent name'), { status: 400 });
mockClient.run.mockRejectedValue(err);
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken))
.post('/api/agents/cloud/researcher/run')
.send({ input: 'x' });
// simulate the client rejecting after the boundary let a valid name through
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
});
describe('boundary name validation (traversal / injection guard)', () => {
// Each decodes (per Express) to a value outside cloud's handle grammar; the
// route must reject at the boundary BEFORE constructing any client call.
const smuggles = [
'..%2Fetc', // -> ../etc
'%2e%2e%2fadmin', // -> ../admin
'..%5Cevil', // -> ..\evil
'a%00b', // -> null byte
'a%0dHost', // -> CR injection
'a%20b', // -> space
];
for (const name of smuggles) {
it(`rejects "${name}" with 400 and never calls the client`, async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken))
.post(`/api/agents/cloud/${name}/run`)
.send({ input: 'x' });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(mockClient.run).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
}
it('rejects a bad name on GET /:name too', async () => {
const res = await request(buildApp(withToken)).get('/api/agents/cloud/..%2Fetc');
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(mockClient.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
});
+201
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
const cookies = require('cookie');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const express = require('express');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { requireJwtAuth, cloudAgentLimiter } = require('~/server/middleware');
const { getCloudAgentsClient, AGENT_NAME_RE } = require('~/server/services/CloudAgentsClient');
/**
* Cloud agents router — lets a signed-in chat user RUN their own canonical Hanzo
* Cloud agents (`/v1/agents`) from the chat thread. Mounted at `/api/agents/cloud`.
*
* GET /api/agents/cloud list the caller's cloud agents
* GET /api/agents/cloud/:name one agent's detail + recent runs
* POST /api/agents/cloud/:name/run run the agent {input} -> RunResult
*
* Auth: `requireJwtAuth` gates every route (guests are rejected). The chat
* backend then forwards the user's hanzo.id id_token to cloud as a Bearer;
* cloud validates it and scopes to the user's org (see CloudAgentsClient). The
* token is read from the server-side session and NEVER returned to the browser.
*/
const router = express.Router();
/**
* Is this token safe to forward on-behalf-of `user`? Fail-secure gates, ALL
* mandatory — the function only ever REMOVES a token from consideration, never
* admits one:
* - Decodable JWT: an opaque/garbage token cannot be principal-bound, so it is
* never forwarded. hanzo.id — the only cloud IdP — always issues JWTs.
* - Principal binding (MANDATORY): the token must NAME the authenticated user
* (`sub === user.openidId`). If we cannot ASSERT the binding — no `openidId`
* on the principal, no `sub` on the token, or a mismatch — we do NOT forward.
* This keeps "forwarded principal == req.user" true by construction, closing
* the credential-mixing confused deputy (a session/cookie carrying a
* different user's token) with no fail-open when binding data is absent.
* - Expiry: never forward a token past its own `exp`.
*
* Decode-only (no signature verification): cloud performs the authoritative
* JWKS + claim validation over the SAME claims, so it runs as exactly this
* `sub`. A forged/tampered token gains nothing here — changing `sub` fails the
* binding; an intact `sub` is rejected by cloud on signature.
*
* @param {string|undefined} token
* @param {{openidId?: string}} user
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isForwardableToken(token, user) {
if (!token || !user?.openidId) {
return false;
}
const claims = jwt.decode(token);
if (!claims || typeof claims !== 'object') {
return false;
}
if (claims.sub !== user.openidId) {
return false;
}
if (typeof claims.exp === 'number' && claims.exp * 1000 <= Date.now()) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Resolve the caller's hanzo.id bearer for the on-behalf-of call to cloud.
*
* Keyed off the VALIDATED principal (`req.user.provider === 'openid'` — the
* authoritative DB user loaded by requireJwtAuth), NOT any cookie. A local user
* never carries a hanzo.id token, so a stale OpenID session left in the browser
* can never be forwarded under a local identity — the confused deputy is denied
* at the identity layer.
*
* EVERY candidate — session first, then the httpOnly no-session cookie fallback;
* id_token preferred, access_token second — must pass `isForwardableToken`:
* principal-bound to req.user and unexpired. Returns null — for an honest 401,
* never a wrong-principal, expired, unbound, or fabricated call — otherwise.
*
* @param {import('express').Request} req
* @returns {string|null}
*/
function getUserCloudBearer(req) {
if (req.user?.provider !== 'openid') {
return null;
}
const parsed = req.headers.cookie ? cookies.parse(req.headers.cookie) : {};
const session = req.session?.openidTokens;
const idToken = session?.idToken || parsed.openid_id_token;
if (isForwardableToken(idToken, req.user)) {
return idToken;
}
/**
* access_token fallback (rare: the session/cookie carries no id_token).
* hanzo.id issues JWT access tokens too, so this stays principal-bound; an
* opaque or foreign access_token fails the gate and is never forwarded.
*/
const accessToken = session?.accessToken || parsed.openid_access_token;
if (isForwardableToken(accessToken, req.user)) {
return accessToken;
}
return null;
}
router.use(requireJwtAuth);
/**
* Per-user rate limit. A run is a real, billable cloud completion holding an
* upstream socket; without this it escapes the throttle that guards the sibling
* chat-completion path. Applies to every cloud route (list/get/run) so no proxy
* op can be looped to degrade the shared backend. Runs after requireJwtAuth so
* the limiter keys on a real user id.
*/
router.use(cloudAgentLimiter);
/**
* Validate the :name path segment at the HTTP boundary — the same cloud handle
* grammar the client enforces, applied here so a malformed/decoded name
* (traversal, null byte, CRLF, backslash) is rejected before any client call is
* even constructed. Defense at the boundary, not only in the client.
*/
router.param('name', (req, res, next, name) => {
if (!AGENT_NAME_RE.test((name ?? '').toString().trim())) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid agent name' });
}
return next();
});
/**
* Map a CloudAgentsClient error to an HTTP response. Upstream failures that
* carry a run body (cloud's 502 with a recorded error run) are passed through so
* the client can render the honest failure; everything else is normalized.
* @param {import('express').Response} res
* @param {Error & {status?: number, body?: any}} err
* @param {string} action
*/
function sendCloudError(res, err, action) {
const status = err.status && err.status >= 400 && err.status < 600 ? err.status : 502;
if (status >= 500) {
logger.warn(`[cloudAgents] ${action} failed`, { status, message: err.message });
}
if (err.body && typeof err.body === 'object') {
return res.status(status).json(err.body);
}
return res.status(status).json({ error: err.message || 'cloud agents request failed' });
}
/** GET /api/agents/cloud — list the caller's cloud agents. */
router.get('/', async (req, res) => {
const client = getCloudAgentsClient();
if (!client) {
return res.json({ agents: [], enabled: false });
}
const bearer = getUserCloudBearer(req);
if (!bearer) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'cloud agents require hanzo.id sign-in' });
}
try {
const data = await client.list(bearer);
return res.json({ ...data, enabled: true });
} catch (err) {
return sendCloudError(res, err, 'list');
}
});
/** GET /api/agents/cloud/:name — one agent's detail + recent runs. */
router.get('/:name', async (req, res) => {
const client = getCloudAgentsClient();
if (!client) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'cloud agents not configured' });
}
const bearer = getUserCloudBearer(req);
if (!bearer) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'cloud agents require hanzo.id sign-in' });
}
try {
const data = await client.get(bearer, req.params.name);
return res.json(data);
} catch (err) {
return sendCloudError(res, err, 'get');
}
});
/** POST /api/agents/cloud/:name/run — run the agent, return its RunResult. */
router.post('/:name/run', async (req, res) => {
const client = getCloudAgentsClient();
if (!client) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'cloud agents not configured' });
}
const bearer = getUserCloudBearer(req);
if (!bearer) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'cloud agents require hanzo.id sign-in' });
}
try {
const run = await client.run(bearer, req.params.name, req.body?.input ?? '');
return res.json(run);
} catch (err) {
return sendCloudError(res, err, 'run');
}
});
module.exports = router;
+70 -14
View File
@@ -8,11 +8,15 @@ const {
messageIpLimiter,
configMiddleware,
messageUserLimiter,
enforceGuestScope,
guestMessageLimiter,
requireGuestOrJwtAuth,
} = require('~/server/middleware');
const { saveMessage } = require('~/models');
const openai = require('./openai');
const responses = require('./responses');
const { v1 } = require('./v1');
const cloud = require('./cloud');
const chat = require('./chat');
const { LIMIT_MESSAGE_IP, LIMIT_MESSAGE_USER } = process.env ?? {};
@@ -33,10 +37,76 @@ router.use('/v1/responses', responses);
*/
router.use('/v1', openai);
/**
* Guest-capable chat completion router.
*
* Mounted before the JWT-only routes below so anonymous guests (when
* `ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT` is enabled) can reach ONLY the completion endpoints. Auth
* here accepts either a guest token or a real JWT; `enforceGuestScope` then pins
* guests to the free Zen endpoint/model and strips every other capability, and
* `guestMessageLimiter` enforces the per-IP guest quota. Every other agents route
* (management, CRUD, files) remains gated by the strict `requireJwtAuth` below,
* which rejects guest tokens.
*/
const RESERVED_CHAT_SUBPATHS = new Set(['stream', 'active', 'status', 'abort']);
const chatRouter = express.Router();
/**
* Defer reserved management subpaths (stream/active/status/abort) to the
* JWT-only handlers defined on the parent router. Without this guard the
* completion route's `POST /:endpoint` would shadow `POST /chat/abort`.
*/
chatRouter.use((req, res, next) => {
const subpath = req.path.split('/').filter(Boolean)[0];
if (RESERVED_CHAT_SUBPATHS.has(subpath)) {
return next('router');
}
return next();
});
chatRouter.use(requireGuestOrJwtAuth);
chatRouter.use(checkBan);
chatRouter.use(uaParser);
chatRouter.use(configMiddleware);
chatRouter.use(enforceGuestScope);
chatRouter.use(guestMessageLimiter);
if (isEnabled(LIMIT_MESSAGE_IP)) {
chatRouter.use(messageIpLimiter);
}
if (isEnabled(LIMIT_MESSAGE_USER)) {
chatRouter.use(messageUserLimiter);
}
chatRouter.use('/', chat);
router.use('/chat', chatRouter);
/**
* Guest-safe active-jobs poll. Guests never own a generation job, so this
* returns an empty set without a DB/user lookup. Registered BEFORE the strict
* JWT guard below so the composer's bootstrap poll doesn't 401-loop for guests;
* every other agents route stays JWT-only and rejects guest tokens.
*/
router.get('/chat/active', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, async (req, res, next) => {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.json({ activeJobIds: [] });
}
return next();
});
router.use(requireJwtAuth);
router.use(checkBan);
router.use(uaParser);
/**
* Canonical Hanzo Cloud agents (`/v1/agents`). Mounted BEFORE the legacy `/`
* (v1) router so `/cloud/*` is not shadowed by v1's `GET /:id`. The cloud router
* carries its own `requireJwtAuth` and forwards the user's hanzo.id bearer to
* cloud server-side (see cloud.js). Legacy `/api/agents` CRUD stays untouched.
*/
router.use('/cloud', cloud);
router.use('/', v1);
/**
@@ -269,18 +339,4 @@ router.post('/chat/abort', async (req, res) => {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Job not found', streamId: jobStreamId });
});
const chatRouter = express.Router();
chatRouter.use(configMiddleware);
if (isEnabled(LIMIT_MESSAGE_IP)) {
chatRouter.use(messageIpLimiter);
}
if (isEnabled(LIMIT_MESSAGE_USER)) {
chatRouter.use(messageUserLimiter);
}
chatRouter.use('/', chat);
router.use('/chat', chatRouter);
module.exports = router;
+2
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ const {
const { verify2FAWithTempToken } = require('~/server/controllers/auth/TwoFactorAuthController');
const { logoutController } = require('~/server/controllers/auth/LogoutController');
const { loginController } = require('~/server/controllers/auth/LoginController');
const { guestTokenController } = require('~/server/controllers/auth/GuestController');
const { getAppConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const middleware = require('~/server/middleware');
const { Balance } = require('~/db/models');
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ router.post(
loginController,
);
router.post('/refresh', refreshController);
router.post('/guest', middleware.guestTokenLimiter, middleware.checkBan, guestTokenController);
router.post(
'/register',
middleware.registerLimiter,
+5
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const { isEnabled, getBalanceConfig } = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { Constants, CacheKeys, defaultSocialLogins } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const { getLdapConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config/ldap');
const { getAppConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config/app');
const { getGuestConfig } = require('~/server/services/guestConfig');
const { getProjectByName } = require('~/models/Project');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
@@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ router.get('/', async function (req, res) {
const balanceConfig = getBalanceConfig(appConfig);
const guestConfig = getGuestConfig();
// Strip server-internal fields from balance config before sending to client.
