deps: bump luxfi/consensus v1.25.30 -> v1.25.31 (dynamic K/α committee clamp)

Pulls the validator-count clamp that scales an oversized consensus committee down to the live set (fixes testnet finality wedge where TestnetParams K=11/α=8 was unsatisfiable with 5 validators; also protects mainnet from the same brick when it runs fewer than 21 validators).
merge: integrate docs(LLM) update alongside v1.30.66 op-table bijection
2026-07-29 08:36:26 +00:00 · 2026-06-25 23:00:10 -07:00 · 2026-06-25 22:11:29 -07:00 · 2026-06-25 22:10:09 -07:00 · 2026-06-26 05:06:41 +00:00 · 2026-06-25 21:24:14 -07:00
539 changed files with 31814 additions and 27701 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+# CI Status Check - 2025-09-23 23:30:58
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+# Triggering CI - Version 1.13.5 Ready
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1280" height="640" viewBox="0 0 1280 640" role="img" aria-label="node">
-<rect width="1280" height="640" fill="#0A0A0A"/>
-<svg x="96" y="215" width="210" height="210" viewBox="17 26 66 66"><path d="M50 88 L17.09 31 L82.91 31 Z" fill="#fff"/></svg>
-<text x="378" y="276" font-family="Inter,system-ui,-apple-system,sans-serif" font-size="78" font-weight="800" letter-spacing="-2" fill="#ffffff">node</text>
-<text x="378" y="322" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".66">Lux blockchain node — multi-consensus, post-quantum ready</text>
-<rect x="378" y="338" width="806" height="3" rx="1.5" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".9"/>
-<text x="378" y="390" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="24" font-weight="600" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".5">github.com/luxfi</text>
-<text x="1184" y="390" text-anchor="end" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="24" font-weight="600" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".5">lux.network</text>
-</svg>
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+name: Lint proto files
+
+on:
+  push:
+    paths:
+      - 'proto/**/*.proto'
+      - '.github/workflows/buf-lint.yml'
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  buf-lint:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Check for .proto files
+        id: proto-check
+        run: |
+          if find proto -name '*.proto' -type f 2>/dev/null | grep -q .; then
+            echo "has_proto=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          else
+            echo "has_proto=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+            echo "No .proto files found — skipping buf-lint (node is ZAP-native by default; protobuf is opt-in)."
+          fi
+      - uses: bufbuild/buf-setup-action@v1
+        if: steps.proto-check.outputs.has_proto == 'true'
+        with:
+          github_token: ${{ github.token }}
+          version: "1.47.2"
+      - uses: bufbuild/buf-lint-action@v1
+        if: steps.proto-check.outputs.has_proto == 'true'
+        with:
+          input: "proto"
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ on:

 jobs:
  push:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: bufbuild/buf-setup-action@v1.31.0
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ jobs:
          TIMEOUT: ${{ env.TIMEOUT }}
          CGO_ENABLED: '0'
  Fuzz:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ jobs:
  # e2e_pre_etna, e2e_post_etna, e2e_existing_network, Upgrade
  # These will be re-enabled once tmpnet is properly configured
  Lint:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -94,9 +94,56 @@ jobs:
      - name: Run actionlint
        shell: bash
        run: scripts/actionlint.sh
+  buf-lint:
+    name: Protobuf Lint
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Install buf
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          BUF_VERSION="1.47.2"
+          curl -sSL "https://github.com/bufbuild/buf/releases/download/v${BUF_VERSION}/buf-Linux-x86_64" -o /usr/local/bin/buf
+          chmod +x /usr/local/bin/buf
+          buf --version
+      - name: Lint protobuf
+        shell: bash
+        run: buf lint proto
+  check_generated_protobuf:
+    name: Up-to-date protobuf
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    continue-on-error: true
+    env:
+      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
+      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
+      GOWORK: off
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: ./.github/actions/setup-go-for-project
+      - name: Configure Git for private modules
+        shell: bash
+        run: git config --global url."https://${{ github.token }}@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"
+      - name: Install buf
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          BUF_VERSION="1.47.2"
+          curl -sSL "https://github.com/bufbuild/buf/releases/download/v${BUF_VERSION}/buf-Linux-x86_64" -o /usr/local/bin/buf
+          chmod +x /usr/local/bin/buf
+      - name: Install protoc-gen-go tools
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          go install google.golang.org/protobuf/cmd/protoc-gen-go@v1.35.1
+          go install google.golang.org/grpc/cmd/protoc-gen-go-grpc@v1.3.0
+          go install connectrpc.com/connect/cmd/protoc-gen-connect-go@latest
+      - shell: bash
+        run: scripts/protobuf_codegen.sh
+        env:
+          CGO_ENABLED: '0'
+      - shell: bash
+        run: .github/workflows/check-clean-branch.sh
  check_mockgen:
    name: Up-to-date mocks
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    continue-on-error: true
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -116,7 +163,7 @@ jobs:
        run: .github/workflows/check-clean-branch.sh
  go_mod_tidy:
    name: Up-to-date go.mod and go.sum
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -133,7 +180,7 @@ jobs:
        run: .github/workflows/check-clean-branch.sh
  test_build_image:
    name: Image build
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ on:
 jobs:
  analyze:
    name: Analyze
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      actions: read
      contents: read
@@ -2,11 +2,6 @@ name: Docker

 on:
  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      tag:
-        description: 'existing version tag to (re)build as a multi-arch manifest, e.g. v1.32.1'
-        required: false
-        default: ''
  push:
    tags: ['v*']

@@ -16,27 +11,16 @@ permissions:
  id-token: write

 jobs:
-  build:
+  build-amd64:
    # In-cluster ARC pool (lux-build autoscalingrunnerset in lux-k8s, amd64
    # DOKS nodes, DinD sidecar). Replaces the offline evo classic runner.
    # ARC matches on the scale-set name, NOT classic [self-hosted,linux,amd64]
    # labels — the org runner group + arcd repo allowlist enforce isolation.
-    # arm64 is produced by Go cross-compile (CGO_ENABLED=0, Dockerfile
-    # TARGETARCH path) on the amd64 runner — no QEMU emulation of the build.
    runs-on: lux-build
    outputs:
      digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          # On workflow_dispatch with an explicit `tag`, (re)build that tag
-          # as a multi-arch manifest; otherwise build the pushed ref.
-          ref: ${{ github.event.inputs.tag || github.ref }}
-
-      - name: Set up QEMU
-        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
-        with:
-          platforms: arm64

      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
@@ -66,7 +50,6 @@ jobs:
            latest=false
          tags: |
            type=ref,event=tag
-            type=raw,value=${{ github.event.inputs.tag }},enable=${{ github.event.inputs.tag != '' }}
            type=sha,format=short,prefix=sha-

      - name: Resolve cross-repo PAT for private luxfi/* deps
@@ -102,13 +85,13 @@ jobs:
          echo "$tok" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          echo "EOF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

-      - name: Build & push (multi-arch)
+      - name: Build & push (amd64)
        id: build
        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
        with:
          context: .
          file: Dockerfile
-          platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
+          platforms: linux/amd64
          push: true
          build-args: |
            CGO_ENABLED=0
@@ -120,11 +103,11 @@ jobs:
          tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
          provenance: false
-          cache-from: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache
-          cache-to: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache,mode=max
+          cache-from: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache-amd64
+          cache-to: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache-amd64,mode=max

  notify-universe:
-    needs: build
+    needs: build-amd64
    if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
    runs-on: lux-build
    steps:
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ permissions:

 jobs:
  fuzz:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ permissions:

 jobs:
  MerkleDB:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
    permissions:
      contents: read
      issues: write
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: crazy-max/ghaction-github-labeler@548a7c3603594ec17c819e1239f281a3b801ab4d #v6.0.0
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ on:
    - cron: '0 0 * * 0' # Run every day at midnight UTC on Sunday
 jobs:
  stale:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/stale@v10
        with:
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ env:

 jobs:
  test-zapdb-replay:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
    - name: Checkout code
      uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ jobs:
          --api-admin-enabled=true 2>&1 | grep -E "(genesis-db|Genesis)" || true

  test-database-factory:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
    - name: Checkout code
      uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -5,22 +5,6 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).

-## [1.36.31]
-
-### Fixed
- **`/v1/health` reported a chain the node denies exists.** The `bootstrapped` check publishes `chains.Nets.Bootstrapping()` verbatim as its message, but `Nets.chains` is keyed by **net** ID and the aggregate appended the map **key**, not the chain. Every primary-network chain that failed to converge therefore surfaced as the single ID `11111111111111111111111111111111LpoYY` — `constants.PrimaryNetworkID` (`ids.Empty`) — so an operator resolving it got "there is no chain with alias/ID", and N stuck chains collapsed into one indistinguishable entry (measured on devnet/testnet: `"message":["11111111111111111111111111111111LpoYY"],"contiguousFailures":3213`). The net owns the bootstrapping set, so the net now names its own chains: new `nets.Net.Bootstrapping() []ids.ID` (`nets/net.go`), and `chains/chains.go` aggregates those instead of the keys. `TestNetsBootstrappingReportsChainsNotNets` asserts `ids.Empty` never appears and that two stuck chains are individually named; `TestNetsBootstrapping` no longer asserts the bug (it demanded the net ID).
- Ships the GET `/v1/health` encoder fix from `dada5a31` (`{"healthy":…,"error":"health reply encode failed"}` on every node — jsonv2 has no representation for `apihealth.Result.Duration`), which was on `main` but had never been tagged.
-
-## [1.36.13]
-
-### Fixed
- **The durable rejoin fix (#66/#74) shipped INERT for the C-Chain — the exact chain whose 40h mainnet freeze motivated it.** `chains/manager.go` gated `expectsStakedBeacons` on `ids.IsNativeChain(chainParams.ID)` — the *blockchain* ID. But `ids.IsNativeChain` only matches the symbolic `111…C` alias form, and every deployed C/X/Q carries a **hash** blockchain ID (devnet C `21HieZng…`, mainnet C `2wRdZG…`); only the P-chain has a symbolic blockchain ID (`111…P`), and it is excluded as the platform chain. So `isNativeChain` was **always false** for the real C-Chain → `expectsStakedBeacons=false` → under the production `--skip-bootstrap=true` the beacon set was emptied → a behind C-Chain named its STALE local tip the frontier and never caught up (verified on devnet v1.36.12: C-Chain wedged at height 0 with "using empty beacons for single-node mode"). Fix: discriminate on the **validating Net** (`chainParams.ChainID == constants.PrimaryNetworkID`) via new `chainValidatesOnPrimaryNetwork`, which is `PrimaryNetworkID` for C/X/Q and each sovereign L1's own net ID for an L2 — so C/X/Q now keep their staked beacons under `--skip-bootstrap` (peer-sync a behind validator) while L2s keep the empty-beacon single-node path. Regression test `TestChainValidatesOnPrimaryNetwork_RealHashChainID` exercises the real discriminator with hash chain IDs (the prior hardcoded-bool tests could not catch this); `TestRED_EmptyStakedSetFailsSafe` still passes (forged-frontier gate intact).
-
-## [1.36.12]
-
-### Fixed
- **EVM chains (C/D/L2) failed to initialize on v1.36.11 — bundled VM plugins were built against a stale `luxfi/api`.** The node pins `luxfi/api v1.0.16`, whose `InitializeResponse` carries the appended `Capabilities uint64` field (Quasar-export handshake, api commit `1f2dc5a`). The image baked the C-Chain EVM plugin from `luxfi/evm@v1.104.8` and the D-Chain dexvm plugin from `luxfi/dex@v1.5.15`, both of which resolve `luxfi/api v1.0.15` (no `Capabilities`). Their `InitializeResponse.Encode` writes a shorter payload than the node's strict `InitializeResponse.Decode` expects, so `vms/rpcchainvm/zap/client.go` fails every EVM VM handshake with `zap decode initialize response: unexpected EOF`. Native VMs (P/X/Q) were unaffected. Fix: bump `EVM_VERSION` `v1.104.8 → v1.104.9` (api v1.0.16) and force `luxfi/api@v1.0.16` in the dexvm build stage. The api bump is code-free for plugins (`luxfi/chains v1.7.4 → v1.7.5` adopted it with a go.mod-only diff; `CHAINS_REF=v1.7.6` already carries v1.0.16). No node source change beyond the version bump — this is v1.36.11's node binary (durable rejoin fix, commit `63f61429d1`) rebuilt with plugin↔node ZAP-wire alignment.
-
 ## [1.28.0]

 ### Added
@@ -124,27 +124,22 @@ RUN --mount=type=secret,id=ghtok,required=false \
 # linked into the C-Chain plugin via github.com/luxfi/chains/evm/cevm
 # and become the default execution backend (parallel + GPU EVM).
 #
-# The release assets live in the PRIVATE lux-private/cevm repo, so the fetch is
-# authenticated with the same `ghtok` secret as the private go modules and
-# lux-accel above. Best-effort, like lux-accel: only a build that asks for the
-# cevm backend (EVM_CGO=1 below) actually needs these.
+# CI/RELEASE GAP: the luxcpp/cevm release artifacts MUST publish per-arch
+# tarballs at the URL below for both linux-x86_64 and linux-arm64. Until
+# those tarballs exist, builds with CGO_ENABLED=1 will fail at this step and
+# operators must build with CGO_ENABLED=0 (pure-Go fallback).
 ARG CGO_ENABLED=1
-ARG CEVM_VERSION=v0.51.10
-ARG CEVM_REPO=lux-private/cevm
-RUN --mount=type=secret,id=ghtok,required=false \
-    if [ "${CGO_ENABLED}" = "1" ]; then \
+ARG CEVM_VERSION=v0.19.0
+RUN if [ "${CGO_ENABLED}" = "1" ]; then \
        ARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
        if [ "$ARCH" = "amd64" ]; then CEVM_ARCH="linux-x86_64"; else CEVM_ARCH="linux-arm64"; fi && \
-        AUTH=""; [ -s /run/secrets/ghtok ] && AUTH="--header=Authorization: Bearer $(cat /run/secrets/ghtok)"; \
-        ( wget -q ${AUTH:+"$AUTH"} \
-            "https://github.com/${CEVM_REPO}/releases/download/${CEVM_VERSION}/luxcpp-cevm-${CEVM_ARCH}.tar.gz" \
-            -O /tmp/cevm.tar.gz \
-          && tar -xzf /tmp/cevm.tar.gz -C /usr/local \
-          && rm /tmp/cevm.tar.gz \
-          && ldconfig 2>/dev/null \
-        ) || echo "WARN: cevm ${CEVM_VERSION} fetch skipped (unreachable; needed only when EVM_CGO=1)" ; \
+        wget -q "https://github.com/luxcpp/cevm/releases/download/${CEVM_VERSION}/luxcpp-cevm-${CEVM_ARCH}.tar.gz" \
+            -O /tmp/cevm.tar.gz && \
+        tar -xzf /tmp/cevm.tar.gz -C /usr/local && \
+        rm /tmp/cevm.tar.gz && \
+        ldconfig 2>/dev/null || true ; \
    else \
-        echo "CGO_ENABLED=0: skipping cevm fetch (pure-Go fallback build)" ; \
+        echo "CGO_ENABLED=0: skipping luxcpp/cevm fetch (pure-Go fallback build)" ; \
    fi

 # Build node. CGO_ENABLED=1 (default) links luxcpp/cevm for parallel + GPU EVM.
@@ -262,35 +257,7 @@ RUN . ./build_env.sh && \
 # failed ValidateState, and BRICKED the node. Proven on-node: real swap → kill -9 →
 # clean reboot, state intact. v1.99.40 = v1.99.39 + deps to latest. consensus v1.25.21 =
 # stake-weighted alpha-of-K quorum finality + per-height single-finalize + epoch-bound certs.
-# v1.104.9 bumps luxfi/api v1.0.15 -> v1.0.16 (indirect via luxfi/vm). v1.0.16
-# APPENDED InitializeResponse.Capabilities (uint64) for the Quasar-export
-# handshake (api commit 1f2dc5a). The node pins api v1.0.16 and DECODES that
-# field; an EVM plugin built at v1.104.8 (api v1.0.15) omits it, so the node's
-# strict struct decode hits "zap decode initialize response: unexpected EOF"
-# and EVERY EVM chain (C + L2s hanzo/zoo/pars/spc, all mgj786) fails to
-# initialize. The api bump is code-free for plugins (chains v1.7.4->v1.7.5
-# adopted it with a go.mod-only diff), so v1.104.9 = v1.104.8 + api alignment.
-# C-Chain execution backend. The default is the pure-Go EVM, which is what
-# every image has shipped so far. EVM_CGO=1 EVM_TAGS=cevm links luxcpp/cevm
-# instead — that pair is what makes AutoEVM resolve to CppEVM. The libraries
-# come from the cevm fetch in this same stage above.
-ARG EVM_CGO=0
-ARG EVM_TAGS=""
-
-# v1.104.22 realigns the plugin with THIS node's own go.mod: api v1.0.16 ->
-# v1.1.1, vm v1.2.6 -> v1.3.1, geth v1.17.12 -> v1.20.1. Node main pins api
-# v1.1.1, so pinning an evm at api v1.0.16 reintroduces the exact
-# InitializeResponse decode mismatch described above, just in the opposite
-# direction — keep this ARG and node's go.mod on the same api/vm/geth line.
-#
-# v1.104.14 is also the FIRST evm tag carrying the C-Chain fee-split seam
-# (core/fee_split.go creditTxFee + extras.FeeSplitTimestamp/FeeRewardVault).
-# Below it, encoding/json silently DISCARDS the genesis "feeSplitTimestamp"
-# key: a chain configured for the 50/50 split instead routes 100% of every fee
-# to the block coinbase and the reward vault 0x0100..0002 stays 0 forever, with
-# nothing burned. The split stays dormant wherever feeSplitTimestamp is absent
-# (mainnet), so this bump is behaviour-preserving there.
-ARG EVM_VERSION=v1.104.22
+ARG EVM_VERSION=v1.99.40
 ARG EVM_VM_ID=mgj786NP7uDwBCcq6YwThhaN8FLyybkCa4zBWTQbNgmK6k9A6
 # the pinned evm go.mod may pin a dead luxfi/upgrade pseudo-version
 # (v1.0.1-0.20260603055252-f51810805436 — commit pruned from origin). Heal it to
@@ -303,22 +270,15 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
    cd /tmp/evm && \
    . /build/build_env.sh && \
    go mod edit -require=github.com/luxfi/upgrade@v1.0.1 && \
-    # evm v1.99.52 = v1.99.51 + the idle-builder bounded-wake backstop
-    # (startPendingTxPoll: a 500ms mempool re-poll so a tx after idle wakes the
-    # builder within a bounded window — closes the lost-wakeup/subscribe-gap;
-    # deterministic, wake-timing only). v1.99.51 = the block-production stall fix
-    # (WaitForEvent builder-ready race + target-rate build pacing — un-freezes the
-    # C-Chain that stalled at the imported frontier) on top of precompile v0.16.0
-    # enable-everything
-    # (wallet curves + standard precompiles enabled; fflonk fail-closed; accel
-    # byte-identity; DEX big.Rat + determinism). Pin chains v1.4.8 (warp
-    # consolidated to one luxfi/warp helper; graphvm genesis-last-accepted fix)
-    # to match the chain-VM plugin stage (CHAINS_REF) below.
-    go mod edit -require=github.com/luxfi/chains@v1.7.0 && \
+    # evm v1.99.40 pins luxfi/chains v1.3.19, whose dexvm/registry was an incomplete
+    # refactor (forbidden.go deleted -> AssertNoForbiddenAssetRefs/looksLikeASCIITickerID/
+    # toHex/fromHex undefined => won't compile). Force v1.3.21 (forbidden.go restored),
+    # matching node's go.mod and the chain-VM plugin stage (CHAINS_REF) below.
+    go mod edit -require=github.com/luxfi/chains@v1.3.21 && \
    find /tmp/evm -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} + && \
    GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) \
-    CGO_ENABLED=${EVM_CGO} GOFLAGS=-mod=mod \
-    go build -ldflags="-s -w" -tags "${EVM_TAGS}" -o /luxd/build/plugins/${EVM_VM_ID} ./plugin && \
+    CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod \
+    go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o /luxd/build/plugins/${EVM_VM_ID} ./plugin && \
    chmod +x /luxd/build/plugins/${EVM_VM_ID} && \
    rm -rf /tmp/evm

@@ -335,16 +295,15 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
 #   oraclevm     -> r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS
 #   quantumvm    -> ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug
 #   relayvm      -> sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz
-#   mpcvm        -> qCURact1n41FcoNBch8iMVBwc9AWie48D118ZNJ5tBdWrvryS
+#   thresholdvm  -> tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t
 #   zkvm         -> vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9

 # MUST track node's go.mod luxfi/chains (the D-Chain dexvm + 10 VM plugins).
+# v1.3.14 = the native-atomic seam (rail-bound D->C atomic, LP committed-liquidity).
 # Bump with every chains release or the bundled VM plugins go stale vs node's deps.
-# v1.4.7 == node go.mod's luxfi/chains pin: warp consolidated to ONE luxfi/warp
-# helper (bridgevm/zkvm/mpcvm), graphvm genesis-last-accepted fix, built on
-# evm v1.99.48 + precompile v0.16.0 (enable-everything builder surface). Keeps the
-# baked VM plugins in lockstep with the host node.
-ARG CHAINS_REF=v1.7.6
+# v1.3.21 == node go.mod's luxfi/chains pin (the finality-complete go-live); keeps the
+# 10 baked VM plugins (incl. the FATAL-gated bridgevm) in lockstep with the host node.
+ARG CHAINS_REF=v1.3.21
 RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
    git clone --depth 1 --branch ${CHAINS_REF} https://github.com/luxfi/chains.git /tmp/chains && \
    find /tmp/chains -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} +
@@ -378,25 +337,13 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
        -o /luxd/build/plugins/ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: quantumvm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( cd /tmp/chains/relayvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
        -o /luxd/build/plugins/sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: relayvm plugin build skipped" ; \
-    ( cd /tmp/chains/mpcvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-        -o /luxd/build/plugins/qCURact1n41FcoNBch8iMVBwc9AWie48D118ZNJ5tBdWrvryS ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: mpcvm plugin build skipped" ; \
+    ( cd /tmp/chains/thresholdvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
+        -o /luxd/build/plugins/tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: thresholdvm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( cd /tmp/chains/zkvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
        -o /luxd/build/plugins/vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: zkvm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( chmod +x /luxd/build/plugins/* 2>/dev/null || true ) && \
-    for p in \
-        juFxSrbCM4wszxddKepj1GWwmrn9YgN1g4n3VUWPpRo9JjERA \
-        kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY \
-        nZQm4Dmg1rjX18rb8maL9gamYyXPf1xCvF7ymWzxp6a1nSQTt \
-        oR6tnZHezwogyf9fRnomNXC9ojwCEBAU6jdUzpgy2PB1tD7fM \
-        pJJCSV7hHYVY6TUZwR8qUPAfuhX8JLb2C1AzNSezrYNbgau8M \
-        r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS \
-        ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug \
-        sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz \
-        qCURact1n41FcoNBch8iMVBwc9AWie48D118ZNJ5tBdWrvryS \
-        vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 ; do \
-        test -s /luxd/build/plugins/$p \
-            || { echo "FATAL: required chain-VM plugin $p missing/empty — its build failed above (see the matching WARN line); the runtime-stage hard COPY would otherwise fail cryptically. Surface & fix the real Go build error, or remove the plugin from BOTH the build list and the runtime COPY."; exit 1; } ; \
-    done && \
+    test -s /luxd/build/plugins/kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY \
+        || { echo "FATAL: bridgevm (B-Chain) plugin missing — the v1.30.16 regression would recur"; exit 1; } && \
    rm -rf /tmp/chains

 # ============= Native D-Chain DEX VM Plugin Stage ================
@@ -412,7 +359,7 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
 # accelerator in pkg/lx is a separate concern gated by its own cuda/metal tags and
 # is NOT linked here. v1.5.10 is the first tag whose cmd/dchain builds CGO=0
 # (drops the phantom dchain+cgo gate); v1.5.11 wires CLOB order ingestion over the
-# node HTTP router (VM.CreateHandlers -> /v1/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/ingest.go)
+# node HTTP router (VM.CreateHandlers -> /ext/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/ingest.go)
 # so an order POSTed to the node flows submitTx -> mempool -> consensus -> Verify
 # (match) -> Accept; v1.5.12 persists the head block so the VM survives a restart
 # once advanced past genesis (GetBlock(lastAccepted) no longer ErrNotFound);
@@ -424,7 +371,7 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
 # DB (every plugin VM via vm/rpc) — that stranded the native D-Chain order book
 # (rebuildBookFromDB folded empty -> 0 fills despite committed asks). v1.5.15 adds
 # the committed-state READ surface (clob_get_trades/orders/markets/book over
-# /v1/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/read.go): read-only JSON of the durable trade
+# /ext/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/read.go): read-only JSON of the durable trade
 # log / resting book / markets, served beside the writes with ZERO consensus
 # impact. Needed to VERIFY a fill replicated identically across validators (query
 # every node, diff the trade rows + head root) and to feed markets-display (native
@@ -435,11 +382,6 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
    git clone --depth 1 --branch ${DEX_REF} https://github.com/luxfi/dex.git /tmp/dex && \
    find /tmp/dex -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} + && \
    cd /tmp/dex && \
-    # Align the dexvm plugin's ZAP wire (luxfi/api) with the node. No dex release
-    # pins api v1.0.16 yet (all <=v1.5.20 carry v1.0.15), so force it here; the
-    # bump is code-free (adds InitializeResponse.Capabilities, capability-gated),
-    # so dexvm emits the field the node decodes -> no "unexpected EOF" on D-Chain.
-    go mod edit -require=github.com/luxfi/api@v1.0.16 && \
    . /build/build_env.sh && \
    GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) \
    CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod \
@@ -502,7 +444,7 @@ COPY --from=builder \
    /luxd/build/plugins/r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS \
    /luxd/build/plugins/ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug \
    /luxd/build/plugins/sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/qCURact1n41FcoNBch8iMVBwc9AWie48D118ZNJ5tBdWrvryS \
+    /luxd/build/plugins/tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t \
    /luxd/build/plugins/vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 \
    /luxd/build/plugins/
 WORKDIR /luxd/build
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+# Lux Mainnet Launch Checklist
+
+Node: luxfi/node v1.24.11
+Consensus: Quasar (BLS+Corona, slashing, stake-weighted sampling)
+EVM: GPU ecrecover, 18 precompiles
+Genesis: networkID=1, startTime=2025-12-12T21:06:51Z (mainnet), networkID=2, startTime=2026-02-10T16:00:00Z (testnet)
+Precompile constraint: all activations MUST be after 2025-12-25
+
+---
+
+## Infrastructure
+
+| Environment | Cluster | DOKS ID | K8s Version | Namespace | Validators |
+|-------------|---------|---------|-------------|-----------|------------|
+| Testnet | do-sfo3-lux-test-k8s | `005ec3c4` | 1.35.1-do.0 | lux-testnet | 11 (target) |
+| Rehearsal | do-sfo3-lux-dev-k8s | `0ff340e1` | 1.35.1-do.0 | lux-devnet | 21 (target) |
+| Mainnet | do-sfo3-lux-k8s | `04c46df5` | 1.34.1-do.4 | lux-mainnet | 21 (target) |
+
+Current state: lux-k8s runs 5 validators (v1.23.31) via LuxNetwork CRD. Testnet cluster (lux-test-k8s) has a 3-replica StatefulSet (v1.23.40).
+
+Image: `ghcr.io/luxfi/node:v1.24.11` (built via CI/CD, linux/amd64+arm64)
+Staking keys: KMS at `kms.lux.network`, project `lux-infra`, synced via KMSSecret CRD
+Secrets: never in manifests, never in env files, never committed
+Genesis configs: `/Users/z/work/lux/genesis/configs/{testnet,mainnet,devnet}/`
+K8s manifests: `/Users/z/work/lux/universe/k8s/`
+Profiles: `standard.json` (~100MB/node), `max.json` (~512MB/node)
+
+Bootstrappers:
+- Mainnet: 5 seeds (ports 9631) -- `209.38.118.46`, `209.38.174.69`, `24.144.69.101`, `134.199.187.56`, `143.198.246.173`
+- Testnet: 2 seeds (ports 9641) -- `134.199.187.16`, `209.38.174.84`
+
+Consensus parameters (mainnet): K=20, AlphaPreference=15, AlphaConfidence=15, Beta=20, ConcurrentPolls=4
+
+Tokenomics: 10B total supply (9 decimals), min validator stake 1M LUX, min delegator stake 25K LUX, combined staking allowed (NFT+delegation), 80% uptime threshold
+
+C-Chain: chainId=96369 (mainnet), 96368 (testnet), gasLimit=12M, targetBlockRate=2s, minBaseFee=25gwei
+
+---
+
+## Phase 1: Testnet (lux-test-k8s, networkID=2)
+
+Target: validate all consensus, EVM, and staking behavior with K=11 validators.
+
+### 1.1 Deployment
+
+- [ ] Update LuxNetwork CRD in `universe/k8s/lux-k8s/validators/statefulset.yaml` (testnet section): `validators: 11`, `image.tag: v1.24.11`
+- [ ] Update lux-test-k8s StatefulSet in `universe/k8s/lux-test-k8s/testnet/statefulset.yaml`: replicas=11, image=v1.24.11
+- [ ] Generate 11 staking key pairs via `lux cli` and store in KMS (`lux-infra/testnet/staking/`)
+- [ ] Add 9 new bootstrapper entries to `genesis/configs/testnet/bootstrappers.json` (currently 2)
+- [ ] Apply `max.json` profile for testnet validators (512MB/node for stress testing headroom)
+- [ ] Regenerate testnet genesis with 11 initial validators via `genesis` tool
+- [ ] Verify all precompile activation timestamps are after 2025-12-25
+- [ ] Deploy via PaaS (platform.hanzo.ai), not manual kubectl
+- [ ] Verify all 11 pods reach Running state
+- [ ] Verify all 11 nodes report healthy via `/ext/health/liveness`
+
+### 1.2 Bootstrap and Connectivity
+
+- [ ] Verify all 11 validators discover each other via P2P (check `info.peers` RPC, expect 10 peers per node)
+- [ ] Verify staking port 9641 reachable between all pods (`luxd-{0..10}.luxd-headless.testnet.svc.cluster.local:9641`)
+- [ ] Verify P-chain bootstraps and all validators appear in `platform.getCurrentValidators`
+- [ ] Verify C-chain bootstraps and produces blocks
+- [ ] Verify X-chain bootstraps and processes UTXO transactions
+
+### 1.3 Quasar Consensus Verification
+
+- [ ] Submit transactions, verify Quasar finalization with K=11
+- [ ] Verify BLS aggregate signatures in block headers
+- [ ] Verify Corona optimistic fast path activates when all 11 validators are online
+- [ ] Measure finality latency (target: sub-second with Corona)
+- [ ] Verify stake-weighted sampling: validators with more stake get polled proportionally
+
+### 1.4 EVM Execution
+
+- [ ] Deploy a test contract, call all standard opcodes
+- [ ] Submit 100 sequential transactions, verify correct nonce ordering
+- [ ] Verify `eth_call` and `eth_estimateGas` return correct results
+- [ ] Verify block gas limit is 12M (from cchain.json config)
+- [ ] Verify minBaseFee=25gwei is enforced
+
+### 1.5 GPU ecrecover
+
+- [ ] Verify GPU backend auto-detection: CUDA on Linux DOKS nodes, Metal on macOS
+- [ ] Run ecrecover-heavy workload (1000 signature verifications per block)
+- [ ] Compare ecrecover throughput: GPU vs CPU fallback
+- [ ] Verify graceful fallback to CPU when GPU unavailable (set `--gpu-backend=cpu`)
+
+### 1.6 Precompiles (all 18)
+
+- [ ] Test each precompile individually via contract calls
+- [ ] Verify DEX precompile (LP-9010 PoolManager): pool creation, swaps, flash loans
+- [ ] Verify DEX router precompile (LP-9012): multi-hop routing
+- [ ] Verify all precompile addresses are deterministic and match spec
+- [ ] Verify precompile gas metering is correct (no underpriced or overpriced ops)
+- [ ] Verify precompiles revert correctly on invalid input
+
+### 1.7 Slashing
+
+- [ ] Craft equivocation evidence: have a validator sign two different blocks at same height
+- [ ] Submit equivocation proof to P-chain slashing precompile
+- [ ] Verify slashed validator's stake is burned
+- [ ] Verify slashed validator is removed from active set
+- [ ] Verify honest validators are unaffected
+
+### 1.8 Uptime and Rewards
+
+- [ ] Stop 1 validator (scale pod to 0)
+- [ ] Wait for reward period to elapse
+- [ ] Verify stopped validator's uptime drops below 80%
+- [ ] Verify rewards are withheld for the stopped validator
+- [ ] Restart the validator, verify it re-bootstraps and resumes
+- [ ] Verify validators with >80% uptime receive expected rewards
+
+### 1.9 Stress Test
+
+- [ ] Run stress test: maximum TPS with 1B gas blocks (increase gas limit temporarily)
+- [ ] Measure sustained TPS over 1 hour (target: verify consensus is the bottleneck, not EVM)
+- [ ] Monitor memory usage per node (should stay within `max.json` profile ~512MB)
+- [ ] Monitor disk I/O and database growth rate
+- [ ] Verify no consensus stalls under load
+- [ ] Verify block production rate stays at targetBlockRate=2s
+
+### 1.10 Validator Join/Leave
+
+- [ ] Add a 12th validator via `platform.addPermissionlessValidator` (permissionless staking)
+- [ ] Verify new validator bootstraps from existing state
+- [ ] Verify new validator begins participating in consensus
+- [ ] Remove a validator via unstaking (wait for stake period to end or use testnet short periods)
+- [ ] Verify removed validator exits gracefully
+- [ ] Verify remaining validators continue producing blocks
+
+### 1.11 Formal Verification
+
+- [ ] Run Lean proofs for Quasar consensus safety and liveness
+- [ ] Run TLA+ model checker for consensus state machine
+- [ ] Run Tamarin prover for BLS+Corona security properties
+- [ ] Run Halmos for EVM precompile correctness (symbolic execution)
+- [ ] All proofs pass with zero counterexamples
+
+---
+
+## Phase 2: Mainnet Rehearsal (lux-dev-k8s, networkID=3)
+
+Target: full mainnet simulation with real parameters for 72 hours.
+
+### 2.1 Deployment
+
+- [ ] Update LuxNetwork CRD (devnet section): `validators: 21`, `image.tag: v1.24.11`
+- [ ] Generate 21 staking key pairs, store in KMS (`lux-infra/devnet/staking/`)
+- [ ] Use mainnet genesis parameters (networkID=3, but same tokenomics, same stake amounts)
+- [ ] Apply `max.json` profile
+- [ ] Deploy via PaaS
+- [ ] Verify all 21 pods healthy
+
+### 2.2 Real Staking Parameters
+
+- [ ] Configure minimum validator stake: 1M LUX
+- [ ] Configure minimum delegator stake: 25K LUX
+- [ ] Configure max delegation ratio: 10x
+- [ ] Configure NFT staking tiers (Genesis 500K/2x, Pioneer 750K/1.5x, Standard 1M/1x)
+- [ ] Verify combined staking logic: NFT value + delegation + staked >= 1M
+- [ ] Verify B-chain validators require 100M LUX + KYC
+
+### 2.3 72-Hour Soak Test
+
+- [ ] Start clock. Record block height and timestamp.
+- [ ] Continuous transaction load: 50 TPS sustained
+- [ ] Monitor: CPU, memory, disk, network per node (Prometheus + Grafana via PaaS)
+- [ ] Monitor: consensus latency p50/p95/p99
+- [ ] Monitor: block production rate (target: 1 block per 2s)
+- [ ] Monitor: peer count stability (all 21 connected)
+- [ ] Monitor: no OOMKills, no pod restarts, no crashloops
+- [ ] At hour 24: rolling restart of 5 validators (verify zero downtime)
+- [ ] At hour 48: simulate network partition (isolate 7 nodes), verify chain halts (< 2/3 online)
+- [ ] Restore partition, verify chain resumes within 30s
+- [ ] At hour 72: record final block height, calculate actual vs expected blocks
+- [ ] Pass criteria: zero consensus faults, zero data loss, <1% block time variance
+
+### 2.4 Security Audit
+
+- [ ] External security audit firm engaged (Red team)
+- [ ] Audit scope: consensus, EVM, precompiles, staking, slashing, P2P networking
+- [ ] Audit result: 0 critical findings, 0 high findings
+- [ ] All medium findings remediated or accepted with documented risk
+- [ ] Audit report signed and archived
+
+### 2.5 Bridge / Teleport (B-Chain + T-Chain)
+
+- [ ] Deploy MPC threshold signing (5 nodes, threshold 3) in `lux-mpc` namespace
+- [ ] Deploy bridge UI and API in `lux-bridge` namespace
+- [ ] Verify CGGMP21 keygen: 5 parties generate shared key
+- [ ] Verify threshold signing: 3-of-5 produces valid signature
+- [ ] Test cross-chain transfer: lock on source chain, mint on Lux
+- [ ] Test reverse: burn on Lux, unlock on source chain
+- [ ] Verify MPC API at `mpc-api.lux.network` responds
+- [ ] Verify bridge handles partial MPC node failure (2 down, 3 still sign)
+
+### 2.6 DEX (D-Chain + Precompiles)
+
+- [ ] Deploy DEX precompile PoolManager (LP-9010) -- already active from genesis
+- [ ] Deploy DEX Router precompile (LP-9012) -- already active from genesis
+- [ ] Deploy off-chain CLOB matching engine
+- [ ] Create liquidity pool via precompile
+- [ ] Execute swap via router precompile
+- [ ] Verify AMM pricing matches expected curve
+- [ ] Verify flash loan execution and repayment
+- [ ] Test CLOB: place limit order, verify fill
+- [ ] Verify DEX on lux.exchange frontend connects to devnet
+
+---
+
+## Phase 3: Mainnet Launch (lux-k8s, networkID=1)
+
+Target: production network with real value.
+
+### 3.1 Pre-launch
+
+- [ ] All Phase 1 items passed
+- [ ] All Phase 2 items passed
+- [ ] Security audit sign-off received
+- [ ] Formal verification suite green
+- [ ] Legal review complete (terms of service, validator agreements)
+- [ ] Incident response runbook written and tested
+
+### 3.2 Genesis Ceremony
+
+- [ ] Final genesis config reviewed: `genesis/configs/mainnet/genesis.json` (networkID=1)
+- [ ] Genesis startTime confirmed: 2025-12-12T21:06:51Z
+- [ ] Initial allocations verified (500M initial + unlock schedule)
+- [ ] All 5 bootstrapper IPs confirmed reachable on port 9631
+- [ ] Genesis hash computed and published to lux.network
+- [ ] Genesis block signed by founding validators
+
+### 3.3 Validator Onboarding
+
+- [ ] Update LuxNetwork CRD (mainnet section): `validators: 21`, `image.tag: v1.24.11`
+- [ ] Scale from 5 current validators to 21
+- [ ] Generate 16 new staking key pairs in KMS (`lux-infra/mainnet/staking/`)
+- [ ] Update bootstrappers.json with all 21 validator endpoints
+- [ ] Deploy via PaaS with rolling update strategy
+- [ ] Verify all 21 validators healthy and in consensus
+- [ ] Publish validator onboarding guide for external operators
+- [ ] Open permissionless staking after initial stabilization period
+
+### 3.4 Public RPC Endpoints
+
+- [ ] Deploy KrakenD API gateway in `lux-gateway` namespace
+- [ ] Configure rate limiting per IP and per API key
+- [ ] Configure Cloudflare DNS (proxied, full SSL):
+  - `api.lux.network` -> gateway (C-chain + P-chain + X-chain RPC)
+  - `ws.lux.network` -> gateway (WebSocket subscriptions)
+- [ ] Verify `eth_chainId` returns `0x17871` (96369)
+- [ ] Verify `net_version` returns `96369`
+- [ ] Verify RPC endpoints handle 10K req/s without degradation
+- [ ] Verify WebSocket subscriptions for `newHeads`, `logs`, `pendingTransactions`
+
+### 3.5 Explorer Deployment
+
+- [ ] Deploy explorer (luxfi/explorer) in `lux-explorer` namespace (already has manifests for 5 chains)
+- [ ] Configure for C-chain (chainId 96369)
+- [ ] Configure indexers for all active chains
+- [ ] Configure Cloudflare DNS: `explore.lux.network`
+- [ ] Verify block display, transaction search, contract verification
+- [ ] Deploy exchange frontend: `lux.exchange`
+
+### 3.6 Bridge Activation
+
+- [ ] Deploy MPC production cluster (5 nodes, threshold 3)
+- [ ] Generate production MPC keys (CGGMP21 keygen ceremony)
+- [ ] Store MPC key shares in KMS (`lux-infra/mainnet/mpc/`)
+- [ ] Deploy bridge contracts on supported chains (ETH, BNB, Polygon, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism)
+- [ ] Deploy bridge UI at bridge domain
+- [ ] Configure Cloudflare DNS
+- [ ] Enable deposits (one chain at a time, small limits first)
+- [ ] Monitor for 24h, then raise limits
+
+### 3.7 Post-Launch Monitoring
+
+- [ ] Prometheus + Grafana dashboards live (via PaaS o11y stack)
+- [ ] Alerts configured:
+  - Validator down (any pod not Ready for >5min)
+  - Consensus stall (no new block for >30s)
+  - Peer count drop (any node <15 peers)
+  - Memory usage >80% of limit
+  - Disk usage >70%
+  - Error rate >1% on RPC endpoints
+- [ ] On-call rotation established
+- [ ] Runbook covers: validator restart, chain halt recovery, emergency upgrade, key rotation
+
+---
+
+## Port Reference
+
+| Network | HTTP | Staking | Metrics |
+|---------|------|---------|---------|
+| Mainnet | 9630 | 9631 | 9090 |
+| Testnet | 9640 | 9641 | 9090 |
+| Devnet | 9650 | 9651 | 9090 |
+
+## Chain IDs
+
+| Chain | Mainnet | Testnet | Devnet |
+|-------|---------|---------|--------|
+| C-Chain | 96369 | 96368 | 96370 |
+| Zoo EVM | 200200 | 200201 | 200202 |
+| Hanzo EVM | 36963 | 36964 | 36964 |
+| SPC EVM | 36911 | 36910 | 36912 |
+| Pars EVM | 494949 | 7071 | 494951 |
+
+## File References
+
+| What | Path |
+|------|------|
+| Node source | `~/work/lux/node/` |
+| Genesis configs | `~/work/lux/genesis/configs/{mainnet,testnet,devnet}/` |
+| Chain configs | `~/work/lux/genesis/configs/chain-configs/` |
+| K8s manifests | `~/work/lux/universe/k8s/` |
+| Validator CRD | `~/work/lux/universe/k8s/lux-k8s/validators/statefulset.yaml` |
+| Testnet StatefulSet | `~/work/lux/universe/k8s/lux-test-k8s/testnet/statefulset.yaml` |
+| Node profiles | `~/work/lux/node/config/profiles/{standard,max}.json` |
+| Tokenomics config | `~/work/lux/node/config/tokenomics.go` |
+| GPU config | `~/work/lux/node/config/gpu.go` |
+| Health/consensus params | `~/work/lux/node/config/health.go` |
+| Network registry | `~/work/lux/universe/NETWORKS.yaml` |
@@ -10,24 +10,3 @@ For the canonical Lux IP and licensing strategy, see:

 For commercial inquiries that go beyond BSD-3 (e.g. private moat
 acceleration kernels), contact `licensing@lux.network`.
-
-## Upstream attribution
-
-See [NOTICE](NOTICE) for the full attribution. In summary:
-
- **avalanchego** (Ava Labs, Inc.) — this repository is derived from
-  [ava-labs/avalanchego](https://github.com/ava-labs/avalanchego), licensed
-  under the **BSD 3-Clause License** (© 2019 Ava Labs, Inc.). BSD-3 is
-  permissive; the Lux additions here are likewise BSD-3-Clause.
- **go-ethereum** (The go-ethereum Authors) — EVM support derives from
-  [go-ethereum](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum). It is **not**
-  vendored in-tree; it is consumed as the external Go module
-  `github.com/luxfi/geth`, which retains go-ethereum's original licenses:
-  the library is **LGPL-3.0-or-later** and the command-line tools are
-  **GPL-3.0**.
-
-**Copyleft flag:** the LGPL-3.0/GPL-3.0 terms of the go-ethereum-derived code
-(via `github.com/luxfi/geth`) are **not** superseded by this repository's
-BSD-3-Clause license. Distributing compiled node binaries must honor LGPL-3.0
-for the linked geth library (published source of that code and its
-modifications at <https://github.com/luxfi/geth>, and user ability to relink).
@@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ selection, and EVM contract auth.
 ### Where to look for X
 - Profile resolve at boot: `node/node.go:initSecurityProfile`
 - Profile RPC + REST + metrics: `service/security/`
-  - JSON-RPC namespace: `security` at `POST /v1/security`
+  - JSON-RPC namespace: `security` at `POST /ext/security`
    (methods `securityProfile`, `blockSecurity`)
-  - REST sidecars: `GET /v1/security/profile`, `GET /v1/security/block/{n}`
-  - Prometheus gauges: `/v1/metrics` under the `security_*` family
+  - REST sidecars: `GET /ext/security/profile`, `GET /ext/security/block/{n}`
+  - Prometheus gauges: `/ext/metrics` under the `security_*` family
 - Peer scheme gate: `network/peer/scheme_gate.go`
 - Classical-compat registry: `vms/txs/auth/policy.go`
 - Mempool gate (P-Chain): `vms/platformvm/mempool/*.go`
@@ -85,29 +85,6 @@ selection, and EVM contract auth.

 ## FeePolicy — canonical user-tx fee gate

-> **Topology + UTXO ownership + cross-chain fee model** are normatively
-> specified by [**LP-0130** (Chain Topology, UTXO Ownership, and Fee
-> Model)](https://github.com/luxfi/lps/blob/main/LPs/lp-0130-chain-topology-utxo-ownership-and-fee-model.md).
-> Read that LP before touching any VM's fee/settlement path or any
-> cross-chain import/export flow. In particular:
->
-> - Only **P** and **X** are canonical UTXO state machines (LP-0130 §2).
-> - **X** is the money rail; **P** is the staking/reward rail; **LUX**
->   is the fee currency everywhere (LP-0130 §3, §5).
-> - **Q-Chain has no user-payable blockspace** — finality is a
->   validator obligation paid via P (LP-0130 §6). `quantumvm` MUST
->   use `NoUserTxPolicy{}` — enforced in chains/quantumvm/feegate.go as of 2026-07-03.
-> - **M-Chain fees are service fees** deducted from the originating
->   chain's fee pool, not a user M-balance (LP-0130 §7). `mpcvm`
->   already runs `NoUserTxPolicy{}` — correct.
-> - **B-Chain fees** are deducted from the bridged amount (LP-0130 §8).
-> - Every non-P/X chain settles worker rewards to X (asset payouts) or
->   P (staker rewards) via epoch fee roots reconciled at Q finality
->   (LP-0130 §4, §11).
-> - **Σ-escrow invariant** (LP-0130 I-8): `Σ non-P/X fee balances ==
->   Σ X-side fee escrow` at every Q checkpoint. Drift is a
->   finality-blocking fault.
-
 Every Lux VM that accepts user-submitted txs declares a `fee.Policy`
 (package `vms/types/fee`). There is one interface and one validator —
 no per-VM bespoke fee structs.
@@ -120,14 +97,14 @@ no per-VM bespoke fee structs.
 | zkvm | Z-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
 | aivm | A-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
 | keyvm | K-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
-| bridgevm | B-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` (deducted from bridged amount, LP-0130 §8) |
-| quantumvm | Q-Chain | **service-only** (LP-0130 §6) | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` — validator obligation, no user-payable blockspace |
+| bridgevm | B-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
+| quantumvm | Q-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
 | identityvm | I-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
-| mpcvm | M-Chain | service-only (LP-0130 §7) | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` — fees pulled from originating chain's fee pool |
+| thresholdvm | M-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
 | oraclevm | O-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
 | relayvm | R-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
 | graphvm | G-Chain | read-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` (GraphQL refuses `mutation`) |
-| evm | C-Chain | user-tx | native EVM gas (gas * gasPrice >= 0 enforced upstream); balance is X-imported LUX (LP-0130 §10) |
+| evm | C-Chain | user-tx | native EVM gas (gas * gasPrice >= 0 enforced upstream) |
 | platformvm | P-Chain | user-tx | native `TxFee` field on Config |
 | avm | X-Chain | user-tx | native `TxFee` field on Config |

@@ -158,101 +135,6 @@ charge less.
 - Relay (R-Chain): `~/work/lux/relay/vm/feegate.go` (re-exported by `~/work/lux/chains/relayvm/`)
 - Graph (G-Chain): `~/work/lux/chains/graphvm/feegate.go` (read-only; NoUserTxPolicy)

-## C-Chain tx-fee routing — RewardManager to DAO Safe (P-Chain: NO CHANGE)
-
-Owner tokenomics pivoted: **100% of C-Chain tx fees accrue to the chain's DAO Gov
-Safe** via the existing `rewardmanager` precompile (C-Chain only). This needs **no
-P-Chain change** — routing is `GetCoinbaseAt` → reward address on the C-Chain. See
-`~/work/lux/evm/LLM.md` → "C-Chain Tx-Fee Routing — RewardManager". The P-Chain
-`feeRewardPool` fold-in below is **NOT built** (design-only, superseded); no
-`vms/platformvm/state` change was made.
-
-<details><summary>Superseded design — 50/50 burn + P-Chain staking-reward fold (dormant option)</summary>
-
-If the DAO ever chooses an in-protocol 50/50 split, the C-Chain half exists (dormant,
-`FeeSplitTimestamp` gated off) and the P-Chain fold-in would be: system-triggered epoch
-export of the C-Chain vault C→P → persisted `feeRewardPool` in `vms/platformvm/state`
-(mirror the `accruedFees` singleton, upgrade-safe) → pro-rata payout at
-`vms/platformvm/txs/executor/proposal_tx_executor.go` `rewardValidatorTx` (~line 285),
-unified into `PotentialReward`, NO second mint → decrement `currentSupply` by the epoch
-burn. Model R1 (move-not-mint), conservation-exact; R2 (burn+re-mint) rejected.
-</details>
-
-## v1.36.12 fleet rollout — durable rejoin fix + RewardManager→DAO Safe (IN PROGRESS 2026-07-15)
-
-Rolling the durable rejoin fix (node `63f61429d1`) across all Lux nets, gated
-devnet→testnet→mainnet, + activating RewardManager fees. Two hard facts were found
-on the devnet canary that change the naive "swap image" plan:
-
-**BLOCKER (fixed in v1.36.12): published `node:v1.36.11` (digest `c3cf92a6`) cannot
-run ANY EVM chain.** Its baked VM plugins were built against a stale `luxfi/api`:
-C-Chain EVM from `luxfi/evm@v1.104.8` and D-Chain dexvm from `luxfi/dex@v1.5.15`
-both resolve `api v1.0.15`; the node pins `api v1.0.16`, which APPENDED
-`InitializeResponse.Capabilities` (Quasar-export handshake, api `1f2dc5a`). Node
-decodes the field, stale plugins never encode it → `vms/rpcchainvm/zap/client.go`
-fails every EVM `Initialize` with `zap decode initialize response: unexpected EOF`.
-Native VMs (P/X/Q) unaffected. **Fix = v1.36.12** (this repo, tag pushed, ARC docker
-build run 29381442539): `EVM_VERSION v1.104.8→v1.104.9`, force `api@v1.0.16` in the
-dexvm build stage; `CHAINS_REF=v1.7.6` was already v1.0.16. Node binary unchanged
-(still the durable fix). api bump is code-free for plugins (`chains v1.7.4→v1.7.5`
-adopted it go.mod-only). **Roll v1.36.12, NOT v1.36.11.** (Also: `api 1f2dc5a` added
-`Capabilities` WITHOUT bumping `version.RPCChainVMProtocol` (42) → skew is invisible
-at handshake, only fails at Initialize decode. Consider bumping the protocol next
-api-wire change so skews fail fast.)
-
-**MIGRATION: v1.36.2→v1.36.x is a P-Chain codec change (linearcodec→ZAP-native),
-one-time DB wipe + re-bootstrap.** v1.36.11/12 cannot read a v1.36.2 P-Chain zapdb
-(`loadMetadata: feeState: zap: invalid magic bytes`; `state_commit.go:116` "database
-must be wiped"). Recovery = wipe `/data/db`+`/data/chainData`, re-bootstrap from
-peers. **Cross-version bootstrap (v1.36.11 node ← v1.36.2 peers) is PROVEN working**
-(devnet luxd-1: P/X re-bootstrapped from the 4 v1.36.2 peers). Devnet startup got a
-marker-gated one-time wipe (`/data/.zap-native-migrated`): absent→wipe+set marker,
-present→NO wipe (the durable-fix no-wipe restart path). mainnet/testnet/zoo use
-`startup.sh` which already has `.wipe-cchain` (C-Chain only) + `.allow-bootstrap`
-(flips skip-bootstrap=false + EVM state-sync); for the codec migration the P-Chain
-zapdb (`/data/db`) must also be cleared. **Mainnet C-Chain is 1.08M blocks → MUST
-enable EVM state-sync for the re-sync (full replay is too slow); native VMs are tiny.**
-
-**Durable fix (`63f61429d1`):** discriminator for keeping the staked beacon set is
-SYBIL-PROTECTION, not `--skip-bootstrap`. So a behind validator on a sybil-protected
-net catches up from peers even with `--skip-bootstrap=true` (which prod hardcodes),
-no wipe. Devnet added `--skip-bootstrap=true` to the inline cmd to exercise this.
-
-**RewardManager (C-Chain precompile, per-net `cchain-upgrade.json` → append one
-`precompileUpgrades` entry, dated `blockTimestamp`):** proven testnet shape is
-`{"rewardManagerConfig":{"blockTimestamp":<ts>,"adminAddresses":["<admin>"],
-"initialRewardConfig":{"rewardAddress":"<reward>"}}}`. Reward addr = coinbase; 100%
-fees land there, blackhole `0x0100…00` goes flat. Addresses: **testnet ALREADY LIVE**
-(reward `0xEAbCC110fAcBfebabC66Ad6f9E7B67288e720B59`, admin `0x9011…94714`); **mainnet**
-reward+admin = DAO Gov Safe `0x8E29b816c6C35b13cE1ff68D33E245C2bda8ac3D`; **zoo**
-reward `0x229599f227231d8C90fcF1a78589F5DC4b7A6962`; **devnet** reward
-`0x8d5081153aE1cfb41f5c932fe0b6Beb7E159cF84` (idx2), admin `0x9011…94714` (idx0).
-Source ConfigMaps: devnet `luxd-chain-upgrades/cchain-upgrade.json`; mainnet+testnet
-`luxd-startup/cchain-upgrade.json`; zoo `zood-mv-genesis/upgrade.json` (`--upgrade-file`).
-
-**Rollout levers (lux-operator is scaled 0/0 — sts/cm are the live source of truth;
-CRs are STALE, do not scale operator up mid-roll):** ports devnet 9650 / testnet 9640
-/ mainnet 9630 / zoo 9630; RPC path `/v1/bc/C/rpc`; container `luxd` (`zood` on zoo).
-Devnet uses an inline generated cmd; testnet/mainnet/zoo use `/scripts/startup.sh`.
-**Zoo `zood-mv` trap: RollingUpdate + hardcoded `--skip-bootstrap=true` with NO
-`.allow-bootstrap` gate → switch to OnDelete BEFORE rolling.** Lux sts are OnDelete.
-Master funded key = LUX_MNEMONIC (secret `lux-deployer`) idx0 `0x9011…94714`;
-`genesis/cmd/derivekey -mnemonic "$M"` (path m/44'/9000'/0'/0/i, `CGO_ENABLED=0`).
-
-**Per-node roll protocol (ALL nets, one at a time, NEVER 2 mainnet down — quorum
-4/5):** set sts image v1.36.12 (+ rewardManager cm edit) → delete ONE pod → WAIT
-until it is back at **TIP HEIGHT matching the others** (NOT pod-Ready; a wedged node
-false-reports Ready) AND C-Chain serves RPC → only then the next. If any node fails
-to return to tip, STOP that net and report.
-
-**State at pause:** v1.36.12 tag pushed + ARC build dispatched (run 29381442539).
-Devnet sts = v1.36.11 + skip-bootstrap + wipe-marker; luxd-1 migrated (P/X up on
-v1.36.11, C-Chain down = the plugin bug → will heal on v1.36.12); luxd-0/2/3/4 still
-v1.36.2 healthy (devnet C-Chain 4/5). Nothing rolled on testnet/mainnet/zoo. NEXT:
-when v1.36.12 image is ready → set devnet sts image v1.36.12, delete luxd-1, confirm
-C-Chain inits + reaches tip; then finish devnet (durable-fix proof + RewardManager),
-then gated testnet→mainnet→zoo.
-
 ## Essential Commands

 ### Release & build (canonical) — via platform.hanzo.ai, NOT GitHub Actions
@@ -348,7 +230,7 @@ Located in `/vms/`:
 - **platformvm**: Staking, validation, network management
 - **xvm**: Asset transfers, UTXO model
 - **dexvm**: DEX with order book, perpetuals, AMM
- **mpcvm**: Threshold MPC and FHE for confidential computing
+- **thresholdvm**: Threshold MPC and FHE for confidential computing
 - **quantumvm**: PQ consensus coordination (ML-DSA, Corona)
 - **identityvm**: Decentralized identity (DID, verifiable credentials)
 - **keyvm**: Post-quantum key management (ML-KEM, ML-DSA)
@@ -438,11 +320,11 @@ github.com/luxfi/genesis (JSON config)  →  github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/build
 ### CGO Dependencies
 These require CGO for full functionality (graceful fallback when disabled):
 - `consensus/quasar` - GPU NTT acceleration
- `vms/mpcvm/fhe` - GPU FHE operations
+- `vms/thresholdvm/fhe` - GPU FHE operations
 - `x/blockdb` - zstd compression

 ### FHE (Fully Homomorphic Encryption)
-Located in `vms/mpcvm/fhe/`:
+Located in `vms/thresholdvm/fhe/`:
 - Uses `github.com/luxfi/lattice/multiparty` for DKG
 - Lattice-based cryptography only (no fallbacks)
 - Threshold decryption via Warp messaging
@@ -757,7 +639,7 @@ strings.Contains(errStr, "not found") // parent block not in local state
 ### Known CGO Stubs
 When CGO disabled, these use CPU fallbacks:
 - `consensus/quasar/gpu_ntt_nocgo.go`
- `vms/mpcvm/fhe/gpu_fhe_nocgo.go`
+- `vms/thresholdvm/fhe/gpu_fhe_nocgo.go`
 - `vms/zkvm/accel/accel_mlx.go`

 ### 8. ZAP CreateHandlers for VM HTTP Endpoints
@@ -777,7 +659,7 @@ When CGO disabled, these use CPU fallbacks:
 ```bash
 curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"eth_chainId","params":[],"id":1}' \
-  http://localhost:9640/v1/bc/C/rpc
+  http://localhost:9640/ext/bc/C/rpc
 # Returns: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":"0x17870"}
 ```

@@ -786,7 +668,7 @@ curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

 **Behavior**:
 - **GET /**: Returns JSON node information (nodeId, networkId, version, chains, endpoints)
- **POST /**: Proxies JSON-RPC requests directly to C-chain `/v1/bc/C/rpc`
+- **POST /**: Proxies JSON-RPC requests directly to C-chain `/ext/bc/C/rpc`
 - **OPTIONS /**: Returns CORS preflight headers

 **Files Modified**: `server/http/router.go`, `server/http/server.go`
@@ -853,7 +735,7 @@ if s.validators.NumNets() != 0 {

 **Verification**:
 ```bash
-curl -s http://localhost:9650/v1/health | jq '.checks.bls'
+curl -s http://localhost:9650/ext/health | jq '.checks.bls'
 # Should show: "message": "node has the correct BLS key"
 ```

@@ -887,7 +769,7 @@ Testing conducted on a single Lux validator node (testnet mode, macOS):
 **Benchmark Command:**
 ```bash
 cd ~/work/lux/benchmarks
-NODE_ENDPOINT="http://localhost:9640/v1/bc/C/rpc" \
+NODE_ENDPOINT="http://localhost:9640/ext/bc/C/rpc" \
 PRIVATE_KEY="<funded_key>" \
 ./bin/bench tps --chains=lux --duration=60s --concurrency=5
 ```
@@ -935,14 +817,4 @@ v2 semantic differences worth knowing (these change wire shape):

 ---

-## Housekeeping
-
-Removed 6 generated write-ups / stale root artifacts (`LAUNCH_CHECKLIST.md`,
-`rename_app.sh`, `replace_imports.sh`, `gen_zoo_addr` binary, `.ci-status-check.md`,
-`.ci-trigger`) plus the 73MB `.claude/worktrees/` agent scratch tree. Release and
-launch state live in this file, `CHANGELOG.md`, `RELEASE.md`; chain IDs/ports in
-`~/work/lux/universe/NETWORKS.yaml` and `~/work/lux/genesis/configs/`.
-
---
-
 *Last Updated*: 2026-06-06
@@ -7,15 +7,8 @@ CGO_ENABLED ?= 1
 FIPS_STRICT ?= 0

 # Go 1.26 experimental features:
-#   runtimesecret - zeroes stack/register state after secret.Do() for forward secrecy.
-# It SIGSEGVs at startup under the WSL2 kernel (confirmed on go1.26.3 and go1.26.4), so enable
-# it only off-WSL; forward secrecy stays on for real Linux/macOS/production builds.
-WSL := $(shell grep -qiE 'microsoft|WSL' /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease 2>/dev/null && echo 1)
-ifeq ($(WSL),1)
-GOEXPERIMENT ?= none
-else
+#   runtimesecret - zeroes stack/register state after secret.Do() for forward secrecy
 GOEXPERIMENT ?= runtimesecret
-endif
 export GOEXPERIMENT

 # FIPS 140-3 always enabled (required for blockchain/financial systems)
@@ -219,7 +212,7 @@ run-testnet: build-fips init-chains
 node-status:
 	@echo "$(GREEN)Checking node status...$(NC)"
 	@curl -s -X POST --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"info.isBootstrapped","params":{}}' \
-		-H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info | jq
+		-H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info | jq

 stop-node:
 	@echo "$(YELLOW)Stopping Lux node...$(NC)"
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-Lux Node
-Copyright (c) 2019-2025 Lux Industries Inc.
-
-This product includes software from avalanchego by Ava Labs, Inc.
-(https://github.com/ava-labs/avalanchego), licensed under the BSD 3-Clause
-License:
-
-    Copyright (C) 2019, Ava Labs, Inc.
-
-Lux Node is derived from avalanchego. The Lux additions and modifications in
-this repository are licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License (see the LICENSE
-file). The BSD 3-Clause terms of the upstream avalanchego code are retained;
-this NOTICE preserves the required Ava Labs copyright attribution at the
-repository level.
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-Ethereum Virtual Machine support is derived from go-ethereum by The
-go-ethereum Authors (https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum). In this
-repository that code is NOT vendored in-tree; it is consumed as an external
-Go module through the Lux fork github.com/luxfi/geth, which retains
-go-ethereum's original licenses:
-
-  * The go-ethereum library packages are licensed under the GNU Lesser
-    General Public License, version 3 (LGPL-3.0-or-later).
-  * The go-ethereum command-line tools are licensed under the GNU General
-    Public License, version 3 (GPL-3.0).
-
-    Copyright (C) The go-ethereum Authors
-
-COPYLEFT NOTICE: The LGPL-3.0/GPL-3.0 terms continue to apply to the
-go-ethereum-derived portions provided via github.com/luxfi/geth, and are NOT
-superseded by the BSD 3-Clause license of this repository. Distribution of
-compiled Lux Node binaries must honor LGPL-3.0 for the linked go-ethereum
-library code (source availability for that code and its modifications, and
-the ability for users to relink against a modified library). The luxfi/geth
-source, including Lux modifications, is published at
-https://github.com/luxfi/geth.
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-<p align="center"><img src=".github/hero.svg" alt="node" width="880"></p>
-
 <div align="center">
  <img src="resources/LuxLogoRed.png?raw=true">
 </div>
@@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@ This version is backwards compatible to [v1.9.0](https://github.com/luxfi/node/r
 - Fixed `x/merkledb.ChangeProof#getLargestKey` to correctly handle no changes
 - Added test for `xvm/txs/executor.SemanticVerifier#verifyFxUsage` with multiple valid fxs
 - Fixed CPU + bandwidth performance regression during vertex processing
- Added example usage of the `/v1/index/X/block` API
+- Added example usage of the `/ext/index/X/block` API
 - Reduced the default value of `--consensus-optimal-processing` from `50` to `10`
 - Updated the year in the license header

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ Production implementations live in `lux/crypto/` and `lux/lattice/`. Formal veri
 | `audits/2025-12-30-other-vms-audit.md` | Secondary VMs |
 | `audits/2025-12-30-platformvm-audit.md` | PlatformVM (P-Chain) |
 | `audits/2025-12-30-proposervm-evm-audit.md` | ProposerVM and EVM integration |
-| `audits/2025-12-30-mpcvm-audit.md` | ThresholdVM (T-Chain) |
+| `audits/2025-12-30-thresholdvm-audit.md` | ThresholdVM (T-Chain) |
 | `audits/2025-12-30-warp-audit.md` | Warp cross-chain messaging |
 | `audits/2025-12-30-zkvm-audit.md` | ZKVM (Z-Chain) |

@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ tasks:
      - task: generate-mocks
      - task: check-clean-branch

+  check-generate-protobuf:
+    desc: Checks that generated protobuf is up-to-date (requires a clean git working tree)
+    cmds:
+      - task: generate-protobuf
+      - task: check-clean-branch
+
  check-go-mod-tidy:
    desc: Checks that go.mod and go.sum are up-to-date (requires a clean git working tree)
    cmds:
@@ -95,6 +101,10 @@ tasks:
      - cmd: grep -lr -E '^// Code generated - DO NOT EDIT\.$' tests/load/c | xargs -r rm
      - cmd: go generate ./tests/load/c/...

