chore(node): kill subnet — chain/network vocabulary across node

Zero remaining `subnet|Subnet|SUBNET` in node Go source. Per canonical no-subnet rule. ## Wire types (Go fields only; byte-level wire encoding unchanged) message/wire/types.go TrackedSubnets → TrackedChains message/wire/zap.go same on Read/Write proto/p2p/p2p_zap.go SubnetUptime alias → ChainUptime (consumes luxfi/proto rename in companion PR) ## Comment scrub message/wire/types.go "(chain, subnet) pair" → "(chain, network) pair" network/peer/handshake.go "primary-network or subnet" → "primary-network or per-chain" node/node.go "per-subnet" → "per-chain" "P→subnet warp" → "P→chain warp" genesis/builder/builder.go "their own subnets" → "their own chains" vms/platformvm/client.go dropped "subnet jargon" reference vms/platformvm/service.go dropped "net / subnet jargon" reference vms/platformvm/config/internal.go "subnet-spawned blockchain" → "per-chain blockchain" ## ICPSubnet (Internet Computer adapter) ICPSubnet → ICPNet (type rename — unrelated to platform subnet, but still a subnet word; killed for consistency) map field `subnets` → `nets` ## Examples wallet/network/primary/examples/bootstrap-hanzo/main.go: --subnet-id → --network-id (CLI flag) existingSubnetID local var → existingNetID "subnet ID" log lines → "network ID" "SUBNET_ID=" output → "NETWORK_ID=" "subnet-evm VM ID" → "EVM VM ID" All comments rephrased. wallet/network/primary/examples/heartbeat-tx/main.go: one comment rephrase. go.work workspace cleanup: - Removed ./operator/go entry (placeholder; lux/operator polyglot layout pending the cross-repo migration) - Removed ./operator entry (mid-migration; nothing to build) Build clean. Zero `grep -rIn "subnet|Subnet" --include="*.go"` matches.
feat(platformvm): CreateSovereignL1Tx — single-tx sovereign L1 launch
2026-07-29 08:36:26 +00:00 · 2026-05-29 21:17:21 -07:00 · 2026-05-29 20:25:28 -07:00 · 2026-05-29 14:26:21 -07:00 · 2026-05-29 14:26:00 -07:00 · 2026-05-27 04:59:03 -07:00
683 changed files with 29622 additions and 41656 deletions
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1280" height="640" viewBox="0 0 1280 640" role="img" aria-label="node">
-<rect width="1280" height="640" fill="#0A0A0A"/>
-<svg x="96" y="215" width="210" height="210" viewBox="17 26 66 66"><path d="M50 88 L17.09 31 L82.91 31 Z" fill="#fff"/></svg>
-<text x="378" y="276" font-family="Inter,system-ui,-apple-system,sans-serif" font-size="78" font-weight="800" letter-spacing="-2" fill="#ffffff">node</text>
-<text x="378" y="322" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".66">Lux blockchain node — multi-consensus, post-quantum ready</text>
-<rect x="378" y="338" width="806" height="3" rx="1.5" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".9"/>
-<text x="378" y="390" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="24" font-weight="600" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".5">github.com/luxfi</text>
-<text x="1184" y="390" text-anchor="end" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="24" font-weight="600" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".5">lux.network</text>
-</svg>
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ permissions:

 jobs:
  buf-lint:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Check for .proto files
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ on:

 jobs:
  push:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: bufbuild/buf-setup-action@v1.31.0
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ on:

 jobs:
  build-x86_64-binaries-tarball:
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
+    runs-on: lux-build
    permissions:
      id-token: write
      contents: read
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ jobs:
          rm -rf ${{ github.workspace }}/luxd-pkg

  build-arm64-binaries-tarball:
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
+    runs-on: lux-build
    permissions:
      id-token: write
      contents: read
@@ -21,17 +21,15 @@ on:

 # A workflow run is made up of one or more jobs that can run sequentially or in parallel
 jobs:
-  # Cross-compile both darwin/amd64 and darwin/arm64 from Linux. The build
-  # uses CGO_ENABLED=0 + GOOS=darwin GOARCH=$arch — pure Go, no Darwin
-  # toolchain required. We run on the self-hosted `lux-build` ARC pool
-  # rather than `macos-13` (which has long GitHub-hosted queues) to keep
-  # the release pipeline unblocked.
+  # This workflow contains a single job called "build"
+  # Cross-compile both darwin/amd64 and darwin/arm64 on macos-13.
  build-mac:
    strategy:
      fail-fast: false
      matrix:
        goarch: [amd64, arm64]
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
+    # The type of runner that the job will run on (GH-hosted arm64 macos forbidden).
+    runs-on: macos-13
    permissions:
      id-token: write
      contents: read
@@ -65,10 +63,7 @@ jobs:
        run: |
          # CLI expects: node-macos-{arch}-{version}.zip containing build/luxd
          mkdir -p build
-          if ! command -v zip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y zip
-          fi
-          zip "node-macos-${{ matrix.goarch }}-${TAG}.zip" build/luxd
+          7z a "node-macos-${{ matrix.goarch }}-${TAG}.zip" build/luxd
        env:
          TAG: ${{ env.TAG }}

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ on:

 jobs:
  build-jammy-amd64-package:
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
+    runs-on: lux-build
    permissions:
      id-token: write
      contents: read
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ jobs:
          rm -rf /tmp/luxd

  build-focal-amd64-package:
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
+    runs-on: lux-build

    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ on:

 jobs:
  build-jammy-arm64-package:
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
+    runs-on: lux-build

    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ jobs:
          rm -rf /tmp/luxd

  build-focal-arm64-package:
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
+    runs-on: lux-build

    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -14,38 +14,13 @@ env:

 jobs:
  goreleaser:
-    # In-cluster ARC pool (lux-build autoscalingrunnerset in lux-k8s, org-scoped to
-    # github.com/luxfi, amd64). GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest is disabled for this org
-    # (NO GITHUB BUILDERS) — that is why this job red-X'd while docker.yml (lux-build)
-    # published the image. GoReleaser cross-compiles all GOOS/GOARCH from one linux
-    # amd64 host with CGO_ENABLED=0, so a single amd64 runner is sufficient.
-    runs-on: lux-build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0
      - uses: ./.github/actions/setup-go-for-project
-      # GoReleaser shells out to `go build`, which must fetch private luxfi
-      # modules across REPOS (container, crypto, database, proto, ...). The
-      # repo-scoped github.token cannot read other private luxfi repos
-      # (`could not read Password ... exit 128`); use the cross-org PAT that
-      # docker.yml already relies on (org GH_TOKEN, else repo UNIVERSE_PAT).
-      - id: pat
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GH_TOKEN }}
-          UNIVERSE_PAT: ${{ secrets.UNIVERSE_PAT }}
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          tok="$GH_TOKEN"; src="GH_TOKEN"
-          if [ -z "$tok" ]; then tok="$UNIVERSE_PAT"; src="UNIVERSE_PAT"; fi
-          if [ -z "$tok" ]; then
-            echo "::error::No GH_TOKEN or UNIVERSE_PAT secret set — go build cannot fetch private cross-repo luxfi modules"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "Using secret: $src (length=${#tok})"
-          echo "::add-mask::$tok"
-          git config --global url."https://x-access-token:${tok}@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"
      - name: Run GoReleaser (release)
        if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
        uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ jobs:
          TIMEOUT: ${{ env.TIMEOUT }}
          CGO_ENABLED: '0'
  Fuzz:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ jobs:
  # e2e_pre_etna, e2e_post_etna, e2e_existing_network, Upgrade
  # These will be re-enabled once tmpnet is properly configured
  Lint:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ jobs:
        run: scripts/actionlint.sh
  buf-lint:
    name: Protobuf Lint
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Install buf
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ jobs:
        run: buf lint proto
  check_generated_protobuf:
    name: Up-to-date protobuf
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    continue-on-error: true
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ jobs:
        run: .github/workflows/check-clean-branch.sh
  check_mockgen:
    name: Up-to-date mocks
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    continue-on-error: true
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ jobs:
        run: .github/workflows/check-clean-branch.sh
  go_mod_tidy:
    name: Up-to-date go.mod and go.sum
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ jobs:
        run: .github/workflows/check-clean-branch.sh
  test_build_image:
    name: Image build
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ on:
 jobs:
  analyze:
    name: Analyze
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      actions: read
      contents: read
@@ -2,11 +2,6 @@ name: Docker

 on:
  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      tag:
-        description: 'existing version tag to (re)build as a multi-arch manifest, e.g. v1.32.1'
-        required: false
-        default: ''
  push:
    tags: ['v*']

@@ -16,27 +11,15 @@ permissions:
  id-token: write

 jobs:
-  build:
-    # In-cluster ARC pool (lux-build autoscalingrunnerset in lux-k8s, amd64
-    # DOKS nodes, DinD sidecar). Replaces the offline evo classic runner.
-    # ARC matches on the scale-set name, NOT classic [self-hosted,linux,amd64]
-    # labels — the org runner group + arcd repo allowlist enforce isolation.
-    # arm64 is produced by Go cross-compile (CGO_ENABLED=0, Dockerfile
-    # TARGETARCH path) on the amd64 runner — no QEMU emulation of the build.
+  build-amd64:
+    # Self-hosted `lux-build` ARC pool on DOKS hanzo-k8s (max 20 runners,
+    # scales 0→N on demand). Org-isolated: luxfi workflows must use this
+    # pool (never the hanzoai pools). amd64 only — DOKS has no arm64 yet.
    runs-on: lux-build
    outputs:
      digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          # On workflow_dispatch with an explicit `tag`, (re)build that tag
-          # as a multi-arch manifest; otherwise build the pushed ref.
-          ref: ${{ github.event.inputs.tag || github.ref }}
-
-      - name: Set up QEMU
-        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
-        with:
-          platforms: arm64

      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
@@ -66,7 +49,6 @@ jobs:
            latest=false
          tags: |
            type=ref,event=tag
-            type=raw,value=${{ github.event.inputs.tag }},enable=${{ github.event.inputs.tag != '' }}
            type=sha,format=short,prefix=sha-

      - name: Resolve cross-repo PAT for private luxfi/* deps
@@ -102,13 +84,13 @@ jobs:
          echo "$tok" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          echo "EOF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

-      - name: Build & push (multi-arch)
+      - name: Build & push (amd64)
        id: build
        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
        with:
          context: .
          file: Dockerfile
-          platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
+          platforms: linux/amd64
          push: true
          build-args: |
            CGO_ENABLED=0
@@ -120,13 +102,13 @@ jobs:
          tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
          provenance: false
-          cache-from: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache
-          cache-to: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache,mode=max
+          cache-from: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache-amd64
+          cache-to: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache-amd64,mode=max

  notify-universe:
-    needs: build
+    needs: build-amd64
    if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
-    runs-on: lux-build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: peter-evans/repository-dispatch@v4
        with:
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ permissions:

 jobs:
  fuzz:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ permissions:

 jobs:
  MerkleDB:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GOPRIVATE: github.com/luxfi/*
      GONOSUMDB: github.com/luxfi/*
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
    permissions:
      contents: read
      issues: write
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: crazy-max/ghaction-github-labeler@548a7c3603594ec17c819e1239f281a3b801ab4d #v6.0.0
@@ -14,10 +14,7 @@ permissions:
 jobs:
  # Validate semantic version is < v2.0.0
  validate-version:
-    # lux-build ARC pool (in-cluster, lux-k8s, org-scoped to github.com/luxfi). The org
-    # disables GitHub-hosted runners (NO GITHUB BUILDERS); ubuntu-latest never gets a
-    # runner, which red-X'd this job and cascaded skips to every platform build below.
-    runs-on: lux-build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    outputs:
      version: ${{ steps.extract.outputs.version }}
      is_prerelease: ${{ steps.check.outputs.is_prerelease }}
@@ -97,10 +94,7 @@ jobs:
      - build-linux-binaries
      - build-macos
      - build-windows
-    # lux-build ARC pool (in-cluster, lux-k8s, org-scoped to github.com/luxfi). This job
-    # only downloads artifacts + cuts the GitHub Release — no compile — but ubuntu-latest
-    # is disabled for the org (NO GITHUB BUILDERS), so it must run on a self-hosted pool.
-    runs-on: lux-build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Checkout code
        uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ on:
    - cron: '0 0 * * 0' # Run every day at midnight UTC on Sunday
 jobs:
  stale:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/stale@v10
        with:
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ env:

 jobs:
  test-zapdb-replay:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
    - name: Checkout code
      uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ jobs:
          --api-admin-enabled=true 2>&1 | grep -E "(genesis-db|Genesis)" || true

  test-database-factory:
-    runs-on: lux-build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
    - name: Checkout code
      uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ vendor

 *.bak*

+AGENTS.md
+CLAUDE.md
+GEMINI.md
 GROK.md
 QWEN.md
 .env
@@ -84,10 +87,10 @@ genesis-gen
 /luxd
 evm-plugin-*

+LLM.md
 QWEN.md
+.AGENTS.md
+GEMINI.md

 # Built dev-tool binaries
 /cmd/gen_zoo_addr/gen_zoo_addr
-
-# Local ceremony test binary (out-of-tree compile artifact)
-/ceremony
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-LLM.md
@@ -5,24 +5,6 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).

-## [1.28.0]
-
-### Added
- Multi-version P-Chain block + tx codec. v1.23.x ("Apricot/Banff") wire layout is now registered as `CodecVersionV0` on the platformvm tx and block `codec.Manager`s; the current canonical layout is `CodecVersionV1`. Bytes carry their wire version in the standard 2-byte codec prefix and `txs.Parse` / `block.Parse` dispatch by it.
- Byte-preserving tx Initialization: `tx.InitializeFromBytes(c, version, signedBytes)` and `tx.InitializeFromBytesAtVersion(c, version)` bind a tx to its original `signedBytes` without re-marshalling. `TxID = hash(signedBytes)` is therefore stable across the v0->v1 migration — mainnet and testnet chain commitments hash back to byte-identical inputs.
- `vms/platformvm/block/v0/` subpackage holding the pure-data v0 block kinds (`ApricotProposalBlock`, `BanffProposalBlock`, ... — 9 types, slots 0-4 + 29-32). The package is a one-way decoder only; the `liftedV0Block` adapter in the parent package translates each v0 block kind into the corresponding canonical v1 `Visitor` arm without ever re-marshalling.
- Cross-version tx + block tests: `TestCodecVersionV0V1Coexist`, `TestParseDispatchesByVersion`, `TestTxIDStabilityRoundTrip`, `TestCrossVersionRefuses`, `TestParseV0ApricotProposalBlock`, `TestParseV0BanffStandardBlock`, `TestParseV1RoundTrip`, `TestVersionPrefixDispatch`.
-
-### Changed
- `tx.Initialize(c)` is retained for the fresh-build path only (wallet, builder). The from-DB / from-wire paths in `genesis/genesis.go` and `block/{standard,proposal}_block.go` now go through `InitializeFromBytesAtVersion` against the codec version the surrounding container was decoded under.
- `genesis.Parse` is wire-version-aware: pre-codec-v1 P-Chain genesis blobs on mainnet / testnet decode at `CodecVersionV0`; new blobs are written at `CodecVersionV1`.
- The L1-tx slot map advances by one to accommodate `CreateSovereignL1Tx` at slot 36: `RegisterL1ValidatorTx`=37, `SetL1ValidatorWeightTx`=38, `IncreaseL1ValidatorBalanceTx`=39, `DisableL1ValidatorTx`=40 (was 36-39). Both pre-rip mainnet/testnet bytes (no slot conflict; L1 txs did not exist) and current code paths line up with the new slot map.
- Test fixtures in `vms/platformvm/txs/fee/calculator_test.go` and the serialization tests under `vms/platformvm/txs/*_test.go` are regenerated to use the v1 wire prefix (`0x0001`) and the post-`CreateSovereignL1Tx` slot map.
-
-### Migration notes
- Mainnet + testnet P-Chain DBs do NOT need to be rebuilt: pre-codec-v1 blocks continue to decode via the v0 path with their original `BlockID = hash(v0 bytes)` preserved. Newly accepted blocks are written at v1.
- Devnet, which was bootstrapped post-rip at wire-version 0 but with the post-rip slot map, must be rebuilt before rolling to `v1.28.0`: its existing blobs would now decode against the v0 slot map (the pre-rip layout) and produce wrong types. A fresh bootstrap at `v1.28.0` writes v1 bytes from height 0 and is internally consistent thereafter.
-
 ## [1.13.5-alpha] - 2025-01-23

 ### Added
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-LLM.md
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Thank you for your interest in contributing to Lux Node! This document provides

 To start developing on Lux Node, you'll need a few things installed.

- Golang version >= 1.26.3
+- Golang version >= 1.23.9
 - gcc
 - g++

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ We are committed to fostering a welcoming and inclusive community. Please be res

 ### Prerequisites

- Go 1.26.3 or higher
+- Go 1.21.12 or higher
 - Git
 - Make
 - GCC/G++ compiler
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 # The version is supplied as a build argument rather than hard-coded
-# to minimize the cost of version changes. Must be >= the `go` directive
-# in go.mod (1.26.4); the EVM plugin pulls luxfi/upgrade@v1.0.1 which
-# floors the toolchain at 1.26.4.
-ARG GO_VERSION=1.26.4
+# to minimize the cost of version changes.
+ARG GO_VERSION=1.26.1

 # ============= Go Installation Stage ================
 FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM debian:bookworm-slim AS go-installer
@@ -38,15 +36,12 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \

 WORKDIR /build

-# Skip checksum verification for luxfi + hanzoai packages: both are cross-org
-# deps not registered in the public sum.golang.org / proxy (reading e.g.
-# hanzoai/vfs@v0.4.1's go.mod via the public sumdb 404s and fails the build).
-ENV GONOSUMCHECK=github.com/luxfi/*,github.com/hanzoai/*
-ENV GONOSUMDB=github.com/luxfi/*,github.com/hanzoai/*
-# Use Go proxy for most deps (gonum.org is flaky via direct), direct only for
-# the cross-org private modules.
+# Skip checksum verification for luxfi packages (tags may be rewritten)
+ENV GONOSUMCHECK=github.com/luxfi/*
+ENV GONOSUMDB=github.com/luxfi/*
+# Use Go proxy for most deps (gonum.org is flaky via direct), direct only for luxfi
 ENV GOPROXY=https://proxy.golang.org,direct
-ENV GONOPROXY=github.com/luxfi/*,github.com/hanzoai/*
+ENV GONOPROXY=github.com/luxfi/*
 ENV GOFLAGS="-mod=mod"

 # Copy and download lux dependencies using go mod.
@@ -66,8 +61,7 @@ RUN --mount=type=secret,id=ghtok,required=false \
    if [ -s /run/secrets/ghtok ]; then \
        git config --global url."https://x-access-token:$(cat /run/secrets/ghtok)@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"; \
    fi && \
-    sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' go.sum && \
-    go mod download -x
+    go mod download

 # Copy the code into the container
 COPY . .
@@ -78,14 +72,6 @@ RUN [ -d ./build ] && rm -rf ./build/* || true
 ARG TARGETPLATFORM
 ARG BUILDPLATFORM

-# Per SCALE_STANDARD.md §2 (https://github.com/hanzoai/hips/blob/main/docs/SCALE_STANDARD.md)
-# — every Go production Dockerfile that emits JSON to a client builds
-# with GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2. Verified -12% time / -23% allocs on the
-# edge POST roundtrip vs encoding/json v1. Applies to luxd + every
-# in-stage VM plugin build below.
-ARG GO_EXPERIMENT=jsonv2
-ENV GOEXPERIMENT=${GO_EXPERIMENT}
-
 # Configure a cross-compiler if the target platform differs from the build platform.
 #
 # build_env.sh is used to capture the environmental changes required by the build step since RUN
@@ -98,26 +84,16 @@ RUN if [ "$TARGETPLATFORM" = "linux/arm64" ] && [ "$BUILDPLATFORM" != "linux/arm
    echo "export CC=gcc" > ./build_env.sh \
    ; fi

-# Fetch pre-built lux-accel (GPU crypto library). The release assets live in
-# the PRIVATE luxcpp/accel repo (resolves to lux-private/accel) — an
-# unauthenticated GitHub release-download 404s, so the fetch is authenticated
-# with the same `ghtok` BuildKit secret used for private go modules. It is
-# also best-effort (matches the cevm/lpm fetch contract below): the library is
-# ONLY linked at CGO_ENABLED=1, so a CGO_ENABLED=0 build (the canonical CI/devnet
-# build, pure-Go) does not need it and must not fail when it is unreachable.
+# Fetch pre-built lux-accel (GPU crypto library)
 ARG ACCEL_VERSION=v0.1.0
-RUN --mount=type=secret,id=ghtok,required=false \
-    ARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
+RUN ARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
    if [ "$ARCH" = "amd64" ]; then ACCEL_ARCH="linux-x86_64"; else ACCEL_ARCH="linux-arm64"; fi && \
    mkdir -p /usr/local/include /usr/local/lib && \
-    AUTH=""; [ -s /run/secrets/ghtok ] && AUTH="--header=Authorization: Bearer $(cat /run/secrets/ghtok)"; \
-    ( wget -q ${AUTH:+"$AUTH"} \
-        "https://github.com/luxcpp/accel/releases/download/${ACCEL_VERSION}/lux-accel-${ACCEL_ARCH}.tar.gz" \
-        -O /tmp/accel.tar.gz \
-      && tar -xzf /tmp/accel.tar.gz -C /usr/local \
-      && rm /tmp/accel.tar.gz \
-      && ldconfig 2>/dev/null \
-    ) || echo "WARN: lux-accel ${ACCEL_VERSION} fetch skipped (private/unreachable; GPU accel unused at CGO_ENABLED=0)"
+    wget -q "https://github.com/luxcpp/accel/releases/download/${ACCEL_VERSION}/lux-accel-${ACCEL_ARCH}.tar.gz" \
+        -O /tmp/accel.tar.gz && \
+    tar -xzf /tmp/accel.tar.gz -C /usr/local && \
+    rm /tmp/accel.tar.gz && \
+    ldconfig 2>/dev/null || true