// commerce.endpoint leaks K8s service URLs; commerce.token is a bearer secret.
const clientBalanceConfig = balanceConfig
@@ -121,6 +124,8 @@ router.get('/', async function (req, res) {
sharePointPickerGraphScope: process.env.SHAREPOINT_PICKER_GRAPH_SCOPE,
sharePointPickerSharePointScope: process.env.SHAREPOINT_PICKER_SHAREPOINT_SCOPE,
openidReuseTokens,
allowGuestChat: guestConfig.enabled,
guestMessageMax: guestConfig.enabled ? guestConfig.messageMax : undefined,
conversationImportMaxFileSize: process.env.CONVERSATION_IMPORT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES
? parseInt(process.env.CONVERSATION_IMPORT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES, 10)
: 0,
+14 -2
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ const { forkConversation, duplicateConversation } = require('~/server/utils/impo
const { storage, importFileFilter } = require('~/server/routes/files/multer');
const { deleteAllSharedLinks, deleteConvoSharedLink } = require('~/models');
const requireJwtAuth = require('~/server/middleware/requireJwtAuth');
const requireGuestOrJwtAuth = require('~/server/middleware/requireGuestOrJwtAuth');
const { importConversations } = require('~/server/utils/import');
const { deleteToolCalls } = require('~/models/ToolCall');
const getLogStores = require('~/cache/getLogStores');
@@ -25,9 +26,17 @@ const assistantClients = {
};
const router = express.Router();
router.use(requireJwtAuth);
router.get('/', async (req, res) => {
/**
* Guest-accessible conversation list. Guests have no persisted conversations, so
* this returns an empty, well-formed page — enough for the UI to mount the chat
* history pane without a DB lookup. Registered with guest-aware auth BEFORE the
* strict JWT guard below; every mutation/read-by-id route stays JWT-only.
*/
router.get('/', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, async (req, res) => {
if (req.user?.guest === true) {
return res.status(200).json({ conversations: [], nextCursor: null });
}
const limit = parseInt(req.query.limit, 10) || 25;
const cursor = req.query.cursor;
const isArchived = isEnabled(req.query.isArchived);
@@ -57,6 +66,9 @@ router.get('/', async (req, res) => {
}
});
/** Every route below reads or writes persisted user data — JWT-only, no guests. */
router.use(requireJwtAuth);
router.get('/:conversationId', async (req, res) => {
const { conversationId } = req.params;
const convo = await getConvo(req.user.id, conversationId);
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
const express = require('express');
const requireJwtAuth = require('~/server/middleware/requireJwtAuth');
const requireGuestOrJwtAuth = require('~/server/middleware/requireGuestOrJwtAuth');
const endpointController = require('~/server/controllers/EndpointController');
const router = express.Router();
router.get('/', requireJwtAuth, endpointController);
router.get('/', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, endpointController);
module.exports = router;
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
const express = require('express');
const { modelController } = require('~/server/controllers/ModelController');
const { requireJwtAuth } = require('~/server/middleware/');
const { requireGuestOrJwtAuth } = require('~/server/middleware/');
const router = express.Router();
router.get('/', requireJwtAuth, modelController);
router.get('/', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, modelController);
module.exports = router;
+8 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// file deepcode ignore NoRateLimitingForLogin: Rate limiting is handled by the `loginLimiter` middleware
// file deepcode ignore NoRateLimitingForLogin: `loginLimiter` is applied per-route to the IdP-initiation GETs (not the machine-driven /callback routes, which would break the OIDC code exchange)
const express = require('express');
const passport = require('passport');
const { randomState } = require('openid-client');
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ const domains = {
};
router.use(logHeaders);
router.use(loginLimiter);
const oauthHandler = createOAuthHandler();
@@ -42,6 +41,7 @@ router.get('/error', (req, res) => {
*/
router.get(
'/google',
loginLimiter,
passport.authenticate('google', {
scope: ['openid', 'profile', 'email'],
session: false,
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ router.get(
*/
router.get(
'/facebook',
loginLimiter,
passport.authenticate('facebook', {
scope: ['public_profile'],
profileFields: ['id', 'email', 'name'],
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ router.get(
/**
* OpenID Routes
*/
router.get('/openid', (req, res, next) => {
router.get('/openid', loginLimiter, (req, res, next) => {
return passport.authenticate('openid', {
session: false,
state: randomState(),
@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ router.get(
*/
router.get(
'/github',
loginLimiter,
passport.authenticate('github', {
scope: ['user:email', 'read:user'],
session: false,
@@ -138,6 +140,7 @@ router.get(
*/
router.get(
'/discord',
loginLimiter,
passport.authenticate('discord', {
scope: ['identify', 'email'],
session: false,
@@ -162,6 +165,7 @@ router.get(
*/
router.get(
'/apple',
loginLimiter,
passport.authenticate('apple', {
session: false,
}),
@@ -184,6 +188,7 @@ router.post(
*/
router.get(
'/saml',
loginLimiter,
passport.authenticate('saml', {
session: false,
}),
+3 -2
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,12 @@ const {
updateFavoritesController,
getFavoritesController,
} = require('~/server/controllers/FavoritesController');
const { requireJwtAuth } = require('~/server/middleware');
const { requireJwtAuth, requireGuestOrJwtAuth } = require('~/server/middleware');
const router = express.Router();
router.get('/favorites', requireJwtAuth, getFavoritesController);
// Read-only favorites are guest-safe (empty list); writes stay JWT-only.
router.get('/favorites', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, getFavoritesController);
router.post('/favorites', requireJwtAuth, updateFavoritesController);
module.exports = router;
+2 -1
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ const {
configMiddleware,
canDeleteAccount,
requireJwtAuth,
requireGuestOrJwtAuth,
} = require('~/server/middleware');
const settings = require('./settings');
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ const settings = require('./settings');
const router = express.Router();
router.use('/settings', settings);
router.get('/', requireJwtAuth, getUserController);
router.get('/', requireGuestOrJwtAuth, getUserController);
router.get('/terms', requireJwtAuth, getTermsStatusController);
router.post('/terms/accept', requireJwtAuth, acceptTermsController);
router.post('/plugins', requireJwtAuth, updateUserPluginsController);
+50 -9
View File
@@ -413,6 +413,53 @@ const setAuthTokens = async (userId, res, _session = null) => {
}
};
/**
* @function persistOpenIDTokensToSession
* Persist the OpenID tokenset material an on-behalf-of downstream call needs
* (e.g. running the caller's canonical Hanzo Cloud `/v1/agents`) into the
* server-side express-session — and ONLY there, never a browser cookie.
*
* This is DELIBERATELY decoupled from the token-refresh strategy. It runs on
* EVERY OpenID login regardless of `OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS`; that flag alone still
* governs whether `/api/auth/refresh` performs an OIDC refresh-grant. It writes
* only server-side session state (no `token_provider`, `refreshToken`, or other
* auth cookie), so it cannot alter the browser-facing login/refresh cookies — a
* REUSE-disabled login stays byte-identical.
*
* The OIDC `refresh` credential is a SEPARATE concern from the on-behalf-of
* BEARER: it is persisted only when passed EXPLICITLY as `refreshToken`, which
* the REUSE path does (its session refreshes via OIDC and `refreshController` /
* `logoutController` read `session.openidTokens.refreshToken`). The decoupled
* default passes NO refresh credential — its session refreshes via the local
* JWT cookie — so no OIDC refresh token is written here. That keeps the decoupled
* session carrying only bearer material and leaves refresh/logout identical to a
* non-OpenID login (they read the local cookie, never this session field).
*
* @param {Object} req - request carrying the express-session
* @param {import('openid-client').TokenEndpointResponse & Partial<import('openid-client').TokenEndpointResponseHelpers>} tokenset
* @param {string} [refreshToken] - OIDC refresh credential to bind to this session (REUSE mode only); omitted in the decoupled path
* @returns {boolean} true if persisted; false when no session (or tokenset) was available
*/
const persistOpenIDTokensToSession = (req, tokenset, refreshToken) => {
if (!req?.session) {
logger.warn(
'[persistOpenIDTokensToSession] No session available; on-behalf-of tokens not stored',
);
return false;
}
if (!tokenset) {
return false;
}
const expiryInMilliseconds = math(process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY, DEFAULT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY);
req.session.openidTokens = {
accessToken: tokenset.access_token,
idToken: tokenset.id_token,
refreshToken,
expiresAt: Date.now() + expiryInMilliseconds,
};
return true;
};
/**
* @function setOpenIDAuthTokens
* Set OpenID Authentication Tokens
@@ -478,15 +525,8 @@ const setOpenIDAuthTokens = (tokenset, req, res, userId, existingRefreshToken) =
sameSite: 'lax',
});
/** Store tokens server-side in session to avoid large cookies */
if (req.session) {
req.session.openidTokens = {
accessToken: tokenset.access_token,
idToken: tokenset.id_token,
refreshToken: refreshToken,
expiresAt: expirationDate.getTime(),
};
} else {
/** Store tokens server-side in session to avoid large cookies (one writer). */
if (!persistOpenIDTokensToSession(req, tokenset, refreshToken)) {
logger.warn('[setOpenIDAuthTokens] No session available, falling back to cookies');
res.cookie('openid_access_token', tokenset.access_token, {
expires: expirationDate,
@@ -596,6 +636,7 @@ module.exports = {
setAuthTokens,
resetPassword,
setOpenIDAuthTokens,
persistOpenIDTokensToSession,
requestPasswordReset,
resendVerificationEmail,
};
+75 -1
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ jest.mock('~/server/services/Config', () => ({ getAppConfig: jest.fn() }));
jest.mock('~/server/utils', () => ({ sendEmail: jest.fn() }));
const { shouldUseSecureCookie } = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { setOpenIDAuthTokens } = require('./AuthService');
const { setOpenIDAuthTokens, persistOpenIDTokensToSession } = require('./AuthService');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
/** Helper to build a mock Express response */
function mockResponse() {
@@ -267,3 +268,76 @@ describe('setOpenIDAuthTokens', () => {
});
});
});
/**
* The on-behalf-of session writer, decoupled from the refresh strategy. Called on
* every OpenID login (regardless of OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS) so downstream cloud
* calls can run as the hanzo.id principal — and ONLY ever touches server-side
* session state, never a browser cookie.
*/
describe('persistOpenIDTokensToSession', () => {
const env = process.env;
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
process.env = { ...env };
delete process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY; // fall back to DEFAULT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY
});
afterAll(() => {
process.env = env;
});
it('stores ONLY the bearer material (no OIDC refresh credential) in the decoupled path', () => {
// Decoupled call (no explicit refreshToken arg): the on-behalf-of bearer is
// persisted, but the tokenset's refresh_token is NOT — the decoupled session
// refreshes via the local JWT cookie, and leaking the OIDC refresh token into
// the session would hijack logout's session lookup (findSession by the wrong
// token) and leave the local session un-invalidated.
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'the-id-token',
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = { session: {} };
const before = Date.now();
const result = persistOpenIDTokensToSession(req, tokenset);
expect(result).toBe(true);
expect(req.session.openidTokens).toEqual({
accessToken: 'the-access-token',
idToken: 'the-id-token',
refreshToken: undefined,
expiresAt: expect.any(Number),
});
// Expiry is anchored ~REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY (default 7d) ahead of now.
expect(req.session.openidTokens.expiresAt).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(before + 604800000);
});
it('persists the OIDC refresh credential only when passed EXPLICITLY (REUSE path)', () => {
const tokenset = { id_token: 'id', access_token: 'acc', refresh_token: 'tokenset-refresh' };
const req = { session: {} };
// The REUSE caller (setOpenIDAuthTokens) resolves and passes the credential.
persistOpenIDTokensToSession(req, tokenset, 'explicit-refresh');
expect(req.session.openidTokens.refreshToken).toBe('explicit-refresh');
});
it('returns false and warns when no session is available (never a cookie)', () => {
const req = { session: null };
const result = persistOpenIDTokensToSession(req, { access_token: 'acc' });
expect(result).toBe(false);
expect(logger.warn).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('returns false when no tokenset is provided', () => {
const req = { session: {} };
const result = persistOpenIDTokensToSession(req, undefined);
expect(result).toBe(false);
expect(req.session.openidTokens).toBeUndefined();
});
});
+282
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
/**
* The canonical cloud agent registry is Hanzo Cloud `/v1/agents`
* (github.com/hanzoai/cloud, clients/agents). This client lets chat's backend
* RUN a caller's own cloud agents from the chat thread, without ever exposing
* the user's IAM token to the browser.