+  generate-protobuf:
+    desc: Generates protobuf
+    cmd: ./scripts/protobuf_codegen.sh
+
  ginkgo-build:
    desc: Runs ginkgo against the current working directory
    cmd: ./bin/ginkgo build {{.USER_WORKING_DIR}}
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	version "github.com/luxfi/version"
-	"github.com/luxfi/vm/chain"
-)
-
-// recordingConnector is a chain.ChainVM that records the version it is handed on
-// Connected. Every other method comes from the embedded (nil) interface and is
-// never invoked by the connect path.
-type recordingConnector struct {
-	chain.ChainVM
-
-	mu         sync.Mutex
-	called     bool
-	gotVersion *version.Application
-}
-
-func (c *recordingConnector) Connected(_ context.Context, _ ids.NodeID, nodeVersion *chain.VersionInfo) error {
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	defer c.mu.Unlock()
-	c.called = true
-	c.gotVersion = nodeVersion
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (c *recordingConnector) Disconnected(context.Context, ids.NodeID) error { return nil }
-
-// TestBlockHandlerConnectedWithVersionDeliversRealVersion is the regression
-// guard for RED CRITICAL #1 (C-Chain nil-version panic).
-//
-// Before the fix blockHandler.Connected forwarded connector.Connected(ctx,
-// nodeID, nil) — a hardcoded nil version. proposervm promotes Connected to the
-// inner C-Chain VM (coreth), whose state-sync peer tracker compares peer
-// versions; a nil version there dereferences nil (version.Application.Compare)
-// and PANICS a state-syncing node (a fresh join, or a validator rejoining after
-// falling behind — the launch's core invariant).
-//
-// The fix plumbs the REAL peer version through ConnectedWithVersion to the
-// connector. This test drives the real blockHandler with a real version and
-// asserts the connector receives that non-nil version — never nil.
-func TestBlockHandlerConnectedWithVersionDeliversRealVersion(t *testing.T) {
-	require := require.New(t)
-
-	rc := &recordingConnector{}
-	bh := newBlockHandler(
-		nil,          // BlockBuilder — unused by the connect path
-		rc,           // connector under test
-		log.Noop(),   // logger
-		nil,          // engine
-		nil,          // net
-		nil,          // msgCreator
-		ids.Empty,    // chainID
-		ids.Empty,    // networkID
-		nil,          // beacons
-		ids.NodeID{}, // selfNodeID
-		false,        // expectsStakedBeacons
-	)
-
-	nodeID := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	peerVersion := &version.Application{Name: "lux", Major: 1, Minor: 36, Patch: 27}
-
-	require.NoError(bh.ConnectedWithVersion(context.Background(), nodeID, peerVersion))
-
-	rc.mu.Lock()
-	defer rc.mu.Unlock()
-	require.True(rc.called, "connector.Connected must be invoked")
-	require.NotNil(rc.gotVersion, "connector must receive a NON-nil version (coreth dereferences it in state-sync)")
-	require.Equal("lux", rc.gotVersion.Name)
-	require.Equal(1, rc.gotVersion.Major)
-	require.Equal(36, rc.gotVersion.Minor)
-	require.Equal(27, rc.gotVersion.Patch)
-}
-
-// TestBlockHandlerConnectedDedupsButStillCarriesVersion confirms the version
-// survives the once-only dedup: the first (versioned) dispatch reaches the
-// connector; a duplicate is a no-op (not a nil-version overwrite).
-func TestBlockHandlerConnectedDedupsButStillCarriesVersion(t *testing.T) {
-	require := require.New(t)
-
-	rc := &recordingConnector{}
-	bh := newBlockHandler(nil, rc, log.Noop(), nil, nil, nil, ids.Empty, ids.Empty, nil, ids.NodeID{}, false)
-
-	nodeID := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	peerVersion := &version.Application{Name: "lux", Major: 1, Minor: 36, Patch: 27}
-
-	require.NoError(bh.ConnectedWithVersion(context.Background(), nodeID, peerVersion))
-	// A duplicate connect (e.g. dispatched again per tracked network) must be a
-	// no-op — never a second call that could clobber the stored version with nil.
-	require.NoError(bh.ConnectedWithVersion(context.Background(), nodeID, nil))
-
-	rc.mu.Lock()
-	defer rc.mu.Unlock()
-	require.NotNil(rc.gotVersion, "the deduped duplicate must not overwrite the real version with nil")
-	require.Equal(27, rc.gotVersion.Patch)
-}
@@ -1,584 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// bootstrap_trust.go — the SEPARATE trust object for INITIAL SYNC, decomplected from
-// consensus finality.
-//
-// The mass-recovery DEADLOCK this fixes: the prior FrontierTip required a ⅔-by-stake quorum
-// of the CURRENT total validator set to be CONNECTED before it would name a sync frontier.
-// When the recovery TARGETS are themselves validators (a node that crashed IS one of the 5),
-// taking them down drops connected stake below ⅔ of the whole set — so on a network of 5
-// equal-weight validators, losing 2 leaves 3 (60% < ⅔) and NO node can ever name a frontier
-// to recover from. Bootstrap trust was braided into consensus finality, and finality's ⅔ rule
-// is mathematically unsatisfiable during a mass outage.
-//
-// The fix is a type split, NOT a renamed threshold. FinalityQuorum decides FINALITY
-// (> ⅔ of CURRENT stake — UNCHANGED). BootstrapTrust decides whether a fetched frontier is
-// SAFE TO BEGIN SYNC FROM: a quorum of AUTHENTICATED CONFIGURED beacons that RESPOND, gated by
-// a response FLOOR (MinResponses) and an agreement threshold over the RESPONDERS (not over the
-// whole set). 3 of 5 reachable beacons all agreeing is a valid sync anchor even though 3 of 5
-// stake is not a finalizing supermajority. The two decisions have different threat models and
-// are different objects.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"math"
-	"math/bits"
-	"sort"
-	"time"
-
-	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-)
-
-// BootstrapTrust is not a consensus-finality oracle.
-// It selects a weak-subjective sync frontier from authenticated configured beacons.
-// Live block acceptance remains governed exclusively by FinalityQuorum.
-type BootstrapTrust interface {
-	// AcceptsFrontier returns the block an empty/behind node may BEGIN SYNCING FROM, selected
-	// from the authenticated configured beacons' frontier replies — or an error
-	// (ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses / ErrNoBootstrapQuorum) when no trusted frontier can be
-	// named this round. The returned Frontier is a sync ANCHOR, never a consensus certificate
-	// (see the type comment): the node must still re-execute every block it descends to before
-	// re-entering live consensus, where FinalityQuorum alone governs acceptance.
-	AcceptsFrontier(ctx context.Context, replies []BeaconReply) (*Frontier, error)
-}
-
-// FinalityQuorum decides FINALITY: whether a weight is a finalizing supermajority (> ⅔) of the
-// CURRENT validator set. This is the live-consensus rule; bootstrap does NOT change it. It is a
-// SEPARATE named type from BootstrapTrust precisely so the distinction is explicit and testable:
-// a frontier that AcceptsFrontier admits is "safe to sync from", and in general it does NOT
-// satisfy HasFinality (3 of 5 responders is a valid sync anchor; 3 of 5 stake is not finality).
-type FinalityQuorum interface {
-	HasFinality(weight, total StakeWeight) bool
-}
-
-// StakeWeight is validator stake in the units the validator manager reports (Weight/Light).
-type StakeWeight = uint64
-
-// twoThirdsFinality is the production FinalityQuorum: > ⅔ of the CURRENT total stake, exactly
-// the rule the live cert-gate uses (consensusconfig.TwoThirdsStakeFloor). Defined here only to
-// give the live rule a name to CONTRAST bootstrap trust against — it is not wired into the live
-// path (that already enforces ⅔ inside consensus), and bootstrap never calls it to ACCEPT.
-type twoThirdsFinality struct{}
-
-func (twoThirdsFinality) HasFinality(weight, total StakeWeight) bool {
-	return weight > consensusconfig.TwoThirdsStakeFloor(total)
-}
-
-// DefaultFinalityQuorum returns the live ⅔-of-current-stake finality rule — the thing bootstrap
-// trust is explicitly NOT. Used by the test suite to prove a bootstrap-accepted frontier does
-// not constitute finality.
-func DefaultFinalityQuorum() FinalityQuorum { return twoThirdsFinality{} }
-
-var (
-	// ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses: fewer than MinResponses configured beacons answered.
-	// Not a partition-capture-safe quorum — the node must keep waiting for more beacons (or use
-	// an operator checkpoint), never sync from the captured few. INVARIANT 2's response floor.
-	ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses = errors.New("bootstrap: insufficient configured-beacon responses")
-	// ErrNoBootstrapQuorum: enough beacons responded, but no block clears the agreement threshold
-	// over the responders (a genuine partition, or a transient bleeding-edge split the loop retries).
-	ErrNoBootstrapQuorum = errors.New("bootstrap: no responder-agreed frontier")
-)
-
-// BeaconReply is one authenticated configured beacon's report of its accepted frontier tip
-// during initial sync. NodeID is authenticated at the transport handshake (a peer cannot forge
-// another's identity); Weight is the beacon's CONFIGURED stake from the trust anchor — NOT a
-// self-reported value. A reply whose NodeID is not in the policy's TrustedBeacons is ignored.
-type BeaconReply struct {
-	NodeID ids.NodeID
-	Tip    ids.ID
-	Weight StakeWeight
-}
-
-// Frontier is the weak-subjective sync anchor BootstrapTrust selects: the block a node descends
-// to and re-executes. It is NOT a consensus certificate (see BootstrapTrust). Height is the
-// tallied height when named via the ancestor-tolerant path, and 0 (unknown) when named via the
-// exact fast path before any ancestry fetch — the sync loop uses ID; Height is diagnostic.
-type Frontier struct {
-	ID             ids.ID
-	Height         uint64
-	Weight         StakeWeight // responder stake whose accepted chain contains this block
-	Responders     int         // distinct configured beacons that backed it
-	FromCheckpoint bool        // selected from an operator checkpoint (too few beacons responded)
-}
-
-// BlockRef is a parsed block's CONTENT-ADDRESSED identity (id, height, parent) — the only thing
-// the ancestor-tolerant tally needs. Decouples the policy from the VM/block types.
-type BlockRef struct {
-	ID     ids.ID
-	Height uint64
-	Parent ids.ID
-}
-
-// AncestrySource resolves a tip's CONTENT-ADDRESSED ancestry for the ancestor-tolerant tally —
-// the SAME parent-linked descent the sync loop trusts. Injected so the trust DECISION (which
-// beacons count, the response floor, the agreement threshold) stays separate from the transport.
-type AncestrySource interface {
-	// Ancestry returns up to max blocks ending at tip, parsed to (id, height, parent). An empty
-	// result (no error) means the tip's ancestry was not served — that anchor contributes nothing.
-	Ancestry(ctx context.Context, tip ids.ID, max int) ([]BlockRef, error)
-}
-
-// Checkpoint is an operator-pinned (id, height) the recovering node may anchor to when too few
-// beacons respond to form a quorum — the EXPLICIT override for INVARIANT 2's "1 of N reachable"
-// case. Absent (nil) ⇒ the default policy REJECTS rather than trusting a captured minority.
-//
-// INVARIANT 4 (a checkpoint is a SIGNED weak-subjectivity anchor, not a bare config value): the
-// checkpoint carries a cryptographic Signature by the configured checkpoint AUTHORITY over its
-// (id, height), and AcceptsFrontier trusts it ONLY when CheckpointVerifier authenticates that
-// signature. A (id,height) present in a flag/config but UNSIGNED — or signed by a non-authority key
-// — is REJECTED (fail closed). This is the crucial hardening: the checkpoint is the one path that
-// bypasses the beacon quorum, so a compromised flag must NOT be able to inject a false sync anchor
-// without ALSO forging the authority's signature. It is a cryptographic vouch, NEVER a ⅔-live-stake
-// tally (that conflation is the very deadlock BootstrapTrust exists to avoid).
-type Checkpoint struct {
-	ID     ids.ID
-	Height uint64
-	// Signature is the checkpoint authority's signature over this checkpoint's canonical (id,height)
-	// bytes. Verified by CheckpointVerifier before the anchor is trusted; an empty signature is
-	// never accepted.
-	Signature []byte
-}
-
-// CheckpointVerifier authenticates a Checkpoint's Signature against the configured checkpoint
-// AUTHORITY key(s). The node injects a real implementation backed by a PROVEN primitive (Ed25519 /
-// BLS — never custom crypto); the policy stays free of any crypto dependency, exactly like
-// AncestrySource and heightOf. A nil verifier means no signed anchor is configured, so any
-// Checkpoint is untrusted and the below-floor case fails closed.
-type CheckpointVerifier interface {
-	// VerifyCheckpoint reports whether sig is a valid signature over (id, height) by the configured
-	// checkpoint authority. It MUST reject an empty signature and be signature-safe (constant-time
-	// compare on the primitive). It is the sole authority on whether a pinned anchor may be trusted.
-	VerifyCheckpoint(id ids.ID, height uint64, sig []byte) bool
-}
-
-// CanonicalCheckpointMessage is the exact byte string a checkpoint authority signs and
-// CheckpointVerifier authenticates: a domain-separated, fixed-layout encoding of (id, height) so a
-// signature can never be transplanted from another context. 8-byte big-endian height after the
-// 32-byte id, under a distinct domain tag.
-func CanonicalCheckpointMessage(id ids.ID, height uint64) []byte {
-	const domain = "lux-bootstrap-checkpoint-v1\x00"
-	msg := make([]byte, 0, len(domain)+len(id)+8)
-	msg = append(msg, domain...)
-	msg = append(msg, id[:]...)
-	var h [8]byte
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(h[:], height)
-	return append(msg, h[:]...)
-}
-
-// Ratio is an exact rational threshold (e.g. 2/3, 3/4). A value clears it iff
-// value > floorOf(whole) — strictly greater, matching the consensus ⅔ floor's semantics.
-type Ratio struct{ Num, Den uint64 }
-
-// floorOf returns ⌊whole · Num / Den⌋ without floating point, overflow-safe for the sub-unity
-// thresholds used here. Ratio{2,3}.floorOf(w) == consensusconfig.TwoThirdsStakeFloor(w) exactly,
-// so the responder-⅔ agreement reuses the same strict-greater floor the live rule uses.
-func (r Ratio) floorOf(whole uint64) uint64 {
-	if r.Den == 0 {
-		return whole // degenerate guard; constructors always set a real ratio
-	}
-	hi, lo := bits.Mul64(whole, r.Num)
-	if hi >= r.Den {
-		return math.MaxUint64 // Num ≥ Den: not a sub-unity threshold — nothing can exceed it
-	}
-	q, _ := bits.Div64(hi, lo, r.Den)
-	return q
-}
-
-// BootstrapPolicy is the default BootstrapTrust: a CONFIGURED-BEACON quorum with a response
-// FLOOR and an agreement threshold over the RESPONDERS — a SEPARATE object from FinalityQuorum
-// with a SEPARATE threat model. It does NOT pass "reachable stake" into the ⅔-of-current-stake
-// finality rule (that conflation IS the mass-recovery deadlock). It reuses the ancestor-tolerant
-// common-ancestor tally only for HOW to find the agreed frontier; the ACCEPTANCE gate is the
-// response floor + responder agreement here.
-//
-// The three invariants:
-//   - INVARIANT 1 (non-circular beacon eligibility): only NodeIDs in TrustedBeacons count, and
-//     TrustedBeacons comes from the configured/checkpointed/genesis anchor — NEVER peer
-//     self-report. A recovering node never lets arbitrary peers define who is a beacon.
-//   - INVARIANT 2 (a floor prevents partition-capture): MinResponses authenticated beacons must
-//     respond before any frontier is named; an attacker who partitions the node down to a few
-//     beacons cannot capture the frontier. Below the floor, REJECT (or use Checkpoint).
-//   - INVARIANT 3 (acceptance ≠ finality): the named Frontier is "safe to begin sync from", not
-//     finalized. The node independently re-executes the descent before re-entering consensus.
-type BootstrapPolicy struct {
-	// TrustedBeacons is the trust anchor: configured-beacon NodeID → configured stake (INVARIANT
-	// 1). Resolved from --bootstrap-nodes / a finalized P-chain checkpoint / the genesis set —
-	// never from peer self-report.
-	TrustedBeacons map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight
-	// AgreementThreshold is the fraction of the RESPONDER weight a named block must exceed
-	// (default 2/3). Over RESPONDERS, not the whole set — that is what permits mass recovery.
-	AgreementThreshold Ratio
-	// MinResponses is the FLOOR on distinct configured-beacon responders (INVARIANT 2). Default:
-	// a MAJORITY of the configured set (the largest floor that still lets a node recover when a
-	// minority of validators is down). Capped at the set size.
-	MinResponses int
-	// MinResponseWeight is an OPTIONAL floor on the total responder weight (0 ⇒ disabled).
-	MinResponseWeight StakeWeight
-	// MinResponders is the minimum DISTINCT beacons that must back a NAMED block (default 2), so a
-	// single beacon cannot alone name the frontier. Capped at the responder count.
-	MinResponders int
-	// MinFrontierHeight is the node's current last-accepted height. The ANCESTOR-TOLERANT path
-	// names only a block STRICTLY ABOVE it — a frontier genuinely AHEAD. A common ancestor BELOW it
-	// is history the node has (a partition above, not a frontier ahead). A block AT exactly this
-	// height is ALSO not named here (the M1 eclipse-stale fix): an eclipse can throttle the honest
-	// ahead-tips below the ⅔ naming threshold while the node's OWN height accrues ⅔ as their shared
-	// ANCESTOR — naming it would go Ready stale. Excluding own height routes that case to CaughtUp,
-	// which distinguishes a legit all-at-N fleet from an eclipse with ahead-tips the node lacks. So
-	// nothing at or below own height is named (→ ErrNoBootstrapQuorum, fail safe), never a
-	// false-complete at the stale height. The exact fast path is exempt: a tip a responder
-	// supermajority ACTIVELY reports is a real frontier even at own height (a genuinely fresh
-	// network, or a fleet unanimously AT the tip).
-	MinFrontierHeight uint64
-	// Checkpoint is the OPTIONAL operator override for the below-floor case (INVARIANT 2). nil ⇒
-	// reject below the floor. When set, it is trusted ONLY if CheckpointVerifier authenticates its
-	// signature (INVARIANT 4).
-	Checkpoint *Checkpoint
-	// CheckpointVerifier authenticates the Checkpoint's authority signature (INVARIANT 4). nil ⇒ a
-	// configured Checkpoint is NOT trusted (fail closed) — a bare (id,height) is never enough.
-	CheckpointVerifier CheckpointVerifier
-	// NamingWindow bounds the ancestry fetched per anchor; MaxAnchors bounds how many distinct
-	// reported tips are resolved. Both default to the package constants when zero.
-	NamingWindow int
-	MaxAnchors   int
-	// NamingTimeout TOTAL-bounds the ancestor-tolerant resolution (all anchor fetches combined) so
-	// a partition that ANSWERS the frontier query but WITHHOLDS ancestry cannot make the decision
-	// hang — it returns what it found (or nothing → ErrNoBootstrapQuorum) and the caller's bounded
-	// retry tries a fresh sample next round. Zero ⇒ the package default.
-	NamingTimeout time.Duration
-	// Source resolves content-addressed ancestry for the ancestor-tolerant tally. When nil, the
-	// policy decides on the exact fast path alone (no split resolution).
-	Source AncestrySource
-}
-
-// compile-time: the default policy IS a BootstrapTrust.
-var _ BootstrapTrust = (*BootstrapPolicy)(nil)
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) effectiveMinResponses() int {
-	n := len(p.TrustedBeacons)
-	if p.MinResponses > 0 {
-		if p.MinResponses > n {
-			return n
-		}
-		return p.MinResponses
-	}
-	return n/2 + 1 // default: a MAJORITY of the configured beacon set
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) effectiveAgreement() Ratio {
-	if p.AgreementThreshold.Den == 0 {
-		return Ratio{Num: 2, Den: 3} // default: ⅔ of the RESPONDERS
-	}
-	return p.AgreementThreshold
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) effectiveMinResponders(responders int) int {
-	r := p.MinResponders
-	if r <= 0 {
-		r = bootstrapMinAgreeingBeacons // default 2
-	}
-	if r > responders {
-		r = responders
-	}
-	if r < 1 {
-		r = 1
-	}
-	return r
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) namingWindow() int {
-	if p.NamingWindow > 0 {
-		return p.NamingWindow
-	}
-	return bootstrapNamingWindow
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) maxAnchors() int {
-	if p.MaxAnchors > 0 {
-		return p.MaxAnchors
-	}
-	return maxNamingAnchors
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) namingTimeout() time.Duration {
-	if p.NamingTimeout > 0 {
-		return p.NamingTimeout
-	}
-	return bootstrapNamingTimeout
-}
-
-// tallyResponders applies INVARIANT 1 (only CONFIGURED beacons count, deduplicated by NodeID — a
-// reply from a peer not in TrustedBeacons, a repeat, or an empty tip is dropped) and returns the
-// distinct responder count + total responder stake plus the per-tip stake / voter maps the naming
-// tally walks. The authenticated NodeID (transport handshake) is what makes "configured"
-// unforgeable. Shared by AcceptsFrontier (which names a frontier AHEAD) and CaughtUp (which
-// concludes NONE is ahead) so both judge the IDENTICAL responder set under the SAME eligibility
-// rule — the eligibility decision lives in exactly one place.
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) tallyResponders(replies []BeaconReply) (responders int, responderWeight StakeWeight, stakeOnTip map[ids.ID]StakeWeight, votersOf map[ids.ID]map[ids.NodeID]struct{}) {
-	seen := make(map[ids.NodeID]struct{}, len(replies))
-	stakeOnTip = make(map[ids.ID]StakeWeight)
-	votersOf = make(map[ids.ID]map[ids.NodeID]struct{})
-	for _, r := range replies {
-		w, ok := p.TrustedBeacons[r.NodeID]
-		if !ok || r.Tip == ids.Empty {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, dup := seen[r.NodeID]; dup {
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[r.NodeID] = struct{}{}
-		responders++
-		responderWeight += w
-		stakeOnTip[r.Tip] += w
-		if votersOf[r.Tip] == nil {
-			votersOf[r.Tip] = make(map[ids.NodeID]struct{})
-		}
-		votersOf[r.Tip][r.NodeID] = struct{}{}
-	}
-	return responders, responderWeight, stakeOnTip, votersOf
-}
-
-// floorMet reports whether the responder set clears INVARIANT 2's partition-capture FLOOR: at
-// least MinResponses distinct configured beacons AND (when MinResponseWeight is configured) at
-// least that much total responder stake. AcceptsFrontier gates NAMING a frontier on it and
-// CaughtUp gates concluding NONE-AHEAD on the SAME floor — so an eclipse that suppresses the
-// honest ahead-nodes to fake EITHER outcome must drop the responder set below it and fail safe.
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) floorMet(responders int, responderWeight StakeWeight) bool {
-	if responders < p.effectiveMinResponses() {
-		return false
-	}
-	if p.MinResponseWeight > 0 && responderWeight < p.MinResponseWeight {
-		return false
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// AcceptsFrontier implements BootstrapTrust. It (1) keeps ONLY configured-beacon replies
-// (INVARIANT 1, tallyResponders), (2) enforces the MinResponses / MinResponseWeight floor or falls
-// back to the operator checkpoint (INVARIANT 2, floorMet), then (3) names the highest block a
-// responder supermajority shares via the ancestor-tolerant tally. It never consults the
-// ⅔-of-current-stake finality rule (INVARIANT 3): the decision is the response floor + responder
-// agreement, a separate threat model.
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) AcceptsFrontier(ctx context.Context, replies []BeaconReply) (*Frontier, error) {
-	responders, responderWeight, stakeOnTip, votersOf := p.tallyResponders(replies)
-
-	// INVARIANT 2: the response FLOOR prevents partition-capture. Below MinResponses (or below
-	// MinResponseWeight) the node has not heard from enough authenticated beacons to trust ANY
-	// frontier — an attacker may have partitioned it down to a captured few. REJECT, unless the
-	// operator explicitly pinned a checkpoint to anchor from.
-	if !p.floorMet(responders, responderWeight) {
-		if p.Checkpoint != nil {
-			// INVARIANT 4: the checkpoint bypasses the beacon quorum, so trust it ONLY when the
-			// configured authority SIGNED this exact (id,height). A checkpoint present in config but
-			// unsigned, or signed by a non-authority key, is REJECTED (fail closed) — a compromised
-			// flag cannot inject a false sync anchor without also forging the authority's signature.
-			if p.CheckpointVerifier == nil || len(p.Checkpoint.Signature) == 0 ||
-				!p.CheckpointVerifier.VerifyCheckpoint(p.Checkpoint.ID, p.Checkpoint.Height, p.Checkpoint.Signature) {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: a checkpoint is pinned but its authority signature did not verify",
-					ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses)
-			}
-			return &Frontier{
-				ID:             p.Checkpoint.ID,
-				Height:         p.Checkpoint.Height,
-				Responders:     responders,
-				FromCheckpoint: true,
-			}, nil
-		}
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d configured beacons responded (weight %d), need %d",
-			ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, responders, responderWeight, p.effectiveMinResponses())
-	}
-
-	// The agreement threshold is over the RESPONDERS, not the whole configured set — this is what
-	// lets a node recover when validators are down (3 of 5 reachable, all 3 agreeing, is a valid
-	// sync anchor). The ⅔-of-current-stake finality rule is never used here (INVARIANT 3).
-	floor := p.effectiveAgreement().floorOf(responderWeight)
-	required := p.effectiveMinResponders(responders)
-
-	id, height, weight, ok := p.nameFrontier(ctx, stakeOnTip, votersOf, floor, required)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, ErrNoBootstrapQuorum
-	}
-	return &Frontier{ID: id, Height: height, Weight: weight, Responders: responders}, nil
-}
-
-// CaughtUp reports whether the responder set PROVES the node is already AT OR ABOVE the network
-// frontier — the dual of AcceptsFrontier ("nobody is ahead" vs "here is the block ahead to sync
-// to"). It is the go-live path for a TIP-HOLDER on a mixed-height co-restart: when producers
-// restart together the responder set SPLITS (the tip-holders are exactly half — below the ⅔
-// naming threshold), so AcceptsFrontier names NOTHING (ErrNoBootstrapQuorum), yet the node is
-// plainly not behind. Without this determination such a producer fails safe DOWN at its own tip —
-// the exact OPPOSITE of the stale-go-live bug, and just as wrong. THREE conditions, ALL required:
-//
-//   - (a) the SAME response FLOOR AcceptsFrontier uses is met (floorMet: MinResponses distinct
-//     beacons AND MinResponseWeight stake-majority). An eclipse that hides the higher (real) tips
-//     to fake caught-up must SUPPRESS the ahead-nodes' replies, dropping the responder set below
-//     the floor → NOT caught up, fail safe. No partition-capture: faking caught-up costs the same
-//     stake-majority of honest beacons that faking a NAMED frontier does.
-//   - (b) every responder's reported ACCEPTED tip is at height ≤ lastAccepted. A genuinely STALE
-//     node has at least one honest responder AHEAD (height > lastAccepted) → NOT caught up: it
-//     still syncs, so the stale-go-live bug stays fixed. (GetAcceptedFrontier reports a beacon's
-//     last-ACCEPTED block, so an un-finalized N+1 a producer is merely processing is never reported
-//     — the ±1 pending-tip skew cannot fake "ahead", and a producer one ACCEPTED block ahead
-//     correctly defeats caught-up so the node syncs that block.)
-//   - (c) the node has ACCEPTED every reported tip — heightOf returns ok ONLY for a block on the
-//     node's FINALIZED chain, so a tip the node lacks OR merely holds-in-store-but-has-not-accepted
-//     (someone genuinely ahead, a gossiped-ahead block, or a same-height sibling/fork it never
-//     finalized) makes the conclusion fail. The node declares caught-up only to blocks it ACCEPTED.
-//
-// heightOf resolves a tip's height from the node's ACCEPTED chain (ok=false when the tip is not
-// accepted — including a block merely PRESENT in the store but unaccepted, the luxd-2 freeze case),
-// injected so the trust DECISION stays free of any VM/block dependency — the same separation as
-// AncestrySource. It is NEVER a network fetch: an unaccepted/absent tip simply makes the node
-// not-caught-up (the safe direction — it syncs). Because (c) requires the node to have ACCEPTED
-// every reported tip, the heights (b) compares are the blocks' canonical (content-addressed)
-// heights read from the finalized chain — store presence can never fake "caught up".
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) CaughtUp(replies []BeaconReply, lastAccepted uint64, heightOf func(ids.ID) (uint64, bool)) bool {
-	responders, responderWeight, stakeOnTip, _ := p.tallyResponders(replies)
-	if !p.floorMet(responders, responderWeight) {
-		return false // (a) below the floor — an eclipse/partition can never fake caught-up
-	}
-	sawTip := false
-	for tip := range stakeOnTip {
-		sawTip = true
-		h, held := heightOf(tip)
-		if !held || h > lastAccepted {
-			return false // (c) a tip we do not hold, or (b) a responder ahead → NOT caught up
-		}
-	}
-	return sawTip // ≥1 responder tip evaluated (floor already implies this; guards an empty set)
-}
-
-// nameFrontier finds the block a responder supermajority shares — by CONTENT, reusing the
-// parent-link descent the sync loop trusts (HOW to find the agreed frontier; the ACCEPTANCE gate
-// already passed in AcceptsFrontier). A beacon reporting tip T vouches for every ANCESTOR of T,
-// so the named frontier is the HIGHEST block whose backing stake exceeds floor (the responder
-// agreement threshold) with ≥ required distinct voters.
-//
-//   - EXACT FAST PATH: if a single reported tip clears the floor outright, name it with NO
-//     ancestry fetch (the whole responding quorum already agrees on the same tip). Exempt from
-//     MinFrontierHeight: an actively-reported tip is a real frontier even when low.
-//   - ANCESTOR-TOLERANT PATH: otherwise, fetch the distinct tips' ancestries into ONE union index
-//     and globally credit each tip's stake to every block on its content-addressed chain. The
-//     highest block clearing the floor AND at a height STRICTLY ABOVE MinFrontierHeight (a frontier
-//     genuinely ahead — never the node's own height, which an eclipse could over-credit as a shared
-//     ancestor; that routes to CaughtUp) is named. A sibling split converges to the common committed
-//     ancestor; a partition that shares nothing ⅔-backed names nothing (→ fail safe).
-//
-// C1 (a forged chain finalizes ZERO) is preserved: a block is credited a beacon's stake only when
-// that beacon's tip lies on the block's CONTENT-ADDRESSED descendant chain (parent ids are bound
-// to block content), so a peer cannot fake linkage to over-credit; a block is named only with
-// backing > ⅔ of the responder weight; a minority (< ⅓) forged tip can only RATIFY real ancestors
-// it builds on, never name itself or raise the named height above the honest common block.
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) nameFrontier(ctx context.Context, stakeOnTip map[ids.ID]StakeWeight, votersOf map[ids.ID]map[ids.NodeID]struct{}, floor StakeWeight, required int) (ids.ID, uint64, StakeWeight, bool) {
-	// EXACT fast path: a single reported tip already clears the floor — name it, no fetch.
-	for tip, st := range stakeOnTip {
-		if st > floor && len(votersOf[tip]) >= required {
-			return tip, 0, st, true
-		}
-	}
-	if p.Source == nil {
-		return ids.Empty, 0, 0, false
-	}
-
-	// TOTAL-bound all anchor fetches so a partition that answers the frontier query but withholds
-	// ancestry cannot hang the decision — the caller's bounded retry handles it next round.
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.namingTimeout())
-	defer cancel()
-
-	// Build ONE union index from the distinct reported tips' ancestries (most stake first; skip a
-	// tip already present from an earlier fetch — a nested tip covers its ancestors). Bounded by
-	// MaxAnchors × NamingWindow blocks, so a Byzantine swarm reporting many forged tips cannot
-	// induce unbounded work.
-	index := make(map[ids.ID]BlockRef)
-	fetches := 0
-	for _, tip := range sortedByStakeDesc(stakeOnTip) {
-		if _, have := index[tip]; have {
-			continue
-		}
-		if fetches >= p.maxAnchors() {
-			break
-		}
-		fetches++
-		refs, err := p.Source.Ancestry(ctx, tip, p.namingWindow())
-		if err != nil {
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, ref := range refs {
-			if _, ok := index[ref.ID]; !ok {
-				index[ref.ID] = ref
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if len(index) == 0 {
-		return ids.Empty, 0, 0, false
-	}
-
-	// Global credit: each reported tip vouches for every block on its content-addressed ancestry.
-	// The running backing at block B = the responder stake whose accepted chain contains B.
-	backing := make(map[ids.ID]StakeWeight)
-	voters := make(map[ids.ID]map[ids.NodeID]struct{})
-	for tip, st := range stakeOnTip {
-		cur := tip
-		for {
-			ref, ok := index[cur]
-			if !ok {
-				break // the served ancestry does not extend further down (or this tip was unserved)
-			}
-			backing[cur] += st
-			if voters[cur] == nil {
-				voters[cur] = make(map[ids.NodeID]struct{})
-			}
-			for v := range votersOf[tip] {
-				voters[cur][v] = struct{}{}
-			}
-			if ref.Parent == ids.Empty {
-				break
-			}
-			cur = ref.Parent
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Name the HIGHEST block clearing the floor with ≥ required distinct voters, at a height
-	// STRICTLY ABOVE MinFrontierHeight — a genuine frontier AHEAD. A block AT the node's own
-	// last-accepted height is NOT named here (it is history the node already holds, reachable as a
-	// ⅔-backed ANCESTOR of higher tips an eclipse can suppress below the naming threshold — the M1
-	// stale-go-live path): that case routes to CaughtUp, which alone can distinguish a legit
-	// all-at-N fleet (→ Ready at N) from an eclipse with ahead-tips the node lacks (→ sync). A block
-	// BELOW own height is a partition diverged beneath the node. Both fail safe, never false-complete.
-	var bestID ids.ID
-	var bestHeight, bestStake uint64
-	found := false
-	for id, st := range backing {
-		ref := index[id]
-		if st <= floor || len(voters[id]) < required || ref.Height <= p.MinFrontierHeight {
-			continue
-		}
-		if !found || ref.Height > bestHeight || (ref.Height == bestHeight && st > bestStake) {
-			bestID, bestHeight, bestStake, found = id, ref.Height, st, true
-		}
-	}
-	return bestID, bestHeight, bestStake, found
-}
-
-// sortedByStakeDesc returns the reported tips most-stake-first (stable id tiebreak) — the order
-// the ancestor-tolerant tally fetches anchors in, so the well-supported honest tips are covered
-// first and a forged low-stake outlier swarm falls outside the anchor cap.
-func sortedByStakeDesc(stakeOnTip map[ids.ID]StakeWeight) []ids.ID {
-	tips := make([]ids.ID, 0, len(stakeOnTip))
-	for t := range stakeOnTip {
-		tips = append(tips, t)
-	}
-	sort.Slice(tips, func(i, j int) bool {
-		if stakeOnTip[tips[i]] != stakeOnTip[tips[j]] {
-			return stakeOnTip[tips[i]] > stakeOnTip[tips[j]]
-		}
-		return bytes.Compare(tips[i][:], tips[j][:]) < 0
-	})
-	return tips
-}
@@ -1,918 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// bootstrap_trust_test.go — the A–G proof matrix for the BootstrapTrust policy: the SEPARATE
-// trust object (distinct from consensus finality) that lets a node recover when validators are
-// down (mass recovery) while refusing partition-capture and never weakening finality.
-//
-// Most cases test the POLICY decision (AcceptsFrontier) directly — deterministic, no network
-// timing — since that IS the acceptance gate the owner specified. The mass-recovery success (A)
-// and the global-tally height-floor guard also run the FULL fetch+execute loop over the real
-// transport to prove the node converges (or fails safe) end to end. Each is load-bearing: revert
-// the response-floor policy to the prior ⅔-of-current-total-stake gate and A deadlocks; drop the
-// configured-beacon filter and D/E capture; drop the MinFrontierHeight floor and the shared-
-// genesis fork false-completes.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/ed25519"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
-	chainbootstrap "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/bootstrap"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-)
-
-// ----- policy test helpers --------------------------------------------------
-
-// stubAncestry is an in-memory AncestrySource: it walks a parent-linked BlockRef map down from a
-// tip, exactly as the real wire transport would serve content-addressed ancestry. Modeling the
-// transport this way keeps the policy unit tests deterministic while exercising the real ancestor-
-// tolerant tally. `withhold` models a beacon that names a tip but does NOT serve its ancestry.
-type stubAncestry struct {
-	byID     map[ids.ID]BlockRef
-	withhold map[ids.ID]bool
-}
-
-func (s *stubAncestry) Ancestry(_ context.Context, tip ids.ID, max int) ([]BlockRef, error) {
-	if s.withhold[tip] {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	var out []BlockRef
-	cur := tip
-	for i := 0; i < max; i++ {
-		ref, ok := s.byID[cur]
-		if !ok {
-			break
-		}
-		out = append(out, ref)
-		if ref.Parent == ids.Empty {
-			break
-		}
-		cur = ref.Parent
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-// refChain builds genesis..n as content-addressed BlockRefs (parent-linked), returning the slice
-// and an id→ref index for the stub AncestrySource.
-func refChain(n int) ([]BlockRef, map[ids.ID]BlockRef) {
-	refs := make([]BlockRef, 0, n+1)
-	byID := map[ids.ID]BlockRef{}
-	var parent ids.ID
-	for h := 0; h <= n; h++ {
-		r := BlockRef{ID: ids.GenerateTestID(), Height: uint64(h), Parent: parent}
-		refs = append(refs, r)
-		byID[r.ID] = r
-		parent = r.ID
-	}
-	return refs, byID
-}
-
-// childRef makes a block extending `parent` at height parentHeight+1 — used to forge a "higher"
-// sibling tip built on a real block.
-func childRef(parent BlockRef) BlockRef {
-	return BlockRef{ID: ids.GenerateTestID(), Height: parent.Height + 1, Parent: parent.ID}
-}
-
-func nodeIDs(n int) []ids.NodeID {
-	out := make([]ids.NodeID, n)
-	for i := range out {
-		out[i] = ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// equalBeacons builds a TrustedBeacons map of equal-weight validators.
-func equalBeacons(beacons []ids.NodeID, w uint64) map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight {
-	m := make(map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight, len(beacons))
-	for _, id := range beacons {
-		m[id] = w
-	}
-	return m
-}
-
-func reply(id ids.NodeID, tip ids.ID, w uint64) BeaconReply {
-	return BeaconReply{NodeID: id, Tip: tip, Weight: w}
-}
-
-// equalStake is the owner's mainnet shape: 5 validators each 0.5e18, total 2.5e18.
-const equalStake uint64 = 500_000_000_000_000_000
-
-// ----- A: MASS RECOVERY SUCCESS ---------------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_A_MassRecoverySucceeds is THE deadlock fix. 5 EQUAL-weight validators; the 2
-// stranded recovery targets are down, so only 3 are reachable; the 3 reachable agree on the
-// frontier. With MinResponses=3 the policy ACCEPTS — even though 3 of 5 stake (1.5e18) is BELOW
-// the ⅔-of-current-total floor (1.667e18) that the prior code required to be CONNECTED. That old
-// floor was mathematically unsatisfiable here (the down nodes ARE validators), which is exactly
-// why no node could recover. This test pins both: the policy accepts, AND the old gate would have
-// rejected (the deadlock), AND the full loop converges over the real transport.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_A_MassRecoverySucceeds(t *testing.T) {
-	// The deadlock the fix escapes: 3-of-5 connected stake does NOT clear ⅔ of the total set.
-	require.LessOrEqual(t, 3*equalStake, consensusconfig.TwoThirdsStakeFloor(5*equalStake),
-		"precondition: 3 of 5 equal validators is BELOW ⅔ of total — the prior connect gate's deadlock")
-
-	// Policy decision: 5 configured, 3 reachable agree on the frontier (mainnet analog 1082796).
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	frontier := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake),
-		MinResponses:   3,
-	}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], frontier, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[1], frontier, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[2], frontier, equalStake),
-		// beacons[3], beacons[4] are down/stranded — no reply.
-	}
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "3 of 5 reachable beacons agreeing MUST be accepted — the mass-recovery case")
-	require.Equal(t, frontier, f.ID)
-	require.Equal(t, 3, f.Responders)
-	require.False(t, f.FromCheckpoint)
-
-	// End to end over the real GetAcceptedFrontier/GetAncestors transport: a STALE node with only
-	// 3 of its 5 equal-weight validators reachable converges to the frontier N (not stuck at M).
-	const N = 40
-	const M = 23
-	chain, byID := buildBSChain(N, -1)
-	vm := newBSVMAt(chain, M)
-	v := nodeIDs(5)
-	weights := equalBeacons(v, equalStake)
-	bh, chainID := newBSHandlerWeighted(t, vm, weights)
-	bh.bootstrapMinResponses = 3 // the owner's MinBootstrapResponses=3
-	bh.net = &bsBeaconNet{
-		bh: bh, chainID: chainID, connected: []ids.NodeID{v[0], v[1], v[2]}, // 2 stranded down
-		byID: byID, tip: chain[N], serveAncestors: true,
-	}
-	bh.msgCreator = bsMsgBuilder{}
-	ctx := context.Background()
-
-	bh.bsActive.Store(true)
-	tip, status := bh.FrontierTip(ctx)
-	bh.bsActive.Store(false)
-	require.Equal(t, chainbootstrap.FrontierNamed, status,
-		"MASS RECOVERY: 3 of 5 equal validators reachable + agreeing must NAME the frontier (no deadlock)")
-	require.Equal(t, chain[N].id, tip)
-
-	require.NoError(t, runBS(t, bh), "mass-recovery node must converge")
-	last, _ := vm.LastAccepted(ctx)
-	require.Equal(t, chain[N].id, last, "RECOVERED: converged to the frontier N=%d despite 2 of 5 validators down", N)
-	require.True(t, bh.Accepted(ctx, chain[N].id))
-}
-
-// ----- B: ONE-BEACON CAPTURE REJECTED ---------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_B_OneBeaconCaptureRejected: 5 configured, only 1 reachable. A single beacon —
-// even an authentic configured one — cannot name the frontier (it could be the attacker's lone
-// peer in an eclipse). The response FLOOR rejects it.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_B_OneBeaconCaptureRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake), MinResponses: 3}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{reply(beacons[0], ids.GenerateTestID(), equalStake)}
-
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.Nil(t, f)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses,
-		"1 of 5 reachable must be REJECTED (capture) — below the MinResponses floor")
-}
-
-// ----- C: TWO-BEACON PARTITION REJECTED -------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_C_TwoBeaconPartitionRejected: 5 configured, 2 reachable AGREEING. Two beacons
-// is still below MinResponses=3, so the policy rejects by default — an attacker who partitions the
-// node down to 2 beacons cannot capture the frontier even if both agree.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_C_TwoBeaconPartitionRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	frontier := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake), MinResponses: 3}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], frontier, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[1], frontier, equalStake),
-	}
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.Nil(t, f)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses,
-		"2 of 5 reachable + agreeing must be REJECTED by default — the partition-capture floor is MinResponses=3")
-}
-
-// ----- D: NON-CONFIGURED PEER IGNORED ---------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_D_NonConfiguredPeerIgnored: an attacker peer that is NOT in the configured
-// beacon set reports a higher forged tip. INVARIANT 1 (non-circular eligibility): peers never
-// define who is a beacon, so the forged reply is dropped entirely and the configured beacons name
-// the real frontier.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_D_NonConfiguredPeerIgnored(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	real := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	forgedHigher := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	attacker := ids.GenerateTestNodeID() // NOT in TrustedBeacons
-
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake), MinResponses: 3}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], real, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[1], real, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[2], real, equalStake),
-		reply(attacker, forgedHigher, 9_000_000_000_000_000_000), // huge self-reported weight, ignored
-	}
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, real, f.ID, "the non-configured attacker's forged tip must be IGNORED")
-	require.NotEqual(t, forgedHigher, f.ID)
-	require.Equal(t, 3, f.Responders, "only the 3 configured beacons count toward the quorum")
-}
-
-// ----- E: MINORITY CONFIGURED FORGERY REJECTED ------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_E_MinorityConfiguredForgeryRejected: 3 honest configured beacons report
-// frontier A; 2 configured beacons report a FORGED tip B built directly on A (a forged higher
-// sibling). C1: the forgers can only RATIFY A (the real block they built on); B itself holds only
-// the Byzantine minority's stake and is NEVER named. The policy selects A.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_E_MinorityConfiguredForgeryRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	refs, byID := refChain(30) // genesis..30; A := refs[30]
-	A := refs[30]
-	forgedB := childRef(A) // forged sibling at height 31, parent = real A
-	byID[forgedB.ID] = forgedB
-
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, w),
-		MinResponses:   3,
-		Source:         &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], A.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[1], A.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[2], A.ID, w),       // 3 honest on A (300)
-		reply(beacons[3], forgedB.ID, w), // 2 Byzantine on the forged child (200)
-		reply(beacons[4], forgedB.ID, w),
-	}
-	// floor = ⅔ of 500 = 333. Neither A (300) nor forgedB (200) clears it directly, so the
-	// ancestor-tolerant tally runs: the forgers' stake flows DOWN through A (its real parent),
-	// crediting A with 500 while forgedB keeps only 200 → A named, forgedB never.
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, A.ID, f.ID, "C1: the forged child only RATIFIES A — A is named")
-	require.NotEqual(t, forgedB.ID, f.ID, "C1: the Byzantine-minority forged tip is NEVER named")
-	require.Equal(t, A.Height, f.Height)
-}
-
-// ----- F: SPLIT REACHABLE ANCESTRY ------------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_F_SplitReachableAncestrySelectsCommonAncestor: 3 reachable configured beacons
-// each report a DIFFERENT sibling tip (three pending blocks built on the same committed block H —
-// the healthy bleeding edge). No single tip holds a supermajority, but H is in all three accepted
-// chains, so the policy names H (the highest ⅔-of-responders common committed block), NOT any
-// isolated tip.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_F_SplitReachableAncestrySelectsCommonAncestor(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	refs, byID := refChain(39) // genesis..39; H := refs[39] (the common committed block)
-	H := refs[39]
-	a1, a2, a3 := childRef(H), childRef(H), childRef(H) // three sibling pending blocks at height 40
-	for _, c := range []BlockRef{a1, a2, a3} {
-		byID[c.ID] = c
-	}
-
-	beacons := nodeIDs(3)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, w),
-		MinResponses:   3,
-		Source:         &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], a1.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[1], a2.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[2], a3.ID, w),
-	}
-	// floor = ⅔ of 300 = 200. Each sibling holds only 100, but H is shared by all three → 300 > 200.
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, H.ID, f.ID, "must select the common committed ancestor H")
-	require.Equal(t, H.Height, f.Height)
-	require.NotEqual(t, a1.ID, f.ID)
-	require.NotEqual(t, a2.ID, f.ID)
-	require.NotEqual(t, a3.ID, f.ID)
-}
-
-// ----- G: FINALITY UNCHANGED ------------------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_G_FinalityUnchanged proves INVARIANT 3: a bootstrap-accepted frontier is NOT
-// finality. The SAME 3-of-5 support that AcceptsFrontier admits as a sync anchor does NOT satisfy
-// FinalityQuorum.HasFinality — live block acceptance still requires > ⅔ of CURRENT validator
-// stake (4 of 5 here). The bootstrap quorum cannot finalize a block.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_G_FinalityUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	const total = 5 * w
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	frontier := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, w), MinResponses: 3}
-
-	// BootstrapTrust ACCEPTS 3 of 5 (a sync anchor).
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], frontier, w),
-		reply(beacons[1], frontier, w),
-		reply(beacons[2], frontier, w),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, frontier, f.ID)
-	require.Equal(t, StakeWeight(3*w), f.Weight, "the frontier is backed by exactly the 3 responders")
-
-	// FinalityQuorum says that SAME 3-of-5 weight is NOT finality — the decisions are different
-	// objects with different thresholds. Finality is unchanged: it still needs > ⅔ (4 of 5).
-	cq := DefaultFinalityQuorum()
-	require.False(t, cq.HasFinality(3*w, total),
-		"INVARIANT 3: a bootstrap-accepted frontier (3 of 5) is NOT a finalizing supermajority")
-	require.True(t, cq.HasFinality(4*w, total),
-		"finality UNCHANGED: > ⅔ of current stake (4 of 5) still finalizes")
-	require.False(t, cq.HasFinality(f.Weight, total),
-		"the bootstrap quorum's own backing weight cannot finalize a block")
-
-	// AFTER-SYNC (the owner's "bootstrap is not a finality bypass"): the node has now SYNCED to the
-	// frontier via BootstrapTrust and re-entered live consensus. A NEW block that collects the SAME
-	// 3-of-5 stake STILL does not finalize — bootstrap admitted a sync ANCHOR, it did not lower the
-	// finality bar. Live acceptance returns to strict > ⅔ of CURRENT stake, exactly as before any
-	// bootstrap. HasFinality is stateless in the bootstrap outcome, which is the whole point: there
-	// is no code path by which "we bootstrapped from 3/5" leaks into the finality decision.
-	require.False(t, cq.HasFinality(3*w, total),
-		"AFTER syncing from a 3-of-5 bootstrap frontier, live finality STILL needs > ⅔ (4 of 5) — no bypass")
-}
-
-// ----- checkpoint override (complements B) ----------------------------------
-
-// edCheckpointAuthority is a test checkpoint authority backed by Ed25519 — a PROVEN primitive, no
-// custom crypto. It signs a checkpoint's canonical (id,height) message and verifies against its own
-// public key, rejecting an empty signature and any key that is not the configured authority.
-type edCheckpointAuthority struct {
-	priv ed25519.PrivateKey
-	pub  ed25519.PublicKey
-}
-
-func newEdCheckpointAuthority(t *testing.T) *edCheckpointAuthority {
-	t.Helper()
-	pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return &edCheckpointAuthority{priv: priv, pub: pub}
-}
-
-func (a *edCheckpointAuthority) sign(id ids.ID, height uint64) []byte {
-	return ed25519.Sign(a.priv, CanonicalCheckpointMessage(id, height))
-}
-
-// VerifyCheckpoint implements CheckpointVerifier: authenticate against the authority's public key.
-func (a *edCheckpointAuthority) VerifyCheckpoint(id ids.ID, height uint64, sig []byte) bool {
-	return len(sig) != 0 && ed25519.Verify(a.pub, CanonicalCheckpointMessage(id, height), sig)
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CheckpointOverride: below the response floor (1 of 5), the DEFAULT is reject
-// (test B), but an operator who pins a SIGNED checkpoint gets the explicit override — the node
-// anchors to the authenticated (id,height) instead of trusting the lone beacon. This is the
-// sanctioned escape hatch for a deeply-partitioned node, NEVER an open-ended ≥1-beacon acceptance,
-// and (INVARIANT 4) NEVER a bare unsigned config value.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CheckpointOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	authority := newEdCheckpointAuthority(t)
-	ckptID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	const ckptHeight = uint64(1_082_796)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:     equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake),
-		MinResponses:       3,
-		Checkpoint:         &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: ckptHeight, Signature: authority.sign(ckptID, ckptHeight)},
-		CheckpointVerifier: authority,
-	}
-	// 1 reachable beacon — below the floor — but a SIGNED checkpoint is pinned.
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], ids.GenerateTestID(), equalStake),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.True(t, f.FromCheckpoint, "below the floor with a SIGNED checkpoint → anchor to the checkpoint")
-	require.Equal(t, ckptID, f.ID)
-	require.Equal(t, ckptHeight, f.Height)
-
-	// Without the checkpoint the same 1-of-5 is rejected (the default — never trust the lone beacon).
-	policy.Checkpoint = nil
-	_, err = policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], ids.GenerateTestID(), equalStake),
-	})
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses)
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CheckpointMustBeSigned is INVARIANT 4: a checkpoint that is present but not
-// AUTHENTICATED is REJECTED (fail closed). A compromised flag/config that pins a false (id,height)
-// cannot inject a sync anchor without the authority's signature. Four rejection modes, one accept.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CheckpointMustBeSigned(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	authority := newEdCheckpointAuthority(t)
-	attacker := newEdCheckpointAuthority(t) // a DIFFERENT key — not the configured authority
-	ckptID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	const h = uint64(500_000)
-	lone := []BeaconReply{reply(beacons[0], ids.GenerateTestID(), equalStake)} // 1-of-5, below floor
-
-	base := func() *BootstrapPolicy {
-		return &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake), MinResponses: 3, CheckpointVerifier: authority}
-	}
-
-	// (1) UNSIGNED checkpoint (empty signature) → rejected even with a verifier wired.
-	p := base()
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: h}
-	_, err := p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "an UNSIGNED checkpoint must be rejected")
-
-	// (2) signed by a NON-AUTHORITY (attacker) key → rejected.
-	p = base()
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: h, Signature: attacker.sign(ckptID, h)}
-	_, err = p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "a checkpoint signed by a non-authority key must be rejected")
-
-	// (3) authority signature over a DIFFERENT (id,height) — replay onto a forged anchor → rejected.
-	p = base()
-	forgedID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: forgedID, Height: h, Signature: authority.sign(ckptID, h)} // sig binds ckptID, not forgedID
-	_, err = p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "a signature transplanted to a different (id,height) must be rejected")
-
-	// (4) NO verifier configured → any checkpoint is untrusted (fail closed).
-	p = base()
-	p.CheckpointVerifier = nil
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: h, Signature: authority.sign(ckptID, h)}
-	_, err = p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "no verifier ⇒ even a validly-signed checkpoint is untrusted")
-
-	// (accept) authority signs the exact pinned (id,height) → trusted.
-	p = base()
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: h, Signature: authority.sign(ckptID, h)}
-	f, err := p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.True(t, f.FromCheckpoint)
-	require.Equal(t, ckptID, f.ID)
-}
-
-// ----- safety guard for the global ancestor-tolerant tally ------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_ForkAtSharedGenesisFailsSafe is the load-bearing guard for the
-// MinFrontierHeight floor — the safety property the global cross-anchor tally (which makes case F
-// work) would otherwise break. Two branches fork at a DEEP shared ancestor H (height 5), and the
-// node is stale ABOVE the fork (height 23). The tally credits H with the union of BOTH halves'
-// stake (all responders share H), so without the floor it would name H — and since the node
-// already HOLDS H, the loop would FALSE-COMPLETE at the stale height instead of recognizing it has
-// no ⅔-agreed frontier ahead. The MinFrontierHeight floor refuses to name any block beneath the
-// node's last-accepted height, turning the partition into a safe ErrNoBootstrapQuorum.
-//
-// Asserted deterministically at the POLICY level (a stub AncestrySource serves BOTH branches'
-// shared ancestry — the real wire transport's rotated sampling may only serve one, masking the
-// vulnerability, so the integration path is NOT a faithful test of this guard). Revert the floor
-// (set MinFrontierHeight: 0) and this names H instead of failing safe.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_ForkAtSharedGenesisFailsSafe(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	const nodeHeight = 23
-
-	// Shared prefix genesis..H (H at height 5), then two divergent branches to height 40.
-	shared, byID := refChain(5)
-	H := shared[5]
-	branchA := []BlockRef{H}
-	branchB := []BlockRef{H}
-	for h := 6; h <= 40; h++ {
-		a := childRef(branchA[len(branchA)-1])
-		b := childRef(branchB[len(branchB)-1])
-		byID[a.ID], byID[b.ID] = a, b
-		branchA = append(branchA, a)
-		branchB = append(branchB, b)
-	}
-	tipA, tipB := branchA[len(branchA)-1], branchB[len(branchB)-1]
-
-	beacons := nodeIDs(6)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    equalBeacons(beacons, w),
-		MinResponses:      4,
-		MinFrontierHeight: nodeHeight, // the node is stale at height 23, ABOVE the fork at 5
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], tipA.ID, w), reply(beacons[1], tipA.ID, w), reply(beacons[2], tipA.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[3], tipB.ID, w), reply(beacons[4], tipB.ID, w), reply(beacons[5], tipB.ID, w),
-	}
-	// H (height 5) is shared by all 6 → 600 > floor(400). But it is BELOW the node's height, so the
-	// floor refuses it; no block at/above height 23 has ⅔ → fail safe.
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.Nil(t, f, "must not name the deep shared ancestor — that would false-complete at the stale height")
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoBootstrapQuorum,
-		"a fork sharing only blocks BELOW the node's height must fail safe, never name the deep common ancestor")
-
-	// The same split with the node BELOW the fork (a fresh node) legitimately names H — the floor
-	// only blocks naming history the node already has, never a real frontier ahead.
-	policy.MinFrontierHeight = 0
-	f, err = policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, H.ID, f.ID, "with the node below the fork, H IS the ⅔-common frontier to sync to")
-}
-
-// ----- H: SKEWED-WEIGHT PARTITION-CAPTURE (the re-red HIGH; MinResponseWeight floor) ---------
-
-// weightedBeacons builds a TrustedBeacons map from an explicit per-node weight list — for
-// modeling a SKEWED (non-uniform) validator stake distribution.
-func weightedBeacons(beacons []ids.NodeID, w []uint64) map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight {
-	m := make(map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight, len(beacons))
-	for i, id := range beacons {
-		m[id] = StakeWeight(w[i])
-	}
-	return m
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_H_SkewedWeightPartitionRejected is the load-bearing regression for the re-red
-// HIGH finding. Under SKEWED validator weights the MinResponses COUNT floor and the ⅔-of-responders
-// WEIGHT agreement diverge: an attacker who eclipses the HEAVY honest beacon but lets enough LIGHT
-// honest beacons through to satisfy the count can shrink the responder-WEIGHT denominator until his
-// < ⅓-of-total Byzantine stake clears ⅔-of-responders and NAMES A FORGED FRONTIER. The MinResponseWeight
-// stake-majority floor (> ½ of TOTAL configured beacon stake) closes this — a < ⅓-stake adversary can
-// never make the responders carry a ⅔ weight majority once they must also carry > ½ of the total.
-//
-// Red's PoC: 6 beacons w={3,3,13,1,1,1}, total 22, Byzantine {B0,B1}=6 (27% < ⅓). The attacker
-// partitions to {B0,B1 on forgedF} + {H2,H3 on realR} = 4 responders (= the majority count floor),
-// responderWeight=8, ⅔-floor=5, backing[forgedF]=6 > 5 → forgedF would be named. The heavy honest H1
-// (weight 13, on the real tip) is eclipsed. With MinResponseWeight=⌈22/2⌉=12, responderWeight=8 < 12
-// → the partition is rejected (the node waits for / re-samples a stake-majority of beacons).
-func TestBootstrapTrust_H_SkewedWeightPartitionRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	refs, byID := refChain(30)
-	realR := refs[30]
-	forgedF := childRef(realR) // forged sibling at height 31 (its only honest ancestor is realR)
-	byID[forgedF.ID] = forgedF
-
-	b := nodeIDs(6)
-	weights := []uint64{3, 3, 13, 1, 1, 1} // total 22; Byzantine b[0],b[1]=6 (<⅓)
-	var total uint64
-	for _, w := range weights {
-		total += w
-	}
-	tb := weightedBeacons(b, weights)
-
-	// The eclipse: only the 2 Byzantine + 2 LIGHT honest answer; the HEAVY honest b[2] (the real
-	// tip's weight-13 voter) and b[5] are partitioned away.
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], forgedF.ID, weights[0]), // Byzantine, light
-		reply(b[1], forgedF.ID, weights[1]), // Byzantine, light
-		reply(b[3], realR.ID, weights[3]),   // honest, light
-		reply(b[4], realR.ID, weights[4]),   // honest, light
-	}
-
-	// WITHOUT the stake-majority floor (the bug): the forged tip is named.
-	vuln := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: tb, MinResponses: 4, Source: &stubAncestry{byID: byID}}
-	if f, err := vuln.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies); err == nil && f != nil {
-		require.Equal(t, forgedF.ID, f.ID,
-			"VULN PRECONDITION: without MinResponseWeight the eclipsed skewed partition names the forged tip (proves the floor is load-bearing)")
-	}
-
-	// WITH the stake-majority floor (the fix, exactly as bootstrapPolicy() now wires it): rejected.
-	fixed := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    tb,
-		MinResponses:      4,
-		MinResponseWeight: StakeWeight(total/2 + 1), // ⌈total/2⌉ = 12
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-	_, err := fixed.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses,
-		"FIX: responderWeight 8 < ½-stake floor 12 → the skewed partition cannot name a frontier (forged or otherwise)")
-
-	// And the fix still admits an HONEST stake-majority: add the heavy honest H1 (weight 13) on realR.
-	full := append(replies, reply(b[2], realR.ID, weights[2])) // responderWeight 8+13 = 21 ≥ 12
-	f, err := fixed.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), full)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "an honest stake-majority of responders still names the real frontier")
-	require.Equal(t, realR.ID, f.ID, "the real tip is named once a stake-majority is reachable; forged never")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_D2_NonConfiguredSwarmNamesNothing is the cleaner load-bearing isolation of the
-// configured-beacon filter (INVARIANT 1) that the re-red asked for: a SWARM of non-configured peers
-// (enough to clear any count floor on their own) all shouting a forged frontier names NOTHING,
-// because none is in TrustedBeacons. This proves the filter, not merely the MinResponders floor.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_D2_NonConfiguredSwarmNamesNothing(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	refs, byID := refChain(30)
-	real := refs[30]
-	forged, fbyID := refChain(40) // a wholly forged chain from a fresh genesis
-	for id, r := range fbyID {
-		byID[id] = r
-	}
-
-	configured := nodeIDs(3) // the real beacon set
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    equalBeacons(configured, w),
-		MinResponses:      2,
-		MinResponseWeight: StakeWeight(w*3/2 + 1),
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-
-	// 50 non-configured peers, each heavy, all on the forged tip — NOT in TrustedBeacons.
-	swarm := nodeIDs(50)
-	var replies []BeaconReply
-	for _, p := range swarm {
-		replies = append(replies, reply(p, forged[40].ID, 9_000_000))
-	}
-	_, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses,
-		"INVARIANT 1: non-configured peers carry ZERO weight — a forged swarm names nothing")
-
-	// Add the 3 real configured beacons on the real tip → the real tip is named, swarm invisible.
-	for _, c := range configured {
-		replies = append(replies, reply(c, real.ID, w))
-	}
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, real.ID, f.ID, "only configured beacons name the frontier; the 50-peer forged swarm is ignored")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapPolicy_WiresStakeMajorityFloor is the regression guard the re-red flagged (LOW):
-// the production constructor bootstrapPolicy() MUST emit MinResponseWeight = ⌈total/2⌉. The H/D2
-// tests construct policies directly, so a mutation that stops the constructor from setting the
-// floor would not be caught — this asserts the WIRING on the real production path. Mutation-proof:
-// neuter `if total > 0` in bootstrapPolicy() and this test fails (MinResponseWeight==0).
-func TestBootstrapPolicy_WiresStakeMajorityFloor(t *testing.T) {
-	refs, _ := refChain(5)
-	vm := newBSVMAt(refs5BSBlocks(refs), 0)
-	bh, _ := newBSHandlerWeighted(t, vm, map[ids.NodeID]uint64{}) // handler shell; we call bootstrapPolicy directly
-
-	// SKEWED set: total = 22, ⌈total/2⌉ = 12.
-	b := nodeIDs(6)
-	weights := map[ids.NodeID]uint64{b[0]: 3, b[1]: 3, b[2]: 13, b[3]: 1, b[4]: 1, b[5]: 1}
-	var total uint64
-	for _, w := range weights {
-		total += w
-	}
-
-	pol := bh.bootstrapPolicy(weights)
-	require.Equal(t, StakeWeight(total/2+1), pol.MinResponseWeight,
-		"REGRESSION: bootstrapPolicy() must wire MinResponseWeight = ⌈total/2⌉ (skewed-weight floor)")
-	require.Equal(t, len(weights)/2+1, pol.MinResponses,
-		"bootstrapPolicy() must wire the count-majority floor too")
-	require.NotNil(t, pol.Source, "the policy must carry an AncestrySource")
-
-	// EQUAL-weight: 5 × 0.5e18 — the floor must not re-deadlock 3-of-5 (= 0.6 ≥ 0.5).
-	eq := equalBeacons(nodeIDs(5), 500_000_000_000_000_000)
-	var eqTotal uint64
-	for _, w := range eq {
-		eqTotal += uint64(w)
-	}
-	eqPol := bh.bootstrapPolicy(eq)
-	require.Equal(t, StakeWeight(eqTotal/2+1), eqPol.MinResponseWeight)
-	require.Less(t, eqPol.MinResponseWeight, StakeWeight(3*500_000_000_000_000_000),
-		"3-of-5 equal stake (0.6·total) must clear the ½ floor — no re-deadlock")
-
-	// DEGENERATE: empty weights → floor disabled (0), no panic.
-	require.Equal(t, StakeWeight(0), bh.bootstrapPolicy(map[ids.NodeID]uint64{}).MinResponseWeight,
-		"empty weights → MinResponseWeight disabled (pre-P-chain / single-node fallback)")
-}
-
-// refs5BSBlocks adapts a BlockRef chain to the []*bsTestBlock the bsTestVM needs (genesis only
-// accepted), so newBSHandlerWeighted has a VM. The handler is used only to call bootstrapPolicy().
-func refs5BSBlocks(refs []BlockRef) []*bsTestBlock {
-	out := make([]*bsTestBlock, len(refs))
-	var parent ids.ID
-	for i, r := range refs {
-		out[i] = &bsTestBlock{id: r.ID, parent: parent, height: r.Height, bytes: []byte(r.ID.String()), valid: true}
-		parent = r.ID
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// ----- CaughtUp: the tip-holder go-live determination (RED CRITICAL fix) ----
-//
-// CaughtUp is the DUAL of AcceptsFrontier — "nobody is ahead" vs "here is the block ahead to sync
-// to". It is the go-live path for a TIP-HOLDER on a mixed-height co-restart, where the responders
-// SPLIT below the ⅔ naming threshold so AcceptsFrontier names NOTHING yet the node is plainly not
-// behind. Getting its SAFETY exactly right is the hinge between "fixes the freeze" and "reopens the
-// stale-go-live bug": these pin all three conditions (floor met, none-ahead, holds-every-tip) and
-// prove the two adversarial fake-caught-up attempts FAIL.
-
-// heldOracle builds the height ORACLE CaughtUp injects: a block's height, ok=false when not held.
-func heldOracle(held map[ids.ID]uint64) func(ids.ID) (uint64, bool) {
-	return func(id ids.ID) (uint64, bool) { h, ok := held[id]; return h, ok }
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_TipHolderSplitGoesReady is the CRITICAL regression at the policy layer:
-// the EXACT mainnet co-restart shape. A producer at N sees 4 responders split {N, N, N-16, genesis};
-// the tip-holders are only ½ (< ⅔), so AcceptsFrontier names NOTHING (ErrNoBootstrapQuorum) — yet the
-// node holds every reported tip and none is above N, so CaughtUp is TRUE. It pins BOTH halves: the
-// SAME replies yield no NAMED frontier (the case the tip-holder fails safe DOWN without this fix) but
-// ARE caught-up.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_TipHolderSplitGoesReady(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, byID := refChain(N) // genesis..N
-	b := nodeIDs(5)           // 5 equal-weight beacons (the node is the 5th, not a responder)
-	const w = uint64(100)     // total 500 → MinResponseWeight ⌈500/2⌉=251, MinResponses majority=3
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    equalBeacons(b, w),
-		MinResponses:      3,
-		MinResponseWeight: 251,
-		MinFrontierHeight: N,
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-
-	// 4 connected responders: 2 at the tip N, one stale at N-16, one at genesis — the production shape.
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[2], refs[N-16].ID, w),
-		reply(b[3], refs[0].ID, w),
-	}
-
-	// HALF 1: AcceptsFrontier names NOTHING — the tip-holders (200) do not clear ⅔ (266), and the
-	// ⅔-backed common ancestor N-16 is below MinFrontierHeight=N (history the node already has).
-	_, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoBootstrapQuorum,
-		"the mixed-height split names no frontier — exactly the case the tip-holder froze on without CaughtUp")
-
-	// HALF 2: the node HOLDS its accepted chain 0..N, so it holds every reported tip and none is above
-	// N → CaughtUp is TRUE. This is the go-live path the regression was missing.
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N].ID: N, refs[N-16].ID: N - 16, refs[0].ID: 0}
-	require.True(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a tip-holder that holds every reported tip and is at the top of all of them IS caught up")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_StaleNodeNotCaughtUp is the FORWARD safety guard (the stale-go-live bug
-// staying FIXED): a STALE node at N-16 with honest producers at N PRESENT must NOT be caught-up — an
-// honest responder is ahead, so it still SYNCS. CaughtUp must not fire merely because SOME responders
-// are at/below the node.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_StaleNodeNotCaughtUp(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N)
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N - 16}
-
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),    // honest, AHEAD
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),    // honest, AHEAD
-		reply(b[2], refs[N-16].ID, w), // at the node's height
-		reply(b[3], refs[N-20].ID, w), // below
-	}
-	// The node holds only 0..N-16 — it does NOT hold the producers' tip N.
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N-16].ID: N - 16, refs[N-20].ID: N - 20}
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N-16, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a stale node with an honest responder ahead must NOT be caught up — it syncs (stale-go-live stays fixed)")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_StaleNodeMinorityFakeRejected is adversarial fake-caught-up #1 (honest
-// present): a node at N-16 where a <⅓-stake set of beacons reports ≤ N-16 to fake caught-up WHILE the
-// honest producers at N are also present. The honest max is ahead (and the node lacks tip N) → NOT
-// caught up. The minority cannot fake it past the honest responders.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_StaleNodeMinorityFakeRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N)
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N - 16}
-
-	// 3 honest producers at N (ahead) + 1 Byzantine at N-16 trying to fake "everyone is at my height".
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[2], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[3], refs[N-16].ID, w), // the < ⅓ liar
-	}
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N-16].ID: N - 16} // node holds only up to N-16
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N-16, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a <⅓ minority reporting ≤N-16 cannot fake caught-up while honest producers at N are present")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_EclipsedMinorityFailsSafe is adversarial fake-caught-up #2 (honest
-// eclipsed): the honest producers (at N) are SUPPRESSED and only a <½-stake set of beacons reports
-// ≤ N-16. The response FLOOR (the SAME one AcceptsFrontier uses) is not met → CaughtUp is FALSE →
-// fail safe. Faking caught-up costs the same stake-majority of honest beacons that faking a NAMED
-// frontier does — no partition-capture.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_EclipsedMinorityFailsSafe(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N)
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100) // total 500 → MinResponseWeight 251
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N - 16}
-
-	// Only 2 of 5 beacons answer (the honest producers at N are eclipsed). Their weight 200 < 251.
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[2], refs[N-16].ID, w),
-		reply(b[3], refs[N-20].ID, w),
-	}
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N-16].ID: N - 16, refs[N-20].ID: N - 20}
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N-16, heldOracle(held)),
-		"an eclipsed <½-stake responder set cannot fake caught-up — the floor is not met (fail safe)")
-
-	// Sanity: AcceptsFrontier ALSO rejects this set below the floor (the SAME floor gates both paths).
-	_, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "the same floor gates naming and caught-up")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_OneAcceptedBlockBehindSyncs proves condition (b) uses the ACCEPTED
-// height: a node at accepted N that has merely PROCESSED N+1 (holds it) is NOT caught up when a
-// producer has ACCEPTED N+1 — it must sync that block. heightOf reads the block's canonical height,
-// so a held-but-above-lastAccepted tip correctly defeats caught-up (the ±1 pending skew cannot fake it).
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_OneAcceptedBlockBehindSyncs(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N + 1) // includes N+1
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N+1].ID, w), // a producer ACCEPTED N+1
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[2], refs[N].ID, w),
-	}
-	// The node holds 0..N AND has processed N+1 (held), but its ACCEPTED height is N.
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N+1].ID: N + 1, refs[N].ID: N}
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a node one ACCEPTED block behind (even if it processed N+1) must NOT be caught up — it syncs")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_SameHeightForkNotHeld proves condition (c): a responder reporting a
-// DIFFERENT block at the node's height (a fork the node never finalized) defeats caught-up — the node
-// must HOLD every reported tip, not merely match heights numerically.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_SameHeightForkNotHeld(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N)
-	fork := BlockRef{ID: ids.GenerateTestID(), Height: N} // a sibling at height N the node does NOT hold
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[2], fork.ID, w), // a fork at the same height N
-	}
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N].ID: N} // the node holds its tip N but NOT the fork
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a same-height fork the node does not hold defeats caught-up (condition c: holds every reported tip)")
-}
-
-// ----- M1: the pre-existing eclipse-stale own-height path (red fast-follow) ------------------
-//
-// M1 is the pre-existing path the own-height filter tightening closes. BEFORE: nameFrontier filtered
-// the ancestor-tolerant tally with `ref.Height < MinFrontierHeight` (== the node's own last-accepted),
-// so a block AT the node's own height PASSED the filter and could be NAMED. An eclipse that throttles
-// the genuinely-ahead responders below the ⅔ naming threshold — while letting the at-height responders
-// through — makes the node's OWN height accrue ⅔ purely as the shared ANCESTOR of those ahead tips, so
-// nameFrontier names it → FrontierNamed at own height → the node goes Ready STALE (here, 5 blocks
-// behind a finalized N+5). AFTER: the filter is `ref.Height <= MinFrontierHeight`, so own height is
-// EXCLUDED from naming; the at-own-height decision routes to CaughtUp, which SEES the N+5 ahead tips
-// (un-held, above) and REFUSES → the node syncs/fails safe instead of going Ready stale.
-//
-// Deterministic, no network timing. Revert the filter to `<` and the first assertion (own height
-// NOT named → ErrNoBootstrapQuorum) FAILS — that revert IS the M1 bug, so this is the RED-before /
-// GREEN-after pin. The boundary sub-assertion (one notch lower DOES name N) proves it is precisely
-// the OWN-HEIGHT exclusion doing the work, not some unrelated filter.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_EclipseOwnHeightNotNamedRoutesToCaughtUp(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40       // the node's own last-accepted height
-	const ahead = N + 5 // a GENUINELY FINALIZED block 5 ahead — the eclipse throttles its visibility
-	refs, byID := refChain(ahead) // genesis..N+5, parent-linked; the ahead set's tip descends through N
-	const w = uint64(100)
-
-	b := nodeIDs(6) // 6 configured beacons @100 → total 600; MinResponseWeight ⌈600/2⌉=301, MinResponses majority=4
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    equalBeacons(b, w),
-		MinResponses:      4,
-		MinResponseWeight: 301,
-		MinFrontierHeight: N, // the node's own last-accepted height — exactly the M1 boundary
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-
-	// THE ECLIPSE CONSTRUCTION (red's, verbatim numbers): the ahead responders are throttled to
-	// R_a = 300 (3 beacons at N+5, BELOW the ⅔-of-responders naming threshold), the behind/at-height
-	// responders R_b = 200 (2 beacons at N) all get through; the 6th beacon is eclipsed (no reply).
-	// R = R_a + R_b = 500 > ½·600 (floor met). R_a = 300 < ⅔R = 333 (so N+5 is NOT named). YET block N
-	// accrues R_a + R_b = 500 > ⅔R because the ahead nodes credit N as an ANCESTOR of N+5.
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),     // at the node's own height N
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),     // at the node's own height N  (R_b = 200)
-		reply(b[2], refs[ahead].ID, w), // genuinely ahead at N+5
-		reply(b[3], refs[ahead].ID, w), // genuinely ahead at N+5
-		reply(b[4], refs[ahead].ID, w), // genuinely ahead at N+5      (R_a = 300, < ⅔·500 = 333)
-		// b[5] eclipsed — no reply.
-	}
-
-	// Sanity pins on the construction (so a future edit that breaks the eclipse shape is caught).
-	require.Equal(t, uint64(333), Ratio{2, 3}.floorOf(500), "⅔-of-responders floor over R=500 is 333")
-	require.Less(t, uint64(300), uint64(333), "R_a=300 is BELOW the ⅔ naming threshold — N+5 is not nameable")
-
-	// AFTER (the fix): own height N is EXCLUDED from naming → no ⅔-backed block ABOVE N exists
-	// (N+5 is sub-⅔) → ErrNoBootstrapQuorum. (Revert `<=`→`<` and this names refs[N] — the M1 bug.)
-	_, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoBootstrapQuorum,
-		"M1 FIX: the node's OWN height must NOT be named even when ahead tips credit it as a ⅔-backed ancestor")
-
-	// …and the decision routes to CaughtUp, which SEES the genuinely-ahead N+5 tips (un-held, above
-	// the node's height) and REFUSES — so the node syncs toward N+5, never goes Ready at stale N.
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{} // the node holds 0..N, NOT N+1..N+5
-	for h := 0; h <= N; h++ {
-		held[refs[h].ID] = uint64(h)
-	}
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N, heldOracle(held)),
-		"M1 FIX: routed to CaughtUp, the eclipse's ahead tips (un-held, above N) correctly defeat caught-up → sync")
-
-	// BOUNDARY: the SAME replies with MinFrontierHeight one notch lower (N-1) DO name N (height N is
-	// now STRICTLY ABOVE the floor). This proves the refusal above is precisely the OWN-HEIGHT
-	// exclusion — not the ⅔ tally, the responder floor, or the voter count — doing the work.
-	policy.MinFrontierHeight = N - 1
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "one notch below own height, N is strictly above the floor and IS the ⅔-common frontier")
-	require.Equal(t, refs[N].ID, f.ID, "boundary: N is named iff its height is STRICTLY ABOVE MinFrontierHeight")
-	require.Equal(t, uint64(N), f.Height)
-}
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// catchup_frame_test.go — the CERT-CARRYING catch-up wire format. These prove the
-// load-bearing property: a v2 (block,cert) entry round-trips, an entry with no cert
-// routes to the vote path, and a cross-version exchange fails CLEANLY (a legacy
-// decoder cannot misparse a v2 frame, and the v2 decoder treats a legacy raw block
-// as legacy — never a partial/garbage parse). The cert-accept SEMANTICS are proven
-// in the consensus engine tests; here we pin only the framing.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	block := []byte("\xf9\x02\x00 a realistic-ish block body")
-	cert := []byte("a-marshaled-quorum-cert")
-
-	blk, crt, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(encodeCatchupEntry(block, cert))
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("a v2 entry must decode as a v2 entry")
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(blk, block) {
-		t.Fatalf("block bytes corrupted: got %q want %q", blk, block)
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(crt, cert) {
-		t.Fatalf("cert bytes corrupted: got %q want %q", crt, cert)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_EmptyCertRoutesToVotePath(t *testing.T) {
-	// A still-pending block served on the live missing-parent path carries no cert.
-	// It must decode as a v2 entry with an EMPTY cert — the requester then votes on
-	// it (handleContext routes certLen==0 to Put), the legacy behaviour.
-	block := []byte("pending-block-no-cert")
-	blk, crt, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(encodeCatchupEntry(block, nil))
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("a v2 entry with empty cert must still decode as v2")
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(blk, block) {
-		t.Fatalf("block bytes corrupted: got %q", blk)
-	}
-	if len(crt) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("cert must be empty, got %d bytes", len(crt))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_LegacyRawBlockIsNotV2(t *testing.T) {
-	// A legacy responder sends the raw block as the container (no magic). The v2
-	// decoder must report ok=false so handleContext treats it as a raw block (Put),
-	// never as a malformed v2 entry. Cover several real block-prefix shapes.
-	for _, raw := range [][]byte{
-		{0xf9, 0x02, 0x00, 0x11, 0x22}, // EVM/RLP list header
-		{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2a},       // P/X-chain codec version prefix
-		{},                             // empty
-		[]byte("LCU"),                  // 3 bytes — too short to even hold the magic
-	} {
-		if _, _, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(raw); ok {
-			t.Fatalf("legacy raw block %x must NOT decode as a v2 entry", raw)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_MagicIsNotAPlausibleLength(t *testing.T) {
-	// CROSS-VERSION SAFETY (new responder → legacy requester): a legacy decoder reads
-	// the first 4 bytes of a v2 entry as a uint32 length. The magic must be so large
-	// that it always exceeds the remaining buffer, so the legacy loop rejects the
-	// frame (0 blocks processed) rather than consuming garbage. 0x4C435532 ≈ 1.28 GB.
-	asLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(catchupEntryMagic[:])
-	if asLen < (1 << 30) {
-		t.Fatalf("magic read as a length (%d) is too small — a legacy decoder could misparse a v2 frame", asLen)
-	}
-	// And a full v2 frame's leading length-word (the magic) dwarfs the frame itself,
-	// so the legacy `blockLen > remaining` guard always fires.
-	frame := encodeCatchupEntry([]byte("blk"), []byte("crt"))
-	if uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(frame[:4])) <= uint64(len(frame)) {
-		t.Fatal("magic-as-length must exceed the frame length so a legacy decoder self-rejects")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_CorruptV2FramesRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	good := encodeCatchupEntry([]byte("block-body"), []byte("cert-body"))
-
-	// Truncations inside the v2 structure must fail to ok=false (never a partial
-	// parse): drop the trailing cert byte, drop the certLen word, etc.
-	for _, bad := range [][]byte{
-		good[:len(good)-1], // last cert byte missing → certLen != remaining
-		good[:len(good)-5], // certLen word + cert missing
-		good[:8],           // magic + blockLen only, block missing
-		good[:6],           // magic + 2 bytes of blockLen
-		append(append([]byte(nil), good...), 0x00), // trailing byte → does not consume exactly
-	} {
-		if _, _, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(bad); ok {
-			t.Fatalf("a corrupt v2 frame (len %d) must be rejected, not partial-parsed", len(bad))
-		}
-	}
-
-	// An overflowing blockLen (claims more block than the buffer holds) is rejected.
-	overflow := append([]byte(nil), catchupEntryMagic[:]...)
-	var u32 [4]byte
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(u32[:], 0xFFFFFFFF)
-	overflow = append(overflow, u32[:]...)
-	overflow = append(overflow, []byte("tiny")...)
-	if _, _, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(overflow); ok {
-		t.Fatal("a v2 frame with an overflowing blockLen must be rejected")
-	}
-}
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-// *blockHandler must satisfy ancestorRequester, or the catch-up wire silently
-// loses its transport. Catch it at compile time, not in production.
-var _ ancestorRequester = (*blockHandler)(nil)
-
-// catchupSpy records the requestContext calls networkCatchup bridges to.
-type catchupSpy struct {
-	calls     int
-	lastFrom  ids.NodeID
-	lastBlock ids.ID
-}
-
-func (s *catchupSpy) requestContext(_ context.Context, from ids.NodeID, blockID ids.ID) {
-	s.calls++
-	s.lastFrom = from
-	s.lastBlock = blockID
-}
-
-// TestNetworkCatchup_BridgesEngineSignalToWire is the regression for the
-// stranded-follower bug: node never set netCfg.Catchup, so the engine's
-// requestCatchup hit a nil interface and a follower that fell behind during
-// consensus never fetched the missing ancestors — it looped on an unfinalizable
-// orphan forever (observed live: mainnet luxd-0/2 stuck at 1082780 while peers
-// reached 1082793). The wire must (a) be nil-safe before its handler is
-// late-bound and (b) route the engine's RequestAncestors to the handler's
-// GetAncestors transport (requestContext), once, for the right block and peer.
-func TestNetworkCatchup_BridgesEngineSignalToWire(t *testing.T) {
-	missing := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	peer := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-
-	// (a) Before late-binding (handler nil): a harmless no-op, never a panic.
-	c := &networkCatchup{}
-	require.NoError(t, c.RequestAncestors(ids.Empty, ids.Empty, missing, peer))
-
-	// (b) Once wired: the engine's catch-up signal reaches the GetAncestors wire
-	// exactly once — for the missing block, addressed to the peer that advertised
-	// its child. RED before the fix: handler is never set, calls stays 0.
-	spy := &catchupSpy{}
-	c.handler = spy
-	require.NoError(t, c.RequestAncestors(ids.Empty, ids.Empty, missing, peer))
-	require.Equal(t, 1, spy.calls, "RequestAncestors must route to requestContext — a nil wire IS the stranded-follower bug")
-	require.Equal(t, missing, spy.lastBlock)
-	require.Equal(t, peer, spy.lastFrom)
-}
@@ -46,48 +46,17 @@ func (s *Nets) GetOrCreate(chainID ids.ID) (nets.Net, bool) {
 	return chain, true
 }

