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node: purge 'snowman' comment references — Quasar/Nova terminology (comment-only, no behavior change)
Removes the forbidden Avalanche term from code comments in chains/manager.go, chains/quorum.go, and vms/proposervm/proposer/windower_determinism_test.go. Reworded to preserve exact meaning; comments only, no identifier/behavior change. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
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+3
-3
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ func (m *manager) buildChain(chainParams ChainParameters, sb nets.Net) (*chainIn
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vmConfigBytes := m.injectAutominingConfig(chainParams.VMID, chainConfig.Config)
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vmConfigBytes = m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(chainParams.VMID, vmConfigBytes)
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// CONSENSUS-SAFETY (single-proposer-per-height): re-wrap multi-validator
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// linear chains in proposervm so block production follows the Snowman++
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// linear chains in proposervm so block production follows the proposervm's
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// proposer schedule — exactly ONE validator builds height H, the rest wait
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// and vote. Without it every validator's engine calls BuildBlock
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// UNCONDITIONALLY at every height off a slightly-different mempool, so two
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@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ func (m *manager) buildChain(chainParams ChainParameters, sb nets.Net) (*chainIn
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// enabling it can never weaken safety — at worst it halts (never forks).
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if consensusParams.K > 1 && strings.EqualFold(os.Getenv("LUX_CONSENSUS_VIEW_CHANGE"), "true") {
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consensusParams.ViewChange = true
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// NOTE: presetK/presetAlpha are the Snowman SAMPLE preset (MainnetParams K=21/α=15),
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// NOTE: presetK/presetAlpha are the sample preset (MainnetParams K=21/α=15),
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// NOT the finality committee. The α-of-K cert and the view-change POL/precommit are
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// sized to the LIVE validator set at runtime via effectiveCommittee/bftCommittee
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// (e.g. 5 validators → K=5/α=4); the engine logs the effective (K,α) whenever it
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@@ -1524,7 +1524,7 @@ func (m *manager) buildChain(chainParams ChainParameters, sb nets.Net) (*chainIn
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// the proposervm, whose SignedBlock carries the real P-chain height
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// (selectChildPChainHeight = max(GetCurrentHeight, parentH)) and exposes
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// PChainHeight() — the SAME value the engine's pChainHeightOf reads. That
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// is precisely the Snowman++ mechanism newPChainHeightVM was a stand-in
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// is precisely the proposervm mechanism newPChainHeightVM was a stand-in
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// for, so stacking both would double-stamp the height. We keep
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// newPChainHeightVM only for the unwrapped K>1 chains (P-Chain, X-Chain).
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if blockBuilder != nil && !wrapInProposerVM {
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+2
-2
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ func selectConsensusParams(sybilProtection bool, networkID uint32) consensusconf
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// shouldWrapInProposerVM decides whether a linear chain.ChainVM is wrapped in
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// proposervm to enforce single-proposer-per-height block production (the
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// Snowman++ window). It is the SINGLE policy gate (the manager calls it once);
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// proposer window). It is the SINGLE policy gate (the manager calls it once);
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// keeping it a pure function makes the policy unit-testable without standing up
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// a whole chain. All three conditions must hold:
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//
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@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ func (s *validatorStakeSource) TotalStake(height uint64) uint64 {
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// ValidatorCount implements consensuschain.StakeSource. The number of DISTINCT
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// validators in the set IN FORCE AT height — the round-scoped view-change's BFT
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// committee size (it sizes its POL/precommit quorum to bftAlpha over this count,
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// NOT the oversized Snowman sample K). Read from the SAME height-indexed set as
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// NOT the oversized sample K). Read from the SAME height-indexed set as
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// Weight/TotalStake so every node computes the identical committee and the
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// count-quorum matches the ⅔-by-stake set exactly.
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func (s *validatorStakeSource) ValidatorCount(height uint64) int {
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
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// - ROTATION (liveness): consecutive slots designate (in general) DIFFERENT
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// proposers, so a down/wedged/forked designated proposer for slot S is routed
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// around: at slot S+1 (5s later) a different validator is designated and builds
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// a signed block the rest accept. This is avalanchego's Snowman++ mechanism,
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// a signed block the rest accept. This is the upstream proposer-window mechanism,
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// byte-for-byte (windower.go is identical to ava's), and the reason a faulty
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// leader cannot halt the chain.
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//
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