*
* Tenant isolation is NOT enforced here — it is enforced BY cloud. This client
* forwards the caller's own hanzo.id bearer (the OpenID id_token) as
* `Authorization: Bearer <token>`; cloud's SanitizeIdentity middleware
* (HIP-0026) validates it and pins `X-Org-Id` from the verified `owner` claim,
* stripping any client-supplied copy. So a chat user can only ever reach their
* OWN org's agents — chat is not trusted to assert the org, and this client
* deliberately never sends an org header for cloud to trust.
*
* This is NOT an open proxy: the base host is fixed from env, the only paths are
* the three hardcoded templates below, and the agent name is validated against
* cloud's own handle grammar before it is ever placed in a URL (no traversal,
* no SSRF).
*
* @example
* const client = getCloudAgentsClient();
* const { agents } = await client.list(userBearer);
* const run = await client.run(userBearer, 'researcher', 'summarize Q3');
*/
/**
* Cloud's org-unique agent handle AND URL path segment. Mirrors nameRE in
* cloud/clients/agents/agents.go exactly — the traversal/SSRF guard at chat's
* boundary, so a malformed name is rejected before it reaches the network.
*/
const AGENT_NAME_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;
/** Matches cloud's maxInput (128 KiB) so oversized input fails fast, locally. */
const MAX_INPUT = 128 * 1024;
/**
* Cap the upstream body we buffer. A run's output is bounded; refusing a runaway
* or malformed response keeps one request from pinning the shared backend's
* memory. Availability defense — the proxy is otherwise unbounded by size.
*/
const MAX_RESPONSE = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
/**
* Process-wide ceiling on concurrent in-flight calls to cloud. Each call holds a
* socket + timer for up to `timeout` ms; without a cap, a burst (many users, or
* one user within the per-user rate window) could saturate the shared backend.
* Fail fast (503) past the ceiling rather than queue and hold resources.
*/
const MAX_CONCURRENT = Number(process.env.CLOUD_AGENT_MAX_CONCURRENT) || 50;
class CloudAgentsClient {
/**
* @param {Object} opts
* @param {string} opts.endpoint - Cloud base URL (e.g. https://api.hanzo.ai)
* @param {number} [opts.timeout] - HTTP timeout in ms (default 30000; a run is
* a real chat completion so it needs more headroom than a metadata read)
* @param {number} [opts.maxConcurrent] - process-wide in-flight ceiling
*/
constructor({ endpoint, timeout = 30000, maxConcurrent = MAX_CONCURRENT }) {
this.endpoint = endpoint.replace(/\/+$/, '');
this.timeout = timeout;
this.maxConcurrent = maxConcurrent;
this._inFlight = 0;
}
/**
* Validate an agent name against cloud's handle grammar. Throws a tagged error
* (status 400) on failure so the route surfaces an honest client error.
* @param {string} name
* @returns {string} the trimmed, validated name
*/
static requireValidName(name) {
const n = (name ?? '').toString().trim();
if (!AGENT_NAME_RE.test(n)) {
const err = new Error('invalid agent name');
err.status = 400;
throw err;
}
return n;
}
/**
* List the caller's cloud agents.
* @param {string} bearer - the caller's hanzo.id id_token
* @returns {Promise<{agents: Array}>}
*/
async list(bearer) {
return this._request('GET', '/v1/agents', bearer);
}
/**
* Get one cloud agent (detail + recent runs).
* @param {string} bearer
* @param {string} name
* @returns {Promise<Object>} cloud's AgentDetail
*/
async get(bearer, name) {
const n = CloudAgentsClient.requireValidName(name);
return this._request('GET', `/v1/agents/${encodeURIComponent(n)}`, bearer);
}
/**
* Run one cloud agent with a caller-supplied input. Records a real run in
* cloud and returns the RunResult (status "ok" with output, or an upstream
* failure surfaced honestly).
* @param {string} bearer
* @param {string} name
* @param {string} input
* @returns {Promise<Object>} cloud's RunResult
*/
async run(bearer, name, input) {
const n = CloudAgentsClient.requireValidName(name);
const body = (input ?? '').toString();
// Byte length, not UTF-16 units — matches cloud's byte-based maxInput exactly
// (a multibyte string can be ~3x its .length in UTF-8).
if (Buffer.byteLength(body, 'utf8') > MAX_INPUT) {
const err = new Error('input too large');
err.status = 400;
throw err;
}
return this._request('POST', `/v1/agents/${encodeURIComponent(n)}/run`, bearer, {
input: body,
});
}
/**
* @param {string} method
* @param {string} path - one of the fixed templates above
* @param {string} bearer - the caller's hanzo.id bearer (required)
* @param {Object} [body]
* @returns {Promise<Object>}
*/
async _request(method, path, bearer, body) {
if (!bearer) {
// Fail secure: never fall back to an ambient/service credential — that
// would run as the wrong principal. Absent a user bearer, deny.
const err = new Error('missing user credential');
err.status = 401;
throw err;
}
if (this._inFlight >= this.maxConcurrent) {
// Shed load: the shared backend is saturated with upstream calls. Refusing
// here protects every other tenant — availability over this one request.
const err = new Error('cloud agents temporarily saturated');
err.status = 503;
throw err;
}
const url = `${this.endpoint}${path}`;
const headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Authorization: `Bearer ${bearer}`,
};
const controller = new AbortController();
const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.timeout);
this._inFlight += 1;
try {
const opts = { method, headers, signal: controller.signal };
if (body && method !== 'GET') {
opts.body = JSON.stringify(body);
}
const resp = await fetch(url, opts);
const text = await this._readCapped(resp, controller);
let json;
try {
json = text ? JSON.parse(text) : {};
} catch {
json = { error: text };
}
if (!resp.ok) {
// A run that executed but failed upstream comes back as 502 with a run
// body (status/error) — preserve that so the caller can surface it.
const err = new Error(`cloud ${method} ${path} returned ${resp.status}`);
err.status = resp.status;
err.body = json;
throw err;
}
return json;
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeoutId);
this._inFlight -= 1;
}
}
/**
* Read the response body but never buffer more than MAX_RESPONSE bytes. Rejects
* a declared-oversize body up front (Content-Length) and aborts a chunked
* stream the instant it exceeds the cap, so a runaway upstream cannot exhaust
* memory. Falls back to `.text()` when the runtime/mocks expose no stream body.
* @param {Response} resp
* @param {AbortController} controller
* @returns {Promise<string>}
*/
async _readCapped(resp, controller) {
const declared = Number(resp.headers?.get?.('content-length'));
if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MAX_RESPONSE) {
controller.abort();
const err = new Error('cloud response too large');
err.status = 502;
throw err;
}
const reader = resp.body?.getReader?.();
if (!reader) {
return resp.text().catch(() => '');
}
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
let out = '';
let total = 0;
for (;;) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
if (done) {
break;
}
total += value.byteLength;
if (total > MAX_RESPONSE) {
await reader.cancel();
controller.abort();
const err = new Error('cloud response too large');
err.status = 502;
throw err;
}
out += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
}
out += decoder.decode();
return out;
}
}
/**
* Singleton, initialized lazily from env. Returns null when cloud agents are not
* configured for this deployment (the route then answers with a disabled state).
*/
let _instance;
function getCloudAgentsClient() {
if (_instance !== undefined) {
return _instance;
}
// Dedicated var first; fall back to the same host the rest of chat already
// talks to (api.hanzo.ai), derived from OPENAI_BASE_URL by stripping the /v1.
let endpoint = (process.env.HANZO_CLOUD_URL || '').trim();
if (!endpoint) {
const base = (process.env.OPENAI_BASE_URL || '').trim();
if (base) {
endpoint = base.replace(/\/v1\/?$/, '');
}
}
if (!endpoint) {
_instance = null;
return null;
}
_instance = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint });
logger.info('[CloudAgentsClient] Initialized', { endpoint });
return _instance;
}
/** Reset the memoized singleton (tests only). */
function _resetCloudAgentsClient() {
_instance = undefined;
}
module.exports = {
CloudAgentsClient,
getCloudAgentsClient,
_resetCloudAgentsClient,
AGENT_NAME_RE,
MAX_INPUT,
MAX_RESPONSE,
MAX_CONCURRENT,
};
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: {
debug: jest.fn(),
error: jest.fn(),
info: jest.fn(),
warn: jest.fn(),
},
}));
const {
CloudAgentsClient,
getCloudAgentsClient,
_resetCloudAgentsClient,
AGENT_NAME_RE,
MAX_INPUT,
MAX_RESPONSE,
} = require('./CloudAgentsClient');
/**
* Build a fetch mock that captures the last request and returns a canned response.
*/
function mockFetch({ ok = true, status = 200, body = {} } = {}) {
const calls = [];
const fn = jest.fn(async (url, opts) => {
calls.push({ url, opts });
return {
ok,
status,
text: async () => (typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body)),
};
});
fn.calls = calls;
return fn;
}
describe('CloudAgentsClient', () => {
const BEARER = 'header.payload.sig';
afterEach(() => {
_resetCloudAgentsClient();
delete global.fetch;
});
describe('name validation (traversal / SSRF guard)', () => {
const bad = ['', '.', '..', '../etc', 'a/b', 'name with space', 'a'.repeat(65), '-lead'];
const good = ['researcher', 'a', 'A.b_c-1', '0abc'];
it('rejects malformed names before any network call', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch();
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
for (const name of bad) {
await expect(client.get(BEARER, name)).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 400 });
}
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('accepts valid handles matching cloud grammar', () => {
for (const name of good) {
expect(AGENT_NAME_RE.test(name)).toBe(true);
expect(CloudAgentsClient.requireValidName(name)).toBe(name);
}
});
});
describe('bearer forwarding + tenant model', () => {
it('forwards the user bearer and NEVER sends an org header', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch({ body: { agents: [] } });
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
await client.list(BEARER);
const { url, opts } = fetch.calls[0];
expect(url).toBe('https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/agents');
expect(opts.headers.Authorization).toBe(`Bearer ${BEARER}`);
// Tenant isolation is cloud's job; chat must not assert an org.
expect(opts.headers['X-Org-Id']).toBeUndefined();
expect(opts.headers['X-Hanzo-Org']).toBeUndefined();
});
it('fails secure (401) with no fallback credential when bearer is missing', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch();
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
await expect(client.list('')).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 401 });
await expect(client.run('', 'researcher', 'x')).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 401 });
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('run', () => {
it('posts {input} to the run endpoint and returns the RunResult', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch({ body: { id: 'run_1', status: 'ok', output: 'hi' } });
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai/' });
const run = await client.run(BEARER, 'researcher', 'summarize');
const { url, opts } = fetch.calls[0];
expect(url).toBe('https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/agents/researcher/run');
expect(opts.method).toBe('POST');
expect(JSON.parse(opts.body)).toEqual({ input: 'summarize' });
expect(run).toEqual({ id: 'run_1', status: 'ok', output: 'hi' });
});
it('rejects oversized input locally (before the network)', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch();
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
const big = 'x'.repeat(128 * 1024 + 1);
await expect(client.run(BEARER, 'researcher', big)).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 400 });
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('surfaces an upstream failure body (cloud 502 error run) with its status', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch({
ok: false,
status: 502,
body: { id: 'run_2', status: 'error', error: 'model down' },
});
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
await expect(client.run(BEARER, 'researcher', 'x')).rejects.toMatchObject({
status: 502,
body: { status: 'error', error: 'model down' },
});
});
});
describe('input byte cap', () => {
it('rejects on UTF-8 BYTE length, not UTF-16 units (multibyte bypass)', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch();
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
// Half MAX_INPUT in .length, but 3 bytes/char in UTF-8 => 1.5x MAX_INPUT bytes.