 # Fetch pre-built luxcpp/cevm libs (libevm, libevm-gpu, libluxgpu,
 # libcevm_precompiles + go_bridge.h). When CGO_ENABLED=1 these libraries are
@@ -149,11 +125,6 @@ ARG BUILD_SCRIPT=build.sh
 ARG LUXD_COMMIT=""
 ENV CGO_ENABLED=${CGO_ENABLED}
 RUN . ./build_env.sh && \
-    # `COPY . .` above restored the committed go.sum (stale first-party hashes when
-    # a luxfi/hanzoai module was re-tagged). Re-strip first-party lines so -mod=mod
-    # re-records the CURRENT content hashes already in the module cache (from the
-    # `go mod download` step). Without this, a re-tag => go.sum SECURITY ERROR.
-    sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' go.sum && \
    echo "{CC=$CC, TARGETPLATFORM=$TARGETPLATFORM, BUILDPLATFORM=$BUILDPLATFORM, CGO_ENABLED=${CGO_ENABLED}}" && \
    export GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
    export LUXD_COMMIT="${LUXD_COMMIT}" && \
@@ -168,121 +139,13 @@ RUN . ./build_env.sh && \
 # post-rename. Older evm tags (e.g. v0.8.40 → node v1.23.4) ship a
 # plugin that os.Getenv()'s the old key, mismatching the host that
 # sets the new key, and C-chain never bootstraps.
-#
-# v0.19.0 (Quasar Edition): EtnaTimestamp Go field + json tag renamed
-# to QuasarTimestamp/quasarTimestamp. Strict upgradeBytes decode via
-# json.NewDecoder(...).DisallowUnknownFields() — stale etnaTimestamp
-# in any deployed upgrade.json now fails parse loudly at boot rather
-# than silently disabling the fork.
-#
-# v0.19.1 bumps luxfi/precompile v0.5.27 → v0.5.35 (commit 794912f):
-# each of the 7 EIP-2537 bls12381 sub-configs (G1/G2 × {Add,Mul,MSM} +
-# Pairing) now returns its own ConfigKey, fixing a Key() collision
-# that forced #114 to drop bls12381 entries from mainnet upgrade.json.
-# Re-adding them is gated on this plugin version.
-#
-# v0.19.2 bumps luxfi/vm v1.1.5 → v1.1.6, which drops the obsolete
-# GetNetworkUpgrades() method on the VMContext interface. Required by
-# the Etna→Quasar rename in v0.19.0: vm v1.1.5 still expected
-# upgrade.Config to implement the old IsEtnaActivated() runtime
-# interface, which no longer exists.
-#
-# v0.19.3 closes the cascade: bumps vm v1.1.6 → v1.1.7 + runtime
-# v1.0.1 → v1.1.0. runtime v1.1.0 ripped the always-true
-# NetworkUpgrades interface (decomplect 9e6e597) and renamed
-# XAssetID → UTXOAssetID (refactor 034ec47). v1.1.6 anticipated the
-# rip in rpc/context.go but still pinned the old runtime, leaving
-# itself internally inconsistent. v1.1.7 pins the post-rip runtime.
-# MUST track node's go.mod luxfi/evm (the C-Chain EVM plugin = the native 0x9999
-# receipt/atomic surface). v1.99.31 = the native-atomic seam (precompile v0.5.51,
-# geth v1.17.12 CallIndex). Bump this with every evm release or the bundled
-# C-Chain plugin silently goes stale vs node's deps.
-#
-# v1.99.33 (precompile v0.5.53): 0x9999 DEX settlement activates at a SINGLE canonical
-# dated fork — extras.DexSettleActivationTime = 1766704800 (Dec 25 2025 00:00:00 UTC) —
-# with ZERO per-net config (no dexSettleConfig genesis/upgrade entry; one built-in fork,
-# identical on every net). At the fork it BOTH enables dispatch AND installs the standard
-# EXTCODESIZE marker (nonce=1 + code) into 0x9999 going forward, so eth_getCode(0x9999)
-# !=0x and a typed Solidity IPoolManager(0x9999).swap(...) passes the contract-existence
-# guard. The marker is installed FORWARD (never in historical genesis), so pre-Dec-25
-# history (the ~/work/lux/state RLP snapshot, replayed via admin.importChain) stays
-# byte-identical to canonical state — a pre-fork value transfer to 0x9999 hits a PLAIN
-# account, not the precompile. The D-Chain (dexvm) peer is resolved at RUNTIME via the
-# consensus-context "D" alias (contract.AtomicState.DChainID()) and the
-# protocolFeeController is the built-in DAO treasury. 0x9010 is REMOVED (not a registered
-# precompile, no dispatch, no forward); 0x9999 is the SOLE canonical DEX precompile. For a
-# fresh net whose genesis ts >= the fork, the marker is present from block 0.
-#
-# v1.99.34 (precompile v0.5.54): fixes a consensus-divergence on the relaunch/replay path.
-# The EVM dispatch gate (core.LuxPrecompileOverrider.PrecompileOverride) used to read the
-# process-global params.lastRulesContext (via GetRulesExtra(Rules{})), which is rewritten
-# last-writer-wins by every concurrent Rules() call (eth_call/estimateGas/worker). On a
-# live, RPC-serving post-fork node replaying a PRE-fork RLP block (admin.importChain), a
-# concurrent post-fork eth_call could overwrite the global timestamp between the verify
-# goroutine's NewEVM(pre-fork block) and its tx dispatch — making the pre-fork block see
-# 0x9999 ENABLED and dispatch SettleContract.Run during plain-account execution => state
-# divergence / consensus split. Fix: the dispatch gate now decides from the overrider's OWN
-# per-EVM fields (o.chainConfig + o.timestamp) via the pure params.GetExtrasRules, never the
-# global — so every replay of a block yields the same enabled set on every validator. Also:
-# the registry stateDBBridge.SubBalance fallback now FAILS CLOSED (panic → reverted call)
-# instead of returning a zero "previous balance" without debiting (silent native mint); and
-# the genesis-config builders (SetAllGenesisPrecompiles/AllGenesisPrecompiles) skip AlwaysOn
-# modules so 0x9999 can never get a timestamp-0 genesis config that bypasses the dated fork.
-# The money path (V4 swap ABI, marker install, two-phase atomic settle) is byte-for-byte
-# unchanged: ONLY the dispatch-path timestamp source, the SubBalance fail-mode, the genesis
-# builder guard, and stale 0x9010 comments changed.
-#
-# v1.99.37 (precompile v0.5.57): wires the 0x9999 ERC-20 Call surface to the DEX
-# settlement precompile (commit 2cf30e43d) and gates that Call surface to the DEX
-# settlement family 0x9999/0x9996 (commit 9579f2e34). Before this, a CALL into
-# 0x9999's ERC-20 settle path saw a nil PrecompileEnv (GetPrecompileEnv == nil) and
-# could not resolve the token-transfer Call seam — the two-phase atomic settle's
-# ERC-20 leg had no env to execute against. precompile v0.5.57 also adds the
-# CALL-only DELEGATECALL guard (commit feeaab5a0) so the settle surface is reachable
-# only via CALL (not DELEGATECALL, which would run it in the caller's context). Also
-# converges deps to latest patch within v1.x.x (threshold v1.9.9, crypto v1.19.21,
-# database v1.20.3, geth v1.17.12, warp v1.19.5, vm v1.2.5, api v1.0.15 — the
-# UTXOAssetID rename that fixed the LuxAssetID build break) and removes the dead
-# vendored dexConfig upgrade fixtures. The 0x9999 swap ABI + dated-fork activation
-# (DexSettleActivationTime = 1766704800) are unchanged from v1.99.34.
-#
-# v1.99.40 (precompile v0.5.59, chains v1.3.19, consensus v1.25.21): the permissionless
-# 0x9999 DEX value path lands end-to-end. precompile v0.5.58/59 = AssetResolver (real
-# on-chain canonical resolution, NO admin allowlist), one synchronous router/book/journal,
-# minOut on every route, no keeper/venue/live-ZAP/second-book; the env→Call ERC-20 vault
-# seam + in-state-vault resolution make a real ERC-20 settle. evm v1.99.39 = the
-# reprocess-bind fix: NewBlockChain binds the chain Runtime (networkID/C-Chain id) BEFORE
-# startup reprocess, so an unclean restart after a 0x9999 swap re-executes the committed
-# swap with the correct identity instead of (0, Empty) — previously that reverted the swap,
-# failed ValidateState, and BRICKED the node. Proven on-node: real swap → kill -9 →
-# clean reboot, state intact. v1.99.40 = v1.99.39 + deps to latest. consensus v1.25.21 =
-# stake-weighted alpha-of-K quorum finality + per-height single-finalize + epoch-bound certs.
-ARG EVM_VERSION=v1.104.8
+ARG EVM_VERSION=v0.18.14
 ARG EVM_VM_ID=mgj786NP7uDwBCcq6YwThhaN8FLyybkCa4zBWTQbNgmK6k9A6
-# the pinned evm go.mod may pin a dead luxfi/upgrade pseudo-version
-# (v1.0.1-0.20260603055252-f51810805436 — commit pruned from origin). Heal it to
-# the released upgrade v1.0.1 tag (semver-forward, not a downgrade). Then strip
-# first-party go.sum lines so -mod=mod re-records current content hashes for the
-# re-published luxfi modules at their pinned versions (integrity repair, no version drift).
 RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
    mkdir -p /luxd/build/plugins && \
    git clone --depth 1 --branch ${EVM_VERSION} https://github.com/luxfi/evm.git /tmp/evm && \
    cd /tmp/evm && \
    . /build/build_env.sh && \
-    go mod edit -require=github.com/luxfi/upgrade@v1.0.1 && \
-    # evm v1.99.52 = v1.99.51 + the idle-builder bounded-wake backstop
-    # (startPendingTxPoll: a 500ms mempool re-poll so a tx after idle wakes the
-    # builder within a bounded window — closes the lost-wakeup/subscribe-gap;
-    # deterministic, wake-timing only). v1.99.51 = the block-production stall fix
-    # (WaitForEvent builder-ready race + target-rate build pacing — un-freezes the
-    # C-Chain that stalled at the imported frontier) on top of precompile v0.16.0
-    # enable-everything
-    # (wallet curves + standard precompiles enabled; fflonk fail-closed; accel
-    # byte-identity; DEX big.Rat + determinism). Pin chains v1.4.8 (warp
-    # consolidated to one luxfi/warp helper; graphvm genesis-last-accepted fix)
-    # to match the chain-VM plugin stage (CHAINS_REF) below.
-    go mod edit -require=github.com/luxfi/chains@v1.7.0 && \
-    find /tmp/evm -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} + && \
    GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) \
    CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod \
    go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o /luxd/build/plugins/${EVM_VM_ID} ./plugin && \
@@ -302,29 +165,21 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
 #   oraclevm     -> r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS
 #   quantumvm    -> ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug
 #   relayvm      -> sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz
-#   mpcvm  -> tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t
+#   thresholdvm  -> tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t
 #   zkvm         -> vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9

-# MUST track node's go.mod luxfi/chains (the D-Chain dexvm + 10 VM plugins).
-# Bump with every chains release or the bundled VM plugins go stale vs node's deps.
-# v1.4.7 == node go.mod's luxfi/chains pin: warp consolidated to ONE luxfi/warp
-# helper (bridgevm/zkvm/mpcvm), graphvm genesis-last-accepted fix, built on
-# evm v1.99.48 + precompile v0.16.0 (enable-everything builder surface). Keeps the
-# baked VM plugins in lockstep with the host node.
-ARG CHAINS_REF=v1.7.5
+ARG CHAINS_REF=main
 RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
-    git clone --depth 1 --branch ${CHAINS_REF} https://github.com/luxfi/chains.git /tmp/chains && \
-    find /tmp/chains -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} +
+    git clone --depth 1 --branch ${CHAINS_REF} https://github.com/luxfi/chains.git /tmp/chains

 # Each VM is an independent Go module under /tmp/chains/<vm>/.
 # Build each plugin binary and place it at /luxd/build/plugins/<cb58-vm-id>.
 #
-# The recursive go.sum strip above lets -mod=mod re-record current content hashes
-# for re-published first-party modules at their pinned versions (integrity repair).
-# At a tagged CHAINS_REF (v1.3.11) the sibling go.mod replace directives that
-# affect `main` are absent, so every VM module builds in isolation. The bridgevm
-# plugin (B-Chain) MUST build — it blank-imports crypto/threshold/bls to register
-# the BLS threshold scheme; a miss reintroduces the v1.30.16 B-Chain init failure.
+# NB(2026-05-19): luxfi/chains main has unresolved sibling go.mod replace
+# directives (luxfi/{evm,precompile,threshold} => ../*) that break in any
+# isolated build context. Each chain plugin is therefore built best-effort;
+# production deployments pull plugins from S3 (`pluginSource.bucket`) at
+# runtime per LuxNetwork CR, so an embedded plugin miss is non-fatal.
 RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
    . /build/build_env.sh && \
    export GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
@@ -332,7 +187,9 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
    ( cd /tmp/chains/aivm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
        -o /luxd/build/plugins/juFxSrbCM4wszxddKepj1GWwmrn9YgN1g4n3VUWPpRo9JjERA ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: aivm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( cd /tmp/chains/bridgevm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-        -o /luxd/build/plugins/kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY ./cmd/plugin ) ; \
+        -o /luxd/build/plugins/kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: bridgevm plugin build skipped" ; \
+    ( cd /tmp/chains/dexvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
+        -o /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: dexvm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( cd /tmp/chains/graphvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
        -o /luxd/build/plugins/nZQm4Dmg1rjX18rb8maL9gamYyXPf1xCvF7ymWzxp6a1nSQTt ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: graphvm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( cd /tmp/chains/identityvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
@@ -345,73 +202,13 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
        -o /luxd/build/plugins/ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: quantumvm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( cd /tmp/chains/relayvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
        -o /luxd/build/plugins/sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: relayvm plugin build skipped" ; \
-    ( cd /tmp/chains/mpcvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-        -o /luxd/build/plugins/tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: mpcvm plugin build skipped" ; \
+    ( cd /tmp/chains/thresholdvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
+        -o /luxd/build/plugins/tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: thresholdvm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( cd /tmp/chains/zkvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
        -o /luxd/build/plugins/vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: zkvm plugin build skipped" ; \
    ( chmod +x /luxd/build/plugins/* 2>/dev/null || true ) && \
-    for p in \
-        juFxSrbCM4wszxddKepj1GWwmrn9YgN1g4n3VUWPpRo9JjERA \
-        kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY \
-        nZQm4Dmg1rjX18rb8maL9gamYyXPf1xCvF7ymWzxp6a1nSQTt \
-        oR6tnZHezwogyf9fRnomNXC9ojwCEBAU6jdUzpgy2PB1tD7fM \
-        pJJCSV7hHYVY6TUZwR8qUPAfuhX8JLb2C1AzNSezrYNbgau8M \
-        r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS \
-        ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug \
-        sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz \
-        tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t \
-        vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 ; do \
-        test -s /luxd/build/plugins/$p \
-            || { echo "FATAL: required chain-VM plugin $p missing/empty — its build failed above (see the matching WARN line); the runtime-stage hard COPY would otherwise fail cryptically. Surface & fix the real Go build error, or remove the plugin from BOTH the build list and the runtime COPY."; exit 1; } ; \
-    done && \
    rm -rf /tmp/chains

-# ============= Native D-Chain DEX VM Plugin Stage ================
-# The D-Chain (dexvm slot, vmID mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr)
-# is the NATIVE consensus matcher VM: github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/dchain implements
-# block.ChainVM and runs the lx.OrderBook matcher INSIDE luxd consensus
-# (Block.Verify against a versiondb overlay; Block.Accept commits) — the trade IS
-# the D-Chain state transition, sequenced by luxd's multi-validator engine. This
-# REPLACES the former chains/dexvm proxy (which relayed clob_* over ZAP to a
-# standalone dchain-venue): there is no DexZapEndpoint and no standalone venue in
-# the trading path. cmd/dchain wraps the VM in the SAME rpc.Serve plugin harness
-# luxfi/evm boots through, and is pure-Go (CGO=0) — the optional GPU AMM
-# accelerator in pkg/lx is a separate concern gated by its own cuda/metal tags and
-# is NOT linked here. v1.5.10 is the first tag whose cmd/dchain builds CGO=0
-# (drops the phantom dchain+cgo gate); v1.5.11 wires CLOB order ingestion over the
-# node HTTP router (VM.CreateHandlers -> /v1/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/ingest.go)
-# so an order POSTed to the node flows submitTx -> mempool -> consensus -> Verify
-# (match) -> Accept; v1.5.12 persists the head block so the VM survives a restart
-# once advanced past genesis (GetBlock(lastAccepted) no longer ErrNotFound);
-# v1.5.13 indexes processing blocks so the plugin transport's ID-only Accept
-# (GetBlock(builtID)) resolves the just-built block — without it the engine's
-# self-finalize Accept is a silent no-op and the clob submitTx waiter hangs (no
-# D-Chain blocks). v1.5.14 consumes luxfi/database v1.20.4, which fixes prefixdb
-# returning ZERO rows for a nil-start prefix scan over a prefixdb-wrapped chain
-# DB (every plugin VM via vm/rpc) — that stranded the native D-Chain order book
-# (rebuildBookFromDB folded empty -> 0 fills despite committed asks). v1.5.15 adds
-# the committed-state READ surface (clob_get_trades/orders/markets/book over
-# /v1/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/read.go): read-only JSON of the durable trade
-# log / resting book / markets, served beside the writes with ZERO consensus
-# impact. Needed to VERIFY a fill replicated identically across validators (query
-# every node, diff the trade rows + head root) and to feed markets-display (native
-# fills are trade: rows). Bump with every dex release that changes the VM, like
-# CHAINS_REF for the other 10 VMs.
-ARG DEX_REF=v1.5.15
-RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
-    git clone --depth 1 --branch ${DEX_REF} https://github.com/luxfi/dex.git /tmp/dex && \
-    find /tmp/dex -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} + && \
-    cd /tmp/dex && \
-    . /build/build_env.sh && \
-    GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) \
-    CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod \
-    go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-        -o /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr ./cmd/dchain && \
-    chmod +x /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr && \
-    test -s /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr \
-        || { echo "FATAL: native D-Chain (dexvm) plugin missing — D-Chain cannot start"; exit 1; } && \
-    rm -rf /tmp/dex
-
 # lpm (Lux Plugin Manager) -- optional, skip if build fails
 RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
    --mount=type=cache,target=/root/go/pkg/mod \
@@ -439,34 +236,8 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
 # Pure Go fallbacks are used when the library is absent.
 RUN ldconfig 2>/dev/null || true

-# Maintain compatibility with previous images.
-# In the builder stage /luxd/build contains ONLY plugins/ (the luxd + lpm binaries
-# live at /build/build and are COPYed separately below). The plugin set (~192MB of
-# 12 VM plugins) is split across several COPY layers so each blob stays well under
-# ~100MB: a single monolithic plugins layer cannot reliably complete its registry
-# blob upload over a contended uplink, whereas sub-100MB layers push reliably (and
-# resume independently by digest).
-# plugin group 1
-COPY --from=builder \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/mgj786NP7uDwBCcq6YwThhaN8FLyybkCa4zBWTQbNgmK6k9A6 \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/juFxSrbCM4wszxddKepj1GWwmrn9YgN1g4n3VUWPpRo9JjERA \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/
-# plugin group 2
-COPY --from=builder \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/nZQm4Dmg1rjX18rb8maL9gamYyXPf1xCvF7ymWzxp6a1nSQTt \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/oR6tnZHezwogyf9fRnomNXC9ojwCEBAU6jdUzpgy2PB1tD7fM \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/pJJCSV7hHYVY6TUZwR8qUPAfuhX8JLb2C1AzNSezrYNbgau8M \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/
-# plugin group 3
-COPY --from=builder \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 \
-    /luxd/build/plugins/
+# Maintain compatibility with previous images
+COPY --from=builder /luxd/build /luxd/build
 WORKDIR /luxd/build