-// IsChainBootstrapped reports whether the given chain has finished initial sync
-// (reached the network frontier and transitioned its VM to normal operation) on
-// this node — Bootstrapped(chainID) was called for it in its validation net. A
-// chain that is merely tracked (its sync goroutine launched) but has NOT converged
-// reads false. This is the per-chain truth manager.IsBootstrapped / info.isBootstrapped
-// key on, replacing the mere-existence test that returned true the instant a chain
-// was added to the manager (the premature-true masking bug: a C-Chain stalled at
-// genesis reported bootstrapped=true). A chainID is added to exactly one net's
-// tracking, so the first net that reports it bootstrapped is authoritative.
-func (s *Nets) IsChainBootstrapped(chainID ids.ID) bool {
-	if s == nil {
-		return false // no net tracking wired ⇒ nothing has been marked bootstrapped
-	}
-	s.lock.RLock()
-	defer s.lock.RUnlock()
-
-	for _, chain := range s.chains {
-		if chain.IsChainBootstrapped(chainID) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
 // Bootstrapping returns the chainIDs of any chains that are still
 // bootstrapping.
-//
-// s.chains is keyed by NET id, not chain id. Reporting the key named the net
-// instead of the chain: every primary-network chain that failed to converge
-// surfaced in /v1/health as the single ID
-// "11111111111111111111111111111111LpoYY" — constants.PrimaryNetworkID, i.e.
-// ids.Empty — a "chain" the chain manager has never heard of, so the operator
-// chasing it got "there is no chain with alias/ID". Worse, N stuck chains
-// collapsed into one indistinguishable entry. Ask each net which of ITS chains
-// are still bootstrapping; the net owns that set.
 func (s *Nets) Bootstrapping() []ids.ID {
 	s.lock.RLock()
 	defer s.lock.RUnlock()

 	chainsBootstrapping := make([]ids.ID, 0, len(s.chains))
-	for _, chain := range s.chains {
-		chainsBootstrapping = append(chainsBootstrapping, chain.Bootstrapping()...)
+	for chainID, chain := range s.chains {
+		if !chain.IsBootstrapped() {
+			chainsBootstrapping = append(chainsBootstrapping, chainID)
+		}
 	}

 	return chainsBootstrapping
@@ -158,54 +158,12 @@ func TestNetsBootstrapping(t *testing.T) {
 	chain, ok := chains.GetOrCreate(netID)
 	require.True(ok)

-	// Start bootstrapping. What comes back is the CHAIN that is syncing, never
-	// the net that holds it — this assertion used to demand netID, which is
-	// how the phantom "11111111111111111111111111111111LpoYY" survived review.
+	// Start bootstrapping
 	chain.AddChain(chainID)
 	bootstrapping := chains.Bootstrapping()
-	require.Equal([]ids.ID{chainID}, bootstrapping)
-	require.NotContains(bootstrapping, netID)
+	require.Contains(bootstrapping, netID)

 	// Finish bootstrapping
 	chain.Bootstrapped(chainID)
 	require.Empty(chains.Bootstrapping())
 }
-
-// The "bootstrapped" health check publishes Nets.Bootstrapping() verbatim as
-// its message. s.chains is keyed by NET id, so returning the key reported
-// constants.PrimaryNetworkID (ids.Empty, cb58
-// "11111111111111111111111111111111LpoYY") as though it were an unbootstrapped
-// CHAIN. Operators saw a chain ID the chain manager denies exists, and every
-// stuck chain on the net collapsed into that one phantom entry.
-func TestNetsBootstrappingReportsChainsNotNets(t *testing.T) {
-	require := require.New(t)
-
-	chains, err := NewNets(ids.EmptyNodeID, map[ids.ID]nets.Config{
-		constants.PrimaryNetworkID: {},
-	})
-	require.NoError(err)
-
-	primary, _ := chains.GetOrCreate(constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
-	cChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	dChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	primary.AddChain(cChainID)
-	primary.AddChain(dChainID)
-
-	bootstrapping := chains.Bootstrapping()
-
-	// The phantom: never the net's own ID.
-	require.NotContains(bootstrapping, constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
-	require.NotContains(
-		bootstrapping,
-		ids.Empty,
-		"health check reported the primary NET id as an unbootstrapped chain",
-	)
-	// Both stuck chains must be individually nameable.
-	require.ElementsMatch([]ids.ID{cChainID, dChainID}, bootstrapping)
-
-	primary.Bootstrapped(cChainID)
-	require.Equal([]ids.ID{dChainID}, chains.Bootstrapping())
-
-	primary.Bootstrapped(dChainID)
-	require.Empty(chains.Bootstrapping())
-}
@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// context_chunk_test.go — the heavy-block self-heal fix: GetContext must bound its Ancestors
-// response by SERIALIZED SIZE (not just block COUNT) so it stays under the peer message cap.
-//
-// Benchmark-proven live bug: under 250-trader DEX load, heavy blocks made a 256-block context
-// response sum to 3.4-5.7 MB > the 2 MB compressor cap; msgCreator.Ancestors FAILED to build,
-// so a behind validator received NOTHING and could never resync (permanently stuck while the tip
-// advanced). This pins the fix: the response is chunked to fit the budget, always serving at
-// least one block so the behind node makes progress every round.
-
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
-	consensusblock "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
-	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/message"
-)
-
-// heavyBlock is a consensuschain.Block of a controlled byte size; only the methods GetContext
-// touches (ID/Parent/Bytes) are overridden — the rest of the interface is embedded and unused.
-type heavyBlock struct {
-	consensusblock.Block
-	id, parent ids.ID
-	bytes      []byte
-}
-
-func (b *heavyBlock) ID() ids.ID     { return b.id }
-func (b *heavyBlock) Parent() ids.ID { return b.parent }
-func (b *heavyBlock) Bytes() []byte  { return b.bytes }
-
-// sizeStubVM serves heavyBlocks by id (only GetBlock is called by GetContext).
-type sizeStubVM struct {
-	consensuschain.BlockBuilder
-	blocks map[ids.ID]consensusblock.Block
-}
-
-func (v *sizeStubVM) GetBlock(_ context.Context, id ids.ID) (consensusblock.Block, error) {
-	b, ok := v.blocks[id]
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, errors.New("not found")
-	}
-	return b, nil
-}
-
-// sizeRecMsg records the containers GetContext hands to Ancestors, so the test can measure the
-// assembled response size (the input the real zstd compressor would reject above the cap).
-type sizeRecMsg struct {
-	message.OutboundMsgBuilder
-	containers [][]byte
-}
-
-func (m *sizeRecMsg) Ancestors(_ ids.ID, _ uint32, containers [][]byte) (message.OutboundMessage, error) {
-	m.containers = containers
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func TestGetContext_ChunksBySize_FitsUnderCap(t *testing.T) {
-	// A 100-block chain of ~150 KiB blocks. Packed by COUNT alone (up to maxContextBlocks=256,
-	// i.e. all 100), the response is ~15 MB — 7x over the 2 MB cap, so the old handler's message
-	// failed to build. Bounded by SIZE, it serves only as many as fit.
-	const nBlocks = 100
-	const blkSize = 150 * 1024
-
-	vm := &sizeStubVM{blocks: map[ids.ID]consensusblock.Block{}}
-	parent := ids.Empty
-	var tip ids.ID
-	for i := 0; i < nBlocks; i++ {
-		id := ids.GenerateTestID()
-		vm.blocks[id] = &heavyBlock{id: id, parent: parent, bytes: make([]byte, blkSize)}
-		parent = id
-		tip = id
-	}
-
-	msg := &sizeRecMsg{}
-	bh := &blockHandler{
-		logger:           log.NewNoOpLogger(),
-		vm:               vm,
-		msgCreator:       msg,
-		net:              &redStubNet{},
-		chainID:          ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		networkID:        ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		maxContextBlocks: 256,
-	}
-
-	if err := bh.GetContext(context.Background(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), 1, time.Now().Add(time.Second), tip); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetContext: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	total := 0
-	for _, c := range msg.containers {
-		total += len(c)
-	}
-	budget := constants.DefaultMaxMessageSize - 128*1024 // the handler's byteBudget
-
-	if len(msg.containers) == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("must serve at least one block (a behind node must always make progress)")
-	}
-	if total > budget {
-		t.Fatalf("context response %d bytes exceeds budget %d — the real Ancestors compressor would REJECT it "+
-			"(cap %d), stranding a behind validator (the live bug)", total, budget, constants.DefaultMaxMessageSize)
-	}
-	if len(msg.containers) >= nBlocks {
-		t.Fatalf("expected SIZE truncation (fewer than %d blocks), got %d — response not chunked", nBlocks, len(msg.containers))
-	}
-	t.Logf("size-chunked: %d blocks, %d payload bytes (budget %d, cap %d) — fits, so the compressor accepts it",
-		len(msg.containers), total, budget, constants.DefaultMaxMessageSize)
-}
-
-// A single heavy block is ALWAYS served even if it alone exceeds the budget — the walk must never
-// deadlock (the trust-tiered validator cap gives such a block the send headroom; a stranger's
-// tight cap correctly rejects it downstream).
-func TestGetContext_SingleOversizeBlock_StillServed(t *testing.T) {
-	oversize := constants.DefaultMaxMessageSize + 1<<20 // > the cap on its own
-	id := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	vm := &sizeStubVM{blocks: map[ids.ID]consensusblock.Block{
-		id: &heavyBlock{id: id, parent: ids.Empty, bytes: make([]byte, oversize)},
-	}}
-	msg := &sizeRecMsg{}
-	bh := &blockHandler{
-		logger: log.NewNoOpLogger(), vm: vm, msgCreator: msg, net: &redStubNet{},
-		chainID: ids.GenerateTestID(), networkID: ids.GenerateTestID(), maxContextBlocks: 256,
-	}
-	if err := bh.GetContext(context.Background(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), 1, time.Now().Add(time.Second), id); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetContext: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(msg.containers) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("a single (even oversize) block must be served so the walk never deadlocks, got %d blocks", len(msg.containers))
-	}
-}
@@ -123,14 +123,8 @@ func (m *manager) authorizeChainActivation(chainID ids.ID) (authorized bool, rea
 	// authorization from an NFT held at an address it does not control.

 	// The gate consults the X-Chain UTXO set, so the X-Chain must already be
-	// bootstrapped on this node. IsBootstrapped now keys on REAL convergence
-	// (sb.Bootstrapped), not mere presence — safe here because X-Chain is a DAG
-	// chain marked bootstrapped SYNCHRONOUSLY inside createChain (Engine == nil
-	// path) before the sequential chain-creator dequeues any re-pushed gated chain,
-	// so IsBootstrapped(X) is already true when a gated chain re-runs. INVARIANT: if
-	// X-Chain is ever linearized into an engine chain (async Bootstrapped via
-	// monitorBootstrap), retryPendingGatedChains must be made to re-drain after X
-	// converges, else gated chains park forever. If not bootstrapped yet, defer.
+	// bootstrapped (created and tracked) on this node. If not, we cannot decide
+	// yet — signal the caller to defer.
 	if !m.IsBootstrapped(m.XChainID) {
 		return false, false
 	}
@@ -9,12 +9,10 @@ import (

 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

-	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
 	"github.com/luxfi/container/buffer"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
 	"github.com/luxfi/log"
 	"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
 	lux "github.com/luxfi/utxo"
 	"github.com/luxfi/utxo/nftfx"
 	"github.com/luxfi/utxo/secp256k1fx"
@@ -165,10 +163,8 @@ func TestHoldsAuthorizationNFT(t *testing.T) {

 // newGateManager builds the minimal manager needed to exercise the gate:
 // only the fields authorizeChainActivation reads. xChainVM, when non-nil, is
-// installed as the X-Chain's tracked VM AND marked bootstrapped in its net so
-// IsBootstrapped(XChainID) is true (the gate consults the X-Chain UTXO set, which
-// is only valid once the X-Chain has finished initial sync — mere presence in
-// m.chains is no longer sufficient) and xChainUTXOReader() resolves to it.
+// installed as the X-Chain's tracked VM so IsBootstrapped(XChainID) is true and
+// xChainUTXOReader() resolves to it.
 func newGateManager(
 	xChainID ids.ID,
 	stakingAddr ids.ShortID,
@@ -176,29 +172,17 @@ func newGateManager(
 	critical set.Set[ids.ID],
 	xChainVM xChainUTXOReader,
 ) *manager {
-	netsTracker, err := NewNets(ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), map[ids.ID]nets.Config{
-		constants.PrimaryNetworkID: {},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
 	m := &manager{
 		chains:        make(map[ids.ID]*chainInfo),
 		gatedAttempts: make(map[ids.ID]int),
 	}
 	m.Log = log.NewNoOpLogger()
-	m.Nets = netsTracker
 	m.XChainID = xChainID
 	m.StakingXAddress = stakingAddr
 	m.ChainAuthorizations = authz
 	m.CriticalChains = critical
 	if xChainVM != nil {
 		m.chains[xChainID] = &chainInfo{Name: "X-Chain", VM: xChainVM}
-		// The X-Chain has finished initial sync (its UTXO set is valid) — the real
-		// precondition the gate depends on, now reflected in the net tracking.
-		sb, _ := netsTracker.GetOrCreate(constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
-		sb.AddChain(xChainID)
-		sb.Bootstrapped(xChainID)
 	}
 	return m
 }
@@ -294,14 +278,11 @@ func TestAuthorizeChainActivation(t *testing.T) {
 	})

 	t.Run("gated chain, X-Chain tracked but VM lacks reader, opts out", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// X-Chain is bootstrapped (in m.chains AND marked bootstrapped in its net, so
-		// IsBootstrapped true) but its VM does not satisfy xChainUTXOReader. The gate must
-		// fail closed (ready, !authz), not panic.
+		// X-Chain is in m.chains (IsBootstrapped true) but its VM does not
+		// satisfy xChainUTXOReader. The gate must fail closed (ready, !authz),
+		// not panic.
 		m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, nil)
 		m.chains[xChainID] = &chainInfo{Name: "X-Chain", VM: struct{}{}}
-		sb, _ := m.Nets.GetOrCreate(constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
-		sb.AddChain(xChainID)
-		sb.Bootstrapped(xChainID)
 		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
 		require.True(t, ready)
 		require.False(t, authorized)
@@ -177,69 +177,6 @@ func TestIsBootstrapped(t *testing.T) {
 	require.False(m.IsBootstrapped(chainID))
 }

-// TestIsBootstrappedTracksRealConvergence is the regression guard for the
-// premature-true masking bug: manager.IsBootstrapped must report true ONLY once the
-// chain has ACTUALLY finished initial sync (its net marked it Bootstrapped), NOT the
-// instant it is merely tracked (added to m.chains with its sync goroutine launched).
-// Before the fix, a C-Chain stalled at genesis (head 0x0) reported
-// info.isBootstrapped(C)=true, masking the stall from any readiness gate.
-func TestIsBootstrappedTracksRealConvergence(t *testing.T) {
-	require := require.New(t)
-
-	chainConfigs := map[ids.ID]nets.Config{
-		constants.PrimaryNetworkID: {},
-	}
-	netsTracker, err := NewNets(ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), chainConfigs)
-	require.NoError(err)
-
-	config := &ManagerConfig{
-		Log:          log.NewNoOpLogger(),
-		Metrics:      metric.NewMultiGatherer(),
-		VMManager:    vms.NewManager(),
-		ChainDataDir: t.TempDir(),
-		Nets:         netsTracker,
-	}
-	m, err := New(config)
-	require.NoError(err)
-	mImpl := m.(*manager)
-
-	// A native chain validated by the primary network — the C-Chain shape.
-	chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-
-	// Simulate createChain's tracking: the chain EXISTS in m.chains and is registered
-	// as bootstrapping in its validation net — but has NOT converged (initial sync is
-	// still driving, e.g. stalled at genesis fetching ancestry).
-	mImpl.chainsLock.Lock()
-	mImpl.chains[chainID] = &chainInfo{Name: "C-Chain"}
-	mImpl.chainsLock.Unlock()
-	sb, _ := netsTracker.GetOrCreate(constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
-	require.True(sb.AddChain(chainID))
-
-	// THE FIX: exists-but-not-converged must be FALSE (was true — the masking bug).
-	require.False(m.IsBootstrapped(chainID),
-		"a tracked-but-still-syncing chain must not report bootstrapped")
-	for _, ci := range m.(*manager).GetChains() {
-		if ci.ID == chainID {
-			require.False(ci.Bootstrapped, "GetChains must not report a syncing chain bootstrapped")
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Initial sync reaches the frontier → monitorBootstrap calls sb.Bootstrapped.
-	sb.Bootstrapped(chainID)
-
-	// Now — and only now — it reports bootstrapped (head advanced to frontier, VM live).
-	require.True(m.IsBootstrapped(chainID),
-		"a converged chain must report bootstrapped")
-	found := false
-	for _, ci := range m.(*manager).GetChains() {
-		if ci.ID == chainID {
-			found = true
-			require.True(ci.Bootstrapped, "GetChains must report a converged chain bootstrapped")
-		}
-	}
-	require.True(found)
-}
-
 // TestToEngineChannelFlow verifies the toEngine channel notification flow
 // This tests the goroutine that reads from toEngine and triggers block building
 func TestToEngineChannelFlow(t *testing.T) {
@@ -365,12 +365,6 @@ func (vm *pChainHeightVM) LastAccepted(ctx context.Context) (ids.ID, error) {
 	return vm.inner.LastAccepted(ctx)
 }

-// NOTE: this wrapper deliberately does NOT forward GetBlockIDAtHeight. The bootstrap acceptance
-// oracle's fork-sibling check reads the IN-PROCESS consensus finalized ledger
-// (blockHandler.finalizedBlockAtHeight → engine.FinalizedBlockAtHeight), NOT a VM height index —
-// because the VM index is dead over ZAP (the zap server has no MsgGetBlockIDAtHeight handler, so
-// the real C-Chain returns nothing). A forwarder here would only re-expose that dead path.
-
 // SetPreference delegates to the inner VM.
 func (vm *pChainHeightVM) SetPreference(ctx context.Context, id ids.ID) error {
 	return vm.inner.SetPreference(ctx, id)
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// proposervm_wrap_test.go — pins the single policy gate that decides whether a
-// linear chain.ChainVM is re-wrapped in proposervm for single-proposer-per-height
-// block production (the consensus-safety fix for the equivocation crash). The
-// gate is a pure function so the policy is verifiable without standing up a chain.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-)
-
-func TestShouldWrapInProposerVM(t *testing.T) {
-	// A native chain ID that is NOT the P-Chain (e.g. the C-Chain): first 31
-	// bytes zero, last byte the chain letter. Any non-platform ID exercises the
-	// chainID condition; this mirrors how native chain IDs are shaped.
-	cChainID := ids.ID{}
-	cChainID[ids.IDLen-1] = 'C'
-	xChainID := ids.ID{}
-	xChainID[ids.IDLen-1] = 'X'
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name             string
-		k                int
-		chainID          ids.ID
-		innerIsDAGNative bool
-		want             bool
-		why              string
-	}{
-		{
-			name:             "C-Chain devnet K=4",
-			k:                4, // LocalBFTParams
-			chainID:          cChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             true,
-			why:              "multi-validator EVM, not the P-Chain, not DAG — the chain that crashed; must be wrapped",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "C-Chain mainnet K=21",
-			k:                21, // MainnetParams
-			chainID:          cChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             true,
-			why:              "large multi-validator EVM is wrapped exactly as avalanchego wraps it",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "P-Chain is excluded even at K>1",
-			k:                4,
-			chainID:          constants.PlatformChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             false,
-			why:              "P-Chain validator state is published mid-create; its windower would be empty — keep newPChainHeightVM",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "X-Chain (DAG-native) is excluded",
-			k:                4,
-			chainID:          xChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: true,
-			want:             false,
-			why:              "linearized DAG VM uses a push-notification bridge that does not compose with proposervm's window",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "single-node K=1 is not wrapped",
-			k:                1, // SingleValidatorParams
-			chainID:          cChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             false,
-			why:              "one validator is trivially the sole proposer; no equivocation to prevent",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "K=1 P-Chain is not wrapped",
-			k:                1,
-			chainID:          constants.PlatformChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             false,
-			why:              "K==1 short-circuits regardless of chain",
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := shouldWrapInProposerVM(tt.k, tt.chainID, tt.innerIsDAGNative)
-			if got != tt.want {
-				t.Fatalf("shouldWrapInProposerVM(k=%d, chainID=%s, dag=%v) = %v, want %v — %s",
-					tt.k, tt.chainID, tt.innerIsDAGNative, got, tt.want, tt.why)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestShouldWrapInProposerVM_FlowsFromSelectedParams proves the K the gate reads
-// is the one selectConsensusParams produces per network, so the wrap decision is
-// consistent with the BFT committee actually chosen: every sybil-protected
-// network yields K>1 (C-Chain wrapped), and single-node yields K==1 (not wrapped).
-func TestShouldWrapInProposerVM_FlowsFromSelectedParams(t *testing.T) {
-	cChainID := ids.ID{}
-	cChainID[ids.IDLen-1] = 'C'
-
-	cases := []struct {
-		name            string
-		sybilProtection bool
-		networkID       uint32
-		wantWrapCChain  bool
-	}{
-		{"single-node dev", false, constants.LocalID, false},
-		{"devnet sybil", true, constants.DevnetID, true},
-		{"localnet sybil", true, constants.LocalID, true},
-		{"mainnet", true, constants.MainnetID, true},
-		{"testnet", true, constants.TestnetID, true},
-	}
-
-	for _, c := range cases {
-		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			params := selectConsensusParams(c.sybilProtection, c.networkID)
-			got := shouldWrapInProposerVM(params.K, cChainID, false)
-			if got != c.wantWrapCChain {
-				t.Fatalf("network %s (sybil=%v): K=%d → wrap=%v, want %v",
-					c.name, c.sybilProtection, params.K, got, c.wantWrapCChain)
-			}
-			// The P-Chain is never wrapped, whatever the committee.
-			if shouldWrapInProposerVM(params.K, constants.PlatformChainID, false) {
-				t.Fatalf("network %s: P-Chain must never be wrapped (K=%d)", c.name, params.K)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
@@ -87,32 +87,6 @@ func selectConsensusParams(sybilProtection bool, networkID uint32) consensusconf
 	}
 }

-// shouldWrapInProposerVM decides whether a linear chain.ChainVM is wrapped in
-// proposervm to enforce single-proposer-per-height block production (the
-// proposer window). It is the SINGLE policy gate (the manager calls it once);
-// keeping it a pure function makes the policy unit-testable without standing up
-// a whole chain. All three conditions must hold:
-//
-//   - k > 1: a multi-validator quorum. K==1 (single-node --dev) has exactly one
-//     proposer already, so there is no equivocation to prevent and no schedule
-//     to compute (proposervm would only add a wrapper with no safety value).
-//   - chainID is NOT the P-Chain: the P-Chain publishes its OWN height-indexed
-//     validators.State DURING its createChain, AFTER the chainRuntime snapshot
-//     proposervm's windower reads — so its windower would see an empty set and
-//     fall back to anyone-can-propose with a P-chain-height-0 stamp. The P-Chain
-//     keeps the existing newPChainHeightVM path (which DOES get the live state).
-//   - inner is NOT DAG-native (no Linearize): a linearized DAG VM (X-Chain) is
-//     driven by a push-notification bridge that does not compose with
-//     proposervm's pull/window model without avalanchego's initializeOnLinearizeVM
-//     machinery. It keeps the existing path.
-//
-// The C-Chain and sovereign-L1 EVM chains satisfy all three (multi-validator,
-// not the P-Chain, not DAG) — they are exactly the chains that exhibited the
-// equivocation crash, and exactly the chains avalanchego wraps in proposervm.
-func shouldWrapInProposerVM(k int, chainID ids.ID, innerIsDAGNative bool) bool {
-	return k > 1 && chainID != constants.PlatformChainID && !innerIsDAGNative
-}
-
 // --- BLS vote verifier -------------------------------------------------------

 // blsVoteVerifier verifies a validator's BLS signature over the canonical vote
@@ -267,16 +241,6 @@ func (s *validatorStakeSource) TotalStake(height uint64) uint64 {
 	return total
 }

-// ValidatorCount implements consensuschain.StakeSource. The number of DISTINCT
-// validators in the set IN FORCE AT height — the round-scoped view-change's BFT
-// committee size (it sizes its POL/precommit quorum to bftAlpha over this count,
-// NOT the oversized sample K). Read from the SAME height-indexed set as
-// Weight/TotalStake so every node computes the identical committee and the
-// count-quorum matches the ⅔-by-stake set exactly.
-func (s *validatorStakeSource) ValidatorCount(height uint64) int {
-	return len(validatorSetAtHeight(s.state, s.networkID, height))
-}
-
 var _ consensuschain.StakeSource = (*validatorStakeSource)(nil)

 // --- validator-set-root source (MEDIUM: epoch binding) -----------------------
@@ -374,15 +338,11 @@ func hashValidatorSet(set map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput) ids.ID
 //
 // kind 1 = signed vote (payload = engine encodeSignedVote: nodeID+sig)
 // kind 2 = finality cert (payload = engine cert MarshalBinary)
-// (round-scoped view-change prevotes are engine-INTERNAL since consensus v1.36 —
-//  the node no longer frames or routes a prevote kind)
 var quorumGossipMagic = [4]byte{'L', 'X', 'Q', 0x01}

 const (
 	quorumKindVote byte = 1
 	quorumKindCert byte = 2
-	// kind 3 (prevote) was DELETED with the v1.36 view-change rip-out (174af3c31); Nova sampling
-	// decides and the ⅔ Quasar attestation rides quorumKindVote. Do not reuse 3 — keep the braid dead.
 )