const multibyte = '你'.repeat(MAX_INPUT / 2);
expect(multibyte.length).toBeLessThan(MAX_INPUT); // would pass a naive .length check
expect(Buffer.byteLength(multibyte, 'utf8')).toBeGreaterThan(MAX_INPUT);
await expect(client.run(BEARER, 'researcher', multibyte)).rejects.toMatchObject({
status: 400,
});
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('response size cap (availability)', () => {
it('rejects a declared-oversize body up front via Content-Length (502)', async () => {
global.fetch = jest.fn(
async () =>
new Response('ok', {
status: 200,
headers: { 'content-length': String(MAX_RESPONSE + 1) },
}),
);
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
await expect(client.list(BEARER)).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 502 });
});
it('aborts a chunked stream once it exceeds the cap (502)', async () => {
const oversize = new Uint8Array(MAX_RESPONSE + 16);
global.fetch = jest.fn(async () => {
const stream = new ReadableStream({
start(controller) {
controller.enqueue(oversize);
controller.close();
},
});
return new Response(stream, { status: 200 }); // chunked: no content-length
});
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
await expect(client.list(BEARER)).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 502 });
});
it('reads a normal small streamed body', async () => {
global.fetch = jest.fn(
async () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ agents: [] }), { status: 200 }),
);
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai' });
await expect(client.list(BEARER)).resolves.toEqual({ agents: [] });
});
});
describe('concurrency cap (load shedding)', () => {
it('sheds load with 503 once the in-flight ceiling is reached, before any fetch', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch({ body: { agents: [] } });
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai', maxConcurrent: 2 });
client._inFlight = 2; // simulate the ceiling being saturated
await expect(client.list(BEARER)).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 503 });
expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('decrements in-flight after a call completes (no leak)', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch({ body: { agents: [] } });
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai', maxConcurrent: 1 });
await client.list(BEARER);
expect(client._inFlight).toBe(0);
await client.list(BEARER); // ceiling of 1 is reusable across sequential calls
expect(client._inFlight).toBe(0);
});
});
describe('endpoint normalization', () => {
it('strips trailing slashes from the base URL', async () => {
const fetch = mockFetch({ body: {} });
global.fetch = fetch;
const client = new CloudAgentsClient({ endpoint: 'https://api.hanzo.ai///' });
await client.list(BEARER);
expect(fetch.calls[0].url).toBe('https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/agents');
});
});
describe('getCloudAgentsClient (env wiring)', () => {
const saved = {};
beforeEach(() => {
saved.HANZO_CLOUD_URL = process.env.HANZO_CLOUD_URL;
saved.OPENAI_BASE_URL = process.env.OPENAI_BASE_URL;
delete process.env.HANZO_CLOUD_URL;
delete process.env.OPENAI_BASE_URL;
_resetCloudAgentsClient();
});
afterEach(() => {
process.env.HANZO_CLOUD_URL = saved.HANZO_CLOUD_URL;
process.env.OPENAI_BASE_URL = saved.OPENAI_BASE_URL;
if (saved.HANZO_CLOUD_URL === undefined) {
delete process.env.HANZO_CLOUD_URL;
}
if (saved.OPENAI_BASE_URL === undefined) {
delete process.env.OPENAI_BASE_URL;
}
_resetCloudAgentsClient();
});
it('returns null when unconfigured', () => {
expect(getCloudAgentsClient()).toBeNull();
});
it('prefers HANZO_CLOUD_URL', () => {
process.env.HANZO_CLOUD_URL = 'https://cloud.example';
expect(getCloudAgentsClient().endpoint).toBe('https://cloud.example');
});
it('derives the host from OPENAI_BASE_URL by stripping /v1', () => {
process.env.OPENAI_BASE_URL = 'https://api.hanzo.ai/v1';
expect(getCloudAgentsClient().endpoint).toBe('https://api.hanzo.ai');
});
});
});
+77 -49
View File
@@ -43,14 +43,31 @@ class CommerceClient {
}
/**
* Check user's balance. Returns cached result if fresh, triggers async
* refresh if stale, synchronous fetch on cache miss. Fails open on error.
* The Commerce namespace (X-Hanzo-Org) for a billing subject. The subject is
* object.BillingSubject(owner, name): "owner/name" (per-user) or "owner"
* (pooled) — so the namespace is always the part before the first "/", or the
* whole subject. Deriving it here keeps every read/write scoped to the right
* tenant without callers having to thread the org separately.
*
* @param {string} userId - Commerce user ID (e.g. "hanzo/alice")
* @param {string} subject
* @returns {string}
*/
_namespaceOf(subject) {
const s = (subject ?? '').toString();
const i = s.indexOf('/');
return i > 0 ? s.slice(0, i) : s;
}
/**
* Check a billing subject's balance. Returns cached result if fresh, triggers
* async refresh if stale, synchronous fetch on cache miss. Fails CLOSED (the
* cold-miss fetch throws) so the caller blocks rather than bleeding.
*
* @param {string} subject - Commerce billing subject (e.g. "hanzo/alice@gmail.com")
* @returns {Promise<{sufficient: boolean, available: number}>}
*/
async checkBalance(userId) {
const cached = this._balanceCache.get(userId);
async checkBalance(subject) {
const cached = this._balanceCache.get(subject);
const now = Date.now();
if (cached) {
@@ -61,13 +78,13 @@ class CommerceClient {
// Stale: serve cached, refresh async
if (!cached.refreshing) {
cached.refreshing = true;
this._fetchBalance(userId).catch(() => {});
this._fetchBalance(subject).catch(() => {});
}
return cached.data;
}
// Cache miss: synchronous fetch
return this._fetchBalance(userId);
return this._fetchBalance(subject);
}
/**
@@ -146,30 +163,31 @@ class CommerceClient {
}
/**
* Create a trial credit grant for a new user.
* Ensure a subject has the one-time $5 starter credit, idempotently.
*
* @param {string} userId - Commerce user ID
* @param {number} amountCents - Grant amount in cents (e.g. 500 = $5)
* @param {number} expiryDays - Days until expiry
* @param {string[]} [eligibility] - Meter IDs (empty = all meters)
* @returns {Promise<Object|null>} Grant object or null on failure
* This posts to /v1/billing/grant-starter, which creates a real Deposit
* transaction (tag "starter-credit", $5, 30-day expiry) — so it nets into
* GET /v1/billing/balance, the account the gateway gate reads and debits.
* (NOT a credit-grant record: those live in a separate ledger the balance
* endpoint does not read, so they would never unblock the gate.)
*
* Idempotent + race-safe in Commerce (tag-deduped inside a transaction): safe
* to call on every first chat; duplicate/concurrent calls never double-grant.
*
* @param {string} subject - Commerce billing subject (e.g. "hanzo/alice@gmail.com")
* @returns {Promise<{granted: boolean}|null>} or null on failure
*/
async createTrialGrant(userId, amountCents, expiryDays, eligibility = []) {
async grantStarter(subject) {
try {
const expiresIn = `${expiryDays * 24}h`;
const resp = await this._request('POST', '/v1/billing/credit-grants', {
userId,
name: 'Trial Credit',
amountCents,
currency: 'usd',
expiresIn,
priority: 100, // Trial burns before purchased (200)
eligibility,
tags: 'trial',
});
const resp = await this._request(
'POST',
'/v1/billing/grant-starter',
{ user: subject, trigger: 'chat_first_use' },
this._namespaceOf(subject),
);
return resp;
} catch (err) {
logger.error('[CommerceClient] Failed to create trial grant', err);
logger.error('[CommerceClient] Failed to ensure starter credit', err);
return null;
}
}
@@ -185,6 +203,8 @@ class CommerceClient {
const resp = await this._request(
'GET',
`/v1/billing/credit-balance/breakdown?userId=${encodeURIComponent(userId)}`,
undefined,
this._namespaceOf(userId),
);
const breakdown = resp.breakdown || {};
return {
@@ -200,27 +220,30 @@ class CommerceClient {
// ── Internal methods ──
async _fetchBalance(userId) {
try {
const resp = await this._request(
'GET',
`/v1/billing/balance?user=${encodeURIComponent(userId)}&currency=usd`,
);
const data = {
sufficient: (resp.available || 0) > 0,
available: resp.available || 0,
};
this._balanceCache.set(userId, {
data,
fetchedAt: Date.now(),
refreshing: false,
});
return data;
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('[CommerceClient] Balance check failed, failing open', { userId, error: err.message });
// Fail open
return { sufficient: true, available: 0 };
}
async _fetchBalance(subject) {
// FAIL CLOSED: this is the money gate. On error we THROW so the caller blocks
// the request rather than letting unfunded/unknown users spend. The cache
// (serve-stale on refresh) smooths transient blips for already-known users;
// only a cold miss + error propagates. `subject` is the billing account
// (object.BillingSubject) used as `?user=`; the namespace (X-Hanzo-Org) is
// its org prefix — matching the gateway's keying so chat reads the SAME
// account the gateway debits.
const resp = await this._request(
'GET',
`/v1/billing/balance?user=${encodeURIComponent(subject)}&currency=usd`,
undefined,
this._namespaceOf(subject),
);
const data = {
sufficient: (resp.available || 0) > 0,
available: resp.available || 0,
};
this._balanceCache.set(subject, {
data,
fetchedAt: Date.now(),
refreshing: false,
});
return data;
}
async _fetchTier(userId, tierName) {
@@ -229,7 +252,7 @@ class CommerceClient {
if (tierName) {
url += `&tier=${encodeURIComponent(tierName)}`;
}
const resp = await this._request('GET', url);
const resp = await this._request('GET', url, undefined, this._namespaceOf(userId));
const tier = resp.tier || null;
if (tier) {
this._tierCache.set(userId, {
@@ -275,12 +298,17 @@ class CommerceClient {
* @param {Object} [body]
* @returns {Promise<Object>}
*/
async _request(method, path, body) {
async _request(method, path, body, orgId) {
const url = `${this.endpoint}${path}`;
const headers = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };
if (this.token) {
headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${this.token}`;
}
// Scope the service-token call to the tenant's commerce namespace so reads/
// writes are correctly per-org (not the service token's default namespace).
if (orgId) {
headers['X-Hanzo-Org'] = orgId;
}
const controller = new AbortController();
const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.timeout);
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ const buildOptions = (req, endpoint, parsedBody, endpointType) => {
const agentPromise = loadAgent({
req,
spec,
agent_id: isAgentsEndpoint(endpoint) ? agent_id : Constants.EPHEMERAL_AGENT_ID,
// No agent selected on the agents endpoint → ad-hoc (ephemeral) chat, so the
// user gets a reply without first creating/selecting an agent. Mirrors the
// access middleware, which treats a missing id as ephemeral.
agent_id: isAgentsEndpoint(endpoint) && agent_id ? agent_id : Constants.EPHEMERAL_AGENT_ID,
endpoint,
model_parameters,
}).catch((error) => {
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
/**
* Regression: when no agent is created/selected, the agents endpoint must resolve
* to an ephemeral (ad-hoc, plain-model) agent so the user gets a reply — instead
* of loadAgent returning null because agent_id was missing.
*
* Hermetic: mocks data-schemas (no winston) and ~/models/Agent (no MongoDB).
*/
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({ logger: { error: jest.fn() } }));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
Constants: { EPHEMERAL_AGENT_ID: 'ephemeral' },
isAgentsEndpoint: (endpoint) => endpoint === 'agents',
removeNullishValues: (obj) =>
Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(obj).filter(([, v]) => v != null)),
}));
const mockLoadAgent = jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve({ id: 'ephemeral', model: 'zen3-nano' }));
jest.mock('~/models/Agent', () => ({ loadAgent: mockLoadAgent }));
const { buildOptions } = require('./build');
const EPHEMERAL = 'ephemeral';
describe('agents buildOptions — missing agent_id resolves to ephemeral', () => {
beforeEach(() => mockLoadAgent.mockClear());
test('no agent_id on agents endpoint → loadAgent called with EPHEMERAL_AGENT_ID', async () => {
const req = { body: {}, user: { id: 'u1' } };
// parsedBody as built from "My Agents" with no agent selected (no agent_id).
const options = buildOptions(req, 'agents', { model: 'zen3-nano' });
await options.agent;
expect(mockLoadAgent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(mockLoadAgent.mock.calls[0][0].agent_id).toBe(EPHEMERAL);
});
test('real agent_id on agents endpoint is passed through unchanged', async () => {
const req = { body: {}, user: { id: 'u1' } };
const options = buildOptions(req, 'agents', { model: 'zen3-nano', agent_id: 'agent_real_42' });
await options.agent;
expect(mockLoadAgent.mock.calls[0][0].agent_id).toBe('agent_real_42');
});
test('non-agents endpoint always resolves to ephemeral', async () => {
const req = { body: {}, user: { id: 'u1' } };
const options = buildOptions(req, 'openAI', { model: 'zen3-nano', agent_id: 'agent_real_42' });
await options.agent;
expect(mockLoadAgent.mock.calls[0][0].agent_id).toBe(EPHEMERAL);
});
});
+118
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
const { isEnabled } = require('@hanzochat/api');
const { EModelEndpoint } = require('librechat-data-provider');
const GUEST_ROLE = 'GUEST';
const GUEST_NAME = 'Guest';
const DEFAULT_GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX = 3;
const DEFAULT_GUEST_TOKEN_EXPIRY_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
const DEFAULT_GUEST_ENDPOINT = 'Hanzo';
const DEFAULT_GUEST_MODEL = 'zen3-nano';
/**
* Resolves the guest-chat configuration from the environment.