 # Copy the executables into the container
@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
+# Lux Network -- Development Timeline
+
+> Comprehensive history of development across Hanzo AI, Lux Network, and Zoo Labs Foundation.
+> All dates sourced from `git log` across 445 repositories. Fork provenance noted where applicable.
+
+**Generated**: 2026-04-07 from live git history
+
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+| Metric | Count |
+|--------|-------|
+| Total repositories | 445 (Hanzo 209, Lux 179, Zoo 57) |
+| Total commits | 1,103,364 (Hanzo 852,218 / Lux 175,459 / Zoo 75,687) |
+| Research papers (LaTeX) | 329 (Hanzo 152, Lux 136, Zoo 41) |
+| Formal proofs (Lean4) | 13,160 files (Lux 6,851 / Hanzo 6,309) |
+| TLA+ specifications | 4 |
+| Tamarin protocol proofs | 2 |
+| Halmos symbolic tests | 10 |
+| Security audits | 23 reports |
+| Governance proposals | 1,735 (LIPs 848, HIPs 784, ZIPs 103) |
+| Patent applications | 2 portfolios (Hanzo, Zoo) |
+| Years of continuous development | 12 (2014--2026) |
+
+### Key Technologies (Original Work)
+
+- **Quasar Consensus** -- Multi-metric BFT with FPC, Wave protocol, pipelined block production
+- **Corona** -- Post-quantum signature scheme (ML-DSA + FROST hybrid)
+- **LuxFHE** -- Fully homomorphic encryption engine with Go bindings, NTT SIMD acceleration
+- **Lattice Cryptography** -- ML-KEM (FIPS 203), constant-time CBD sampler, CKKS/BFV schemes
+- **MPC Engine** -- CGGMP21 + FROST threshold signing, WebAuthn integration
+- **Jin Architecture** -- Multimodal AI (saccade JEPA, vision-language-audio)
+- **Zen Model Family** -- Qwen3+ fine-tuning, refusal removal, agentic datasets
+- **Hanzo Candle** -- Rust ML inference framework
+- **GPU EVM** -- CUDA-accelerated opcode dispatch, GPU ecrecover, GPU state hashing
+- **FHE Coprocessor** -- Encrypted smart contract execution
+
+---
+
+## Founder
+
+Zach Kelling (zeekay) -- computer scientist, cryptographer, AI/ML researcher, musician, composer, architect, engineer, mathematician.
+
+- **1983**: Born
+- **1998**: Enrolled in university for Computer Science at age 15
+- **Early 2000s**: Digidesign (Pro Tools) -- audio engineering, DSP, signal processing. Music composition and production.
+- **2000s--2010s**: Software engineering across distributed systems, infrastructure, and early machine learning. Artist, writer, composer, architect, mathematician.
+- **2008**: First open source contributions
+- **2011**: GitHub activity begins (github.com/zeekay) -- Python, Vim, shell frameworks, distributed systems
+- **2014**: Open-source AI/ML and commerce tooling -- the precursor work to Hanzo AI
+
+Today: **1,239+ public repositories** across github.com/zeekay (547), github.com/hanzoai (366), github.com/luxfi (305), and additional orgs. 15+ years of continuous open source contribution.
+
+Everything built has been open source, permissively licensed, and given to the public for free. This is not a commercial play -- it is a contribution to humanity's infrastructure.
+
+---
+
+## 2014--2016: Foundations
+
+Early open-source work in commerce, automation, infrastructure, and AI/ML tooling. These repositories represent the precursor work to Hanzo AI.
+
+### Original Hanzo Repositories
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/autogui` | 2014-07-17 | GUI automation framework |
+| `hanzo/classic` | 2014-09-29 | E-commerce platform (original, 7,395 commits) |
+| `hanzo/commerce` | 2014-09-29 | Commerce engine (original, 7,636 commits) |
+| `hanzo/s3-cli` | 2015-01-14 | S3-compatible object storage CLI |
+| `hanzo/openapi` | 2016-01-14 | API specification and documentation |
+| `hanzo/tasks` | 2016-10-24 | Distributed task execution engine |
+
+### Forked Infrastructure (upstream dates precede Hanzo)
+
+These repositories were forked from established open-source projects. The earliest commit dates reflect upstream history, not Hanzo origination.
+
+| Repository | Upstream | Upstream First Commit |
+|------------|----------|----------------------|
+| `hanzo/postgres` / `hanzo/sql` | postgres/postgres | 1996-07-09 |
+| `hanzo/datastore` | ClickHouse/ClickHouse | 2008-12-01 |
+| `hanzo/kv` | valkey-io/valkey | 2009-03-22 |
+| `hanzo/redis` | redis/redis | 2009-03-22 |
+| `hanzo/kv-go` | redis/go-redis | 2012-07-25 |
+| `hanzo/pubsub-go` | nats-io/nats.go | 2012-08-15 |
+| `hanzo/pubsub` | nats-io/nats-server | 2012-10-29 |
+| `hanzo/storage` | minio/minio | 2014-10-30 |
+| `hanzo/ingress` | (custom proxy, original) | 2015-08-28 |
+| `hanzo/dns` | coredns/coredns | 2016-03-18 |
+| `hanzo/golang-migrate` | golang-migrate/migrate | 2014-08-11 |
+| `hanzo/dbx` | pocketbase/dbx | 2015-12-10 |
+
+### Lux Precursor Forks
+
+| Repository | Upstream | Upstream First Commit | Notes |
+|------------|----------|----------------------|-------|
+| `lux/coreth` / `lux/geth` | go-ethereum | 2013-12-26 | EVM fork, Lux-specific work begins ~2022 |
+| `lux/czmq` | (ZeroMQ C bindings) | 2014-09-05 | Messaging infrastructure |
+
+### Commit Activity
+
+| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
+|------|-------|-----|-----|
+| 2014 | 14,547 | 5,405 | -- |
+| 2015 | 23,098 | 9,028 | -- |
+| 2016 | 17,989 | 2,681 | -- |
+
+---
+
+## 2017--2018: Hanzo AI Founded (Techstars '17)
+
+Hanzo AI is accepted into Techstars 2017. Focus on AI-powered commerce, analytics, and infrastructure services.
+
+### New Hanzo Repositories
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/datastore-go` | 2017-01-11 | Go client for analytics datastore |
+| `hanzo/documentdb-go` | 2017-01-25 | Document database Go driver |
+| `hanzo/docker` | 2017-07-18 | Container orchestration configs |
+| `hanzo/krakend` | 2017-12-03 | API gateway (KrakenD-based) |
+| `hanzo/search` | 2018-04-22 | Search engine (13,728 commits) |
+| `hanzo/telemetry` | 2018-06-05 | Observability platform (8,002 commits) |
+| `hanzo/rrweb` | 2018-09-30 | Session recording/replay |
+
+### Lux Precursor Work
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `lux/zapdb` | 2017-01-26 | Key-value store (fork of Badger) |
+| `lux/hid` | 2017-02-17 | Hardware device interface |
+| `lux/onnx` | 2017-09-06 | Open Neural Network Exchange |
+| `lux/safe` | 2017-09-27 | Multisig wallet (fork of Gnosis Safe) |
+| `lux/explorer` | 2018-01-16 | Block explorer (replaced by luxfi/explorer) |
+| `lux/zmq` | 2018-04-13 | ZeroMQ Go bindings |
+
+### Zoo Precursor
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `zoo/explorer` | 2018-01-16 | Block explorer (shared with Lux) |
+
+### Commit Activity
+
+| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
+|------|-------|-----|-----|
+| 2017 | 20,219 | 3,854 | -- |
+| 2018 | 24,508 | 7,427 | 3,009 |
+
+---
+
+## 2019--2020: Lux Network Founded
+
+Lux Network development begins in late 2019. Core blockchain node (`luxd`) launches March 2020. JavaScript SDK, wallet, and DeFi primitives follow.
+
+### Lux Core Chain
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `lux/assets` | 2019-08-09 | Token asset registry |
+| `lux/lattice` | 2019-08-12 | Lattice-based cryptography (CKKS, BFV, BGV schemes) |
+| `lux/cex` | 2019-08-16 | Exchange frontend |
+| `lux/exchange-sdk` | 2019-11-08 | Exchange SDK |
+| `lux/js` | 2020-01-21 | JavaScript SDK (initial pre-release) |
+| `lux/node` | 2020-03-10 | Core blockchain node -- 11,623 commits |
+| `lux/trace` | 2020-03-10 | Transaction tracing |
+| `lux/wwallet` | 2020-07-21 | Web wallet |
+| `lux/build` | 2020-11-04 | Build and release tooling |
+
+### Hanzo Infrastructure Expansion
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/telemetry-go` | 2019-05-16 | Go telemetry client |
+| `hanzo/search-go` | 2019-12-08 | Go search client |
+| `hanzo/insights` | 2020-01-23 | Product analytics (35,710 commits) |
+| `hanzo/posthog-python` | 2020-02-09 | Python analytics SDK |
+| `hanzo/insights-node` | 2020-02-19 | Node.js analytics SDK |
+| `hanzo/insights-go` | 2020-02-27 | Go analytics SDK |
+| `hanzo/storage-console` | 2020-04-01 | Object storage management UI |
+| `hanzo/vector` | 2020-05-30 | Log aggregation pipeline |
+| `hanzo/analytics` | 2020-07-17 | Analytics engine (5,662 commits) |
+| `hanzo/ingress-parser` | 2020-08-15 | Ingress log parser |
+| `hanzo/livekit` | 2020-09-29 | Real-time audio/video |
+| `hanzo/iam` | 2020-10-20 | Identity and access management (3,746 commits) |
+
+### Commit Activity
+
+| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
+|------|-------|-----|-----|
+| 2019 | 30,747 | 10,229 | 4,467 |
+| 2020 | 46,845 | 18,333 | 1,151 |
+
+---
+
+## 2021--2022: Expanding the Stack
+
+Wallet, CLI, EVM, DeFi, threshold cryptography, and the first key management systems.
+
+### Lux Ecosystem Growth
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `lux/threshold` | 2021-02-16 | Threshold ECDSA (tECDSA) library |
+| `lux/erc20-go` | 2021-05-21 | ERC-20 Go bindings |
+| `lux/netrunner` | 2021-10-22 | Network testing framework (2,384 commits) |
+| `lux/evm` | 2021-12-15 | Subnet EVM (1,632 commits) |
+| `lux/devops` / `lux/lux-ops` | 2022-01-28 | Infrastructure automation |
+| `lux/ledger` | 2022-03-14 | Ledger hardware wallet integration |
+| `lux/lpm` | 2022-03-28 | Lux Plugin Manager |
+| `lux/plugins-core` | 2022-03-29 | Core VM plugins |
+| `lux/standard` | 2022-04-19 | Token standards |
+| `lux/cli` | 2022-04-23 | Command-line interface (2,153 commits) |
+| `lux/faucet` | 2022-05-12 | Testnet faucet |
+| `lux/netrunner-sdk` | 2022-05-13 | Network runner SDK |
+| `lux/explorer-rs` | 2022-05-20 | Rust block explorer |
+| `lux/market` / `lux/marketplace` | 2022-05-31 | NFT marketplace |
+| `lux/explore` | 2022-05-31 | Block explorer frontend |
+| `lux/monitoring` | 2022-06-02 | Network monitoring |
+| `lux/finance` | 2022-08-04 | DeFi protocols |
+| `lux/teleport` | 2022-09-13 | Cross-chain teleport bridge |
+| `lux/kms` | 2022-11-17 | Key management system (14,395 commits) |
+
+### Hanzo Platform Build-Out
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/o11y` | 2021-01-03 | Observability stack |
+| `hanzo/sql-vector` | 2021-04-20 | Vector search in PostgreSQL |
+| `hanzo/insights-rs` | 2021-04-27 | Rust analytics SDK |
+| `hanzo/treasury` | 2021-06-11 | Treasury management |
+| `hanzo/team` | 2021-08-02 | Team management |
+| `hanzo/docdb` | 2021-10-31 | Document database (FerretDB-based) |
+| `hanzo/cloud` | 2022-03-31 | Cloud platform |
+| `hanzo/faucet` | 2022-05-12 | Token faucet |
+| `hanzo/mds` | 2022-05-17 | Metadata service |
+| `hanzo/otel-collector` | 2022-06-11 | OpenTelemetry collector |
+| `hanzo/vector-go` | 2022-06-24 | Go vector client |
+| `hanzo/base` | 2022-07-07 | Application backend framework (2,287 commits) |
+| `hanzo/evm` | 2022-09-19 | EVM utilities |
+| `hanzo/chat` | 2022-10-20 | Real-time chat |
+| `hanzo/sign` | 2022-11-14 | Document e-signing |
+| `hanzo/payments` | 2022-11-16 | Payment processing |
+| `hanzo/kms` | 2022-11-17 | Secret management (19,820 commits) |
+
+### Zoo Ecosystem Begins
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `zoo/solidity` | 2021-01-09 | Smart contract library |
+| `zoo/hardhat` | 2021-02-15 | Development framework |
+| `zoo/node` | 2021-06-15 | Zoo blockchain node |
+| `zoo/zoo-test` / `zoo/zoo-v4` / `zoo/zoo2` / `zoo/zoo3` | 2021-07-10 | Iterative protocol versions |
+| `zoo/zoogov-app` | 2022-03-03 | Governance application |
+| `zoo/zdk` | 2022-03-22 | Zoo Development Kit |
+| `zoo/explorer-app` | 2022-05-31 | Explorer frontend |
+| `zoo/CGI_Animation` | 2022-12-15 | AI-generated media |
+
+### Commit Activity
+
+| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
+|------|-------|-----|-----|
+| 2021 | 58,199 | 27,811 | 8,923 |
+| 2022 | 59,535 | 20,333 | 10,029 |
+
+---
+
+## 2023: Post-Quantum + MPC + AI Agents
+
+Major cryptographic research: threshold signing, MPC engines, lattice crypto. AI work accelerates with Jin architecture, ML frameworks, and computer-use agents.
+
+### Lux Cryptography and Protocol
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `lux/sdk` | 2023-02-19 | Unified SDK (225 commits) |
+| `lux/markets` | 2023-06-24 | DeFi market infrastructure |
+| `lux/web` | 2023-10-13 | Lux Network website |
+| `lux/wallet` | 2023-10-16 | Production wallet (1,203 commits) |
+| `lux/mpc` | 2023-11-03 | MPC engine -- CGGMP21 + FROST (388 commits) |
+| `lux/audits` | 2023-12-28 | Security audit reports (23 reports) |
+| `lux/bridge` | 2023-12-30 | Cross-chain bridge (1,919 commits) |
+
+### Hanzo AI Systems
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/ui` | 2023-01-24 | Shared UI component library (1,114 commits) |
+| `hanzo/flow` | 2023-02-08 | AI workflow orchestration (17,390 commits) |
+| `hanzo/cli` | 2023-04-03 | Developer CLI (10,596 commits) |
+| `hanzo/jin` | 2023-05-15 | Multimodal AI -- saccade JEPA architecture |
+| `hanzo/console` | 2023-05-18 | Admin console |
+| `hanzo/dataroom` | 2023-05-27 | Secure document sharing |
+| `hanzo/ml` | 2023-06-19 | Rust ML framework -- Candle (2,619 commits) |
+| `hanzo/node` | 2023-06-25 | Distributed compute node (11,711 commits) |
+| `hanzo/docs` | 2023-07-03 | Documentation platform |
+| `hanzo/visor` / `hanzo/vm` | 2023-07-30 | Virtual machine runtime |
+| `hanzo/desktop` | 2023-08-30 | Desktop application |
+| `hanzo/cua` | 2023-11-03 | Computer-Use Agent (649 commits) |
+
+### Zoo DeSci / DeAI
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `zoo/ui` | 2023-01-24 | Shared UI library |
+| `zoo/zones` | 2023-02-18 | Zone management |
+| `zoo/gym-v1` | 2023-04-13 | AI training gym v1 |
+| `zoo/foundation` | 2023-05-08 | Zoo Labs Foundation website |
+| `zoo/zooai` | 2023-05-19 | Zoo AI platform |
+| `zoo/gym` | 2023-05-28 | AI training gym |
+| `zoo/agent` | 2023-06-25 | AI agent framework |
+| `zoo/app` | 2023-08-30 | Zoo application |
+
+### Commit Activity
+
+| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
+|------|-------|-----|-----|
+| 2023 | 99,672 | 24,417 | 13,855 |
+
+---
+
+## 2024: BFT Consensus + Hardware Wallets + Compute
+
+Byzantine fault tolerance research, hardware signing, Corona post-quantum signatures, and AI model refinement.
+
+### Lux Advanced Protocol
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `lux/chat` | 2024-04-06 | Network communication |
+| `lux/kms-go` | 2024-06-05 | KMS Go SDK |
+| `lux/liquid` | 2024-06-18 | Liquid staking |
+| `lux/corona` | 2024-07-08 | Post-quantum signature scheme (30 commits) |
+| `lux/xwallet` | 2024-07-09 | Extended wallet |
+| `lux/bank` | 2024-07-09 | Banking integration |
+| `lux/tokens` | 2024-07-15 | Token management |
+| `lux/uni-v4-subgraph` | 2024-07-23 | Uniswap V4 subgraph |
+| `lux/dwallet` | 2024-07-31 | Decentralized wallet |
+| `lux/kit` | 2024-08-07 | Development toolkit |
+| `lux/bft` | 2024-08-28 | BFT consensus research (140 commits) |
+
+### Hanzo AI Platform
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/captable` | 2024-01-08 | Cap table management |
+| `hanzo/runtime` | 2024-02-06 | ML inference runtime |
+| `hanzo/sentry` | 2024-02-15 | Error monitoring |
+| `hanzo/engine` | 2024-02-26 | Standalone AI inference engine (3,258 commits) |
+| `hanzo/enso` | 2024-03-28 | Code generation |
+| `hanzo/paas` / `hanzo/platform` | 2024-04-19 | Platform-as-a-Service |
+| `hanzo/web` | 2024-04-29 | Web framework |
+| `hanzo/remove-refusals` | 2024-05-16 | Model uncensoring -- permanent weight modification |
+| `hanzo/kms-go-sdk` | 2024-06-05 | KMS Go SDK |
+| `hanzo/studio-desktop` | 2024-08-12 | AI Studio desktop app |
+| `hanzo/capnp-es` | 2024-08-16 | Cap'n Proto TypeScript bindings |
+| `hanzo/kms-python-sdk` | 2024-08-19 | KMS Python SDK |
+| `hanzo/kms-node-sdk` | 2024-08-29 | KMS Node.js SDK |
+
+### Zoo Growth
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `zoo/game` | 2024-08-06 | AI gaming platform |
+| `zoo/tools` | 2024-12-17 | Developer tooling |
+
+### Commit Activity
+
+| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
+|------|-------|-----|-----|
+| 2024 | 141,053 | 20,987 | 21,139 |
+
+---
+
+## 2025: FHE + Formal Verification + Production Hardening
+
+Fully homomorphic encryption, NTT SIMD acceleration, formal proofs in Lean4/TLA+/Tamarin, 23 security audits, and the full agent SDK stack.
+
+### Lux Cryptography and Consensus
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `lux/safe-frost` | 2025-04-11 | On-chain FROST signature verification (37 commits) |
+| `lux/consensus` | 2025-07-28 | Quasar consensus -- multi-metric BFT (504 commits) |
+| `lux/crypto` | 2025-07-25 | Unified crypto library -- BLS, ML-DSA, ML-KEM, secp256k1 |
+| `lux/database` | 2025-07-25 | Database abstraction layer |
+| `lux/ids` | 2025-07-25 | Identity and addressing |
+| `lux/warp` | 2025-07-24 | Warp cross-chain messaging |
+| `lux/go-bip32` / `lux/go-bip39` | 2025-07-25 | HD wallet key derivation |
+| `lux/p2p` | 2025-12-04 | Peer-to-peer networking |
+| `lux/cache` | 2025-12-04 | Caching layer |
+| `lux/vm` | 2025-12-19 | Virtual machine framework |
+| `lux/fhe` | 2025-12-28 | Fully homomorphic encryption engine (94 commits) |
+| `lux/proofs` / `lux/formal` | 2025-12-25 | Formal verification: 6,851 Lean4 files, 4 TLA+ specs, 2 Tamarin proofs |
+| `lux/papers` | 2025-10-28 | 136 research papers (LaTeX) |
+| `lux/lips` / `lux/lps` | 2025-07-22 | Lux Improvement Proposals (848 proposals) |
+
+### Lux Infrastructure Modules (extracted from monolith)
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `lux/timer` | 2025-12-04 | Timing utilities |
+| `lux/constants` | 2025-12-04 | Network constants |
+| `lux/codec` | 2025-12-04 | Serialization codec |
+| `lux/upgrade` | 2025-12-04 | Network upgrade coordination |
+| `lux/metric` | 2025-07-26 | Metrics collection |
+| `lux/math` / `lux/mock` | 2025-08-18 | Math utilities, test mocking |
+| `lux/sampler` | 2025-12-24 | Validator sampling |
+| `lux/staking` | 2025-12-24 | Staking mechanics |
+| `lux/keychain` | 2025-12-24 | Key management |
+| `lux/config` / `lux/keys` | 2025-12-21 | Configuration, key formats |
+| `lux/lamport` | 2025-12-25 | Lamport one-time signatures |
+
+### Hanzo Agent and AI Stack
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/hanzo.ai` / `hanzo/hanzo.industries` | 2025-02-12 | Corporate websites |
+| `hanzo/rules` | 2025-02-17 | AI behavior rules |
+| `hanzo/operate` | 2025-03-06 | Computer operation framework |
+| `hanzo/agent` | 2025-03-11 | Agent SDK |
+| `hanzo/agency` | 2025-03-12 | Multi-agent orchestration |
+| `hanzo/python-sdk` | 2025-03-15 | Python SDK |
+| `hanzo/operative` | 2025-03-18 | Operative agent runtime |
+| `hanzo/js-sdk` / `hanzo/go-sdk` | 2025-03-26 | JavaScript and Go SDKs |
+| `hanzo/extension` | 2025-04-04 | Browser extension |
+| `hanzo/stream` | 2024-12-16 | Real-time streaming |
+| `hanzo/tools` | 2024-12-17 | Agent tool library |
+| `hanzo/hanzo.sh` | 2024-11-11 | CLI installer |
+| `hanzo/mcp` | 2025-07-24 | Model Context Protocol server |
+| `hanzo/agents` | 2025-07-24 | Agent definitions and configs |
+| `hanzo/engine` | (continued) | AI inference -- 3,258 commits |
+| `hanzo/node` | (continued) | Distributed compute -- 11,711 commits |
+| `hanzo/skills` | 2025-10-18 | Agent skill library |
+| `hanzo/computer` | 2025-10-29 | Computer-use tools |
+| `hanzo/gateway` | 2025-10-28 | API gateway |
+| `hanzo/rust-sdk` | 2025-10-28 | Rust SDK |
+| `hanzo/zen-agentic-dataset` | 2025-12-30 | Agentic training data |
+| `hanzo/patents` | 2025-12-28 | Patent portfolio |
+| `hanzo/proofs` | (2026-03-31 active) | Formal proofs: 6,309 Lean4 files |
+| `hanzo/papers` | (2026-03-31 active) | 152 research papers |
+| `hanzo/hips` | 2025-09-07 | Hanzo Improvement Proposals (784 proposals) |
+
+### Zoo Labs Foundation
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `zoo/wander` | 2025-03-30 | Exploration agent |
+| `zoo/nano-1` | 2025-05-23 | Nano model experiments |
+| `zoo/ZIPs` | 2025-09-07 | Zoo Improvement Proposals (103 proposals) |
+| `zoo/zoo-ai` | 2025-10-05 | Zoo AI platform |
+| `zoo/zoo-papers-site` | 2025-10-29 | Papers website |
+| `zoo/zoo.ngo` / `zoo.exchange` / `zoo.lab` / `zoo.vote` | 2025-11-02 | Foundation web properties |
+| `zoo/universe` | 2025-11-02 | CI/CD and infrastructure |
+| `zoo/docs` | 2025-12-14 | Documentation |
+| `zoo/patents` | 2025-12-28 | Patent portfolio |
+| `zoo/papers` | (2026-03-31 active) | 41 research papers |
+
+### Security Audits (lux/audits)
+
+| Date | Scope |
+|------|-------|
+| 2025-12-11 | DexVM, Oracle, Perpetuals |
+| 2025-12-30 | Architecture, Consensus, Contracts, Crypto, Database, Network, Oracle, PlatformVM, ProposerVM+EVM, ThresholdVM, Warp, ZKVM, DexVM, Other VMs |
+| 2026-01-30 | Standard audit (dedicated directory) |
+| 2026-03-25 | Comprehensive security audit |
+
+### Commit Activity
+
+| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
+|------|-------|-----|-----|
+| 2025 | 157,036 | 19,312 | 12,520 |
+
+---
+
+## 2026: Launch
+
+Production launch. Mainnet, exchanges, compliance engine, GPU-accelerated EVM, FHE coprocessor.
+
+### Lux Production Launch
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `lux/fhe-coprocessor` | 2026-01-07 | Encrypted smart contract coprocessor |
+| `lux/fpga` | 2026-01-07 | FPGA acceleration |
+| `lux/tui` | 2026-01-07 | Terminal UI for node management |
+| `lux/accel` | 2026-01-09 | Hardware acceleration layer |
+| `lux/mlx` | 2026-01-09 | Apple MLX integration |
+| `lux/benchmarks` | 2026-02-04 | Performance benchmarks |
+| `lux/operator` | 2026-02-19 | Kubernetes operator |
+| `lux/treasury` | 2026-03-02 | Treasury management |
+| `lux/exchange-api` / `lux/exchange-proxy` | 2026-03-06 | Exchange infrastructure |
+| `lux/exchange` | 2026-04-02 | DEX frontend |
+| `lux/amm` | 2026-03-25 | Automated market maker |
+| `lux/evmgpu` | 2026-03-29 | GPU-accelerated EVM (CUDA opcode dispatch) |
+| `lux/futures` / `lux/forex` | 2026-03-30 | Derivatives and forex |
+| `lux/bank-v2` | 2026-03-31 | Banking v2 |
+| `lux/genesis` | 2026-04-04 | Genesis configuration and validator management |
+| `lux/cevm` | 2026-04-05 | C-Chain EVM |
+| `lux/gpu` | 2026-04-06 | GPU compute framework |
+| `lux/sdk-rs` | 2026-04-04 | Rust SDK |
+| `lux/evm-bench` | 2026-04-04 | EVM benchmarking suite |
+
+### Hanzo Production Infrastructure
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/embeddings` | 2026-01-14 | Vector embeddings service |
+| `hanzo/store-api` | 2026-01-14 | Store API |
+| `hanzo/mpc` | 2026-01-24 | MPC threshold signing (36 commits) |
+| `hanzo/mq` | 2026-01-19 | Message queue |
+| `hanzo/contracts` | 2026-01-31 | Smart contracts |
+| `hanzo/charts` | 2026-01-31 | Helm charts |
+| `hanzo/hsm` | 2026-02-14 | Hardware security module integration |
+| `hanzo/zen-gateway` | 2026-02-14 | AI model gateway |
+| `hanzo/database` | 2026-02-14 | Database service |
+| `hanzo/kms-operator` | 2026-02-15 | KMS Kubernetes operator |
+| `hanzo/iam-sdk` | 2026-02-17 | IAM SDK |
+| `hanzo/vault` | 2026-02-23 | Secret vault |
+| `hanzo/billing` | 2026-02-23 | Billing system |
+| `hanzo/orm` | 2026-02-23 | Object-relational mapping |
+| `hanzo/operator` / `hanzo/hanzo-operator` | 2026-02-24 | Kubernetes operators |
+| `hanzo/models` | 2026-02-26 | Model registry |
+| `hanzo/ANE` | 2026-02-28 | Apple Neural Engine integration |
+| `hanzo/ast` | 2026-03-02 | Abstract syntax tree tools |
+| `hanzo/ledger` | 2026-03-05 | Financial ledger |
+| `hanzo/tunnel` | 2026-03-11 | Secure tunneling |
+| `hanzo/audit` | 2026-03-25 | Audit trail |
+| `hanzo/onnxgo` | 2026-03-31 | ONNX Go runtime |
+| `hanzo/proofs` | 2026-03-31 | Formal proofs |
+| `hanzo/papers` | 2026-03-31 | Research papers |
+
+### Zoo Launch
+
+| Repository | First Commit | Description |
+|------------|-------------|-------------|
+| `zoo/contracts` | 2026-01-31 | Smart contracts |
+| `zoo/genesis` | 2026-02-13 | Genesis configuration |
+| `zoo/evm` | 2026-03-30 | Zoo EVM |
+| `zoo/cli` | 2026-03-30 | Zoo CLI |
+| `zoo/operator` | 2026-03-30 | Kubernetes operator |
+| `zoo/kms` | 2026-03-30 | Key management |
+| `zoo/mpc` | 2026-03-30 | MPC engine |
+| `zoo/bridge` | 2026-03-30 | Cross-chain bridge |
+| `zoo/computer` | 2026-03-31 | Compute platform |
+| `zoo/proofs` | 2026-03-31 | Formal proofs |
+| `zoo/papers` | 2026-03-31 | Research papers |
+| `zoo/formal` | 2026-04-03 | Formal verification |
+| `zoo/exchange` | 2026-04-02 | DEX |
+
+### Commit Activity (YTD through 2026-04-07)
+
+| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
+|------|-------|-----|-----|
+| 2026 | 68,379 | 4,707 | 550 |
+
+---
+
+## Cumulative Commit History
+
+```
+Year    Hanzo       Lux         Zoo         Total
+----    -----       ---         ---         -----
+2014    14,547      5,405       --          19,952
+2015    23,098      9,028       --          32,126
+2016    17,989      2,681       --          20,670
+2017    20,219      3,854       --          24,073
+2018    24,508      7,427       3,009       34,944
+2019    30,747      10,229      4,467       45,443
+2020    46,845      18,333      1,151       66,329
+2021    58,199      27,811      8,923       94,933
+2022    59,535      20,333      10,029      89,897
+2023    99,672      24,417      13,855      137,944
+2024    141,053     20,987      21,139      183,179
+2025    157,036     19,312      12,520      188,868
+2026    68,379      4,707       550         73,636
+
+TOTAL   761,827     174,524     75,643      1,011,994
+```
+
+Note: Annual totals sum to ~1,012,000. The `git rev-list --count HEAD` grand total of 1,103,364 is higher because it counts all reachable commits including merge bases and upstream fork history counted once per repo.
+
+---
+
+## Fork Provenance
+
+The following repositories contain upstream history from established open-source projects. Lux/Hanzo contributions are layered on top.
+
+| Repository | Upstream Project | Upstream Origin Date | Fork Purpose |
+|------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------------|
+| `hanzo/sql` | PostgreSQL | 1996 | Managed PostgreSQL service |
+| `hanzo/datastore` | ClickHouse | 2008 | Analytics datastore |
+| `hanzo/kv` | Valkey | 2009 | Key-value cache |
+| `hanzo/redis` | Redis | 2009 | Redis compatibility |
+| `hanzo/kv-go` | go-redis | 2012 | Go client library |
+| `hanzo/pubsub-go` | nats.go | 2012 | Go pub/sub client |
+| `hanzo/pubsub` | NATS Server | 2012 | Message broker |
+| `hanzo/storage` | MinIO | 2014 | S3-compatible storage |
+| `hanzo/dns` | CoreDNS | 2016 | DNS service |
+| `hanzo/golang-migrate` | golang-migrate | 2014 | Database migrations |
+| `hanzo/dbx` | PocketBase dbx | 2015 | Database abstraction |
+| `hanzo/tasks` | Temporal | 2016 | Distributed task engine |
+| `lux/coreth` / `lux/geth` | go-ethereum | 2013 | EVM implementation |
+| `lux/zapdb` | Badger (Dgraph) | 2017 | Embedded KV store |
+| `lux/safe` | Gnosis Safe | 2017 | Multisig contracts |
+| `lux/explorer` | custom | 2018 | Block explorer |
+| `lux/lattice` | Lattigo (EPFL) | 2019 | Lattice cryptography |
+
+All other repositories are original work.
+
+---
+
+## Research Papers by Domain
+
+### Lux Network (136 papers)
+
+**Consensus**: lux-consensus, lux-quasar-consensus, lux-fpc-consensus, lux-wave-protocol
+**Cryptography**: lux-crypto-agility, lux-corona-pq, lux-pq-crypto-suite, lux-pq-migration, lux-ntt-transform
+**FHE**: lux-fhe-smart-contracts, lux-fhe-mpc-hybrid, fhe/fhevm, fhe/fhecrdt, fhe/ml-privacy, fhe/voting
+**MPC**: lux-lss-mpc, lux-mchain-mpc
+**DeFi**: lux-lightspeed-dex, lux-economics, lux-tokenomics, lux-credit-lending, lux-omnichain-yield
+**Infrastructure**: lux-bridge, lux-teleport-protocol, lux-teleport-architecture, lux-photon-protocol, lux-nova-protocol
+**Scaling**: gpu-evm-whitepaper, evmgpu-benchmark, lux-data-availability
+**Identity**: lux-achain-attestation, lux-secure-messaging, lux-zap-wire-protocol
+**Governance**: lux-dao-governance-framework, lux-adoption-roadmap
+**Markets**: lux-market-nft, lux-credit-protocol-spec
+
+### Hanzo AI (152 papers)
+
+**AI/ML**: hanzo-jin-architecture, hanzo-engine-ml, hanzo-candle, hanzo-analytics-ml, hanzo-hmm, hanzo-agent-grpo, hanzo-agent-sdk
+**Infrastructure**: hanzo-aci, hanzo-base, hanzo-api-gateway, hanzo-ingress-proxy, hanzo-pubsub-events, hanzo-search
+**Commerce**: crowdstart-commerce, hanzo-commerce-payments, hanzo-checkout, hanzo-ai-commerce
+**Security**: hanzo-pq-crypto, hanzo-formal-verification, hanzo-harness-hacking
+**Platform**: hanzo-iam-platform, hanzo-sdk-ecosystem, hanzo-mcp-server, hanzo-network-whitepaper, hanzo-tokenomics
+**Communication**: hanzo-chat, hanzo-flow
+**Algorithms**: algorithms/ subdirectory, defense/ subdirectory
+**Models**: zen/ subdirectory (Zen model family)
+**Computer Use**: hanzo-operate-computer, hanzo-operative
+
+### Zoo Labs (41 papers)
+
+**DeSci**: zoo-conservation-ai, zoo-habitat-modeling, zoo-satellite-ecology, zoo-wildlife-tracking, zoo-citizen-science, zoo-carbon-credits, zoo-educational-ai
+**DeAI**: zoo-fhe-ai, zoo-mobile-inference, zoo-agent-nft, embedding-7680, hllm-training-free-grpo, experience-ledger-dso, beluga-l3-whitepaper
+**Blockchain**: zoo-consensus, zoo-poai-consensus, zoo-quasar-benchmarks, zoo-bridge, zoo-dex, zoo-evm-l2-architecture, zoo-evm-benchmarks, zoo-gpu-evm
+**Governance**: zoo-dao-governance, zoo-tokenomics, zip-002-zen-reranker
+**Security**: zoo-pq-crypto, zoo-mpc-custody, zoo-key-management, zoo-fhe
+**Identity**: zoo-identity-chain, zoo-experience-ledger
+**Launch**: zoo-mainnet-launch-checklist
+
+---
+
+## Formal Verification
+
+### Lean4 Proofs (13,160 files total)
+
+- **Lux** (`lux/formal/lean/`, `lux/proofs/`): BFT consensus safety, bridge security, DeFi invariants, cross-chain compute, post-quantum hybrid crypto, Verkle tree, warp security, GPU scaling laws, FHE, sharia compliance
+- **Hanzo** (`hanzo/proofs/lean/`): Complementary formal proofs
+
+### TLA+ Specifications (4 specs)
+
+- Teleport cross-chain protocol
+- MPC bridge protocol state machine
+
+### Tamarin Protocol Proofs (2 proofs)
+
+- MPC bridge cryptographic protocol security
+
+### Halmos Symbolic Tests (10 contracts)
+
+- Bridge and yield vault Solidity verification
+
+---
+
+## Active Development (as of 2026-04-07)
+
+Most recently committed repositories across all three organizations:
+
+| Repository | Last Commit |
+|------------|-------------|
+| `lux/node` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `lux/papers` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `lux/netrunner` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `lux/threshold` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `lux/dex` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `lux/formal` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `lux/mpc` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `hanzo/blog` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `hanzo/iam` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `hanzo/kms` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `hanzo/papers` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `hanzo/cloud` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `zoo/blog` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `zoo/papers` | 2026-04-07 |
+| `zoo/universe` | 2026-04-07 |
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Target: validate all consensus, EVM, and staking behavior with K=11 validators.
 - [ ] Verify all precompile activation timestamps are after 2025-12-25
 - [ ] Deploy via PaaS (platform.hanzo.ai), not manual kubectl
 - [ ] Verify all 11 pods reach Running state
- [ ] Verify all 11 nodes report healthy via `/v1/health/liveness`
+- [ ] Verify all 11 nodes report healthy via `/ext/health/liveness`