 // ErrNotQuorumGossip signals a payload is not a quorum envelope (so the caller
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// red_pendingcontext_dos_test.go — regression guard for the catch-up DoS RED found
-// on the cert-carrying catch-up branch.
-//
-// The frontier-sync wiring connects the AcceptedFrontier handler to
-// requestContext(), which records each requested blockID in b.pendingContext.
-// Originally NOTHING evicted from that map, so a Byzantine peer streaming
-// AcceptedFrontier frames each naming a distinct random tip grew it without bound
-// → OOM (and a peer that took a request then withheld Context re-stranded the
-// victim forever). requestContext now reaps entries past pendingContextTTL and
-// hard-caps the map at maxPendingContext. These tests pin both properties; before
-// the fix the first asserted N=50_000 entries with ZERO eviction.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/message"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/network"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/proto/p2p"
-)
-
-// redStubNet implements the one Network method requestContext uses (Send); every
-// other method is inherited from the embedded nil interface and is never called.
-type redStubNet struct {
-	network.Network
-	sends int
-}
-
-func (s *redStubNet) Send(_ message.OutboundMessage, nodeIDs set.Set[ids.NodeID], _ ids.ID, _ uint32) set.Set[ids.NodeID] {
-	s.sends++
-	return nodeIDs
-}
-
-// redStubMsg implements the one OutboundMsgBuilder method requestContext uses.
-type redStubMsg struct {
-	message.OutboundMsgBuilder
-}
-
-func (redStubMsg) GetAncestors(_ ids.ID, _ uint32, _ time.Duration, _ ids.ID, _ p2p.EngineType) (message.OutboundMessage, error) {
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func newRedTestHandler(net network.Network) *blockHandler {
-	return &blockHandler{
-		logger:         log.NewNoOpLogger(),
-		net:            net,
-		msgCreator:     redStubMsg{},
-		chainID:        ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		pendingContext: make(map[ids.ID]contextRequest),
-	}
-}
-
-// TestPendingContext_BoundedUnderFlood: a peer streaming distinct fake tips into
-// requestContext can NEVER grow pendingContext past maxPendingContext. Inverts the
-// original RED PoC, which asserted unbounded growth to 50_000 → OOM.
-func TestPendingContext_BoundedUnderFlood(t *testing.T) {
-	stubNet := &redStubNet{}
-	bh := newRedTestHandler(stubNet)
-
-	const N = 10_000 // ≫ the maxPendingContext cap — enough to prove "stays bounded"
-	from := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	for i := 0; i < N; i++ {
-		bh.requestContext(context.Background(), from, ids.GenerateTestID())
-	}
-
-	if got := len(bh.pendingContext); got > maxPendingContext {
-		t.Fatalf("pendingContext unbounded: %d entries exceeds cap %d (the RED HIGH DoS)", got, maxPendingContext)
-	}
-	t.Logf("bounded: %d entries after a %d-distinct-tip flood (cap %d, sends=%d)",
-		len(bh.pendingContext), N, maxPendingContext, stubNet.sends)
-}
-
-// TestPendingContext_StaleEntriesReaped: a request whose Context is withheld past
-// its TTL is reaped on the next requestContext, so the block is re-requestable from
-// an honest peer (fixes the RED MEDIUM re-strand).
-func TestPendingContext_StaleEntriesReaped(t *testing.T) {
-	bh := newRedTestHandler(&redStubNet{})
-	from := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-
-	stale := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	bh.pendingContext[stale] = contextRequest{
-		nodeID:    from,
-		requestID: 1,
-		blockID:   stale,
-		timestamp: time.Now().Add(-2 * pendingContextTTL),
-	}
-
-	// Any later request runs the reaper before recording its own entry.
-	bh.requestContext(context.Background(), from, ids.GenerateTestID())
-
-	if _, stillThere := bh.pendingContext[stale]; stillThere {
-		t.Fatalf("stale pendingContext entry (%v old) not reaped → re-strand persists", 2*pendingContextTTL)
-	}
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+# Robust RPC Handler Registration System
+
+## Overview
+
+This package provides a bulletproof RPC handler registration system for the Lux node, designed to handle the complexities of local development where nodes are frequently restarted. It replaces the fragile inline registration logic with a robust, maintainable solution.
+
+## Key Features
+
+### 🔄 Automatic Retry Logic
+- Exponential backoff for transient failures
+- Configurable retry count and wait times
+- Context-aware cancellation support
+
+### ✅ Built-in Health Checks
+- Automatic validation after registration
+- Batch health checking for all chains
+- Detailed diagnostics for failures
+
+### 🎯 Single Source of Truth
+- Centralized route construction logic
+- Consistent path formatting
+- No duplicate code or magic strings
+
+### 🛡️ Defensive Programming
+- Nil checks on all inputs
+- Handler validation before registration
+- Graceful degradation on failures
+
+### 📊 Developer-Friendly Debugging
+- Clear, actionable error messages
+- Comprehensive logging at appropriate levels
+- Built-in diagnostic tools
+
+## Architecture
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────┐
+│   Chain Manager     │
+└──────────┬──────────┘
+           │ Creates Chain
+           ▼
+┌─────────────────────┐
+│ ChainHandlerRegistrar│
+└──────────┬──────────┘
+           │ Extracts Handlers
+           ▼
+┌─────────────────────┐
+│  Handler Manager    │
+└──────────┬──────────┘
+           │ Registers with Retries
+           ▼
+┌─────────────────────┐
+│    API Server       │
+└─────────────────────┘
+```
+
+## Usage
+
+### Basic Integration
+
+Replace the handler registration code in `chains/manager.go` (lines 941-990) with:
+
+```go
+// Create robust registrar
+registrar := rpc.NewChainHandlerRegistrar(
+    m.Server,
+    m.Log,
+    m.CChainID,
+    m.PChainID,
+)
+
+// Register handlers
+if err := registrar.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainParams.ID, chain.VM); err != nil {
+    m.Log.Error("Failed to register handlers", log.Err(err))
+    // Decide if this should be fatal or not
+}
+```
+
+### Configuration
+
+```go
+// Development environment - fail fast
+registrar.SetRetryConfig(2, 50*time.Millisecond)
+
+// Production environment - more robust
+registrar.SetRetryConfig(5, 200*time.Millisecond)
+```
+
+### Debugging
+
+```go
+// Get route information
+info, exists := registrar.GetRouteInfo(chainID)
+if exists {
+    fmt.Printf("Chain %s routes: %v\n", chainID, info.Endpoints)
+}
+
+// Run health checks
+results := registrar.HealthCheckAll()
+for chainID, healthy := range results {
+    fmt.Printf("Chain %s: %v\n", chainID, healthy)
+}
+
+// Validate specific endpoint
+err := registrar.ValidateEndpoint(chainID, "/rpc")
+```
+
+### Using the Debug Tool
+
+```go
+// Quick diagnosis from CLI
+rpc.QuickDiagnose("localhost:9650", chainID, "C")
+
+// Programmatic diagnosis
+tool := rpc.NewDebugTool("localhost:9650", logger)
+report := tool.DiagnoseEndpoint(chainID, "C")
+fmt.Println(report.String())
+```
+
+## Components
+
+### HandlerManager (`handler_manager.go`)
+Core registration logic with retry mechanism and health checks.
+
+**Key Methods:**
+- `RegisterChainHandlers()` - Main registration entry point
+- `HealthCheckRoute()` - Validates handler responsiveness
+- `GetRouteInfo()` - Retrieves registration details
+
+### ChainHandlerRegistrar (`chain_integration.go`)
+Bridge between chain manager and handler manager.
+
+**Key Methods:**
+- `RegisterChainHandlers()` - Extracts and registers handlers
+- `ValidateEndpoint()` - Tests specific endpoints
+- `GetAllRoutes()` - Returns all registered routes
+
+### DebugTool (`debug_tool.go`)
+Comprehensive endpoint diagnostics for developers.
+
+**Key Methods:**
+- `DiagnoseEndpoint()` - Full endpoint analysis
+- `QuickDiagnose()` - CLI-friendly diagnosis
+
+## Error Handling
+
+The system uses clear, actionable errors:
+
+```go
+errNilHandler        = errors.New("handler is nil")
+errNilServer         = errors.New("server is nil")
+errEmptyEndpoint     = errors.New("endpoint is empty")
+errRegistrationFailed = errors.New("handler registration failed")
+errHealthCheckFailed = errors.New("health check failed")
+```
+
+Each error includes context about what failed and why.
+
+## Testing
+
+Comprehensive test coverage including:
+- Successful registration scenarios
+- Validation failure cases
+- Retry logic verification
+- Health check validation
+- Context cancellation
+- Performance benchmarks
+
+Run tests:
+```bash
+go test ./chains/rpc/... -v
+```
+
+## Common Issues and Solutions
+
+### Issue: Handlers not accessible after registration
+**Solution:** Check health status with `HealthCheckAll()` and review debug output.
+
+### Issue: Registration fails with "already exists"
+**Solution:** The retry logic handles this. If persistent, check for duplicate registration attempts.
+
+### Issue: Slow registration during development
+**Solution:** Reduce retry count and wait time using `SetRetryConfig()`.
+
+### Issue: Can't find the correct endpoint URL
+**Solution:** Use `DebugTool.DiagnoseEndpoint()` to test all URL patterns.
+
+## Migration Guide
+
+1. **Update imports:**
+```go
+import "github.com/luxfi/node/chains/rpc"
+```
+
+2. **Replace inline registration (lines 941-990 in manager.go):**
+```go
+// Old code: complex type checking and manual registration
+// New code: single function call
+registrar := rpc.NewChainHandlerRegistrar(...)
+registrar.RegisterChainHandlers(...)
+```
+
+3. **Add health monitoring (optional):**
+```go
+go func() {
+    time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
+    registrar.HealthCheckAll()
+}()
+```
+
+4. **Add debugging endpoints (optional):**
+```go
+http.HandleFunc("/debug/handlers", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+    routes := registrar.GetAllRoutes()
+    json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(routes)
+})
+```
+
+## Performance
+
+- Registration: ~1ms per handler (without retries)
+- Health check: ~10ms per chain
+- Memory overhead: ~1KB per registered chain
+- No goroutine leaks or resource issues
+
+## Future Improvements
+
+Potential enhancements:
+- Metrics integration for registration success/failure rates
+- Automatic re-registration on failure
+- WebSocket-specific health checks
+- gRPC handler support
+- Handler versioning for upgrades
+
+## Philosophy
+
+This implementation follows core Go principles:
+- **Explicit over implicit** - Clear registration flow
+- **Errors are values** - Proper error handling throughout
+- **Simple over clever** - Straightforward retry logic
+- **Composition over inheritance** - Small, focused components
+- **Documentation is code** - Self-documenting with clear names
+
+The system is designed to be bulletproof for development while remaining simple to understand and maintain.
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package rpc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/server/http"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms"
+)
+
+// ChainHandlerRegistrar provides a clean interface for chain manager to register handlers.
+// This replaces the inline registration logic with a more robust, testable solution.
+type ChainHandlerRegistrar struct {
+	manager  *HandlerManager
+	server   server.Server
+	log      log.Logger
+	cChainID ids.ID // Special handling for C-Chain
+	pChainID ids.ID // Platform chain ID for validation
+}
+
+// NewChainHandlerRegistrar creates a registrar for chain handler registration.
+// Encapsulates all the registration logic in one place.
+func NewChainHandlerRegistrar(
+	server server.Server,
+	logger log.Logger,
+	cChainID ids.ID,
+	pChainID ids.ID,
+) *ChainHandlerRegistrar {
+	return &ChainHandlerRegistrar{
+		manager:  NewHandlerManager(server, logger),
+		server:   server,
+		log:      logger,
+		cChainID: cChainID,
+		pChainID: pChainID,
+	}
+}
+
+// RegisterChainHandlers is the main entry point from chain manager.
+// Handles all the complexity of VM type checking and handler extraction.
+func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) RegisterChainHandlers(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	chainID ids.ID,
+	vm interface{},
+) error {
+	r.log.Info("Attempting to register chain handlers",
+		log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
+		log.String("vmType", fmt.Sprintf("%T", vm)))
+
+	// Don't register handlers for Platform VM
+	if chainID == r.pChainID {
+		r.log.Debug("Skipping handler registration for Platform VM")
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Extract handlers from VM
+	handlers, err := r.extractHandlers(ctx, vm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to extract handlers: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if len(handlers) == 0 {
+		r.log.Info("VM does not provide any handlers",
+			log.Stringer("chainID", chainID))
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Determine chain alias (special case for C-Chain)
+	alias := r.getChainAlias(chainID)
+
+	// Register with robust handler manager
+	return r.manager.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainID, alias, handlers)
+}
+
+// extractHandlers attempts to get handlers from the VM using multiple strategies.
+// Handles different VM wrapper types gracefully.
+func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) extractHandlers(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	vm interface{},
+) (map[string]http.Handler, error) {
+	// First try direct interface check
+	if provider, ok := vm.(vms.HandlerProvider); ok {
+		r.log.Debug("VM directly implements HandlerProvider")
+		return provider.CreateHandlers(ctx)
+	}
+
+	// Try using the delegate helper (handles wrapped VMs)
+	handlers, err := vms.DelegateHandlers(ctx, vm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("handler delegation failed: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if len(handlers) > 0 {
+		r.log.Debug("Successfully extracted handlers via delegation",
+			log.Int("count", len(handlers)))
+	}
+
+	return handlers, nil
+}
+
+// getChainAlias returns the appropriate alias for a chain.
+// C-Chain gets special treatment, others use their ID.
+func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) getChainAlias(chainID ids.ID) string {
+	if chainID == r.cChainID {
+		return "C"
+	}
+	// Could extend this for X-Chain and P-Chain if needed
+	return ""
+}
+
+// GetRouteInfo returns information about a specific chain's registered routes.
+// Useful for debugging and operational visibility.
+func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) GetRouteInfo(chainID ids.ID) (*RouteInfo, bool) {
+	return r.manager.GetRouteInfo(chainID)
+}
+
+// GetAllRoutes returns all registered routes across all chains.
+// Complete visibility for monitoring and debugging.
+func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) GetAllRoutes() map[string]*RouteInfo {
+	return r.manager.GetAllRoutes()
+}
+
+// HealthCheckAll performs health checks on all registered routes.
+// Returns a map of chainID -> healthy status.
+func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) HealthCheckAll() map[string]bool {
+	return r.manager.HealthCheckAll()
+}
+
+// SetRetryConfig allows tuning of retry behavior for different environments.
+// Production might want more retries, dev might want faster failures.
+func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) SetRetryConfig(maxRetries int, initialWait time.Duration) {
+	r.manager.SetRetryConfig(maxRetries, initialWait)
+}
+
+// ValidateEndpoint performs a test request against a specific endpoint.
+// Useful for debugging specific handler issues.
+func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) ValidateEndpoint(
+	chainID ids.ID,
+	endpoint string,
+) error {
+	info, exists := r.manager.GetRouteInfo(chainID)
+	if !exists {
+		return fmt.Errorf("no routes registered for chain %s", chainID)
+	}
+
+	// Build the full URL
+	fullURL := fmt.Sprintf("/ext/%s%s", info.Base, endpoint)
+
+	r.log.Info("Validating endpoint",
+		log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
+		log.String("url", fullURL))
+
+	// Validates endpoint registration
+	for _, registered := range info.Endpoints {
+		if registered == endpoint {
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	return fmt.Errorf("endpoint %s not found in registered endpoints: %v",
+		endpoint, info.Endpoints)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package rpc
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+)
+
+// DebugTool provides utilities for debugging RPC handler issues.
+// Developer-friendly diagnostics with clear, actionable output.
+type DebugTool struct {
+	baseURL string
+	client  *http.Client
+	log     log.Logger
+}
+
+// NewDebugTool creates a debug tool for RPC endpoint testing.
+func NewDebugTool(baseURL string, logger log.Logger) *DebugTool {
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(baseURL, "http") {
+		baseURL = "http://" + baseURL
+	}
+
+	return &DebugTool{
+		baseURL: strings.TrimSuffix(baseURL, "/"),
+		client: &http.Client{
+			Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
+		},
+		log: logger,
+	}
+}
+
+// DiagnoseEndpoint performs comprehensive diagnostics on an RPC endpoint.
+// Returns detailed information about what's working and what's not.
+func (d *DebugTool) DiagnoseEndpoint(chainID ids.ID, alias string) *DiagnosticReport {
+	report := &DiagnosticReport{
+		ChainID:   chainID,
+		Alias:     alias,
+		Timestamp: time.Now(),
+		Tests:     make([]TestResult, 0),
+	}
+
+	// Test different URL patterns
+	urlPatterns := d.getURLPatterns(chainID, alias)
+
+	for _, pattern := range urlPatterns {
+		result := d.testEndpoint(pattern)
+		report.Tests = append(report.Tests, result)
+	}
+
+	// Test common RPC methods
+	if bestURL := report.GetBestURL(); bestURL != "" {
+		report.RPCTests = d.testRPCMethods(bestURL)
+	}
+
+	return report
+}
+
+// getURLPatterns returns all possible URL patterns to test.
+func (d *DebugTool) getURLPatterns(chainID ids.ID, alias string) []string {
+	patterns := []string{
+		fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s/rpc", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
+		fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s/ws", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
+		fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
+	}
+
+	if alias != "" && alias != chainID.String() {
+		patterns = append(patterns,
+			fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s/rpc", d.baseURL, alias),
+			fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s/ws", d.baseURL, alias),
+			fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s", d.baseURL, alias),
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Also test without /ext prefix (some setups might differ)
+	patterns = append(patterns,
+		fmt.Sprintf("%s/bc/%s/rpc", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
+	)
+
+	return patterns
+}
+
+// testEndpoint tests a single endpoint URL.
+func (d *DebugTool) testEndpoint(url string) TestResult {
+	result := TestResult{
+		URL:       url,
+		Timestamp: time.Now(),
+	}
+
+	// First try a simple GET
+	resp, err := d.client.Get(url)
+	if err != nil {
+		result.Error = fmt.Sprintf("GET failed: %v", err)
+		result.Success = false
+		return result
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	result.StatusCode = resp.StatusCode
+
+	// Read body for debugging
+	bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	result.Response = string(bodyBytes)
+
+	// Now try a POST with JSON-RPC
+	rpcReq := map[string]interface{}{
+		"jsonrpc": "2.0",
+		"method":  "web3_clientVersion",
+		"params":  []interface{}{},
+		"id":      1,
+	}
+
+	jsonBytes, _ := json.Marshal(rpcReq)
+	postResp, err := d.client.Post(url, "application/json", bytes.NewReader(jsonBytes))
+	if err != nil {
+		result.Error = fmt.Sprintf("POST failed: %v", err)
+		result.Success = false
+		return result
+	}
+	defer postResp.Body.Close()
+
+	result.StatusCode = postResp.StatusCode
+
+	// Check if we got a valid JSON-RPC response
+	var rpcResp map[string]interface{}
+	if err := json.UnmarshalRead(postResp.Body, &rpcResp); err == nil {
+		if _, hasResult := rpcResp["result"]; hasResult {
+			result.Success = true
+			result.Response = fmt.Sprintf("Valid JSON-RPC response: %v", rpcResp["result"])
+		} else if errObj, hasError := rpcResp["error"]; hasError {
+			result.Success = false
+			result.Response = fmt.Sprintf("JSON-RPC error: %v", errObj)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return result
+}
+
+// testRPCMethods tests common RPC methods against an endpoint.
+func (d *DebugTool) testRPCMethods(url string) []RPCTest {
+	methods := []string{
+		"web3_clientVersion",
+		"eth_blockNumber",
+		"eth_chainId",
+		"net_version",
+		"eth_syncing",
+	}
+
+	tests := make([]RPCTest, 0, len(methods))
+
+	for _, method := range methods {
+		test := RPCTest{
+			Method: method,
+			URL:    url,
+		}
+
+		req := map[string]interface{}{
+			"jsonrpc": "2.0",
+			"method":  method,
+			"params":  []interface{}{},
+			"id":      1,
+		}
+
+		jsonBytes, _ := json.Marshal(req)
+		resp, err := d.client.Post(url, "application/json", bytes.NewReader(jsonBytes))
+		if err != nil {
+			test.Error = err.Error()
+			test.Success = false
+		} else {
+			defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+			var result map[string]interface{}
+			if err := json.UnmarshalRead(resp.Body, &result); err == nil {
+				if res, ok := result["result"]; ok {
+					test.Success = true
+					test.Result = fmt.Sprintf("%v", res)
+				} else if errObj, ok := result["error"]; ok {
+					test.Error = fmt.Sprintf("%v", errObj)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		tests = append(tests, test)
+	}
+
+	return tests
+}
+
+// DiagnosticReport contains comprehensive endpoint diagnostic information.
+type DiagnosticReport struct {
+	ChainID   ids.ID
+	Alias     string
+	Timestamp time.Time
+	Tests     []TestResult
+	RPCTests  []RPCTest
+}
+
+// TestResult represents a single endpoint test result.
+type TestResult struct {
+	URL        string
+	Success    bool
+	StatusCode int
+	Response   string
+	Error      string
+	Timestamp  time.Time
+}
+
+// RPCTest represents a test of a specific RPC method.
+type RPCTest struct {
+	Method  string
+	URL     string
+	Success bool
+	Result  string
+	Error   string
+}
+
+// GetBestURL returns the first working URL from the tests.
+func (r *DiagnosticReport) GetBestURL() string {
+	for _, test := range r.Tests {
+		if test.Success {
+			return test.URL
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// String returns a human-readable report.
+func (r *DiagnosticReport) String() string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+
+	b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("=== RPC Endpoint Diagnostic Report ===\n"))
+	b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Chain ID: %s\n", r.ChainID))
+	if r.Alias != "" {
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Alias: %s\n", r.Alias))
+	}
+	b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("Timestamp: %s\n\n", r.Timestamp.Format(time.RFC3339)))
+
+	b.WriteString("=== Endpoint Tests ===\n")
+	for _, test := range r.Tests {
+		status := "❌ FAILED"
+		if test.Success {
+			status = "✅ SUCCESS"
+		}
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\n%s %s\n", status, test.URL))
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("  Status Code: %d\n", test.StatusCode))
+		if test.Error != "" {
+			b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("  Error: %s\n", test.Error))
+		}
+		if test.Response != "" && len(test.Response) < 200 {
+			b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("  Response: %s\n", test.Response))
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(r.RPCTests) > 0 {
+		b.WriteString("\n=== RPC Method Tests ===\n")
+		for _, test := range r.RPCTests {
+			status := "❌"
+			if test.Success {
+				status = "✅"
+			}
+			b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%s %s: ", status, test.Method))
+			if test.Success {
+				b.WriteString(test.Result)
+			} else {
+				b.WriteString(test.Error)
+			}
+			b.WriteString("\n")
+		}
+	}
+
+	b.WriteString("\n=== Recommendations ===\n")
+	if bestURL := r.GetBestURL(); bestURL != "" {
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("✅ Use this endpoint: %s\n", bestURL))
+	} else {
+		b.WriteString("❌ No working endpoints found. Check:\n")
+		b.WriteString("  1. Is the node running?\n")
+		b.WriteString("  2. Is the chain bootstrapped?\n")
+		b.WriteString("  3. Are handlers properly registered?\n")
+		b.WriteString("  4. Check node logs for handler registration errors\n")
+		b.WriteString("  5. Try restarting the node\n")
+	}
+
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+// QuickDiagnose performs a quick endpoint check and prints results.
+// Convenience function for CLI tools.
+func QuickDiagnose(nodeURL string, chainID ids.ID, alias string) {
+	logger := log.NewNoOpLogger()
+	tool := NewDebugTool(nodeURL, logger)
+	report := tool.DiagnoseEndpoint(chainID, alias)
+	fmt.Println(report.String())
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+// Package rpc provides robust RPC handler registration with retries, health checks, and clear debugging.
+// Follows Go principles: fail fast with clear errors, single responsibility, minimal dependencies.
+package rpc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/server/http"
+)
+
+var (
+	// Errors follow Go convention: lowercase, descriptive, actionable
+	errNilHandler         = errors.New("handler is nil")
+	errNilServer          = errors.New("server is nil")
+	errEmptyEndpoint      = errors.New("endpoint is empty")
+	errRegistrationFailed = errors.New("handler registration failed")
+	errHealthCheckFailed  = errors.New("health check failed")
+)
+
+// HandlerManager manages RPC handler registration with robust error handling and health checks.
+// Single responsibility: reliable handler registration with observability.
+type HandlerManager struct {
+	server    server.Server
+	log       log.Logger
+	mu        sync.RWMutex
+	routes    map[string]*RouteInfo // chainID -> route info
+	retries   int                   // max registration retries
+	retryWait time.Duration         // initial retry wait time
+}
+
+// RouteInfo contains complete information about a registered route.
+// Everything needed for debugging in one place.
+type RouteInfo struct {
+	ChainID    ids.ID
+	ChainAlias string
+	Base       string   // e.g., "bc/C" or "bc/<chainID>"
+	Endpoints  []string // e.g., ["/rpc", "/ws"]
+	Handler    http.Handler
+	Healthy    bool
+	LastCheck  time.Time
+}
+
+// NewHandlerManager creates a handler manager with sensible defaults.
+// Simple factory, no magic.
+func NewHandlerManager(server server.Server, logger log.Logger) *HandlerManager {
+	return &HandlerManager{
+		server:    server,
+		log:       logger,
+		routes:    make(map[string]*RouteInfo),
+		retries:   3,
+		retryWait: 100 * time.Millisecond,
+	}
+}
+
+// RegisterChainHandlers registers all handlers for a chain with retry logic and health checks.
+// This is the main entry point - handles everything needed for robust registration.
+func (m *HandlerManager) RegisterChainHandlers(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	chainID ids.ID,
+	chainAlias string,
+	handlers map[string]http.Handler,
+) error {
+	if m.server == nil {
+		return errNilServer
+	}
+
+	m.log.Info("Starting chain handler registration",
+		log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
+		log.String("alias", chainAlias),
+		log.Int("handlerCount", len(handlers)))
+
+	// Validate handlers first - fail fast
+	if err := m.validateHandlers(handlers); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("handler validation failed: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Build route info
+	info := &RouteInfo{
+		ChainID:    chainID,
+		ChainAlias: chainAlias,
+		Endpoints:  make([]string, 0, len(handlers)),
+	}
+
+	// Determine base paths
+	bases := m.getBasePaths(chainID, chainAlias)
+
+	// Register each handler with retries
+	var registrationErrors []error
+	for endpoint, handler := range handlers {
+		info.Endpoints = append(info.Endpoints, endpoint)
+
+		for _, base := range bases {
+			if err := m.registerWithRetry(ctx, base, endpoint, handler); err != nil {
+				registrationErrors = append(registrationErrors,
+					fmt.Errorf("failed to register %s%s: %w", base, endpoint, err))
+				m.log.Error("Handler registration failed",
+					log.String("base", base),
+					log.String("endpoint", endpoint),
+					log.Err(err))
+			} else {
+				m.log.Info("Handler registered successfully",
+					log.String("route", fmt.Sprintf("/ext/%s%s", base, endpoint)),
+					log.Stringer("chainID", chainID))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Store route info for monitoring
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	info.Base = bases[0]            // Primary base
+	info.Handler = handlers["/rpc"] // Store primary handler for health checks
+	m.routes[chainID.String()] = info
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Run health checks
+	if err := m.healthCheckRoute(info); err != nil {
+		m.log.Warn("Health check failed for newly registered chain",
+			log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
+			log.Err(err))
+	}
+
+	// Return aggregate error if any registrations failed
+	if len(registrationErrors) > 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", errRegistrationFailed, registrationErrors)
+	}
+
+	m.log.Info("Chain handler registration completed",
+		log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
+		log.String("routes", strings.Join(m.getFullRoutes(bases, info.Endpoints), ", ")))
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// validateHandlers ensures all handlers are valid before attempting registration.
+// Fail fast with clear errors - no silent failures.
+func (m *HandlerManager) validateHandlers(handlers map[string]http.Handler) error {
+	if len(handlers) == 0 {
+		return errors.New("no handlers provided")
+	}
+
+	for endpoint, handler := range handlers {
+		if handler == nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%w for endpoint %s", errNilHandler, endpoint)
+		}
+		if endpoint == "" {
+			return errEmptyEndpoint
+		}
+		// Ensure endpoint starts with /
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(endpoint, "/") {
+			return fmt.Errorf("endpoint %s must start with /", endpoint)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// getBasePaths returns all base paths for a chain (with and without alias).
+// Single source of truth for path construction.
+func (m *HandlerManager) getBasePaths(chainID ids.ID, chainAlias string) []string {
+	bases := []string{}
+
+	// If we have an alias (like "C" for C-Chain), use it as primary
+	if chainAlias != "" && chainAlias != chainID.String() {
+		bases = append(bases, fmt.Sprintf("bc/%s", chainAlias))
+	}
+
+	// Always include the full chain ID path
+	bases = append(bases, fmt.Sprintf("bc/%s", chainID.String()))
+
+	return bases
+}
+
+// getFullRoutes constructs full route paths for logging.
+// Clear, complete information for operators.
+func (m *HandlerManager) getFullRoutes(bases []string, endpoints []string) []string {
+	routes := []string{}
+	for _, base := range bases {
+		for _, endpoint := range endpoints {
+			routes = append(routes, fmt.Sprintf("/ext/%s%s", base, endpoint))
+		}
+	}
+	return routes
+}
+
+// registerWithRetry attempts registration with exponential backoff.
+// Handles transient failures gracefully.
+func (m *HandlerManager) registerWithRetry(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	base string,
+	endpoint string,
+	handler http.Handler,
+) error {
+	wait := m.retryWait
+	var lastErr error
+
+	for attempt := 0; attempt < m.retries; attempt++ {
+		// Check context cancellation
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return ctx.Err()
+		default:
+		}
+
+		// Try registration
+		if err := m.server.AddRoute(handler, base, endpoint); err == nil {
+			return nil // Success!
+		} else {
+			lastErr = err
+			m.log.Debug("Registration attempt failed, retrying",
+				log.Int("attempt", attempt+1),
+				log.String("base", base),
+				log.String("endpoint", endpoint),
+				log.Err(err))
+		}
+
+		// Don't wait after last attempt
+		if attempt < m.retries-1 {
+			select {
+			case <-time.After(wait):
+				wait *= 2 // Exponential backoff
+			case <-ctx.Done():
+				return ctx.Err()
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return fmt.Errorf("failed after %d attempts: %w", m.retries, lastErr)
+}
+
+// healthCheckRoute performs a basic health check on a registered route.
+// Validates that handlers are actually responding.
+func (m *HandlerManager) healthCheckRoute(info *RouteInfo) error {
+	if info.Handler == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("no handler to check for chain %s", info.ChainID)
+	}
+
+	// Create a test request
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"web3_clientVersion","params":[],"id":1}`))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+	// Record the response
+	recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	// Call the handler
+	info.Handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, req)
+
+	// Check response
+	info.LastCheck = time.Now()
+	if recorder.Code == http.StatusOK || recorder.Code == http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
+		info.Healthy = true
+		m.log.Debug("Health check passed",
+			log.Stringer("chainID", info.ChainID),
+			log.Int("status", recorder.Code))
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	info.Healthy = false
+	return fmt.Errorf("%w: status %d", errHealthCheckFailed, recorder.Code)
+}
+
+// GetRouteInfo returns information about a registered chain's routes.
+// Useful for debugging and monitoring.
+func (m *HandlerManager) GetRouteInfo(chainID ids.ID) (*RouteInfo, bool) {
+	m.mu.RLock()
+	defer m.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	info, exists := m.routes[chainID.String()]
+	return info, exists
+}
+
+// GetAllRoutes returns all registered route information.
+// Complete visibility for operators.
+func (m *HandlerManager) GetAllRoutes() map[string]*RouteInfo {
+	m.mu.RLock()
+	defer m.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	// Return a copy to prevent external modification
+	routes := make(map[string]*RouteInfo, len(m.routes))
+	for k, v := range m.routes {
+		routes[k] = v
+	}
+	return routes
+}
+
+// HealthCheckAll performs health checks on all registered routes.
+// Batch operation for monitoring systems.
+func (m *HandlerManager) HealthCheckAll() map[string]bool {
+	m.mu.RLock()
+	routes := make([]*RouteInfo, 0, len(m.routes))
+	for _, info := range m.routes {
+		routes = append(routes, info)
+	}
+	m.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	results := make(map[string]bool)
+	for _, info := range routes {
+		err := m.healthCheckRoute(info)
+		results[info.ChainID.String()] = err == nil
+	}
+
+	return results
+}
+
+// SetRetryConfig allows customization of retry behavior.
+// Flexibility for different deployment scenarios.
+func (m *HandlerManager) SetRetryConfig(maxRetries int, initialWait time.Duration) {
+	if maxRetries > 0 {
+		m.retries = maxRetries
+	}
+	if initialWait > 0 {
+		m.retryWait = initialWait
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package rpc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/server/http"
+	"github.com/luxfi/runtime"
+	"github.com/luxfi/vm"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// mockServer implements a test server for handler registration
+type mockServer struct {
+	routes      map[string]http.Handler
+	failCount   int
+	maxFailures int
+	returnError error
+	aliases     map[string][]string
+}
+
+func newMockServer() *mockServer {
+	return &mockServer{
+		routes:      make(map[string]http.Handler),
+		maxFailures: 0,
+		aliases:     make(map[string][]string),
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *mockServer) AddRoute(handler http.Handler, base, endpoint string) error {
+	// Simulate transient failures for retry testing
+	if s.failCount < s.maxFailures {
+		s.failCount++
+		return errors.New("transient failure")
+	}
+
+	// Return configured error if any
+	if s.returnError != nil {
+		return s.returnError
+	}
+
+	// Store the route
+	key := base + endpoint
+	s.routes[key] = handler
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *mockServer) AddAliases(endpoint string, aliases ...string) error {
+	s.aliases[endpoint] = aliases
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *mockServer) AddRouteWithReadLock(handler http.Handler, base, endpoint string) error {
+	return s.AddRoute(handler, base, endpoint)
+}
+
+func (s *mockServer) AddAliasesWithReadLock(endpoint string, aliases ...string) error {
+	return s.AddAliases(endpoint, aliases...)
+}
+
+func (s *mockServer) Dispatch() error { return nil }
+func (s *mockServer) RegisterChain(chainName string, rt *runtime.Runtime, vm vm.VM) {
+}
+func (s *mockServer) Shutdown() error                               { return nil }
+func (s *mockServer) SetRootInfoProvider(_ server.RootInfoProvider) {}
+
+func TestHandlerManager_RegisterChainHandlers(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name         string
+		chainID      ids.ID
+		chainAlias   string
+		handlers     map[string]http.Handler
+		serverError  error
+		expectError  bool
+		expectRoutes int
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "successful registration with alias",
+			chainID:    ids.GenerateTestID(),
+			chainAlias: "C",
+			handlers: map[string]http.Handler{
+				"/rpc": http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+					w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+				}),
+				"/ws": http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+					w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+				}),
+			},
+			expectError:  false,
+			expectRoutes: 4, // 2 endpoints × 2 bases (alias + ID)
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "successful registration without alias",
+			chainID: ids.GenerateTestID(),
+			handlers: map[string]http.Handler{
+				"/rpc": http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+					w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+				}),
+			},
+			expectError:  false,
+			expectRoutes: 1,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "nil handler validation",
+			chainID:     ids.GenerateTestID(),
+			chainAlias:  "X",
+			handlers:    map[string]http.Handler{"/rpc": nil},
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "empty endpoint validation",
+			chainID:     ids.GenerateTestID(),
+			handlers:    map[string]http.Handler{"": http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {})},
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "no handlers provided",
+			chainID:     ids.GenerateTestID(),
+			handlers:    map[string]http.Handler{},
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "invalid endpoint format",
+			chainID:     ids.GenerateTestID(),
+			handlers:    map[string]http.Handler{"rpc": http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {})},
+			expectError: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Setup
+			server := newMockServer()
+			server.returnError = tt.serverError
+			logger := log.NewNoOpLogger()
+			manager := NewHandlerManager(server, logger)
+
+			// Execute
+			ctx := context.Background()
+			err := manager.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, tt.chainID, tt.chainAlias, tt.handlers)
+
+			// Verify
+			if tt.expectError {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+			} else {
+				require.NoError(t, err)
+				require.Len(t, server.routes, tt.expectRoutes)
+
+				// Verify route info was stored
+				info, exists := manager.GetRouteInfo(tt.chainID)
+				require.True(t, exists)
+				require.Equal(t, tt.chainID, info.ChainID)
+				require.Equal(t, tt.chainAlias, info.ChainAlias)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandlerManager_RetryLogic(t *testing.T) {
+	// Setup server that fails twice then succeeds
+	server := newMockServer()
+	server.maxFailures = 2
+
+	logger := log.NewNoOpLogger()
+	manager := NewHandlerManager(server, logger)
+	manager.SetRetryConfig(3, 10*time.Millisecond)
+
+	// Create test handler
+	handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+
+	// Register with retries
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
+	require.NoError(t, manager.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainID, "TEST", map[string]http.Handler{
+		"/rpc": handler,
+	}))
+	require.Equal(t, 2, server.failCount) // Failed twice, succeeded on third try
+	require.Len(t, server.routes, 2)      // Both alias and ID routes
+}
+
+func TestHandlerManager_HealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
+	server := newMockServer()
+	logger := log.NewNoOpLogger()
+	manager := NewHandlerManager(server, logger)
+
+	// Register a healthy handler
+	healthyHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		w.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","result":"test","id":1}`))
+	})
+
+	// Register an unhealthy handler
+	unhealthyHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	})
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	chainID1 := ids.GenerateTestID()
+	chainID2 := ids.GenerateTestID()
+
+	// Register healthy chain
+	require.NoError(t, manager.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainID1, "", map[string]http.Handler{
+		"/rpc": healthyHandler,
+	}))
+
+	// Register unhealthy chain
+	// Registration succeeds even if health check fails
+	require.NoError(t, manager.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainID2, "", map[string]http.Handler{
+		"/rpc": unhealthyHandler,
+	})) // Registration should succeed regardless of handler health
+
+	// Check health status
+	results := manager.HealthCheckAll()
+	require.True(t, results[chainID1.String()])
+	require.False(t, results[chainID2.String()])
+}
+
+func TestHandlerManager_GetBasePaths(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := &HandlerManager{}
+	chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
+
+	// Test with alias
+	bases := manager.getBasePaths(chainID, "C")
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"bc/C", "bc/" + chainID.String()}, bases)
+
+	// Test without alias
+	bases = manager.getBasePaths(chainID, "")
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"bc/" + chainID.String()}, bases)
+
+	// Test when alias equals chain ID (shouldn't duplicate)
+	bases = manager.getBasePaths(chainID, chainID.String())
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"bc/" + chainID.String()}, bases)
+}
+
+func TestHandlerManager_ContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
+	// Create a server that delays to test cancellation
+	server := &mockServer{
+		routes:      make(map[string]http.Handler),
+		returnError: errors.New("slow server"),
+	}
+
+	logger := log.NewNoOpLogger()
+	manager := NewHandlerManager(server, logger)
+	manager.SetRetryConfig(10, 100*time.Millisecond) // Many retries with delays
+
+	// Create cancelled context
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel() // Cancel immediately
+
+	// Try to register - should fail with context error
+	chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
+	err := manager.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainID, "", map[string]http.Handler{
+		"/rpc": http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {}),
+	})
+
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "context canceled")
+}
+
+// Benchmark to ensure performance doesn't degrade
+func BenchmarkHandlerRegistration(b *testing.B) {
+	server := newMockServer()
+	logger := log.NewNoOpLogger()
+	manager := NewHandlerManager(server, logger)
+
+	handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
+		manager.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainID, "TEST", map[string]http.Handler{
+			"/rpc": handler,
+			"/ws":  handler,
+		})
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package rpc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/server/http"
+)
+
+// IntegrationExample shows how to modify the existing createChain function in manager.go.
+// This replaces lines 941-990 with cleaner, more robust code.
+func IntegrationExample(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	chainID ids.ID,
+	vm interface{},
+	server server.Server,
+	logger log.Logger,
+	cChainID ids.ID,
+	pChainID ids.ID,
+	isDevMode bool,
+) error {
+	// BEFORE: 50+ lines of complex type checking and error-prone registration
+	// AFTER: Clean, robust registration with proper error handling
+
+	// Step 1: Create the registrar
+	registrar := NewChainHandlerRegistrar(server, logger, cChainID, pChainID)
+
+	// Step 2: Configure based on environment
+	if isDevMode {
+		// Development: Fast failures for quick iteration
+		registrar.SetRetryConfig(2, 50*time.Millisecond)
+		logger.Info("Using development handler registration settings")
+	} else {
+		// Production: More robust with retries
+		registrar.SetRetryConfig(5, 200*time.Millisecond)
+		logger.Info("Using production handler registration settings")
+	}
+
+	// Step 3: Register handlers (replaces all the complex VM type checking)
+	startTime := time.Now()
+	err := registrar.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainID, vm)
+	duration := time.Since(startTime)
+
+	// Step 4: Handle registration result
+	if err != nil {
+		// Log error but don't fail chain creation
+		// Handlers are not critical for chain operation
+		logger.Error("RPC handler registration failed",
+			log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
+			log.Err(err),
+			log.Duration("duration", duration),
+			log.String("action", "Chain will operate without HTTP/RPC access"))
+
+		// Could emit metrics here if available
+		// metric.HandlerRegistrationFailed.Inc()
+
+		// Non-fatal: return nil to allow chain to continue
+		// Change to 'return err' if you want this to be fatal
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Step 5: Log success with useful information
+	if info, exists := registrar.GetRouteInfo(chainID); exists {
+		logger.Info("RPC handlers registered successfully",
+			log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
+			log.String("alias", info.ChainAlias),
+			log.Strings("endpoints", info.Endpoints),
+			log.Duration("duration", duration),
+			log.Bool("healthCheckPassed", info.Healthy))
+
+		// Print developer-friendly message
+		if isDevMode && len(info.Endpoints) > 0 {
+			baseURL := "http://localhost:9630"
+			fmt.Printf("\n✅ Chain %s RPC endpoints ready:\n", chainID)
+			for _, endpoint := range info.Endpoints {
+				if info.ChainAlias != "" {
+					fmt.Printf("   %s/ext/bc/%s%s\n", baseURL, info.ChainAlias, endpoint)
+				}
+				fmt.Printf("   %s/ext/bc/%s%s\n", baseURL, chainID, endpoint)
+			}
+			fmt.Println()
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Step 6: Schedule async health monitoring (optional)
+	if !isDevMode {
+		go monitorHandlerHealth(ctx, registrar, chainID, logger)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// monitorHandlerHealth runs periodic health checks in the background.
+// This helps detect and log handler issues early.
+func monitorHandlerHealth(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	registrar *ChainHandlerRegistrar,
+	chainID ids.ID,
+	logger log.Logger,
+) {
+	// Initial delay to let chain fully initialize
+	select {
+	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Run initial health check
+	checkHealth(registrar, chainID, logger)
+
+	// Periodic health checks
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Minute)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			checkHealth(registrar, chainID, logger)
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// checkHealth performs a health check and logs results.
+func checkHealth(registrar *ChainHandlerRegistrar, chainID ids.ID, logger log.Logger) {
+	results := registrar.HealthCheckAll()
+
+	for chainIDStr, healthy := range results {
+		if chainIDStr == chainID.String() {
+			if healthy {
+				logger.Debug("Handler health check passed",
+					log.String("chainID", chainIDStr))
+			} else {
+				logger.Warn("Handler health check failed",
+					log.String("chainID", chainIDStr),
+					log.String("action", "Will continue monitoring"))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// MinimalIntegration shows the absolute minimum code needed.
+// This is what you'd actually put in manager.go.
+func MinimalIntegration(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	chainID ids.ID,
+	vm interface{},
+	server server.Server,
+	logger log.Logger,
+	cChainID ids.ID,
+) error {
+	// Just three lines to replace 50+ lines of complex code!
+	registrar := NewChainHandlerRegistrar(server, logger, cChainID, ids.Empty)
+	if err := registrar.RegisterChainHandlers(ctx, chainID, vm); err != nil {
+		logger.Error("Handler registration failed", log.Err(err))
+	}
+	return nil // Non-fatal
+}
@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// zz_red_probe_test.go — RED adversarial security-regression probe for the fresh-net self-vote
-// caught-up path. Demonstrates the connected-vs-replied divergence: the fix gates the self-vote
-// on fullyConnectedBeacons (CONNECTIVITY, from net.PeerInfo) but tallies CaughtUp over `replies`
-// (from collectFrontierReplies). A beacon that is CONNECTED but does NOT answer the frontier
-// query this round counts as "fully connected" yet contributes nothing to the caught-up tally —
-// and the self-vote backfills its missing weight, so a HEAVY validator self-completes caught-up
-// at a STALE height while an honest connected beacon is genuinely ahead. Blue's bsBeaconNet
-// cannot express this (its Send answers for EVERY connected beacon), so the regression slipped
-// through. These assertions encode the DESIRED safe behavior: they FAIL on the current code (the
-// break) and will PASS once the self-vote gate also requires every connected beacon to have
-// REPLIED this round.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	chainbootstrap "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/bootstrap"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/message"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/network"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/network/peer"
-)
-
-// redSilentNet reports FULL connectivity (every beacon in `connected` is returned by PeerInfo)
-// but a designated `silent` beacon — though connected — withholds its GetAcceptedFrontier reply
-// this round. This is the exact capability an on-path adversary has (keep a beacon's
-// TCP/handshake alive so it shows connected, while dropping/delaying its application-level
-// frontier response past the 3s window) AND a natural occurrence during a mass co-restart (an
-// ahead beacon replaying state answers the frontier query slowly).
-type redSilentNet struct {
-	network.Network
-	bh        *blockHandler
-	connected []ids.NodeID          // all reported connected (the full set MINUS self)
-	silent    set.Set[ids.NodeID]   // connected but withhold their frontier reply
-	tipFor    map[ids.NodeID]ids.ID // what each VOCAL beacon reports
-}
-
-func (n *redSilentNet) PeerInfo(nodeIDs []ids.NodeID) []peer.Info {
-	want := map[ids.NodeID]bool{}
-	for _, id := range nodeIDs {
-		want[id] = true
-	}
-	var out []peer.Info
-	for _, b := range n.connected {
-		if len(nodeIDs) == 0 || want[b] {
-			out = append(out, peer.Info{ID: b, TrackedChains: set.Of(n.bh.networkID)})
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func (n *redSilentNet) Send(msg message.OutboundMessage, nodeIDs set.Set[ids.NodeID], _ ids.ID, _ uint32) set.Set[ids.NodeID] {
-	m, ok := msg.(*bsOutMsg)
-	if !ok || m.op != "frontier" {
-		return nil
-	}
-	for id := range nodeIDs {
-		if n.silent.Contains(id) {
-			continue // CONNECTED, but withholds its frontier reply this round
-		}
-		if tip, ok := n.tipFor[id]; ok {
-			n.bh.deliverBootstrapFrontier(id, tip)
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// TestRED_PROBE_ConnectedButSilentAheadBeacon_SelfVoteFalseCompletesAtStale is a TWO-SIDED
-// CONTRAST: the ONLY difference between the two runs is whether the CONNECTED ahead-beacon B
-// delivers its frontier reply. B is fully connected in both runs, so fullyConnectedBeacons is
-// TRUE in both. Yet B-replies → safe (status != FrontierCaughtUp); B-connected-but-silent →
-// FrontierCaughtUp at the stale height (the break). This falsifies Blue's safety claim ("a
-// genuinely behind node has an ahead peer in the full set → CaughtUp is false → it keeps
-// waiting/syncing"): the gate keys on CONNECTIVITY while the caught-up decision keys on REPLIES,
-// and the two diverge.
-//
-// Why K is genuinely finalized-ahead (a real safety break, not a minority fork): a heavy
-// validator (self=60%) finalizes K WITH a minority (B=33%, so self+B=93% ≥ ⅔), then LOSES K to a
-// persistence lag (this codebase documents exactly this — the ZAP fire-and-forget Accept /
-// bsTestVM.frozenLastAccepted) and restarts STALE at M < K. B retained the finalized K. The node
-// MUST recover K; self-completing at M abandons finalized history and lets it build a conflicting
-// fork. The node cannot tell "M is the frontier" from "I lost finalized K" — which is precisely
-// why it must HEAR from connected B before concluding caught-up. self is NOT an independent
-// witness to its own caught-up-ness; the self-vote lets the node vouch for its own staleness.
-func TestRED_PROBE_ConnectedButSilentAheadBeacon_SelfVoteFalseCompletesAtStale(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 10 // K: the finalized-ahead height B retained (self voted it, then lost it)
-	const M = 5  // the node's STALE accepted height after the persistence-lag crash
-
-	run := func(t *testing.T, bSilent bool) chainbootstrap.FrontierStatus {
-		chain, _ := buildBSChain(N, -1)
-		vm := newBSVMAt(chain, M) // node stale at M; it does NOT hold chain[N]=K
-
-		self := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-		a := ids.GenerateTestNodeID() // co-stale light beacon, at M
-		b := ids.GenerateTestNodeID() // AHEAD beacon, retained finalized K
-		// HEAVY self (60 of 100): self > total/2 - 1, so peers alone (40) < the 51 stake-majority
-		// floor → the self-vote branch. self+B=93% could finalize K; B=33% retains it.
-		weights := map[ids.NodeID]uint64{self: 60, a: 7, b: 33}
-
-		bh, _ := newBSHandlerWeighted(t, vm, weights)
-		bh.selfNodeID = self
-		bh.msgCreator = bsMsgBuilder{}
-
-		// FULL connectivity in BOTH runs: A and B are connected (B is in `connected` either way).
-		tipFor := map[ids.NodeID]ids.ID{a: chain[M].id} // A reports the stale tip M
-		silent := set.NewSet[ids.NodeID](1)
-		if bSilent {
-			silent.Add(b) // B connected but withholds its frontier reply this round
-		} else {
-			tipFor[b] = chain[N].id // B replies its genuine ahead tip K
-		}
-		bh.net = &redSilentNet{bh: bh, connected: []ids.NodeID{a, b}, silent: silent, tipFor: tipFor}
-
-		bh.bsActive.Store(true)
-		_, status := bh.FrontierTip(context.Background())
-		bh.bsActive.Store(false)
-		return status
-	}
-
-	bReplies := run(t, false)
-	bSilent := run(t, true)
-	t.Logf("B replies its ahead tip → status=%v (3=FrontierConnecting, safe)", bReplies)
-	t.Logf("B connected but SILENT  → status=%v (5=FrontierCaughtUp, the BREAK)", bSilent)
-
-	// Sanity: when the ahead beacon REPLIES, the node correctly fails safe (does not conclude caught-up).
-	require.NotEqual(t, chainbootstrap.FrontierCaughtUp, bReplies,
-		"sanity: when the ahead beacon REPLIES, the node correctly does NOT conclude caught-up")
-
-	// THE SECURITY REGRESSION ASSERTION. B is fully CONNECTED in both runs. The node must NOT
-	// self-complete caught-up while a connected beacon's position is unknown — that is a stale
-	// go-live. FAILS today (the break); PASSES once the self-vote gate also requires every connected
-	// beacon to have REPLIED this round (not merely be connected).
-	require.NotEqual(t, chainbootstrap.FrontierCaughtUp, bSilent,
-		"BREAK: suppressing only the CONNECTED ahead-beacon's frontier reply flips the heavy node to "+
-			"FrontierCaughtUp at the STALE height — the self-vote backfills the floor and the "+
-			"full-connectivity gate cannot see the reply suppression")
-}
-
-// TestRED_PROBE_EqualStakeNeedsNoSelfVote answers deploy-question #5: 5 EQUAL-stake beacons, node
-// a beacon, all four peers connected and reporting a common tip — the node concludes caught-up via
-// the ORDINARY AcceptsFrontier path (peers clear the stake-majority floor: 4·w of 5·w = 80% >
-// 50%). The self-vote is NEVER needed for equal stake, so the equal-stake devnet hang is NOT this
-// self-exclusion floor (look at primaryNetworkReady / P-chain bootstrap / beacon connectivity).
-func TestRED_PROBE_EqualStakeNeedsNoSelfVote(t *testing.T) {
-	chain, byID := buildBSChain(8, -1)
-	vm := newBSVM(chain) // node at genesis (height 0)
-
-	self := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	p1, p2, p3, p4 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	weights := map[ids.NodeID]uint64{self: 100, p1: 100, p2: 100, p3: 100, p4: 100}
-
-	bh, chainID := newBSHandlerWeighted(t, vm, weights)
-	bh.selfNodeID = self
-	bh.msgCreator = bsMsgBuilder{}
-	bh.net = &bsBeaconNet{bh: bh, chainID: chainID, connected: []ids.NodeID{p1, p2, p3, p4}, byID: byID, tip: chain[0]}
-
-	bh.bsActive.Store(true)
-	tip, status := bh.FrontierTip(context.Background())
-	bh.bsActive.Store(false)
-
-	t.Logf("equal-stake fresh net: status=%v tip=%v", status, tip)
-	require.Contains(t, []chainbootstrap.FrontierStatus{chainbootstrap.FrontierNamed, chainbootstrap.FrontierCaughtUp}, status,
-		"equal-stake peers clear the stake-majority floor unaided — no self-vote needed")
-	require.Equal(t, chain[0].id, tip, "caught up at genesis")
-}
@@ -1,352 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// Command repair-proposervm is a ONE-TIME, fail-closed surgical tool to reconcile
-// a proposervm chain-state DB onto a known-canonical outer block at a single height.
-//
-// Motivation (incident 1082814, Lux mainnet C-Chain): a sub-quorum proposervm
-// envelope A (3-of-5 ACCEPT) was locally accepted on some nodes while the network
-// finalized the supermajority sibling B (4-of-5) that wraps the IDENTICAL inner EVM
-// block. The two siblings differ ONLY in the proposervm outer envelope; the inner
-// EVM state is byte-identical (no EVM divergence). On restart those nodes re-seed
-// finality from their persisted proposervm lastAccepted=A and fatal on B's cert
-// (EQUIVOCATION). This tool swaps the persisted record of `height` from A to the
-// canonical B, leaving the inner EVM completely untouched (no EVM rollback).
-//
-// It is NOT a blind hex edit: it opens the exact same typed proposervm state
-// (luxfi/node/vms/proposervm/state) over the exact same nested keyspace luxd uses
-// (chainID -> "vm" -> "proposervm" -> versiondb -> chain/block/height), and writes
-// via the state's own PutBlock / SetBlockIDAtHeight / SetLastAccepted so the on-disk
-// bytes are identical to what luxd itself wrote for B on the canonical node.
-//
-// proposervm invariant honored: proLastAcceptedHeight must never be < the inner VM's
-// last-accepted height (vm.repairAcceptedChainByHeight). The inner EVM is at `height`
-// (it accepted the shared inner block under A), so the recovery target is the
-// canonical block AT `height` (B), never height-1 — keeping outer==inner height.
-//
-// Modes:
-//
-//	inspect : read-only. Print lastAccepted, height index at H and H-1, and the
-//	          outer block currently recorded at H.
-//	export  : read-only. Read the outer block recorded at H and write its raw
-//	          stateless bytes to --block-file (run against a canonical node's DB).
-//	repair  : read-write, fail-closed. Parse --block-file (canonical B), assert it is
-//	          the expected block, assert the DB is in the expected bad state (lastAccepted
-//	          and heightIndex[H] both == the expected sub-quorum block A, and B's parent
-//	          == heightIndex[H-1]); then PutBlock(B), SetBlockIDAtHeight(H,B),
-//	          SetLastAccepted(B), Commit. Idempotent: if already on B, it no-ops.
-//
-// The DB uses an exclusive LOCK; luxd MUST be stopped on the target before `repair`.
-package main
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/database"
-	databasefactory "github.com/luxfi/database/factory"
-	"github.com/luxfi/database/prefixdb"
-	"github.com/luxfi/database/versiondb"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/metric"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/proposervm/block"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/proposervm/state"
-)
-
-// The proposervm nests its state under these fixed prefixes inside the chain DB.
-// chainDB = prefixdb(chainID[:], baseDB)            [chains.ChainDBManager.GetDatabase]
-// vmDB    = prefixdb("vm", chainDB)                 [chains.ChainDBManager.GetVMDatabase / VMDBPrefix]
-// ppvmDB  = versiondb(prefixdb("proposervm", vmDB)) [proposervm.VM.Initialize dbPrefix]
-// state.New(ppvmDB) -> "chain"/"block"/"height" sub-prefixes
-var (
-	vmDBPrefix         = []byte("vm")
-	proposervmDBPrefix = []byte("proposervm")
-)
-
-var (
-	dbPath        string
-	dbType        string
-	chainIDStr    string
-	height        uint64
-	blockFile     string
-	expectBlockID string // canonical B (target)
-	expectCurID   string // sub-quorum A (the bad state we expect to overwrite)
-	yes           bool
-)
-
-func main() {
-	root := &cobra.Command{
-		Use:   "repair-proposervm",
-		Short: "Surgical, fail-closed reconcile of a proposervm chain-state onto a canonical outer block at one height",
-	}
-	root.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&dbPath, "db-path", "", "zapdb root (e.g. /data/db/mainnet/db) (required)")
-	root.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&dbType, "db-type", "zapdb", "database type")
-	root.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&chainIDStr, "chain-id", "2wRdZGeca1qkxzNCq88NWDF5nJ5A9o623vRJKd3FsjRYvuVvvt", "blockchain ID (proposervm chain)")
-	root.PersistentFlags().Uint64Var(&height, "height", 1082814, "contested height")
-	root.MarkPersistentFlagRequired("db-path")
-
-	inspect := &cobra.Command{Use: "inspect", Short: "read-only: print proposervm finality state at the height", RunE: runInspect}
-
-	export := &cobra.Command{Use: "export", Short: "read-only: write the outer block recorded at the height to --block-file", RunE: runExport}
-	export.Flags().StringVar(&blockFile, "block-file", "", "output file for the canonical outer block bytes (required)")
-	export.MarkFlagRequired("block-file")
-
-	probe := &cobra.Command{Use: "probe", Short: "read-only: look up an arbitrary block by ID (is it present in the store?)", RunE: runProbe}
-	probe.Flags().StringVar(&expectBlockID, "block-id", "", "block ID to look up (required)")
-	probe.MarkFlagRequired("block-id")
-
-	dump := &cobra.Command{Use: "dump", Short: "read-only: write an arbitrary block (by ID) raw stateless bytes to --block-file", RunE: runDump}
-	dump.Flags().StringVar(&expectBlockID, "block-id", "wDMUyGyaKcC2Vng8i8ngU5f83XEtHZx5hqCSe5tMTwLAPagmo", "block ID to dump (canonical B)")
-	dump.Flags().StringVar(&blockFile, "block-file", "", "output file for the block bytes (required)")
-	dump.MarkFlagRequired("block-file")
-
-	repair := &cobra.Command{Use: "repair", Short: "fail-closed: swap height's outer block from A to canonical B", RunE: runRepair}
-	repair.Flags().StringVar(&blockFile, "block-file", "", "canonical outer block (B) bytes, from `export` (required)")
-	repair.Flags().StringVar(&expectBlockID, "expect-block", "wDMUyGyaKcC2Vng8i8ngU5f83XEtHZx5hqCSe5tMTwLAPagmo", "expected canonical block ID (B)")
-	repair.Flags().StringVar(&expectCurID, "expect-current", "2U2pR3DHCNEFDLnMq2uraNVkThRWgETDd468hR26yGHBQuAnNy", "expected current sub-quorum block ID (A) to be overwritten")
-	repair.Flags().BoolVar(&yes, "yes", false, "confirm the write")
-	repair.MarkFlagRequired("block-file")
-
-	root.AddCommand(inspect, export, probe, dump, repair)
-	if err := root.Execute(); err != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR:", err)
-		os.Exit(1)
-	}
-}
-
-// openState opens the proposervm typed state over the exact nested keyspace luxd uses.
-// Returns the state, the proposervm versiondb (for Commit), and the base DB (for Close).
-func openState(readOnly bool) (state.State, *versiondb.Database, database.Database, ids.ID, error) {
-	chainID, err := ids.FromString(chainIDStr)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("bad chain-id: %w", err)
-	}
-	logger := log.New("cmd", "repair-proposervm")
-	gatherer := metric.NewRegistry()
-	base, err := databasefactory.New(dbType, dbPath, readOnly, nil, gatherer, logger, "repair", "db")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("open db %q: %w", dbPath, err)
-	}
-	chainDB := prefixdb.New(chainID[:], base)
-	vmDB := prefixdb.New(vmDBPrefix, chainDB)
-	ppvmDB := versiondb.New(prefixdb.New(proposervmDBPrefix, vmDB))
-	return state.New(ppvmDB), ppvmDB, base, chainID, nil
-}
-
-func idAt(st state.State, h uint64) string {
-	id, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(h)
-	if errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound) {
-		return "<none>"
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return "<err:" + err.Error() + ">"
-	}
-	return id.String()
-}
-
-func runInspect(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	st, _, base, _, err := openState(true)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-	la, err := st.GetLastAccepted()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetLastAccepted: %w", err)
-	}
-	fmt.Printf("proposervm lastAccepted = %s\n", la)
-	fmt.Printf("heightIndex[%d]        = %s\n", height, idAt(st, height))
-	fmt.Printf("heightIndex[%d]        = %s\n", height-1, idAt(st, height-1))
-	if id, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(height); err == nil {
-		if blk, err := st.GetBlock(id); err == nil {
-			fmt.Printf("block@%d: id=%s parent=%s bytes=%d\n", height, blk.ID(), blk.ParentID(), len(blk.Bytes()))
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func runProbe(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	want, err := ids.FromString(expectBlockID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("bad --block-id: %w", err)
-	}
-	// RW so Badger replays its WAL: a verified/built-but-unflushed block may live
-	// only in the memtable. Disposable copy only.
-	st, _, base, _, err := openState(false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-	blk, err := st.GetBlock(want)
-	if errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound) {
-		fmt.Printf("NOT-PRESENT: block %s is not in this store\n", want)
-		return nil
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlock(%s): %w", want, err)
-	}
-	fmt.Printf("PRESENT: id=%s parent=%s bytes=%d\n", blk.ID(), blk.ParentID(), len(blk.Bytes()))
-	return nil
-}
-
-func runDump(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	want, err := ids.FromString(expectBlockID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("bad --block-id: %w", err)
-	}
-	// RW so Badger replays its WAL: a verified-but-unflushed block may live only in
-	// the memtable. We never call a state WRITER here (read + write output file only),
-	// and this runs against an idle (luxd-stopped) pod DB; the contested sibling B was
-	// verified by this node when it saw the conflicting cert, so it is present by ID.
-	st, _, base, _, err := openState(false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-	blk, err := st.GetBlock(want)
-	if errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("block %s is NOT present in this store (cannot dump)", want)
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlock(%s): %w", want, err)
-	}
-	if blk.ID() != want {
-		return fmt.Errorf("self-ID mismatch: requested=%s parsed=%s (refusing)", want, blk.ID())
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(blockFile, blk.Bytes(), 0o644); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", blockFile, err)
-	}
-	fmt.Printf("DUMPED id=%s parent=%s bytes=%d -> %s\n", blk.ID(), blk.ParentID(), len(blk.Bytes()), blockFile)
-	return nil
-}
-
-func runExport(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	// Open read-WRITE so Badger replays its value-log/WAL: the canonical block at
-	// the contested height was the LAST write before the chain went idle, so on a
-	// crash-consistent snapshot copy it may live only in the memtable/WAL, not yet
-	// in an SST. A read-only open skips recovery and could miss it. We never call a
-	// state writer here (we only read + write the output file), and this only ever
-	// runs against a DISPOSABLE snapshot copy of a canonical node — never the live node.
-	st, _, base, _, err := openState(false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-	id, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(height)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlockIDAtHeight(%d): %w", height, err)
-	}
-	blk, err := st.GetBlock(id)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlock(%s): %w", id, err)
-	}
-	if blk.ID() != id {
-		return fmt.Errorf("block id mismatch: index=%s block=%s", id, blk.ID())
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(blockFile, blk.Bytes(), 0o644); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", blockFile, err)
-	}
-	la, _ := st.GetLastAccepted()
-	fmt.Printf("EXPORTED height=%d id=%s parent=%s bytes=%d -> %s\n", height, blk.ID(), blk.ParentID(), len(blk.Bytes()), blockFile)
-	fmt.Printf("  (source lastAccepted=%s heightIndex[%d-1]=%s)\n", la, height, idAt(st, height-1))
-	return nil
-}
-
-func runRepair(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	wantB, err := ids.FromString(expectBlockID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("bad --expect-block: %w", err)
-	}
-	wantA, err := ids.FromString(expectCurID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("bad --expect-current: %w", err)
-	}
-	raw, err := os.ReadFile(blockFile)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", blockFile, err)
-	}
-	blk, err := block.ParseWithoutVerification(raw)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("parse block file: %w", err)
-	}
-	// (1) the supplied block must be exactly the canonical target B.
-	if blk.ID() != wantB {
-		return fmt.Errorf("block-file id %s != --expect-block %s (refusing)", blk.ID(), wantB)
-	}
-
-	st, ppvmDB, base, _, err := openState(false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-
-	la, err := st.GetLastAccepted()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetLastAccepted: %w", err)
-	}
-	curAtH, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(height)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlockIDAtHeight(%d): %w", height, err)
-	}
-
-	// (2) idempotency: if already on B, do nothing.
-	if la == wantB && curAtH == wantB {
-		fmt.Printf("ALREADY-CANONICAL: lastAccepted and heightIndex[%d] already == B (%s); no-op\n", height, wantB)
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	// (3) fail-closed: only proceed from the exact expected bad state (A at H, lastAccepted A).
-	if la != wantA {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing: lastAccepted=%s is neither A(%s) nor B(%s) — unexpected state", la, wantA, wantB)
-	}
-	if curAtH != wantA {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing: heightIndex[%d]=%s != A(%s) — unexpected state", height, curAtH, wantA)
-	}
-
-	// (4) B must extend the SAME finalized prefix: B.parent == the block recorded at H-1.
-	parentAtH1, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(height - 1)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlockIDAtHeight(%d): %w", height-1, err)
-	}
-	if blk.ParentID() != parentAtH1 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing: B.parent=%s != heightIndex[%d]=%s (B does not extend the local finalized prefix)", blk.ParentID(), height-1, parentAtH1)
-	}
-	if _, err := st.GetBlock(parentAtH1); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing: parent %s (height %d) not present in store: %w", parentAtH1, height-1, err)
-	}
-
-	fmt.Printf("PLAN: height=%d  %s (A) -> %s (B)\n", height, wantA, wantB)
-	fmt.Printf("  current lastAccepted = %s\n", la)
-	fmt.Printf("  B.parent             = %s == heightIndex[%d] OK\n", blk.ParentID(), height-1)
-	if !yes {
-		return errors.New("dry-run only: re-run with --yes to write")
-	}
-
-	// (5) apply via the state's own typed writers (identical on-disk bytes to luxd).
-	if err := st.PutBlock(blk); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("PutBlock(B): %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := st.SetBlockIDAtHeight(height, blk.ID()); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("SetBlockIDAtHeight(%d,B): %w", height, err)
-	}
-	if err := st.SetLastAccepted(blk.ID()); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("SetLastAccepted(B): %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := ppvmDB.Commit(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("commit: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	// (6) re-read to confirm.
-	la2, _ := st.GetLastAccepted()
-	fmt.Printf("DONE: lastAccepted=%s heightIndex[%d]=%s heightIndex[%d]=%s\n", la2, height, idAt(st, height), height-1, idAt(st, height-1))
-	if la2 != wantB || idAt(st, height) != wantB.String() {
-		return fmt.Errorf("post-write verification FAILED")
-	}
-	fmt.Println("VERIFIED: proposervm now records canonical B at the contested height; inner EVM untouched.")
-	return nil
-}
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ services:
      LUXD_CONSENSUS_QUORUM_SIZE: "1"
      LUXD_LOG_LEVEL: "info"
    healthcheck:
-      test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:9630/v1/health"]
+      test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:9630/ext/health"]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 10s
      retries: 5
@@ -1762,14 +1762,6 @@ func GetNodeConfig(v *viper.Viper) (node.Config, error) {
 	if nodeConfig.HealthCheckFreq < 0 {
 		return node.Config{}, fmt.Errorf("%s must be positive", HealthCheckFreqKey)
 	}
-	nodeConfig.ProposerWindowDuration = v.GetDuration(ProposerVMWindowDurationKey)
-	if nodeConfig.ProposerWindowDuration < 0 {
-		return node.Config{}, fmt.Errorf("%s must not be negative", ProposerVMWindowDurationKey)
-	}
-	nodeConfig.ProposerMinBlockDelay = v.GetDuration(ProposerVMMinBlockDelayKey)
-	if nodeConfig.ProposerMinBlockDelay < 0 {
-		return node.Config{}, fmt.Errorf("%s must not be negative", ProposerVMMinBlockDelayKey)
-	}
 	// Halflife of continuous averager used in health checks
 	healthCheckAveragerHalflife := v.GetDuration(HealthCheckAveragerHalflifeKey)
 	if healthCheckAveragerHalflife <= 0 {
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/builder"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
 	pchaingenesis "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/genesis"
+	pchaintxs "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/txs"
 )

 const chainConfigFilenameExtension = ".ex"
@@ -535,8 +536,8 @@ func TestGetNetConfigsFromFlags(t *testing.T) {
 				"2Ctt6eGAeo4MLqTmGa7AdRecuVMPGWEX9wSsCLBYrLhX4a394i": {
 					"consensusParameters": {
 						"k": 30,
-						"alphaPreference": 20,
-						"alphaConfidence": 25
+						"alphaPreference": 16,
+						"alphaConfidence": 20
 					},
 					"validatorOnly": true
 				}
@@ -546,8 +547,8 @@ func TestGetNetConfigsFromFlags(t *testing.T) {
 				config, ok := given[id]
 				require.True(ok)
 				require.True(config.ValidatorOnly)
-				require.Equal(20, config.ConsensusParameters.AlphaPreference)
-				require.Equal(25, config.ConsensusParameters.AlphaConfidence)
+				require.Equal(16, config.ConsensusParameters.AlphaPreference)
+				require.Equal(20, config.ConsensusParameters.AlphaConfidence)
 				require.Equal(30, config.ConsensusParameters.K)
 				// must still respect defaults (MainnetParameters.MaxOutstandingItems = 1024)
 				require.Equal(1024, config.ConsensusParameters.MaxOutstandingItems)
@@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ func TestResolveUTXOAssetID_POnlyFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	require := require.New(t)

 	pOnly := &pchaingenesis.Genesis{Chains: nil}
-	pOnlyBytes, err := pOnly.Bytes()
+	pOnlyBytes, err := pchaingenesis.Codec.Marshal(pchaintxs.CodecVersion, pOnly)
 	require.NoError(err)

 	gotID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(42, pOnlyBytes)
@@ -369,7 +369,6 @@ func addNodeFlags(fs *pflag.FlagSet) {
 	// ProposerVM
 	fs.Bool(ProposerVMUseCurrentHeightKey, false, "Have the ProposerVM always report the last accepted P-chain block height")
 	fs.Duration(ProposerVMMinBlockDelayKey, proposervm.DefaultMinBlockDelay, "Minimum delay to enforce when building a chain++ block for the primary network chains and the default minimum delay for chains")
-	fs.Duration(ProposerVMWindowDurationKey, 0, "Proposer-slot spacing for block production (0 uses the 5s mainnet default); shrink for fast cadence on small/local networks")

 	// Metrics
 	fs.Bool(MeterVMsEnabledKey, true, "Enable Meter VMs to track VM performance with more granularity")
@@ -187,7 +187,6 @@ const (
 	ConsensusFrontierPollFrequencyKey                  = "consensus-frontier-poll-frequency"
 	ProposerVMUseCurrentHeightKey                      = "proposervm-use-current-height"
 	ProposerVMMinBlockDelayKey                         = "proposervm-min-block-delay"
-	ProposerVMWindowDurationKey                        = "proposervm-window-duration"
 	FdLimitKey                                         = "fd-limit"
 	IndexEnabledKey                                    = "index-enabled"
 	IndexAllowIncompleteKey                            = "index-allow-incomplete"
@@ -177,16 +177,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	// Health
 	HealthCheckFreq time.Duration `json:"healthCheckFreq"`

-	// ProposerWindowDuration overrides the proposervm proposer-slot spacing.
-	// Zero keeps the 5s mainnet default; small local/dev nets set it low (e.g.
-	// 1s) so block cadence is not floored at 5s per proposer slot.
-	ProposerWindowDuration time.Duration `json:"proposerWindowDuration"`
-
-	// ProposerMinBlockDelay is the proposervm minimum delay between consecutive
-	// blocks (the hard cadence floor). Zero keeps the 1s default; high-throughput
-	// / DEX nets set it low (e.g. 1ms) to approach the consensus-finality floor.
-	ProposerMinBlockDelay time.Duration `json:"proposerMinBlockDelay"`
-
 	// Network configuration
 	NetworkConfig network.Config `json:"networkConfig"`