* Guest chat is disabled unless `ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT` is explicitly enabled.
*
* @returns {{
* enabled: boolean,
* messageMax: number,
* tokenExpiryMs: number,
* endpoint: string,
* model: string,
* }}
*/
const getGuestConfig = () => {
const messageMax = Number.parseInt(process.env.GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX, 10);
const tokenExpiryMs = Number.parseInt(process.env.GUEST_TOKEN_EXPIRY, 10);
return {
enabled: isEnabled(process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT),
messageMax:
Number.isFinite(messageMax) && messageMax > 0 ? messageMax : DEFAULT_GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX,
tokenExpiryMs:
Number.isFinite(tokenExpiryMs) && tokenExpiryMs > 0
? tokenExpiryMs
: DEFAULT_GUEST_TOKEN_EXPIRY_MS,
endpoint: process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT || DEFAULT_GUEST_ENDPOINT,
model: process.env.GUEST_MODEL || DEFAULT_GUEST_MODEL,
};
};
/**
* Builds the ephemeral guest principal for a verified guest token.
*
* This is the SINGLE source of truth for the guest `req.user` shape. It is a
* plain object — never a DB document — so no route ever reads or writes real
* user data on behalf of a guest. No email, no DB id.
*
* @param {string} id - The synthetic guest id from the token (`guest_<uuid>`).
* @returns {{ id: string, role: string, name: string, guest: true }}
*/
const buildGuestPrincipal = (id) => ({
id,
role: GUEST_ROLE,
name: GUEST_NAME,
guest: true,
});
/**
* Builds the guest-scoped `/api/user` response: the ephemeral principal only.
* Mirrors the safe-field shape the client expects (no password/totp/email/db id).
*
* @param {{ id: string }} principal
* @returns {object}
*/
const buildGuestUser = (principal) => ({
id: principal.id,
username: GUEST_NAME,
name: GUEST_NAME,
role: GUEST_ROLE,
provider: 'guest',
emailVerified: false,
guest: true,
});
/**
* Builds the guest-scoped endpoints config: ONLY the configured guest endpoint,
* with no builder/agent/file/preset capabilities. Everything else is omitted so
* the client cannot surface any other endpoint to a guest.
*
* @returns {Record<string, object>}
*/
const buildGuestEndpointsConfig = () => {
const { endpoint } = getGuestConfig();
return {
[endpoint]: {
type: EModelEndpoint.custom,
userProvide: false,
modelDisplayLabel: endpoint,
order: 0,
},
};
};
/**
* Builds the guest-scoped models config: the single configured guest model under
* the guest endpoint. The client pins the composer to exactly this one model.
*
* @returns {Record<string, string[]>}
*/
const buildGuestModelsConfig = () => {
const { endpoint, model } = getGuestConfig();
return {
[endpoint]: [model],
};
};
module.exports = {
getGuestConfig,
buildGuestPrincipal,
buildGuestUser,
buildGuestEndpointsConfig,
buildGuestModelsConfig,
GUEST_ROLE,
GUEST_NAME,
DEFAULT_GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX,
DEFAULT_GUEST_TOKEN_EXPIRY_MS,
DEFAULT_GUEST_ENDPOINT,
DEFAULT_GUEST_MODEL,
};
+120
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
jest.mock('@hanzochat/api', () => ({
isEnabled: (value) => value === 'true' || value === true,
}));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
EModelEndpoint: { custom: 'custom' },
}));
const {
getGuestConfig,
buildGuestPrincipal,
buildGuestUser,
buildGuestEndpointsConfig,
buildGuestModelsConfig,
GUEST_ROLE,
GUEST_NAME,
DEFAULT_GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX,
DEFAULT_GUEST_ENDPOINT,
DEFAULT_GUEST_MODEL,
} = require('./guestConfig');
describe('getGuestConfig', () => {
const originalEnv = { ...process.env };
beforeEach(() => {
delete process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT;
delete process.env.GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX;
delete process.env.GUEST_TOKEN_EXPIRY;
delete process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT;
delete process.env.GUEST_MODEL;
});
afterAll(() => {
process.env = originalEnv;
});
it('is disabled by default (fail closed)', () => {
expect(getGuestConfig().enabled).toBe(false);
});
it('is enabled only when ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT is truthy', () => {
process.env.ALLOW_GUEST_CHAT = 'true';
expect(getGuestConfig().enabled).toBe(true);
});
it('uses defaults when env is unset', () => {
const config = getGuestConfig();
expect(config.messageMax).toBe(DEFAULT_GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX);
expect(config.endpoint).toBe(DEFAULT_GUEST_ENDPOINT);
expect(config.model).toBe(DEFAULT_GUEST_MODEL);
});
it('honors GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX', () => {
process.env.GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX = '7';
expect(getGuestConfig().messageMax).toBe(7);
});
it('falls back to default for invalid or non-positive GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX', () => {
process.env.GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX = 'abc';
expect(getGuestConfig().messageMax).toBe(DEFAULT_GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX);
process.env.GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX = '0';
expect(getGuestConfig().messageMax).toBe(DEFAULT_GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX);
process.env.GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX = '-5';
expect(getGuestConfig().messageMax).toBe(DEFAULT_GUEST_MESSAGE_MAX);
});
it('honors the configurable guest endpoint and model', () => {
process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT = 'Hanzo';
process.env.GUEST_MODEL = 'zen4-mini';
const config = getGuestConfig();
expect(config.endpoint).toBe('Hanzo');
expect(config.model).toBe('zen4-mini');
});
it('exposes GUEST_ROLE constant', () => {
expect(GUEST_ROLE).toBe('GUEST');
});
});
describe('guest principal + scoped-config builders', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
delete process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT;
delete process.env.GUEST_MODEL;
});
it('buildGuestPrincipal returns an ephemeral GUEST principal with no DB id/email', () => {
const principal = buildGuestPrincipal('guest_abc');
expect(principal).toEqual({
id: 'guest_abc',
role: GUEST_ROLE,
name: GUEST_NAME,
guest: true,
});
expect(principal).not.toHaveProperty('email');
expect(principal).not.toHaveProperty('_id');
});
it('buildGuestUser exposes only safe, guest-scoped fields (no email)', () => {
const user = buildGuestUser(buildGuestPrincipal('guest_abc'));
expect(user.id).toBe('guest_abc');
expect(user.role).toBe(GUEST_ROLE);
expect(user.name).toBe(GUEST_NAME);
expect(user.guest).toBe(true);
expect(user).not.toHaveProperty('email');
expect(user).not.toHaveProperty('password');
});
it('buildGuestEndpointsConfig exposes ONLY the configured guest endpoint', () => {
process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT = 'Hanzo';
const config = buildGuestEndpointsConfig();
expect(Object.keys(config)).toEqual(['Hanzo']);
expect(config.Hanzo).toMatchObject({ type: 'custom', userProvide: false });
});
it('buildGuestModelsConfig exposes ONLY the single configured guest model', () => {
process.env.GUEST_ENDPOINT = 'Hanzo';
process.env.GUEST_MODEL = 'zen5-mini';
expect(buildGuestModelsConfig()).toEqual({ Hanzo: ['zen5-mini'] });
});
});
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
const removePorts = require('./removePorts');
/**
* Resolves the real client IP for per-IP guest rate limiting.
*
* hanzo.chat is served behind Cloudflare → the DO LB → the ingress. With that
* many hops, Express `req.ip` (via `trust proxy`) is not reliably the visitor's
* address, which would let anonymous users share/reset their free-message bucket
* (or collapse everyone into one bucket). Cloudflare always sets
* `CF-Connecting-IP` to the true originating client and — unlike a
* client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` entry — a browser cannot forge it through
* the CF edge. Prefer it; fall back to the trust-proxy-resolved `req.ip` when the
* request did not transit Cloudflare (e.g. in-cluster/local).
*
* The returned string is the SOLE identity the guest quota keys on, so it must be
* stable across guest tokens, cookie clears, and incognito sessions from the same
* network origin.
*
* @param {import('express').Request} req
* @returns {string}
*/
const guestClientIp = (req) => {
const cf = req.headers?.['cf-connecting-ip'];
if (typeof cf === 'string' && cf.trim()) {
return cf.trim();
}
return removePorts(req);
};
module.exports = guestClientIp;
+2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
const removePorts = require('./removePorts');
const guestClientIp = require('./guestClientIp');
const handleText = require('./handleText');
const sendEmail = require('./sendEmail');
const queue = require('./queue');
@@ -7,6 +8,7 @@ const files = require('./files');
module.exports = {
...handleText,
removePorts,
guestClientIp,
sendEmail,
...files,
...queue,
+10
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,16 @@ const jwtLogin = () =>
},
async (payload, done) => {
try {
/**
* Guest tokens carry `guest: true` and a synthetic `guest_<uuid>` id that
* is NOT a Mongo ObjectId. Reject them cleanly here so the strict `jwt`
* strategy fails with a 401 instead of letting `getUserById` throw a
* Mongoose CastError (→ 500). Guests reach their scoped routes through
* `requireGuestOrJwtAuth`, never through this strategy. Fail closed.
*/
if (payload?.guest === true) {
return done(null, false);
}
const user = await getUserById(payload?.id, '-password -__v -totpSecret -backupCodes');
if (user) {
user.id = user._id.toString();
+87
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
const { SystemRoles } = require('librechat-data-provider');
// --- Capture the verify callback passed to JwtStrategy ---
let capturedVerifyCallback;
jest.mock('passport-jwt', () => ({
Strategy: jest.fn((_opts, verifyCallback) => {
capturedVerifyCallback = verifyCallback;
return { name: 'jwt' };
}),
ExtractJwt: {
fromAuthHeaderAsBearerToken: jest.fn(() => 'mock-extractor'),
},
}));
jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn() },
}));
jest.mock('~/models', () => ({
getUserById: jest.fn(),
updateUser: jest.fn(),
}));
const { getUserById, updateUser } = require('~/models');
const jwtLogin = require('./jwtStrategy');
// Helper: invoke the captured verify callback as a promise
const invokeVerify = (payload) =>
new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
capturedVerifyCallback(payload, (err, user, info) => {
if (err) {
return reject(err);
}
resolve({ user, info });
});
});
describe('jwtStrategy verify callback', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
// Instantiate to capture the verify callback.
jwtLogin();
});
it('rejects a guest token cleanly without touching the DB (no CastError → 401)', async () => {
const { user } = await invokeVerify({ id: 'guest_abc-123', guest: true, role: 'GUEST' });
// done(null, false) → passport responds 401, never 500.