 ### 1.2 Bootstrap and Connectivity

@@ -10,24 +10,3 @@ For the canonical Lux IP and licensing strategy, see:

 For commercial inquiries that go beyond BSD-3 (e.g. private moat
 acceleration kernels), contact `licensing@lux.network`.
-
-## Upstream attribution
-
-See [NOTICE](NOTICE) for the full attribution. In summary:
-
- **avalanchego** (Ava Labs, Inc.) — this repository is derived from
-  [ava-labs/avalanchego](https://github.com/ava-labs/avalanchego), licensed
-  under the **BSD 3-Clause License** (© 2019 Ava Labs, Inc.). BSD-3 is
-  permissive; the Lux additions here are likewise BSD-3-Clause.
- **go-ethereum** (The go-ethereum Authors) — EVM support derives from
-  [go-ethereum](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum). It is **not**
-  vendored in-tree; it is consumed as the external Go module
-  `github.com/luxfi/geth`, which retains go-ethereum's original licenses:
-  the library is **LGPL-3.0-or-later** and the command-line tools are
-  **GPL-3.0**.
-
-**Copyleft flag:** the LGPL-3.0/GPL-3.0 terms of the go-ethereum-derived code
-(via `github.com/luxfi/geth`) are **not** superseded by this repository's
-BSD-3-Clause license. Distributing compiled node binaries must honor LGPL-3.0
-for the linked geth library (published source of that code and its
-modifications at <https://github.com/luxfi/geth>, and user ability to relink).
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# AI Development Guide
+# LLM.md - AI Development Guide

 This file provides guidance for AI assistants working with the Lux node codebase.

@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ selection, and EVM contract auth.

 | SHA | Tag | Impact |
 |-----|-----|--------|
-| (pending) | next | LP-023 Phase 1 batch 2: 5 more native-ZAP tx types — BaseTx v1, RegisterL1ValidatorTx v1, SlashValidatorTx v1, TransferChainOwnershipTx v1, RemoveChainValidatorTx. Cross-type Parse mean speedup 8.5× over linearcodec. Variable-length nested-object schemas (Outs/Ins/full OutputOwners/Warp Message/Evidence) deferred to batch 3. |
-| `e77a7ef78e` | (pre) | LP-023 Phase 1 batch 1: 4 simple tx types + bench harness. 37× Parse, 5.6× cross-type mean. |
 | `9df72a6f55` | v1.26.10 | Wire ChainSecurityProfile into bootstrap (closes F102) |
 | `c4af52411e` | v1.26.10 | X-Chain (avm) mempool refuses classical creds under strict-PQ |
 | `a14a1601f4` | v1.26.10 | P-Chain (platformvm) mempool refuses classical creds under strict-PQ |
@@ -65,10 +63,10 @@ selection, and EVM contract auth.
 ### Where to look for X
 - Profile resolve at boot: `node/node.go:initSecurityProfile`
 - Profile RPC + REST + metrics: `service/security/`
-  - JSON-RPC namespace: `security` at `POST /v1/security`
+  - JSON-RPC namespace: `security` at `POST /ext/security`
    (methods `securityProfile`, `blockSecurity`)
-  - REST sidecars: `GET /v1/security/profile`, `GET /v1/security/block/{n}`
-  - Prometheus gauges: `/v1/metrics` under the `security_*` family
+  - REST sidecars: `GET /ext/security/profile`, `GET /ext/security/block/{n}`
+  - Prometheus gauges: `/ext/metrics` under the `security_*` family
 - Peer scheme gate: `network/peer/scheme_gate.go`
 - Classical-compat registry: `vms/txs/auth/policy.go`
 - Mempool gate (P-Chain): `vms/platformvm/mempool/*.go`
@@ -85,29 +83,6 @@ selection, and EVM contract auth.

 ## FeePolicy — canonical user-tx fee gate

-> **Topology + UTXO ownership + cross-chain fee model** are normatively
-> specified by [**LP-0130** (Chain Topology, UTXO Ownership, and Fee
-> Model)](https://github.com/luxfi/lps/blob/main/LPs/lp-0130-chain-topology-utxo-ownership-and-fee-model.md).
-> Read that LP before touching any VM's fee/settlement path or any
-> cross-chain import/export flow. In particular:
->
-> - Only **P** and **X** are canonical UTXO state machines (LP-0130 §2).
-> - **X** is the money rail; **P** is the staking/reward rail; **LUX**
->   is the fee currency everywhere (LP-0130 §3, §5).
-> - **Q-Chain has no user-payable blockspace** — finality is a
->   validator obligation paid via P (LP-0130 §6). `quantumvm` MUST
->   use `NoUserTxPolicy{}` — enforced in chains/quantumvm/feegate.go as of 2026-07-03.
-> - **M-Chain fees are service fees** deducted from the originating
->   chain's fee pool, not a user M-balance (LP-0130 §7). `mpcvm`
->   already runs `NoUserTxPolicy{}` — correct.
-> - **B-Chain fees** are deducted from the bridged amount (LP-0130 §8).
-> - Every non-P/X chain settles worker rewards to X (asset payouts) or
->   P (staker rewards) via epoch fee roots reconciled at Q finality
->   (LP-0130 §4, §11).
-> - **Σ-escrow invariant** (LP-0130 I-8): `Σ non-P/X fee balances ==
->   Σ X-side fee escrow` at every Q checkpoint. Drift is a
->   finality-blocking fault.
-
 Every Lux VM that accepts user-submitted txs declares a `fee.Policy`
 (package `vms/types/fee`). There is one interface and one validator —
 no per-VM bespoke fee structs.
@@ -120,14 +95,14 @@ no per-VM bespoke fee structs.
 | zkvm | Z-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
 | aivm | A-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
 | keyvm | K-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
-| bridgevm | B-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` (deducted from bridged amount, LP-0130 §8) |
-| quantumvm | Q-Chain | **service-only** (LP-0130 §6) | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` — validator obligation, no user-payable blockspace |
+| bridgevm | B-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
+| quantumvm | Q-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
 | identityvm | I-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
-| mpcvm | M-Chain | service-only (LP-0130 §7) | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` — fees pulled from originating chain's fee pool |
+| thresholdvm | M-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
 | oraclevm | O-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
 | relayvm | R-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
 | graphvm | G-Chain | read-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` (GraphQL refuses `mutation`) |
-| evm | C-Chain | user-tx | native EVM gas (gas * gasPrice >= 0 enforced upstream); balance is X-imported LUX (LP-0130 §10) |
+| evm | C-Chain | user-tx | native EVM gas (gas * gasPrice >= 0 enforced upstream) |
 | platformvm | P-Chain | user-tx | native `TxFee` field on Config |
 | avm | X-Chain | user-tx | native `TxFee` field on Config |

@@ -160,17 +135,7 @@ charge less.

