5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
zeekay 988ac803ae fix(deps): correct moved-tag hashes for luxfi modules in go.sum
Several luxfi versions carry TWO different contents across this workspace,
because published tags were moved instead of a new patch being cut:
age@v1.5.0, pq@v1.0.3, threshold@v1.9.4, zap@v0.6.0, zap@v0.8.1.

Adjudicated before editing, since "checksum mismatch / SECURITY ERROR" is also
what a real supply-chain attack looks like. It is not one here: sum.golang.org
holds the OLD hash while proxy.golang.org and a direct fetch BOTH serve the same
NEW bytes. Two independent transports agreeing means nothing is rewriting
content in flight — the tag moved at source. The sumdb entry is a fossil:
GOPRIVATE covers github.com/luxfi/* with GOSUMDB=off, so our own modules never
consult the checksum DB and a moved tag splits consumers silently.

The old bytes are served by nothing now, so a stale pin can never build.
Corrected to the only content that exists, in BOTH line forms (h1: and
/go.mod h1:) — Go reports these one at a time, so a partial fix just relocates
the error.

Deliberately no `go mod tidy`: this changes no selected version, only the
recorded hash of versions already chosen.

Verified: `go list -m all` resolves with no checksum error.

The durable fix is upstream: never move a published tag, cut x.y.z+1 instead.
2026-07-26 02:42:49 -07:00
zeekayandHanzo Dev 6874c1f114 bump: latest dealerless PQ (corona v0.10.3, pulsar v1.8.0)
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-30 13:26:35 -07:00
zeekay 0eca5da897 bump: dealerless pulsar/corona/dkg/mlwe (no trusted dealer, no-reconstruct)
Move to the dealerless threshold-signature stack: corona v0.10.2 (Module-LWE
Ringtail, dealerless Pedersen-VSS) + pulsar v1.7.1 (dealerless Mithril RSS keygen
+ no-reconstruct signing, trusted dealer ripped) + dkg v0.3.5 + mlwe v0.2.1.
2026-06-28 19:39:51 -07:00
zeekay 0d9516147f mcp: decomplect into 3 orthogonal packages (transport / evmread / governance)
Split the flat governance MCP package into three independently-complete
packages so the generic parts are written ONCE and future MCP surfaces
(mining, treasury, bridge) are just a bag of read tools, never re-implementing
transport. One and only one way:

  github.com/luxfi/mcp           (root)  - domain-agnostic READ-ONLY MCP
                                           transport (Serve, Tool, Surface,
                                           dispatch, per-call timeout, line
                                           cap, panic->JSON-RPC recover) +
                                           ChainObservation. Imports NO geth.
  github.com/luxfi/mcp/evmread           - the SOLE go-ethereum importer: a
                                           minimal read-only Caller, Contract,
                                           Call/CallStruct[T], and the
                                           per-request Bounded call ceiling.
  github.com/luxfi/mcp/governance        - a Surface of the 8 read tools;
                                           reads via evmread, contributes
                                           []mcp.Tool to the shared transport.
  github.com/luxfi/mcp/cmd/lux-mcp       - the binary (was aivm-gov-mcp).

What this generalizes (the real point, not just a move):
- Tool is now a value carrying its own Read closure; Serve composes
  ...Surface and rejects duplicate / empty / nil-Read tools.
- ChainObservation lifted to the root and WIRED INTO ALL 8 TOOLS: every read
  returns (value, *ChainObservation) so an operator-LLM's signed verdict can
  bind Observation.Hash() and re-verify the chain state it claims to have seen
  - domain-independently. (Closes the previously-deferred MED-8.)
- The read-only AST gate is now MODULE-WIDE: it proves go-ethereum is imported
  by exactly one package (evmread), no package imports bind/geth-crypto/
  geth-rpc/reflect, the string-fragment denylist holds, and evmread.Caller's
  method set is exactly {CallContract,ChainID,BlockNumber,HeaderByNumber}.

Behavior-preserving and adversarially re-verified (blue->red loop):
- HIGH-1 bonded-quorum tally still matches AIGovernor.settle()'s _bonded
  filter exactly (PoC drives real compiled Solidity via core/vm/runtime).
- Parity tests remain real (independent ABI decode vs MCP output), struct
  mirrors still field-for-field aligned with luxfi/standard.
- Per-request bounded ceiling cannot leak/bypass; line cap + timeout + recover
  preserved. Read-only invariant intact and STRONGER (adding a write method to
  Caller is now a compile failure).
- Tests: 33 pass, 0 fail, 0 skip across the 3 packages (was 23 pre-split;
  none dropped, several strengthened); go build / vet / -race clean.
2026-06-24 23:46:17 -07:00
zeekay e0b32e58ab governance: node-side Proof-of-AI governance MCP (the operator-LLM sensory surface)
The missing "LLM of node operator" half of on-chain AI governance: a read-only
MCP server a node exposes so an operator-LLM can query its own chain mid-thought
before signing an AIGovernor verdict — chain_state, param_history, receipt_lookup,
quorum_status, etc. Read-only by construction (AST gate, no state-mutating verb),
bounded calls + per-call timeout, every read at a pinned block.

EthCaller is the read-only EVM seam; quorum tally mirrors AIGovernor.settle so the
LLM sees the same canonical view the chain will. cmd/aivm-gov-mcp serves it over
stdio (drop-in for hanzo-dev / Claude Desktop mcp-servers, like gym.distributed.mcp).

Verified: go test ./governance/ = ok (SDKROOT set; CGO secp256k1/gopsutil need the
macOS SDK path). Pairs with luxfi/standard ai/governance (AIGovernor/AIApproval/
AIExecute). Future: decomplect transport+evmread to module root as a Surface once a
2nd surface (mining/treasury) lands — held per YAGNI.
2026-06-24 19:08:04 -07:00