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(getUserById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('never calls getUserById for a guest id, even if it would CastError', async () => {
getUserById.mockRejectedValue(new Error('CastError: not an ObjectId'));
const { user } = await invokeVerify({ id: 'guest_xyz', guest: true });
expect(user).toBe(false);
expect(getUserById).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('resolves a real user for a non-guest token', async () => {
getUserById.mockResolvedValue({ _id: { toString: () => 'real-id' }, role: SystemRoles.USER });
const { user } = await invokeVerify({ id: 'real-id' });
expect(getUserById).toHaveBeenCalledWith('real-id', expect.any(String));
expect(user).toMatchObject({ id: 'real-id', role: SystemRoles.USER });
});
it('returns false when a non-guest user is not found', async () => {
getUserById.mockResolvedValue(null);
const { user } = await invokeVerify({ id: 'missing-id' });
expect(user).toBe(false);
});
it('propagates a DB error for a non-guest token (done(err, false))', async () => {
getUserById.mockRejectedValue(new Error('db down'));
await expect(invokeVerify({ id: 'real-id' })).rejects.toThrow('db down');
});
it('does not treat guest:false as a guest token', async () => {
getUserById.mockResolvedValue({ _id: { toString: () => 'real-id' }, role: SystemRoles.USER });
await invokeVerify({ id: 'real-id', guest: false });
expect(getUserById).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('backfills a missing role for a real user', async () => {
getUserById.mockResolvedValue({ _id: { toString: () => 'real-id' } });
const { user } = await invokeVerify({ id: 'real-id' });
expect(updateUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith('real-id', { role: SystemRoles.USER });
expect(user.role).toBe(SystemRoles.USER);
});
});
+2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
<meta name="apple-mobile-web-app-status-bar-style" content="black-translucent" />
<meta name="description" content="Hanzo Chat - AI chat platform with support for multiple AI models" />
<title>Hanzo Chat</title>
<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="assets/logo.svg" />
<link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/favicon.ico" sizes="any" />
<link rel="icon" type="image/png" sizes="32x32" href="assets/favicon-32x32.png" />
<link rel="icon" type="image/png" sizes="16x16" href="assets/favicon-16x16.png" />
<link rel="apple-touch-icon" href="assets/apple-touch-icon-180x180.png" />
+1 -1
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
"@codesandbox/sandpack-react": "^2.19.10",
"@dicebear/collection": "^9.2.2",
"@dicebear/core": "^9.2.2",
"@hanzo/iam": "^0.4.0",
"@hanzo/iam": "^0.13.1",
"@headlessui/react": "^2.1.2",
"@librechat/client": "workspace:*",
"@marsidev/react-turnstile": "^1.1.0",
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+8 -1
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@@ -1 +1,8 @@
<svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" fill="#f2f2f2"><path d="M3 2 H7 V10 H17 V2 H21 V22 H17 V14 H7 V22 H3 Z"/></svg>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 67 67" role="img" aria-label="Hanzo">
<style>path{fill:#000}@media (prefers-color-scheme:dark){path{fill:#fff}}</style>
<path d="M22.21 67V44.6369H0V67H22.21Z"/>
<path d="M66.7038 22.3184H22.2534L0.0878906 44.6367H44.4634L66.7038 22.3184Z"/>
<path d="M22.21 0H0V22.3184H22.21V0Z"/>
<path d="M66.7198 0H44.5098V22.3184H66.7198V0Z"/>
<path d="M66.7198 67V44.6369H44.5098V67H66.7198Z"/>
</svg>

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+2 -1
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@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ async function postBuild() {
try {
await fs.copy('public/assets', 'dist/assets');
await fs.copy('public/robots.txt', 'dist/robots.txt');
console.log('✅ PWA icons and robots.txt copied successfully. Glob pattern warnings resolved.');
await fs.copy('public/favicon.ico', 'dist/favicon.ico');
console.log('✅ PWA icons, favicon.ico, and robots.txt copied successfully. Glob pattern warnings resolved.');
} catch (err) {
console.error('❌ Error copying files:', err);
process.exit(1);
+13 -3
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
import { useEffect } from 'react';
import { lazy, Suspense, useEffect } from 'react';
import { RecoilRoot } from 'recoil';
import { DndProvider } from 'react-dnd';
import { RouterProvider } from 'react-router-dom';
import * as RadixToast from '@radix-ui/react-toast';
import { HTML5Backend } from 'react-dnd-html5-backend';
import { ReactQueryDevtools } from '@tanstack/react-query-devtools';
import { Toast, ThemeProvider, ToastProvider } from '@librechat/client';
import { QueryClient, QueryClientProvider, QueryCache } from '@tanstack/react-query';
import { ScreenshotProvider, useApiErrorBoundary } from './hooks';
@@ -14,6 +13,13 @@ import { initializeFontSize } from '~/store/fontSize';
import { LiveAnnouncer } from '~/a11y';
import { router } from './routes';
// Dev-only: lazily loaded so the devtools bundle never ships in production builds.
const ReactQueryDevtools = import.meta.env.DEV
? lazy(() =>
import('@tanstack/react-query-devtools').then((m) => ({ default: m.ReactQueryDevtools })),
)
: null;
const App = () => {
const { setError } = useApiErrorBoundary();
@@ -63,7 +69,11 @@ const App = () => {
<DndProvider backend={HTML5Backend}>
<RouterProvider router={router} />
<WakeLockManager />
<ReactQueryDevtools initialIsOpen={false} position="top-right" />
{import.meta.env.DEV && ReactQueryDevtools && (
<Suspense fallback={null}>
<ReactQueryDevtools initialIsOpen={false} position="top-right" />
</Suspense>
)}
<Toast />
<RadixToast.Viewport className="pointer-events-none fixed inset-0 z-[1000] mx-auto my-2 flex max-w-[560px] flex-col items-stretch justify-start md:pb-5" />
</DndProvider>
+1
View File
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ export type TAuthContext = {
user: t.TUser | undefined;
token: string | undefined;
isAuthenticated: boolean;
isGuest: boolean;
error: string | undefined;
login: (data: t.TLoginUser) => void;
logout: (redirect?: string) => void;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ const AgentMarketplace: React.FC<AgentMarketplaceProps> = ({ className = '' }) =
const scrollContainerRef = useRef<HTMLDivElement>(null);
// Set page title
useDocumentTitle(`${localize('com_agents_marketplace')} | LibreChat`);
useDocumentTitle(`${localize('com_agents_marketplace')} | Hanzo Chat`);
// Ensure right sidebar is always visible in marketplace
useEffect(() => {
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ describe('AgentCard', () => {
expect(avatarImg).toHaveAttribute('src', '/string-avatar.png');
});
it('displays Feather icon fallback when no avatar is provided', () => {
it('displays the Hanzo mark fallback when no avatar is provided', () => {
const agentWithoutAvatar = {
...mockAgent,
avatar: undefined,
@@ -209,9 +209,9 @@ describe('AgentCard', () => {
</Wrapper>,
);
// Check for Feather icon presence by looking for the svg with lucide-feather class
const featherIcon = document.querySelector('.lucide-feather');
expect(featherIcon).toBeInTheDocument();
// The fallback renders the Hanzo H-mark (aria-label="Hanzo")
const hanzoMark = document.querySelector('[aria-label="Hanzo"]');
expect(hanzoMark).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it('card is clickable and has dialog trigger', () => {
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
import { useState, useEffect, useCallback } from 'react';
import { OGDialog, OGDialogTemplate, Button } from '@librechat/client';
import { getHanzoIamSdk, isStaticIamMode } from '~/utils/iam';
import { useGetStartupConfig } from '~/data-provider';
import { useLocalize } from '~/hooks';
/**
* Login gate shown when an anonymous guest exhausts the free message quota.
* Reuses the existing OpenID / Hanzo IAM login flow it does not implement a
* new login. Listens for the `guestLimitReached` window event dispatched by the
* chat submission path on a `402 { type: 'GUEST_LIMIT' }` response.
*/
export default function GuestLimitDialog() {
const [open, setOpen] = useState(false);
const localize = useLocalize();
const { data: startupConfig } = useGetStartupConfig();
useEffect(() => {
const handler = () => setOpen(true);
window.addEventListener('guestLimitReached', handler);
return () => window.removeEventListener('guestLimitReached', handler);
}, []);
const handleLogin = useCallback(() => {
const iamSdk = getHanzoIamSdk();
if (isStaticIamMode() && iamSdk) {
iamSdk.signinRedirect();
return;
}
if (startupConfig?.openidLoginEnabled && startupConfig?.serverDomain) {
window.location.href = `${startupConfig.serverDomain}/oauth/openid`;
return;
}
window.location.href = '/login';
}, [startupConfig]);
return (
<OGDialog open={open} onOpenChange={setOpen}>
<OGDialogTemplate
title={localize('com_auth_guest_limit_title')}
className="max-w-md"
main={
<div className="text-sm text-text-secondary">
{localize('com_auth_guest_limit_message')}
</div>
}
buttons={
<Button variant="submit" onClick={handleLogin}>
{localize('com_auth_guest_limit_login')}
</Button>
}
/>
</OGDialog>
);
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ export default function OAuthCallback() {
try {
const tokens = await iamSdk.handleCallback();
if (tokens.access_token) {
setTokenHeader(tokens.access_token);
if (tokens.accessToken) {
setTokenHeader(tokens.accessToken);
}
navigate('/c/new', { replace: true });
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
import { useState, useRef, useEffect, useMemo, memo } from 'react';
import { AutoSizer, List } from 'react-virtualized';
import { Spinner, useCombobox } from '@librechat/client';
import { useSetRecoilState, useRecoilValue } from 'recoil';
import type { MentionOption } from '~/common';
import { useListCloudAgentsQuery } from '~/data-provider';
import { removeCharIfLast } from '~/utils';
import { useLocalize } from '~/hooks';
import MentionItem from './MentionItem';
import store from '~/store';
const commandChar = '/';
const ROW_HEIGHT = 44;
/**
* `/agent` command popover lists the caller's canonical Hanzo Cloud agents
* (`/v1/agents`) as they type `/agent …`. Selecting one sets the composer to
* `/agent <name> ` so the user can add a prompt; submitting runs the agent (the
* run is intercepted in ChatForm and dispatched through the ONE run path,
* useRunCloudAgent). Structurally mirrors PromptsCommand to stay DRY.
*/
function AgentsCommand({
index,
textAreaRef,
}: {
index: number;
textAreaRef: React.MutableRefObject<HTMLTextAreaElement | null>;
}) {
const localize = useLocalize();
const setShowAgentsPopover = useSetRecoilState(store.showAgentsPopoverFamily(index));
const showAgentsPopover = useRecoilValue(store.showAgentsPopoverFamily(index));
const { data, isLoading } = useListCloudAgentsQuery({ enabled: showAgentsPopover });
const options = useMemo<MentionOption[]>(
() =>
(data?.agents ?? []).map((agent) => ({
type: 'cloudAgent',
value: agent.name,
label: agent.name,
description: agent.description || agent.model,
})),
[data],
);
const [activeIndex, setActiveIndex] = useState(0);
const timeoutRef = useRef<NodeJS.Timeout | null>(null);
const inputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement | null>(null);
const { open, setOpen, searchValue, setSearchValue, matches } = useCombobox({
value: '',
options,
});
const handleSelect = (mention?: MentionOption) => {
if (!mention) {
return;
}
setSearchValue('');
setOpen(false);
setShowAgentsPopover(false);
const el = textAreaRef.current;
if (el) {
// Replace the in-progress command with `/agent <name> ` and keep focus so
// the user can type a prompt, then Enter to run.
removeCharIfLast(el, commandChar);
el.value = `/agent ${mention.value} `;
el.dispatchEvent(new Event('input', { bubbles: true }));
el.focus();
el.setSelectionRange(el.value.length, el.value.length);
}
};
useEffect(() => {
if (!open) {
setActiveIndex(0);
}
}, [open]);
useEffect(() => {
return () => {
if (timeoutRef.current) {
clearTimeout(timeoutRef.current);
}
};
}, []);
useEffect(() => {
const currentActiveItem = document.getElementById(`agent-item-${activeIndex}`);
currentActiveItem?.scrollIntoView({ behavior: 'instant', block: 'nearest' });
}, [activeIndex]);
if (!showAgentsPopover) {
return null;
}
const rowRenderer = ({
index: rowIndex,
key,
style,
}: {
index: number;
key: string;
style: React.CSSProperties;
}) => {
const mention = matches[rowIndex] as MentionOption;
return (
<MentionItem
index={rowIndex}
type="agent"
key={key}
style={style}
onClick={() => {
if (timeoutRef.current) {
clearTimeout(timeoutRef.current);
}
timeoutRef.current = null;
handleSelect(mention);
}}
name={mention.label ?? ''}
icon={mention.icon}
description={mention.description}
isActive={rowIndex === activeIndex}
/>
);
};
return (
<div className="absolute bottom-28 z-10 w-full space-y-2">
<div className="popover border-token-border-light rounded-2xl border bg-surface-tertiary-alt p-2 shadow-lg">
<input
// Focus transitions to the input field when the popover opens.