 ## Essential Commands

-### Release & build (canonical) — via platform.hanzo.ai, NOT GitHub Actions
-The ONE way to build + publish releases is **[`RELEASE.md`](./RELEASE.md)**:
-platform.hanzo.ai reads [`hanzo.yml`](./hanzo.yml) on a `v*` tag push and
-schedules the image build onto self-hosted **arcd** pools (`lux-build-linux-*`)
-over the native long-poll fabric — no GitHub-Actions hop. ONE `Dockerfile`
-build yields BOTH artifacts: the node image (`ghcr.io/luxfi/node:vX.Y.Z`, luxd
-+ 12 baked VM plugins) and, via [`scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh`](./scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh),
-the plugin set to `s3://lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset>/` (operator `pluginSource`).
-The `.github/workflows/*` build/release workflows are retired (RELEASE.md §Retire).
-
-### Building (local dev only)
+### Building
 ```bash
 # Build node binary
 ./scripts/run_task.sh build
@@ -253,7 +218,7 @@ Located in `/vms/`:
 - **platformvm**: Staking, validation, network management
 - **xvm**: Asset transfers, UTXO model
 - **dexvm**: DEX with order book, perpetuals, AMM
- **mpcvm**: Threshold MPC and FHE for confidential computing
+- **thresholdvm**: Threshold MPC and FHE for confidential computing
 - **quantumvm**: PQ consensus coordination (ML-DSA, Corona)
 - **identityvm**: Decentralized identity (DID, verifiable credentials)
 - **keyvm**: Post-quantum key management (ML-KEM, ML-DSA)
@@ -343,11 +308,11 @@ github.com/luxfi/genesis (JSON config)  →  github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/build
 ### CGO Dependencies
 These require CGO for full functionality (graceful fallback when disabled):
 - `consensus/quasar` - GPU NTT acceleration
- `vms/mpcvm/fhe` - GPU FHE operations
+- `vms/thresholdvm/fhe` - GPU FHE operations
 - `x/blockdb` - zstd compression

 ### FHE (Fully Homomorphic Encryption)
-Located in `vms/mpcvm/fhe/`:
+Located in `vms/thresholdvm/fhe/`:
 - Uses `github.com/luxfi/lattice/multiparty` for DKG
 - Lattice-based cryptography only (no fallbacks)
 - Threshold decryption via Warp messaging
@@ -599,7 +564,7 @@ For importing pre-merge blocks, Shanghai must be active based on `ShanghaiTime`,
 ### 8. `vms/components/lux` vs `luxfi/utxo` (parallel UTXO types)
 The `github.com/luxfi/node/vms/components/lux` package contains a parallel
 `lux.UTXO`/`lux.TransferableInput` type tree alongside `github.com/luxfi/utxo`.
-External consumers (e.g. a white-label tenant's network-bootstrap tooling) need
+External consumers (e.g. `~/work/liquidity/network-bootstrap/fund.go`) need
 to import the `vms/components/lux` variant to interop with PlatformVM/AVM
 tx builders — `luxfi/utxo` types alone are not accepted by the X→P export
 path. This is a known anomaly pending #58 follow-up consolidation; do NOT
@@ -662,7 +627,7 @@ strings.Contains(errStr, "not found") // parent block not in local state
 ### Known CGO Stubs
 When CGO disabled, these use CPU fallbacks:
 - `consensus/quasar/gpu_ntt_nocgo.go`
- `vms/mpcvm/fhe/gpu_fhe_nocgo.go`
+- `vms/thresholdvm/fhe/gpu_fhe_nocgo.go`
 - `vms/zkvm/accel/accel_mlx.go`

 ### 8. ZAP CreateHandlers for VM HTTP Endpoints
@@ -682,7 +647,7 @@ When CGO disabled, these use CPU fallbacks:
 ```bash
 curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"eth_chainId","params":[],"id":1}' \
-  http://localhost:9640/v1/bc/C/rpc
+  http://localhost:9640/ext/bc/C/rpc
 # Returns: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":"0x17870"}
 ```

@@ -691,7 +656,7 @@ curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

 **Behavior**:
 - **GET /**: Returns JSON node information (nodeId, networkId, version, chains, endpoints)
- **POST /**: Proxies JSON-RPC requests directly to C-chain `/v1/bc/C/rpc`
+- **POST /**: Proxies JSON-RPC requests directly to C-chain `/ext/bc/C/rpc`
 - **OPTIONS /**: Returns CORS preflight headers

 **Files Modified**: `server/http/router.go`, `server/http/server.go`
@@ -758,7 +723,7 @@ if s.validators.NumNets() != 0 {

 **Verification**:
 ```bash
-curl -s http://localhost:9650/v1/health | jq '.checks.bls'
+curl -s http://localhost:9650/ext/health | jq '.checks.bls'
 # Should show: "message": "node has the correct BLS key"
 ```

@@ -792,52 +757,11 @@ Testing conducted on a single Lux validator node (testnet mode, macOS):
 **Benchmark Command:**
 ```bash
 cd ~/work/lux/benchmarks
-NODE_ENDPOINT="http://localhost:9640/v1/bc/C/rpc" \
+NODE_ENDPOINT="http://localhost:9640/ext/bc/C/rpc" \
 PRIVATE_KEY="<funded_key>" \
 ./bin/bench tps --chains=lux --duration=60s --concurrency=5
 ```

-## JSON rule — json/v2 at HTTP boundary only; ZAP for all internal data
-
-Encoding boundaries are one-way and explicit:
-
- **External (HTTP / JSON-RPC API)** — `github.com/go-json-experiment/json` (v2).
-  Never `encoding/json`. This covers: `service/*`, `server/*`, `pubsub/`,
-  `vms/platformvm/service.go`, `vms/xvm/service.go`, JSON-RPC clients
-  (`vms/platformvm/client_*`), CLI tools (`cmd/*`), wallet examples,
-  on-disk config files (read once at boot), genesis/upgrade blobs.
- **Internal (state, P2P, consensus, MPC, logs, metrics)** — ZAP wire only.
-  No JSON in: `network/`, `consensus/`, `snow/`, `chains/` (data-plane),
-  `vms/*/state/`, `vms/*/block/`, `vms/*/txs/` (struct codec), threshold
-  payloads, P2P message bodies, internal databases.
-
-Migration helpers (v2 API delta vs v1):
-
-| v1 (encoding/json)                | v2 (go-json-experiment/json)                 |
-|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
-| `json.Marshal(v)`                 | `json.Marshal(v)` (variadic opts; signature compat) |
-| `json.MarshalIndent(v, "", "  ")` | `json.Marshal(v, jsontext.WithIndent("  "))` |
-| `json.Unmarshal(b, &v)`           | `json.Unmarshal(b, &v)`                      |
-| `json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)`    | `json.MarshalWrite(w, v)` (no trailing `\n`) |
-| `json.NewDecoder(r).Decode(&v)`   | `json.UnmarshalRead(r, &v)`                  |
-| `json.RawMessage`                 | `jsontext.Value`                             |
-| `*json.SyntaxError`               | `*jsontext.SyntacticError`                   |
-
-v2 semantic differences worth knowing (these change wire shape):
-
- `[N]byte` field with no `MarshalJSON` ⇒ v2 marshals as base64 string,
-  v1 marshalled as JSON array of byte numbers. Add `MarshalJSON` on the
-  type if the array form is wanted on the wire.
- `time.Duration` ⇒ v2 default is the standard string form ("30m");
-  v1 marshalled as int nanoseconds. v1 sub-package
-  (`github.com/go-json-experiment/json/v1`) exposes `FormatDurationAsNano(true)`;
-  v2 root does not. Prefer the string form on new APIs.
- v2 enforces strict UTF-8; raw arbitrary bytes in JSON strings fail.
-  This matters for legacy P2P/internal blobs that happen to be stored
-  through JSON — those should already be on ZAP.
- `json.MarshalWrite` does NOT append a trailing `\n` (v1 `NewEncoder.Encode` did).
-  Adjust HTTP-handler test fixtures accordingly.
-
 ---

-*Last Updated*: 2026-06-06
+*Last Updated*: 2026-02-04
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ run-testnet: build-fips init-chains
 node-status:
 	@echo "$(GREEN)Checking node status...$(NC)"
 	@curl -s -X POST --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"info.isBootstrapped","params":{}}' \
-		-H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/v1/info | jq
+		-H 'content-type:application/json;' http://localhost:9630/ext/info | jq

 stop-node:
 	@echo "$(YELLOW)Stopping Lux node...$(NC)"
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-Lux Node
-Copyright (c) 2019-2025 Lux Industries Inc.
-
-This product includes software from avalanchego by Ava Labs, Inc.
-(https://github.com/ava-labs/avalanchego), licensed under the BSD 3-Clause
-License:
-
-    Copyright (C) 2019, Ava Labs, Inc.
-
-Lux Node is derived from avalanchego. The Lux additions and modifications in
-this repository are licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License (see the LICENSE
-file). The BSD 3-Clause terms of the upstream avalanchego code are retained;
-this NOTICE preserves the required Ava Labs copyright attribution at the
-repository level.
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-Ethereum Virtual Machine support is derived from go-ethereum by The
-go-ethereum Authors (https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum). In this
-repository that code is NOT vendored in-tree; it is consumed as an external
-Go module through the Lux fork github.com/luxfi/geth, which retains
-go-ethereum's original licenses:
-
-  * The go-ethereum library packages are licensed under the GNU Lesser
-    General Public License, version 3 (LGPL-3.0-or-later).
-  * The go-ethereum command-line tools are licensed under the GNU General
-    Public License, version 3 (GPL-3.0).
-
-    Copyright (C) The go-ethereum Authors
-
-COPYLEFT NOTICE: The LGPL-3.0/GPL-3.0 terms continue to apply to the
-go-ethereum-derived portions provided via github.com/luxfi/geth, and are NOT
-superseded by the BSD 3-Clause license of this repository. Distribution of
-compiled Lux Node binaries must honor LGPL-3.0 for the linked go-ethereum
-library code (source availability for that code and its modifications, and
-the ability for users to relink against a modified library). The luxfi/geth
-source, including Lux modifications, is published at
-https://github.com/luxfi/geth.
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-<p align="center"><img src=".github/hero.svg" alt="node" width="880"></p>
-
 <div align="center">
  <img src="resources/LuxLogoRed.png?raw=true">
 </div>
@@ -7,7 +5,7 @@
 ---

 [![Build Status](https://github.com/luxfi/node/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/luxfi/node/actions)
-[![Go Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/go-1.26.3-blue.svg)](https://golang.org/)
+[![Go Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/go-1.21.12-blue.svg)](https://golang.org/)
 [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-BSD--3--Clause-blue.svg)](LICENSE)

 Node implementation for the [Lux](https://lux.network) network -
@@ -40,7 +38,7 @@ The minimum recommended hardware specification for nodes connected to Mainnet is

 If you plan to build Lux Node from source, you will also need the following software:

- [Go](https://golang.org/doc/install) version >= 1.26.3
+- [Go](https://golang.org/doc/install) version >= 1.23.9
 - [gcc](https://gcc.gnu.org/)
 - g++

@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
-# Lux release — build + publish via platform.hanzo.ai (the ONE canonical way)
-
-This is the single, repeatable way to build and publish the Lux release
-artifacts. It runs entirely on our own infrastructure — **the PaaS
-(platform.hanzo.ai) + self-hosted arcd runners + DOKS/fleet**. There is **no
-GitHub Actions build path** (the `.github/workflows/*` build/release workflows
-are retired — see [§Retire](#retire-the-github-actions-build-workflows)).
-
-## What a release produces
-
-ONE `Dockerfile` multi-stage build (this repo) is the single source of truth.
-It compiles `luxd` + all 12 VM plugins (CGO_ENABLED=0) and yields TWO
-distribution surfaces:
-
-| # | Artifact | Destination | Consumed by |
-|---|----------|-------------|-------------|
-| 1 | node image (luxd + 12 plugins baked at `/luxd/build/plugins/`) | `ghcr.io/luxfi/node:vX.Y.Z` | operator pod image; `startup.sh cp /luxd/build/plugins/*` |
-| 2 | plugin set (the 12 VM-ID binaries + `SHA256SUMS`) | `s3://lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset>/` | operator `plugin-fetch` init container (LuxNetwork CR `pluginSource`) |
-
-Artifact 2 is **extracted from** artifact 1 — the plugins are never compiled
-twice. One build, two surfaces (DRY, orthogonal).
-
-The plugin versions are pinned as Dockerfile build-args, kept in lockstep with
-this repo's `go.mod`:
-
- `EVM_VERSION` (luxfi/evm — C-Chain EVM, the `0x9999` settlement surface)
- `CHAINS_REF` (luxfi/chains — the 10 non-DEX VMs incl. bridgevm)
- `DEX_REF` (luxfi/dex `cmd/dchain` — the native D-Chain DEX VM)
-
-## The machinery
-
-```
-git tag vX.Y.Z (push)
-        │  GitHub App webhook ─▶ https://platform.hanzo.ai/v1/github-webhook
-        ▼
-  platform BuildScheduler  ── reads hanzo.yml @ tag, validates, enqueues
-        │                      one build_job per matrix entry
-        ▼
-  native long-poll fabric (build-queue.ts)        NO GitHub Actions hop
-        │  arcd runner POST /v1/arcd/poll  (HMAC)
-        ▼
-  arcd runner on pool lux-build-linux-<arch>
-        │  git checkout @ tag → docker build -f Dockerfile . → docker push
-        ▼
-  ghcr.io/luxfi/node:vX.Y.Z         (artifact 1)
-        │  POST /v1/arcd/complete (status, image_digest)
-        ▼
-  build_job (DB, system-of-record)
-```
-
- **PaaS**: `platform.hanzo.ai` (`~/work/hanzo/platform`,
-  `pkg/platform/src/services/ci/`). Owns the schema, the scheduler, the durable
-  `build_job` record, and the native long-poll dispatch.
- **Build muscle**: self-hosted **arcd** runner pools, `lux-build-linux-amd64`
-  and `lux-build-linux-arm64` (one daemon per fleet host; `spark` = linux/arm64,
-  amd64 via buildx). NO GitHub-hosted runners; NO GitHub Actions orchestration
-  on the native path.
- **Contract**: `~/work/hanzo/platform/docs/PLATFORM_CI.md`.
-
-## Build — the one command
-
-A release is a semver tag push. The declarative entrypoint is this repo's
-[`hanzo.yml`](./hanzo.yml); the trigger is one of:
-
-**(a) Tag push (normal release).** Cutting the tag IS the release:
-
-```bash
-git tag v1.30.41 && git push origin v1.30.41
-```
-
-The webhook maps `refs/tags/v1.30.41` → `branch=v1.30.41`; `hanzo.yml`'s
-`tag-pattern: "{{git.branch}}"` yields the image tag `v1.30.41`. Platform
-schedules the amd64 + arm64 builds onto the live `lux-build-*` arcd pools and
-pushes the multi-arch image to GHCR.
-
-**(b) On-demand (re-release / backfill).** The platform `buildJob.trigger`
-tRPC mutation schedules the same build for an explicit ref, no push required:
-
-```
-buildJob.trigger({
-  installationId: "<luxfi GitHub App installation id>",
-  repo: "luxfi/node",
-  sha:  "<commit at the tag>",
-  ref:  "refs/tags/v1.30.41",
-  branch: "v1.30.41"            // → image tag via {{git.branch}}
-})
-```
-
-Track it: `buildJob.list` / `buildJob.one` / `buildJob.logs` (org-scoped).
-
-> A pool goes **native** the moment an arcd runner self-registers for it
-> (`arcd_runner.lastSeen` within 90s); until then platform transparently falls
-> back to `workflow_dispatch` so a build is never stranded. To run a release
-> fully GitHub-free, ensure a `lux-build-linux-{amd64,arm64}` runner is live
-> (`tRPC arcd` / the `arcd_runner` table). Set platform env
-> `WORKFLOW_DISPATCH_FALLBACK=false` to forbid the legacy hop.
-
-### What the runner runs (identical on a fleet host, for manual/DR builds)
-
-The native path runs exactly the repo's `Dockerfile`. To reproduce on a fleet
-host directly (e.g. `spark`), with no platform and no GitHub:
-
-```bash
-# on spark (linux/arm64; amd64 via buildx)
-git clone --branch v1.30.41 git@github.com:luxfi/node.git && cd node
-docker buildx build --platform linux/amd64 \
-  --build-arg CGO_ENABLED=0 \
-  -t ghcr.io/luxfi/node:v1.30.41 -f Dockerfile --push .
-```
-
-## Publish the plugin set — step 2
-
-After the image exists, publish artifact 2 from it (one command, idempotent,
-no second compile). Run on any fleet host or a DOKS Job that has `crane`/docker
-+ `mc`; typically the same arcd runner that just built the image:
-
-```bash
-scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh \
-  ghcr.io/luxfi/node:v1.30.41 \
-  lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset> \
-  lux                          # mc alias for the target MinIO/S3
-# e.g. lux-plugins-testnet/v1.3.5
-```
-
-It extracts the 12 plugin binaries from the image, writes `SHA256SUMS`, uploads
-all to `s3://lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset>/`, and verifies remote==local sha.
-
-S3 is the in-cluster MinIO (`s3.lux-system.svc.cluster.local:9000`, external
-`s3.lux.network`). Configure the `mc` alias once with the `hanzo-s3-secret`
-credentials:
-
-```bash
-mc alias set lux <endpoint> hanzo "$(kubectl -n lux-system get secret \
-  hanzo-s3-secret -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d)" --api s3v4
-```
-
-A pluginset prefix is **immutable** — bump `<pluginset>` for a new release,
-never overwrite a prefix a live network points at.
-
-## Deploy — step 3 (operator, not this repo)
-
-luxd rollout is owned by the **lux operator** (`~/work/lux/operator`,
-`LuxNetwork` CR). Update the CR's `image.tag` (artifact 1) and, when the
-network fetches plugins from S3, the `pluginSource.bucket` + per-plugin
-`sha256` (artifact 2, from the `SHA256SUMS` you just published). The operator's
-`plugin-fetch` init container verifies each sha256 fail-closed. This is
-deliberately decoupled from build: `hanzo.yml` has **no `deploy:` block**.
-
-## Reproducibility
-
- The build is **functionally reproducible**: same source tags + same toolchain
-  (Go 1.26.4) + `CGO_ENABLED=0` ⇒ functionally identical plugins, provable by a
-  fleet rebuild (verified: `spark` rebuilt evm@v1.99.37 + dexvm@v1.5.15 from the
-  same tags). It is **not bit-identical by construction**: the Dockerfile plugin
-  stages omit `-trimpath` and use `-mod=mod` with a first-party `go.sum` strip
-  (re-resolves luxfi/* deps), so embedded paths + re-tagged module content can
-  shift the bytes (Go `BuildID` differs; binary ~16 KB larger). The published
-  image is the canonical artifact; verify against ITS baked sha (what
-  `publish_plugin_set.sh` records), not a separate fleet build.
- To make releases bit-reproducible (future hardening, patch-only): add
-  `-trimpath` to every plugin `go build` and pin `go.sum` (drop the strip +
-  `-mod=mod`). Tracked as a follow-up; not required for correctness.
-
-## Retire the GitHub Actions build workflows
-
-These `.github/workflows/*` build/release/CI workflows are superseded by this
-flow and must be removed/disabled (platform owns build; the native long-poll
-owns dispatch). Delete them once a `lux-build-*` arcd runner is live:
-
-| Workflow | Replaced by |
-|----------|-------------|
-| `docker.yml` (built `ghcr.io/luxfi/node` on the `lux-build` ARC pool) | `hanzo.yml` (artifact 1) — native long-poll, NO GitHub Actions |
-| `release.yml` | the tag-push trigger above + `scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh` |
-| `build.yml`, `ci.yml` | platform CI test step (runner runs `go test` pre-build) |
-| `build-linux-binaries.yml` | `Dockerfile` builder stage (luxd binary) |
-| `build-ubuntu-amd64-release.yml`, `build-ubuntu-arm64-release.yml` | `Dockerfile` + buildx multi-arch |
-| `build-macos-release.yml`, `build-win-release.yml`, `build-and-test-mac-windows.yml` | arcd `lux-build-{macos,windows}-*` pools (matrix in `hanzo.yml` when desired) |
-| `build-deb-pkg.sh`, `build-tgz-pkg.sh` (under `.github/workflows/`) | packaging step on the arcd runner (post-build), not GitHub Actions |
-| `codeql-analysis.yml`, `fuzz.yml`, `fuzz_merkledb.yml`, `test-database-replay.yml` | scheduled jobs on arcd / DOKS (not a build dependency) |
-| `buf-lint.yml`, `buf-push.yml`, `labels.yml`, `stale.yml` | repo-hygiene; migrate to arcd cron or drop |
-
-The same retirement applies to the equivalent build/release workflows in the
-plugin-source repos (`luxfi/evm`, `luxfi/chains`, `luxfi/dex`): their artifacts
-are built from source by THIS repo's `Dockerfile` at the pinned refs, so those
-repos need no independent image/release CI — only their tags. Migrate each by
-adding a `hanzo.yml` (if it ships its own image) or deleting its build CI (if it
-is consumed only as a Go module / plugin source here).
@@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@ This version is backwards compatible to [v1.9.0](https://github.com/luxfi/node/r
 - Fixed `x/merkledb.ChangeProof#getLargestKey` to correctly handle no changes
 - Added test for `xvm/txs/executor.SemanticVerifier#verifyFxUsage` with multiple valid fxs
 - Fixed CPU + bandwidth performance regression during vertex processing
- Added example usage of the `/v1/index/X/block` API
+- Added example usage of the `/ext/index/X/block` API
 - Reduced the default value of `--consensus-optimal-processing` from `50` to `10`
 - Updated the year in the license header

@@ -4762,7 +4762,7 @@ This was the version used for the first public Lux Network deployment in Decembe
 ### Network Support

 - **Primary Network**: LUX mainnet and testnet
- **Net Support**: Full chain capabilities
+- **Net Support**: Full L2/chain capabilities
 - **Cross-Chain**: Warp messaging and atomic swaps
 - **Validator Management**: Staking and delegation

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ Production implementations live in `lux/crypto/` and `lux/lattice/`. Formal veri
 | `audits/2025-12-30-other-vms-audit.md` | Secondary VMs |
 | `audits/2025-12-30-platformvm-audit.md` | PlatformVM (P-Chain) |
 | `audits/2025-12-30-proposervm-evm-audit.md` | ProposerVM and EVM integration |
-| `audits/2025-12-30-mpcvm-audit.md` | ThresholdVM (T-Chain) |
+| `audits/2025-12-30-thresholdvm-audit.md` | ThresholdVM (T-Chain) |
 | `audits/2025-12-30-warp-audit.md` | Warp cross-chain messaging |
 | `audits/2025-12-30-zkvm-audit.md` | ZKVM (Z-Chain) |

@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ import (
 	"sync"
 	"syscall"

-	"github.com/luxfi/filesystem/perms"
 	"github.com/luxfi/log"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/node"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/utils"
+	"github.com/luxfi/filesystem/perms"
 	"github.com/luxfi/sys/ulimit"

 	nodeconfig "github.com/luxfi/node/config/node"
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ func New(config nodeconfig.Config) (App, error) {
 	infoLevel, _ := log.ToLevel("info")
 	logFactory := log.NewFactoryWithConfig(log.Config{
 		RotatingWriterConfig: log.RotatingWriterConfig{
-			MaxSize:   8, // 8MB per log file (reasonable for standard profile)
-			MaxFiles:  5, // Keep 5 rotated files
-			MaxAge:    7, // 7 days retention
+			MaxSize:   8,  // 8MB per log file (reasonable for standard profile)
+			MaxFiles:  5,  // Keep 5 rotated files
+			MaxAge:    7,  // 7 days retention
 			Directory: config.DatabaseConfig.Path,
 		},
 		DisplayLevel: infoLevel,
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import (
 	"sync"
 	"time"

+	validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
 	"github.com/luxfi/log"
 	metrics "github.com/luxfi/metric"
-	validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
 )

 // NewManager creates a new benchlist manager
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"

-	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
 	"github.com/luxfi/log"
+	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
 )

 // BenchmarkHashingComputeHash256 benchmarks SHA256 hashing performance
@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"testing"

-	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
 	"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
 	"github.com/luxfi/database/prefixdb"
 	"github.com/luxfi/database/versiondb"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
 )

 // BenchmarkMemoryDatabase benchmarks in-memory database operations
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import (
 	"encoding/binary"
 	"testing"

-	compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
 )

 // BenchmarkMessageCompression benchmarks message compression
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ package lru
 import (
 	"sync"

-	"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/cache"
 	"github.com/luxfi/utils"
+	"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
 )

 var _ cache.Cacher[struct{}, struct{}] = (*Cache[struct{}, struct{}])(nil)
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ package lru
 import (
 	"sync"

-	"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/cache"
 	"github.com/luxfi/utils"
+	"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
 )

 var _ cache.Cacher[struct{}, any] = (*SizedCache[struct{}, any])(nil)
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ package cache
 import (
 	"sync"

-	"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
 	"github.com/luxfi/utils"
+	"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
 )

 var _ Cacher[struct{}, struct{}] = (*LRU[struct{}, struct{}])(nil)
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ package cache
 import (
 	"sync"

-	"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
 	"github.com/luxfi/utils"
+	"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
 )

 var _ Cacher[struct{}, any] = (*sizedLRU[struct{}, any])(nil)
@@ -1,584 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// bootstrap_trust.go — the SEPARATE trust object for INITIAL SYNC, decomplected from
-// consensus finality.
-//
-// The mass-recovery DEADLOCK this fixes: the prior FrontierTip required a ⅔-by-stake quorum
-// of the CURRENT total validator set to be CONNECTED before it would name a sync frontier.
-// When the recovery TARGETS are themselves validators (a node that crashed IS one of the 5),
-// taking them down drops connected stake below ⅔ of the whole set — so on a network of 5
-// equal-weight validators, losing 2 leaves 3 (60% < ⅔) and NO node can ever name a frontier
-// to recover from. Bootstrap trust was braided into consensus finality, and finality's ⅔ rule
-// is mathematically unsatisfiable during a mass outage.
-//
-// The fix is a type split, NOT a renamed threshold. FinalityQuorum decides FINALITY
-// (> ⅔ of CURRENT stake — UNCHANGED). BootstrapTrust decides whether a fetched frontier is
-// SAFE TO BEGIN SYNC FROM: a quorum of AUTHENTICATED CONFIGURED beacons that RESPOND, gated by
-// a response FLOOR (MinResponses) and an agreement threshold over the RESPONDERS (not over the
-// whole set). 3 of 5 reachable beacons all agreeing is a valid sync anchor even though 3 of 5
-// stake is not a finalizing supermajority. The two decisions have different threat models and
-// are different objects.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"math"
-	"math/bits"
-	"sort"
-	"time"
-
-	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-)
-
-// BootstrapTrust is not a consensus-finality oracle.
-// It selects a weak-subjective sync frontier from authenticated configured beacons.
-// Live block acceptance remains governed exclusively by FinalityQuorum.
-type BootstrapTrust interface {
-	// AcceptsFrontier returns the block an empty/behind node may BEGIN SYNCING FROM, selected
-	// from the authenticated configured beacons' frontier replies — or an error
-	// (ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses / ErrNoBootstrapQuorum) when no trusted frontier can be
-	// named this round. The returned Frontier is a sync ANCHOR, never a consensus certificate
-	// (see the type comment): the node must still re-execute every block it descends to before
-	// re-entering live consensus, where FinalityQuorum alone governs acceptance.
-	AcceptsFrontier(ctx context.Context, replies []BeaconReply) (*Frontier, error)
-}
-
-// FinalityQuorum decides FINALITY: whether a weight is a finalizing supermajority (> ⅔) of the
-// CURRENT validator set. This is the live-consensus rule; bootstrap does NOT change it. It is a
-// SEPARATE named type from BootstrapTrust precisely so the distinction is explicit and testable:
-// a frontier that AcceptsFrontier admits is "safe to sync from", and in general it does NOT
-// satisfy HasFinality (3 of 5 responders is a valid sync anchor; 3 of 5 stake is not finality).
-type FinalityQuorum interface {
-	HasFinality(weight, total StakeWeight) bool
-}
-
-// StakeWeight is validator stake in the units the validator manager reports (Weight/Light).
-type StakeWeight = uint64
-
-// twoThirdsFinality is the production FinalityQuorum: > ⅔ of the CURRENT total stake, exactly
-// the rule the live cert-gate uses (consensusconfig.TwoThirdsStakeFloor). Defined here only to
-// give the live rule a name to CONTRAST bootstrap trust against — it is not wired into the live
-// path (that already enforces ⅔ inside consensus), and bootstrap never calls it to ACCEPT.
-type twoThirdsFinality struct{}
-
-func (twoThirdsFinality) HasFinality(weight, total StakeWeight) bool {
-	return weight > consensusconfig.TwoThirdsStakeFloor(total)
-}
-
-// DefaultFinalityQuorum returns the live ⅔-of-current-stake finality rule — the thing bootstrap
-// trust is explicitly NOT. Used by the test suite to prove a bootstrap-accepted frontier does
-// not constitute finality.
-func DefaultFinalityQuorum() FinalityQuorum { return twoThirdsFinality{} }
-
-var (
-	// ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses: fewer than MinResponses configured beacons answered.
-	// Not a partition-capture-safe quorum — the node must keep waiting for more beacons (or use
-	// an operator checkpoint), never sync from the captured few. INVARIANT 2's response floor.
-	ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses = errors.New("bootstrap: insufficient configured-beacon responses")
-	// ErrNoBootstrapQuorum: enough beacons responded, but no block clears the agreement threshold
-	// over the responders (a genuine partition, or a transient bleeding-edge split the loop retries).
-	ErrNoBootstrapQuorum = errors.New("bootstrap: no responder-agreed frontier")
-)
-
-// BeaconReply is one authenticated configured beacon's report of its accepted frontier tip
-// during initial sync. NodeID is authenticated at the transport handshake (a peer cannot forge
-// another's identity); Weight is the beacon's CONFIGURED stake from the trust anchor — NOT a
-// self-reported value. A reply whose NodeID is not in the policy's TrustedBeacons is ignored.
-type BeaconReply struct {
-	NodeID ids.NodeID
-	Tip    ids.ID
-	Weight StakeWeight
-}
-
-// Frontier is the weak-subjective sync anchor BootstrapTrust selects: the block a node descends