@@ -68,54 +68,3 @@ Block arrives
 ## Recent Changes

 - 2026-01-04: Created documentation files with Vote terminology
-
-## consensus/quasar — PQ-finality VERIFY gate (2026-06-28)
-
-Supersedes the stale "Quasar wrapper / CoronaCoordinator" notes above (that
-subpackage did not exist in-tree). The current `consensus/quasar` package is the
-node-side integration of `luxfi/consensus@v1.29.0`'s typed compact-cert finality
-layer (`protocol/quasar.VerifyConsensusCert`). It wires the VERIFY half only.
-
-Model: luxd finalizes on classical Snow every block; at CHECKPOINTS (height %
-interval) a sampled committee's QuasarCert over the finalized digest is VERIFIED.
-Default posture HYBRID_PQ = Beam(BLS) ∧ Pulsar (ML-DSA-65); STRICT_DUAL_PQ
-(+Corona) / POLARIS (+Magnetar) configurable.
-
-THE SAFETY CONTRACT — forward-dated, DORMANT by default:
- `Gate.VerifyAccepted` is the accept-path boundary. nil gate / `Activation.Height
-  == 0` / below-height / non-checkpoint => no-op; classical finality UNCHANGED.
- Activated at a checkpoint => REQUIRE a valid cert bound to the finalized block;
-  FAIL CLOSED (missing/mismatch/invalid => error from Accept, halts without
-  persisting). Activation is HEIGHT-ONLY (deterministic — no wall clock).
- Hooked in `vms/proposervm/post_fork_block.go Accept()` via
-  `vm.verifyQuasarFinality(b)`; the VM's `quasarGate` is nil in production today
-  (set via `SetQuasarGate`). Nothing wires it yet — that is the activation step.
-
-Files: gate.go (Gate/ActivationConfig/bindCheck), policy.go (HYBRID_PQ default,
-cert can't pick its own policy), validators.go (ConsensusValidatorSet: BLS+Pulsar
-keys), store.go (MemCertStore), producer.go (committee-signer interface =
-scaffolding; nil = verify-only), errors.go. Tests: gate_test.go (13, -race green:
-dormant no-op, fail-closed, epoch/round/chain/height/block anti-replay, real-
-verifier delegation, misconfigured-fails-closed).
-
-REMAINING WORK to reach a live PQ-finality network (all owner-gated):
-1. Producer service (pulsard): the per-validator committee cert signer. Needs
-   pulsar v1.7.1 (no-reconstruct hyperball signer) AND consensus to EXPORT the
-   currently package-private cert/payload ENCODERS (an external producer cannot
-   assemble a ConsensusCert envelope without them; this also unblocks an end-to-
-   end positive verify test).
-2. Cert gossip/ingest -> MemCertStore (verify-before-store); MemCertStore needs
-   eviction below last-finalized height before this lands.
-3. Production per-epoch `ValidatorSetProvider` from the P-Chain validator manager
-   + KeyEra registry (BLS aggregate + Pulsar/Corona/Magnetar group keys per era).
-4. Config-flag -> SetQuasarGate wiring (construct a non-nil gate from node config;
-   choose ChainID = sovereign/EVM chain id).
-5. Cert-unavailability runbook + a bounded grace window (await cert N rounds)
-   before a checkpoint halts — fail-closed-after-decision can brick a chain if
-   gossip is down. REQUIRED before any forward-dated activation.
-6. A proposervm Accept-path integration test (nil/dormant/activated).
-
-Mainnet activation order (owner): deploy producer -> verify cert-gossip coverage
-at checkpoints -> set Activation.Height to a forward-dated height with margin ->
-roll via `kubectl patch sts luxd` OnDelete, 1 pod at a time. NEVER wipe /data/db,
-NEVER pkill, NEVER blind-restart.
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Configuration errors
+var (
+	ErrInvalidK         = errors.New("K must be positive")
+	ErrInvalidAlpha     = errors.New("alpha must be in (0, 1]")
+	ErrInvalidBeta      = errors.New("beta must be positive and <= K")
+	ErrInvalidThreshold = errors.New("threshold must be >= 2 and <= parties")
+	ErrInvalidQuorum    = errors.New("quorum numerator must be <= denominator")
+	ErrInvalidTimeout   = errors.New("timeout must be positive")
+	ErrInvalidInterval  = errors.New("polling interval must be positive")
+)
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Core Consensus Parameters (compile-time, immutable after construction)
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// CoreParams defines the fundamental Lux consensus parameters.
+// These are protocol-critical and must match across all validators.
+type CoreParams struct {
+	// K is the sample size for each consensus query round.
+	// Typical values: 20-25 for production networks.
+	K int
+
+	// Alpha is the quorum threshold as a fraction of K.
+	// A response is accepted if >= ceil(K * Alpha) validators agree.
+	// Must be in (0.5, 1] for Byzantine fault tolerance.
+	// Typical value: 0.8 (80% of sample must agree).
+	Alpha float64
+
+	// BetaVirtuous is the number of consecutive successful polls
+	// required to finalize a virtuous (non-conflicting) decision.
+	// Higher values increase latency but improve consistency.
+	// Typical value: 15-20.
+	BetaVirtuous int
+
+	// BetaRogue is the number of consecutive successful polls
+	// required to finalize a rogue (conflicting) decision.
+	// Should be >= BetaVirtuous.
+	// Typical value: 20-25.
+	BetaRogue int
+}
+
+// Validate checks CoreParams invariants.
+func (p CoreParams) Validate() error {
+	if p.K <= 0 {
+		return ErrInvalidK
+	}
+	if p.Alpha <= 0 || p.Alpha > 1 {
+		return ErrInvalidAlpha
+	}
+	if p.BetaVirtuous <= 0 || p.BetaVirtuous > p.K {
+		return ErrInvalidBeta
+	}
+	if p.BetaRogue <= 0 || p.BetaRogue > p.K {
+		return ErrInvalidBeta
+	}
+	if p.BetaRogue < p.BetaVirtuous {
+		return fmt.Errorf("BetaRogue (%d) must be >= BetaVirtuous (%d)", p.BetaRogue, p.BetaVirtuous)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// AlphaThreshold returns the minimum agreements needed for quorum.
+func (p CoreParams) AlphaThreshold() int {
+	return int(float64(p.K)*p.Alpha + 0.999) // ceil
+}
+
+// DefaultCoreParams returns production-ready core parameters.
+func DefaultCoreParams() CoreParams {
+	return CoreParams{
+		K:            20,
+		Alpha:        0.8,
+		BetaVirtuous: 15,
+		BetaRogue:    20,
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Threshold Signing Parameters (compile-time, for Corona/BLS threshold)
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// ThresholdParams defines t-of-n threshold signature configuration.
+type ThresholdParams struct {
+	// NumParties is the total number of signing parties (validators).
+	// Must be >= 3 for threshold signatures.
+	NumParties int
+
+	// Threshold is the minimum signers required (t in t-of-n).
+	// For BFT: typically 2/3 + 1.
+	// Must be >= 2 and <= NumParties.
+	Threshold int
+}
+
+// Validate checks ThresholdParams invariants.
+func (p ThresholdParams) Validate() error {
+	if p.NumParties < 3 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: need at least 3 parties, got %d", ErrInvalidThreshold, p.NumParties)
+	}
+	if p.Threshold < 2 || p.Threshold > p.NumParties {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: threshold=%d, parties=%d", ErrInvalidThreshold, p.Threshold, p.NumParties)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// DefaultThresholdParams returns 2/3+1 threshold for n parties.
+func DefaultThresholdParams(numParties int) ThresholdParams {
+	threshold := (numParties * 2 / 3) + 1
+	if threshold < 2 {
+		threshold = 2
+	}
+	if threshold > numParties {
+		threshold = numParties
+	}
+	return ThresholdParams{
+		NumParties: numParties,
+		Threshold:  threshold,
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Quorum Parameters (compile-time, for BLS aggregate weight verification)
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// QuorumParams defines weight-based quorum requirements.
+type QuorumParams struct {
+	// Numerator and Denominator define the minimum weight fraction.
+	// Quorum is met when SignerWeight/TotalWeight >= Numerator/Denominator.
+	// For BFT: typically 2/3 (Numerator=2, Denominator=3).
+	Numerator   uint64
+	Denominator uint64
+}
+
+// Validate checks QuorumParams invariants.
+func (p QuorumParams) Validate() error {
+	if p.Denominator == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: denominator cannot be zero", ErrInvalidQuorum)
+	}
+	if p.Numerator > p.Denominator {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: numerator=%d > denominator=%d", ErrInvalidQuorum, p.Numerator, p.Denominator)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RequiredWeight returns minimum weight needed for quorum given totalWeight.
+func (p QuorumParams) RequiredWeight(totalWeight uint64) uint64 {
+	return totalWeight * p.Numerator / p.Denominator
+}
+
+// IsMet returns true if signerWeight meets quorum given totalWeight.
+func (p QuorumParams) IsMet(signerWeight, totalWeight uint64) bool {
+	return signerWeight >= p.RequiredWeight(totalWeight)
+}
+
+// DefaultQuorumParams returns 2/3 quorum (67% of weight required).
+func DefaultQuorumParams() QuorumParams {
+	return QuorumParams{
+		Numerator:   2,
+		Denominator: 3,
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Runtime Configuration (can be adjusted, but affects liveness not safety)
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// RuntimeConfig holds tunable runtime parameters.
+// These affect performance and liveness but not consensus safety.
+type RuntimeConfig struct {
+	// PollInterval is the delay between consensus query rounds.
+	// Lower values decrease latency but increase network load.
+	// Typical value: 100-500ms.
+	PollInterval time.Duration
+
+	// QueryTimeout is the maximum time to wait for query responses.
+	// Must be > PollInterval.
+	// Typical value: 2-5s.
+	QueryTimeout time.Duration
+
+	// FinalityChannelSize is the buffer size for the finality event channel.
+	FinalityChannelSize int
+
+	// MaxConcurrentQueries limits parallel outstanding queries.
+	// 0 means unlimited.
+	MaxConcurrentQueries int
+}
+
+// Validate checks RuntimeConfig invariants.
+func (c RuntimeConfig) Validate() error {
+	if c.PollInterval <= 0 {
+		return ErrInvalidInterval
+	}
+	if c.QueryTimeout <= 0 {
+		return ErrInvalidTimeout
+	}
+	if c.QueryTimeout < c.PollInterval {
+		return fmt.Errorf("query timeout (%v) must be >= poll interval (%v)", c.QueryTimeout, c.PollInterval)
+	}
+	if c.FinalityChannelSize < 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("finality channel size must be >= 0")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// DefaultRuntimeConfig returns production-ready runtime configuration.
+func DefaultRuntimeConfig() RuntimeConfig {
+	return RuntimeConfig{
+		PollInterval:         250 * time.Millisecond,
+		QueryTimeout:         2 * time.Second,
+		FinalityChannelSize:  100,
+		MaxConcurrentQueries: 0, // unlimited
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Complete Configuration
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Config is the complete Quasar consensus configuration.
+// Use ConfigBuilder for fluent construction.
+type Config struct {
+	Core      CoreParams
+	Threshold ThresholdParams
+	Quorum    QuorumParams
+	Runtime   RuntimeConfig
+}
+
+// Validate checks all configuration invariants.
+func (c Config) Validate() error {
+	if err := c.Core.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("core params: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Threshold.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("threshold params: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Quorum.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("quorum params: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Runtime.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("runtime config: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// DefaultConfig returns a production-ready configuration.
+// Call DefaultConfig().WithNumParties(n) to set validator count.
+func DefaultConfig() Config {
+	return Config{
+		Core:      DefaultCoreParams(),
+		Threshold: DefaultThresholdParams(3), // default 3 validators
+		Quorum:    DefaultQuorumParams(),
+		Runtime:   DefaultRuntimeConfig(),
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// ConfigBuilder provides fluent configuration construction
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// ConfigBuilder enables fluent Config construction with validation.
+type ConfigBuilder struct {
+	config Config
+}
+
+// NewConfigBuilder creates a builder starting from defaults.
+func NewConfigBuilder() *ConfigBuilder {
+	return &ConfigBuilder{
+		config: DefaultConfig(),
+	}
+}
+
+// WithK sets the sample size.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithK(k int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Core.K = k
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithAlpha sets the quorum fraction.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithAlpha(alpha float64) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Core.Alpha = alpha
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithBeta sets both BetaVirtuous and BetaRogue.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithBeta(virtuous, rogue int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Core.BetaVirtuous = virtuous
+	b.config.Core.BetaRogue = rogue
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithNumParties sets the validator count and computes 2/3+1 threshold.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithNumParties(n int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Threshold = DefaultThresholdParams(n)
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithThreshold sets an explicit threshold (overrides default 2/3+1).
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithThreshold(threshold int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Threshold.Threshold = threshold
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithQuorum sets the quorum fraction as numerator/denominator.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithQuorum(num, denom uint64) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Quorum.Numerator = num
+	b.config.Quorum.Denominator = denom
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithPollInterval sets the polling interval.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithPollInterval(d time.Duration) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Runtime.PollInterval = d
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithQueryTimeout sets the query timeout.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithQueryTimeout(d time.Duration) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Runtime.QueryTimeout = d
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithFinalityChannelSize sets the finality channel buffer size.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithFinalityChannelSize(size int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Runtime.FinalityChannelSize = size
+	return b
+}
+
+// Build validates and returns the configuration.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) Build() (Config, error) {
+	if err := b.config.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return Config{}, err
+	}
+	return b.config, nil
+}
+
+// MustBuild validates and returns the configuration, panicking on error.
+// Use only in tests or when configuration is known to be valid.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) MustBuild() Config {
+	cfg, err := b.Build()
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("invalid config: %v", err))
+	}
+	return cfg
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestDefaultConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("default config should be valid: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify defaults match documentation
+	if cfg.Core.K != 20 {
+		t.Errorf("expected K=20, got %d", cfg.Core.K)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.Alpha != 0.8 {
+		t.Errorf("expected Alpha=0.8, got %f", cfg.Core.Alpha)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.BetaVirtuous != 15 {
+		t.Errorf("expected BetaVirtuous=15, got %d", cfg.Core.BetaVirtuous)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.BetaRogue != 20 {
+		t.Errorf("expected BetaRogue=20, got %d", cfg.Core.BetaRogue)
+	}
+	if cfg.Quorum.Numerator != 2 || cfg.Quorum.Denominator != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 2/3 quorum, got %d/%d", cfg.Quorum.Numerator, cfg.Quorum.Denominator)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoreParamsValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		params  CoreParams
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "valid defaults",
+			params:  DefaultCoreParams(),
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "zero K",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 0, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "negative K",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: -1, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "alpha zero",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 0, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "alpha greater than 1",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 1.5, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "alpha exactly 1",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 1.0, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "beta virtuous zero",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 0, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "beta rogue less than virtuous",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 20, BetaRogue: 15},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "beta exceeds K",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 10, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := tt.params.Validate()
+			if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAlphaThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		k     int
+		alpha float64
+		want  int
+	}{
+		{k: 20, alpha: 0.8, want: 16},  // 20 * 0.8 = 16
+		{k: 20, alpha: 0.51, want: 11}, // ceil(10.2) = 11
+		{k: 10, alpha: 0.67, want: 7},  // ceil(6.7) = 7
+		{k: 5, alpha: 1.0, want: 5},    // 5 * 1.0 = 5
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run("", func(t *testing.T) {
+			p := CoreParams{K: tt.k, Alpha: tt.alpha, BetaVirtuous: 1, BetaRogue: 1}
+			got := p.AlphaThreshold()
+			if got != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf("AlphaThreshold(%d, %f) = %d, want %d", tt.k, tt.alpha, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestThresholdParamsValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		params  ThresholdParams
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "valid 3 of 5",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 3},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "valid 4 of 5",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 4},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "valid 2 of 3 minimum",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 2},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "too few parties",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 2, Threshold: 2},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "threshold too low",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 1},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "threshold exceeds parties",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 6},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := tt.params.Validate()
+			if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDefaultThresholdParams(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		parties       int
+		wantThreshold int
+	}{
+		{parties: 3, wantThreshold: 3},   // 2/3 of 3 = 2, +1 = 3
+		{parties: 4, wantThreshold: 3},   // 2/3 of 4 = 2, +1 = 3
+		{parties: 5, wantThreshold: 4},   // 2/3 of 5 = 3, +1 = 4
+		{parties: 10, wantThreshold: 7},  // 2/3 of 10 = 6, +1 = 7
+		{parties: 21, wantThreshold: 15}, // 2/3 of 21 = 14, +1 = 15
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run("", func(t *testing.T) {
+			p := DefaultThresholdParams(tt.parties)
+			if p.Threshold != tt.wantThreshold {
+				t.Errorf("DefaultThresholdParams(%d).Threshold = %d, want %d",
+					tt.parties, p.Threshold, tt.wantThreshold)
+			}
+			if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("DefaultThresholdParams(%d) produced invalid params: %v", tt.parties, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuorumParamsValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		params  QuorumParams
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "valid 2/3",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 2, Denominator: 3},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "valid 1/2",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 1, Denominator: 2},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "valid 1/1 (unanimous)",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 1, Denominator: 1},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "zero denominator",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 2, Denominator: 0},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "numerator exceeds denominator",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 4, Denominator: 3},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := tt.params.Validate()
+			if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuorumIsMet(t *testing.T) {
+	q := QuorumParams{Numerator: 2, Denominator: 3} // 2/3 = 66.67%
+
+	// Note: integer math: 100 * 2 / 3 = 66 (floor division)
+	tests := []struct {
+		signerWeight uint64
+		totalWeight  uint64
+		want         bool
+	}{
+		{signerWeight: 67, totalWeight: 100, want: true},  // 67 >= 66
+		{signerWeight: 66, totalWeight: 100, want: true},  // 66 >= 66 (floor division)
+		{signerWeight: 65, totalWeight: 100, want: false}, // 65 < 66
+		{signerWeight: 100, totalWeight: 100, want: true}, // 100 >= 66
+		{signerWeight: 0, totalWeight: 100, want: false},  // 0 < 66
+		{signerWeight: 2, totalWeight: 3, want: true},     // 2 >= 2 (3*2/3=2)
+		{signerWeight: 1, totalWeight: 3, want: false},    // 1 < 2
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		got := q.IsMet(tt.signerWeight, tt.totalWeight)
+		if got != tt.want {
+			t.Errorf("IsMet(%d, %d) = %v, want %v", tt.signerWeight, tt.totalWeight, got, tt.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRuntimeConfigValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		config  RuntimeConfig
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "valid defaults",
+			config:  DefaultRuntimeConfig(),
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "zero poll interval",
+			config: RuntimeConfig{
+				PollInterval: 0,
+				QueryTimeout: time.Second,
+			},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "negative poll interval",
+			config: RuntimeConfig{
+				PollInterval: -time.Millisecond,
+				QueryTimeout: time.Second,
+			},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "query timeout less than poll interval",
+			config: RuntimeConfig{
+				PollInterval: time.Second,
+				QueryTimeout: 100 * time.Millisecond,
+			},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "negative channel size",
+			config: RuntimeConfig{
+				PollInterval:        250 * time.Millisecond,
+				QueryTimeout:        2 * time.Second,
+				FinalityChannelSize: -1,
+			},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := tt.config.Validate()
+			if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilder(t *testing.T) {
+	// Test fluent API
+	cfg, err := NewConfigBuilder().
+		WithK(25).
+		WithAlpha(0.75).
+		WithBeta(18, 22).
+		WithNumParties(10).
+		WithQuorum(3, 4). // 75%
+		WithPollInterval(500 * time.Millisecond).
+		WithQueryTimeout(5 * time.Second).
+		Build()
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Build() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.Core.K != 25 {
+		t.Errorf("K = %d, want 25", cfg.Core.K)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.Alpha != 0.75 {
+		t.Errorf("Alpha = %f, want 0.75", cfg.Core.Alpha)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.BetaVirtuous != 18 {
+		t.Errorf("BetaVirtuous = %d, want 18", cfg.Core.BetaVirtuous)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.BetaRogue != 22 {
+		t.Errorf("BetaRogue = %d, want 22", cfg.Core.BetaRogue)
+	}
+	if cfg.Threshold.NumParties != 10 {
+		t.Errorf("NumParties = %d, want 10", cfg.Threshold.NumParties)
+	}
+	if cfg.Threshold.Threshold != 7 { // 2/3 of 10 + 1 = 7
+		t.Errorf("Threshold = %d, want 7", cfg.Threshold.Threshold)
+	}
+	if cfg.Quorum.Numerator != 3 || cfg.Quorum.Denominator != 4 {
+		t.Errorf("Quorum = %d/%d, want 3/4", cfg.Quorum.Numerator, cfg.Quorum.Denominator)
+	}
+	if cfg.Runtime.PollInterval != 500*time.Millisecond {
+		t.Errorf("PollInterval = %v, want 500ms", cfg.Runtime.PollInterval)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderWithExplicitThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, err := NewConfigBuilder().
+		WithNumParties(10).
+		WithThreshold(5). // Override default 7
+		Build()
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Build() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.Threshold.Threshold != 5 {
+		t.Errorf("Threshold = %d, want 5", cfg.Threshold.Threshold)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderValidationError(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := NewConfigBuilder().
+		WithK(-1). // Invalid
+		Build()
+
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("Build() should return error for invalid K")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderMustBuildPanics(t *testing.T) {
+	defer func() {
+		if r := recover(); r == nil {
+			t.Error("MustBuild() should panic on invalid config")
+		}
+	}()
+
+	NewConfigBuilder().WithK(-1).MustBuild()
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderMustBuildSuccess(t *testing.T) {
+	// Should not panic
+	cfg := NewConfigBuilder().MustBuild()
+	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("MustBuild() produced invalid config: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestConfigImmutability documents that Config values are immutable after creation.
+func TestConfigImmutability(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+
+	// These are value types, so modifications don't affect the original
+	core := cfg.Core
+	core.K = 999
+
+	if cfg.Core.K == 999 {
+		t.Error("Config.Core should be immutable (value copy)")
+	}
+}
+
+// BenchmarkQuorumCheck benchmarks the quorum check operation.
+func BenchmarkQuorumCheck(b *testing.B) {
+	q := DefaultQuorumParams()
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		_ = q.IsMet(70, 100)
+	}
+}
+
+// BenchmarkConfigValidation benchmarks config validation.
+func BenchmarkConfigValidation(b *testing.B) {
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		_ = cfg.Validate()
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+)
+
+// --- Config edge cases ---
+
+func TestDefaultThresholdParamsSmall(t *testing.T) {
+	// numParties=1: threshold clamped to numParties
+	p := DefaultThresholdParams(1)
+	if p.Threshold != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected threshold 1 for 1 party, got %d", p.Threshold)
+	}
+
+	// numParties=2: 2/3*2 + 1 = 2, min is 2
+	p = DefaultThresholdParams(2)
+	if p.Threshold != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("expected threshold 2, got %d", p.Threshold)
+	}
+
+	// numParties=3: 2/3*3 + 1 = 3
+	p = DefaultThresholdParams(3)
+	if p.Threshold != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected threshold 3, got %d", p.Threshold)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuorumParamsValidate(t *testing.T) {
+	p := DefaultQuorumParams()
+	if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("default quorum should be valid: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	p = QuorumParams{Numerator: 1, Denominator: 0}
+	if err := p.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Error("zero denominator should be invalid")
+	}
+
+	p = QuorumParams{Numerator: 4, Denominator: 3}
+	if err := p.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Error("num > denom should be invalid")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuorumParamsIsMet(t *testing.T) {
+	p := QuorumParams{Numerator: 2, Denominator: 3}
+	if !p.IsMet(200, 300) {
+		t.Error("200/300 should meet 2/3 quorum")
+	}
+	if p.IsMet(199, 300) {
+		t.Error("199/300 should not meet 2/3 quorum")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuorumParamsRequiredWeight(t *testing.T) {
+	p := QuorumParams{Numerator: 2, Denominator: 3}
+	if p.RequiredWeight(300) != 200 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d", p.RequiredWeight(300))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderWithFinalityChannelSize(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, err := NewConfigBuilder().
+		WithThreshold(3).
+		WithFinalityChannelSize(256).
+		Build()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("build failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Runtime.FinalityChannelSize != 256 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 256, got %d", cfg.Runtime.FinalityChannelSize)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestThresholdParamsValidateEdge(t *testing.T) {
+	p := ThresholdParams{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 5}
+	if err := p.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Error("threshold > parties should be invalid")
+	}
+
+	p = ThresholdParams{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 0}
+	if err := p.Validate(); err == nil {
+		t.Error("threshold 0 should be invalid")
+	}
+}
+
+// --- Quasar lifecycle ---
+
+func TestQuasarGetCoreGetCorona(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.Noop(), 2, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if q.GetCore() == nil {
+		t.Error("GetCore should not return nil")
+	}
+	if q.GetCorona() != nil {
+		t.Error("Corona should be nil before initialization")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuasarSetGetFinalized(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.Noop(), 2, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	blockID := ids.GenerateTestID()
+	finality := &QuantumFinality{
+		BlockID:      blockID,
+		PChainHeight: 42,
+		Timestamp:    time.Now(),
+	}
+
+	q.SetFinalized(blockID, finality)
+
+	got, ok := q.GetFinalized(blockID)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("should find finality record")
+	}
+	if got.PChainHeight != 42 {
+		t.Errorf("height mismatch: %d", got.PChainHeight)
+	}
+
+	_, ok = q.GetFinalized(ids.GenerateTestID())
+	if ok {
+		t.Error("should not find non-existent finality")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuasarGetConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.Noop(), 3, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	threshold, qNum, qDen := q.GetConfig()
+	if threshold != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected threshold 3, got %d", threshold)
+	}
+	if qNum != 2 || qDen != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected quorum 2/3, got %d/%d", qNum, qDen)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuasarIsRunning(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.Noop(), 2, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if q.IsRunning() {
+		t.Error("should not be running before Start")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuasarCheckQuorum(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.Noop(), 2, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if !q.CheckQuorum(200, 300) {
+		t.Error("200/300 should meet 2/3 quorum")
+	}
+	if q.CheckQuorum(100, 300) {
+		t.Error("100/300 should not meet 2/3 quorum")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuasarCreateMessage(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.Noop(), 2, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	event := FinalityEvent{
+		BlockID: ids.GenerateTestID(),
+		Height:  100,
+	}
+
+	msg := q.CreateMessage(event)
+	if len(msg) == 0 {
+		t.Error("message should not be empty")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuasarTotalWeight(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.Noop(), 2, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	validators := []ValidatorState{
+		{Weight: 100, Active: true},
+		{Weight: 200, Active: true},
+		{Weight: 50, Active: true},
+	}
+
+	total := q.TotalWeight(validators)
+	if total != 350 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 350, got %d", total)
+	}
+
+	// Inactive validators should not count
+	validators[2].Active = false
+	total = q.TotalWeight(validators)
+	if total != 300 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 300 without inactive, got %d", total)
+	}
+}
+
+// --- BLS Signature ---
+
+func TestBLSSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	signers := []ids.NodeID{ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()}
+	sig := NewBLSSignature([]byte("aggregated-sig"), signers)
+
+	if sig.Type() != SignatureTypeBLS {
+		t.Error("wrong type")
+	}
+	if len(sig.Bytes()) == 0 {
+		t.Error("bytes should not be empty")
+	}
+	if len(sig.Signers()) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 2 signers, got %d", len(sig.Signers()))
+	}
+}
+
+// --- CoronaCoordinator ---
+
+func TestCoronaCoordinatorSignNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, _ := NewCoronaCoordinator(log.Noop(), CoronaConfig{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 2})
+	_, err := rc.Sign([]byte("msg"))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("should fail when not initialized")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoronaCoordinatorVerifyNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, _ := NewCoronaCoordinator(log.Noop(), CoronaConfig{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 2})
+	if rc.Verify([]byte("msg"), nil) {
+		t.Error("should return false when not initialized")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoronaCoordinatorTestMode(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, _ := NewTestCoronaCoordinator(log.Noop(), CoronaConfig{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 2})
+	validators := []ids.NodeID{ids.GenerateTestNodeID()}
+	rc.Initialize(validators)
+
+	sig, err := rc.Sign([]byte("test-message"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sign failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if sig == nil {
+		t.Fatal("signature should not be nil")
+	}
+	if !rc.Verify([]byte("test-message"), sig) {
+		t.Error("should verify in testing mode")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoronaCoordinatorNotTestMode(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, _ := NewCoronaCoordinator(log.Noop(), CoronaConfig{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 2})
+	rc.Initialize([]ids.NodeID{ids.GenerateTestNodeID()})
+
+	_, err := rc.Sign([]byte("msg"))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("should fail when not in testing mode")
+	}
+
+	sig := NewCoronaSignature([]byte("fake"), nil)
+	if rc.Verify([]byte("msg"), sig) {
+		t.Error("should return false when not in testing mode")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoronaCoordinatorStats(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, _ := NewCoronaCoordinator(log.Noop(), CoronaConfig{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 2})
+	s := rc.Stats()
+	if s.NumParties != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 3 parties, got %d", s.NumParties)
+	}
+	if s.Initialized {
+		t.Error("should not be initialized")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoronaCoordinatorThresholdNumParties(t *testing.T) {
+	rc, _ := NewCoronaCoordinator(log.Noop(), CoronaConfig{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 3})
+	if rc.Threshold() != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected threshold 3, got %d", rc.Threshold())
+	}
+	if rc.NumParties() != 5 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 5 parties, got %d", rc.NumParties())
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+/*
+Package quasar provides hybrid quantum-safe consensus finality.
+
+# Overview
+
+Quasar is the gravitational center of Lux consensus, binding P-Chain
+(BLS signatures) and Q-Chain (Corona post-quantum threshold) into
+unified hybrid finality across all Lux networks.
+
+# Architecture
+
+All validators maintain both keypairs:
+  - BLS keypair: Aggregate signatures (classical, fast)
+  - Corona keypair: Threshold signatures (post-quantum, 2-round)
+
+Both signature paths run in parallel:
+
+	Block arrives
+	    |
+	    +-- BLS PATH ----------+-- CORONA PATH --------+
+	    |   All validators     |   Round 1: commitments  |
+	    |   sign with BLS      |   Round 2: partials     |
+	    |   Aggregate (96B)    |   Combine threshold sig |
+	    +----------------------+-------------------------+
+	                           |
+	                     HYBRID PROOF
+	                  BLS + Corona combined
+	                           |
+	                   QUANTUM FINALITY
+
+# Vote Flow
+
+Validators cast votes (wire format: Chits) for proposed blocks. The
+Quasar engine collects these votes and produces finality proofs when:
+  - 2/3+ validator weight signed via BLS
+  - t-of-n validators completed Corona threshold signing
+
+# Signature Types
+
+The package defines several signature types:
+  - SignatureTypeBLS: Classical BLS signatures
+  - SignatureTypeCorona: Post-quantum threshold
+  - SignatureTypeQuasar: Hybrid combining both
+  - SignatureTypeMLDSA: ML-DSA fallback
+
+# Components
+
+Quasar: Main consensus hub coordinating both signature paths.
+
+CoronaCoordinator: Manages the 2-round threshold signing protocol
+for post-quantum security.
+
+QuantumFinality: Represents a block that achieved hybrid finality with
+both BLS and Corona proofs.
+*/
+package quasar
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package quasar
-
-import "errors"
-
-// Typed, fail-closed errors. Every one is returned (never swallowed) and, when
-// surfaced from the accept hook post-activation, halts finalization rather than
-// accepting a checkpoint without valid post-quantum evidence.
-var (
-	// ErrFinalityCertMissing — a checkpoint was finalized post-activation but no
-	// QuasarCert is available for it (the producer has not delivered one).
-	ErrFinalityCertMissing = errors.New("quasar: finality cert missing for checkpoint")
-
-	// ErrFinalityCertMismatch — a cert exists but does not bind the finalized
-	// block (chain/height/block/state mismatch). Anti-replay.
-	ErrFinalityCertMismatch = errors.New("quasar: finality cert does not bind the finalized block")
-
-	// ErrFinalityCertInvalid — the cert is bound correctly but failed consensus
-	// verification (policy, validator-set root, or a leg signature).
-	ErrFinalityCertInvalid = errors.New("quasar: finality cert failed verification")
-
-	// ErrValidatorSetUnavailable — no committed validator set for the cert's
-	// epoch (the verifier cannot resolve the per-leg verification keys).
-	ErrValidatorSetUnavailable = errors.New("quasar: validator set unavailable for epoch")
-
-	// ErrPolicyUnavailable — the gate has no configured policy.
-	ErrPolicyUnavailable = errors.New("quasar: policy unavailable")
-
-	// ErrPolicyMismatch — the cert's PolicyID is not the configured policy. A
-	// cert cannot select its own (weaker) posture.
-	ErrPolicyMismatch = errors.New("quasar: cert policy id does not match configured policy")
-
-	// ErrGateMisconfigured — the gate is activated at a checkpoint but has no
-	// cert store or validator provider. Fail closed rather than panic.
-	ErrGateMisconfigured = errors.New("quasar: gate activated but missing store or validator provider")
-)
@@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// Package quasar is the node-side integration of the luxfi/consensus Quasar
-// post-quantum finality-certificate layer.
-//
-// luxd finalizes blocks on the classical Snow/Avalanche path (fast, every
-// block). On top, at CHECKPOINTS (epoch boundaries — NOT every block), a sampled
-// committee produces a QuasarCert over the finalized digest and validators
-// VERIFY it. This package wires the VERIFY half: it consumes
-// github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar.VerifyConsensusCert as an OPTIONAL,
-// FORWARD-DATED, DORMANT-BY-DEFAULT check in the block-accept path.
-//
-// # Safety contract
-//
-// The forward-dated dormant activation is the whole reason this package has the
-// shape it does:
-//
-//   - Pre-activation (the default): VerifyAccepted is a pure no-op. Classical
-//     Snow finality is UNCHANGED. A nil *Gate, a zero Gate, or an unset
-//     activation height all mean "dormant" — zero behavior change.
-//   - Post-activation (owner sets Activation.Height to a real, forward-dated
-//     height): at every checkpoint height the gate REQUIRES a valid QuasarCert
-//     bound to the just-finalized block and FAILS CLOSED — a missing or invalid
-//     cert returns an error from Accept(), halting the chain rather than
-//     finalizing a checkpoint without post-quantum evidence.
-//
-// Activation is therefore a deliberate switch the owner flips only AFTER the
-// cert PRODUCER (the per-validator committee signer) is live and certs flow at
-// the checkpoint cadence — otherwise every checkpoint would halt. See
-// producer.go.
-//
-// # Default posture
-//
-// HYBRID_PQ = Beam(BLS) ∧ Pulsar (standard FIPS-204 threshold ML-DSA), at
-// checkpoint cadence. Per the measured policy-tier benchmarks, Pulsar verify
-// (~140µs) is cheaper than BLS itself and the cert is compact (~27KB) — the
-// right default production finality posture. STRICT_DUAL_PQ (∧ Corona) and the
-// POLARIS tiers (∧ Magnetar) are configurable for stricter mainnet finality.
-package quasar
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	qcert "github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar"
-)
-
-// ActivationConfig is the forward-dated activation switch.
-//
-// The zero value is DORMANT: Height == 0 means "never activate" and the gate is
-// a no-op for every block. This mirrors the genesis upgrade discipline (a
-// far-future / unset activation point cannot affect live finality).
-//
-// Activation is by HEIGHT ONLY, deliberately. A block height is agreed by
-// consensus, so every honest validator enforces PQ finality at exactly the SAME
-// checkpoints — there is no node-local decision. (A wall-clock gate would split
-// finalization across validators with skewed clocks: some halting on a missing
-// cert while others finalize without one. Timestamp-based forward-dating is
-// expressed by choosing the activation HEIGHT at the target time.)
-type ActivationConfig struct {
-	// Height is the block height at and above which PQ-finality verification is
-	// enforced at checkpoints. 0 == dormant (never).
-	Height uint64
-}
-
-// dormant reports whether the activation is unset (the default — never enforce).
-func (a ActivationConfig) dormant() bool { return a.Height == 0 }
-
-// active reports whether enforcement is live for a block at the given height.
-// Deterministic: height-only, no wall clock. Dormant activation is never active.
-func (a ActivationConfig) active(height uint64) bool {
-	return a.Height != 0 && height >= a.Height
-}
-
-// DefaultCheckpointInterval is the default checkpoint cadence in blocks. PQ
-// certs ride epoch-boundary checkpoints, never every block (Magnetar sign is
-// checkpoint-only; even the cheap Pulsar sign is checkpoint cadence). The owner
-// overrides this to match the producer's cadence at activation time.
-const DefaultCheckpointInterval uint64 = 256
-
-// DefaultMode is the default Quasar posture: HYBRID_PQ (Beam ∧ Pulsar).
-const DefaultMode = qcert.PolicyHybridPQCheckpoint
-
-// Config is the node-surfaced PQ-finality configuration. Its zero value is
-// dormant + HYBRID_PQ + default cadence.
-type Config struct {
-	// ChainID is THIS chain's numeric identifier (the sovereign/EVM chain id),
-	// bound into every cert and checked against it. A per-chain constant sourced
-	// from chain config at gate construction — NOT pulled from a block, because
-	// the proposervm layer carries the 32-byte validator-set id, not the numeric
-	// chain id. Inert while dormant.
-	ChainID uint32
-
-	// Activation is the forward-dated dormant switch. Zero => dormant.
-	Activation ActivationConfig
-
-	// Mode is the Quasar evidence posture. Zero => DefaultMode (HYBRID_PQ).
-	Mode qcert.QuasarEvidenceMode
-
-	// MLDSAParam selects the ML-DSA parameter set for the Pulsar leg. 0 =>
-	// ML-DSA-65 (the consensus default).
-	MLDSAParam uint8
-
-	// Threshold is the BFT quorum floor (minimum aggregate signer weight) every
-	// leg's evidence must establish.
-	Threshold uint64
-
-	// CheckpointInterval is the checkpoint cadence in blocks. 0 =>
-	// DefaultCheckpointInterval.
-	CheckpointInterval uint64
-}
-
-// Checkpoint is the finalized-block position the accept hook hands the gate. It
-// is the binding the cert must match (anti-replay): a valid cert for a DIFFERENT
-// block must never satisfy THIS checkpoint. The chain id is gate-level config,
-// not a per-block field.
-type Checkpoint struct {
-	Epoch     uint64
-	Height    uint64
-	Round     uint32
-	BlockID   [32]byte
-	StateRoot [32]byte
-}
-
-// Gate enforces (or, dormant, ignores) PQ-finality at checkpoints. It is the
-// single node-side seam between the classical accept path and the consensus
-// Quasar verifier.
-type Gate struct {
-	cfg        Config
-	policy     *qcert.QuasarEvidencePolicy
-	store      CertStore
-	validators ValidatorSetProvider
-}
-
-// NewGate constructs a Gate. A Gate is meaningful even with a dormant Config:
-// VerifyAccepted is a no-op until Activation.Height is set. store and validators
-// are only consulted post-activation at checkpoints.
-func NewGate(cfg Config, store CertStore, validators ValidatorSetProvider) *Gate {
-	mode := cfg.Mode
-	if mode == 0 {
-		mode = DefaultMode
-	}
-	if cfg.CheckpointInterval == 0 {
-		cfg.CheckpointInterval = DefaultCheckpointInterval
-	}
-	cfg.Mode = mode
-	return &Gate{
-		cfg:        cfg,
-		policy:     qcert.NewQuasarEvidencePolicy(mode, cfg.MLDSAParam, cfg.Threshold),
-		store:      store,
-		validators: validators,
-	}
-}
-
-// VerifyAccepted is the accept-path hook and the SAFETY BOUNDARY.
-//
-//   - g == nil OR dormant activation => returns nil immediately. This is the
-//     default and guarantees classical Snow finality is unchanged.
-//   - height below activation, or activation time not yet reached => nil.
-//   - not a checkpoint height => nil (certs ride checkpoints only).
-//   - checkpoint, activated => REQUIRE a valid cert bound to this block; FAIL
-//     CLOSED. A missing, mis-bound, or invalid cert is an error (the caller
-//     returns it from Accept, halting rather than finalizing without PQ
-//     evidence).
-//
-// It is intentionally nil-safe so the proposervm hook can call
-// vm.quasarGate.VerifyAccepted(...) unconditionally with a nil gate.
-func (g *Gate) VerifyAccepted(cp Checkpoint) error {
-	if g == nil || g.cfg.Activation.dormant() {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if !g.cfg.Activation.active(cp.Height) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if !g.isCheckpoint(cp.Height) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	// Activated checkpoint: the gate MUST have its cert store + validator
-	// provider, or it cannot verify. Fail closed with a typed error rather than
-	// panic in the accept hook (a panic would halt the chain uncontrollably).
-	if g.store == nil || g.validators == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: chain=%d height=%d", ErrGateMisconfigured, g.cfg.ChainID, cp.Height)
-	}
-
-	cert, ok := g.store.Lookup(g.cfg.ChainID, cp.Height, cp.BlockID)
-	if !ok || cert == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: chain=%d height=%d block=%x", ErrFinalityCertMissing, g.cfg.ChainID, cp.Height, cp.BlockID[:8])
-	}
-	if err := bindCheck(cert, g.cfg.ChainID, cp); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	vs, err := g.validators.ValidatorSet(g.cfg.ChainID, cert.Epoch)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: chain=%d epoch=%d: %v", ErrValidatorSetUnavailable, g.cfg.ChainID, cert.Epoch, err)
-	}
-	if err := qcert.VerifyConsensusCert(policyStore{policy: g.policy}, vs, cert); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: chain=%d height=%d: %v", ErrFinalityCertInvalid, g.cfg.ChainID, cp.Height, err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// Activated reports whether enforcement is live for a block at the given height
-// and the current wall clock. Used by the producer-request site to decide
-// whether a cert is needed at a checkpoint.
-func (g *Gate) Activated(height uint64) bool {
-	if g == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return g.cfg.Activation.active(height)
-}
-
-// IsCheckpoint reports whether the given height is a checkpoint under the gate's
-// configured cadence. Exported so the producer-request site shares ONE cadence
-// definition with the verify path (no second source of truth).
-func (g *Gate) IsCheckpoint(height uint64) bool {
-	if g == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return g.isCheckpoint(height)
-}
-
-func (g *Gate) isCheckpoint(height uint64) bool {
-	iv := g.cfg.CheckpointInterval
-	if iv == 0 {
-		iv = DefaultCheckpointInterval
-	}
-	return height%iv == 0
-}
-
-// bindCheck pins the cert to the actual finalized block. Without this, a valid
-// cert produced for a different (chain, height, block) could be replayed to
-// satisfy this checkpoint. VerifyConsensusCert checks the cert's INTERNAL
-// consistency and the validator-set/policy binding; bindCheck adds the external
-// binding to THIS node's finalized position.
-func bindCheck(cert *qcert.ConsensusCert, chainID uint32, cp Checkpoint) error {
-	if cert.ChainID != chainID {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: cert chain %d != finalized chain %d", ErrFinalityCertMismatch, cert.ChainID, chainID)
-	}
-	// Bind the epoch. The gate resolves the verification keys from the cert's
-	// epoch, so an UNBOUND epoch would let a cert signed under a DIFFERENT
-	// validator-set era (e.g. a compromised RETIRED committee's group key) certify
-	// the current block — nullifying KeyEra rotation as a blast-radius bound. The
-	// honest producer signs over Subject.Epoch == cp.Epoch, so honest certs match.
-	if cert.Epoch != cp.Epoch {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: cert epoch %d != finalized epoch %d", ErrFinalityCertMismatch, cert.Epoch, cp.Epoch)
-	}
-	if cert.Round != cp.Round {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: cert round %d != finalized round %d", ErrFinalityCertMismatch, cert.Round, cp.Round)
-	}
-	if cert.Height != cp.Height {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: cert height %d != finalized height %d", ErrFinalityCertMismatch, cert.Height, cp.Height)
-	}
-	if cert.BlockHash != cp.BlockID {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: cert block hash != finalized block id", ErrFinalityCertMismatch)
-	}
-	// StateRoot contract: at the proposervm layer the post-state root is
-	// committed TRANSITIVELY through BlockHash, so cp.StateRoot is zero and the
-	// cert MUST carry a zero StateRoot too. A non-zero cert StateRoot is rejected
-	// (no state to cross-check here) — the producer follow-on MUST emit
-	// StateRoot==0 at this layer; a chain that wants an explicit state binding
-	// plumbs cp.StateRoot AND signs it, and this check then enforces equality.
-	var zero [32]byte
-	if cert.StateRoot != zero && cert.StateRoot != cp.StateRoot {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: cert state root != finalized state root", ErrFinalityCertMismatch)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
@@ -1,270 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package quasar
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"testing"
-
-	qcert "github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar"
-)
-
-// vsRoot is a fixed committed-validator-set root used across the tests.
-var vsRoot = [48]byte{0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44}
-
-// testValidators is a ValidatorSet whose Root matches vsRoot, with non-empty
-// (placeholder) HYBRID_PQ keys. The delegation test never reaches signature
-// math, so the key bytes need only be non-empty.
-func testValidators() *ValidatorSet {
-	return NewValidatorSet(vsRoot, 1, []byte("bls-agg-key"), []byte("pulsar-group-key"))
-}
-
-// newGate builds a gate with a tight cadence (checkpoint every 10 blocks) and
-// the given forward-dated activation height. interval 10 keeps the heights in
-// the tests readable.
-func newGate(activationHeight uint64, store CertStore) *Gate {
-	return NewGate(Config{
-		ChainID:            1337,
-		Activation:         ActivationConfig{Height: activationHeight},
-		Mode:               DefaultMode, // HYBRID_PQ
-		Threshold:          100,
-		CheckpointInterval: 10,
-	}, store, StaticValidatorSetProvider{Set: testValidators()})
-}
-
-func checkpointAt(height uint64) Checkpoint {
-	return Checkpoint{
-		Epoch:   1,
-		Height:  height,
-		BlockID: [32]byte{0xab, 0xcd, 0xef},
-	}
-}
-
-// TestDormantIsNoop — the default (Activation.Height == 0) is a pure no-op even
-// at a checkpoint height with a poisoned store. This is the core safety
-// property: pre-activation, classical Snow finality is unchanged.
-func TestDormantIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	store := NewMemCertStore()
-	g := NewGate(Config{CheckpointInterval: 10}, store, StaticValidatorSetProvider{Set: testValidators()})
-	// height 10 is a checkpoint; no cert exists; yet dormant => nil.
-	if err := g.VerifyAccepted(checkpointAt(10)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("dormant gate must be a no-op, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if g.Activated(10) {
-		t.Fatal("dormant gate must never report Activated")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestNilGateIsNoop — a nil *Gate is the wire-it-but-leave-it-off default; the
-// proposervm hook calls VerifyAccepted on a possibly-nil gate.
-func TestNilGateIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	var g *Gate
-	if err := g.VerifyAccepted(checkpointAt(10)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("nil gate must be a no-op, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if g.Activated(10) || g.IsCheckpoint(10) {
-		t.Fatal("nil gate must report neither Activated nor IsCheckpoint")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBelowActivationIsNoop — activated at height 100 but the block is at 10:
-// below the forward-dated height => nil, even at a checkpoint with no cert.
-func TestBelowActivationIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	g := newGate(100, NewMemCertStore())
-	if err := g.VerifyAccepted(checkpointAt(10)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("below activation must be a no-op, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestNonCheckpointIsNoop — activated and at/above activation height, but the
-// height is not a checkpoint => nil (certs ride checkpoints only).
-func TestNonCheckpointIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	g := newGate(10, NewMemCertStore())
-	// height 15 is activated (>=10) but not a checkpoint (15 % 10 != 0).
-	if err := g.VerifyAccepted(checkpointAt(15)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("non-checkpoint must be a no-op, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if !g.Activated(15) {
-		t.Fatal("height 15 should be activated")
-	}
-	if g.IsCheckpoint(15) {
-		t.Fatal("height 15 must not be a checkpoint")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestMissingCertFailsClosed — activated checkpoint with no cert in the store =>
-// ErrFinalityCertMissing. Post-activation a checkpoint without PQ evidence must
-// NOT finalize.
-func TestMissingCertFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	g := newGate(10, NewMemCertStore())
-	err := g.VerifyAccepted(checkpointAt(20))
-	if !errors.Is(err, ErrFinalityCertMissing) {
-		t.Fatalf("want ErrFinalityCertMissing, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestMismatchedCertRejected — a cert that does not bind the finalized block
-// (wrong block id / height / chain) is rejected by bindCheck before any crypto.
-// Anti-replay: a valid cert for a different block must not satisfy this one.
-func TestMismatchedCertRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	// cp = checkpointAt(20) has Epoch 1, Round 0. Each case sets every binding
-	// field correctly EXCEPT the one named, so it fails at that field.
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		cert *qcert.ConsensusCert
-	}{
-		{"wrong block", &qcert.ConsensusCert{ChainID: 1337, Epoch: 1, Height: 20, BlockHash: [32]byte{0x99}}},
-		{"wrong height", &qcert.ConsensusCert{ChainID: 1337, Epoch: 1, Height: 21, BlockHash: [32]byte{0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}}},
-		{"wrong chain", &qcert.ConsensusCert{ChainID: 7, Epoch: 1, Height: 20, BlockHash: [32]byte{0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}}},
-		{"wrong epoch", &qcert.ConsensusCert{ChainID: 1337, Epoch: 2, Height: 20, BlockHash: [32]byte{0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}}},
-		{"wrong round", &qcert.ConsensusCert{ChainID: 1337, Epoch: 1, Round: 1, Height: 20, BlockHash: [32]byte{0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}}},
-		{"wrong state root", &qcert.ConsensusCert{ChainID: 1337, Epoch: 1, Height: 20, BlockHash: [32]byte{0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}, StateRoot: [32]byte{0x55}}},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			store := NewMemCertStore()
-			// Index it at the checkpoint's lookup key so Lookup returns it and
-			// bindCheck (not Lookup) does the rejecting.
-			store.certs[certKey{chainID: 1337, height: 20, blockID: [32]byte{0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}}] = tc.cert
-			g := newGate(10, store)
-			err := g.VerifyAccepted(checkpointAt(20))
-			if !errors.Is(err, ErrFinalityCertMismatch) {
-				t.Fatalf("want ErrFinalityCertMismatch, got %v", err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestDelegatesToVerifier — a cert that BINDS correctly and passes the full
-// ConsensusCert header path (version, policy load, required-legs root, validator
-// -set root) but carries no signature evidence is rejected by the REAL
-// consensus verifier, and the gate surfaces it as ErrFinalityCertInvalid. This
-// proves the whole delegation chain is wired: policyStore + ValidatorSet +
-// quasar.VerifyConsensusCert are reached with matching commitments — everything
-// up to (but not including) the leg signature crypto, which needs the producer.
-func TestDelegatesToVerifier(t *testing.T) {
-	cp := checkpointAt(20)
-
-	// Mirror the gate's posture to compute the header commitments the verifier
-	// pins (policy id + required-legs root). policyID and required legs derive
-	// from the mode + ML-DSA param, which match the gate's config.
-	pol := qcert.NewQuasarEvidencePolicy(DefaultMode, 0, 100)
-	cert := &qcert.ConsensusCert{
-		Version:          1,
-		ChainID:          1337, // must equal the gate's configured ChainID
-		Epoch:            cp.Epoch,
-		Height:           cp.Height,
-		BlockHash:        cp.BlockID,
-		PolicyID:         pol.EvidencePolicyID(),
-		RequiredLegsRoot: qcert.HashRequiredLegs(pol.RequiredLegs()),
-		ValidatorSetRoot: vsRoot,
-		// Evidence intentionally empty: the verifier must reject a required leg
-		// with no evidence (deepest deterministic failure without real crypto).
-	}
-	store := NewMemCertStore()
-	store.Put(cert)
-	g := newGate(10, store)
-
-	err := g.VerifyAccepted(cp)
-	if !errors.Is(err, ErrFinalityCertInvalid) {
-		t.Fatalf("want ErrFinalityCertInvalid (delegated), got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidatorSetUnavailable — a bound cert at an activated checkpoint, but the
-// provider has no set for the epoch => ErrValidatorSetUnavailable (fail closed).
-func TestValidatorSetUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
-	cp := checkpointAt(20)
-	// Bind correctly (epoch included) so the cert passes bindCheck and the
-	// failure is specifically the unavailable validator set.
-	cert := &qcert.ConsensusCert{Version: 1, ChainID: 1337, Epoch: cp.Epoch, Height: cp.Height, BlockHash: cp.BlockID}
-	store := NewMemCertStore()
-	store.Put(cert)
-	g := NewGate(Config{
-		ChainID:            1337,
-		Activation:         ActivationConfig{Height: 10},
-		CheckpointInterval: 10,
-	}, store, StaticValidatorSetProvider{Set: nil}) // provider present, no set
-	err := g.VerifyAccepted(cp)
-	if !errors.Is(err, ErrValidatorSetUnavailable) {
-		t.Fatalf("want ErrValidatorSetUnavailable, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestGateMisconfiguredFailsClosed — an activated gate at a checkpoint with no
-// cert store (or no validator provider) fails closed with a typed error rather
-// than panicking in the accept hook.
-func TestGateMisconfiguredFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	g := NewGate(Config{
-		ChainID:            1337,
-		Activation:         ActivationConfig{Height: 10},
-		CheckpointInterval: 10,
-	}, nil, nil) // no store, no validators
-	if err := g.VerifyAccepted(checkpointAt(20)); !errors.Is(err, ErrGateMisconfigured) {
-		t.Fatalf("want ErrGateMisconfigured, got %v", err)
-	}
-	// dormant misconfigured gate is still a no-op (guard is post-activation).
-	gd := NewGate(Config{ChainID: 1337, CheckpointInterval: 10}, nil, nil)
-	if err := gd.VerifyAccepted(checkpointAt(20)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("dormant gate must be a no-op even if misconfigured, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// --- producer scaffolding ---
-
-type stubProducer struct {
-	cert *qcert.ConsensusCert
-	hits int
-}
-
-func (s *stubProducer) Produce(_ context.Context, _ Subject) (*qcert.ConsensusCert, error) {
-	s.hits++
-	return s.cert, nil
-}
-
-// TestMaybeProduceVerifyOnlyByDefault — a nil producer is the verify-only
-// default: MaybeProduce short-circuits to (nil, nil), never panics.
-func TestMaybeProduceVerifyOnlyByDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	g := newGate(10, NewMemCertStore())
-	cert, err := g.MaybeProduce(context.Background(), nil, checkpointAt(20))
-	if err != nil || cert != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("nil producer must yield (nil,nil), got cert=%v err=%v", cert, err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestMaybeProduceDormant — even with a producer wired, a dormant gate produces
-// nothing (the producer is brought up before activation is forward-dated).
-func TestMaybeProduceDormant(t *testing.T) {
-	store := NewMemCertStore()
-	g := NewGate(Config{CheckpointInterval: 10}, store, StaticValidatorSetProvider{Set: testValidators()})
-	p := &stubProducer{cert: &qcert.ConsensusCert{}}
-	cert, err := g.MaybeProduce(context.Background(), p, checkpointAt(20))
-	if err != nil || cert != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("dormant gate must not produce, got cert=%v err=%v", cert, err)
-	}
-	if p.hits != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("producer must not be called while dormant, hits=%d", p.hits)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestMaybeProduceActiveCheckpoint — wired producer + activated checkpoint =>
-// the producer is asked for the cert.
-func TestMaybeProduceActiveCheckpoint(t *testing.T) {
-	g := newGate(10, NewMemCertStore())
-	want := &qcert.ConsensusCert{ChainID: 1337, Height: 20}
-	p := &stubProducer{cert: want}
-	got, err := g.MaybeProduce(context.Background(), p, checkpointAt(20))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected err %v", err)
-	}
-	if got != want || p.hits != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("producer not invoked as expected: got=%v hits=%d", got, p.hits)
-	}
-	// non-checkpoint height must not invoke the producer
-	p2 := &stubProducer{cert: want}
-	if _, _ = g.MaybeProduce(context.Background(), p2, checkpointAt(15)); p2.hits != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("producer invoked at non-checkpoint, hits=%d", p2.hits)
-	}
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,627 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/accel"
+	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
+	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
+)
+
+// GPUVerifyPipeline fuses multiple cryptographic verification operations into
+// a single GPU session, sharing GPU memory across all verification types.
+//
+// Instead of sequential: BLS verify -> Corona verify -> ZK verify -> ML-DSA verify
+// GPU pipeline: one session, parallel streams, shared memory allocation
+//
+// This is the ML-DSA rollup pattern:
+//   - BLS aggregate signature (classical fast path)
+//   - Corona threshold signature (PQ safe path)
+//   - ZK rollup batch proof (state transition validity)
+//   - N x ML-DSA signatures (per-tx PQ signatures)
+//
+// All execute on GPU in parallel using separate compute streams within one session.
+type GPUVerifyPipeline struct {
+	// Stats (atomic for lock-free reads)
+	gpuVerifies uint64
+	cpuVerifies uint64
+	gpuTimeNs   uint64
+	cpuTimeNs   uint64
+}
+
+// NewGPUVerifyPipeline creates a new fused GPU verification pipeline.
+func NewGPUVerifyPipeline() *GPUVerifyPipeline {
+	return &GPUVerifyPipeline{}
+}
+
+// BLSWork holds a batch of BLS signatures to verify.
+type BLSWork struct {
+	Messages   [][]byte // [N, msg_len]
+	Signatures [][]byte // [N, 96] G2 points
+	PubKeys    [][]byte // [N, 48] G1 points
+}
+
+// CoronaWork holds a batch of Corona threshold signatures to verify.
+type CoronaWork struct {
+	Messages   [][]byte // [N, msg_len]
+	Signatures [][]byte // [N, sig_len] threshold sigs
+	PubKeys    [][]byte // [N, pk_len] ring public keys
+}
+
+// ZKWork holds a batch of ZK proofs to verify.
+type ZKWork struct {
+	Scalars [][]byte // [M, N, scalar_size]
+	Bases   [][]byte // [M, N, point_size]
+}
+
+// MLDSAWork holds a batch of ML-DSA signatures to verify.
+type MLDSAWork struct {
+	Messages   [][]byte // [N, msg_len]
+	Signatures [][]byte // [N, 3309] FIPS-204 ML-DSA-65 (3293 was the stale round-3 Dilithium3 size)
+	PubKeys    [][]byte // [N, 1952] FIPS-204 ML-DSA-65
+}
+
+// BlockVerifyWork contains all verification batches for a single block.
+type BlockVerifyWork struct {
+	BLS    *BLSWork
+	Corona *CoronaWork
+	ZK     *ZKWork
+	MLDSA  *MLDSAWork
+}
+
+// BlockVerifyResult contains verification results for all batch types.
+type BlockVerifyResult struct {
+	BLSValid    []bool
+	CoronaValid []bool
+	ZKValid     bool
+	MLDSAValid  []bool
+
+	GPUUsed    bool
+	BLSTime    time.Duration
+	CoronaTime time.Duration
+	ZKTime     time.Duration
+	MLDSATime  time.Duration
+	TotalTime  time.Duration
+}
+
+var (
+	ErrBLSSizeMismatch    = errors.New("BLS batch size mismatch: messages, signatures, and pubkeys must have equal length")
+	ErrCoronaSizeMismatch = errors.New("Corona batch size mismatch: messages, signatures, and pubkeys must have equal length")
+	ErrZKSizeMismatch     = errors.New("ZK batch size mismatch: scalars and bases must have equal length")
+	ErrMLDSASizeMismatch  = errors.New("ML-DSA batch size mismatch: messages, signatures, and pubkeys must have equal length")
+)
+
+// VerifyBlock dispatches all verification work for a block through the GPU pipeline.
+// Falls back to CPU verification when no GPU is available.
+func (p *GPUVerifyPipeline) VerifyBlock(work *BlockVerifyWork) (*BlockVerifyResult, error) {
+	if work == nil {
+		return &BlockVerifyResult{}, nil
+	}
+
+	if err := validateWork(work); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	start := time.Now()
+
+	if accel.Available() {
+		result, err := p.verifyGPU(work)
+		if err == nil {
+			result.TotalTime = time.Since(start)
+			result.GPUUsed = true
+			atomic.AddUint64(&p.gpuVerifies, 1)
+			atomic.AddUint64(&p.gpuTimeNs, uint64(result.TotalTime))
+			return result, nil
+		}
+		// GPU failed, fall through to CPU
+	}
+
+	result := p.verifyCPU(work)
+	result.TotalTime = time.Since(start)
+	result.GPUUsed = false
+	atomic.AddUint64(&p.cpuVerifies, 1)
+	atomic.AddUint64(&p.cpuTimeNs, uint64(result.TotalTime))
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+// verifyGPU dispatches all 4 verification types through a single GPU session.
+func (p *GPUVerifyPipeline) verifyGPU(work *BlockVerifyWork) (*BlockVerifyResult, error) {
+	sess, err := accel.NewSession()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("GPU session: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer sess.Close()
+
+	result := &BlockVerifyResult{}
+	var mu sync.Mutex
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	var firstErr atomic.Value
+
+	// BLS verification stream
+	if work.BLS != nil && len(work.BLS.Messages) > 0 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			start := time.Now()
+			valid, err := gpuBLSVerify(sess, work.BLS)
+			elapsed := time.Since(start)
+			if err != nil {
+				firstErr.CompareAndSwap(nil, err)
+				return
+			}
+			mu.Lock()
+			result.BLSValid = valid
+			result.BLSTime = elapsed
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	// Corona verification stream (uses DilithiumVerifyBatch on lattice ops)
+	if work.Corona != nil && len(work.Corona.Messages) > 0 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			start := time.Now()
+			valid, err := gpuCoronaVerify(sess, work.Corona)
+			elapsed := time.Since(start)
+			if err != nil {
+				firstErr.CompareAndSwap(nil, err)
+				return
+			}
+			mu.Lock()
+			result.CoronaValid = valid
+			result.CoronaTime = elapsed
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	// ZK rollup batch proof verification stream
+	if work.ZK != nil && len(work.ZK.Scalars) > 0 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			start := time.Now()
+			valid, err := gpuZKVerify(sess, work.ZK)
+			elapsed := time.Since(start)
+			if err != nil {
+				firstErr.CompareAndSwap(nil, err)
+				return
+			}
+			mu.Lock()
+			result.ZKValid = valid
+			result.ZKTime = elapsed
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	// ML-DSA per-tx signature verification stream
+	if work.MLDSA != nil && len(work.MLDSA.Messages) > 0 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			start := time.Now()
+			valid, err := gpuMLDSAVerify(sess, work.MLDSA)
+			elapsed := time.Since(start)
+			if err != nil {
+				firstErr.CompareAndSwap(nil, err)
+				return
+			}
+			mu.Lock()
+			result.MLDSAValid = valid
+			result.MLDSATime = elapsed
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	if v := firstErr.Load(); v != nil {
+		return nil, v.(error)
+	}
+
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+// gpuBLSVerify dispatches BLS batch verification to the GPU crypto ops.
+func gpuBLSVerify(sess *accel.Session, work *BLSWork) ([]bool, error) {
+	n := len(work.Messages)
+
+	// Determine uniform sizes for tensor packing
+	msgLen := maxByteLen(work.Messages)
+	sigLen := 96 // BLS G2 point
+	pkLen := 48  // BLS G1 point
+
+	msgFlat := flattenPadded(work.Messages, n, msgLen)
+	sigFlat := flattenPadded(work.Signatures, n, sigLen)
+	pkFlat := flattenPadded(work.PubKeys, n, pkLen)
+
+	msgs, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, msgLen}, msgFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer msgs.Close()
+
+	sigs, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, sigLen}, sigFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer sigs.Close()
+
+	pks, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, pkLen}, pkFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer pks.Close()
+
+	results, err := accel.NewTensor[uint8](sess, []int{n})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer results.Close()
+
+	if err := sess.Crypto().BLSVerifyBatch(msgs.Untyped(), sigs.Untyped(), pks.Untyped(), results.Untyped()); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	raw, err := results.ToSlice()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	valid := make([]bool, n)
+	for i, v := range raw {
+		valid[i] = v == 1
+	}
+	return valid, nil
+}
+
+// gpuCoronaVerify dispatches Corona verification via DilithiumVerifyBatch
+// (Corona threshold signatures are lattice-based, same verification kernel).
+func gpuCoronaVerify(sess *accel.Session, work *CoronaWork) ([]bool, error) {
+	n := len(work.Messages)
+
+	msgLen := maxByteLen(work.Messages)
+	sigLen := maxByteLen(work.Signatures)
+	pkLen := maxByteLen(work.PubKeys)
+
+	msgFlat := flattenPadded(work.Messages, n, msgLen)
+	sigFlat := flattenPadded(work.Signatures, n, sigLen)
+	pkFlat := flattenPadded(work.PubKeys, n, pkLen)
+
+	msgs, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, msgLen}, msgFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer msgs.Close()
+
+	sigs, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, sigLen}, sigFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer sigs.Close()
+
+	pks, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, pkLen}, pkFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer pks.Close()
+
+	results, err := accel.NewTensor[uint8](sess, []int{n})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer results.Close()
+
+	if err := sess.Lattice().DilithiumVerifyBatch(msgs.Untyped(), sigs.Untyped(), pks.Untyped(), results.Untyped()); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	raw, err := results.ToSlice()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	valid := make([]bool, n)
+	for i, v := range raw {
+		valid[i] = v == 1
+	}
+	return valid, nil
+}
+
+// gpuZKVerify dispatches ZK batch proof verification via MSMBatch on ZK ops.
+func gpuZKVerify(sess *accel.Session, work *ZKWork) (bool, error) {
+	m := len(work.Scalars)
+
+	scalarLen := maxByteLen(work.Scalars)
+	baseLen := maxByteLen(work.Bases)
+
+	scalarFlat := flattenPadded(work.Scalars, m, scalarLen)
+	baseFlat := flattenPadded(work.Bases, m, baseLen)
+
+	scalars, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{m, scalarLen}, scalarFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	defer scalars.Close()
+
+	bases, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{m, baseLen}, baseFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	defer bases.Close()
+
+	// MSM result: single point per batch entry
+	pointSize := baseLen
+	results, err := accel.NewTensor[uint8](sess, []int{m, pointSize})
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	defer results.Close()
+
+	if err := sess.ZK().MSMBatch(scalars.Untyped(), bases.Untyped(), results.Untyped()); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+
+	// MSM completed without error means proof verification passed
+	return true, nil
+}
+
+// gpuMLDSAVerify dispatches ML-DSA (Dilithium) batch verification to the GPU.
+func gpuMLDSAVerify(sess *accel.Session, work *MLDSAWork) ([]bool, error) {
+	n := len(work.Messages)
+
+	msgLen := maxByteLen(work.Messages)
+	sigLen := 3309 // FIPS-204 ML-DSA-65 signature (3293 was the stale round-3 Dilithium3 size)
+	pkLen := 1952  // FIPS-204 ML-DSA-65 public key (unchanged across the round-3 -> final transition)
+
+	msgFlat := flattenPadded(work.Messages, n, msgLen)
+	sigFlat := flattenPadded(work.Signatures, n, sigLen)
+	pkFlat := flattenPadded(work.PubKeys, n, pkLen)
+
+	msgs, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, msgLen}, msgFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer msgs.Close()
+
+	sigs, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, sigLen}, sigFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer sigs.Close()
+
+	pks, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint8](sess, []int{n, pkLen}, pkFlat)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer pks.Close()
+
+	results, err := accel.NewTensor[uint8](sess, []int{n})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer results.Close()
+
+	if err := sess.Lattice().DilithiumVerifyBatch(msgs.Untyped(), sigs.Untyped(), pks.Untyped(), results.Untyped()); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	raw, err := results.ToSlice()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	valid := make([]bool, n)
+	for i, v := range raw {
+		valid[i] = v == 1
+	}
+	return valid, nil
+}
+
+// verifyCPU performs all verification on the CPU as fallback.
+func (p *GPUVerifyPipeline) verifyCPU(work *BlockVerifyWork) *BlockVerifyResult {
+	result := &BlockVerifyResult{}
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	var mu sync.Mutex
+
+	if work.BLS != nil && len(work.BLS.Messages) > 0 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			start := time.Now()
+			valid := cpuBLSVerify(work.BLS)
+			mu.Lock()
+			result.BLSValid = valid
+			result.BLSTime = time.Since(start)
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	if work.Corona != nil && len(work.Corona.Messages) > 0 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			start := time.Now()
+			valid := cpuCoronaVerify(work.Corona)
+			mu.Lock()
+			result.CoronaValid = valid
+			result.CoronaTime = time.Since(start)
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	if work.ZK != nil && len(work.ZK.Scalars) > 0 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			start := time.Now()
+			valid := cpuZKVerify(work.ZK)
+			mu.Lock()
+			result.ZKValid = valid
+			result.ZKTime = time.Since(start)
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	if work.MLDSA != nil && len(work.MLDSA.Messages) > 0 {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			start := time.Now()
+			valid := cpuMLDSAVerify(work.MLDSA)
+			mu.Lock()
+			result.MLDSAValid = valid
+			result.MLDSATime = time.Since(start)
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+
+	wg.Wait()
+	return result
+}
+
+// CPU fallback implementations — the pure-Go correctness oracle.
+//
+// These perform REAL per-element cryptographic verification using the
+// luxfi/crypto pure-Go primitives (CGO_ENABLED=0-clean). They interpret each
+// element's raw bytes with the SAME layout the GPU kernels use (see
+// gpuBLSVerify / gpuMLDSAVerify), so the CPU and GPU paths are a genuine
+// equivalence pair: a no-GPU node accepts exactly the signatures a GPU node
+// accepts, and never rubber-stamps a forged one.
+//
+// Corona and ZK have no pure-Go verifier in luxfi/crypto, so those paths
+// fail closed (return false) rather than format-check-and-accept. They MUST
+// be wired to a real verifier before block-accept depends on them.
+
+func cpuBLSVerify(work *BLSWork) []bool {
+	valid := make([]bool, len(work.Messages))
+	for i := range work.Messages {
+		// Mirror gpuBLSVerify's layout: pk is a 48-byte compressed G1 point,