// eslint-disable-next-line jsx-a11y/no-autofocus
autoFocus
ref={inputRef}
placeholder={localize('com_agents_cloud_command_placeholder')}
className="mb-1 w-full border-0 bg-surface-tertiary-alt p-2 text-sm focus:outline-none dark:text-gray-200"
autoComplete="off"
value={searchValue}
onKeyDown={(e) => {
if (e.key === 'Escape') {
setOpen(false);
setShowAgentsPopover(false);
textAreaRef.current?.focus();
} else if (e.key === 'ArrowDown') {
setActiveIndex((prev) => (prev + 1) % Math.max(matches.length, 1));
} else if (e.key === 'ArrowUp') {
setActiveIndex((prev) => (prev - 1 + matches.length) % Math.max(matches.length, 1));
} else if (e.key === 'Enter' || e.key === 'Tab') {
e.preventDefault();
handleSelect(matches[activeIndex] as MentionOption | undefined);
} else if (e.key === 'Backspace' && searchValue === '') {
setOpen(false);
setShowAgentsPopover(false);
textAreaRef.current?.focus();
}
}}
onChange={(e) => setSearchValue(e.target.value)}
onFocus={() => setOpen(true)}
onBlur={() => {
timeoutRef.current = setTimeout(() => {
setOpen(false);
setShowAgentsPopover(false);
}, 150);
}}
/>
<div className="max-h-40 overflow-y-auto">
{isLoading && open ? (
<div className="flex h-32 items-center justify-center text-text-primary">
<Spinner />
</div>
) : null}
{!isLoading && open ? (
<div className="max-h-40">
<AutoSizer disableHeight>
{({ width }) => (
<List
width={width}
overscanRowCount={5}
rowHeight={ROW_HEIGHT}
rowCount={matches.length}
rowRenderer={rowRenderer}
scrollToIndex={activeIndex}
height={Math.min(matches.length * ROW_HEIGHT, 160)}
/>
)}
</AutoSizer>
</div>
) : null}
</div>
</div>
</div>
);
}
export default memo(AgentsCommand);
+27 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
import { memo, useRef, useMemo, useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react';
import { useWatch } from 'react-hook-form';
import { TextareaAutosize } from '@librechat/client';
import { useRecoilState, useRecoilValue } from 'recoil';
import { useRecoilState, useRecoilValue, useSetRecoilState } from 'recoil';
import { Constants, isAssistantsEndpoint, isAgentsEndpoint } from 'librechat-data-provider';
import {
useChatContext,
@@ -19,12 +19,14 @@ import {
useSubmitMessage,
useFocusChatEffect,
} from '~/hooks';
import { useRunCloudAgent } from '~/hooks/Agents';
import { mainTextareaId, BadgeItem } from '~/common';
import AttachFileChat from './Files/AttachFileChat';
import FileFormChat from './Files/FileFormChat';
import { cn, removeFocusRings } from '~/utils';
import { cn, removeFocusRings, parseAgentCommand } from '~/utils';
import TextareaHeader from './TextareaHeader';
import PromptsCommand from './PromptsCommand';
import AgentsCommand from './AgentsCommand';
import AudioRecorder from './AudioRecorder';
import CollapseChat from './CollapseChat';
import StreamAudio from './StreamAudio';
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ const ChatForm = memo(({ index = 0 }: { index?: number }) => {
const [showMentionPopover, setShowMentionPopover] = useRecoilState(
store.showMentionPopoverFamily(index),
);
const setShowAgentsPopover = useSetRecoilState(store.showAgentsPopoverFamily(index));
const { requiresKey } = useRequiresKey();
const methods = useChatFormContext();
@@ -129,6 +132,26 @@ const ChatForm = memo(({ index = 0 }: { index?: number }) => {
});
const { submitMessage, submitPrompt } = useSubmitMessage();
const runCloudAgent = useRunCloudAgent();
/**
* Submit handler that intercepts the `/agent <name> [prompt]` command and
* dispatches it through the single cloud-agent run path; everything else is a
* normal chat message. This is the ONE place the command is turned into a run.
*/
const onSubmit = useCallback(
(data?: { text: string }) => {
const command = parseAgentCommand(data?.text ?? '');
if (command) {
methods.reset();
setShowAgentsPopover(false);
void runCloudAgent(command.name, command.prompt);
return;
}
submitMessage(data);
},
[methods, runCloudAgent, submitMessage, setShowAgentsPopover],
);
const handleKeyUp = useHandleKeyUp({
index,
@@ -203,7 +226,7 @@ const ChatForm = memo(({ index = 0 }: { index?: number }) => {
return (
<form
onSubmit={methods.handleSubmit(submitMessage)}
onSubmit={methods.handleSubmit(onSubmit)}
className={cn(
'mx-auto flex w-full flex-row gap-3 transition-[max-width] duration-300 sm:px-2',
maximizeChatSpace ? 'max-w-full' : 'md:max-w-3xl xl:max-w-4xl',
@@ -237,6 +260,7 @@ const ChatForm = memo(({ index = 0 }: { index?: number }) => {
/>
)}
<PromptsCommand index={index} textAreaRef={textAreaRef} submitPrompt={submitPrompt} />
<AgentsCommand index={index} textAreaRef={textAreaRef} />
<div
onClick={handleContainerClick}
className={cn(
@@ -1,10 +1,25 @@
import { useMemo, useCallback } from 'react';
import { PenLine, Lightbulb, Code2, Sparkles } from 'lucide-react';
import { EModelEndpoint, Constants } from 'librechat-data-provider';
import { useChatContext, useAgentsMapContext, useAssistantsMapContext } from '~/Providers';
import { useGetAssistantDocsQuery, useGetEndpointsQuery } from '~/data-provider';
import { getIconEndpoint, getEntity } from '~/utils';
import { useSubmitMessage } from '~/hooks';
type Starter = { text: string; Icon?: typeof PenLine };
/**
* Curated fallback starters for plain-model chats (no agent/assistant-specific
* starters). Keeps the empty state from being bare and matches the ChatGPT/Claude
* suggestion-chip pattern. Category-style so submitting reads naturally.
*/
const DEFAULT_STARTERS: Starter[] = [
{ text: 'Help me write or refine something', Icon: PenLine },
{ text: 'Explain a concept clearly', Icon: Lightbulb },
{ text: 'Review, debug, or improve some code', Icon: Code2 },
{ text: 'Brainstorm ideas and a plan', Icon: Sparkles },
];
const ConversationStarters = () => {
const { conversation } = useChatContext();
const agentsMap = useAgentsMapContext();
@@ -35,16 +50,25 @@ const ConversationStarters = () => {
assistant_id: conversation?.assistant_id,
});
const conversation_starters = useMemo(() => {
const starters: Starter[] = useMemo(() => {
const toStarters = (list: string[]): Starter[] => list.map((text) => ({ text }));
if (entity?.conversation_starters?.length) {
return entity.conversation_starters;
return toStarters(entity.conversation_starters);
}
// Agents may intentionally omit starters — honor that (no defaults).
if (isAgent) {
return [];
}
return documentsMap.get(entity?.id ?? '')?.conversation_starters ?? [];
const docStarters = documentsMap.get(entity?.id ?? '')?.conversation_starters;
if (docStarters?.length) {
return toStarters(docStarters);
}
// Plain-model chat: fall back to curated defaults so the empty state isn't bare.
return DEFAULT_STARTERS;
}, [documentsMap, isAgent, entity]);
const { submitMessage } = useSubmitMessage();
@@ -53,25 +77,26 @@ const ConversationStarters = () => {
[submitMessage],
);
if (!conversation_starters.length) {
if (!starters.length) {
return null;
}
return (
<div className="mt-8 flex flex-wrap justify-center gap-3 px-4">
{conversation_starters
.slice(0, Constants.MAX_CONVO_STARTERS)
.map((text: string, index: number) => (
<button
key={index}
onClick={() => sendConversationStarter(text)}
className="relative flex w-40 cursor-pointer flex-col gap-2 rounded-2xl border border-border-medium px-3 pb-4 pt-3 text-start align-top text-[15px] shadow-[0_0_2px_0_rgba(0,0,0,0.05),0_4px_6px_0_rgba(0,0,0,0.02)] transition-colors duration-300 ease-in-out fade-in hover:bg-surface-tertiary"
>
<p className="break-word line-clamp-3 overflow-hidden text-balance break-all text-text-secondary">
{text}
</p>
</button>
))}
<div className="mx-auto mt-6 grid w-full max-w-2xl grid-cols-1 gap-2.5 px-4 sm:grid-cols-2">
{starters.slice(0, Constants.MAX_CONVO_STARTERS).map(({ text, Icon = Sparkles }, index) => (
<button
key={index}
onClick={() => sendConversationStarter(text)}
className="group flex items-center gap-3 rounded-2xl border border-border-light bg-surface-primary-alt px-4 py-3.5 text-start transition-all duration-200 ease-out hover:-translate-y-0.5 hover:border-border-medium hover:bg-surface-tertiary hover:shadow-lg focus:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-border-heavy motion-reduce:transform-none motion-reduce:transition-none"
>
<span className="flex size-8 shrink-0 items-center justify-center rounded-lg bg-surface-tertiary text-text-secondary transition-colors duration-200 group-hover:text-text-primary">
<Icon className="size-4" aria-hidden="true" />
</span>
<span className="line-clamp-2 text-balance text-sm text-text-secondary transition-colors duration-200 group-hover:text-text-primary">
{text}
</span>
</button>
))}
</div>
);
};
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ export default function MCPConfigDialog({
}
selection={{
selectHandler: handleSubmit(onFormSubmit),
selectClasses: 'bg-green-500 hover:bg-green-600 text-white',
selectClasses: 'bg-primary hover:bg-primary/90 text-primary-foreground',
selectText: isSubmitting ? localize('com_ui_saving') : localize('com_ui_save'),
}}
buttons={
@@ -77,6 +77,22 @@ export default function Mention({
}
};
if (mention.type === 'cloudAgent') {
// Arm the `/agent <name> ` command so the run flows through the single
// cloud-agent run path (intercepted on submit in ChatForm).
setSearchValue('');
setOpen(false);
setShowMentionPopover(false);
const el = textAreaRef.current;
if (el) {
removeCharIfLast(el, commandChar);
el.value = `/agent ${mention.value} `;
el.dispatchEvent(new Event('input', { bubbles: true }));
el.focus();
el.setSelectionRange(el.value.length, el.value.length);
}
return;
}
if (mention.type === 'endpoint' && mention.value === EModelEndpoint.agents) {
setSearchValue('');
setInputOptions(agentsList ?? []);
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ export interface MentionItemProps {
name: string;
onClick: (e: React.MouseEvent<HTMLButtonElement>) => void;
index: number;
type?: 'prompt' | 'mention' | 'add-convo';
type?: 'prompt' | 'mention' | 'add-convo' | 'agent';
icon?: React.ReactNode;
isActive?: boolean;
description?: string;
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import { memo } from 'react';
import { Feather } from 'lucide-react';
import HanzoLogoIcon from '~/components/svg/HanzoLogoIcon';
import ZenLogoIcon from '~/components/svg/ZenLogoIcon';
import { EModelEndpoint, isAssistantsEndpoint, alternateName } from 'librechat-data-provider';
import {
Plugin,
@@ -11,7 +12,6 @@ import {
AssistantIcon,
AnthropicIcon,
AzureMinimalIcon,
CustomMinimalIcon,
} from '@librechat/client';
import UnknownIcon from '~/hooks/Endpoint/UnknownIcon';
import { IconProps } from '~/common';
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ const MessageEndpointIcon: React.FC<IconProps> = (props) => {
) : (
<div className="h-6 w-6">
<div className="shadow-stroke flex h-6 w-6 items-center justify-center overflow-hidden rounded-full">
<Feather className="h-2/3 w-2/3 text-gray-400" aria-hidden="true" />
<HanzoLogoIcon className="h-2/3 w-2/3 text-gray-400" aria-hidden="true" />
</div>
</div>
),
@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ const MessageEndpointIcon: React.FC<IconProps> = (props) => {
name: alternateName[EModelEndpoint.bedrock],
},
[EModelEndpoint.custom]: {
icon: <CustomMinimalIcon size={size * 0.7} />,
name: 'Custom',
// hanzo.chat's custom endpoint is Zen-only (Hanzo AI zen* models) — brand it
// with the ensō mark instead of the generic LibreChat "custom" glyph.