-// to and re-executes. It is NOT a consensus certificate (see BootstrapTrust). Height is the
-// tallied height when named via the ancestor-tolerant path, and 0 (unknown) when named via the
-// exact fast path before any ancestry fetch — the sync loop uses ID; Height is diagnostic.
-type Frontier struct {
-	ID             ids.ID
-	Height         uint64
-	Weight         StakeWeight // responder stake whose accepted chain contains this block
-	Responders     int         // distinct configured beacons that backed it
-	FromCheckpoint bool        // selected from an operator checkpoint (too few beacons responded)
-}
-
-// BlockRef is a parsed block's CONTENT-ADDRESSED identity (id, height, parent) — the only thing
-// the ancestor-tolerant tally needs. Decouples the policy from the VM/block types.
-type BlockRef struct {
-	ID     ids.ID
-	Height uint64
-	Parent ids.ID
-}
-
-// AncestrySource resolves a tip's CONTENT-ADDRESSED ancestry for the ancestor-tolerant tally —
-// the SAME parent-linked descent the sync loop trusts. Injected so the trust DECISION (which
-// beacons count, the response floor, the agreement threshold) stays separate from the transport.
-type AncestrySource interface {
-	// Ancestry returns up to max blocks ending at tip, parsed to (id, height, parent). An empty
-	// result (no error) means the tip's ancestry was not served — that anchor contributes nothing.
-	Ancestry(ctx context.Context, tip ids.ID, max int) ([]BlockRef, error)
-}
-
-// Checkpoint is an operator-pinned (id, height) the recovering node may anchor to when too few
-// beacons respond to form a quorum — the EXPLICIT override for INVARIANT 2's "1 of N reachable"
-// case. Absent (nil) ⇒ the default policy REJECTS rather than trusting a captured minority.
-//
-// INVARIANT 4 (a checkpoint is a SIGNED weak-subjectivity anchor, not a bare config value): the
-// checkpoint carries a cryptographic Signature by the configured checkpoint AUTHORITY over its
-// (id, height), and AcceptsFrontier trusts it ONLY when CheckpointVerifier authenticates that
-// signature. A (id,height) present in a flag/config but UNSIGNED — or signed by a non-authority key
-// — is REJECTED (fail closed). This is the crucial hardening: the checkpoint is the one path that
-// bypasses the beacon quorum, so a compromised flag must NOT be able to inject a false sync anchor
-// without ALSO forging the authority's signature. It is a cryptographic vouch, NEVER a ⅔-live-stake
-// tally (that conflation is the very deadlock BootstrapTrust exists to avoid).
-type Checkpoint struct {
-	ID     ids.ID
-	Height uint64
-	// Signature is the checkpoint authority's signature over this checkpoint's canonical (id,height)
-	// bytes. Verified by CheckpointVerifier before the anchor is trusted; an empty signature is
-	// never accepted.
-	Signature []byte
-}
-
-// CheckpointVerifier authenticates a Checkpoint's Signature against the configured checkpoint
-// AUTHORITY key(s). The node injects a real implementation backed by a PROVEN primitive (Ed25519 /
-// BLS — never custom crypto); the policy stays free of any crypto dependency, exactly like
-// AncestrySource and heightOf. A nil verifier means no signed anchor is configured, so any
-// Checkpoint is untrusted and the below-floor case fails closed.
-type CheckpointVerifier interface {
-	// VerifyCheckpoint reports whether sig is a valid signature over (id, height) by the configured
-	// checkpoint authority. It MUST reject an empty signature and be signature-safe (constant-time
-	// compare on the primitive). It is the sole authority on whether a pinned anchor may be trusted.
-	VerifyCheckpoint(id ids.ID, height uint64, sig []byte) bool
-}
-
-// CanonicalCheckpointMessage is the exact byte string a checkpoint authority signs and
-// CheckpointVerifier authenticates: a domain-separated, fixed-layout encoding of (id, height) so a
-// signature can never be transplanted from another context. 8-byte big-endian height after the
-// 32-byte id, under a distinct domain tag.
-func CanonicalCheckpointMessage(id ids.ID, height uint64) []byte {
-	const domain = "lux-bootstrap-checkpoint-v1\x00"
-	msg := make([]byte, 0, len(domain)+len(id)+8)
-	msg = append(msg, domain...)
-	msg = append(msg, id[:]...)
-	var h [8]byte
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(h[:], height)
-	return append(msg, h[:]...)
-}
-
-// Ratio is an exact rational threshold (e.g. 2/3, 3/4). A value clears it iff
-// value > floorOf(whole) — strictly greater, matching the consensus ⅔ floor's semantics.
-type Ratio struct{ Num, Den uint64 }
-
-// floorOf returns ⌊whole · Num / Den⌋ without floating point, overflow-safe for the sub-unity
-// thresholds used here. Ratio{2,3}.floorOf(w) == consensusconfig.TwoThirdsStakeFloor(w) exactly,
-// so the responder-⅔ agreement reuses the same strict-greater floor the live rule uses.
-func (r Ratio) floorOf(whole uint64) uint64 {
-	if r.Den == 0 {
-		return whole // degenerate guard; constructors always set a real ratio
-	}
-	hi, lo := bits.Mul64(whole, r.Num)
-	if hi >= r.Den {
-		return math.MaxUint64 // Num ≥ Den: not a sub-unity threshold — nothing can exceed it
-	}
-	q, _ := bits.Div64(hi, lo, r.Den)
-	return q
-}
-
-// BootstrapPolicy is the default BootstrapTrust: a CONFIGURED-BEACON quorum with a response
-// FLOOR and an agreement threshold over the RESPONDERS — a SEPARATE object from FinalityQuorum
-// with a SEPARATE threat model. It does NOT pass "reachable stake" into the ⅔-of-current-stake
-// finality rule (that conflation IS the mass-recovery deadlock). It reuses the ancestor-tolerant
-// common-ancestor tally only for HOW to find the agreed frontier; the ACCEPTANCE gate is the
-// response floor + responder agreement here.
-//
-// The three invariants:
-//   - INVARIANT 1 (non-circular beacon eligibility): only NodeIDs in TrustedBeacons count, and
-//     TrustedBeacons comes from the configured/checkpointed/genesis anchor — NEVER peer
-//     self-report. A recovering node never lets arbitrary peers define who is a beacon.
-//   - INVARIANT 2 (a floor prevents partition-capture): MinResponses authenticated beacons must
-//     respond before any frontier is named; an attacker who partitions the node down to a few
-//     beacons cannot capture the frontier. Below the floor, REJECT (or use Checkpoint).
-//   - INVARIANT 3 (acceptance ≠ finality): the named Frontier is "safe to begin sync from", not
-//     finalized. The node independently re-executes the descent before re-entering consensus.
-type BootstrapPolicy struct {
-	// TrustedBeacons is the trust anchor: configured-beacon NodeID → configured stake (INVARIANT
-	// 1). Resolved from --bootstrap-nodes / a finalized P-chain checkpoint / the genesis set —
-	// never from peer self-report.
-	TrustedBeacons map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight
-	// AgreementThreshold is the fraction of the RESPONDER weight a named block must exceed
-	// (default 2/3). Over RESPONDERS, not the whole set — that is what permits mass recovery.
-	AgreementThreshold Ratio
-	// MinResponses is the FLOOR on distinct configured-beacon responders (INVARIANT 2). Default:
-	// a MAJORITY of the configured set (the largest floor that still lets a node recover when a
-	// minority of validators is down). Capped at the set size.
-	MinResponses int
-	// MinResponseWeight is an OPTIONAL floor on the total responder weight (0 ⇒ disabled).
-	MinResponseWeight StakeWeight
-	// MinResponders is the minimum DISTINCT beacons that must back a NAMED block (default 2), so a
-	// single beacon cannot alone name the frontier. Capped at the responder count.
-	MinResponders int
-	// MinFrontierHeight is the node's current last-accepted height. The ANCESTOR-TOLERANT path
-	// names only a block STRICTLY ABOVE it — a frontier genuinely AHEAD. A common ancestor BELOW it
-	// is history the node has (a partition above, not a frontier ahead). A block AT exactly this
-	// height is ALSO not named here (the M1 eclipse-stale fix): an eclipse can throttle the honest
-	// ahead-tips below the ⅔ naming threshold while the node's OWN height accrues ⅔ as their shared
-	// ANCESTOR — naming it would go Ready stale. Excluding own height routes that case to CaughtUp,
-	// which distinguishes a legit all-at-N fleet from an eclipse with ahead-tips the node lacks. So
-	// nothing at or below own height is named (→ ErrNoBootstrapQuorum, fail safe), never a
-	// false-complete at the stale height. The exact fast path is exempt: a tip a responder
-	// supermajority ACTIVELY reports is a real frontier even at own height (a genuinely fresh
-	// network, or a fleet unanimously AT the tip).
-	MinFrontierHeight uint64
-	// Checkpoint is the OPTIONAL operator override for the below-floor case (INVARIANT 2). nil ⇒
-	// reject below the floor. When set, it is trusted ONLY if CheckpointVerifier authenticates its
-	// signature (INVARIANT 4).
-	Checkpoint *Checkpoint
-	// CheckpointVerifier authenticates the Checkpoint's authority signature (INVARIANT 4). nil ⇒ a
-	// configured Checkpoint is NOT trusted (fail closed) — a bare (id,height) is never enough.
-	CheckpointVerifier CheckpointVerifier
-	// NamingWindow bounds the ancestry fetched per anchor; MaxAnchors bounds how many distinct
-	// reported tips are resolved. Both default to the package constants when zero.
-	NamingWindow int
-	MaxAnchors   int
-	// NamingTimeout TOTAL-bounds the ancestor-tolerant resolution (all anchor fetches combined) so
-	// a partition that ANSWERS the frontier query but WITHHOLDS ancestry cannot make the decision
-	// hang — it returns what it found (or nothing → ErrNoBootstrapQuorum) and the caller's bounded
-	// retry tries a fresh sample next round. Zero ⇒ the package default.
-	NamingTimeout time.Duration
-	// Source resolves content-addressed ancestry for the ancestor-tolerant tally. When nil, the
-	// policy decides on the exact fast path alone (no split resolution).
-	Source AncestrySource
-}
-
-// compile-time: the default policy IS a BootstrapTrust.
-var _ BootstrapTrust = (*BootstrapPolicy)(nil)
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) effectiveMinResponses() int {
-	n := len(p.TrustedBeacons)
-	if p.MinResponses > 0 {
-		if p.MinResponses > n {
-			return n
-		}
-		return p.MinResponses
-	}
-	return n/2 + 1 // default: a MAJORITY of the configured beacon set
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) effectiveAgreement() Ratio {
-	if p.AgreementThreshold.Den == 0 {
-		return Ratio{Num: 2, Den: 3} // default: ⅔ of the RESPONDERS
-	}
-	return p.AgreementThreshold
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) effectiveMinResponders(responders int) int {
-	r := p.MinResponders
-	if r <= 0 {
-		r = bootstrapMinAgreeingBeacons // default 2
-	}
-	if r > responders {
-		r = responders
-	}
-	if r < 1 {
-		r = 1
-	}
-	return r
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) namingWindow() int {
-	if p.NamingWindow > 0 {
-		return p.NamingWindow
-	}
-	return bootstrapNamingWindow
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) maxAnchors() int {
-	if p.MaxAnchors > 0 {
-		return p.MaxAnchors
-	}
-	return maxNamingAnchors
-}
-
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) namingTimeout() time.Duration {
-	if p.NamingTimeout > 0 {
-		return p.NamingTimeout
-	}
-	return bootstrapNamingTimeout
-}
-
-// tallyResponders applies INVARIANT 1 (only CONFIGURED beacons count, deduplicated by NodeID — a
-// reply from a peer not in TrustedBeacons, a repeat, or an empty tip is dropped) and returns the
-// distinct responder count + total responder stake plus the per-tip stake / voter maps the naming
-// tally walks. The authenticated NodeID (transport handshake) is what makes "configured"
-// unforgeable. Shared by AcceptsFrontier (which names a frontier AHEAD) and CaughtUp (which
-// concludes NONE is ahead) so both judge the IDENTICAL responder set under the SAME eligibility
-// rule — the eligibility decision lives in exactly one place.
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) tallyResponders(replies []BeaconReply) (responders int, responderWeight StakeWeight, stakeOnTip map[ids.ID]StakeWeight, votersOf map[ids.ID]map[ids.NodeID]struct{}) {
-	seen := make(map[ids.NodeID]struct{}, len(replies))
-	stakeOnTip = make(map[ids.ID]StakeWeight)
-	votersOf = make(map[ids.ID]map[ids.NodeID]struct{})
-	for _, r := range replies {
-		w, ok := p.TrustedBeacons[r.NodeID]
-		if !ok || r.Tip == ids.Empty {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, dup := seen[r.NodeID]; dup {
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[r.NodeID] = struct{}{}
-		responders++
-		responderWeight += w
-		stakeOnTip[r.Tip] += w
-		if votersOf[r.Tip] == nil {
-			votersOf[r.Tip] = make(map[ids.NodeID]struct{})
-		}
-		votersOf[r.Tip][r.NodeID] = struct{}{}
-	}
-	return responders, responderWeight, stakeOnTip, votersOf
-}
-
-// floorMet reports whether the responder set clears INVARIANT 2's partition-capture FLOOR: at
-// least MinResponses distinct configured beacons AND (when MinResponseWeight is configured) at
-// least that much total responder stake. AcceptsFrontier gates NAMING a frontier on it and
-// CaughtUp gates concluding NONE-AHEAD on the SAME floor — so an eclipse that suppresses the
-// honest ahead-nodes to fake EITHER outcome must drop the responder set below it and fail safe.
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) floorMet(responders int, responderWeight StakeWeight) bool {
-	if responders < p.effectiveMinResponses() {
-		return false
-	}
-	if p.MinResponseWeight > 0 && responderWeight < p.MinResponseWeight {
-		return false
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// AcceptsFrontier implements BootstrapTrust. It (1) keeps ONLY configured-beacon replies
-// (INVARIANT 1, tallyResponders), (2) enforces the MinResponses / MinResponseWeight floor or falls
-// back to the operator checkpoint (INVARIANT 2, floorMet), then (3) names the highest block a
-// responder supermajority shares via the ancestor-tolerant tally. It never consults the
-// ⅔-of-current-stake finality rule (INVARIANT 3): the decision is the response floor + responder
-// agreement, a separate threat model.
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) AcceptsFrontier(ctx context.Context, replies []BeaconReply) (*Frontier, error) {
-	responders, responderWeight, stakeOnTip, votersOf := p.tallyResponders(replies)
-
-	// INVARIANT 2: the response FLOOR prevents partition-capture. Below MinResponses (or below
-	// MinResponseWeight) the node has not heard from enough authenticated beacons to trust ANY
-	// frontier — an attacker may have partitioned it down to a captured few. REJECT, unless the
-	// operator explicitly pinned a checkpoint to anchor from.
-	if !p.floorMet(responders, responderWeight) {
-		if p.Checkpoint != nil {
-			// INVARIANT 4: the checkpoint bypasses the beacon quorum, so trust it ONLY when the
-			// configured authority SIGNED this exact (id,height). A checkpoint present in config but
-			// unsigned, or signed by a non-authority key, is REJECTED (fail closed) — a compromised
-			// flag cannot inject a false sync anchor without also forging the authority's signature.
-			if p.CheckpointVerifier == nil || len(p.Checkpoint.Signature) == 0 ||
-				!p.CheckpointVerifier.VerifyCheckpoint(p.Checkpoint.ID, p.Checkpoint.Height, p.Checkpoint.Signature) {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: a checkpoint is pinned but its authority signature did not verify",
-					ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses)
-			}
-			return &Frontier{
-				ID:             p.Checkpoint.ID,
-				Height:         p.Checkpoint.Height,
-				Responders:     responders,
-				FromCheckpoint: true,
-			}, nil
-		}
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d configured beacons responded (weight %d), need %d",
-			ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, responders, responderWeight, p.effectiveMinResponses())
-	}
-
-	// The agreement threshold is over the RESPONDERS, not the whole configured set — this is what
-	// lets a node recover when validators are down (3 of 5 reachable, all 3 agreeing, is a valid
-	// sync anchor). The ⅔-of-current-stake finality rule is never used here (INVARIANT 3).
-	floor := p.effectiveAgreement().floorOf(responderWeight)
-	required := p.effectiveMinResponders(responders)
-
-	id, height, weight, ok := p.nameFrontier(ctx, stakeOnTip, votersOf, floor, required)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, ErrNoBootstrapQuorum
-	}
-	return &Frontier{ID: id, Height: height, Weight: weight, Responders: responders}, nil
-}
-
-// CaughtUp reports whether the responder set PROVES the node is already AT OR ABOVE the network
-// frontier — the dual of AcceptsFrontier ("nobody is ahead" vs "here is the block ahead to sync
-// to"). It is the go-live path for a TIP-HOLDER on a mixed-height co-restart: when producers
-// restart together the responder set SPLITS (the tip-holders are exactly half — below the ⅔
-// naming threshold), so AcceptsFrontier names NOTHING (ErrNoBootstrapQuorum), yet the node is
-// plainly not behind. Without this determination such a producer fails safe DOWN at its own tip —
-// the exact OPPOSITE of the stale-go-live bug, and just as wrong. THREE conditions, ALL required:
-//
-//   - (a) the SAME response FLOOR AcceptsFrontier uses is met (floorMet: MinResponses distinct
-//     beacons AND MinResponseWeight stake-majority). An eclipse that hides the higher (real) tips
-//     to fake caught-up must SUPPRESS the ahead-nodes' replies, dropping the responder set below
-//     the floor → NOT caught up, fail safe. No partition-capture: faking caught-up costs the same
-//     stake-majority of honest beacons that faking a NAMED frontier does.
-//   - (b) every responder's reported ACCEPTED tip is at height ≤ lastAccepted. A genuinely STALE
-//     node has at least one honest responder AHEAD (height > lastAccepted) → NOT caught up: it
-//     still syncs, so the stale-go-live bug stays fixed. (GetAcceptedFrontier reports a beacon's
-//     last-ACCEPTED block, so an un-finalized N+1 a producer is merely processing is never reported
-//     — the ±1 pending-tip skew cannot fake "ahead", and a producer one ACCEPTED block ahead
-//     correctly defeats caught-up so the node syncs that block.)
-//   - (c) the node has ACCEPTED every reported tip — heightOf returns ok ONLY for a block on the
-//     node's FINALIZED chain, so a tip the node lacks OR merely holds-in-store-but-has-not-accepted
-//     (someone genuinely ahead, a gossiped-ahead block, or a same-height sibling/fork it never
-//     finalized) makes the conclusion fail. The node declares caught-up only to blocks it ACCEPTED.
-//
-// heightOf resolves a tip's height from the node's ACCEPTED chain (ok=false when the tip is not
-// accepted — including a block merely PRESENT in the store but unaccepted, the luxd-2 freeze case),
-// injected so the trust DECISION stays free of any VM/block dependency — the same separation as
-// AncestrySource. It is NEVER a network fetch: an unaccepted/absent tip simply makes the node
-// not-caught-up (the safe direction — it syncs). Because (c) requires the node to have ACCEPTED
-// every reported tip, the heights (b) compares are the blocks' canonical (content-addressed)
-// heights read from the finalized chain — store presence can never fake "caught up".
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) CaughtUp(replies []BeaconReply, lastAccepted uint64, heightOf func(ids.ID) (uint64, bool)) bool {
-	responders, responderWeight, stakeOnTip, _ := p.tallyResponders(replies)
-	if !p.floorMet(responders, responderWeight) {
-		return false // (a) below the floor — an eclipse/partition can never fake caught-up
-	}
-	sawTip := false
-	for tip := range stakeOnTip {
-		sawTip = true
-		h, held := heightOf(tip)
-		if !held || h > lastAccepted {
-			return false // (c) a tip we do not hold, or (b) a responder ahead → NOT caught up
-		}
-	}
-	return sawTip // ≥1 responder tip evaluated (floor already implies this; guards an empty set)
-}
-
-// nameFrontier finds the block a responder supermajority shares — by CONTENT, reusing the
-// parent-link descent the sync loop trusts (HOW to find the agreed frontier; the ACCEPTANCE gate
-// already passed in AcceptsFrontier). A beacon reporting tip T vouches for every ANCESTOR of T,
-// so the named frontier is the HIGHEST block whose backing stake exceeds floor (the responder
-// agreement threshold) with ≥ required distinct voters.
-//
-//   - EXACT FAST PATH: if a single reported tip clears the floor outright, name it with NO
-//     ancestry fetch (the whole responding quorum already agrees on the same tip). Exempt from
-//     MinFrontierHeight: an actively-reported tip is a real frontier even when low.
-//   - ANCESTOR-TOLERANT PATH: otherwise, fetch the distinct tips' ancestries into ONE union index
-//     and globally credit each tip's stake to every block on its content-addressed chain. The
-//     highest block clearing the floor AND at a height STRICTLY ABOVE MinFrontierHeight (a frontier
-//     genuinely ahead — never the node's own height, which an eclipse could over-credit as a shared
-//     ancestor; that routes to CaughtUp) is named. A sibling split converges to the common committed
-//     ancestor; a partition that shares nothing ⅔-backed names nothing (→ fail safe).
-//
-// C1 (a forged chain finalizes ZERO) is preserved: a block is credited a beacon's stake only when
-// that beacon's tip lies on the block's CONTENT-ADDRESSED descendant chain (parent ids are bound
-// to block content), so a peer cannot fake linkage to over-credit; a block is named only with
-// backing > ⅔ of the responder weight; a minority (< ⅓) forged tip can only RATIFY real ancestors
-// it builds on, never name itself or raise the named height above the honest common block.
-func (p *BootstrapPolicy) nameFrontier(ctx context.Context, stakeOnTip map[ids.ID]StakeWeight, votersOf map[ids.ID]map[ids.NodeID]struct{}, floor StakeWeight, required int) (ids.ID, uint64, StakeWeight, bool) {
-	// EXACT fast path: a single reported tip already clears the floor — name it, no fetch.
-	for tip, st := range stakeOnTip {
-		if st > floor && len(votersOf[tip]) >= required {
-			return tip, 0, st, true
-		}
-	}
-	if p.Source == nil {
-		return ids.Empty, 0, 0, false
-	}
-
-	// TOTAL-bound all anchor fetches so a partition that answers the frontier query but withholds
-	// ancestry cannot hang the decision — the caller's bounded retry handles it next round.
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, p.namingTimeout())
-	defer cancel()
-
-	// Build ONE union index from the distinct reported tips' ancestries (most stake first; skip a
-	// tip already present from an earlier fetch — a nested tip covers its ancestors). Bounded by
-	// MaxAnchors × NamingWindow blocks, so a Byzantine swarm reporting many forged tips cannot
-	// induce unbounded work.
-	index := make(map[ids.ID]BlockRef)
-	fetches := 0
-	for _, tip := range sortedByStakeDesc(stakeOnTip) {
-		if _, have := index[tip]; have {
-			continue
-		}
-		if fetches >= p.maxAnchors() {
-			break
-		}
-		fetches++
-		refs, err := p.Source.Ancestry(ctx, tip, p.namingWindow())
-		if err != nil {
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, ref := range refs {
-			if _, ok := index[ref.ID]; !ok {
-				index[ref.ID] = ref
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if len(index) == 0 {
-		return ids.Empty, 0, 0, false
-	}
-
-	// Global credit: each reported tip vouches for every block on its content-addressed ancestry.
-	// The running backing at block B = the responder stake whose accepted chain contains B.
-	backing := make(map[ids.ID]StakeWeight)
-	voters := make(map[ids.ID]map[ids.NodeID]struct{})
-	for tip, st := range stakeOnTip {
-		cur := tip
-		for {
-			ref, ok := index[cur]
-			if !ok {
-				break // the served ancestry does not extend further down (or this tip was unserved)
-			}
-			backing[cur] += st
-			if voters[cur] == nil {
-				voters[cur] = make(map[ids.NodeID]struct{})
-			}
-			for v := range votersOf[tip] {
-				voters[cur][v] = struct{}{}
-			}
-			if ref.Parent == ids.Empty {
-				break
-			}
-			cur = ref.Parent
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Name the HIGHEST block clearing the floor with ≥ required distinct voters, at a height
-	// STRICTLY ABOVE MinFrontierHeight — a genuine frontier AHEAD. A block AT the node's own
-	// last-accepted height is NOT named here (it is history the node already holds, reachable as a
-	// ⅔-backed ANCESTOR of higher tips an eclipse can suppress below the naming threshold — the M1
-	// stale-go-live path): that case routes to CaughtUp, which alone can distinguish a legit
-	// all-at-N fleet (→ Ready at N) from an eclipse with ahead-tips the node lacks (→ sync). A block
-	// BELOW own height is a partition diverged beneath the node. Both fail safe, never false-complete.
-	var bestID ids.ID
-	var bestHeight, bestStake uint64
-	found := false
-	for id, st := range backing {
-		ref := index[id]
-		if st <= floor || len(voters[id]) < required || ref.Height <= p.MinFrontierHeight {
-			continue
-		}
-		if !found || ref.Height > bestHeight || (ref.Height == bestHeight && st > bestStake) {
-			bestID, bestHeight, bestStake, found = id, ref.Height, st, true
-		}
-	}
-	return bestID, bestHeight, bestStake, found
-}
-
-// sortedByStakeDesc returns the reported tips most-stake-first (stable id tiebreak) — the order
-// the ancestor-tolerant tally fetches anchors in, so the well-supported honest tips are covered
-// first and a forged low-stake outlier swarm falls outside the anchor cap.
-func sortedByStakeDesc(stakeOnTip map[ids.ID]StakeWeight) []ids.ID {
-	tips := make([]ids.ID, 0, len(stakeOnTip))
-	for t := range stakeOnTip {
-		tips = append(tips, t)
-	}
-	sort.Slice(tips, func(i, j int) bool {
-		if stakeOnTip[tips[i]] != stakeOnTip[tips[j]] {
-			return stakeOnTip[tips[i]] > stakeOnTip[tips[j]]
-		}
-		return bytes.Compare(tips[i][:], tips[j][:]) < 0
-	})
-	return tips
-}
@@ -1,918 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// bootstrap_trust_test.go — the A–G proof matrix for the BootstrapTrust policy: the SEPARATE
-// trust object (distinct from consensus finality) that lets a node recover when validators are
-// down (mass recovery) while refusing partition-capture and never weakening finality.
-//
-// Most cases test the POLICY decision (AcceptsFrontier) directly — deterministic, no network
-// timing — since that IS the acceptance gate the owner specified. The mass-recovery success (A)
-// and the global-tally height-floor guard also run the FULL fetch+execute loop over the real
-// transport to prove the node converges (or fails safe) end to end. Each is load-bearing: revert
-// the response-floor policy to the prior ⅔-of-current-total-stake gate and A deadlocks; drop the
-// configured-beacon filter and D/E capture; drop the MinFrontierHeight floor and the shared-
-// genesis fork false-completes.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/ed25519"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
-	chainbootstrap "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/bootstrap"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-)
-
-// ----- policy test helpers --------------------------------------------------
-
-// stubAncestry is an in-memory AncestrySource: it walks a parent-linked BlockRef map down from a
-// tip, exactly as the real wire transport would serve content-addressed ancestry. Modeling the
-// transport this way keeps the policy unit tests deterministic while exercising the real ancestor-
-// tolerant tally. `withhold` models a beacon that names a tip but does NOT serve its ancestry.
-type stubAncestry struct {
-	byID     map[ids.ID]BlockRef
-	withhold map[ids.ID]bool
-}
-
-func (s *stubAncestry) Ancestry(_ context.Context, tip ids.ID, max int) ([]BlockRef, error) {
-	if s.withhold[tip] {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	var out []BlockRef
-	cur := tip
-	for i := 0; i < max; i++ {
-		ref, ok := s.byID[cur]
-		if !ok {
-			break
-		}
-		out = append(out, ref)
-		if ref.Parent == ids.Empty {
-			break
-		}
-		cur = ref.Parent
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-// refChain builds genesis..n as content-addressed BlockRefs (parent-linked), returning the slice
-// and an id→ref index for the stub AncestrySource.
-func refChain(n int) ([]BlockRef, map[ids.ID]BlockRef) {
-	refs := make([]BlockRef, 0, n+1)
-	byID := map[ids.ID]BlockRef{}
-	var parent ids.ID
-	for h := 0; h <= n; h++ {
-		r := BlockRef{ID: ids.GenerateTestID(), Height: uint64(h), Parent: parent}
-		refs = append(refs, r)
-		byID[r.ID] = r
-		parent = r.ID
-	}
-	return refs, byID
-}
-
-// childRef makes a block extending `parent` at height parentHeight+1 — used to forge a "higher"
-// sibling tip built on a real block.
-func childRef(parent BlockRef) BlockRef {
-	return BlockRef{ID: ids.GenerateTestID(), Height: parent.Height + 1, Parent: parent.ID}
-}
-
-func nodeIDs(n int) []ids.NodeID {
-	out := make([]ids.NodeID, n)
-	for i := range out {
-		out[i] = ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// equalBeacons builds a TrustedBeacons map of equal-weight validators.
-func equalBeacons(beacons []ids.NodeID, w uint64) map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight {
-	m := make(map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight, len(beacons))
-	for _, id := range beacons {
-		m[id] = w
-	}
-	return m
-}
-
-func reply(id ids.NodeID, tip ids.ID, w uint64) BeaconReply {
-	return BeaconReply{NodeID: id, Tip: tip, Weight: w}
-}
-
-// equalStake is the owner's mainnet shape: 5 validators each 0.5e18, total 2.5e18.
-const equalStake uint64 = 500_000_000_000_000_000
-
-// ----- A: MASS RECOVERY SUCCESS ---------------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_A_MassRecoverySucceeds is THE deadlock fix. 5 EQUAL-weight validators; the 2