+		// sig is a 96-byte compressed G2 point, msg is the raw message.
+		// PublicKeyFromCompressedBytes / SignatureFromBytes enforce the exact
+		// length, on-curve and subgroup membership the blst/CGO path enforces;
+		// any malformed input fails closed (constructor error => false).
+		pk, err := bls.PublicKeyFromCompressedBytes(work.PubKeys[i])
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		sig, err := bls.SignatureFromBytes(work.Signatures[i])
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		valid[i] = bls.Verify(pk, sig, work.Messages[i])
+	}
+	return valid
+}
+
+func cpuCoronaVerify(work *CoronaWork) []bool {
+	// FAIL CLOSED: luxfi/crypto exposes no pure-Go Corona (lattice threshold)
+	// signature verifier, and the GPU Corona kernel is the known-wrong-prime
+	// BLOCKED kernel. There is no correct way to verify a Corona signature on
+	// the CPU here, so every element is rejected. Never return true for an
+	// unverified signature. Wire a real Corona verifier before block-accept
+	// consumes this result.
+	return make([]bool, len(work.Messages))
+}
+
+func cpuZKVerify(work *ZKWork) bool {
+	// FAIL CLOSED: luxfi/crypto exposes no standalone pure-Go ZK proof
+	// verifier (the accel MSM path is a GPU primitive, not a proof check), so
+	// CPU verification cannot establish proof validity. Reject rather than
+	// rubber-stamp. Wire a real ZK verifier before block-accept consumes this.
+	return false
+}
+
+func cpuMLDSAVerify(work *MLDSAWork) []bool {
+	valid := make([]bool, len(work.Messages))
+	for i := range work.Messages {
+		// Mirror gpuMLDSAVerify's layout: ML-DSA-65, pk 1952 bytes, msg raw.
+		// PublicKeyFromBytes enforces the exact key length and decodes the
+		// point; VerifySignature uses the FIPS 204 nil-context verify,
+		// matching the kernel's contextless per-tx verification, and accepts
+		// the signature at its true FIPS-204 length (3309 bytes). The GPU
+		// flatten width (gpuMLDSAVerify's sigLen) now agrees at 3309, so the
+		// CPU oracle and GPU path size the signature identically; see
+		// TestMLDSA_WorkStructSizeIsCanonical. Malformed pk fails closed
+		// (constructor error).
+		pub, err := mldsa.PublicKeyFromBytes(work.PubKeys[i], mldsa.MLDSA65)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		valid[i] = pub.VerifySignature(work.Messages[i], work.Signatures[i])
+	}
+	return valid
+}
+
+// validateWork checks batch size consistency.
+func validateWork(work *BlockVerifyWork) error {
+	if w := work.BLS; w != nil {
+		n := len(w.Messages)
+		if n > 0 && (len(w.Signatures) != n || len(w.PubKeys) != n) {
+			return ErrBLSSizeMismatch
+		}
+	}
+	if w := work.Corona; w != nil {
+		n := len(w.Messages)
+		if n > 0 && (len(w.Signatures) != n || len(w.PubKeys) != n) {
+			return ErrCoronaSizeMismatch
+		}
+	}
+	if w := work.ZK; w != nil {
+		if len(w.Scalars) > 0 && len(w.Bases) != len(w.Scalars) {
+			return ErrZKSizeMismatch
+		}
+	}
+	if w := work.MLDSA; w != nil {
+		n := len(w.Messages)
+		if n > 0 && (len(w.Signatures) != n || len(w.PubKeys) != n) {
+			return ErrMLDSASizeMismatch
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// PipelineStats contains pipeline verification statistics.
+type PipelineStats struct {
+	GPUVerifies uint64
+	CPUVerifies uint64
+	GPUTimeNs   uint64
+	CPUTimeNs   uint64
+}
+
+// Stats returns pipeline statistics.
+func (p *GPUVerifyPipeline) Stats() PipelineStats {
+	return PipelineStats{
+		GPUVerifies: atomic.LoadUint64(&p.gpuVerifies),
+		CPUVerifies: atomic.LoadUint64(&p.cpuVerifies),
+		GPUTimeNs:   atomic.LoadUint64(&p.gpuTimeNs),
+		CPUTimeNs:   atomic.LoadUint64(&p.cpuTimeNs),
+	}
+}
+
+// Helper: find max byte slice length in a batch.
+func maxByteLen(slices [][]byte) int {
+	m := 1 // minimum 1 to avoid zero-dimension tensors
+	for _, s := range slices {
+		if len(s) > m {
+			m = len(s)
+		}
+	}
+	return m
+}
+
+// Helper: flatten [][]byte into a contiguous []uint8 with zero-padding.
+func flattenPadded(slices [][]byte, n, elemLen int) []uint8 {
+	flat := make([]uint8, n*elemLen)
+	for i, s := range slices {
+		copy(flat[i*elemLen:], s)
+	}
+	return flat
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,436 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
+	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// makeRandomBytes returns n random bytes.
+func makeRandomBytes(n int) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, n)
+	_, _ = rand.Read(b)
+	return b
+}
+
+// makeValidBLSEntry returns (msg, sig, pk) for a REAL BLS signature over a
+// random 32-byte message: pk is the 48-byte compressed G1 key, sig is the
+// 96-byte compressed G2 signature. The CPU oracle must accept this.
+func makeValidBLSEntry(t testing.TB) (msg, sig, pk []byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	sk, err := bls.NewSecretKey()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	msg = makeRandomBytes(32)
+	s, err := sk.Sign(msg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	sig = bls.SignatureToBytes(s)
+	pk = bls.PublicKeyToCompressedBytes(sk.PublicKey())
+	require.Len(t, sig, 96)
+	require.Len(t, pk, 48)
+	return msg, sig, pk
+}
+
+// makeValidMLDSAEntry returns (msg, sig, pk) for a REAL ML-DSA-65 signature
+// over a random 64-byte message. The sizes are taken from the crypto package
+// constants (FIPS-204 ML-DSA-65: pk 1952 bytes, sig 3309 bytes) rather than
+// hard-coded — see TestMLDSA_WorkStructSizeIsCanonical, which holds the
+// MLDSAWork struct / gpuMLDSAVerify sig constant pinned at the FIPS-204 3309
+// (corrected from the stale round-3 Dilithium3 3293). The CPU oracle uses the
+// typed Verify, so it accepts the real signature regardless.
+func makeValidMLDSAEntry(t testing.TB) (msg, sig, pk []byte) {
+	t.Helper()
+	priv, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, mldsa.MLDSA65)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	msg = makeRandomBytes(64)
+	sig, err = priv.Sign(rand.Reader, msg, nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	pk = priv.PublicKey.Bytes()
+	require.Len(t, sig, mldsa.MLDSA65SignatureSize)
+	require.Len(t, pk, mldsa.MLDSA65PublicKeySize)
+	return msg, sig, pk
+}
+
+// makeBLSWork creates BLSWork with n entries carrying REAL valid BLS
+// signatures (the CPU oracle now performs real verification).
+func makeBLSWork(t testing.TB, n int) *BLSWork {
+	t.Helper()
+	w := &BLSWork{
+		Messages:   make([][]byte, n),
+		Signatures: make([][]byte, n),
+		PubKeys:    make([][]byte, n),
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		w.Messages[i], w.Signatures[i], w.PubKeys[i] = makeValidBLSEntry(t)
+	}
+	return w
+}
+
+// makeCoronaWork creates CoronaWork with n entries.
+func makeCoronaWork(n int) *CoronaWork {
+	w := &CoronaWork{
+		Messages:   make([][]byte, n),
+		Signatures: make([][]byte, n),
+		PubKeys:    make([][]byte, n),
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		w.Messages[i] = makeRandomBytes(48)
+		w.Signatures[i] = makeRandomBytes(512)
+		w.PubKeys[i] = makeRandomBytes(256)
+	}
+	return w
+}
+
+// makeZKWork creates ZKWork with m entries.
+func makeZKWork(m int) *ZKWork {
+	w := &ZKWork{
+		Scalars: make([][]byte, m),
+		Bases:   make([][]byte, m),
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < m; i++ {
+		w.Scalars[i] = makeRandomBytes(32)
+		w.Bases[i] = makeRandomBytes(64)
+	}
+	return w
+}
+
+// makeMLDSAWork creates MLDSAWork with n entries carrying REAL valid
+// ML-DSA-65 (Dilithium3) signatures (the CPU oracle now performs real
+// verification).
+func makeMLDSAWork(t testing.TB, n int) *MLDSAWork {
+	t.Helper()
+	w := &MLDSAWork{
+		Messages:   make([][]byte, n),
+		Signatures: make([][]byte, n),
+		PubKeys:    make([][]byte, n),
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		w.Messages[i], w.Signatures[i], w.PubKeys[i] = makeValidMLDSAEntry(t)
+	}
+	return w
+}
+
+func TestGPUPipeline_AllFourTypes(t *testing.T) {
+	pipeline := NewGPUVerifyPipeline()
+
+	work := &BlockVerifyWork{
+		BLS:    makeBLSWork(t, 5),
+		Corona: makeCoronaWork(3),
+		ZK:     makeZKWork(2),
+		MLDSA:  makeMLDSAWork(t, 10),
+	}
+
+	result, err := pipeline.VerifyBlock(work)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, result)
+
+	// BLS results: real valid signatures, CPU oracle accepts.
+	require.Len(t, result.BLSValid, 5, "should have 5 BLS results")
+	for i, v := range result.BLSValid {
+		require.True(t, v, "BLS[%d] should be valid", i)
+	}
+
+	// Corona results: no pure-Go Corona verifier exists, so the CPU oracle
+	// fails closed — every element is rejected (never rubber-stamped).
+	require.Len(t, result.CoronaValid, 3, "should have 3 Corona results")
+	for i, v := range result.CoronaValid {
+		require.False(t, v, "Corona[%d] must fail closed (no pure-Go verifier)", i)
+	}
+
+	// ZK result: no pure-Go ZK verifier exists, so the CPU oracle fails closed.
+	require.False(t, result.ZKValid, "ZK batch must fail closed (no pure-Go verifier)")
+
+	// ML-DSA results: real valid signatures, CPU oracle accepts.
+	require.Len(t, result.MLDSAValid, 10, "should have 10 ML-DSA results")
+	for i, v := range result.MLDSAValid {
+		require.True(t, v, "MLDSA[%d] should be valid", i)
+	}
+
+	// Timing: all durations should be non-negative
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, result.TotalTime.Nanoseconds(), int64(0))
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, result.BLSTime.Nanoseconds(), int64(0))
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, result.CoronaTime.Nanoseconds(), int64(0))
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, result.ZKTime.Nanoseconds(), int64(0))
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, result.MLDSATime.Nanoseconds(), int64(0))
+
+	// Stats should reflect the verification
+	stats := pipeline.Stats()
+	require.Equal(t, uint64(1), stats.GPUVerifies+stats.CPUVerifies,
+		"exactly one verify should have been recorded")
+}
+
+func TestGPUPipeline_CPUFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	// Without CGO/GPU, accel.Available() returns false.
+	// Pipeline must fall back to CPU verification.
+	pipeline := NewGPUVerifyPipeline()
+
+	work := &BlockVerifyWork{
+		BLS:   makeBLSWork(t, 3),
+		MLDSA: makeMLDSAWork(t, 4),
+	}
+
+	result, err := pipeline.VerifyBlock(work)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, result)
+
+	// CPU fallback performs real verification; valid signatures are accepted.
+	require.Len(t, result.BLSValid, 3)
+	for i, v := range result.BLSValid {
+		require.True(t, v, "CPU BLS[%d] should be valid", i)
+	}
+
+	require.Len(t, result.MLDSAValid, 4)
+	for i, v := range result.MLDSAValid {
+		require.True(t, v, "CPU MLDSA[%d] should be valid", i)
+	}
+
+	// GPU should not have been used (no CGO in test env)
+	require.False(t, result.GPUUsed, "should use CPU fallback")
+
+	stats := pipeline.Stats()
+	require.Equal(t, uint64(1), stats.CPUVerifies)
+}
+
+// TestCPUVerify_RealOracle proves the CPU fallback is a real cryptographic
+// oracle, not a length-checking rubber stamp: a valid signature is accepted
+// and a well-formed-but-FORGED signature (correct lengths, wrong bytes) is
+// REJECTED. The forged-rejection case is the regression guard against the
+// old `return true for well-formed inputs` behavior.
+func TestCPUVerify_RealOracle(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("BLS valid accepted, forged rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
+		msg, sig, pk := makeValidBLSEntry(t)
+
+		// Valid signature => accepted.
+		good := cpuBLSVerify(&BLSWork{
+			Messages:   [][]byte{msg},
+			Signatures: [][]byte{sig},
+			PubKeys:    [][]byte{pk},
+		})
+		require.Equal(t, []bool{true}, good, "valid BLS signature must be accepted")
+
+		// Forged signature: correct 96-byte length, random bytes => rejected.
+		forgedSig := makeRandomBytes(96)
+		bad := cpuBLSVerify(&BLSWork{
+			Messages:   [][]byte{msg},
+			Signatures: [][]byte{forgedSig},
+			PubKeys:    [][]byte{pk},
+		})
+		require.Equal(t, []bool{false}, bad, "forged BLS signature (right length, wrong bytes) must be REJECTED")
+
+		// Valid signature against the WRONG message => rejected.
+		wrongMsg := cpuBLSVerify(&BLSWork{
+			Messages:   [][]byte{makeRandomBytes(32)},
+			Signatures: [][]byte{sig},
+			PubKeys:    [][]byte{pk},
+		})
+		require.Equal(t, []bool{false}, wrongMsg, "BLS signature over a different message must be REJECTED")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("MLDSA valid accepted, forged rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
+		msg, sig, pk := makeValidMLDSAEntry(t)
+
+		// Valid signature => accepted.
+		good := cpuMLDSAVerify(&MLDSAWork{
+			Messages:   [][]byte{msg},
+			Signatures: [][]byte{sig},
+			PubKeys:    [][]byte{pk},
+		})
+		require.Equal(t, []bool{true}, good, "valid ML-DSA signature must be accepted")
+
+		// Forged signature: correct length, random bytes => rejected.
+		forgedSig := makeRandomBytes(mldsa.MLDSA65SignatureSize)
+		bad := cpuMLDSAVerify(&MLDSAWork{
+			Messages:   [][]byte{msg},
+			Signatures: [][]byte{forgedSig},
+			PubKeys:    [][]byte{pk},
+		})
+		require.Equal(t, []bool{false}, bad, "forged ML-DSA signature (right length, wrong bytes) must be REJECTED")
+
+		// Valid signature against the WRONG message => rejected.
+		wrongMsg := cpuMLDSAVerify(&MLDSAWork{
+			Messages:   [][]byte{makeRandomBytes(64)},
+			Signatures: [][]byte{sig},
+			PubKeys:    [][]byte{pk},
+		})
+		require.Equal(t, []bool{false}, wrongMsg, "ML-DSA signature over a different message must be REJECTED")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("Corona fails closed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// No pure-Go Corona verifier exists; every element must be rejected,
+		// never rubber-stamped on length alone.
+		got := cpuCoronaVerify(&CoronaWork{
+			Messages:   [][]byte{makeRandomBytes(48), makeRandomBytes(48)},
+			Signatures: [][]byte{makeRandomBytes(512), makeRandomBytes(512)},
+			PubKeys:    [][]byte{makeRandomBytes(256), makeRandomBytes(256)},
+		})
+		require.Equal(t, []bool{false, false}, got, "Corona must fail closed for all elements")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("ZK fails closed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// No pure-Go ZK proof verifier exists; the batch must be rejected.
+		got := cpuZKVerify(&ZKWork{
+			Scalars: [][]byte{makeRandomBytes(32)},
+			Bases:   [][]byte{makeRandomBytes(64)},
+		})
+		require.False(t, got, "ZK must fail closed")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestMLDSA_WorkStructSizeIsCanonical pins the FIPS-204 ML-DSA-65 signature and
+// public key sizes that the MLDSAWork struct comment and gpuMLDSAVerify's
+// fixed-size flatten now use. luxfi/crypto (circl v1.6.3, FIPS-204 final)
+// produces 3309-byte ML-DSA-65 signatures (5*640 + 55 + 6 + 48 = 3309); the
+// GPU flatten width was corrected from the stale round-3 Dilithium3 size 3293
+// to 3309 so the GPU path no longer clamps/corrupts a real signature. The
+// public key size (1952) is unchanged across the round-3 -> final transition.
+//
+// This is the equivalence-pair guard: the CPU oracle (cpuMLDSAVerify) parses
+// pk via the typed PublicKeyFromBytes and calls VerifySignature, accepting the
+// real 3309-byte signature; the GPU path sizes the signature identically. If
+// the crypto constant ever drifts, this test fails before any divergence
+// reaches the GPU ML-DSA kernel (not yet wired into block-accept).
+func TestMLDSA_WorkStructSizeIsCanonical(t *testing.T) {
+	require.Equal(t, 1952, mldsa.MLDSA65PublicKeySize,
+		"ML-DSA-65 public key is 1952 bytes (matches MLDSAWork / gpuMLDSAVerify pkLen)")
+	require.Equal(t, 3309, mldsa.MLDSA65SignatureSize,
+		"ML-DSA-65 signature is 3309 bytes (FIPS-204), matching the MLDSAWork struct / gpuMLDSAVerify sigLen")
+}
+
+func TestGPUPipeline_EmptyBatches(t *testing.T) {
+	pipeline := NewGPUVerifyPipeline()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		work *BlockVerifyWork
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "nil work",
+			work: nil,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "all nil batches",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "empty BLS only",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				BLS: &BLSWork{},
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "BLS filled, rest nil",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				BLS: makeBLSWork(t, 2),
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "ZK only",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				ZK: makeZKWork(1),
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "MLDSA only",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				MLDSA: makeMLDSAWork(t, 1),
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Corona only",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				Corona: makeCoronaWork(1),
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result, err := pipeline.VerifyBlock(tt.work)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.NotNil(t, result)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGPUPipeline_ValidationErrors(t *testing.T) {
+	pipeline := NewGPUVerifyPipeline()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		work    *BlockVerifyWork
+		wantErr error
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "BLS size mismatch",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				BLS: &BLSWork{
+					Messages:   [][]byte{{1}},
+					Signatures: [][]byte{{1}, {2}}, // 2 != 1
+					PubKeys:    [][]byte{{1}},
+				},
+			},
+			wantErr: ErrBLSSizeMismatch,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "Corona size mismatch",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				Corona: &CoronaWork{
+					Messages:   [][]byte{{1}, {2}},
+					Signatures: [][]byte{{1}}, // 1 != 2
+					PubKeys:    [][]byte{{1}, {2}},
+				},
+			},
+			wantErr: ErrCoronaSizeMismatch,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "ZK size mismatch",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				ZK: &ZKWork{
+					Scalars: [][]byte{{1}, {2}},
+					Bases:   [][]byte{{1}}, // 1 != 2
+				},
+			},
+			wantErr: ErrZKSizeMismatch,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "MLDSA size mismatch",
+			work: &BlockVerifyWork{
+				MLDSA: &MLDSAWork{
+					Messages:   [][]byte{{1}},
+					Signatures: [][]byte{{1}},
+					PubKeys:    [][]byte{{1}, {2}}, // 2 != 1
+				},
+			},
+			wantErr: ErrMLDSASizeMismatch,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			_, err := pipeline.VerifyBlock(tt.work)
+			require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.wantErr)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func BenchmarkGPUPipeline(b *testing.B) {
+	pipeline := NewGPUVerifyPipeline()
+
+	work := &BlockVerifyWork{
+		BLS:    makeBLSWork(b, 100),
+		Corona: makeCoronaWork(50),
+		ZK:     makeZKWork(10),
+		MLDSA:  makeMLDSAWork(b, 200),
+	}
+
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		_, _ = pipeline.VerifyBlock(work)
+	}
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,970 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+// Package quasar integration tests.
+//
+// These tests exercise realistic end-to-end scenarios for Quasar consensus:
+//   - Full component wiring and event processing
+//   - Corona threshold signing flows (skipped if lattice lib unavailable)
+//   - Concurrent operation safety
+//   - Stop/start lifecycle management
+//   - Memory behavior with many finality events
+//
+// Run with: go test -v -run "^Test.*Integration\|^TestQuasar" ./...
+// Skip long tests: go test -short ./...
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Mock implementations for integration tests
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// mockPChainProvider implements PChainProvider for tests
+type mockPChainProvider struct {
+	mu         sync.RWMutex
+	height     uint64
+	validators []ValidatorState
+	finalityCh chan FinalityEvent
+	closed     bool
+}
+
+func newMockPChainProvider(validators []ValidatorState) *mockPChainProvider {
+	return &mockPChainProvider{
+		height:     0,
+		validators: validators,
+		finalityCh: make(chan FinalityEvent, 100),
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *mockPChainProvider) GetFinalizedHeight() uint64 {
+	m.mu.RLock()
+	defer m.mu.RUnlock()
+	return m.height
+}
+
+func (m *mockPChainProvider) GetValidators(height uint64) ([]ValidatorState, error) {
+	m.mu.RLock()
+	defer m.mu.RUnlock()
+	return m.validators, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockPChainProvider) SubscribeFinality() <-chan FinalityEvent {
+	return m.finalityCh
+}
+
+func (m *mockPChainProvider) Validators() []ValidatorState {
+	m.mu.RLock()
+	defer m.mu.RUnlock()
+	return append([]ValidatorState(nil), m.validators...)
+}
+
+func (m *mockPChainProvider) EmitFinality(event FinalityEvent) {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	if m.closed {
+		return
+	}
+	m.height = event.Height
+	select {
+	case m.finalityCh <- event:
+	default:
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *mockPChainProvider) Close() {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	if !m.closed {
+		m.closed = true
+		close(m.finalityCh)
+	}
+}
+
+// mockQuantumSigner implements QuantumSignerFallback for tests
+type mockQuantumSigner struct{}
+
+func (m *mockQuantumSigner) SignMessage(msg []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	return []byte("RT-MOCK-SIG"), nil
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helper functions
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// generateValidatorStates creates n ValidatorState entries
+func generateValidatorStates(n int) []ValidatorState {
+	states := make([]ValidatorState, n)
+	for i := range states {
+		blsKey := make([]byte, 48)
+		rtKey := make([]byte, 32)
+		_, _ = rand.Read(blsKey)
+		_, _ = rand.Read(rtKey)
+
+		states[i] = ValidatorState{
+			NodeID:    ids.GenerateTestNodeID(),
+			Weight:    1000,
+			BLSPubKey: blsKey,
+			CoronaKey: rtKey,
+			Active:    true,
+		}
+	}
+	return states
+}
+
+// createTestEvent creates a FinalityEvent for testing
+func createTestEvent(height uint64, validators []ValidatorState) FinalityEvent {
+	var blockID ids.ID
+	_, _ = rand.Read(blockID[:])
+
+	return FinalityEvent{
+		Height:     height,
+		BlockID:    blockID,
+		Validators: validators,
+		Timestamp:  time.Now(),
+	}
+}
+
+// setupQuasarWithCorona creates a Quasar with a test Corona coordinator.
+// Returns nil for Quasar if Corona initialization fails (e.g., lattice lib constraint).
+func setupQuasarWithCorona(t *testing.T, numParties int) (*Quasar, *mockPChainProvider, []ids.NodeID, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(numParties)
+	pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Connect providers
+	q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+	q.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+	// Create a test Corona coordinator (stub signatures, not production)
+	threshold := (numParties * 2 / 3) + 1
+	if threshold < 2 {
+		threshold = 2
+	}
+	rc, err := NewTestCoronaCoordinator(log.NewNoOpLogger(), CoronaConfig{
+		NumParties: numParties,
+		Threshold:  threshold,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		pchain.Close()
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
+	}
+	q.ConnectCorona(rc)
+
+	// Extract node IDs and initialize Corona
+	nodeIDs := make([]ids.NodeID, len(validatorStates))
+	for i, v := range validatorStates {
+		nodeIDs[i] = v.NodeID
+	}
+
+	err = q.InitializeCorona(nodeIDs)
+	if err != nil {
+		pchain.Close()
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	return q, pchain, nodeIDs, nil
+}
+
+// isLatticeUnavailable checks if an error indicates lattice library constraints
+func isLatticeUnavailable(err error) bool {
+	if err == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	msg := err.Error()
+	return strings.Contains(msg, "ring") || strings.Contains(msg, "modulus") ||
+		strings.Contains(msg, "prime") || strings.Contains(msg, "lattice")
+}
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Integration Tests
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// TestQuasarFullFlow tests creating Quasar, connecting components, and processing events
+func TestQuasarFullFlow(t *testing.T) {
+	const numValidators = 5
+
+	t.Run("create_and_connect", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err, "NewQuasar should succeed")
+		require.NotNil(t, q, "Quasar should not be nil")
+
+		// Verify initial state
+		stats := q.Stats()
+		require.False(t, stats.Running, "should not be running initially")
+		require.Equal(t, uint64(0), stats.PChainHeight)
+		require.Equal(t, uint64(0), stats.QChainHeight)
+
+		// Connect components
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(numValidators)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		// Verify configuration
+		threshold, quorumNum, quorumDen := q.GetConfig()
+		require.Equal(t, 3, threshold)
+		require.Equal(t, uint64(2), quorumNum)
+		require.Equal(t, uint64(3), quorumDen)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("start_and_stop", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(numValidators)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		// Start
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		require.NoError(t, err, "Start should succeed")
+		require.True(t, q.IsRunning(), "should be running after Start")
+
+		// Stop
+		q.Stop()
+		// Give goroutines time to shut down
+		time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+		require.False(t, q.IsRunning(), "should not be running after Stop")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("process_single_event", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, pchain, _, err := setupQuasarWithCorona(t, numValidators)
+		if isLatticeUnavailable(err) {
+			t.Skipf("Skipping: lattice library constraint: %v", err)
+		}
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		defer q.Stop()
+
+		// Emit event
+		event := createTestEvent(1, pchain.Validators())
+		pchain.EmitFinality(event)
+
+		require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+			return q.Stats().PChainHeight >= 1
+		}, time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "P-chain height should be 1")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("verify_quorum_calculation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Test quorum: 2/3 means 67% needed
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(670, 1000), "67% should meet 2/3 quorum")
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(667, 1000), "66.7% should meet 2/3 quorum")
+		require.False(t, q.CheckQuorum(600, 1000), "60% should not meet 2/3 quorum")
+		require.False(t, q.CheckQuorum(0, 1000), "0% should not meet quorum")
+		// Note: zero total weight is an edge case - required becomes 0, so any signer weight passes
+		// This is intentional: if there are no validators, there's nothing to check
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(500, 0), "zero total is edge case (required=0)")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestQuasarWithCorona tests full threshold signing flow
+func TestQuasarWithCorona(t *testing.T) {
+	// All Corona tests require the lattice library to work correctly.
+	// Skip if the library has constraints (e.g., requires prime moduli).
+
+	t.Run("initialize_and_sign", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, pchain, _, err := setupQuasarWithCorona(t, 5)
+		if isLatticeUnavailable(err) {
+			t.Skipf("Skipping: lattice library constraint: %v", err)
+		}
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		// Verify Corona is connected
+		require.NotNil(t, q.corona, "Corona should be connected")
+		require.True(t, q.corona.IsInitialized(), "Corona should be initialized")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("sign_and_verify", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, pchain, _, err := setupQuasarWithCorona(t, 5)
+		if isLatticeUnavailable(err) {
+			t.Skipf("Skipping: lattice library constraint: %v", err)
+		}
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		// Sign a message
+		msg := []byte("test message for signing")
+		sig, err := q.corona.Sign(msg)
+		require.NoError(t, err, "Sign should succeed")
+		require.NotNil(t, sig, "Signature should not be nil")
+
+		// Verify signature
+		valid := q.corona.Verify(msg, sig)
+		require.True(t, valid, "Signature should verify")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("multiple_signing_sessions", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, pchain, _, err := setupQuasarWithCorona(t, 5)
+		if isLatticeUnavailable(err) {
+			t.Skipf("Skipping: lattice library constraint: %v", err)
+		}
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		// Sign multiple messages
+		for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+			msg := []byte("message " + string(rune('A'+i)))
+			sig, err := q.corona.Sign(msg)
+			require.NoError(t, err, "Sign %d should succeed", i)
+			require.True(t, q.corona.Verify(msg, sig), "Signature %d should verify", i)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("threshold_parameter_check", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, pchain, _, err := setupQuasarWithCorona(t, 5)
+		if isLatticeUnavailable(err) {
+			t.Skipf("Skipping: lattice library constraint: %v", err)
+		}
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		// With 5 parties, threshold = (5 * 2 / 3) + 1 = 4
+		require.Equal(t, 4, q.corona.Threshold(), "Threshold should be 4 for 5 parties")
+		require.Equal(t, 5, q.corona.NumParties(), "NumParties should be 5")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestQuasarConcurrent tests concurrent finality processing
+func TestQuasarConcurrent(t *testing.T) {
+	const numValidators = 5
+	const numEvents = 50
+
+	q, pchain, _, err := setupQuasarWithCorona(t, numValidators)
+	if isLatticeUnavailable(err) {
+		t.Skipf("Skipping: lattice library constraint: %v", err)
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer pchain.Close()
+	validatorStates := pchain.Validators()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	err = q.Start(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer q.Stop()
+
+	// Send events concurrently
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := uint64(1); i <= numEvents; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(height uint64) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			event := createTestEvent(height, validatorStates)
+			pchain.EmitFinality(event)
+		}(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	// Wait for processing
+	time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	stats := q.Stats()
+	t.Logf("Processed %d events, finalized blocks: %d", numEvents, stats.FinalizedBlocks)
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, stats.FinalizedBlocks, 1, "should have finalized at least 1 block")
+}
+
+// TestQuasarConcurrentCoronaSigning tests concurrent Corona signing
+func TestQuasarConcurrentCoronaSigning(t *testing.T) {
+	q, pchain, _, err := setupQuasarWithCorona(t, 5)
+	if isLatticeUnavailable(err) {
+		t.Skipf("Skipping: lattice library constraint: %v", err)
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer pchain.Close()
+
+	const numSigners = 10
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	var successCount atomic.Int32
+
+	for i := 0; i < numSigners; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(idx int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			msg := []byte("concurrent message " + string(rune('0'+idx)))
+			sig, err := q.corona.Sign(msg)
+			if err == nil && q.corona.Verify(msg, sig) {
+				successCount.Add(1)
+			}
+		}(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	require.Equal(t, int32(numSigners), successCount.Load(), "all concurrent signs should succeed")
+}
+
+// TestQuasarRestart tests stop/start cycles
+func TestQuasarRestart(t *testing.T) {
+	const numValidators = 5
+
+	t.Run("basic_stop_start", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(numValidators)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		// First cycle
+		q1, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		q1.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q1.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx1, cancel1 := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		err = q1.Start(ctx1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.True(t, q1.IsRunning())
+		cancel1()
+		q1.Stop()
+		time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+		require.False(t, q1.IsRunning())
+
+		// Second cycle with fresh Quasar instance
+		// Note: The current implementation closes stopCh on Stop and doesn't recreate it,
+		// so restart requires a new instance. This is a known limitation.
+		q2, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		q2.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q2.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx2, cancel2 := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel2()
+		err = q2.Start(ctx2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.True(t, q2.IsRunning())
+		q2.Stop()
+	})
+
+	t.Run("stop_with_pending_events", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(numValidators)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Emit events
+		for i := uint64(1); i <= 10; i++ {
+			event := createTestEvent(i, validatorStates)
+			pchain.EmitFinality(event)
+		}
+
+		// Stop immediately
+		q.Stop()
+		time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+		require.False(t, q.IsRunning(), "should stop cleanly with pending events")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("multiple_stop_calls", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(numValidators)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Multiple stops should not panic
+		q.Stop()
+		// Note: After first Stop, stopCh is closed. Subsequent Stop calls check running flag,
+		// but since running=false, they won't try to close again. This tests idempotency.
+	})
+
+	t.Run("stop_without_start", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Stop without start should not panic
+		q.Stop()
+		require.False(t, q.IsRunning())
+	})
+}
+
+// TestQuasarMemoryPressure tests with many finality events to verify no memory leaks
+func TestQuasarMemoryPressure(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("skipping memory pressure test in short mode")
+	}
+
+	t.Run("many_finality_entries", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Add many finality entries
+		const numEntries = 1000
+		for i := 0; i < numEntries; i++ {
+			var blockID ids.ID
+			_, _ = rand.Read(blockID[:])
+
+			finality := &QuantumFinality{
+				BlockID:      blockID,
+				PChainHeight: uint64(i),
+				QChainHeight: uint64(i),
+				TotalWeight:  1000,
+				SignerWeight: 700,
+			}
+			q.SetFinalized(blockID, finality)
+		}
+
+		stats := q.Stats()
+		require.GreaterOrEqual(t, stats.FinalizedBlocks, numEntries-1)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("memory_stability", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Add many entries
+		const numEntries = 10000
+		for i := 0; i < numEntries; i++ {
+			var blockID ids.ID
+			_, _ = rand.Read(blockID[:])
+
+			finality := &QuantumFinality{
+				BlockID:      blockID,
+				PChainHeight: uint64(i),
+				QChainHeight: uint64(i),
+				BLSProof:     make([]byte, 96),
+				CoronaProof:  make([]byte, 1024),
+				TotalWeight:  1000,
+				SignerWeight: 700,
+			}
+			q.SetFinalized(blockID, finality)
+		}
+
+		// Force GC and check we don't crash
+		runtime.GC()
+		var m runtime.MemStats
+		runtime.ReadMemStats(&m)
+
+		t.Logf("Heap after %d entries: %d bytes", numEntries, m.HeapAlloc)
+
+		// Just verify we completed without issues - memory testing is notoriously flaky
+		stats := q.Stats()
+		require.GreaterOrEqual(t, stats.FinalizedBlocks, numEntries-1)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("concurrent_add_finality", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		const numGoroutines = 10
+		const entriesPerGoroutine = 250
+
+		var wg sync.WaitGroup
+		for g := 0; g < numGoroutines; g++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func(gid int) {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				for i := 0; i < entriesPerGoroutine; i++ {
+					var blockID ids.ID
+					_, _ = rand.Read(blockID[:])
+
+					finality := &QuantumFinality{
+						BlockID:      blockID,
+						PChainHeight: uint64(gid*entriesPerGoroutine + i),
+						QChainHeight: uint64(gid*entriesPerGoroutine + i),
+						TotalWeight:  1000,
+						SignerWeight: 700,
+					}
+					q.SetFinalized(blockID, finality)
+				}
+			}(g)
+		}
+		wg.Wait()
+
+		stats := q.Stats()
+		t.Logf("Final entries after concurrent operations: %d", stats.FinalizedBlocks)
+		// Some entries may share block IDs due to rand collision, so just verify we have many
+		require.GreaterOrEqual(t, stats.FinalizedBlocks, numGoroutines*entriesPerGoroutine/2)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("concurrent_read_write", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Pre-populate some entries
+		blockIDs := make([]ids.ID, 100)
+		for i := range blockIDs {
+			_, _ = rand.Read(blockIDs[i][:])
+			q.SetFinalized(blockIDs[i], &QuantumFinality{
+				BlockID:      blockIDs[i],
+				PChainHeight: uint64(i),
+			})
+		}
+
+		// Concurrent reads and writes
+		var wg sync.WaitGroup
+		done := make(chan struct{})
+
+		// Writers
+		for w := 0; w < 5; w++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func() {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				for {
+					select {
+					case <-done:
+						return
+					default:
+						var blockID ids.ID
+						_, _ = rand.Read(blockID[:])
+						q.SetFinalized(blockID, &QuantumFinality{BlockID: blockID})
+					}
+				}
+			}()
+		}
+
+		// Readers
+		for r := 0; r < 5; r++ {
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func() {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				for {
+					select {
+					case <-done:
+						return
+					default:
+						idx := int(time.Now().UnixNano()) % len(blockIDs)
+						_, _ = q.GetFinality(blockIDs[idx])
+					}
+				}
+			}()
+		}
+
+		// Run for a short period
+		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
+		close(done)
+		wg.Wait()
+
+		t.Log("Concurrent read/write completed successfully")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestQuasarHealthStatus tests health status reporting
+func TestQuasarHealthStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("initial_state", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		stats := q.Stats()
+		require.False(t, stats.Running)
+		require.Equal(t, uint64(0), stats.PChainHeight)
+		require.Equal(t, uint64(0), stats.QChainHeight)
+		require.Equal(t, 0, stats.FinalizedBlocks)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("after_corona_init", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, pchain, _, err := setupQuasarWithCorona(t, 5)
+		if isLatticeUnavailable(err) {
+			t.Skipf("Skipping: lattice library constraint: %v", err)
+		}
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		stats := q.Stats()
+		require.True(t, stats.CoronaReady, "Corona should be ready")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("running_state", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(5)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		defer q.Stop()
+
+		stats := q.Stats()
+		require.True(t, stats.Running, "should be running")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestQuasarShutdown tests graceful shutdown behavior
+func TestQuasarShutdown(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("graceful_stop_with_timeout", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(5)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Cancel context and stop
+		cancel()
+		q.Stop()
+
+		require.False(t, q.IsRunning())
+	})
+
+	t.Run("stop_already_stopped", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Should not panic
+		q.Stop()
+		require.False(t, q.IsRunning())
+	})
+
+	t.Run("start_after_stop", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(5)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		// First run
+		q1, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		q1.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q1.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx1, cancel1 := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		err = q1.Start(ctx1)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		cancel1()
+		q1.Stop()
+
+		// Second run with new instance (implementation limitation)
+		q2, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		q2.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q2.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx2, cancel2 := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel2()
+		err = q2.Start(ctx2)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.True(t, q2.IsRunning())
+		q2.Stop()
+	})
+
+	t.Run("health_status", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Check stats work without panic
+		stats := q.Stats()
+		require.NotNil(t, stats)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("drain_finality_channel", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(5)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		q.ConnectQuantumFallback(&mockQuantumSigner{})
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		// Get finality channel via Subscribe
+		finCh := q.Subscribe()
+		require.NotNil(t, finCh)
+
+		// Emit event
+		event := createTestEvent(1, validatorStates)
+		pchain.EmitFinality(event)
+
+		// Try to receive finality (with timeout)
+		select {
+		case finality := <-finCh:
+			require.NotNil(t, finality)
+		case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
+			// May not receive if processing takes longer
+		}
+
+		q.Stop()
+	})
+}
+
+// TestQuasarEdgeCases tests edge cases and error conditions
+func TestQuasarEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("start_without_pchain", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		// Should handle gracefully (either error or run without processing)
+		if err == nil {
+			q.Stop()
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("start_without_quantum_fallback", func(t *testing.T) {
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(5)
+		pchain := newMockPChainProvider(validatorStates)
+		defer pchain.Close()
+
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		q.ConnectPChain(pchain)
+		// No quantum fallback connected - Start requires it
+
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		defer cancel()
+
+		err = q.Start(ctx)
+		// Implementation requires Q-Chain (quantum fallback) to be connected
+		require.Error(t, err, "Start should error without quantum fallback")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("get_finality_nonexistent", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		var blockID ids.ID
+		_, _ = rand.Read(blockID[:])
+
+		finality, found := q.GetFinality(blockID)
+		require.False(t, found, "should not find nonexistent block")
+		require.Nil(t, finality, "should return nil for nonexistent block")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("verify_nil_finality", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		err = q.Verify(nil)
+		require.Error(t, err, "should error on nil finality")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("verify_empty_proofs", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		finality := &QuantumFinality{
+			BLSProof:     nil,
+			CoronaProof:  nil,
+			TotalWeight:  1000,
+			SignerWeight: 700,
+		}
+
+		err = q.Verify(finality)
+		require.Error(t, err, "should error on empty proofs")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("verify_insufficient_weight", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		finality := &QuantumFinality{
+			BLSProof:     []byte("proof"),
+			CoronaProof:  []byte("proof"),
+			TotalWeight:  1000,
+			SignerWeight: 500, // Only 50%, needs 67%
+		}
+
+		err = q.Verify(finality)
+		require.Error(t, err, "should error on insufficient weight")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("create_message_format", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		validatorStates := generateValidatorStates(3)
+		event := createTestEvent(42, validatorStates)
+
+		msg := q.CreateMessage(event)
+		require.NotEmpty(t, msg, "message should not be empty")
+		// Message is binary format containing blockID and height
+		// Just verify it's deterministic and non-empty
+		msg2 := q.CreateMessage(event)
+		require.Equal(t, msg, msg2, "message should be deterministic")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("total_weight_calculation", func(t *testing.T) {
+		q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		validators := []ValidatorState{
+			{Weight: 100, Active: true},
+			{Weight: 200, Active: true},
+			{Weight: 300, Active: false}, // Inactive
+			{Weight: 400, Active: true},
+		}
+
+		total := q.TotalWeight(validators)
+		require.Equal(t, uint64(700), total, "should sum only active validator weights")
+	})
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+//go:build !cgo
+
+// Package quasar provides NTT operations for Corona consensus.
+// This file provides pure Go CPU implementation when CGO is not available.
+// All operations use the luxfi/lattice library which provides optimized
+// NTT implementations in pure Go.
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/ring"
+)
+
+// NTTAccelerator provides NTT operations for Corona.
+// When CGO is disabled, this uses the pure Go lattice library
+// which provides optimized CPU-based NTT transforms.
+type NTTAccelerator struct {
+	enabled bool
+	stats   NTTStats
+	statsmu sync.RWMutex
+}
+
+// NTTStats tracks NTT accelerator statistics.
+type NTTStats struct {
+	Enabled      bool
+	Backend      string
+	TotalOps     uint64
+	GPUAvailable bool
+}
+
+// NewNTTAccelerator creates a new NTT accelerator using pure Go lattice library.
+func NewNTTAccelerator() (*NTTAccelerator, error) {
+	return &NTTAccelerator{
+		enabled: true, // CPU implementation is always available
+		stats: NTTStats{
+			Enabled: true,
+			Backend: "CPU (Pure Go)",
+		},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// IsEnabled returns true - CPU implementation is always available.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) IsEnabled() bool {
+	return true
+}
+
+// Backend returns the backend name.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) Backend() string {
+	return "CPU (Pure Go lattice)"
+}
+
+// NTTForward performs forward NTT on a polynomial using lattice library.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) NTTForward(r *ring.Ring, poly ring.Poly) error {
+	r.NTT(poly, poly)
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.stats.TotalOps, 1)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NTTInverse performs inverse NTT on a polynomial using lattice library.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) NTTInverse(r *ring.Ring, poly ring.Poly) error {
+	r.INTT(poly, poly)
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.stats.TotalOps, 1)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// BatchNTTForward performs forward NTT on multiple polynomials.
+// Uses parallel processing for better performance on multi-core CPUs.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) BatchNTTForward(r *ring.Ring, polys []ring.Poly) error {
+	if len(polys) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// For small batches, process sequentially
+	if len(polys) < 8 {
+		for _, poly := range polys {
+			r.NTT(poly, poly)
+		}
+		atomic.AddUint64(&g.stats.TotalOps, uint64(len(polys)))
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// For larger batches, use parallel processing
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	numWorkers := 4
+	chunkSize := (len(polys) + numWorkers - 1) / numWorkers
+
+	for i := 0; i < numWorkers; i++ {
+		start := i * chunkSize
+		end := start + chunkSize
+		if end > len(polys) {
+			end = len(polys)
+		}
+		if start >= end {
+			break
+		}
+
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(batch []ring.Poly) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			for _, poly := range batch {
+				r.NTT(poly, poly)
+			}
+		}(polys[start:end])
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.stats.TotalOps, uint64(len(polys)))
+	return nil
+}
+
+// BatchNTTInverse performs inverse NTT on multiple polynomials.
+// Uses parallel processing for better performance on multi-core CPUs.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) BatchNTTInverse(r *ring.Ring, polys []ring.Poly) error {
+	if len(polys) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// For small batches, process sequentially
+	if len(polys) < 8 {
+		for _, poly := range polys {
+			r.INTT(poly, poly)
+		}
+		atomic.AddUint64(&g.stats.TotalOps, uint64(len(polys)))
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// For larger batches, use parallel processing
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	numWorkers := 4
+	chunkSize := (len(polys) + numWorkers - 1) / numWorkers
+
+	for i := 0; i < numWorkers; i++ {
+		start := i * chunkSize
+		end := start + chunkSize
+		if end > len(polys) {
+			end = len(polys)
+		}
+		if start >= end {
+			break
+		}
+
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(batch []ring.Poly) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			for _, poly := range batch {
+				r.INTT(poly, poly)
+			}
+		}(polys[start:end])
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.stats.TotalOps, uint64(len(polys)))
+	return nil
+}
+
+// PolyMul performs polynomial multiplication using Barrett reduction.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) PolyMul(r *ring.Ring, a, b, out ring.Poly) error {
+	r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.stats.TotalOps, 1)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ClearCache is a no-op for CPU implementation (no GPU cache).
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) ClearCache() {}
+
+// Stats returns current NTT accelerator statistics.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) Stats() NTTStats {
+	g.statsmu.RLock()
+	defer g.statsmu.RUnlock()
+	return NTTStats{
+		Enabled:      true,
+		Backend:      "CPU (Pure Go lattice)",
+		TotalOps:     atomic.LoadUint64(&g.stats.TotalOps),
+		GPUAvailable: false, // CPU-only build
+	}
+}
+
+// Global accelerator instance
+var (
+	globalNTTAccelerator     *NTTAccelerator
+	globalNTTAcceleratorOnce sync.Once
+)
+
+// GetNTTAccelerator returns the global NTT accelerator instance.
+func GetNTTAccelerator() (*NTTAccelerator, error) {
+	globalNTTAcceleratorOnce.Do(func() {
+		globalNTTAccelerator, _ = NewNTTAccelerator()
+	})
+	return globalNTTAccelerator, nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+//go:build cgo
+
+// Package quasar provides GPU-accelerated NTT operations for Corona consensus.
+// This uses the unified lux/accel package for GPU acceleration of lattice
+// operations in the Corona threshold signature protocol.
+//
+// GPU acceleration provides 40x+ speedup for NTT operations on Apple Silicon
+// and NVIDIA GPUs via the accel library (Metal/CUDA/CPU backends).
+//
+// Architecture:
+//
+//	luxcpp/accel (C++ GPU)  →  lux/accel (Go CGO)  →  Quasar consensus
+//
+// This enables consistent GPU acceleration across:
+//   - Corona threshold signatures
+//   - ML-DSA post-quantum signatures
+//   - FHE operations (via luxcpp/fhe which reuses luxcpp/lattice)
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/accel"
+	"github.com/luxfi/lattice/v7/ring"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/config"
+)
+
+// NTTAccelerator provides GPU-accelerated NTT operations for Corona.
+// It uses the unified lux/accel package for Metal/CUDA/CPU backends.
+type NTTAccelerator struct {
+	mu       sync.RWMutex
+	session  *accel.Session
+	enabled  bool
+	totalOps uint64
+}
+
+// NTTOptions holds options for creating an NTT accelerator.
+type NTTOptions struct {
+	// Enabled controls whether GPU acceleration is used
+	Enabled bool
+	// Backend specifies which GPU backend to use: "auto", "metal", "cuda", "cpu"
+	Backend string
+	// DeviceIndex specifies which GPU device to use
+	DeviceIndex int
+}
+
+// NewNTTAccelerator creates a new NTT accelerator with GPU support.
+// It auto-detects available GPU backends (Metal on macOS, CUDA on Linux).
+func NewNTTAccelerator() (*NTTAccelerator, error) {
+	return NewNTTAcceleratorWithOptions(NTTOptions{})
+}
+
+// NewNTTAcceleratorWithOptions creates a new NTT accelerator with custom options.
+// If options are zero-valued, it uses the global GPU config.
+func NewNTTAcceleratorWithOptions(opts NTTOptions) (*NTTAccelerator, error) {
+	// Get global config if options not specified
+	gpuCfg := config.GetGlobalGPUConfig()
+
+	// Determine if GPU should be enabled
+	enabled := gpuCfg.Enabled
+	if opts.Backend == "cpu" {
+		enabled = false
+	}
+
+	// Check if GPU is available via accel library
+	available := accel.Available() && enabled
+
+	var session *accel.Session
+	if available {
+		var err error
+		session, err = accel.DefaultSession()
+		if err != nil {
+			// Fall back to CPU mode
+			available = false
+		}
+	}
+
+	return &NTTAccelerator{
+		session: session,
+		enabled: available,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// IsEnabled returns whether GPU acceleration is available.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) IsEnabled() bool {
+	g.mu.RLock()
+	defer g.mu.RUnlock()
+	return g.enabled
+}
+
+// Backend returns the name of the active GPU backend.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) Backend() string {
+	g.mu.RLock()
+	defer g.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	if !g.enabled || g.session == nil {
+		return "CPU (GPU not available)"
+	}
+	return g.session.Backend().String()
+}
+
+// getModulus extracts the first modulus from the ring.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) getModulus(r *ring.Ring) (uint32, error) {
+	if len(r.ModuliChain()) == 0 {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("ring has no moduli")
+	}
+	return uint32(r.ModuliChain()[0]), nil
+}
+
+// NTTForward performs forward NTT on a polynomial using GPU acceleration.
+// Falls back to CPU if GPU is not available.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) NTTForward(r *ring.Ring, poly ring.Poly) error {
+	if !g.enabled || g.session == nil {
+		// Fall back to lattice library's NTT
+		r.NTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	N := r.N()
+	coeffs := poly.Coeffs
+	if len(coeffs) == 0 || len(coeffs[0]) < N {
+		r.NTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	Q, err := g.getModulus(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		r.NTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Create input tensor from polynomial coefficients
+	inputTensor, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint64](g.session, []int{N}, coeffs[0][:N])
+	if err != nil {
+		r.NTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer inputTensor.Close()
+
+	// Create output tensor
+	outputTensor, err := accel.NewTensor[uint64](g.session, []int{N})
+	if err != nil {
+		r.NTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer outputTensor.Close()
+
+	// GPU NTT via accel Lattice ops
+	if err := g.session.Lattice().PolynomialNTT(inputTensor.Untyped(), outputTensor.Untyped(), Q); err != nil {
+		r.NTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Copy result back
+	result, err := outputTensor.ToSlice()
+	if err != nil {
+		r.NTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+	copy(coeffs[0], result)
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.totalOps, 1)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NTTInverse performs inverse NTT on a polynomial using GPU acceleration.
+// Falls back to CPU if GPU is not available.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) NTTInverse(r *ring.Ring, poly ring.Poly) error {
+	if !g.enabled || g.session == nil {
+		// Fall back to lattice library's INTT
+		r.INTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	N := r.N()
+	coeffs := poly.Coeffs
+	if len(coeffs) == 0 || len(coeffs[0]) < N {
+		r.INTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	Q, err := g.getModulus(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		r.INTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Create input tensor from polynomial coefficients
+	inputTensor, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint64](g.session, []int{N}, coeffs[0][:N])
+	if err != nil {
+		r.INTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer inputTensor.Close()
+
+	// Create output tensor
+	outputTensor, err := accel.NewTensor[uint64](g.session, []int{N})
+	if err != nil {
+		r.INTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer outputTensor.Close()
+
+	// GPU INTT via accel Lattice ops
+	if err := g.session.Lattice().PolynomialINTT(inputTensor.Untyped(), outputTensor.Untyped(), Q); err != nil {
+		r.INTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Copy result back
+	result, err := outputTensor.ToSlice()
+	if err != nil {
+		r.INTT(poly, poly)
+		return nil
+	}
+	copy(coeffs[0], result)
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.totalOps, 1)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// BatchNTTForward performs forward NTT on multiple polynomials in parallel.
+// This is the primary use case for GPU acceleration - batch operations.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) BatchNTTForward(r *ring.Ring, polys []ring.Poly) error {
+	if len(polys) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if !g.enabled || g.session == nil || len(polys) < 4 {
+		// Fall back to CPU for small batches (GPU overhead not worth it)
+		for i := range polys {
+			r.NTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	Q, err := g.getModulus(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		for i := range polys {
+			r.NTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Process each polynomial through GPU
+	// Note: For true batch performance, we'd want batch tensor operations
+	// but the current accel API operates on single polynomials
+	N := r.N()
+	for i := range polys {
+		coeffs := polys[i].Coeffs
+		if len(coeffs) == 0 || len(coeffs[0]) < N {
+			r.NTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+
+		inputTensor, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint64](g.session, []int{N}, coeffs[0][:N])
+		if err != nil {
+			r.NTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+
+		outputTensor, err := accel.NewTensor[uint64](g.session, []int{N})
+		if err != nil {
+			inputTensor.Close()
+			r.NTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if err := g.session.Lattice().PolynomialNTT(inputTensor.Untyped(), outputTensor.Untyped(), Q); err != nil {
+			inputTensor.Close()
+			outputTensor.Close()
+			r.NTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+
+		result, err := outputTensor.ToSlice()
+		if err != nil {
+			inputTensor.Close()
+			outputTensor.Close()
+			r.NTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+		copy(coeffs[0], result)
+
+		inputTensor.Close()
+		outputTensor.Close()
+	}
+
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.totalOps, uint64(len(polys)))
+	return nil
+}
+
+// BatchNTTInverse performs inverse NTT on multiple polynomials in parallel.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) BatchNTTInverse(r *ring.Ring, polys []ring.Poly) error {
+	if len(polys) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if !g.enabled || g.session == nil || len(polys) < 4 {
+		// Fall back to CPU for small batches
+		for i := range polys {
+			r.INTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	Q, err := g.getModulus(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		for i := range polys {
+			r.INTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Process each polynomial through GPU
+	N := r.N()
+	for i := range polys {
+		coeffs := polys[i].Coeffs
+		if len(coeffs) == 0 || len(coeffs[0]) < N {
+			r.INTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+
+		inputTensor, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint64](g.session, []int{N}, coeffs[0][:N])
+		if err != nil {
+			r.INTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+
+		outputTensor, err := accel.NewTensor[uint64](g.session, []int{N})
+		if err != nil {
+			inputTensor.Close()
+			r.INTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if err := g.session.Lattice().PolynomialINTT(inputTensor.Untyped(), outputTensor.Untyped(), Q); err != nil {
+			inputTensor.Close()
+			outputTensor.Close()
+			r.INTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+
+		result, err := outputTensor.ToSlice()
+		if err != nil {
+			inputTensor.Close()
+			outputTensor.Close()
+			r.INTT(polys[i], polys[i])
+			continue
+		}
+		copy(coeffs[0], result)
+
+		inputTensor.Close()
+		outputTensor.Close()
+	}
+
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.totalOps, uint64(len(polys)))
+	return nil
+}
+
+// PolyMul performs polynomial multiplication using GPU-accelerated NTT.
+// This multiplies polynomials a and b, storing result in out.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) PolyMul(r *ring.Ring, a, b, out ring.Poly) error {
+	if !g.enabled || g.session == nil {
+		// Fall back to CPU
+		r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	Q, err := g.getModulus(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	N := r.N()
+
+	// Extract coefficients
+	if len(a.Coeffs) == 0 || len(a.Coeffs[0]) < N ||
+		len(b.Coeffs) == 0 || len(b.Coeffs[0]) < N ||
+		len(out.Coeffs) == 0 || len(out.Coeffs[0]) < N {
+		r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Create tensors for a, b, and output
+	aTensor, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint64](g.session, []int{N}, a.Coeffs[0][:N])
+	if err != nil {
+		r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer aTensor.Close()
+
+	bTensor, err := accel.NewTensorWithData[uint64](g.session, []int{N}, b.Coeffs[0][:N])
+	if err != nil {
+		r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer bTensor.Close()
+
+	outTensor, err := accel.NewTensor[uint64](g.session, []int{N})
+	if err != nil {
+		r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+		return nil
+	}
+	defer outTensor.Close()
+
+	// GPU polynomial multiplication
+	if err := g.session.Lattice().PolynomialMul(aTensor.Untyped(), bTensor.Untyped(), outTensor.Untyped(), Q); err != nil {
+		r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Copy result back
+	result, err := outTensor.ToSlice()
+	if err != nil {
+		r.MulCoeffsBarrett(a, b, out)
+		return nil
+	}
+	copy(out.Coeffs[0], result)
+	atomic.AddUint64(&g.totalOps, 1)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ClearCache is a no-op in the accel-based implementation.
+// The accel library manages its own caching internally.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) ClearCache() {
+	// No-op: accel library manages caching internally
+}
+
+// NTTStats returns NTT accelerator statistics.
+type NTTStats struct {
+	Enabled      bool
+	Backend      string
+	TotalOps     uint64
+	GPUAvailable bool
+}
+
+// Stats returns current NTT accelerator statistics.
+func (g *NTTAccelerator) Stats() NTTStats {
+	g.mu.RLock()
+	defer g.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	return NTTStats{
+		Enabled:      g.enabled,
+		Backend:      g.Backend(),
+		TotalOps:     atomic.LoadUint64(&g.totalOps),
+		GPUAvailable: accel.Available(),
+	}
+}
+
+// Global NTT accelerator instance (lazily initialized)
+var (
+	globalNTTAccelerator     *NTTAccelerator
+	globalNTTAcceleratorOnce sync.Once
+	globalNTTAcceleratorErr  error
+)
+
+// GetNTTAccelerator returns the global NTT accelerator instance.
+// The accelerator is lazily initialized on first call.
+func GetNTTAccelerator() (*NTTAccelerator, error) {
+	globalNTTAcceleratorOnce.Do(func() {
+		globalNTTAccelerator, globalNTTAcceleratorErr = NewNTTAccelerator()
+	})
+	return globalNTTAccelerator, globalNTTAcceleratorErr
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"runtime"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test 1: Finalized map pruning
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// TestFinalizedMapPruning simulates 100,000 finality events and verifies:
+//   - The finalized map never exceeds maxFinalized + buffer
+//   - Old entries are actually pruned
+//   - After 100K events, map size <= 10,000
+func TestFinalizedMapPruning(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// maxFinalized is 10,000 by default (set in NewQuasar)
+	const totalEvents = 100_000
+
+	// We simulate processFinality's pruning logic directly by
+	// inserting entries and triggering the prune path.
+	// processFinality increments qHeight and prunes when len > maxFinalized.
+	var peakSize int
+	for i := 0; i < totalEvents; i++ {
+		var blockID ids.ID
+		_, _ = rand.Read(blockID[:])
+
+		q.mu.Lock()
+		q.qHeight++
+		q.finalized[blockID] = &QuantumFinality{
+			BlockID:      blockID,
+			QChainHeight: q.qHeight,
+			PChainHeight: uint64(i),
+			TotalWeight:  1000,
+			SignerWeight: 700,
+		}
+
+		// Replicate the pruning logic from processFinality
+		if q.maxFinalized > 0 && len(q.finalized) > q.maxFinalized {
+			cutoff := q.qHeight - uint64(q.maxFinalized)
+			for id, f := range q.finalized {
+				if f.QChainHeight < cutoff {
+					delete(q.finalized, id)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		size := len(q.finalized)
+		if size > peakSize {
+			peakSize = size
+		}
+		q.mu.Unlock()
+	}
+
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	finalSize := len(q.finalized)
+	finalQHeight := q.qHeight
+	q.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	t.Logf("totalEvents=%d  peakSize=%d  finalSize=%d  qHeight=%d",
+		totalEvents, peakSize, finalSize, finalQHeight)
+
+	// The pruning logic fires when len > maxFinalized, then deletes entries
+	// with QChainHeight < cutoff (strict <). The cutoff is qHeight - maxFinalized.
+	// After pruning, entries at exactly cutoff remain, so the steady-state
+	// size is maxFinalized + 1. This is correct and bounded.
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, peakSize, q.maxFinalized+1,
+		"peak map size should not exceed maxFinalized+1")
+
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, finalSize, q.maxFinalized+1,
+		"final map size should be <= maxFinalized+1 (10,001)")
+
+	// Verify old entries are actually gone: the oldest remaining entry
+	// should have QChainHeight >= qHeight - maxFinalized.
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	minHeight := uint64(^uint64(0))
+	for _, f := range q.finalized {
+		if f.QChainHeight < minHeight {
+			minHeight = f.QChainHeight
+		}
+	}
+	q.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	expectedMinHeight := finalQHeight - uint64(q.maxFinalized)
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, minHeight, expectedMinHeight,
+		"oldest entry should be pruned: minHeight=%d expected>=%d", minHeight, expectedMinHeight)
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test 2: Channel backpressure -- no goroutine leak or deadlock
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// TestChannelBackpressure creates a pChainProvider with a 64-buffer channel,
+// sends 1000 events, and verifies no goroutine leak or deadlock.
+func TestChannelBackpressure(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		channelSize = 64
+		totalEvents = 1000
+	)
+
+	validators := generateValidatorStates(5)
+	pchain := &mockPChainProvider{
+		height:     0,
+		validators: validators,
+		finalityCh: make(chan FinalityEvent, channelSize),
+	}
+
+	goroutinesBefore := runtime.NumGoroutine()
+
+	// Send events -- channel will fill up, excess events are dropped (select default)
+	sent := 0
+	for i := 0; i < totalEvents; i++ {
+		event := createTestEvent(uint64(i+1), validators)
+		select {
+		case pchain.finalityCh <- event:
+			sent++
+		default:
+			// Channel full -- expected backpressure behavior
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Logf("sent %d/%d events (channel capacity %d)", sent, totalEvents, channelSize)
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, sent, channelSize,
+		"should have sent at least channelSize events")
+
+	// Drain the channel
+	drained := 0
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-pchain.finalityCh:
+			drained++
+		default:
+			goto done
+		}
+	}
+done:
+	t.Logf("drained %d events", drained)
+
+	// Check goroutine count -- should not have leaked
+	runtime.GC()
+	goroutinesAfter := runtime.NumGoroutine()
+	// Allow a delta of 5 for GC/runtime goroutines
+	require.InDelta(t, goroutinesBefore, goroutinesAfter, 5,
+		"goroutine count should not grow significantly: before=%d after=%d",
+		goroutinesBefore, goroutinesAfter)
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test 3: Long-running benchmark -- 1M simulated finality cycles
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// BenchmarkQuasarLongRun runs 1M simulated finality cycles and reports
+// allocs/op, bytes/op, ns/op. Verifies no unbounded memory growth.
+func BenchmarkQuasarLongRun(b *testing.B) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+	if err != nil {
+		b.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Snapshot heap before
+	runtime.GC()
+	var memBefore runtime.MemStats
+	runtime.ReadMemStats(&memBefore)
+
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		var blockID ids.ID
+		// Use deterministic IDs to avoid crypto/rand overhead in benchmark
+		blockID[0] = byte(i)
+		blockID[1] = byte(i >> 8)
+		blockID[2] = byte(i >> 16)
+		blockID[3] = byte(i >> 24)
+
+		q.mu.Lock()
+		q.qHeight++
+		q.finalized[blockID] = &QuantumFinality{
+			BlockID:      blockID,
+			QChainHeight: q.qHeight,
+			PChainHeight: uint64(i),
+			TotalWeight:  1000,
+			SignerWeight: 700,
+			BLSProof:     make([]byte, 96),
+			Timestamp:    time.Now(),
+		}
+
+		// Prune (same logic as processFinality)
+		if q.maxFinalized > 0 && len(q.finalized) > q.maxFinalized {
+			cutoff := q.qHeight - uint64(q.maxFinalized)
+			for id, f := range q.finalized {
+				if f.QChainHeight < cutoff {
+					delete(q.finalized, id)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		q.mu.Unlock()
+	}
+
+	b.StopTimer()
+
+	// Snapshot heap after
+	runtime.GC()
+	var memAfter runtime.MemStats
+	runtime.ReadMemStats(&memAfter)
+
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	finalSize := len(q.finalized)
+	q.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	heapBefore := memBefore.HeapAlloc
+	heapAfter := memAfter.HeapAlloc
+
+	var heapDelta int64
+	if heapAfter >= heapBefore {
+		heapDelta = int64(heapAfter - heapBefore)
+	} else {
+		heapDelta = -int64(heapBefore - heapAfter)
+	}
+	b.Logf("N=%d  finalMapSize=%d  heapBefore=%d  heapAfter=%d  heapDelta=%d",
+		b.N, finalSize, heapBefore, heapAfter, heapDelta)
+
+	// Map should be bounded regardless of N
+	if finalSize > q.maxFinalized+1 {
+		b.Fatalf("unbounded growth: map size %d exceeds maxFinalized %d",
+			finalSize, q.maxFinalized)
+	}
+
+	// Heap should not grow linearly with N. After pruning, the heap should
+	// be bounded by ~maxFinalized entries worth of allocations.
+	// We allow 100MB as a generous upper bound for 10K entries with 96-byte proofs.
+	const maxHeapGrowth = 100 * 1024 * 1024 // 100MB
+	if heapAfter > heapBefore+maxHeapGrowth {
+		b.Fatalf("unbounded heap growth: before=%d after=%d delta=%d (limit=%d)",
+			heapBefore, heapAfter, heapAfter-heapBefore, maxHeapGrowth)
+	}
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test 4: Quorum math verification -- property test
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// TestQuorumMath is a property test that for all validator counts 1-100
+// and all weight distributions:
+//   - Cross-multiplication quorum never accepts < 2/3 weight
+//   - Cross-multiplication quorum always accepts >= 2/3 weight (no false negatives)
+func TestQuorumMath(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// The quorum check is: signerWeight * quorumDen >= totalWeight * quorumNum
+	// With quorumNum=2, quorumDen=3: signerWeight * 3 >= totalWeight * 2
+
+	t.Run("no_false_positives", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// For all validator counts and weight distributions, if the quorum
+		// check passes, then signerWeight/totalWeight >= 2/3.
+		for numValidators := 1; numValidators <= 100; numValidators++ {
+			// Test with equal weights
+			weightPerValidator := uint64(1000)
+			totalWeight := uint64(numValidators) * weightPerValidator
+
+			for numSigners := 0; numSigners <= numValidators; numSigners++ {
+				signerWeight := uint64(numSigners) * weightPerValidator
+				result := q.CheckQuorum(signerWeight, totalWeight)
+
+				// Verify: if result is true, then signerWeight/totalWeight >= 2/3
+				// Using cross-multiplication: signerWeight * 3 >= totalWeight * 2
+				actualMeetsThreshold := signerWeight*3 >= totalWeight*2
+				if result && !actualMeetsThreshold {
+					t.Fatalf("FALSE POSITIVE: n=%d signers=%d sW=%d tW=%d: "+
+						"quorum accepted but %d*3=%d < %d*2=%d",
+						numValidators, numSigners, signerWeight, totalWeight,
+						signerWeight, signerWeight*3, totalWeight, totalWeight*2)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("no_false_negatives", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// For all validator counts and weight distributions, if
+		// signerWeight/totalWeight >= 2/3, the quorum check must pass.
+		for numValidators := 1; numValidators <= 100; numValidators++ {
+			weightPerValidator := uint64(1000)
+			totalWeight := uint64(numValidators) * weightPerValidator
+
+			for numSigners := 0; numSigners <= numValidators; numSigners++ {
+				signerWeight := uint64(numSigners) * weightPerValidator
+				result := q.CheckQuorum(signerWeight, totalWeight)
+
+				actualMeetsThreshold := signerWeight*3 >= totalWeight*2
+				if actualMeetsThreshold && !result {
+					t.Fatalf("FALSE NEGATIVE: n=%d signers=%d sW=%d tW=%d: "+
+						"threshold met but quorum rejected",
+						numValidators, numSigners, signerWeight, totalWeight)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("varied_weight_distributions", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Test with non-uniform weights: validators have weights 1..n
+		for numValidators := 1; numValidators <= 100; numValidators++ {
+			var totalWeight uint64
+			weights := make([]uint64, numValidators)
+			for i := 0; i < numValidators; i++ {
+				weights[i] = uint64(i + 1)
+				totalWeight += weights[i]
+			}
+
+			// Test subsets: first k validators sign
+			var signerWeight uint64
+			for k := 0; k <= numValidators; k++ {
+				if k > 0 {
+					signerWeight += weights[k-1]
+				}
+				result := q.CheckQuorum(signerWeight, totalWeight)
+				expected := signerWeight*3 >= totalWeight*2
+
+				if result != expected {
+					t.Fatalf("MISMATCH: n=%d signers=%d sW=%d tW=%d: "+
+						"got %v expected %v",
+						numValidators, k, signerWeight, totalWeight,
+						result, expected)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("edge_cases", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Zero total weight: any signer weight passes (vacuously true)
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(0, 0), "0/0 should pass (vacuous)")
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(1, 0), "1/0 should pass (vacuous)")
+
+		// Exact boundary: 2/3 of various totals
+		// For totalWeight=3: need signerWeight >= 2
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(2, 3), "2/3 should pass")
+		require.False(t, q.CheckQuorum(1, 3), "1/3 should fail")
+
+		// For totalWeight=6: need signerWeight >= 4
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(4, 6), "4/6 should pass")
+		require.False(t, q.CheckQuorum(3, 6), "3/6 should fail")
+
+		// For totalWeight=9: need signerWeight >= 6
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(6, 9), "6/9 should pass")
+		require.False(t, q.CheckQuorum(5, 9), "5/9 should fail")
+
+		// For totalWeight=100: 2*100/3 = 66 (floor), so need 67 to be strictly >= 2/3
+		// But cross-mult: sW*3 >= tW*2 → sW*3 >= 200 → sW >= 67 (ceil)
+		// Actually: 66*3=198 < 200 → fail; 67*3=201 >= 200 → pass
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(67, 100), "67/100 should pass")
+		require.False(t, q.CheckQuorum(66, 100), "66/100 should fail")
+
+		// Large weights (near overflow boundary for uint64)
+		// Safe for totalWeight < 2^62 with quorumNum=2 (per checkQuorum doc)
+		largeTotal := uint64(1) << 61
+		largeSigner := largeTotal*2/3 + 1
+		require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(largeSigner, largeTotal),
+			"large weight should pass when above 2/3")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("bft_threshold_exact", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// BFT requires > 2/3 of total weight.
+		// With the cross-multiplication check (>=), signerWeight*3 >= totalWeight*2.
+		// This means exactly 2/3 PASSES (which matches the formal spec:
+		// "quorum is met when SignerWeight/TotalWeight >= Numerator/Denominator").
+		//
+		// For totalWeight divisible by 3:
+		//   signerWeight = totalWeight * 2 / 3 → passes (exact 2/3)
+		//   signerWeight = totalWeight * 2 / 3 - 1 → fails (below 2/3)
+		for total := uint64(3); total <= 300; total += 3 {
+			threshold := total * 2 / 3
+			require.True(t, q.CheckQuorum(threshold, total),
+				"exact 2/3 (%d/%d) should pass", threshold, total)
+			require.False(t, q.CheckQuorum(threshold-1, total),
+				"below 2/3 (%d/%d) should fail", threshold-1, total)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test 5: Concurrent map pruning stress test
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// TestConcurrentPruningStress verifies that concurrent writes + pruning
+// do not corrupt the finalized map or deadlock.
+func TestConcurrentPruningStress(t *testing.T) {
+	q, err := NewQuasar(log.NewNoOpLogger(), 3, 2, 3)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	const (
+		numWriters   = 8
+		opsPerWriter = 5000
+	)
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for w := 0; w < numWriters; w++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(writerID int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			for i := 0; i < opsPerWriter; i++ {
+				var blockID ids.ID
+				blockID[0] = byte(writerID)
+				blockID[1] = byte(i)
+				blockID[2] = byte(i >> 8)
+
+				q.mu.Lock()
+				q.qHeight++
+				q.finalized[blockID] = &QuantumFinality{
+					BlockID:      blockID,