icon: <ZenLogoIcon size={size * 0.72} className="text-white" />,
name: 'Zen',
},
null: { icon: <GPTIcon size={size * 0.7} />, bg: 'grey', name: 'N/A' },
default: {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { Feather } from 'lucide-react';
import HanzoLogoIcon from '~/components/svg/HanzoLogoIcon';
import { EModelEndpoint, alternateName } from 'librechat-data-provider';
import {
Sparkles,
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ const MinimalIcon: React.FC<IconProps> = (props) => {
[EModelEndpoint.assistants]: { icon: <Sparkles className="icon-sm" />, name: 'Assistant' },
[EModelEndpoint.azureAssistants]: { icon: <Sparkles className="icon-sm" />, name: 'Assistant' },
[EModelEndpoint.agents]: {
icon: <Feather className="icon-sm" aria-hidden="true" />,
icon: <HanzoLogoIcon className="icon-sm" aria-hidden="true" />,
name: props.modelLabel ?? alternateName[EModelEndpoint.agents],
},
[EModelEndpoint.bedrock]: {
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ const SaveAsPresetDialog = ({ open, onOpenChange, preset }: TEditPresetProps) =>
}
selection={{
selectHandler: submitPreset,
selectClasses: 'bg-green-500 hover:bg-green-600 dark:hover:bg-green-600 text-white',
selectClasses: 'bg-primary hover:bg-primary/90 text-primary-foreground',
selectText: localize('com_ui_save'),
}}
/>
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ export default function FileListItem2({
return (
<span
key={index}
className="ml-2 mt-1 content-center rounded-full bg-[#f2f8ec] px-2 text-xs text-[#91c561]"
className="ml-2 mt-1 content-center rounded-full bg-surface-secondary px-2 text-xs text-text-secondary"
>
{vectorStore.name}
</span>
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ export default function FilePreview() {
&nbsp; Status
</span>
<div className="w-1/2 sm:w-3/4 md:w-3/5">
<span className="flex w-20 flex-row items-center justify-evenly rounded-full bg-[#f2f8ec] p-1 text-[#91c561]">
<span className="flex w-20 flex-row items-center justify-evenly rounded-full bg-surface-secondary p-1 text-text-secondary">
<CheckMark className="m-0 p-0" />
<div>{file.object}</div>
</span>
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ export const fileTableColumns: ColumnDef<TFile>[] = [
return null;
}
return (
<span key={index} className="ml-2 mt-2 rounded-full bg-[#f2f8ec] px-2 text-[#91c561]">
<span key={index} className="ml-2 mt-2 rounded-full bg-surface-secondary px-2 text-text-secondary">
{vectorStore.name}
</span>
);
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ export default function VectorStorePreview() {
</span>
<div className="w-1/2 md:w-3/5">
<p className="text-gray-500">
<span className="text-[#91c561]">0 KB hours</span>
<span className="text-text-secondary">0 KB hours</span>
&nbsp; Free until end of 2024
</p>
</div>
+22 -20
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ const colors = {
mutedFg: 'hsla(0, 0%, 70%, 0.85)',
border: 'hsla(0, 0%, 40%, 0.2)',
fg: 'hsl(0, 0%, 96%)',
brand: '#fd4444',
brandDim: 'rgba(253, 68, 68, 0.10)',
brandGlow: 'rgba(253, 68, 68, 0.04)',
brand: '#ffffff',
brandDim: 'rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.10)',
brandGlow: 'rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.06)',
secondary: '#1f1f1f',
} as const;
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ const features = [
{
title: '100+ Models',
description:
'Claude, GPT-5, DeepSeek, Qwen, and more. Every major provider through one interface.',
'The Zen model family plus Claude, GPT-5, Gemini, and more. Every major provider through one interface.',
Icon: IconCube,
},
{
@@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ const zenModels = [
{ name: 'zen3-omni', description: 'Multimodal vision and text', context: '128K', params: '32B' },
];
// Independent third-party providers offered via the gateway. NO upstream
// base-model names that would leak the Zen family's provenance (brand policy:
// no raw Qwen/DeepSeek/Kimi/Llama/HuggingFace names).
const thirdPartyModels = [
'GPT-5', 'Claude Opus 4', 'Gemini 2.5', 'DeepSeek R1',
'Qwen3', 'Llama 4', 'Mistral Large', 'Command R+',
'Grok', 'Phi-4',
'GPT-5', 'Claude Opus 4', 'Gemini 2.5', 'Grok',
'Mistral Large', 'Command R+',
];
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -152,7 +154,7 @@ export default function LandingPage() {
return (
<div
className="min-h-screen selection:bg-[#fd4444]/30"
className="min-h-screen selection:bg-white/20"
style={{
backgroundColor: colors.bg,
color: colors.fg,
@@ -169,7 +171,7 @@ export default function LandingPage() {
>
<div className="mx-auto flex max-w-[1400px] items-center justify-between px-6 py-3">
<div className="flex items-center gap-2.5">
<HanzoLogo className="size-5 text-[#fd4444]" />
<HanzoLogo className="size-5 text-white" />
<span className="text-sm font-bold tracking-tight">Hanzo Chat</span>
</div>
<div className="flex items-center gap-3">
@@ -199,7 +201,7 @@ export default function LandingPage() {
href={loginHref}
onClick={handleLoginClick}
className="rounded-full px-5 py-2 text-sm font-medium tracking-tight transition-colors"
style={{ backgroundColor: colors.brand, color: '#fff' }}
style={{ backgroundColor: colors.brand, color: '#000' }}
onMouseOver={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.filter = 'brightness(1.15)')}
onMouseOut={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.filter = 'none')}
>
@@ -215,7 +217,7 @@ export default function LandingPage() {
className="relative flex min-h-[600px] flex-col overflow-hidden rounded-2xl"
style={{
border: `1px solid ${colors.border}`,
background: `linear-gradient(135deg, rgba(253,68,68,0.08) 0%, transparent 50%, rgba(253,68,68,0.04) 100%)`,
background: `linear-gradient(135deg, rgba(255,255,255,0.08) 0%, transparent 50%, rgba(255,255,255,0.04) 100%)`,
}}
>
{/* Grid pattern overlay */}
@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ export default function LandingPage() {
<div
className="flex w-fit items-center gap-2 rounded-full px-3 py-1.5 text-xs font-medium"
style={{
border: `1px solid rgba(253,68,68,0.5)`,
border: `1px solid rgba(255,255,255,0.5)`,
color: colors.brand,
}}
>
@@ -258,7 +260,7 @@ export default function LandingPage() {
href={loginHref}
onClick={handleLoginClick}
className="inline-flex items-center justify-center rounded-full px-5 py-3 text-sm font-medium tracking-tight transition-colors"
style={{ backgroundColor: colors.brand, color: '#fff' }}
style={{ backgroundColor: colors.brand, color: '#000' }}
onMouseOver={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.filter = 'brightness(1.15)')}
onMouseOut={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.filter = 'none')}
>
@@ -363,8 +365,8 @@ zen4-coder: I'll help you refactor the auth module.
<div
className="rounded-2xl p-6 text-sm shadow-lg md:p-8"
style={{
backgroundColor: 'rgba(253, 68, 68, 0.06)',
border: `1px solid rgba(253, 68, 68, 0.15)`,
backgroundColor: 'rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.06)',
border: `1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.15)`,
}}
>
<IconBolt className="mb-4 size-8" style={{ color: colors.brand }} />
@@ -383,7 +385,7 @@ zen4-coder: I'll help you refactor the auth module.
border: `1px solid ${colors.border}`,
backgroundColor: 'rgba(0,0,0,0.2)',
}}
onMouseOver={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.borderColor = 'rgba(253, 68, 68, 0.3)')}
onMouseOver={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.borderColor = 'rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.3)')}
onMouseOut={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.borderColor = colors.border)}
>
<div className="mb-2 flex items-center gap-2">
@@ -480,11 +482,11 @@ zen4-coder: I'll help you refactor the auth module.
<div
className="rounded-xl p-6"
style={{
border: `1px solid rgba(253, 68, 68, 0.3)`,
backgroundColor: 'rgba(253, 68, 68, 0.04)',
border: `1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.3)`,
backgroundColor: 'rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04)',
}}
>
<p className="mb-2 text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wider" style={{ color: 'rgba(253, 68, 68, 0.7)' }}>
<p className="mb-2 text-xs font-medium uppercase tracking-wider" style={{ color: 'rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.7)' }}>
Free credit
</p>
<p className="text-3xl font-bold">$5</p>
@@ -528,7 +530,7 @@ zen4-coder: I'll help you refactor the auth module.
href={loginHref}
onClick={handleLoginClick}
className="inline-flex items-center justify-center rounded-full px-5 py-3 text-sm font-medium tracking-tight transition-colors"
style={{ backgroundColor: colors.brand, color: '#fff' }}
style={{ backgroundColor: colors.brand, color: '#000' }}
onMouseOver={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.filter = 'brightness(1.15)')}
onMouseOut={(e) => (e.currentTarget.style.filter = 'none')}
>
@@ -125,11 +125,12 @@ const errorMessages = {
);
}
// Commerce insufficient balance
// Commerce insufficient balance — new users claim the $5 starter credit,
// spent-out users add funds. Both live at billing.hanzo.ai.
if (reason === 'commerce_insufficient') {
return (
<>
{'Your account balance is empty. Please add funds to continue.'}
{'You have no Hanzo Cloud balance. Claim your $5 starter credit (or add funds) to start chatting.'}
<br />
<br />
<a
@@ -138,12 +139,18 @@ const errorMessages = {
rel="noopener noreferrer"
className="text-hanzo-red underline"
>
Add funds to your Hanzo account
Claim your $5 credit at billing.hanzo.ai
</a>
</>
);
}
// Commerce unreachable — fail closed (we block rather than bleed). The user
// may well be funded; do NOT tell them to add funds.
if (reason === 'commerce_unavailable') {
return 'Billing is temporarily unavailable, so we could not verify your balance. Please try again in a moment.';
}
// Convert tokenCredits to USD: 1,000,000 tokenCredits = $1 USD
const balanceUsd = (balance / 1000000).toFixed(4);
const costUsd = (tokenCost / 1000000).toFixed(4);
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ describe('About', () => {
expect(mockCopy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const [blob, options] = mockCopy.mock.calls[0] as [string, { format: string }];
expect(options).toEqual({ format: 'text/plain' });
expect(blob).toContain(`LibreChat version: ${Constants.VERSION}`);
expect(blob).toContain(`Hanzo Chat version: ${Constants.VERSION}`);
expect(blob).toContain(`Commit: ${populatedBuildInfo.commit}`);
expect(blob).toContain(`Branch: ${populatedBuildInfo.branch}`);
expect(blob).toContain('Build date: 2026-04-20 12:00:00 UTC');
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ function buildDiagnosticsBlob(
buildInfo: TStartupConfig['buildInfo'] | undefined,
): string {
const lines: string[] = [
`LibreChat version: ${version}`,
`Hanzo Chat version: ${version}`,
`Commit: ${buildInfo?.commit ?? UNKNOWN_PLACEHOLDER}`,
`Branch: ${buildInfo?.branch ?? UNKNOWN_PLACEHOLDER}`,
`Build date: ${formatBuildDate(buildInfo?.buildDate)}`,
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ export default function ActionsInput({
<button
disabled={!functions || !functions.length}
onClick={saveAction}
className="focus:shadow-outline mt-1 flex min-w-[100px] items-center justify-center rounded bg-green-500 px-4 py-2 font-semibold text-white hover:bg-green-400 focus:border-green-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-0 disabled:bg-green-400"
className="focus:shadow-outline mt-1 flex min-w-[100px] items-center justify-center rounded bg-primary px-4 py-2 font-semibold text-primary-foreground hover:bg-primary/90 focus:outline-none focus:ring-0 disabled:opacity-50"
type="button"
>
{getButtonContent()}
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ export default function AgentConfig() {
return (
<>
<div className="h-auto bg-white px-4 pt-3 dark:bg-transparent">
<div className="h-auto bg-white px-3 pt-3 dark:bg-transparent sm:px-4">
{/* Avatar & Name */}
<div className="mb-4">
<AgentAvatar avatar={agent?.['avatar'] ?? null} />
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ export default function AgentConfig() {
/>
<div
className={cn(
'mt-1 w-56 text-sm text-red-500',
'mt-1 w-full max-w-full break-words text-sm text-red-500',
errors.name ? 'visible h-auto' : 'invisible h-0',
)}
role="alert"
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ export default function AgentConfig() {
/>
))}
</div>
<div className="mt-2 flex space-x-2">
<div className="mt-2 flex flex-col gap-2 sm:flex-row sm:gap-2">
{(toolsEnabled ?? false) && (
<button
type="button"

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