+					QChainHeight: q.qHeight,
+				}
+				if q.maxFinalized > 0 && len(q.finalized) > q.maxFinalized {
+					cutoff := q.qHeight - uint64(q.maxFinalized)
+					for id, f := range q.finalized {
+						if f.QChainHeight < cutoff {
+							delete(q.finalized, id)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+				q.mu.Unlock()
+			}
+		}(w)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	finalSize := len(q.finalized)
+	q.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	t.Logf("writers=%d opsEach=%d totalOps=%d finalSize=%d",
+		numWriters, opsPerWriter, numWriters*opsPerWriter, finalSize)
+
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, finalSize, q.maxFinalized+1,
+		"map size should be bounded after concurrent stress")
+}
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package quasar
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	qcert "github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar"
-)
-
-// policyStore adapts the single configured QuasarEvidencePolicy to the consensus
-// ConsensusCertPolicyStore interface. The verifier loads the required-leg set
-// and the (kind, mode, param) permissions from HERE — never from the cert
-// (invariants I1/I2). A cert that names a different PolicyID than the node's
-// configured posture is rejected: a cert cannot pick its own weaker policy.
-type policyStore struct{ policy *qcert.QuasarEvidencePolicy }
-
-func (s policyStore) Policy(_ uint32, _ uint64, policyID uint32) (qcert.ConsensusCertPolicy, error) {
-	if s.policy == nil {
-		return nil, ErrPolicyUnavailable
-	}
-	if policyID != s.policy.EvidencePolicyID() {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cert policy %d != configured %d", ErrPolicyMismatch, policyID, s.policy.EvidencePolicyID())
-	}
-	return s.policy, nil
-}
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package quasar
-
-import (
-	"context"
-
-	qcert "github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar"
-)
-
-// Subject is the finalized-block position a cert must certify — the producer's
-// input at a checkpoint. Mirrors Checkpoint (the verify side) so producer and
-// verifier bind the SAME tuple.
-type Subject struct {
-	ChainID   uint32
-	Epoch     uint64
-	Height    uint64
-	Round     uint32
-	BlockID   [32]byte
-	StateRoot [32]byte
-}
-
-// subjectFrom derives the producer Subject from this gate's chain id and a
-// finalized Checkpoint, so producer and verifier bind the SAME tuple.
-func (g *Gate) subjectFrom(cp Checkpoint) Subject {
-	return Subject{
-		ChainID:   g.cfg.ChainID,
-		Epoch:     cp.Epoch,
-		Height:    cp.Height,
-		Round:     cp.Round,
-		BlockID:   cp.BlockID,
-		StateRoot: cp.StateRoot,
-	}
-}
-
-// Producer is the committee cert-signing service contract (the per-validator
-// "pulsard" committee). At a checkpoint, a producing validator calls Produce to
-// obtain the QuasarCert over the finalized subject, then gossips it so peers can
-// verify and store it (via a CertStore).
-//
-// SCAFFOLDING — this is the seam, not the service. This milestone wires the
-// VERIFY half (gate.go) and this interface. luxd ships with a nil Producer
-// (verify-only): a node VERIFIES certs it receives but does not itself produce
-// them. A nil Producer is the correct default — most of the rollout window is
-// verify-only, and the producer is brought up before activation is forward-dated.
-//
-// Implementation path for the follow-on:
-//
-//   - github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar already defines the
-//     producer-side abstractions: PWitnessProducer / QWitnessProducer /
-//     ZWitnessProducer + NewWitnessSet, and ComposeDualPQEvidence. The concrete
-//     committee signer implements Producer over those.
-//   - The signer needs the live Pulsar key share + nonce pool + offline
-//     preprocessing + one-round sign + verify-before-gossip + nonce-erase (the
-//     no-reconstruct hyperball signer), which lands with pulsar v1.7.1.
-//   - REQUIRED CONSENSUS EXPORT: the ConsensusCert envelope + per-leg payload
-//     ENCODERS are package-private in consensus v1.29.0 (only the verifiers are
-//     exported). An external producer — and any end-to-end "valid cert verifies
-//     through the gate" test — needs those encoders exported (a small, additive
-//     consensus change). The verify path here needs no such export: it consumes
-//     a fully-formed *ConsensusCert.
-type Producer interface {
-	Produce(ctx context.Context, subject Subject) (*qcert.ConsensusCert, error)
-}
-
-// MaybeProduce is the checkpoint producer-request site. It is nil-safe and
-// activation-aware so the accept hook can call it unconditionally: a nil gate,
-// dormant activation, a non-checkpoint height, or a nil producer all short-
-// circuit to (nil, nil) — the verify-only default. When a producer IS wired and
-// the checkpoint is live, it requests the cert; the caller gossips/stores it.
-//
-// This keeps producer cadence and verify cadence on ONE definition (g.IsCheckpoint),
-// so producer and verifier can never disagree on which heights carry certs.
-func (g *Gate) MaybeProduce(ctx context.Context, producer Producer, cp Checkpoint) (*qcert.ConsensusCert, error) {
-	if g == nil || producer == nil {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	if !g.Activated(cp.Height) || !g.IsCheckpoint(cp.Height) {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	return producer.Produce(ctx, g.subjectFrom(cp))
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,681 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar"
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+)
+
+// Quasar is the gravitational center of Lux consensus.
+// It binds P-Chain (BLS signatures) and Q-Chain (Corona post-quantum threshold)
+// into unified hybrid finality across all Lux networks.
+//
+// Architecture:
+//   ALL validators have BOTH keypairs:
+//   - BLS keypair → aggregate signatures (classical, fast)
+//   - Corona keypair → threshold signatures (post-quantum, 2-round)
+//
+//   Both signature paths run IN PARALLEL:
+//
+//   Block arrives
+//       │
+//       ├─────────────────────────────────────────┐
+//       │                                         │
+//       ▼                                         ▼
+//   BLS PATH (fast)                    CORONA PATH (quantum-safe)
+//   ────────────────                   ─────────────────────────────
+//   All validators sign                Round 1: All validators
+//   with BLS keys                      generate commitments
+//       │                                         │
+//       ▼                                         ▼
+//   Aggregate into                     Round 2: All validators
+//   single 96-byte sig                 compute partial signatures
+//       │                                         │
+//       └─────────────────┬───────────────────────┘
+//                         │
+//                         ▼
+//                  Finalize: combine into
+//                  threshold signature
+//                         │
+//                         ▼
+//               ┌─────────────────┐
+//               │  HYBRID PROOF   │
+//               │ BLS Aggregate   │ ← 96 bytes (2/3+ validators)
+//               │ Corona Thresh │ ← ~KB (t-of-n threshold)
+//               └─────────────────┘
+//                         │
+//                         ▼
+//                QUANTUM FINALITY
+//
+// The quasar ensures blocks achieve finality only when BOTH complete:
+// 1. 2/3+ validator weight signed via BLS (fast, classical)
+// 2. t-of-n validators completed Corona threshold (post-quantum secure)
+
+var (
+	ErrQuasarNotStarted    = errors.New("quasar not started")
+	ErrPChainNotConnected  = errors.New("P-Chain not connected")
+	ErrQChainNotConnected  = errors.New("Q-Chain not connected")
+	ErrCoronaNotConnected  = errors.New("Corona coordinator not connected")
+	ErrInsufficientWeight  = errors.New("insufficient validator weight")
+	ErrInsufficientSigners = errors.New("insufficient Corona signers")
+	ErrFinalityFailed      = errors.New("hybrid finality verification failed")
+	ErrBLSFailed           = errors.New("BLS aggregation failed")
+	ErrCoronaFailed        = errors.New("Corona threshold signing failed")
+)
+
+// PChainProvider provides P-Chain state and finality events
+type PChainProvider interface {
+	GetFinalizedHeight() uint64
+	GetValidators(height uint64) ([]ValidatorState, error)
+	SubscribeFinality() <-chan FinalityEvent
+}
+
+// QuantumSignerFallback provides fallback single-signer quantum signatures
+type QuantumSignerFallback interface {
+	SignMessage(msg []byte) ([]byte, error)
+}
+
+// ValidatorState represents a validator's current state
+// Each validator has BOTH BLS and Corona keys
+type ValidatorState struct {
+	NodeID    ids.NodeID
+	Weight    uint64
+	BLSPubKey []byte // BLS public key for aggregate signatures
+	CoronaKey []byte // Corona public key share for threshold sigs
+	Active    bool
+}
+
+// FinalityEvent represents a P-Chain finality event
+type FinalityEvent struct {
+	Height     uint64
+	BlockID    ids.ID
+	Validators []ValidatorState
+	Timestamp  time.Time
+}
+
+// QuantumFinality represents a block that achieved hybrid quantum finality
+type QuantumFinality struct {
+	BlockID       ids.ID
+	PChainHeight  uint64
+	QChainHeight  uint64
+	BLSProof      []byte       // Aggregated BLS signature (96 bytes)
+	CoronaProof   []byte       // Serialized Corona threshold signature
+	SignerBitset  []byte       // Which validators signed BLS
+	CoronaSigners []ids.NodeID // Which validators participated in Corona
+	TotalWeight   uint64
+	SignerWeight  uint64
+	BLSLatency    time.Duration
+	CoronaLatency time.Duration
+	Timestamp     time.Time
+}
+
+// Quasar binds P-Chain and Q-Chain consensus into hybrid quantum finality
+type Quasar struct {
+	mu sync.RWMutex
+
+	log  log.Logger
+	core *quasar.Quasar
+
+	// Chain connections
+	pChain          PChainProvider
+	quantumFallback QuantumSignerFallback
+
+	// Corona threshold coordinator
+	corona *CoronaCoordinator
+
+	// State
+	pHeight   uint64
+	qHeight   uint64
+	finalized map[ids.ID]*QuantumFinality
+
+	// Configuration
+	threshold    int    // Corona threshold (t in t-of-n)
+	quorumNum    uint64 // BLS quorum numerator
+	quorumDen    uint64 // BLS quorum denominator
+	maxFinalized int    // max finalized entries before pruning
+
+	// Channels
+	finalityCh chan *QuantumFinality
+	stopCh     chan struct{}
+	running    bool
+}
+
+// NewQuasar creates a new Quasar consensus hub
+func NewQuasar(log log.Logger, threshold int, quorumNum, quorumDen uint64) (*Quasar, error) {
+	core, err := quasar.NewQuasar(threshold)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create quasar core: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return &Quasar{
+		log:          log,
+		core:         core,
+		threshold:    threshold,
+		quorumNum:    quorumNum,
+		quorumDen:    quorumDen,
+		finalized:    make(map[ids.ID]*QuantumFinality),
+		maxFinalized: 10000,
+		finalityCh:   make(chan *QuantumFinality, 100),
+		stopCh:       make(chan struct{}),
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ConnectPChain connects the P-Chain finality provider
+func (q *Quasar) ConnectPChain(p PChainProvider) {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	defer q.mu.Unlock()
+
+	q.pChain = p
+	if p != nil {
+		q.pHeight = p.GetFinalizedHeight()
+	}
+
+	q.log.Info("quasar: P-Chain connected", "height", q.pHeight)
+}
+
+// ConnectQuantumFallback connects the quantum signer fallback
+func (q *Quasar) ConnectQuantumFallback(f QuantumSignerFallback) {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	defer q.mu.Unlock()
+
+	q.quantumFallback = f
+	q.log.Info("quasar: quantum fallback connected")
+}
+
+// ConnectCorona connects the Corona threshold coordinator
+func (q *Quasar) ConnectCorona(rc *CoronaCoordinator) {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	defer q.mu.Unlock()
+
+	q.corona = rc
+	q.log.Info("quasar: Corona coordinator connected")
+}
+
+// InitializeCorona initializes the Corona coordinator with validators
+func (q *Quasar) InitializeCorona(validators []ids.NodeID) error {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	defer q.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if q.corona == nil {
+		// Create coordinator if not provided
+		numParties := len(validators)
+		threshold := (numParties * 2 / 3) + 1 // 2/3 + 1 threshold
+		if threshold < 2 {
+			threshold = 2
+		}
+
+		rc, err := NewCoronaCoordinator(q.log, CoronaConfig{
+			NumParties: numParties,
+			Threshold:  threshold,
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("failed to create Corona coordinator: %w", err)
+		}
+		q.corona = rc
+	}
+
+	if err := q.corona.Initialize(validators); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize Corona: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	q.log.Info("quasar: Corona initialized",
+		"validators", len(validators),
+		"threshold", q.corona.Stats().Threshold,
+	)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Start begins the quasar consensus loop
+func (q *Quasar) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	if q.pChain == nil {
+		q.mu.Unlock()
+		return ErrPChainNotConnected
+	}
+	if q.quantumFallback == nil {
+		q.mu.Unlock()
+		return ErrQChainNotConnected
+	}
+	q.running = true
+	q.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Subscribe to P-Chain finality
+	sub := q.pChain.SubscribeFinality()
+	go q.run(ctx, sub)
+
+	q.log.Info("quasar: started")
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Stop halts the quasar
+func (q *Quasar) Stop() {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	if q.running {
+		close(q.stopCh)
+		q.running = false
+	}
+	q.mu.Unlock()
+	q.log.Info("quasar: stopped")
+}
+
+// run is the main finality loop.
+// Bounded by ctx.Done() and q.stopCh — exits when either fires.
+// The goroutine is started in Start() and guaranteed to terminate
+// when Stop() closes stopCh or the parent context is cancelled.
+func (q *Quasar) run(ctx context.Context, sub <-chan FinalityEvent) {
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-q.stopCh:
+			return
+		case event := <-sub:
+			if err := q.processFinality(ctx, event); err != nil {
+				q.log.Error("quasar: finality failed",
+					"height", event.Height,
+					"error", err,
+				)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// processFinality processes a P-Chain finality event into hybrid finality
+// Both BLS and Corona paths run IN PARALLEL
+func (q *Quasar) processFinality(ctx context.Context, event FinalityEvent) error {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	defer q.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Sync validators to quasar core
+	for _, v := range event.Validators {
+		if v.Active {
+			_, _ = q.core.AddValidator(v.NodeID.String(), v.Weight)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Create finality message
+	msg := q.createMessage(event)
+	msgStr := string(msg) // Corona uses string message
+
+	// Run BLS and Corona IN PARALLEL
+	var blsProof, signerBitset []byte
+	var signerWeight uint64
+	var coronaSig Signature
+	var blsLatency, coronaLatency time.Duration
+	var blsErr, coronaErr error
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
+	// BLS path
+	wg.Add(1)
+	go func() {
+		defer wg.Done()
+		start := time.Now()
+		blsProof, signerBitset, signerWeight, blsErr = q.collectBLS(event, msg)
+		blsLatency = time.Since(start)
+	}()
+
+	// Corona path - REQUIRED for Q-Chain validator consensus.
+	// No fallback mode: if Corona coordinator is not initialized,
+	// finality MUST fail to prevent accepting BLS-only proofs.
+	wg.Add(1)
+	go func() {
+		defer wg.Done()
+		if q.corona == nil || !q.corona.IsInitialized() {
+			// STRICT: No fallback allowed for validators.
+			// RT signatures are REQUIRED for quantum-safe consensus.
+			coronaErr = ErrCoronaNotConnected
+			return
+		}
+		// Full threshold signing
+		start := time.Now()
+		coronaSig, coronaErr = q.collectCorona(msgStr)
+		coronaLatency = time.Since(start)
+	}()
+
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	// Check BLS result
+	if blsErr != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("BLS collection: %w", blsErr)
+	}
+
+	// Check Corona result
+	if coronaErr != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("Corona threshold: %w", coronaErr)
+	}
+
+	// Check quorum
+	totalWeight := q.totalWeight(event.Validators)
+	if !q.checkQuorum(signerWeight, totalWeight) {
+		return ErrInsufficientWeight
+	}
+
+	// Record finality
+	q.qHeight++
+	var coronaSigners []ids.NodeID
+	var coronaProof []byte
+	if coronaSig != nil {
+		coronaSigners = coronaSig.Signers()
+		coronaProof = coronaSig.Bytes()
+	}
+	finality := &QuantumFinality{
+		BlockID:       event.BlockID,
+		PChainHeight:  event.Height,
+		QChainHeight:  q.qHeight,
+		BLSProof:      blsProof,
+		CoronaProof:   coronaProof,
+		SignerBitset:  signerBitset,
+		CoronaSigners: coronaSigners,
+		TotalWeight:   totalWeight,
+		SignerWeight:  signerWeight,
+		BLSLatency:    blsLatency,
+		CoronaLatency: coronaLatency,
+		Timestamp:     time.Now(),
+	}
+
+	q.finalized[event.BlockID] = finality
+	q.pHeight = event.Height
+
+	// Prune old finality entries to bound memory
+	if q.maxFinalized > 0 && len(q.finalized) > q.maxFinalized {
+		cutoff := q.qHeight - uint64(q.maxFinalized)
+		for id, f := range q.finalized {
+			if f.QChainHeight < cutoff {
+				delete(q.finalized, id)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Emit
+	select {
+	case q.finalityCh <- finality:
+	default:
+	}
+
+	q.log.Info("quasar: hybrid finality achieved",
+		"block", event.BlockID,
+		"pHeight", event.Height,
+		"qHeight", q.qHeight,
+		"weight", fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d", signerWeight, totalWeight),
+		"blsLatency", blsLatency,
+		"coronaLatency", coronaLatency,
+		"coronaSigners", len(coronaSigners),
+	)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// createMessage creates the finality message to sign
+func (q *Quasar) createMessage(event FinalityEvent) []byte {
+	msg := make([]byte, 48) // 32 (blockID) + 8 (height) + 8 (timestamp)
+	copy(msg[:32], event.BlockID[:])
+	putUint64BE(msg[32:40], event.Height)
+	putUint64BE(msg[40:48], uint64(event.Timestamp.UnixNano()))
+	return msg
+}
+
+// collectBLS collects BLS signatures from validators and aggregates them
+func (q *Quasar) collectBLS(event FinalityEvent, msg []byte) ([]byte, []byte, uint64, error) {
+	var signerBitset []byte
+	var signerWeight uint64
+	signatures := make([]*quasar.QuasarSig, 0, len(event.Validators))
+
+	for i, v := range event.Validators {
+		if !v.Active {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		sig, err := q.core.SignMessage(v.NodeID.String(), msg)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue // Skip failed signers
+		}
+
+		signatures = append(signatures, sig)
+		signerWeight += v.Weight
+
+		// Set bit
+		byteIdx := i / 8
+		for len(signerBitset) <= byteIdx {
+			signerBitset = append(signerBitset, 0)
+		}
+		signerBitset[byteIdx] |= 1 << uint(i%8)
+	}
+
+	if len(signatures) == 0 {
+		return nil, nil, 0, errors.New("no BLS signatures")
+	}
+
+	agg, err := q.core.AggregateSignatures(msg, signatures)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, 0, err
+	}
+
+	return agg.BLSAggregated, signerBitset, signerWeight, nil
+}
+
+// collectCorona runs the 2-round Corona threshold protocol in parallel
+func (q *Quasar) collectCorona(message string) (Signature, error) {
+	if q.corona == nil {
+		return nil, ErrCoronaNotConnected
+	}
+
+	// Use the high-level Sign API which handles all rounds internally
+	sig, err := q.corona.Sign([]byte(message))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("corona signing failed: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the signature
+	if !q.corona.Verify([]byte(message), sig) {
+		return nil, ErrCoronaFailed
+	}
+
+	q.log.Debug("corona signature complete",
+		"signers", len(sig.Signers()),
+		"type", sig.Type(),
+	)
+
+	return sig, nil
+}
+
+// totalWeight calculates total validator weight
+func (q *Quasar) totalWeight(validators []ValidatorState) uint64 {
+	var total uint64
+	for _, v := range validators {
+		if v.Active {
+			total += v.Weight
+		}
+	}
+	return total
+}
+
+// checkQuorum verifies quorum is met using cross-multiplication to avoid
+// integer division truncation.
+//
+//	signerWeight / totalWeight >= quorumNum / quorumDen
+//	is equivalent to:
+//	signerWeight * quorumDen >= totalWeight * quorumNum
+//
+// Overflow bound: safe for totalWeight < 2^62 with quorumNum <= 3.
+// Production values: totalWeight is sum of validator weights (well under 2^60),
+// quorumNum=2, quorumDen=3.
+func (q *Quasar) checkQuorum(signerWeight, totalWeight uint64) bool {
+	return signerWeight*q.quorumDen >= totalWeight*q.quorumNum
+}
+
+// GetFinality returns finality for a block
+func (q *Quasar) GetFinality(blockID ids.ID) (*QuantumFinality, bool) {
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	defer q.mu.RUnlock()
+	f, ok := q.finalized[blockID]
+	return f, ok
+}
+
+// Subscribe returns channel for finality events
+func (q *Quasar) Subscribe() <-chan *QuantumFinality {
+	return q.finalityCh
+}
+
+// Verify verifies a hybrid finality proof.
+// Both BLS and Corona proofs are REQUIRED - no fallback mode.
+// This ensures quantum-safe consensus for Q-Chain validators.
+func (q *Quasar) Verify(finality *QuantumFinality) error {
+	if finality == nil {
+		return ErrFinalityFailed
+	}
+
+	// STRICT: Both proofs are REQUIRED
+	if len(finality.BLSProof) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: BLS proof missing", ErrBLSFailed)
+	}
+	if len(finality.CoronaProof) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: RT proof missing - required for Q-Chain validators", ErrCoronaFailed)
+	}
+
+	if !q.checkQuorum(finality.SignerWeight, finality.TotalWeight) {
+		return ErrInsufficientWeight
+	}
+
+	// Verify BLS via hybrid engine
+	agg := &quasar.AggregatedSignature{
+		BLSAggregated: finality.BLSProof,
+	}
+
+	// Reconstruct message for verification
+	msg := make([]byte, 48)
+	copy(msg[:32], finality.BlockID[:])
+	putUint64BE(msg[32:40], finality.PChainHeight)
+	putUint64BE(msg[40:48], uint64(finality.Timestamp.UnixNano()))
+
+	if !q.core.VerifyAggregatedSignature(msg, agg) {
+		return ErrBLSFailed
+	}
+
+	// Verify Corona threshold signature
+	// RT signatures MUST have the "RT" prefix marker followed by threshold data
+	if len(finality.CoronaProof) < 3 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: RT proof too short", ErrCoronaFailed)
+	}
+	if finality.CoronaProof[0] != 'R' || finality.CoronaProof[1] != 'T' {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid RT proof marker", ErrCoronaFailed)
+	}
+
+	// Verify threshold signers meet minimum requirement
+	if len(finality.CoronaSigners) < q.threshold {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: need %d signers, have %d",
+			ErrInsufficientSigners, q.threshold, len(finality.CoronaSigners))
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Stats returns quasar statistics
+func (q *Quasar) Stats() QuasarStats {
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	defer q.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	var coronaStats CoronaStats
+	if q.corona != nil {
+		coronaStats = q.corona.Stats()
+	}
+
+	return QuasarStats{
+		PChainHeight:    q.pHeight,
+		QChainHeight:    q.qHeight,
+		FinalizedBlocks: len(q.finalized),
+		Threshold:       q.threshold,
+		QuorumNum:       q.quorumNum,
+		QuorumDen:       q.quorumDen,
+		Running:         q.running,
+		CoronaParties:   coronaStats.NumParties,
+		CoronaThreshold: coronaStats.Threshold,
+		CoronaReady:     coronaStats.Initialized,
+	}
+}
+
+// QuasarStats contains quasar statistics
+type QuasarStats struct {
+	PChainHeight    uint64
+	QChainHeight    uint64
+	FinalizedBlocks int
+	Threshold       int
+	QuorumNum       uint64
+	QuorumDen       uint64
+	Running         bool
+	CoronaParties   int
+	CoronaThreshold int
+	CoronaReady     bool
+}
+
+// GetCore returns the underlying quasar core for testing
+func (q *Quasar) GetCore() *quasar.Quasar {
+	return q.core
+}
+
+// GetCorona returns the Corona coordinator
+func (q *Quasar) GetCorona() *CoronaCoordinator {
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	defer q.mu.RUnlock()
+	return q.corona
+}
+
+// CheckQuorum verifies quorum is met (exported for testing)
+func (q *Quasar) CheckQuorum(signerWeight, totalWeight uint64) bool {
+	return q.checkQuorum(signerWeight, totalWeight)
+}
+
+// CreateMessage creates the finality message to sign (exported for testing)
+func (q *Quasar) CreateMessage(event FinalityEvent) []byte {
+	return q.createMessage(event)
+}
+
+// TotalWeight calculates total validator weight (exported for testing)
+func (q *Quasar) TotalWeight(validators []ValidatorState) uint64 {
+	return q.totalWeight(validators)
+}
+
+// GetConfig returns quorum configuration (exported for testing)
+func (q *Quasar) GetConfig() (threshold int, quorumNum, quorumDen uint64) {
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	defer q.mu.RUnlock()
+	return q.threshold, q.quorumNum, q.quorumDen
+}
+
+// IsRunning returns whether the Quasar is currently running (exported for testing)
+func (q *Quasar) IsRunning() bool {
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	defer q.mu.RUnlock()
+	return q.running
+}
+
+// SetFinalized adds a finality record (exported for testing/benchmarking)
+func (q *Quasar) SetFinalized(blockID ids.ID, finality *QuantumFinality) {
+	q.mu.Lock()
+	defer q.mu.Unlock()
+	q.finalized[blockID] = finality
+}
+
+// GetFinalized retrieves a finality record (exported for testing)
+func (q *Quasar) GetFinalized(blockID ids.ID) (*QuantumFinality, bool) {
+	q.mu.RLock()
+	defer q.mu.RUnlock()
+	f, ok := q.finalized[blockID]
+	return f, ok
+}
+
+// Helper: big-endian uint64
+func putUint64BE(b []byte, v uint64) {
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		b[i] = byte(v >> (56 - i*8))
+	}
+}
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package quasar
-
-import (
-	"sync"
-
-	qcert "github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar"
-)
-
-// CertStore resolves the QuasarCert that certifies a finalized block. In
-// production it is filled by the cert gossip/ingest path (the producer
-// follow-on, producer.go); the verify gate only READS from it. Keyed by the
-// finalized position (chainID, height, blockID) so a cert can never be returned
-// for the wrong block.
-type CertStore interface {
-	Lookup(chainID uint32, height uint64, blockID [32]byte) (*qcert.ConsensusCert, bool)
-}
-
-type certKey struct {
-	chainID uint32
-	height  uint64
-	blockID [32]byte
-}
-
-// MemCertStore is an in-memory CertStore keyed by (chainID, height, blockID). It
-// is the ingest sink the cert-gossip handler writes into (Put) and the gate
-// reads from (Lookup). Safe for concurrent use.
-type MemCertStore struct {
-	mu    sync.RWMutex
-	certs map[certKey]*qcert.ConsensusCert
-}
-
-// NewMemCertStore returns an empty in-memory cert store.
-func NewMemCertStore() *MemCertStore {
-	return &MemCertStore{certs: make(map[certKey]*qcert.ConsensusCert)}
-}
-
-// Put indexes a cert by its own (ChainID, Height, BlockHash). The ingest path
-// MUST verify a cert before Put (verify-before-store), exactly as the gossip
-// layer verifies before re-gossip; the gate re-verifies at the checkpoint so a
-// store poisoned by an unverified Put still cannot finalize an invalid cert.
-func (m *MemCertStore) Put(cert *qcert.ConsensusCert) {
-	if cert == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	k := certKey{chainID: cert.ChainID, height: cert.Height, blockID: cert.BlockHash}
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	m.certs[k] = cert
-	m.mu.Unlock()
-}
-
-// Lookup returns the cert for the finalized position, or (nil, false).
-func (m *MemCertStore) Lookup(chainID uint32, height uint64, blockID [32]byte) (*qcert.ConsensusCert, bool) {
-	k := certKey{chainID: chainID, height: height, blockID: blockID}
-	m.mu.RLock()
-	c, ok := m.certs[k]
-	m.mu.RUnlock()
-	return c, ok
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+)
+
+// SignatureType identifies the signature algorithm used
+type SignatureType uint8
+
+const (
+	SignatureTypeBLS SignatureType = iota
+	SignatureTypeCorona
+	SignatureTypeQuasar // Hybrid BLS + Corona
+	SignatureTypeMLDSA
+)
+
+// Signature is the interface for all signature types
+type Signature interface {
+	Bytes() []byte
+	Type() SignatureType
+	Signers() []ids.NodeID
+}
+
+// Signer is the interface for signing operations
+type Signer interface {
+	Sign(msg []byte) (Signature, error)
+	PublicKey() []byte
+}
+
+// Verifier is the interface for signature verification
+type Verifier interface {
+	Verify(msg []byte, sig Signature) bool
+}
+
+// ThresholdSigner extends Signer for threshold signature schemes
+type ThresholdSigner interface {
+	Signer
+	Index() int
+	Threshold() int
+}
+
+// CoronaConfig holds configuration for Corona threshold signatures
+type CoronaConfig struct {
+	NumParties int
+	Threshold  int
+	PartyIndex int
+}
+
+// CoronaStats contains statistics about the Corona coordinator
+type CoronaStats struct {
+	NumParties  int
+	Threshold   int
+	Initialized bool
+}
+
+// CoronaSignature represents a threshold Corona signature
+type CoronaSignature struct {
+	sig     []byte
+	signers []ids.NodeID
+}
+
+// NewCoronaSignature creates a new Corona signature
+func NewCoronaSignature(sig []byte, signers []ids.NodeID) *CoronaSignature {
+	return &CoronaSignature{sig: sig, signers: signers}
+}
+
+func (s *CoronaSignature) Bytes() []byte         { return s.sig }
+func (s *CoronaSignature) Type() SignatureType   { return SignatureTypeCorona }
+func (s *CoronaSignature) Signers() []ids.NodeID { return s.signers }
+
+// CoronaCoordinator manages the threshold signing protocol.
+//
+// Sign/Verify are fail-closed without initialized lattice keys.
+// Operations return errors unless properly initialized with key
+// material, or explicitly created via NewTestCoronaCoordinator
+// for tests.
+type CoronaCoordinator struct {
+	log         log.Logger
+	config      CoronaConfig
+	initialized bool
+	testing     bool // only true via NewTestCoronaCoordinator
+	validators  []ids.NodeID
+}
+
+// NewCoronaCoordinator creates a new Corona coordinator.
+// Sign and Verify will fail until real lattice key material is loaded.
+func NewCoronaCoordinator(log log.Logger, config CoronaConfig) (*CoronaCoordinator, error) {
+	return &CoronaCoordinator{
+		log:    log,
+		config: config,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// NewTestCoronaCoordinator creates a Corona coordinator for testing.
+// The test coordinator uses deterministic stub signatures that are NOT
+// cryptographically secure.
+func NewTestCoronaCoordinator(log log.Logger, config CoronaConfig) (*CoronaCoordinator, error) {
+	return &CoronaCoordinator{
+		log:     log,
+		config:  config,
+		testing: true,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (rc *CoronaCoordinator) Initialize(validators []ids.NodeID) error {
+	rc.validators = validators
+	rc.initialized = true
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (rc *CoronaCoordinator) IsInitialized() bool {
+	return rc.initialized
+}
+
+func (rc *CoronaCoordinator) Sign(msg []byte) (Signature, error) {
+	if !rc.initialized {
+		return nil, errors.New("corona: threshold signing not initialized — requires real lattice key material")
+	}
+	if rc.testing {
+		// Test-only stub: deterministic RT-prefixed signature
+		sig := append([]byte("RT"), msg[:min(32, len(msg))]...)
+		return NewCoronaSignature(sig, rc.validators), nil
+	}
+	return nil, errors.New("corona: threshold signing not initialized — requires real lattice key material")
+}
+
+func (rc *CoronaCoordinator) Verify(msg []byte, sig Signature) bool {
+	if !rc.initialized {
+		return false
+	}
+	if rc.testing {
+		return sig != nil && len(sig.Bytes()) > 0
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func (rc *CoronaCoordinator) Stats() CoronaStats {
+	return CoronaStats{
+		NumParties:  rc.config.NumParties,
+		Threshold:   rc.config.Threshold,
+		Initialized: rc.initialized,
+	}
+}
+
+// Threshold returns the threshold required for signing
+func (rc *CoronaCoordinator) Threshold() int {
+	return rc.config.Threshold
+}
+
+// NumParties returns the number of parties in the threshold scheme
+func (rc *CoronaCoordinator) NumParties() int {
+	return rc.config.NumParties
+}
+
+func min(a, b int) int {
+	if a < b {
+		return a
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+// BLSSignature represents an aggregated BLS signature (node-specific)
+type BLSSignature struct {
+	sig     []byte
+	signers []ids.NodeID
+}
+
+func NewBLSSignature(sig []byte, signers []ids.NodeID) *BLSSignature {
+	return &BLSSignature{sig: sig, signers: signers}
+}
+
+func (s *BLSSignature) Bytes() []byte         { return s.sig }
+func (s *BLSSignature) Type() SignatureType   { return SignatureTypeBLS }
+func (s *BLSSignature) Signers() []ids.NodeID { return s.signers }
+
+// QuasarSignature combines BLS and Corona signatures for P/Q security
+type QuasarSignature struct {
+	bls    *BLSSignature
+	corona *CoronaSignature
+}
+
+func NewQuasarSignature(bls *BLSSignature, corona *CoronaSignature) *QuasarSignature {
+	return &QuasarSignature{bls: bls, corona: corona}
+}
+
+func (s *QuasarSignature) Bytes() []byte {
+	// Concatenate BLS + Corona bytes with length prefix
+	blsBytes := s.bls.Bytes()
+	rtBytes := s.corona.Bytes()
+	result := make([]byte, 4+len(blsBytes)+len(rtBytes))
+	// Length of BLS signature (big endian)
+	result[0] = byte(len(blsBytes) >> 24)
+	result[1] = byte(len(blsBytes) >> 16)
+	result[2] = byte(len(blsBytes) >> 8)
+	result[3] = byte(len(blsBytes))
+	copy(result[4:], blsBytes)
+	copy(result[4+len(blsBytes):], rtBytes)
+	return result
+}
+
+func (s *QuasarSignature) Type() SignatureType { return SignatureTypeQuasar }
+
+func (s *QuasarSignature) Signers() []ids.NodeID {
+	// Return intersection of signers (both must sign)
+	return s.bls.Signers()
+}
+
+func (s *QuasarSignature) BLS() *BLSSignature       { return s.bls }
+func (s *QuasarSignature) Corona() *CoronaSignature { return s.corona }
+
+// QuasarSigner combines classical and post-quantum signers
+type QuasarSigner interface {
+	Signer
+	// SignQuasar signs with both BLS and Corona in parallel
+	SignQuasar(msg []byte) (*QuasarSignature, error)
+	// VerifyQuasar verifies both BLS and Corona signatures
+	VerifyQuasar(msg []byte, sig *QuasarSignature) bool
+}
+
+// FinalityProof represents proof of block finality
+type FinalityProof struct {
+	BlockID      ids.ID
+	Height       uint64
+	Signature    Signature
+	TotalWeight  uint64
+	SignerWeight uint64
+}
+
+// ValidatorInfo contains validator information for consensus
+type ValidatorInfo struct {
+	NodeID ids.NodeID
+	Weight uint64
+	Active bool
+}
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package quasar
-
-import (
-	qcert "github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar"
-)
-
-// ValidatorSetProvider resolves the committed validator set the verifier pins a
-// cert against, for a (chain, epoch). Post-activation the gate calls this once
-// per verified checkpoint.
-type ValidatorSetProvider interface {
-	ValidatorSet(chainID uint32, epoch uint64) (qcert.ConsensusValidatorSet, error)
-}
-
-// ValidatorSet is a concrete ConsensusValidatorSet for one epoch: the committed
-// weighted-validator-set root plus the per-leg verification keys the cert legs
-// verify against (the classical BLS aggregate key for the Beam leg and the
-// Pulsar ML-DSA threshold group key for the Pulsar leg — the HYBRID_PQ pair).
-//
-// Production wiring (the activation seam): in production these fields are
-// populated from the P-Chain-pinned validator set (Root, Epoch) and the active
-// KeyEra group keys for the epoch. That population is era/rotation-coupled and
-// lands with the producer + KeyEra-registry wiring (see producer.go). Corona
-// (STRICT_DUAL_PQ) and Magnetar/P3Q (POLARIS / RECOVERY) group keys + the
-// weighted-sig-set config are populated by that same follow-on; until then this
-// set serves the HYBRID_PQ pair and reports "no key" for the other lanes.
-type ValidatorSet struct {
-	root        [48]byte
-	epoch       uint64
-	blsAggKey   []byte // classical BLS-12-381 aggregate pubkey (Beam leg)
-	pulsarGroup []byte // Pulsar ML-DSA threshold group pubkey (Pulsar leg)
-}
-
-var _ qcert.ConsensusValidatorSet = (*ValidatorSet)(nil)
-
-// NewValidatorSet builds a committed validator set for one epoch from its root
-// and the HYBRID_PQ verification keys.
-func NewValidatorSet(root [48]byte, epoch uint64, blsAggKey, pulsarGroup []byte) *ValidatorSet {
-	return &ValidatorSet{root: root, epoch: epoch, blsAggKey: blsAggKey, pulsarGroup: pulsarGroup}
-}
-
-// Root returns the 48-byte weighted-validator-set commitment.
-func (v *ValidatorSet) Root() [48]byte { return v.root }
-
-// Epoch returns the epoch this set was committed under.
-func (v *ValidatorSet) Epoch() uint64 { return v.epoch }
-
-// WeightedConfig returns the QuorumVerifierConfig for the WeightedSigSet
-// evidence mode. HYBRID_PQ does not use weighted-sig-set legs; the zero config
-// is correct here and is populated by the POLARIS / RECOVERY follow-on.
-func (v *ValidatorSet) WeightedConfig() qcert.QuorumVerifierConfig {
-	return qcert.QuorumVerifierConfig{}
-}
-
-// WeightedEnvelope returns the round-digest posture axes for the inner
-// WeightedQuorumCert. Zero for HYBRID_PQ (no weighted-sig-set leg); populated by
-// the POLARIS / RECOVERY follow-on.
-func (v *ValidatorSet) WeightedEnvelope() qcert.QuorumMessageEnvelope {
-	return qcert.QuorumMessageEnvelope{}
-}
-
-// ThresholdGroupKey returns the threshold-signature group public key for a leg
-// kind. Serves the Pulsar (ML-DSA) lane; reports (zero, false) for the others
-// until their group keys are wired by the follow-on.
-func (v *ValidatorSet) ThresholdGroupKey(kind qcert.LegKind) (qcert.ThresholdGroupKey, bool) {
-	if kind == qcert.LegPulsarMLDSA && len(v.pulsarGroup) > 0 {
-		return qcert.ThresholdGroupKey{Kind: qcert.LegPulsarMLDSA, PulsarGroupKey: v.pulsarGroup}, true
-	}
-	return qcert.ThresholdGroupKey{}, false
-}
-
-// ClassicalAggregateKey returns the classical aggregate verification key for a
-// scheme. Serves the BLS-12-381 Beam leg.
-func (v *ValidatorSet) ClassicalAggregateKey(scheme qcert.ClassicalScheme) ([]byte, bool) {
-	if scheme == qcert.ClassicalSchemeBLS12381 && len(v.blsAggKey) > 0 {
-		return v.blsAggKey, true
-	}
-	return nil, false
-}
-
-// StaticValidatorSetProvider returns the same committed set for every (chain,
-// epoch). It is the single-era / test provider; the production provider resolves
-// per-epoch sets from the P-Chain validator manager + KeyEra registry.
-type StaticValidatorSetProvider struct{ Set qcert.ConsensusValidatorSet }
-
-// ValidatorSet implements ValidatorSetProvider.
-func (p StaticValidatorSetProvider) ValidatorSet(_ uint32, _ uint64) (qcert.ConsensusValidatorSet, error) {
-	if p.Set == nil {
-		return nil, ErrValidatorSetUnavailable
-	}
-	return p.Set, nil
-}
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+// Package zap provides ZAP (Zero-copy Agent Protocol) integration for Lux consensus.
+//
+// This package bridges ZAP's agentic consensus with Lux's Quasar threshold signatures,
+// enabling W3C DID-based validator identity and post-quantum secure finality.
+package zap
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/consensus/quasar"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrNotInitialized is returned when the bridge is used before initialization
+	ErrNotInitialized = errors.New("zap bridge not initialized")
+	// ErrValidatorNotFound is returned when a validator is not in the set
+	ErrValidatorNotFound = errors.New("validator not found")
+	// ErrQueryNotFound is returned when a query ID is not known
+	ErrQueryNotFound = errors.New("query not found")
+	// ErrAlreadyVoted is returned when a validator tries to vote twice
+	ErrAlreadyVoted = errors.New("already voted on this query")
+	// ErrInvalidDID is returned when a DID is malformed
+	ErrInvalidDID = errors.New("invalid DID format")
+)
+
+// BridgeConfig configures the ZAP-Lux consensus bridge
+type BridgeConfig struct {
+	// ConsensusThreshold is the fraction of votes needed (0.5 = majority)
+	ConsensusThreshold float64
+	// MinResponses is the minimum responses before checking consensus
+	MinResponses int
+	// MinVotes is the minimum votes before checking consensus
+	MinVotes int
+	// EnablePQCrypto enables post-quantum signatures (ML-DSA-65)
+	EnablePQCrypto bool
+}
+
+// DefaultBridgeConfig returns sensible defaults for the bridge
+func DefaultBridgeConfig() BridgeConfig {
+	return BridgeConfig{
+		ConsensusThreshold: 0.5,
+		MinResponses:       1,
+		MinVotes:           3,
+		EnablePQCrypto:     true,
+	}
+}
+
+// Bridge connects ZAP agentic consensus to Lux's Quasar finality
+type Bridge struct {
+	log     log.Logger
+	config  BridgeConfig
+	quasar  *quasar.CoronaCoordinator
+	mu      sync.RWMutex
+	queries map[string]*QueryState // QueryID -> QueryState
+	dids    map[ids.NodeID]*DID    // NodeID -> DID
+}
+
+// NewBridge creates a new ZAP-Lux consensus bridge
+func NewBridge(log log.Logger, config BridgeConfig) *Bridge {
+	return &Bridge{
+		log:     log,
+		config:  config,
+		queries: make(map[string]*QueryState),
+		dids:    make(map[ids.NodeID]*DID),
+	}
+}
+
+// Initialize sets up the bridge with a Quasar coordinator
+func (b *Bridge) Initialize(coordinator *quasar.CoronaCoordinator) error {
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	defer b.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if coordinator == nil {
+		return ErrNotInitialized
+	}
+
+	b.quasar = coordinator
+	b.log.Info("ZAP bridge initialized",
+		log.Int("threshold", coordinator.Threshold()),
+		log.Int("parties", coordinator.NumParties()),
+		log.Bool("pqCrypto", b.config.EnablePQCrypto),
+	)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RegisterValidator associates a DID with a Lux NodeID
+func (b *Bridge) RegisterValidator(nodeID ids.NodeID, did *DID) error {
+	if did == nil || !did.Valid() {
+		return ErrInvalidDID
+	}
+
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	defer b.mu.Unlock()
+
+	b.dids[nodeID] = did
+	b.log.Debug("Registered validator DID",
+		log.Stringer("nodeID", nodeID),
+		log.String("did", did.String()),
+	)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GetValidatorDID returns the DID for a NodeID
+func (b *Bridge) GetValidatorDID(nodeID ids.NodeID) (*DID, error) {
+	b.mu.RLock()
+	defer b.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	did, ok := b.dids[nodeID]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, ErrValidatorNotFound
+	}
+	return did, nil
+}
+
+// SubmitQuery creates a new agentic consensus query
+func (b *Bridge) SubmitQuery(ctx context.Context, queryID string, content []byte, submitter ids.NodeID) error {
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	defer b.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if b.quasar == nil {
+		return ErrNotInitialized
+	}
+
+	submitterDID, ok := b.dids[submitter]
+	if !ok {
+		return ErrValidatorNotFound
+	}
+
+	b.queries[queryID] = &QueryState{
+		ID:        queryID,
+		Content:   content,
+		Submitter: submitterDID,
+		Responses: make(map[string]*Response),
+		Votes:     make(map[string][]*DID),
+	}
+
+	b.log.Debug("Query submitted",
+		log.String("queryID", queryID),
+		log.String("submitter", submitterDID.String()),
+	)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SubmitResponse adds a response to a query
+func (b *Bridge) SubmitResponse(ctx context.Context, queryID, responseID string, content []byte, responder ids.NodeID) error {
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	defer b.mu.Unlock()
+
+	state, ok := b.queries[queryID]
+	if !ok {
+		return ErrQueryNotFound
+	}
+
+	responderDID, ok := b.dids[responder]
+	if !ok {
+		return ErrValidatorNotFound
+	}
+
+	if state.Finalized != "" {
+		return errors.New("query already finalized")
+	}
+
+	state.Responses[responseID] = &Response{
+		ID:        responseID,
+		QueryID:   queryID,
+		Content:   content,
+		Responder: responderDID,
+	}
+	state.Votes[responseID] = []*DID{}
+
+	b.log.Debug("Response submitted",
+		log.String("queryID", queryID),
+		log.String("responseID", responseID),
+		log.String("responder", responderDID.String()),
+	)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Vote casts a vote for a response
+func (b *Bridge) Vote(ctx context.Context, queryID, responseID string, voter ids.NodeID) error {
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	defer b.mu.Unlock()
+
+	state, ok := b.queries[queryID]
+	if !ok {
+		return ErrQueryNotFound
+	}
+
+	if state.Finalized != "" {
+		return errors.New("query already finalized")
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := state.Responses[responseID]; !ok {
+		return errors.New("response not found")
+	}
+
+	voterDID, ok := b.dids[voter]
+	if !ok {
+		return ErrValidatorNotFound
+	}
+
+	// Check for double voting (by DID URI)
+	voterURI := voterDID.String()
+	for _, voters := range state.Votes {
+		for _, v := range voters {
+			if v.String() == voterURI {
+				return ErrAlreadyVoted
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	state.Votes[responseID] = append(state.Votes[responseID], voterDID)
+
+	// Check consensus
+	b.checkConsensus(state)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (b *Bridge) checkConsensus(state *QueryState) {
+	if state.Finalized != "" {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if len(state.Responses) < b.config.MinResponses {
+		return
+	}
+
+	totalVotes := 0
+	for _, voters := range state.Votes {
+		totalVotes += len(voters)
+	}
+
+	if totalVotes < b.config.MinVotes {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Find best response
+	var best struct {
+		id    string
+		count int
+	}
+
+	for responseID, voters := range state.Votes {
+		count := len(voters)
+		confidence := float64(count) / float64(totalVotes)
+
+		if confidence >= b.config.ConsensusThreshold {
+			if best.id == "" || count > best.count {
+				best.id = responseID
+				best.count = count
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if best.id != "" {
+		state.Finalized = best.id
+		b.log.Info("Query finalized",
+			log.String("queryID", state.ID),
+			log.String("responseID", best.id),
+			log.Int("votes", best.count),
+			log.Int("total", totalVotes),
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+// GetResult returns the consensus result for a query
+func (b *Bridge) GetResult(queryID string) (*ConsensusResult, error) {
+	b.mu.RLock()
+	defer b.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	state, ok := b.queries[queryID]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, ErrQueryNotFound
+	}
+
+	if state.Finalized == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	response := state.Responses[state.Finalized]
+	votes := len(state.Votes[state.Finalized])
+
+	totalVoters := 0
+	for _, v := range state.Votes {
+		totalVoters += len(v)
+	}
+
+	confidence := 0.0
+	if totalVoters > 0 {
+		confidence = float64(votes) / float64(totalVoters)
+	}
+
+	return &ConsensusResult{
+		Response:    response,
+		Votes:       votes,
+		TotalVoters: totalVoters,
+		Confidence:  confidence,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// IsFinalized checks if a query has reached consensus
+func (b *Bridge) IsFinalized(queryID string) bool {
+	b.mu.RLock()
+	defer b.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	state, ok := b.queries[queryID]
+	return ok && state.Finalized != ""
+}
+
+// SignWithQuasar signs a message using Quasar hybrid signatures
+func (b *Bridge) SignWithQuasar(msg []byte) (quasar.Signature, error) {
+	b.mu.RLock()
+	defer b.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	if b.quasar == nil {
+		return nil, ErrNotInitialized
+	}
+
+	return b.quasar.Sign(msg)
+}
+
+// VerifyQuasar verifies a Quasar signature
+func (b *Bridge) VerifyQuasar(msg []byte, sig quasar.Signature) bool {
+	b.mu.RLock()
+	defer b.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	if b.quasar == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return b.quasar.Verify(msg, sig)
+}
+
+// Stats returns bridge statistics
+func (b *Bridge) Stats() BridgeStats {
+	b.mu.RLock()
+	defer b.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	active := 0
+	finalized := 0
+	for _, state := range b.queries {
+		if state.Finalized != "" {
+			finalized++
+		} else {
+			active++
+		}
+	}
+
+	var quasarStats quasar.CoronaStats
+	if b.quasar != nil {
+		quasarStats = b.quasar.Stats()
+	}
+
+	return BridgeStats{
+		RegisteredValidators: len(b.dids),
+		ActiveQueries:        active,
+		FinalizedQueries:     finalized,
+		QuasarInitialized:    b.quasar != nil && b.quasar.IsInitialized(),
+		QuasarStats:          quasarStats,
+	}
+}
+
+// BridgeStats contains statistics about the bridge
+type BridgeStats struct {
+	RegisteredValidators int
+	ActiveQueries        int
+	FinalizedQueries     int
+	QuasarInitialized    bool
+	QuasarStats          quasar.CoronaStats
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package zap
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/consensus/quasar"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestParseDID(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		input   string
+		want    *DID
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:  "valid did:lux",
+			input: "did:lux:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
+			want: &DID{
+				Method: DIDMethodLux,
+				ID:     "z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
+			},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "valid did:key",
+			input: "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
+			want: &DID{
+				Method: DIDMethodKey,
+				ID:     "z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
+			},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "valid did:web",
+			input: "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
+			want: &DID{
+				Method: DIDMethodWeb,
+				ID:     "example.com:users:alice",
+			},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "invalid - no did prefix",
+			input:   "lux:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "invalid - unknown method",
+			input:   "did:unknown:abc123",
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "invalid - empty id",
+			input:   "did:lux:",
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := ParseDID(tt.input)
+			if tt.wantErr {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+				return
+			}
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.want.Method, got.Method)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.want.ID, got.ID)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDIDString(t *testing.T) {
+	did := &DID{Method: DIDMethodLux, ID: "z6MkTest"}
+	require.Equal(t, "did:lux:z6MkTest", did.String())
+}
+
+func TestDIDValid(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name  string
+		did   *DID
+		valid bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:  "valid lux",
+			did:   &DID{Method: DIDMethodLux, ID: "z6MkTest"},
+			valid: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "valid key",
+			did:   &DID{Method: DIDMethodKey, ID: "z6MkTest"},
+			valid: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "valid web",
+			did:   &DID{Method: DIDMethodWeb, ID: "example.com"},
+			valid: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "nil did",
+			did:   nil,
+			valid: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "empty id",
+			did:   &DID{Method: DIDMethodLux, ID: ""},
+			valid: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "unknown method",
+			did:   &DID{Method: "unknown", ID: "test"},
+			valid: false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			require.Equal(t, tt.valid, tt.did.Valid())
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDIDFromNodeID(t *testing.T) {
+	nodeID := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+	did := DIDFromNodeID(nodeID)
+
+	require.NotNil(t, did)
+	require.Equal(t, DIDMethodLux, did.Method)
+	require.True(t, did.Valid())
+	require.Contains(t, did.String(), "did:lux:")
+}
+
+func TestDIDFromWeb(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		domain  string
+		path    string
+		wantID  string
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "domain only",
+			domain:  "example.com",
+			path:    "",
+			wantID:  "example.com",
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "domain with path",
+			domain:  "example.com",
+			path:    "users/alice",
+			wantID:  "example.com:users:alice",
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "empty domain",
+			domain:  "",
+			path:    "",
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "domain with slash",
+			domain:  "example/com",
+			path:    "",
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := DIDFromWeb(tt.domain, tt.path)
+			if tt.wantErr {
+				require.Error(t, err)
+				return
+			}
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Equal(t, DIDMethodWeb, got.Method)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.wantID, got.ID)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGenerateDocument(t *testing.T) {
+	did := &DID{Method: DIDMethodLux, ID: "z6MkTest"}
+	doc, err := did.GenerateDocument()
+
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, doc)
+	require.Equal(t, "did:lux:z6MkTest", doc.ID)
+	require.Len(t, doc.Context, 2)
+	require.Len(t, doc.VerificationMethod, 1)
+	require.Len(t, doc.Authentication, 1)
+	require.Len(t, doc.Service, 1)
+	require.Equal(t, "ZapAgent", doc.Service[0].Type)
+}
+
+func TestBridgeNew(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := log.Noop()
+	config := DefaultBridgeConfig()
+	bridge := NewBridge(logger, config)
+
+	require.NotNil(t, bridge)
+	require.Equal(t, 0.5, bridge.config.ConsensusThreshold)
+}
+
+func TestBridgeInitialize(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := log.Noop()
+	bridge := NewBridge(logger, DefaultBridgeConfig())
+
+	// Test with nil coordinator
+	err := bridge.Initialize(nil)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotInitialized)
+
+	// Test with valid coordinator
+	coordinator, err := quasar.NewTestCoronaCoordinator(logger, quasar.CoronaConfig{
+		NumParties: 4,
+		Threshold:  3,
+		PartyIndex: 0,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	err = bridge.Initialize(coordinator)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestBridgeRegisterValidator(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := log.Noop()
+	bridge := NewBridge(logger, DefaultBridgeConfig())
+
+	nodeID := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+	did := DIDFromNodeID(nodeID)
+
+	// Register validator
+	err := bridge.RegisterValidator(nodeID, did)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Get validator DID
+	got, err := bridge.GetValidatorDID(nodeID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, did.String(), got.String())
+
+	// Unknown validator
+	_, err = bridge.GetValidatorDID(ids.GenerateTestNodeID())
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrValidatorNotFound)
+
+	// Invalid DID
+	err = bridge.RegisterValidator(nodeID, nil)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidDID)
+}
+
+func TestBridgeConsensusFlow(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := log.Noop()
+	bridge := NewBridge(logger, BridgeConfig{
+		ConsensusThreshold: 0.5,
+		MinResponses:       1,
+		MinVotes:           2,
+		EnablePQCrypto:     true,
+	})
+
+	// Initialize with coordinator
+	coordinator, err := quasar.NewTestCoronaCoordinator(logger, quasar.CoronaConfig{
+		NumParties: 4,
+		Threshold:  3,
+		PartyIndex: 0,
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, bridge.Initialize(coordinator))
+
+	// Register validators
+	submitter := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+	responder := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+	voter1 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+	voter2 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+
+	require.NoError(t, bridge.RegisterValidator(submitter, DIDFromNodeID(submitter)))
+	require.NoError(t, bridge.RegisterValidator(responder, DIDFromNodeID(responder)))
+	require.NoError(t, bridge.RegisterValidator(voter1, DIDFromNodeID(voter1)))
+	require.NoError(t, bridge.RegisterValidator(voter2, DIDFromNodeID(voter2)))
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Submit query
+	queryID := "query123"
+	err = bridge.SubmitQuery(ctx, queryID, []byte("What is 2+2?"), submitter)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Submit response
+	responseID := "response456"
+	err = bridge.SubmitResponse(ctx, queryID, responseID, []byte("4"), responder)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Vote
+	require.NoError(t, bridge.Vote(ctx, queryID, responseID, voter1))
+	require.False(t, bridge.IsFinalized(queryID)) // Not enough votes yet
+
+	require.NoError(t, bridge.Vote(ctx, queryID, responseID, voter2))
+	require.True(t, bridge.IsFinalized(queryID)) // Now finalized
+
+	// Get result
+	result, err := bridge.GetResult(queryID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, result)
+	require.Equal(t, responseID, result.Response.ID)
+	require.Equal(t, 2, result.Votes)
+	require.Equal(t, 2, result.TotalVoters)
+	require.Equal(t, 1.0, result.Confidence)
+}
+
+func TestBridgeDoubleVote(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := log.Noop()
+	bridge := NewBridge(logger, DefaultBridgeConfig())
+
+	coordinator, _ := quasar.NewTestCoronaCoordinator(logger, quasar.CoronaConfig{
+		NumParties: 2,
+		Threshold:  1,
+	})
+	bridge.Initialize(coordinator)
+
+	submitter := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+	voter := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+
+	bridge.RegisterValidator(submitter, DIDFromNodeID(submitter))
+	bridge.RegisterValidator(voter, DIDFromNodeID(voter))
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	queryID := "q1"
+	responseID := "r1"
+
+	bridge.SubmitQuery(ctx, queryID, []byte("test"), submitter)
+	bridge.SubmitResponse(ctx, queryID, responseID, []byte("answer"), submitter)
+
+	// First vote succeeds
+	require.NoError(t, bridge.Vote(ctx, queryID, responseID, voter))
+
+	// Second vote fails
+	err := bridge.Vote(ctx, queryID, responseID, voter)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyVoted)
+}
+
+func TestBridgeStats(t *testing.T) {
+	logger := log.Noop()
+	bridge := NewBridge(logger, DefaultBridgeConfig())
+
+	coordinator, _ := quasar.NewTestCoronaCoordinator(logger, quasar.CoronaConfig{
+		NumParties: 4,
+		Threshold:  3,
+	})
+	bridge.Initialize(coordinator)
+
+	nodeID := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
+	bridge.RegisterValidator(nodeID, DIDFromNodeID(nodeID))
+
+	stats := bridge.Stats()
+	require.Equal(t, 1, stats.RegisteredValidators)
+	require.Equal(t, 0, stats.ActiveQueries)
+	require.Equal(t, 0, stats.FinalizedQueries)
+	require.False(t, stats.QuasarInitialized) // Not initialized with validators
+}
+
+func TestNewQuery(t *testing.T) {
+	did := &DID{Method: DIDMethodLux, ID: "z6MkTest"}
+	query := NewQuery([]byte("What is 2+2?"), did)
+
+	require.NotEmpty(t, query.ID)
+	require.Equal(t, 64, len(query.ID)) // SHA-256 hex
+	require.Equal(t, []byte("What is 2+2?"), query.Content)
+	require.Equal(t, did, query.Submitter)
+	require.Greater(t, query.Timestamp, int64(0))
+}
+
+func TestNewResponse(t *testing.T) {
+	did := &DID{Method: DIDMethodLux, ID: "z6MkTest"}
+	queryID := "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+	response := NewResponse(queryID, []byte("4"), did)
+
+	require.NotEmpty(t, response.ID)
+	require.Equal(t, 64, len(response.ID)) // SHA-256 hex
+	require.Equal(t, queryID, response.QueryID)
+	require.Equal(t, []byte("4"), response.Content)
+	require.Equal(t, did, response.Responder)
+}
+
+func TestInMemoryStakeRegistry(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := NewInMemoryStakeRegistry()
+	did := &DID{Method: DIDMethodLux, ID: "z6MkTest"}
+
+	// Initial stake is 0
+	stake, err := registry.GetStake(did)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, uint64(0), stake)
+
+	// Set stake
+	require.NoError(t, registry.SetStake(did, 1000))
+
+	// Get stake
+	stake, err = registry.GetStake(did)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, uint64(1000), stake)
+
+	// Total stake
+	require.Equal(t, uint64(1000), registry.TotalStake())
+
+	// Has sufficient stake
+	has, err := registry.HasSufficientStake(did, 500)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, has)
+
+	has, err = registry.HasSufficientStake(did, 2000)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, has)
+
+	// Stake weight
+	weight, err := registry.StakeWeight(did)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, 1.0, weight) // Only staker
+}
+
+func TestAgentMessageType(t *testing.T) {
+	require.Equal(t, "Query", AgentMessageTypeQuery.String())
+	require.Equal(t, "Response", AgentMessageTypeResponse.String())
+	require.Equal(t, "Vote", AgentMessageTypeVote.String())
+	require.Equal(t, "Finality", AgentMessageTypeFinality.String())
+	require.Equal(t, "Unknown", AgentMessageType(255).String())
+}
+
+func TestBase58EncodeDecode(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		data []byte
+	}{
+		{"empty", []byte{}},
+		{"single byte", []byte{0x01}},
+		{"multiple bytes", []byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}},
+		{"leading zeros", []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02}},
+		{"all zeros", []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			encoded := base58Encode(tt.data)
+			decoded, err := base58Decode(encoded)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.Equal(t, tt.data, decoded)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBase58DecodeInvalidChar(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := base58Decode("0OIl") // Invalid chars
+	require.Error(t, err)
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package zap
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+)
+
+const (
+	// MethodLux is the did:lux method for blockchain-anchored DIDs
+	MethodLux = "lux"
+	// MethodKey is the did:key method for self-certifying DIDs
+	MethodKey = "key"
+	// MethodWeb is the did:web method for DNS-based DIDs
+	MethodWeb = "web"
+
+	// MLDSAPublicKeySize is the expected size of ML-DSA-65 public keys
+	MLDSAPublicKeySize = 1952
+
+	// MultibaseBase58BTC is the multibase prefix for base58btc
+	MultibaseBase58BTC = 'z'
+)
+
+// MulticodecMLDSA65 is the provisional multicodec prefix for ML-DSA-65
+var MulticodecMLDSA65 = []byte{0x13, 0x09}
+
+// DIDMethod represents a DID method identifier
+type DIDMethod string
+
+const (
+	DIDMethodLux DIDMethod = MethodLux
+	DIDMethodKey DIDMethod = MethodKey
+	DIDMethodWeb DIDMethod = MethodWeb
+)
+
+// DID represents a W3C Decentralized Identifier
+type DID struct {
+	Method DIDMethod
+	ID     string
+}
+
+// NewDID creates a DID from method and identifier
+func NewDID(method DIDMethod, id string) *DID {
+	return &DID{Method: method, ID: id}
+}
+
+// ParseDID parses a DID from a string in format "did:method:id"
+func ParseDID(s string) (*DID, error) {
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(s, "did:") {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: must start with 'did:'", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+
+	rest := s[4:] // Skip "did:"
+	colonIndex := strings.Index(rest, ":")
+	if colonIndex == -1 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: expected 'did:method:id'", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+
+	methodStr := rest[:colonIndex]
+	id := rest[colonIndex+1:]
+
+	if id == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: identifier cannot be empty", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+
+	var method DIDMethod
+	switch methodStr {
+	case MethodLux:
+		method = DIDMethodLux
+	case MethodKey:
+		method = DIDMethodKey
+	case MethodWeb:
+		method = DIDMethodWeb
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: unknown method '%s'", ErrInvalidDID, methodStr)
+	}
+
+	return &DID{Method: method, ID: id}, nil
+}
+
+// String returns the full DID URI
+func (d *DID) String() string {
+	if d == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("did:%s:%s", d.Method, d.ID)
+}
+
+// Valid checks if the DID is well-formed
+func (d *DID) Valid() bool {
+	if d == nil || d.ID == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	switch d.Method {
+	case DIDMethodLux, DIDMethodKey, DIDMethodWeb:
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+// DIDFromNodeID creates a did:lux from a Lux NodeID
+func DIDFromNodeID(nodeID ids.NodeID) *DID {
+	// Use multibase-encoded NodeID bytes
+	encoded := base58Encode(nodeID[:])
+	return &DID{
+		Method: DIDMethodLux,
+		ID:     string(MultibaseBase58BTC) + encoded,
+	}
+}
+
+// DIDFromPublicKey creates a did:key from an ML-DSA-65 public key
+func DIDFromPublicKey(publicKey []byte) (*DID, error) {
+	if len(publicKey) != MLDSAPublicKeySize {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid ML-DSA public key size: expected %d, got %d",
+			MLDSAPublicKeySize, len(publicKey))
+	}
+
+	// Prefix with multicodec for ML-DSA-65
+	prefixed := make([]byte, len(MulticodecMLDSA65)+len(publicKey))
+	copy(prefixed, MulticodecMLDSA65)
+	copy(prefixed[len(MulticodecMLDSA65):], publicKey)
+
+	// Encode with multibase (base58btc)
+	encoded := base58Encode(prefixed)
+
+	return &DID{
+		Method: DIDMethodKey,
+		ID:     string(MultibaseBase58BTC) + encoded,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// DIDFromWeb creates a did:web from a domain and optional path
+func DIDFromWeb(domain string, path string) (*DID, error) {
+	if domain == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: domain cannot be empty", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+	if strings.ContainsAny(domain, "/:") {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: domain cannot contain '/' or ':'", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+
+	var id string
+	if path != "" {
+		// Replace '/' with ':' per did:web spec
+		pathParts := strings.ReplaceAll(path, "/", ":")
+		id = domain + ":" + pathParts
+	} else {
+		id = domain
+	}
+
+	return &DID{Method: DIDMethodWeb, ID: id}, nil
+}
+
+// ExtractKeyMaterial extracts raw key bytes from did:key or did:lux
+func (d *DID) ExtractKeyMaterial() ([]byte, error) {
+	if d == nil || d.ID == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: empty identifier", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+
+	if d.ID[0] != MultibaseBase58BTC {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: unsupported multibase encoding", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+
+	// Decode base58btc (skip multibase prefix)
+	decoded, err := base58Decode(d.ID[1:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrInvalidDID, err)
+	}
+
+	if len(decoded) < 2 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: identifier too short", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+
+	// Skip multicodec prefix if it matches ML-DSA-65
+	if len(decoded) >= 2 && decoded[0] == MulticodecMLDSA65[0] && decoded[1] == MulticodecMLDSA65[1] {
+		return decoded[2:], nil
+	}
+
+	return decoded, nil
+}
+
+// Hash returns a 32-byte hash of the DID for indexing
+func (d *DID) Hash() ids.ID {
+	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(d.String()))
+	var id ids.ID
+	copy(id[:], h[:])
+	return id
+}
+
+// ToHex returns the DID hash as a hex string
+func (d *DID) ToHex() string {
+	id := d.Hash()
+	return hex.EncodeToString(id[:])
+}
+
+// VerificationMethod represents a verification method in a DID Document
+type VerificationMethod struct {
+	ID                  string
+	Type                string
+	Controller          string
+	PublicKeyMultibase  string
+	BlockchainAccountID string
+}
+
+// Service represents a service endpoint in a DID Document
+type Service struct {
+	ID              string
+	Type            string
+	ServiceEndpoint string
+}
+
+// DIDDocument represents a W3C DID Document
+type DIDDocument struct {
+	Context              []string
+	ID                   string
+	Controller           string
+	VerificationMethod   []VerificationMethod
+	Authentication       []string
+	AssertionMethod      []string
+	KeyAgreement         []string
+	CapabilityInvocation []string
+	CapabilityDelegation []string
+	Service              []Service
+}
+
+// GenerateDocument creates a DID Document for a DID
+func (d *DID) GenerateDocument() (*DIDDocument, error) {
+	if !d.Valid() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid DID", ErrInvalidDID)
+	}
+
+	uri := d.String()
+	keyID := uri + "#keys-1"
+
+	var vm VerificationMethod
+	switch d.Method {
+	case DIDMethodLux, DIDMethodKey:
+		vm = VerificationMethod{
+			ID:                 keyID,
+			Type:               "JsonWebKey2020",
+			Controller:         uri,
+			PublicKeyMultibase: d.ID,
+		}
+		if d.Method == DIDMethodLux {
+			// Add blockchain account ID
+			keyMaterial, err := d.ExtractKeyMaterial()
+			if err == nil && len(keyMaterial) >= 20 {
+				vm.BlockchainAccountID = "lux:" + hex.EncodeToString(keyMaterial[:20])
+			}
+		}
+	case DIDMethodWeb:
+		vm = VerificationMethod{
+			ID:         keyID,
+			Type:       "JsonWebKey2020",
+			Controller: uri,
+		}
+	}
+
+	return &DIDDocument{
+		Context: []string{
+			"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
+			"https://w3id.org/security/suites/jws-2020/v1",
+		},
+		ID:                   uri,
+		VerificationMethod:   []VerificationMethod{vm},
+		Authentication:       []string{keyID},
+		AssertionMethod:      []string{keyID},
+		CapabilityInvocation: []string{keyID},
+		Service: []Service{
+			{
+				ID:              uri + "#zap-agent",
+				Type:            "ZapAgent",
+				ServiceEndpoint: "zap://" + d.ID,
+			},
+		},
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Base58 encoding/decoding (Bitcoin alphabet)
+const base58Alphabet = "123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+
+func base58Encode(data []byte) string {
+	// Convert to big integer
+	result := make([]byte, 0, len(data)*2)
+	for _, b := range data {
+		carry := int(b)
+		for i := 0; i < len(result); i++ {
+			carry += int(result[i]) << 8
+			result[i] = byte(carry % 58)
+			carry /= 58
+		}
+		for carry > 0 {
+			result = append(result, byte(carry%58))
+			carry /= 58
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Handle leading zeros
+	for _, b := range data {
+		if b != 0 {
+			break
+		}
+		result = append(result, 0)
+	}
+
+	// Reverse and convert to alphabet
+	output := make([]byte, len(result))
+	for i := range result {
+		output[len(result)-1-i] = base58Alphabet[result[i]]
+	}
+
+	return string(output)
+}
+
+func base58Decode(s string) ([]byte, error) {
+	result := make([]byte, 0, len(s))
+	for _, c := range s {
+		index := strings.IndexRune(base58Alphabet, c)
+		if index == -1 {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid base58 character: %c", c)
+		}
+
+		carry := index
+		for i := 0; i < len(result); i++ {
+			carry += int(result[i]) * 58
+			result[i] = byte(carry)
+			carry >>= 8
+		}
+		for carry > 0 {
+			result = append(result, byte(carry))
+			carry >>= 8
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Handle leading ones
+	for _, c := range s {
+		if c != rune(base58Alphabet[0]) {
+			break
+		}
+		result = append(result, 0)
+	}
+
+	// Reverse
+	for i, j := 0, len(result)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
+		result[i], result[j] = result[j], result[i]
+	}
+
+	return result, nil
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package zap
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// QueryState represents the state of a consensus query
+type QueryState struct {
+	ID        string
+	Content   []byte
+	Submitter *DID
+	Timestamp time.Time
+	Responses map[string]*Response
+	Votes     map[string][]*DID // ResponseID -> list of voter DIDs
+	Finalized string            // ResponseID if finalized
+}
+
+// Response represents a response to a query
+type Response struct {
+	ID        string
+	QueryID   string
+	Content   []byte
+	Responder *DID
+	Timestamp time.Time
+}
+
+// ConsensusResult represents the outcome of consensus voting
+type ConsensusResult struct {
+	Response    *Response
+	Votes       int
+	TotalVoters int
+	Confidence  float64
+}
+
+// Query represents an agentic consensus query
+type Query struct {
+	ID        string
+	Content   []byte
+	Submitter *DID
+	Timestamp int64
+}
+
+// NewQuery creates a query with auto-generated ID
+func NewQuery(content []byte, submitter *DID) *Query {
+	timestamp := time.Now().Unix()
+	data := append(content, []byte(submitter.String())...)
+	data = append(data, int64ToBytes(timestamp)...)
+	hash := sha256.Sum256(data)
+
+	return &Query{
+		ID:        hex.EncodeToString(hash[:]),
+		Content:   content,
+		Submitter: submitter,
+		Timestamp: timestamp,
+	}
+}
+
+// NewResponse creates a response with auto-generated ID
+func NewResponse(queryID string, content []byte, responder *DID) *Response {
+	timestamp := time.Now()
+	queryIDBytes, _ := hex.DecodeString(queryID)
+	data := append(queryIDBytes, content...)
+	data = append(data, []byte(responder.String())...)
+	data = append(data, int64ToBytes(timestamp.Unix())...)
+	hash := sha256.Sum256(data)
+
+	return &Response{
+		ID:        hex.EncodeToString(hash[:]),
+		QueryID:   queryID,
+		Content:   content,
+		Responder: responder,
+		Timestamp: timestamp,
+	}
+}
+
+// Vote represents a vote cast by a validator
+type Vote struct {
+	QueryID    string
+	ResponseID string
+	Voter      *DID
+	Timestamp  int64
+	Signature  []byte // Optional post-quantum signature
+}
+
+// NewVote creates a new vote
+func NewVote(queryID, responseID string, voter *DID) *Vote {
+	return &Vote{
+		QueryID:    queryID,
+		ResponseID: responseID,
+		Voter:      voter,
+		Timestamp:  time.Now().Unix(),
+	}
+}
+
+// FinalityProof represents proof of agentic consensus finality
+type FinalityProof struct {
+	QueryID     string
+	ResponseID  string
+	Votes       []Vote
+	TotalVoters int
+	Confidence  float64
+	Timestamp   int64
+	Signature   []byte // Quasar hybrid signature
+}
+
+// ValidatorWeight represents a validator's weight in consensus
+type ValidatorWeight struct {
+	DID    *DID
+	Weight uint64
+	Stake  uint64
+	Active bool
+}
+
+// AgentMessage represents a ZAP protocol message for agentic consensus
+type AgentMessage struct {
+	Type      AgentMessageType
+	Query     *Query
+	Response  *Response
+	Vote      *Vote
+	Signature []byte
+}
+
+// AgentMessageType identifies the type of agent message
+type AgentMessageType uint8
+
+const (
+	AgentMessageTypeQuery AgentMessageType = iota
+	AgentMessageTypeResponse
+	AgentMessageTypeVote
+	AgentMessageTypeFinality
+)
+
+// String returns the message type name
+func (t AgentMessageType) String() string {
+	switch t {
+	case AgentMessageTypeQuery:
+		return "Query"
+	case AgentMessageTypeResponse:
+		return "Response"
+	case AgentMessageTypeVote:
+		return "Vote"
+	case AgentMessageTypeFinality:
+		return "Finality"
+	default:
+		return "Unknown"
+	}
+}
+
+func int64ToBytes(n int64) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, 8)
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		b[i] = byte(n >> (i * 8))
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+// PQSignatureType identifies the post-quantum signature algorithm
+type PQSignatureType uint8
+
+const (
+	// PQSignatureTypeMLDSA65 is NIST FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65
+	PQSignatureTypeMLDSA65 PQSignatureType = iota
+	// PQSignatureTypeCorona is Ring-LWE based threshold signatures
+	PQSignatureTypeCorona
+	// PQSignatureTypeHybrid combines classical and post-quantum
+	PQSignatureTypeHybrid
+)
+
+// PQSignature wraps a post-quantum signature
+type PQSignature struct {
+	Type      PQSignatureType
+	Signature []byte
+	PublicKey []byte
+}
+
+// PQKeypair represents a post-quantum keypair
+type PQKeypair struct {
+	Type       PQSignatureType
+	PublicKey  []byte
+	PrivateKey []byte
+}
+
+// Sign signs a message using the keypair (stub - real impl in pqcrypto)
+func (k *PQKeypair) Sign(message []byte) (*PQSignature, error) {
+	// Stub: returns SHA-256 hash as fixed-size signature for testing
+	hash := sha256.Sum256(append(message, k.PrivateKey...))
+	return &PQSignature{
+		Type:      k.Type,
+		Signature: hash[:],
+		PublicKey: k.PublicKey,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Verify verifies a signature (stub - real impl in pqcrypto)
+func (k *PQKeypair) Verify(message []byte, sig *PQSignature) bool {
+	// Stub: accepts any non-empty signature
+	return sig != nil && len(sig.Signature) > 0
+}
+
+// StakeRegistry interface for validator stake tracking
+type StakeRegistry interface {
+	GetStake(did *DID) (uint64, error)
+	SetStake(did *DID, amount uint64) error
+	TotalStake() uint64
+	HasSufficientStake(did *DID, minimum uint64) (bool, error)
+	StakeWeight(did *DID) (float64, error)
+}
+
+// InMemoryStakeRegistry is a simple in-memory stake registry for testing
+type InMemoryStakeRegistry struct {
+	stakes map[string]uint64
+}
+
+// NewInMemoryStakeRegistry creates a new in-memory stake registry
+func NewInMemoryStakeRegistry() *InMemoryStakeRegistry {
+	return &InMemoryStakeRegistry{
+		stakes: make(map[string]uint64),
+	}
+}
+
+// GetStake returns the stake for a DID
+func (r *InMemoryStakeRegistry) GetStake(did *DID) (uint64, error) {
+	return r.stakes[did.String()], nil
+}
+
+// SetStake sets the stake for a DID
+func (r *InMemoryStakeRegistry) SetStake(did *DID, amount uint64) error {
+	r.stakes[did.String()] = amount
+	return nil
+}
+
+// TotalStake returns the total stake across all validators
+func (r *InMemoryStakeRegistry) TotalStake() uint64 {
+	var total uint64
+	for _, stake := range r.stakes {
+		total += stake
+	}
+	return total
+}
+
+// HasSufficientStake checks if a DID has at least the minimum stake
+func (r *InMemoryStakeRegistry) HasSufficientStake(did *DID, minimum uint64) (bool, error) {
+	stake, _ := r.GetStake(did)
+	return stake >= minimum, nil
+}
+
+// StakeWeight returns the stake weight as a fraction of total stake
+func (r *InMemoryStakeRegistry) StakeWeight(did *DID) (float64, error) {
+	stake, _ := r.GetStake(did)
+	total := r.TotalStake()
+	if total == 0 {
+		return 0.0, nil
+	}
+	return float64(stake) / float64(total), nil
+}
@@ -133,12 +133,12 @@ deploy:

 ### Prometheus Metrics

-The node exposes metrics at `http://localhost:9630/v1/metrics`
+The node exposes metrics at `http://localhost:9630/ext/metrics`

 ### Health Checks

- Liveness: `http://localhost:9630/v1/health`
- Readiness: `http://localhost:9630/v1/info`
+- Liveness: `http://localhost:9630/ext/health`
+- Readiness: `http://localhost:9630/ext/info`

 ### Grafana Dashboard

@@ -178,12 +178,12 @@ docker exec -it luxd /bin/bash
 # Check if bootstrapped
 curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"info.isBootstrapped","params":{"chain":"C"}}' \
-  http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+  http://localhost:9630/ext/info

 # Get block number
 curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_blockNumber","params":[]}' \
-  http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/C/rpc
+  http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/C/rpc
 ```

 ## CI/CD
@@ -287,10 +287,10 @@ echo "📝 Starting with command:"
 echo "   $CMD"
 echo ""
 echo "📡 API Endpoints:"
-echo "   - JSON-RPC: http://$HTTP_HOST:$HTTP_PORT/v1/bc/C/rpc"
-echo "   - WebSocket: ws://$HTTP_HOST:$HTTP_PORT/v1/bc/C/ws"
-echo "   - Health: http://$HTTP_HOST:$HTTP_PORT/v1/health"
-echo "   - Info: http://$HTTP_HOST:$HTTP_PORT/v1/info"
+echo "   - JSON-RPC: http://$HTTP_HOST:$HTTP_PORT/ext/bc/C/rpc"
+echo "   - WebSocket: ws://$HTTP_HOST:$HTTP_PORT/ext/bc/C/ws"
+echo "   - Health: http://$HTTP_HOST:$HTTP_PORT/ext/health"
+echo "   - Info: http://$HTTP_HOST:$HTTP_PORT/ext/info"
 echo ""

 # Execute
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ export default function HomePage() {
              </p>
              <pre className="mt-4 overflow-x-auto rounded-lg bg-black/50 p-4">
                <code className="text-sm text-green-400">
-                  curl -X POST --data &#39;&#123;&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;health.health&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:1&#125;&#39; \{"\n"}  -H &#39;content-type:application/json&#39; \{"\n"}  127.0.0.1:9650/v1/health
+                  curl -X POST --data &#39;&#123;&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;health.health&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:1&#125;&#39; \{"\n"}  -H &#39;content-type:application/json&#39; \{"\n"}  127.0.0.1:9650/ext/health
                </code>
              </pre>
            </div>
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Or in configuration:
 ## Endpoint

 ```
-http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ## Methods
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "chain":"2S53R2ub94CV5vmSRAjqPYmRxvuiFunCb1gN2CAw3DQBfPWghX"
    },
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ---
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "chain":"2S53R2ub94CV5vmSRAjqPYmRxvuiFunCb1gN2CAw3DQBfPWghX"
    },
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 **Response:**
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.getLogLevel",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 **Response:**
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "logLevel":"debug"
    },
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ---
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.loadVMs",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 **Response:**
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.startCPUProfiler",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ---
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.stopCPUProfiler",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ---
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.memoryProfile",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ---
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.getConfig",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 **Response:**
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.shutdown",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ---
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.db.commit",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ## Profiling and Debugging
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.startCPUProfiler",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin

 # Let it run for 30 seconds
 sleep 30
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.stopCPUProfiler",
    "params":{},
    "id":2
-}' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin

 # Analyze profile
 go tool pprof cpu.prof
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.memoryProfile",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin

 # Analyze
 go tool pprof mem.prof
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ set_log_level() {
        \"method\":\"admin.setLogLevel\",
        \"params\":{\"logLevel\":\"$LEVEL\"},
        \"id\":1
-    }" http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+    }" http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 }

 # Increase verbosity for debugging
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ Enable audit logging for admin operations:
 # auto_restart.sh

 check_health() {
-    curl -s http://localhost:9630/v1/health | jq -r '.healthy'
+    curl -s http://localhost:9630/ext/health | jq -r '.healthy'
 }

 restart_node() {
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ restart_node() {
        "method":"admin.shutdown",
        "params":{},
        "id":1
-    }' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+    }' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin

    sleep 10

@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ CURRENT=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.getConfig",
    "params":{},
    "id":1
-}' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin)
+}' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin)

 echo "Current configuration:"
 echo $CURRENT | jq .
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"admin.setLogLevel",
    "params":{"logLevel":"debug"},
    "id":2
-}' http://localhost:9630/v1/admin
+}' http://localhost:9630/ext/admin
 ```

 ## Troubleshooting
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ The Health API provides endpoints to monitor the health and readiness of your Lu
 ## Endpoint

 ```
-http://localhost:9630/v1/health
+http://localhost:9630/ext/health
 ```

 ## Health Check Types
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ http://localhost:9630/v1/health
 Get the overall health status of the node:

 ```bash
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/health
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/health
 ```

 **Response:**
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ curl http://localhost:9630/v1/health
 Check if the node is ready to serve requests:

 ```bash
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/health/readiness
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/health/readiness
 ```

 Returns:
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Returns:
 Check if the node is alive and running:

 ```bash
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/health/liveness
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/health/liveness
 ```

 Returns:
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "id": 1,
    "method": "health.health",
    "params": {}
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/health
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/health
 ```

 **Response:**
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ Configure per-chain health parameters:
 Export health metrics in Prometheus format:

 ```bash
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/metrics | grep health
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/metrics | grep health
 ```

 Metrics:
@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ spec:
        image: luxfi/node:latest
        livenessProbe:
          httpGet:
-            path: /v1/health/liveness
+            path: /ext/health/liveness
            port: 9630
          initialDelaySeconds: 30
          periodSeconds: 10
        readinessProbe:
          httpGet:
-            path: /v1/health/readiness
+            path: /ext/health/readiness
            port: 9630
          initialDelaySeconds: 60
          periodSeconds: 5
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ spec:
 # health_monitor.sh

 while true; do
-    HEALTH=$(curl -s http://localhost:9630/v1/health | jq -r '.healthy')
+    HEALTH=$(curl -s http://localhost:9630/ext/health | jq -r '.healthy')

    if [ "$HEALTH" != "true" ]; then
        echo "ALERT: Node unhealthy at $(date)"
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ done
 # health_analysis.sh

 # Get detailed health
-RESPONSE=$(curl -s http://localhost:9630/v1/health)
+RESPONSE=$(curl -s http://localhost:9630/ext/health)

 # Parse each chain
 for CHAIN in P X C Q; do
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ done

 ```
 backend lux_nodes
-    option httpchk GET /v1/health
+    option httpchk GET /ext/health
    http-check expect status 200

    server node1 192.168.1.10:9630 check
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ upstream lux_nodes {
 }

 location /health_check {
-    proxy_pass http://lux_nodes/v1/health;
+    proxy_pass http://lux_nodes/ext/health;
    proxy_connect_timeout 1s;
    proxy_read_timeout 1s;
 }
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ The Info API provides general information about the node and network status. Thi
 ## Endpoint

 ```
-http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 ## Format
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.<method>",
    "params": {...},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 ## Methods
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getNodeVersion",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getNodeID",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getNodeIP",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getNetworkID",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getNetworkName",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "alias": "P"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "chain": "P"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.peers",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getTxFee",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.uptime",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response (Validator):**
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getVMs",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getUpgrades",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ VERSION=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getNodeVersion",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.version')
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.version')

 echo "Version: $VERSION"

@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ NODE_ID=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.getNodeID",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.nodeID')
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.nodeID')

 echo "Node ID: $NODE_ID"

@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ PEERS=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.peers",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.numPeers')
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.numPeers')

 echo "Connected Peers: $PEERS"

@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ for CHAIN in P X C Q; do
        \"method\": \"info.isBootstrapped\",
        \"params\": {\"chain\": \"$CHAIN\"},
        \"id\": 1
-    }" -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.isBootstrapped')
+    }" -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.isBootstrapped')

    echo "$CHAIN-Chain Bootstrapped: $STATUS"
 done
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ UPTIME=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.uptime",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.result.rewardingStakePercentage' 2>/dev/null)
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.result.rewardingStakePercentage' 2>/dev/null)

 if [ "$UPTIME" != "null" ] && [ -n "$UPTIME" ]; then
    echo "Validator Uptime: $UPTIME%"
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ PEERS=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.peers",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.peers[]')
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.peers[]')

 echo "=== Peer Connection Quality ==="
 echo "Node ID | Latency (ms) | Uptime % | Version"
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ while true; do
            \"method\": \"info.isBootstrapped\",
            \"params\": {\"chain\": \"$CHAIN\"},
            \"id\": 1
-        }" -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.isBootstrapped')
+        }" -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.isBootstrapped')

        if [ "$STATUS" == "true" ]; then
            echo "✅ $CHAIN-Chain: Bootstrapped"
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ while true; do
        "method": "info.peers",
        "params": {},
        "id": 1
-    }' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.numPeers')
+    }' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.numPeers')

    echo ""
    echo "Connected Peers: $PEERS"
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ while true; do
            \"method\": \"info.isBootstrapped\",
            \"params\": {\"chain\": \"$CHAIN\"},
            \"id\": 1
-        }" -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.isBootstrapped')
+        }" -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.isBootstrapped')

        if [ "$STATUS" != "true" ]; then
            ALL_BOOTSTRAPPED=false
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ The Platform Chain (P-Chain) is responsible for staking, validators, and chain m
 ## Endpoint

 ```
-http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ## Format
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.<method>",
    "params": {...},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ## Methods
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getHeight",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "addresses": ["P-lux1q8tgunsf7sxpl2qp9fz0xjs36kstm7vdjvpzcc"]
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "limit": 100
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getCurrentValidators",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getPendingValidators",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "height": 365000
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "height": 365000
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "addresses": ["P-lux1q8tgunsf7sxpl2qp9fz0xjs36kstm7vdjvpzcc"]
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getMinStake",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getTotalStake",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "txID": "2nmH8LithVbdjaXsxVQCQfXtzN9hBbmebrsaEYnLM9T32Uy3Y5"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getTimestamp",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getBlockchains",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "blockID": "vXSY7FK7NR65Y8BrJDKQH4a6vBdJuqAMvVzWj3Zxcap5J4ZE3"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "txID": "2nmH8LithVbdjaXsxVQCQfXtzN9hBbmebrsaEYnLM9T32Uy3Y5"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "txID": "2nmH8LithVbdjaXsxVQCQfXtzN9hBbmebrsaEYnLM9T32Uy3Y5"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 **Example Response:**
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getCurrentSupply",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getChains",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "password": "mypassword"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ---
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ curl -s -X POST --data "{
        \"nodeIDs\": [\"$NODE_ID\"]
    },
    \"id\": 1
-}" -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P | jq '.result.validators[0]'
+}" -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P | jq '.result.validators[0]'
 ```

 ### Monitor Staking Rewards
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ STAKE=$(curl -s -X POST --data "{
        \"addresses\": [\"$ADDRESS\"]
    },
    \"id\": 1
-}" -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P)
+}" -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P)

 echo "Current stake: $(echo $STAKE | jq -r '.result.staked')"
 echo "Stakeable: $(echo $STAKE | jq -r '.result.stakeable')"
@@ -210,14 +210,14 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "health.health"
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/health
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/health

 # Get node info
 curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "info.getNodeVersion"
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info

 # Check bootstrap status
 curl -X POST --data '{
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "params": {
        "chain": "P"
    }
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 ## Troubleshooting
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "health.health"
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/health
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/health
 ```

 ### Bootstrap Status
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "id": 1,
    "method": "info.isBootstrapped",
    "params": {"chain": "P"}
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 ### Metrics
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
 Access Prometheus metrics:

 ```bash
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/metrics
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/metrics
 ```

 Key metrics to monitor:
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "platform.getHeight"
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P

 # Check bootstrap status for all chains
 curl -X POST --data '{
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "id": 1,
    "method": "info.isBootstrapped",
    "params": {"chain": "P"}
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 ### Configure Public IP
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "info.getNodeID"
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 Response:
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "password": "mypassword"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/keystore
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/keystore

 # Create P-Chain address
 curl -X POST --data '{
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "password": "mypassword"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ### Transfer LUX to P-Chain
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "amount": 2000000000000
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/X
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/X

 # Import to P-Chain
 curl -X POST --data '{
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "sourceChain": "X"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ## Step 4: Add as Validator
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "delegationFeeRate": 10
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 Parameters:
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getPendingValidators",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P

 # Get current validators
 curl -X POST --data '{
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method": "platform.getCurrentValidators",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ## Step 5: Monitor Your Validator
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "nodeID": "NodeID-5KqnQfaFQxY9rsFBAa68377qWSherYLQ7"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ### Monitor Performance Metrics
@@ -277,10 +277,10 @@ Key metrics to track:

 ```bash
 # Node health
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/health
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/health

 # Prometheus metrics
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/metrics | grep -E "uptime|stake|validator"
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/metrics | grep -E "uptime|stake|validator"
 ```

 Important metrics:
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ NODE_URL="http://localhost:9630"
 WEBHOOK_URL="your-webhook-url"

 # Check if node is responsive
-if ! curl -s "$NODE_URL/v1/health" > /dev/null; then
+if ! curl -s "$NODE_URL/ext/health" > /dev/null; then
  curl -X POST "$WEBHOOK_URL" -d '{"text":"ALERT: Node is not responding!"}'
 fi

@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ UPTIME=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "method":"platform.getValidator",
    "params":{"nodeID":"NodeID-xxx"},
    "id":1
-}' "$NODE_URL/v1/bc/P" | jq -r '.result.uptime')
+}' "$NODE_URL/ext/bc/P" | jq -r '.result.uptime')

 if [ "$UPTIME" -lt "80" ]; then
  curl -X POST "$WEBHOOK_URL" -d "{\"text\":\"WARNING: Uptime is $UPTIME%\"}"
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "nodeID": "NodeID-5KqnQfaFQxY9rsFBAa68377qWSherYLQ7"
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ## Chain Validation
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "weight": 1000
    },
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ### Chain Requirements
@@ -104,14 +104,14 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "info.getNetworkInfo"
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9650/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9650/ext/info

 # Get node ID
 curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "info.getNodeID"
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9650/v1/info
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9650/ext/info
 ```

 ## Chain Management
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "genesisData": "...",
        "netID": "network-id"
    }
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9650/v1/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9650/ext/P
 ```

 ### Validator Management
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "endTime": ...,
        "stakeAmount": ...
    }
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9650/v1/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9650/ext/P
 ```

 ## Configuration Reference
@@ -175,10 +175,10 @@ curl -X POST --data '{

 ```bash
 # Prometheus metrics endpoint
-curl http://localhost:9650/v1/metrics
+curl http://localhost:9650/ext/metrics

 # Health check
-curl http://localhost:9650/v1/health
+curl http://localhost:9650/ext/health
 ```

 ### Logs
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "id": 1,
    "method": "admin.setLogLevel",
    "params": {"logLevel": "debug"}
-}' http://localhost:9650/v1/admin
+}' http://localhost:9650/ext/admin
 ```

 ## Testing
@@ -595,10 +595,10 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "method":"info.peers",
    "id":1
-}' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' http://localhost:9630/ext/info

 # Check network metrics
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/metrics | grep network
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/metrics | grep network

 # Monitor connections
 netstat -an | grep 9631
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ scrape_configs:
  - job_name: 'lux-node'
    static_configs:
      - targets: ['localhost:9630']
-    metrics_path: '/v1/metrics'
+    metrics_path: '/ext/metrics'

  - job_name: 'node-exporter'
    static_configs:
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ alerting:

 ### Available Metrics

-The Lux node exposes 400+ Prometheus metrics at `http://localhost:9630/v1/metrics`.
+The Lux node exposes 400+ Prometheus metrics at `http://localhost:9630/ext/metrics`.

 #### Key Metric Categories

@@ -419,11 +419,11 @@ groups:

 ```bash
 # Basic health check
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/health
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/health

 # Detailed health with readiness/liveness
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/health/readiness
-curl http://localhost:9630/v1/health/liveness
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/health/readiness
+curl http://localhost:9630/ext/health/liveness
 ```

 ### Custom Health Script
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ send_alert() {
 }

 # Check if node is responsive
-if ! curl -s "$NODE_URL/v1/health" > /dev/null; then
+if ! curl -s "$NODE_URL/ext/health" > /dev/null; then
    send_alert "Node is not responding!"
    exit 1
 fi
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ for CHAIN in P X C Q; do
        \"method\": \"info.isBootstrapped\",
        \"params\": {\"chain\": \"$CHAIN\"},
        \"id\": 1
-    }" -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.isBootstrapped')
+    }" -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.isBootstrapped')

    if [ "$STATUS" != "true" ]; then
        send_alert "$CHAIN-Chain is not bootstrapped!"
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ PEERS=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "method": "info.peers",
    "params": {},
    "id": 1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/v1/info | jq -r '.result.numPeers')
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' $NODE_URL/ext/info | jq -r '.result.numPeers')

 if [ "$PEERS" -lt 4 ]; then
    send_alert "Low peer count: $PEERS"
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ Create runbooks for common issues:

 ```bash
 # Real-time metrics
-watch -n 1 'curl -s http://localhost:9630/v1/metrics | grep -E "chain_height|network_peers"'
+watch -n 1 'curl -s http://localhost:9630/ext/metrics | grep -E "chain_height|network_peers"'

 # Log streaming
 tail -f ~/.luxd/logs/*.log | grep --line-buffered ERROR
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ else
 fi

 # Check API responsiveness
-if curl -s http://localhost:9630/v1/health > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+if curl -s http://localhost:9630/ext/health > /dev/null 2>&1; then
    echo "✅ API is responsive"
 else
    echo "❌ API is NOT responsive"
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ PEERS=$(curl -s -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "method":"info.peers",
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.result.numPeers')
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.result.numPeers')

 if [ -n "$PEERS" ] && [ "$PEERS" -gt 0 ]; then
    echo "✅ Connected peers: $PEERS"
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"platform.getCurrentValidators",
    "params":{"nodeIDs":["<your-node-id>"]},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P

 # Verify staking transaction
 curl -X POST --data '{
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"platform.getTx",
    "params":{"txID":"<staking-tx-id>"},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 #### Issue: Low uptime percentage
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "method":"platform.getHeight",
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P

 # Reduce consensus participation
 ./build/node --consensus-gossip-concurrent=2
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ grep "api" ~/.luxd/configs/node-config.json
 ./build/node --http-host=0.0.0.0

 # Check for rate limiting
-curl -I http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+curl -I http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 ### Staking Issues
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "method":"platform.getBalance",
    "params":{"addresses":["P-lux1..."]},
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P

 # Import funds from X-Chain
 curl -X POST --data '{
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
        "sourceChain":"X"
    },
    "id":1
-}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/bc/P
+}' -H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/bc/P
 ```

 ## Log Analysis
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ curl -X POST --data '{
    "jsonrpc":"2.0",
    "method":"info.getNodeID",
    "id":1
-}' http://localhost:9630/v1/info
+}' http://localhost:9630/ext/info
 ```

 ### Support Channels
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-# Postmortem: C-Chain accepted-head state GC eviction (mainnet freeze)
-
-**Status:** Resolved. Mainnet recovered and accepted at 5/5 validators, C-Chain
-height 1085412, hash `0xd957eae6cb0bbef37174…`, all validators in agreement,
-explorer at tip, treasury and Genesis NFT state verified.
-
-**Severity:** Critical (mainnet C-Chain unable to build blocks; no state loss).
-
-## Accepted permanent invariant
-
-> The accepted C-Chain head's state root must never be GC/pruning eligible —
-> across idle windows, duplicate empty-block state roots, cold snapshot/cache
-> layers, small state history, and restarts.
->
-> accepted head ⇒ accepted head state root is pinned ⇒ GC/pruning cannot evict
-> the execution base for H+1.
-
-The specific accepted-head GC eviction failure is **structurally prevented** by
-the head-state pin, and production evidence confirms the fleet no longer
-exhibits the prior failure signature. (A formal long-idle ritual was not
-completed to termination during the incident window; the sign-off rests on the
-structural invariant plus production evidence: a head idle for 3h04m was built
-on cleanly, multiple 5–15 minute zero-traffic windows passed with tip state
-readable, and zero eviction/materialize canaries appeared fleet-wide after the
-fix.)
-
-## Failure mode (exact)
-
-The C-Chain EVM (coreth-lineage, `luxfi/evm`) in pruning mode manages trie
-memory with `cappedMemoryTrieWriter` (`core/state_manager.go`):
-
- Accepted state roots are held in a `tipBuffer` (`BoundedBuffer`) of depth
-  `state-history` (default **32**); as roots age out of the buffer they are
-  `Dereference`d.
- Dirty trie nodes are only committed to disk at `commit-interval` boundaries
-  (default **4096** blocks), with optimistic `Cap` flushes near the boundary.
- The insert-time `triedb.Reference(root, {})` in `writeBlockAndSetHead` is
-  **refcount-balanced**: it is consumed as the block ages through the
-  tipBuffer (or via `RejectTrie`). It therefore does not protect an idle head.
-
-On an idle chain, consecutive empty blocks share identical state roots. The
-tipBuffer's aging `Dereference` for an old entry then lands on the *live head
-root* (duplicate key), dropping its reference count to zero. At any height that
-is not a commit boundary the head root has never been persisted, so the next
-`Cap`/flush evicts it from the dirty cache. The subsequent `BuildBlock` cannot
-open the parent (head) state:
-
-```
-failed to materialize parent state for build: … StateAt: missing trie node
-<head state root> … is not available, not found
-```
-
-and the chain wedges. RPC reads at `latest` fail with the same error (any
-`StateAt(root)` caller). Consensus is unaffected — all validators agree on the
-head *block*; only the local execution base for H+1 is gone. State is always
-deterministically re-derivable from durable blocks, so a restart re-executes
-and recovers — **restart is recovery evidence, not a fix**: the head could
-still be evicted again in the next idle window.
-
-### Preconditions (all defaults on affected mainnet validators)
-
- `pruning-enabled: true`
- `state-history: 32`
- `commit-interval: 4096`
- idle or bursty-then-idle traffic (heartbeat pause, low organic flow)
- duplicate empty-block state roots at the tip
- current height not at a commit boundary
-
-Any C-Chain deployment matching these preconditions is exposed on affected
-versions — this bug class will recur wherever the EVM runs with pruning, small
-state history, long commit intervals, and idle traffic.
-
-### Observed occurrences
-
-1. Mainnet froze at height 1085200 after a ~10 minute heartbeat pause
-   (2026-07-07). All five validators had the block, none could serve or build
-   on its state.
-2. An earlier fleet-wide variant contributed to the 1082879→1085012 incident
-   window (mixed with a separate proposervm/consensus issue documented in the
-   consensus fault-recovery audit).
-
-## Affected / fixed versions
-
-| Component | Affected | Fixed |
-|---|---|---|
-| `luxfi/evm` (C-Chain plugin) | ≤ v1.104.6 (all pruning-mode deployments; the balanced insert-time Reference in v1.104.3-hotfix was insufficient) | **v1.104.7** |
-| `luxfi/node` image | v1.34.14 – v1.34.23 (carry affected EVM plugins) | **v1.34.24** (interim), **v1.34.25** (canonical: identical fix, proper semver, clean go.mod) |
-
-Fix commits (`luxfi/evm`, branch `evm-main-bugb`): `9bab20f7a` (pin),
-`58b90490c` (non-fatal degradation), `e3781c35c` (vm v1.2.6 parity).
-
-## The fix (structural)
-
-`core/blockchain.go`: a dedicated **unbalanced** GC reference held on the
-accepted head's state root — `headStatePinRoot` + `pinAcceptedHead(root)`:
-
- Transferred head-to-head: `Reference` the new head root first, then
-  `Dereference` the previous pinned root; exactly one live head pin exists at
-  all times, on `lastAccepted.Root()`.
- Established in `Accept`, in `SetLastAcceptedBlockDirect`, and on the loaded
-  head at startup (`loadLastState`), so the invariant holds across restarts
-  and the restart-then-idle path.
- Skips when the root is unchanged (duplicate empty-block roots keep exactly
-  one reference) and when state is not yet materialized (bootstrapping /
-  state-sync; the first `Accept` then establishes it).
- Deliberately **not** balanced against `InsertTrie`/`AcceptTrie`/`RejectTrie`
-  — its lifetime is "is the accepted head", nothing else.
- Non-fatal on backend error (pathdb `Reference`/`Dereference` are no-ops /
-  "not supported"): a failed pin degrades to pre-fix behavior with a WARN
-  rather than wedging Accept or startup.
-
-No archive-mode workaround and no state-sync hack. Disk growth is unchanged
-(one extra referenced root).
-
-## Recovery recipe (what actually worked)
-
-1. **Wedged-at-tip (state evicted, DB otherwise consistent):** restart the
-   node. Boot re-executes from the last committed root and re-materializes the
-   head state deterministically. Valid as *recovery*; deploy the fixed version
-   so it cannot recur.
-2. **proposervm/EVM height split** (`proposervm finality index … is BEHIND the
-   inner VM tip`; produced here by crash-churn on affected versions — the
-   fail-closed guard then correctly refuses to mount): restarts cannot heal a
-   split. Restore the node's PVC from a `VolumeSnapshot` of a currently
-   healthy peer. Per-ordinal staking keys are installed by `startup.sh` from
-   the `luxd-staking` secret, so cross-node volume clones are safe (distinct
-   NodeIDs).
-3. **PVC swaps must happen at StatefulSet `replicas=0`.** A live single-pod
-   PVC delete/recreate always loses the race to the StatefulSet controller,
-   which recreates a blank PVC first.
-4. If a fleet-consistent EVM rewind is needed instead (no healthy peer):
-   `evm/cmd/repair-cchain` rewinds the standalone EVM `lastAccepted` to the
-   proposervm floor; on boot the heightAhead branch self-heals (used in the
-   1084996 recovery). Zero re-execution; never a re-genesis.
-5. Retain evidence snapshots before every destructive step.
-
-## Residual follow-ups (non-blocking; restart/churn liveness, not consensus or state-loss)
-
-1. **Proposer-preference restart loop:** after heavy sibling churn, a node's
-   proposervm preference can reference a never-persisted outer block; every
-   `BuildBlock` then fails `not found` in a tight loop and the node's voter
-   goes mute (observed ~170 err/s). Restart clears it. Fix: fall back to
-   last-accepted when the preferred parent is not fetchable.
-   **FIXED (commit `8001bc5179`, branch `ship/node-v1.34.24`, ships in
-   v1.34.26):** `vms/proposervm/vm.go` `BuildBlock` now builds the child on
-   last-accepted (always held — committed state) when `vm.preferred` is
-   unfetchable, instead of hard-erroring; it surfaces the original error only
-   when last-accepted is itself the unfetchable id. Build-side companion to the
-   already-shipped defect #1 `SetPreference` validate-before-assign hardening.
-   Tests: `vms/proposervm/vm_buildblock_fallback_test.go`.
-2. **Ancestor-fetch liveness:** the finality guard refuses certs with
-   "ancestor … is not tracked (behind; fetch and retry)" but the fetch never
-   fires, so the node loops instead of catching up. Restart clears it. Fix:
-   actually schedule the ancestor fetch on this path.
-
-## Monitoring (keep active)
-
- Eviction/materialize canaries: `STATE-MATERIALIZE`, `missing trie node`,
-  `ACCEPT-BACKSTOP` log lines — expect zero.
- Accepted height/hash equality across all validators.
- Explorer tip parity with chain head.
- `is BEHIND the inner` (heightBehind) occurrences — expect zero.
- Do not treat the heartbeat as a safety mechanism; it is a liveness nicety.
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ func NewMultiNetworkNode() *MultiNetworkNode {

 // StartRPCServer starts the unified RPC server
 func (n *MultiNetworkNode) StartRPCServer(port int) {
-	http.HandleFunc("/v1/crossnet/status", n.handleCrossNetStatus)
-	http.HandleFunc("/v1/crossnet/validators", n.handleCrossNetValidators)
-	http.HandleFunc("/v1/network/", n.handleNetworkSpecific)
+	http.HandleFunc("/ext/crossnet/status", n.handleCrossNetStatus)
+	http.HandleFunc("/ext/crossnet/validators", n.handleCrossNetValidators)
+	http.HandleFunc("/ext/network/", n.handleNetworkSpecific)

 	fmt.Printf("🌐 Multi-Network RPC Server starting on port %d\n", port)
 	log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(fmt.Sprintf(":%d", port), nil))
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func (n *MultiNetworkNode) handleCrossNetValidators(w http.ResponseWriter, r *ht

 // handleNetworkSpecific routes to network-specific handlers
 func (n *MultiNetworkNode) handleNetworkSpecific(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	// Parse network ID from path: /v1/network/{networkID}/...
+	// Parse network ID from path: /ext/network/{networkID}/...
 	// This would route to the appropriate network's chain manager

 	response := fmt.Sprintf(`{
@@ -251,9 +251,9 @@ func main() {
 	}

 	fmt.Println("\n🌐 Starting Multi-Network RPC Server...")
-	fmt.Println("  • Cross-network status: http://localhost:9650/v1/crossnet/status")
-	fmt.Println("  • Cross-network validators: http://localhost:9650/v1/crossnet/validators")
-	fmt.Println("  • Network-specific: http://localhost:9650/v1/network/{networkID}/...")
+	fmt.Println("  • Cross-network status: http://localhost:9650/ext/crossnet/status")
+	fmt.Println("  • Cross-network validators: http://localhost:9650/ext/crossnet/validators")
+	fmt.Println("  • Network-specific: http://localhost:9650/ext/network/{networkID}/...")

 	// This would be replaced with actual RPC server
 	node.StartRPCServer(9650)
@@ -54,8 +54,7 @@ var (
 	QChainAliases = AliasesFor("Q")
 	AChainAliases = AliasesFor("A")
 	BChainAliases = AliasesFor("B")
-	MChainAliases = AliasesFor("M")
-	FChainAliases = AliasesFor("F")
+	TChainAliases = AliasesFor("T")
 	ZChainAliases = AliasesFor("Z")
 	GChainAliases = AliasesFor("G")
 	KChainAliases = AliasesFor("K")
@@ -605,8 +604,7 @@ func FromConfig(config *genesiscfg.Config) ([]byte, ids.ID, error) {
 		{[]byte(config.CChainGenesis), constants.EVMID, "C-Chain", nil},
 		{[]byte(config.DChainGenesis), constants.DexVMID, "D-Chain", nil},
 		{[]byte(config.BChainGenesis), constants.BridgeVMID, "B-Chain", nil},
-		{[]byte(config.MChainGenesis), constants.MPCVMID, "M-Chain", nil},
-		{[]byte(config.FChainGenesis), constants.FHEVMID, "F-Chain", nil},
+		{[]byte(config.TChainGenesis), constants.ThresholdVMID, "T-Chain", nil},
 		{[]byte(config.QChainGenesis), constants.QuantumVMID, "Q-Chain", nil},
 		{[]byte(config.ZChainGenesis), constants.ZKVMID, "Z-Chain", nil},
 		// A/G/K carry genesis blobs and are deterministic genesis chains
@@ -728,10 +726,10 @@ func UTXOAssetIDFromGenesisBytes(genesisBytes []byte) (ids.ID, bool, error) {
 		if !ok {
 			continue
 		}
-		if uChain.VMID() != constants.XVMID {
+		if uChain.VMID != constants.XVMID {
 			continue
 		}
-		id, err := xvmgenesis.AssetIDFromBytes(uChain.GenesisData())
+		id, err := xvmgenesis.AssetIDFromBytes(uChain.GenesisData)
 		if err != nil {
 			return ids.Empty, false, fmt.Errorf("derive X-Chain asset ID from genesis data: %w", err)
 		}
@@ -749,7 +747,7 @@ func VMGenesis(genesisBytes []byte, vmID ids.ID) (*pchaintxs.Tx, error) {
 	}
 	for _, chain := range gen.Chains {
 		uChain := chain.Unsigned.(*pchaintxs.CreateChainTx)
-		if uChain.VMID() == vmID {
+		if uChain.VMID == vmID {
 			return chain, nil
 		}
 	}
@@ -778,7 +776,7 @@ func Aliases(genesisBytes []byte) (map[string][]string, map[ids.ID][]string, err
 		uChain := chain.Unsigned.(*pchaintxs.CreateChainTx)
 		chainID := chain.ID()
 		endpoint := path.Join(constants.ChainAliasPrefix, chainID.String())
-		switch uChain.VMID() {
+		switch uChain.VMID {
 		case constants.XVMID:
 			apiAliases[endpoint] = []string{
 				"X",
@@ -834,24 +832,16 @@ func Aliases(genesisBytes []byte) (map[string][]string, map[ids.ID][]string, err
 				path.Join(constants.ChainAliasPrefix, "bridge"),
 			}
 			chainAliases[chainID] = BChainAliases
-		case constants.MPCVMID:
+		case constants.ThresholdVMID:
 			apiAliases[endpoint] = []string{
-				"M",
+				"T",
+				"threshold",
+				"thresholdvm",
 				"mpc",
-				"mpcvm",
-				path.Join(constants.ChainAliasPrefix, "M"),
-				path.Join(constants.ChainAliasPrefix, "mpc"),
+				path.Join(constants.ChainAliasPrefix, "T"),
+				path.Join(constants.ChainAliasPrefix, "threshold"),
 			}
-			chainAliases[chainID] = MChainAliases
-		case constants.FHEVMID:
-			apiAliases[endpoint] = []string{
-				"F",
-				"fhe",
-				"fhevm",
-				path.Join(constants.ChainAliasPrefix, "F"),
-				path.Join(constants.ChainAliasPrefix, "fhe"),
-			}
-			chainAliases[chainID] = FChainAliases
+			chainAliases[chainID] = TChainAliases
 		case constants.ZKVMID:
 			apiAliases[endpoint] = []string{
 				"Z",
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

 	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/genesis"
+	pchaintxs "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/txs"
 )

 // TestUTXOAssetIDFromGenesisBytes_Sovereign asserts the canonical
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ func TestUTXOAssetIDFromGenesisBytes_POnly(t *testing.T) {
 	require := require.New(t)

 	pOnly := &genesis.Genesis{Chains: nil}
-	pOnlyBytes, err := pOnly.Bytes()
+	pOnlyBytes, err := genesis.Codec.Marshal(pchaintxs.CodecVersion, pOnly)
 	require.NoError(err)

 	id, ok, err := UTXOAssetIDFromGenesisBytes(pOnlyBytes)
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ func TestVMGenesisOptInChains(t *testing.T) {
 	pOnly := &genesis.Genesis{
 		Chains: nil,
 	}
-	pOnlyBytes, err := pOnly.Bytes()
+	pOnlyBytes, err := genesis.Codec.Marshal(pchaintxs.CodecVersion, pOnly)
 	require.NoError(err)

 	for name, vmID := range map[string]ids.ID{
@@ -314,15 +314,15 @@ func TestFromConfigExplicitStakers(t *testing.T) {
 	for i, vdrTx := range parsed.Validators {
 		switch ut := vdrTx.Unsigned.(type) {
 		case *txs.AddValidatorTx:
-			require.Equal(stakers[i].Weight, ut.Weight(),
+			require.Equal(stakers[i].Weight, ut.Wght,
 				"validator %d weight mismatch", i)
 			t.Logf("Validator %d: NodeID=%s Weight=%d StakeOuts=%d",
-				i, ut.Validator().NodeID, ut.Weight(), len(ut.StakeOuts()))
+				i, ut.Validator.NodeID, ut.Wght, len(ut.StakeOuts))
 		case *txs.AddPermissionlessValidatorTx:
-			require.Equal(stakers[i].Weight, ut.Weight(),
+			require.Equal(stakers[i].Weight, ut.Wght,
 				"validator %d weight mismatch", i)
 			t.Logf("Validator %d: NodeID=%s Weight=%d StakeOuts=%d",
-				i, ut.Validator().NodeID, ut.Weight(), len(ut.StakeOuts()))
+				i, ut.Validator.NodeID, ut.Wght, len(ut.StakeOuts))
 		default:
 			t.Fatalf("unexpected validator tx type: %T", ut)
 		}
@@ -396,15 +396,15 @@ func TestFromConfigExplicitStakersNoStakedFunds(t *testing.T) {
 	for i, vdrTx := range parsed.Validators {
 		switch ut := vdrTx.Unsigned.(type) {
 		case *txs.AddValidatorTx:
-			require.Greater(ut.Weight(), uint64(0), "validator %d weight must be non-zero", i)
-			require.Greater(len(ut.StakeOuts()), 0, "validator %d must have stake outputs", i)
+			require.Greater(ut.Wght, uint64(0), "validator %d weight must be non-zero", i)
+			require.Greater(len(ut.StakeOuts), 0, "validator %d must have stake outputs", i)
 			t.Logf("Validator %d: NodeID=%s Weight=%d StakeOuts=%d",
-				i, ut.Validator().NodeID, ut.Weight(), len(ut.StakeOuts()))
+				i, ut.Validator.NodeID, ut.Wght, len(ut.StakeOuts))
 		case *txs.AddPermissionlessValidatorTx:
-			require.Greater(ut.Weight(), uint64(0), "validator %d weight must be non-zero", i)
-			require.Greater(len(ut.StakeOuts()), 0, "validator %d must have stake outputs", i)
+			require.Greater(ut.Wght, uint64(0), "validator %d weight must be non-zero", i)
+			require.Greater(len(ut.StakeOuts), 0, "validator %d must have stake outputs", i)
 			t.Logf("Validator %d: NodeID=%s Weight=%d StakeOuts=%d",
-				i, ut.Validator().NodeID, ut.Weight(), len(ut.StakeOuts()))
+				i, ut.Validator.NodeID, ut.Wght, len(ut.StakeOuts))
 		default:
 			t.Fatalf("unexpected validator tx type: %T", ut)
 		}
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More