-// stranded recovery targets are down, so only 3 are reachable; the 3 reachable agree on the
-// frontier. With MinResponses=3 the policy ACCEPTS — even though 3 of 5 stake (1.5e18) is BELOW
-// the ⅔-of-current-total floor (1.667e18) that the prior code required to be CONNECTED. That old
-// floor was mathematically unsatisfiable here (the down nodes ARE validators), which is exactly
-// why no node could recover. This test pins both: the policy accepts, AND the old gate would have
-// rejected (the deadlock), AND the full loop converges over the real transport.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_A_MassRecoverySucceeds(t *testing.T) {
-	// The deadlock the fix escapes: 3-of-5 connected stake does NOT clear ⅔ of the total set.
-	require.LessOrEqual(t, 3*equalStake, consensusconfig.TwoThirdsStakeFloor(5*equalStake),
-		"precondition: 3 of 5 equal validators is BELOW ⅔ of total — the prior connect gate's deadlock")
-
-	// Policy decision: 5 configured, 3 reachable agree on the frontier (mainnet analog 1082796).
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	frontier := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake),
-		MinResponses:   3,
-	}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], frontier, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[1], frontier, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[2], frontier, equalStake),
-		// beacons[3], beacons[4] are down/stranded — no reply.
-	}
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "3 of 5 reachable beacons agreeing MUST be accepted — the mass-recovery case")
-	require.Equal(t, frontier, f.ID)
-	require.Equal(t, 3, f.Responders)
-	require.False(t, f.FromCheckpoint)
-
-	// End to end over the real GetAcceptedFrontier/GetAncestors transport: a STALE node with only
-	// 3 of its 5 equal-weight validators reachable converges to the frontier N (not stuck at M).
-	const N = 40
-	const M = 23
-	chain, byID := buildBSChain(N, -1)
-	vm := newBSVMAt(chain, M)
-	v := nodeIDs(5)
-	weights := equalBeacons(v, equalStake)
-	bh, chainID := newBSHandlerWeighted(t, vm, weights)
-	bh.bootstrapMinResponses = 3 // the owner's MinBootstrapResponses=3
-	bh.net = &bsBeaconNet{
-		bh: bh, chainID: chainID, connected: []ids.NodeID{v[0], v[1], v[2]}, // 2 stranded down
-		byID: byID, tip: chain[N], serveAncestors: true,
-	}
-	bh.msgCreator = bsMsgBuilder{}
-	ctx := context.Background()
-
-	bh.bsActive.Store(true)
-	tip, status := bh.FrontierTip(ctx)
-	bh.bsActive.Store(false)
-	require.Equal(t, chainbootstrap.FrontierNamed, status,
-		"MASS RECOVERY: 3 of 5 equal validators reachable + agreeing must NAME the frontier (no deadlock)")
-	require.Equal(t, chain[N].id, tip)
-
-	require.NoError(t, runBS(t, bh), "mass-recovery node must converge")
-	last, _ := vm.LastAccepted(ctx)
-	require.Equal(t, chain[N].id, last, "RECOVERED: converged to the frontier N=%d despite 2 of 5 validators down", N)
-	require.True(t, bh.Accepted(ctx, chain[N].id))
-}
-
-// ----- B: ONE-BEACON CAPTURE REJECTED ---------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_B_OneBeaconCaptureRejected: 5 configured, only 1 reachable. A single beacon —
-// even an authentic configured one — cannot name the frontier (it could be the attacker's lone
-// peer in an eclipse). The response FLOOR rejects it.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_B_OneBeaconCaptureRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake), MinResponses: 3}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{reply(beacons[0], ids.GenerateTestID(), equalStake)}
-
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.Nil(t, f)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses,
-		"1 of 5 reachable must be REJECTED (capture) — below the MinResponses floor")
-}
-
-// ----- C: TWO-BEACON PARTITION REJECTED -------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_C_TwoBeaconPartitionRejected: 5 configured, 2 reachable AGREEING. Two beacons
-// is still below MinResponses=3, so the policy rejects by default — an attacker who partitions the
-// node down to 2 beacons cannot capture the frontier even if both agree.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_C_TwoBeaconPartitionRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	frontier := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake), MinResponses: 3}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], frontier, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[1], frontier, equalStake),
-	}
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.Nil(t, f)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses,
-		"2 of 5 reachable + agreeing must be REJECTED by default — the partition-capture floor is MinResponses=3")
-}
-
-// ----- D: NON-CONFIGURED PEER IGNORED ---------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_D_NonConfiguredPeerIgnored: an attacker peer that is NOT in the configured
-// beacon set reports a higher forged tip. INVARIANT 1 (non-circular eligibility): peers never
-// define who is a beacon, so the forged reply is dropped entirely and the configured beacons name
-// the real frontier.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_D_NonConfiguredPeerIgnored(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	real := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	forgedHigher := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	attacker := ids.GenerateTestNodeID() // NOT in TrustedBeacons
-
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake), MinResponses: 3}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], real, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[1], real, equalStake),
-		reply(beacons[2], real, equalStake),
-		reply(attacker, forgedHigher, 9_000_000_000_000_000_000), // huge self-reported weight, ignored
-	}
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, real, f.ID, "the non-configured attacker's forged tip must be IGNORED")
-	require.NotEqual(t, forgedHigher, f.ID)
-	require.Equal(t, 3, f.Responders, "only the 3 configured beacons count toward the quorum")
-}
-
-// ----- E: MINORITY CONFIGURED FORGERY REJECTED ------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_E_MinorityConfiguredForgeryRejected: 3 honest configured beacons report
-// frontier A; 2 configured beacons report a FORGED tip B built directly on A (a forged higher
-// sibling). C1: the forgers can only RATIFY A (the real block they built on); B itself holds only
-// the Byzantine minority's stake and is NEVER named. The policy selects A.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_E_MinorityConfiguredForgeryRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	refs, byID := refChain(30) // genesis..30; A := refs[30]
-	A := refs[30]
-	forgedB := childRef(A) // forged sibling at height 31, parent = real A
-	byID[forgedB.ID] = forgedB
-
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, w),
-		MinResponses:   3,
-		Source:         &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], A.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[1], A.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[2], A.ID, w),       // 3 honest on A (300)
-		reply(beacons[3], forgedB.ID, w), // 2 Byzantine on the forged child (200)
-		reply(beacons[4], forgedB.ID, w),
-	}
-	// floor = ⅔ of 500 = 333. Neither A (300) nor forgedB (200) clears it directly, so the
-	// ancestor-tolerant tally runs: the forgers' stake flows DOWN through A (its real parent),
-	// crediting A with 500 while forgedB keeps only 200 → A named, forgedB never.
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, A.ID, f.ID, "C1: the forged child only RATIFIES A — A is named")
-	require.NotEqual(t, forgedB.ID, f.ID, "C1: the Byzantine-minority forged tip is NEVER named")
-	require.Equal(t, A.Height, f.Height)
-}
-
-// ----- F: SPLIT REACHABLE ANCESTRY ------------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_F_SplitReachableAncestrySelectsCommonAncestor: 3 reachable configured beacons
-// each report a DIFFERENT sibling tip (three pending blocks built on the same committed block H —
-// the healthy bleeding edge). No single tip holds a supermajority, but H is in all three accepted
-// chains, so the policy names H (the highest ⅔-of-responders common committed block), NOT any
-// isolated tip.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_F_SplitReachableAncestrySelectsCommonAncestor(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	refs, byID := refChain(39) // genesis..39; H := refs[39] (the common committed block)
-	H := refs[39]
-	a1, a2, a3 := childRef(H), childRef(H), childRef(H) // three sibling pending blocks at height 40
-	for _, c := range []BlockRef{a1, a2, a3} {
-		byID[c.ID] = c
-	}
-
-	beacons := nodeIDs(3)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, w),
-		MinResponses:   3,
-		Source:         &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], a1.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[1], a2.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[2], a3.ID, w),
-	}
-	// floor = ⅔ of 300 = 200. Each sibling holds only 100, but H is shared by all three → 300 > 200.
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, H.ID, f.ID, "must select the common committed ancestor H")
-	require.Equal(t, H.Height, f.Height)
-	require.NotEqual(t, a1.ID, f.ID)
-	require.NotEqual(t, a2.ID, f.ID)
-	require.NotEqual(t, a3.ID, f.ID)
-}
-
-// ----- G: FINALITY UNCHANGED ------------------------------------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_G_FinalityUnchanged proves INVARIANT 3: a bootstrap-accepted frontier is NOT
-// finality. The SAME 3-of-5 support that AcceptsFrontier admits as a sync anchor does NOT satisfy
-// FinalityQuorum.HasFinality — live block acceptance still requires > ⅔ of CURRENT validator
-// stake (4 of 5 here). The bootstrap quorum cannot finalize a block.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_G_FinalityUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	const total = 5 * w
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	frontier := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, w), MinResponses: 3}
-
-	// BootstrapTrust ACCEPTS 3 of 5 (a sync anchor).
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], frontier, w),
-		reply(beacons[1], frontier, w),
-		reply(beacons[2], frontier, w),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, frontier, f.ID)
-	require.Equal(t, StakeWeight(3*w), f.Weight, "the frontier is backed by exactly the 3 responders")
-
-	// FinalityQuorum says that SAME 3-of-5 weight is NOT finality — the decisions are different
-	// objects with different thresholds. Finality is unchanged: it still needs > ⅔ (4 of 5).
-	cq := DefaultFinalityQuorum()
-	require.False(t, cq.HasFinality(3*w, total),
-		"INVARIANT 3: a bootstrap-accepted frontier (3 of 5) is NOT a finalizing supermajority")
-	require.True(t, cq.HasFinality(4*w, total),
-		"finality UNCHANGED: > ⅔ of current stake (4 of 5) still finalizes")
-	require.False(t, cq.HasFinality(f.Weight, total),
-		"the bootstrap quorum's own backing weight cannot finalize a block")
-
-	// AFTER-SYNC (the owner's "bootstrap is not a finality bypass"): the node has now SYNCED to the
-	// frontier via BootstrapTrust and re-entered live consensus. A NEW block that collects the SAME
-	// 3-of-5 stake STILL does not finalize — bootstrap admitted a sync ANCHOR, it did not lower the
-	// finality bar. Live acceptance returns to strict > ⅔ of CURRENT stake, exactly as before any
-	// bootstrap. HasFinality is stateless in the bootstrap outcome, which is the whole point: there
-	// is no code path by which "we bootstrapped from 3/5" leaks into the finality decision.
-	require.False(t, cq.HasFinality(3*w, total),
-		"AFTER syncing from a 3-of-5 bootstrap frontier, live finality STILL needs > ⅔ (4 of 5) — no bypass")
-}
-
-// ----- checkpoint override (complements B) ----------------------------------
-
-// edCheckpointAuthority is a test checkpoint authority backed by Ed25519 — a PROVEN primitive, no
-// custom crypto. It signs a checkpoint's canonical (id,height) message and verifies against its own
-// public key, rejecting an empty signature and any key that is not the configured authority.
-type edCheckpointAuthority struct {
-	priv ed25519.PrivateKey
-	pub  ed25519.PublicKey
-}
-
-func newEdCheckpointAuthority(t *testing.T) *edCheckpointAuthority {
-	t.Helper()
-	pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return &edCheckpointAuthority{priv: priv, pub: pub}
-}
-
-func (a *edCheckpointAuthority) sign(id ids.ID, height uint64) []byte {
-	return ed25519.Sign(a.priv, CanonicalCheckpointMessage(id, height))
-}
-
-// VerifyCheckpoint implements CheckpointVerifier: authenticate against the authority's public key.
-func (a *edCheckpointAuthority) VerifyCheckpoint(id ids.ID, height uint64, sig []byte) bool {
-	return len(sig) != 0 && ed25519.Verify(a.pub, CanonicalCheckpointMessage(id, height), sig)
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CheckpointOverride: below the response floor (1 of 5), the DEFAULT is reject
-// (test B), but an operator who pins a SIGNED checkpoint gets the explicit override — the node
-// anchors to the authenticated (id,height) instead of trusting the lone beacon. This is the
-// sanctioned escape hatch for a deeply-partitioned node, NEVER an open-ended ≥1-beacon acceptance,
-// and (INVARIANT 4) NEVER a bare unsigned config value.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CheckpointOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	authority := newEdCheckpointAuthority(t)
-	ckptID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	const ckptHeight = uint64(1_082_796)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:     equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake),
-		MinResponses:       3,
-		Checkpoint:         &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: ckptHeight, Signature: authority.sign(ckptID, ckptHeight)},
-		CheckpointVerifier: authority,
-	}
-	// 1 reachable beacon — below the floor — but a SIGNED checkpoint is pinned.
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], ids.GenerateTestID(), equalStake),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.True(t, f.FromCheckpoint, "below the floor with a SIGNED checkpoint → anchor to the checkpoint")
-	require.Equal(t, ckptID, f.ID)
-	require.Equal(t, ckptHeight, f.Height)
-
-	// Without the checkpoint the same 1-of-5 is rejected (the default — never trust the lone beacon).
-	policy.Checkpoint = nil
-	_, err = policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], ids.GenerateTestID(), equalStake),
-	})
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses)
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CheckpointMustBeSigned is INVARIANT 4: a checkpoint that is present but not
-// AUTHENTICATED is REJECTED (fail closed). A compromised flag/config that pins a false (id,height)
-// cannot inject a sync anchor without the authority's signature. Four rejection modes, one accept.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CheckpointMustBeSigned(t *testing.T) {
-	beacons := nodeIDs(5)
-	authority := newEdCheckpointAuthority(t)
-	attacker := newEdCheckpointAuthority(t) // a DIFFERENT key — not the configured authority
-	ckptID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	const h = uint64(500_000)
-	lone := []BeaconReply{reply(beacons[0], ids.GenerateTestID(), equalStake)} // 1-of-5, below floor
-
-	base := func() *BootstrapPolicy {
-		return &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(beacons, equalStake), MinResponses: 3, CheckpointVerifier: authority}
-	}
-
-	// (1) UNSIGNED checkpoint (empty signature) → rejected even with a verifier wired.
-	p := base()
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: h}
-	_, err := p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "an UNSIGNED checkpoint must be rejected")
-
-	// (2) signed by a NON-AUTHORITY (attacker) key → rejected.
-	p = base()
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: h, Signature: attacker.sign(ckptID, h)}
-	_, err = p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "a checkpoint signed by a non-authority key must be rejected")
-
-	// (3) authority signature over a DIFFERENT (id,height) — replay onto a forged anchor → rejected.
-	p = base()
-	forgedID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: forgedID, Height: h, Signature: authority.sign(ckptID, h)} // sig binds ckptID, not forgedID
-	_, err = p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "a signature transplanted to a different (id,height) must be rejected")
-
-	// (4) NO verifier configured → any checkpoint is untrusted (fail closed).
-	p = base()
-	p.CheckpointVerifier = nil
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: h, Signature: authority.sign(ckptID, h)}
-	_, err = p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "no verifier ⇒ even a validly-signed checkpoint is untrusted")
-
-	// (accept) authority signs the exact pinned (id,height) → trusted.
-	p = base()
-	p.Checkpoint = &Checkpoint{ID: ckptID, Height: h, Signature: authority.sign(ckptID, h)}
-	f, err := p.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), lone)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.True(t, f.FromCheckpoint)
-	require.Equal(t, ckptID, f.ID)
-}
-
-// ----- safety guard for the global ancestor-tolerant tally ------------------
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_ForkAtSharedGenesisFailsSafe is the load-bearing guard for the
-// MinFrontierHeight floor — the safety property the global cross-anchor tally (which makes case F
-// work) would otherwise break. Two branches fork at a DEEP shared ancestor H (height 5), and the
-// node is stale ABOVE the fork (height 23). The tally credits H with the union of BOTH halves'
-// stake (all responders share H), so without the floor it would name H — and since the node
-// already HOLDS H, the loop would FALSE-COMPLETE at the stale height instead of recognizing it has
-// no ⅔-agreed frontier ahead. The MinFrontierHeight floor refuses to name any block beneath the
-// node's last-accepted height, turning the partition into a safe ErrNoBootstrapQuorum.
-//
-// Asserted deterministically at the POLICY level (a stub AncestrySource serves BOTH branches'
-// shared ancestry — the real wire transport's rotated sampling may only serve one, masking the
-// vulnerability, so the integration path is NOT a faithful test of this guard). Revert the floor
-// (set MinFrontierHeight: 0) and this names H instead of failing safe.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_ForkAtSharedGenesisFailsSafe(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	const nodeHeight = 23
-
-	// Shared prefix genesis..H (H at height 5), then two divergent branches to height 40.
-	shared, byID := refChain(5)
-	H := shared[5]
-	branchA := []BlockRef{H}
-	branchB := []BlockRef{H}
-	for h := 6; h <= 40; h++ {
-		a := childRef(branchA[len(branchA)-1])
-		b := childRef(branchB[len(branchB)-1])
-		byID[a.ID], byID[b.ID] = a, b
-		branchA = append(branchA, a)
-		branchB = append(branchB, b)
-	}
-	tipA, tipB := branchA[len(branchA)-1], branchB[len(branchB)-1]
-
-	beacons := nodeIDs(6)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    equalBeacons(beacons, w),
-		MinResponses:      4,
-		MinFrontierHeight: nodeHeight, // the node is stale at height 23, ABOVE the fork at 5
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(beacons[0], tipA.ID, w), reply(beacons[1], tipA.ID, w), reply(beacons[2], tipA.ID, w),
-		reply(beacons[3], tipB.ID, w), reply(beacons[4], tipB.ID, w), reply(beacons[5], tipB.ID, w),
-	}
-	// H (height 5) is shared by all 6 → 600 > floor(400). But it is BELOW the node's height, so the
-	// floor refuses it; no block at/above height 23 has ⅔ → fail safe.
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.Nil(t, f, "must not name the deep shared ancestor — that would false-complete at the stale height")
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoBootstrapQuorum,
-		"a fork sharing only blocks BELOW the node's height must fail safe, never name the deep common ancestor")
-
-	// The same split with the node BELOW the fork (a fresh node) legitimately names H — the floor
-	// only blocks naming history the node already has, never a real frontier ahead.
-	policy.MinFrontierHeight = 0
-	f, err = policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, H.ID, f.ID, "with the node below the fork, H IS the ⅔-common frontier to sync to")
-}
-
-// ----- H: SKEWED-WEIGHT PARTITION-CAPTURE (the re-red HIGH; MinResponseWeight floor) ---------
-
-// weightedBeacons builds a TrustedBeacons map from an explicit per-node weight list — for
-// modeling a SKEWED (non-uniform) validator stake distribution.
-func weightedBeacons(beacons []ids.NodeID, w []uint64) map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight {
-	m := make(map[ids.NodeID]StakeWeight, len(beacons))
-	for i, id := range beacons {
-		m[id] = StakeWeight(w[i])
-	}
-	return m
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_H_SkewedWeightPartitionRejected is the load-bearing regression for the re-red
-// HIGH finding. Under SKEWED validator weights the MinResponses COUNT floor and the ⅔-of-responders
-// WEIGHT agreement diverge: an attacker who eclipses the HEAVY honest beacon but lets enough LIGHT
-// honest beacons through to satisfy the count can shrink the responder-WEIGHT denominator until his
-// < ⅓-of-total Byzantine stake clears ⅔-of-responders and NAMES A FORGED FRONTIER. The MinResponseWeight
-// stake-majority floor (> ½ of TOTAL configured beacon stake) closes this — a < ⅓-stake adversary can
-// never make the responders carry a ⅔ weight majority once they must also carry > ½ of the total.
-//
-// Red's PoC: 6 beacons w={3,3,13,1,1,1}, total 22, Byzantine {B0,B1}=6 (27% < ⅓). The attacker
-// partitions to {B0,B1 on forgedF} + {H2,H3 on realR} = 4 responders (= the majority count floor),
-// responderWeight=8, ⅔-floor=5, backing[forgedF]=6 > 5 → forgedF would be named. The heavy honest H1
-// (weight 13, on the real tip) is eclipsed. With MinResponseWeight=⌈22/2⌉=12, responderWeight=8 < 12
-// → the partition is rejected (the node waits for / re-samples a stake-majority of beacons).
-func TestBootstrapTrust_H_SkewedWeightPartitionRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	refs, byID := refChain(30)
-	realR := refs[30]
-	forgedF := childRef(realR) // forged sibling at height 31 (its only honest ancestor is realR)
-	byID[forgedF.ID] = forgedF
-
-	b := nodeIDs(6)
-	weights := []uint64{3, 3, 13, 1, 1, 1} // total 22; Byzantine b[0],b[1]=6 (<⅓)
-	var total uint64
-	for _, w := range weights {
-		total += w
-	}
-	tb := weightedBeacons(b, weights)
-
-	// The eclipse: only the 2 Byzantine + 2 LIGHT honest answer; the HEAVY honest b[2] (the real
-	// tip's weight-13 voter) and b[5] are partitioned away.
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], forgedF.ID, weights[0]), // Byzantine, light
-		reply(b[1], forgedF.ID, weights[1]), // Byzantine, light
-		reply(b[3], realR.ID, weights[3]),   // honest, light
-		reply(b[4], realR.ID, weights[4]),   // honest, light
-	}
-
-	// WITHOUT the stake-majority floor (the bug): the forged tip is named.
-	vuln := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: tb, MinResponses: 4, Source: &stubAncestry{byID: byID}}
-	if f, err := vuln.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies); err == nil && f != nil {
-		require.Equal(t, forgedF.ID, f.ID,
-			"VULN PRECONDITION: without MinResponseWeight the eclipsed skewed partition names the forged tip (proves the floor is load-bearing)")
-	}
-
-	// WITH the stake-majority floor (the fix, exactly as bootstrapPolicy() now wires it): rejected.
-	fixed := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    tb,
-		MinResponses:      4,
-		MinResponseWeight: StakeWeight(total/2 + 1), // ⌈total/2⌉ = 12
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-	_, err := fixed.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses,
-		"FIX: responderWeight 8 < ½-stake floor 12 → the skewed partition cannot name a frontier (forged or otherwise)")
-
-	// And the fix still admits an HONEST stake-majority: add the heavy honest H1 (weight 13) on realR.
-	full := append(replies, reply(b[2], realR.ID, weights[2])) // responderWeight 8+13 = 21 ≥ 12
-	f, err := fixed.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), full)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "an honest stake-majority of responders still names the real frontier")
-	require.Equal(t, realR.ID, f.ID, "the real tip is named once a stake-majority is reachable; forged never")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_D2_NonConfiguredSwarmNamesNothing is the cleaner load-bearing isolation of the
-// configured-beacon filter (INVARIANT 1) that the re-red asked for: a SWARM of non-configured peers
-// (enough to clear any count floor on their own) all shouting a forged frontier names NOTHING,
-// because none is in TrustedBeacons. This proves the filter, not merely the MinResponders floor.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_D2_NonConfiguredSwarmNamesNothing(t *testing.T) {
-	const w uint64 = 100
-	refs, byID := refChain(30)
-	real := refs[30]
-	forged, fbyID := refChain(40) // a wholly forged chain from a fresh genesis
-	for id, r := range fbyID {
-		byID[id] = r
-	}
-
-	configured := nodeIDs(3) // the real beacon set
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    equalBeacons(configured, w),
-		MinResponses:      2,
-		MinResponseWeight: StakeWeight(w*3/2 + 1),
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-
-	// 50 non-configured peers, each heavy, all on the forged tip — NOT in TrustedBeacons.
-	swarm := nodeIDs(50)
-	var replies []BeaconReply
-	for _, p := range swarm {
-		replies = append(replies, reply(p, forged[40].ID, 9_000_000))
-	}
-	_, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses,
-		"INVARIANT 1: non-configured peers carry ZERO weight — a forged swarm names nothing")
-
-	// Add the 3 real configured beacons on the real tip → the real tip is named, swarm invisible.
-	for _, c := range configured {
-		replies = append(replies, reply(c, real.ID, w))
-	}
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, real.ID, f.ID, "only configured beacons name the frontier; the 50-peer forged swarm is ignored")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapPolicy_WiresStakeMajorityFloor is the regression guard the re-red flagged (LOW):
-// the production constructor bootstrapPolicy() MUST emit MinResponseWeight = ⌈total/2⌉. The H/D2
-// tests construct policies directly, so a mutation that stops the constructor from setting the
-// floor would not be caught — this asserts the WIRING on the real production path. Mutation-proof:
-// neuter `if total > 0` in bootstrapPolicy() and this test fails (MinResponseWeight==0).
-func TestBootstrapPolicy_WiresStakeMajorityFloor(t *testing.T) {
-	refs, _ := refChain(5)
-	vm := newBSVMAt(refs5BSBlocks(refs), 0)
-	bh, _ := newBSHandlerWeighted(t, vm, map[ids.NodeID]uint64{}) // handler shell; we call bootstrapPolicy directly
-
-	// SKEWED set: total = 22, ⌈total/2⌉ = 12.
-	b := nodeIDs(6)
-	weights := map[ids.NodeID]uint64{b[0]: 3, b[1]: 3, b[2]: 13, b[3]: 1, b[4]: 1, b[5]: 1}
-	var total uint64
-	for _, w := range weights {
-		total += w
-	}
-
-	pol := bh.bootstrapPolicy(weights)
-	require.Equal(t, StakeWeight(total/2+1), pol.MinResponseWeight,
-		"REGRESSION: bootstrapPolicy() must wire MinResponseWeight = ⌈total/2⌉ (skewed-weight floor)")
-	require.Equal(t, len(weights)/2+1, pol.MinResponses,
-		"bootstrapPolicy() must wire the count-majority floor too")
-	require.NotNil(t, pol.Source, "the policy must carry an AncestrySource")
-
-	// EQUAL-weight: 5 × 0.5e18 — the floor must not re-deadlock 3-of-5 (= 0.6 ≥ 0.5).
-	eq := equalBeacons(nodeIDs(5), 500_000_000_000_000_000)
-	var eqTotal uint64
-	for _, w := range eq {
-		eqTotal += uint64(w)
-	}
-	eqPol := bh.bootstrapPolicy(eq)
-	require.Equal(t, StakeWeight(eqTotal/2+1), eqPol.MinResponseWeight)
-	require.Less(t, eqPol.MinResponseWeight, StakeWeight(3*500_000_000_000_000_000),
-		"3-of-5 equal stake (0.6·total) must clear the ½ floor — no re-deadlock")
-
-	// DEGENERATE: empty weights → floor disabled (0), no panic.
-	require.Equal(t, StakeWeight(0), bh.bootstrapPolicy(map[ids.NodeID]uint64{}).MinResponseWeight,
-		"empty weights → MinResponseWeight disabled (pre-P-chain / single-node fallback)")
-}
-
-// refs5BSBlocks adapts a BlockRef chain to the []*bsTestBlock the bsTestVM needs (genesis only
-// accepted), so newBSHandlerWeighted has a VM. The handler is used only to call bootstrapPolicy().
-func refs5BSBlocks(refs []BlockRef) []*bsTestBlock {
-	out := make([]*bsTestBlock, len(refs))
-	var parent ids.ID
-	for i, r := range refs {
-		out[i] = &bsTestBlock{id: r.ID, parent: parent, height: r.Height, bytes: []byte(r.ID.String()), valid: true}
-		parent = r.ID
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// ----- CaughtUp: the tip-holder go-live determination (RED CRITICAL fix) ----
-//
-// CaughtUp is the DUAL of AcceptsFrontier — "nobody is ahead" vs "here is the block ahead to sync
-// to". It is the go-live path for a TIP-HOLDER on a mixed-height co-restart, where the responders
-// SPLIT below the ⅔ naming threshold so AcceptsFrontier names NOTHING yet the node is plainly not
-// behind. Getting its SAFETY exactly right is the hinge between "fixes the freeze" and "reopens the
-// stale-go-live bug": these pin all three conditions (floor met, none-ahead, holds-every-tip) and
-// prove the two adversarial fake-caught-up attempts FAIL.
-
-// heldOracle builds the height ORACLE CaughtUp injects: a block's height, ok=false when not held.
-func heldOracle(held map[ids.ID]uint64) func(ids.ID) (uint64, bool) {
-	return func(id ids.ID) (uint64, bool) { h, ok := held[id]; return h, ok }
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_TipHolderSplitGoesReady is the CRITICAL regression at the policy layer:
-// the EXACT mainnet co-restart shape. A producer at N sees 4 responders split {N, N, N-16, genesis};
-// the tip-holders are only ½ (< ⅔), so AcceptsFrontier names NOTHING (ErrNoBootstrapQuorum) — yet the
-// node holds every reported tip and none is above N, so CaughtUp is TRUE. It pins BOTH halves: the
-// SAME replies yield no NAMED frontier (the case the tip-holder fails safe DOWN without this fix) but
-// ARE caught-up.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_TipHolderSplitGoesReady(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, byID := refChain(N) // genesis..N
-	b := nodeIDs(5)           // 5 equal-weight beacons (the node is the 5th, not a responder)
-	const w = uint64(100)     // total 500 → MinResponseWeight ⌈500/2⌉=251, MinResponses majority=3
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    equalBeacons(b, w),
-		MinResponses:      3,
-		MinResponseWeight: 251,
-		MinFrontierHeight: N,
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-
-	// 4 connected responders: 2 at the tip N, one stale at N-16, one at genesis — the production shape.
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[2], refs[N-16].ID, w),
-		reply(b[3], refs[0].ID, w),
-	}
-
-	// HALF 1: AcceptsFrontier names NOTHING — the tip-holders (200) do not clear ⅔ (266), and the
-	// ⅔-backed common ancestor N-16 is below MinFrontierHeight=N (history the node already has).
-	_, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoBootstrapQuorum,
-		"the mixed-height split names no frontier — exactly the case the tip-holder froze on without CaughtUp")
-
-	// HALF 2: the node HOLDS its accepted chain 0..N, so it holds every reported tip and none is above
-	// N → CaughtUp is TRUE. This is the go-live path the regression was missing.
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N].ID: N, refs[N-16].ID: N - 16, refs[0].ID: 0}
-	require.True(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a tip-holder that holds every reported tip and is at the top of all of them IS caught up")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_StaleNodeNotCaughtUp is the FORWARD safety guard (the stale-go-live bug
-// staying FIXED): a STALE node at N-16 with honest producers at N PRESENT must NOT be caught-up — an
-// honest responder is ahead, so it still SYNCS. CaughtUp must not fire merely because SOME responders
-// are at/below the node.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_StaleNodeNotCaughtUp(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N)
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N - 16}
-
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),    // honest, AHEAD
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),    // honest, AHEAD
-		reply(b[2], refs[N-16].ID, w), // at the node's height
-		reply(b[3], refs[N-20].ID, w), // below
-	}
-	// The node holds only 0..N-16 — it does NOT hold the producers' tip N.
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N-16].ID: N - 16, refs[N-20].ID: N - 20}
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N-16, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a stale node with an honest responder ahead must NOT be caught up — it syncs (stale-go-live stays fixed)")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_StaleNodeMinorityFakeRejected is adversarial fake-caught-up #1 (honest
-// present): a node at N-16 where a <⅓-stake set of beacons reports ≤ N-16 to fake caught-up WHILE the
-// honest producers at N are also present. The honest max is ahead (and the node lacks tip N) → NOT
-// caught up. The minority cannot fake it past the honest responders.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_StaleNodeMinorityFakeRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N)
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N - 16}
-
-	// 3 honest producers at N (ahead) + 1 Byzantine at N-16 trying to fake "everyone is at my height".
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[2], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[3], refs[N-16].ID, w), // the < ⅓ liar
-	}
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N-16].ID: N - 16} // node holds only up to N-16
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N-16, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a <⅓ minority reporting ≤N-16 cannot fake caught-up while honest producers at N are present")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_EclipsedMinorityFailsSafe is adversarial fake-caught-up #2 (honest
-// eclipsed): the honest producers (at N) are SUPPRESSED and only a <½-stake set of beacons reports
-// ≤ N-16. The response FLOOR (the SAME one AcceptsFrontier uses) is not met → CaughtUp is FALSE →
-// fail safe. Faking caught-up costs the same stake-majority of honest beacons that faking a NAMED
-// frontier does — no partition-capture.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_EclipsedMinorityFailsSafe(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N)
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100) // total 500 → MinResponseWeight 251
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N - 16}
-
-	// Only 2 of 5 beacons answer (the honest producers at N are eclipsed). Their weight 200 < 251.
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[2], refs[N-16].ID, w),
-		reply(b[3], refs[N-20].ID, w),
-	}
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N-16].ID: N - 16, refs[N-20].ID: N - 20}
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N-16, heldOracle(held)),
-		"an eclipsed <½-stake responder set cannot fake caught-up — the floor is not met (fail safe)")
-
-	// Sanity: AcceptsFrontier ALSO rejects this set below the floor (the SAME floor gates both paths).
-	_, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInsufficientBootstrapResponses, "the same floor gates naming and caught-up")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_OneAcceptedBlockBehindSyncs proves condition (b) uses the ACCEPTED
-// height: a node at accepted N that has merely PROCESSED N+1 (holds it) is NOT caught up when a
-// producer has ACCEPTED N+1 — it must sync that block. heightOf reads the block's canonical height,
-// so a held-but-above-lastAccepted tip correctly defeats caught-up (the ±1 pending skew cannot fake it).
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_OneAcceptedBlockBehindSyncs(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N + 1) // includes N+1
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N+1].ID, w), // a producer ACCEPTED N+1
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[2], refs[N].ID, w),
-	}
-	// The node holds 0..N AND has processed N+1 (held), but its ACCEPTED height is N.
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N+1].ID: N + 1, refs[N].ID: N}
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a node one ACCEPTED block behind (even if it processed N+1) must NOT be caught up — it syncs")
-}
-
-// TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_SameHeightForkNotHeld proves condition (c): a responder reporting a
-// DIFFERENT block at the node's height (a fork the node never finalized) defeats caught-up — the node
-// must HOLD every reported tip, not merely match heights numerically.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_CaughtUp_SameHeightForkNotHeld(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40
-	refs, _ := refChain(N)
-	fork := BlockRef{ID: ids.GenerateTestID(), Height: N} // a sibling at height N the node does NOT hold
-	b := nodeIDs(5)
-	const w = uint64(100)
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{TrustedBeacons: equalBeacons(b, w), MinResponses: 3, MinResponseWeight: 251, MinFrontierHeight: N}
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),
-		reply(b[2], fork.ID, w), // a fork at the same height N
-	}
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{refs[N].ID: N} // the node holds its tip N but NOT the fork
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N, heldOracle(held)),
-		"a same-height fork the node does not hold defeats caught-up (condition c: holds every reported tip)")
-}
-
-// ----- M1: the pre-existing eclipse-stale own-height path (red fast-follow) ------------------
-//
-// M1 is the pre-existing path the own-height filter tightening closes. BEFORE: nameFrontier filtered
-// the ancestor-tolerant tally with `ref.Height < MinFrontierHeight` (== the node's own last-accepted),
-// so a block AT the node's own height PASSED the filter and could be NAMED. An eclipse that throttles
-// the genuinely-ahead responders below the ⅔ naming threshold — while letting the at-height responders
-// through — makes the node's OWN height accrue ⅔ purely as the shared ANCESTOR of those ahead tips, so
-// nameFrontier names it → FrontierNamed at own height → the node goes Ready STALE (here, 5 blocks
-// behind a finalized N+5). AFTER: the filter is `ref.Height <= MinFrontierHeight`, so own height is
-// EXCLUDED from naming; the at-own-height decision routes to CaughtUp, which SEES the N+5 ahead tips
-// (un-held, above) and REFUSES → the node syncs/fails safe instead of going Ready stale.
-//
-// Deterministic, no network timing. Revert the filter to `<` and the first assertion (own height
-// NOT named → ErrNoBootstrapQuorum) FAILS — that revert IS the M1 bug, so this is the RED-before /
-// GREEN-after pin. The boundary sub-assertion (one notch lower DOES name N) proves it is precisely
-// the OWN-HEIGHT exclusion doing the work, not some unrelated filter.
-func TestBootstrapTrust_EclipseOwnHeightNotNamedRoutesToCaughtUp(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 40       // the node's own last-accepted height
-	const ahead = N + 5 // a GENUINELY FINALIZED block 5 ahead — the eclipse throttles its visibility
-	refs, byID := refChain(ahead) // genesis..N+5, parent-linked; the ahead set's tip descends through N
-	const w = uint64(100)
-
-	b := nodeIDs(6) // 6 configured beacons @100 → total 600; MinResponseWeight ⌈600/2⌉=301, MinResponses majority=4
-	policy := &BootstrapPolicy{
-		TrustedBeacons:    equalBeacons(b, w),
-		MinResponses:      4,
-		MinResponseWeight: 301,
-		MinFrontierHeight: N, // the node's own last-accepted height — exactly the M1 boundary
-		Source:            &stubAncestry{byID: byID},
-	}
-
-	// THE ECLIPSE CONSTRUCTION (red's, verbatim numbers): the ahead responders are throttled to
-	// R_a = 300 (3 beacons at N+5, BELOW the ⅔-of-responders naming threshold), the behind/at-height
-	// responders R_b = 200 (2 beacons at N) all get through; the 6th beacon is eclipsed (no reply).
-	// R = R_a + R_b = 500 > ½·600 (floor met). R_a = 300 < ⅔R = 333 (so N+5 is NOT named). YET block N
-	// accrues R_a + R_b = 500 > ⅔R because the ahead nodes credit N as an ANCESTOR of N+5.
-	replies := []BeaconReply{
-		reply(b[0], refs[N].ID, w),     // at the node's own height N
-		reply(b[1], refs[N].ID, w),     // at the node's own height N  (R_b = 200)
-		reply(b[2], refs[ahead].ID, w), // genuinely ahead at N+5
-		reply(b[3], refs[ahead].ID, w), // genuinely ahead at N+5
-		reply(b[4], refs[ahead].ID, w), // genuinely ahead at N+5      (R_a = 300, < ⅔·500 = 333)
-		// b[5] eclipsed — no reply.
-	}
-
-	// Sanity pins on the construction (so a future edit that breaks the eclipse shape is caught).
-	require.Equal(t, uint64(333), Ratio{2, 3}.floorOf(500), "⅔-of-responders floor over R=500 is 333")
-	require.Less(t, uint64(300), uint64(333), "R_a=300 is BELOW the ⅔ naming threshold — N+5 is not nameable")
-
-	// AFTER (the fix): own height N is EXCLUDED from naming → no ⅔-backed block ABOVE N exists
-	// (N+5 is sub-⅔) → ErrNoBootstrapQuorum. (Revert `<=`→`<` and this names refs[N] — the M1 bug.)
-	_, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoBootstrapQuorum,
-		"M1 FIX: the node's OWN height must NOT be named even when ahead tips credit it as a ⅔-backed ancestor")
-
-	// …and the decision routes to CaughtUp, which SEES the genuinely-ahead N+5 tips (un-held, above
-	// the node's height) and REFUSES — so the node syncs toward N+5, never goes Ready at stale N.
-	held := map[ids.ID]uint64{} // the node holds 0..N, NOT N+1..N+5
-	for h := 0; h <= N; h++ {
-		held[refs[h].ID] = uint64(h)
-	}
-	require.False(t, policy.CaughtUp(replies, N, heldOracle(held)),
-		"M1 FIX: routed to CaughtUp, the eclipse's ahead tips (un-held, above N) correctly defeat caught-up → sync")
-
-	// BOUNDARY: the SAME replies with MinFrontierHeight one notch lower (N-1) DO name N (height N is
-	// now STRICTLY ABOVE the floor). This proves the refusal above is precisely the OWN-HEIGHT
-	// exclusion — not the ⅔ tally, the responder floor, or the voter count — doing the work.
-	policy.MinFrontierHeight = N - 1
-	f, err := policy.AcceptsFrontier(context.Background(), replies)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "one notch below own height, N is strictly above the floor and IS the ⅔-common frontier")
-	require.Equal(t, refs[N].ID, f.ID, "boundary: N is named iff its height is STRICTLY ABOVE MinFrontierHeight")
-	require.Equal(t, uint64(N), f.Height)
-}
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// catchup_frame_test.go — the CERT-CARRYING catch-up wire format. These prove the
-// load-bearing property: a v2 (block,cert) entry round-trips, an entry with no cert
-// routes to the vote path, and a cross-version exchange fails CLEANLY (a legacy
-// decoder cannot misparse a v2 frame, and the v2 decoder treats a legacy raw block
-// as legacy — never a partial/garbage parse). The cert-accept SEMANTICS are proven
-// in the consensus engine tests; here we pin only the framing.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	block := []byte("\xf9\x02\x00 a realistic-ish block body")
-	cert := []byte("a-marshaled-quorum-cert")
-
-	blk, crt, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(encodeCatchupEntry(block, cert))
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("a v2 entry must decode as a v2 entry")
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(blk, block) {
-		t.Fatalf("block bytes corrupted: got %q want %q", blk, block)
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(crt, cert) {
-		t.Fatalf("cert bytes corrupted: got %q want %q", crt, cert)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_EmptyCertRoutesToVotePath(t *testing.T) {
-	// A still-pending block served on the live missing-parent path carries no cert.
-	// It must decode as a v2 entry with an EMPTY cert — the requester then votes on
-	// it (handleContext routes certLen==0 to Put), the legacy behaviour.
-	block := []byte("pending-block-no-cert")
-	blk, crt, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(encodeCatchupEntry(block, nil))
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("a v2 entry with empty cert must still decode as v2")
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(blk, block) {
-		t.Fatalf("block bytes corrupted: got %q", blk)
-	}
-	if len(crt) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("cert must be empty, got %d bytes", len(crt))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_LegacyRawBlockIsNotV2(t *testing.T) {
-	// A legacy responder sends the raw block as the container (no magic). The v2
-	// decoder must report ok=false so handleContext treats it as a raw block (Put),
-	// never as a malformed v2 entry. Cover several real block-prefix shapes.
-	for _, raw := range [][]byte{
-		{0xf9, 0x02, 0x00, 0x11, 0x22}, // EVM/RLP list header
-		{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2a},       // P/X-chain codec version prefix
-		{},                             // empty
-		[]byte("LCU"),                  // 3 bytes — too short to even hold the magic
-	} {
-		if _, _, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(raw); ok {
-			t.Fatalf("legacy raw block %x must NOT decode as a v2 entry", raw)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_MagicIsNotAPlausibleLength(t *testing.T) {
-	// CROSS-VERSION SAFETY (new responder → legacy requester): a legacy decoder reads
-	// the first 4 bytes of a v2 entry as a uint32 length. The magic must be so large
-	// that it always exceeds the remaining buffer, so the legacy loop rejects the
-	// frame (0 blocks processed) rather than consuming garbage. 0x4C435532 ≈ 1.28 GB.
-	asLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(catchupEntryMagic[:])
-	if asLen < (1 << 30) {
-		t.Fatalf("magic read as a length (%d) is too small — a legacy decoder could misparse a v2 frame", asLen)
-	}
-	// And a full v2 frame's leading length-word (the magic) dwarfs the frame itself,
-	// so the legacy `blockLen > remaining` guard always fires.
-	frame := encodeCatchupEntry([]byte("blk"), []byte("crt"))
-	if uint64(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(frame[:4])) <= uint64(len(frame)) {
-		t.Fatal("magic-as-length must exceed the frame length so a legacy decoder self-rejects")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCatchupEntry_CorruptV2FramesRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	good := encodeCatchupEntry([]byte("block-body"), []byte("cert-body"))
-
-	// Truncations inside the v2 structure must fail to ok=false (never a partial
-	// parse): drop the trailing cert byte, drop the certLen word, etc.
-	for _, bad := range [][]byte{
-		good[:len(good)-1], // last cert byte missing → certLen != remaining
-		good[:len(good)-5], // certLen word + cert missing
-		good[:8],           // magic + blockLen only, block missing
-		good[:6],           // magic + 2 bytes of blockLen
-		append(append([]byte(nil), good...), 0x00), // trailing byte → does not consume exactly
-	} {
-		if _, _, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(bad); ok {
-			t.Fatalf("a corrupt v2 frame (len %d) must be rejected, not partial-parsed", len(bad))
-		}
-	}
-
-	// An overflowing blockLen (claims more block than the buffer holds) is rejected.
-	overflow := append([]byte(nil), catchupEntryMagic[:]...)
-	var u32 [4]byte
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(u32[:], 0xFFFFFFFF)
-	overflow = append(overflow, u32[:]...)
-	overflow = append(overflow, []byte("tiny")...)
-	if _, _, ok := decodeCatchupEntry(overflow); ok {
-		t.Fatal("a v2 frame with an overflowing blockLen must be rejected")
-	}
-}
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-// *blockHandler must satisfy ancestorRequester, or the catch-up wire silently
-// loses its transport. Catch it at compile time, not in production.
-var _ ancestorRequester = (*blockHandler)(nil)
-
-// catchupSpy records the requestContext calls networkCatchup bridges to.
-type catchupSpy struct {
-	calls     int
-	lastFrom  ids.NodeID
-	lastBlock ids.ID
-}
-
-func (s *catchupSpy) requestContext(_ context.Context, from ids.NodeID, blockID ids.ID) {
-	s.calls++
-	s.lastFrom = from
-	s.lastBlock = blockID
-}
-
-// TestNetworkCatchup_BridgesEngineSignalToWire is the regression for the
-// stranded-follower bug: node never set netCfg.Catchup, so the engine's
-// requestCatchup hit a nil interface and a follower that fell behind during
-// consensus never fetched the missing ancestors — it looped on an unfinalizable
-// orphan forever (observed live: mainnet luxd-0/2 stuck at 1082780 while peers
-// reached 1082793). The wire must (a) be nil-safe before its handler is
-// late-bound and (b) route the engine's RequestAncestors to the handler's
-// GetAncestors transport (requestContext), once, for the right block and peer.
-func TestNetworkCatchup_BridgesEngineSignalToWire(t *testing.T) {
-	missing := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	peer := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-
-	// (a) Before late-binding (handler nil): a harmless no-op, never a panic.
-	c := &networkCatchup{}
-	require.NoError(t, c.RequestAncestors(ids.Empty, ids.Empty, missing, peer))
-
-	// (b) Once wired: the engine's catch-up signal reaches the GetAncestors wire
-	// exactly once — for the missing block, addressed to the peer that advertised
-	// its child. RED before the fix: handler is never set, calls stays 0.
-	spy := &catchupSpy{}
-	c.handler = spy
-	require.NoError(t, c.RequestAncestors(ids.Empty, ids.Empty, missing, peer))
-	require.Equal(t, 1, spy.calls, "RequestAncestors must route to requestContext — a nil wire IS the stranded-follower bug")
-	require.Equal(t, missing, spy.lastBlock)
-	require.Equal(t, peer, spy.lastFrom)
-}
@@ -46,30 +46,6 @@ func (s *Nets) GetOrCreate(chainID ids.ID) (nets.Net, bool) {
 	return chain, true
 }

-// IsChainBootstrapped reports whether the given chain has finished initial sync
-// (reached the network frontier and transitioned its VM to normal operation) on
-// this node — Bootstrapped(chainID) was called for it in its validation net. A
-// chain that is merely tracked (its sync goroutine launched) but has NOT converged
-// reads false. This is the per-chain truth manager.IsBootstrapped / info.isBootstrapped
-// key on, replacing the mere-existence test that returned true the instant a chain
-// was added to the manager (the premature-true masking bug: a C-Chain stalled at
-// genesis reported bootstrapped=true). A chainID is added to exactly one net's
-// tracking, so the first net that reports it bootstrapped is authoritative.
-func (s *Nets) IsChainBootstrapped(chainID ids.ID) bool {
-	if s == nil {
-		return false // no net tracking wired ⇒ nothing has been marked bootstrapped
-	}
-	s.lock.RLock()
-	defer s.lock.RUnlock()
-
-	for _, chain := range s.chains {
-		if chain.IsChainBootstrapped(chainID) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
 // Bootstrapping returns the chainIDs of any chains that are still
 // bootstrapping.
 func (s *Nets) Bootstrapping() []ids.ID {
@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// context_chunk_test.go — the heavy-block self-heal fix: GetContext must bound its Ancestors
-// response by SERIALIZED SIZE (not just block COUNT) so it stays under the peer message cap.
-//
-// Benchmark-proven live bug: under 250-trader DEX load, heavy blocks made a 256-block context
-// response sum to 3.4-5.7 MB > the 2 MB compressor cap; msgCreator.Ancestors FAILED to build,
-// so a behind validator received NOTHING and could never resync (permanently stuck while the tip
-// advanced). This pins the fix: the response is chunked to fit the budget, always serving at
-// least one block so the behind node makes progress every round.
-
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
-	consensusblock "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
-	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/message"
-)
-
-// heavyBlock is a consensuschain.Block of a controlled byte size; only the methods GetContext
-// touches (ID/Parent/Bytes) are overridden — the rest of the interface is embedded and unused.
-type heavyBlock struct {
-	consensusblock.Block
-	id, parent ids.ID
-	bytes      []byte
-}
-
-func (b *heavyBlock) ID() ids.ID     { return b.id }
-func (b *heavyBlock) Parent() ids.ID { return b.parent }
-func (b *heavyBlock) Bytes() []byte  { return b.bytes }
-
-// sizeStubVM serves heavyBlocks by id (only GetBlock is called by GetContext).
-type sizeStubVM struct {
-	consensuschain.BlockBuilder
-	blocks map[ids.ID]consensusblock.Block
-}
-
-func (v *sizeStubVM) GetBlock(_ context.Context, id ids.ID) (consensusblock.Block, error) {
-	b, ok := v.blocks[id]
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, errors.New("not found")
-	}
-	return b, nil
-}
-
-// sizeRecMsg records the containers GetContext hands to Ancestors, so the test can measure the
-// assembled response size (the input the real zstd compressor would reject above the cap).
-type sizeRecMsg struct {
-	message.OutboundMsgBuilder
-	containers [][]byte
-}
-
-func (m *sizeRecMsg) Ancestors(_ ids.ID, _ uint32, containers [][]byte) (message.OutboundMessage, error) {
-	m.containers = containers
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func TestGetContext_ChunksBySize_FitsUnderCap(t *testing.T) {
-	// A 100-block chain of ~150 KiB blocks. Packed by COUNT alone (up to maxContextBlocks=256,
-	// i.e. all 100), the response is ~15 MB — 7x over the 2 MB cap, so the old handler's message
-	// failed to build. Bounded by SIZE, it serves only as many as fit.
-	const nBlocks = 100
-	const blkSize = 150 * 1024
-
-	vm := &sizeStubVM{blocks: map[ids.ID]consensusblock.Block{}}
-	parent := ids.Empty
-	var tip ids.ID
-	for i := 0; i < nBlocks; i++ {
-		id := ids.GenerateTestID()
-		vm.blocks[id] = &heavyBlock{id: id, parent: parent, bytes: make([]byte, blkSize)}
-		parent = id
-		tip = id
-	}
-
-	msg := &sizeRecMsg{}
-	bh := &blockHandler{
-		logger:           log.NewNoOpLogger(),
-		vm:               vm,
-		msgCreator:       msg,
-		net:              &redStubNet{},
-		chainID:          ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		networkID:        ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		maxContextBlocks: 256,
-	}
-
-	if err := bh.GetContext(context.Background(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), 1, time.Now().Add(time.Second), tip); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetContext: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	total := 0
-	for _, c := range msg.containers {
-		total += len(c)
-	}
-	budget := constants.DefaultMaxMessageSize - 128*1024 // the handler's byteBudget
-
-	if len(msg.containers) == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("must serve at least one block (a behind node must always make progress)")
-	}
-	if total > budget {
-		t.Fatalf("context response %d bytes exceeds budget %d — the real Ancestors compressor would REJECT it "+
-			"(cap %d), stranding a behind validator (the live bug)", total, budget, constants.DefaultMaxMessageSize)
-	}
-	if len(msg.containers) >= nBlocks {
-		t.Fatalf("expected SIZE truncation (fewer than %d blocks), got %d — response not chunked", nBlocks, len(msg.containers))
-	}
-	t.Logf("size-chunked: %d blocks, %d payload bytes (budget %d, cap %d) — fits, so the compressor accepts it",
-		len(msg.containers), total, budget, constants.DefaultMaxMessageSize)
-}
-
-// A single heavy block is ALWAYS served even if it alone exceeds the budget — the walk must never
-// deadlock (the trust-tiered validator cap gives such a block the send headroom; a stranger's
-// tight cap correctly rejects it downstream).
-func TestGetContext_SingleOversizeBlock_StillServed(t *testing.T) {
-	oversize := constants.DefaultMaxMessageSize + 1<<20 // > the cap on its own
-	id := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	vm := &sizeStubVM{blocks: map[ids.ID]consensusblock.Block{
-		id: &heavyBlock{id: id, parent: ids.Empty, bytes: make([]byte, oversize)},
-	}}
-	msg := &sizeRecMsg{}
-	bh := &blockHandler{
-		logger: log.NewNoOpLogger(), vm: vm, msgCreator: msg, net: &redStubNet{},
-		chainID: ids.GenerateTestID(), networkID: ids.GenerateTestID(), maxContextBlocks: 256,
-	}
-	if err := bh.GetContext(context.Background(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), 1, time.Now().Add(time.Second), id); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("GetContext: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(msg.containers) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("a single (even oversize) block must be served so the walk never deadlocks, got %d blocks", len(msg.containers))
-	}
-}
@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"sync"

+	"github.com/luxfi/vm/chain"
 	consensusvertex "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/vertex"
 	"github.com/luxfi/database"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/fx"
 	"github.com/luxfi/runtime"
 	vmcore "github.com/luxfi/vm"
-	"github.com/luxfi/vm/chain"
 	"github.com/luxfi/warp"
 )

@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
-	lux "github.com/luxfi/utxo"
-	"github.com/luxfi/utxo/nftfx"
-)
-
-// maxGatedActivationAttempts bounds how many times a gated chain may be
-// deferred waiting for the X-Chain to bootstrap before it is opted out. Each
-// X-Chain creation re-queues parked chains exactly once, so this also bounds
-// total re-queues per chain. It exists only as defense-in-depth against an
-// X-Chain that never bootstraps; the normal path defers zero or one time.
-const maxGatedActivationAttempts = 8
-
-// NFTAuthorization identifies the X-Chain NFT a validator's staking address
-// must hold to activate (track/validate) a gated chain.
-//
-// A chain is "gated" when ManagerConfig.ChainAuthorizations has an entry for
-// its blockchain ID. Chains with no entry are ungated and always authorized —
-// so a nil/empty ChainAuthorizations map preserves today's behavior exactly
-// for every chain (P/C/X/Q/D/…).
-type NFTAuthorization struct {
-	AssetID ids.ID // X-Chain nftfx asset (the collection)
-	GroupID uint32 // nftfx group within the collection; 0 = any group
-}
-
-// xChainUTXOReader is the narrow in-process accessor the gate needs from the
-// X-Chain VM: list the UTXOs owned by an address set. *xvm.VM satisfies it via
-// its GetUTXOs method (vms/xvm/vm.go), which wraps lux.GetAllUTXOs over the
-// chain's committed state. Keeping the interface to this one method avoids
-// importing the concrete xvm VM type into the chain manager.
-type xChainUTXOReader interface {
-	GetUTXOs(addrs set.Set[ids.ShortID]) ([]*lux.UTXO, error)
-}
-
-// holdsAuthorizationNFT is the pure authorization policy: it reports whether
-// [utxos] contains an nftfx transfer output that satisfies [auth]. A UTXO
-// matches when its output is an *nftfx.TransferOutput for auth.AssetID and,
-// when auth.GroupID is non-zero, its GroupID equals auth.GroupID (GroupID 0
-// means "any group in the collection").
-//
-// This is the one place the NFT-ownership rule lives. It takes plain values
-// (the fetched UTXOs and the requirement) and returns a decision, so it is
-// unit-testable without standing up a manager or an X-Chain.
-func holdsAuthorizationNFT(utxos []*lux.UTXO, auth NFTAuthorization) bool {
-	for _, utxo := range utxos {
-		out, ok := utxo.Out.(*nftfx.TransferOutput)
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		if utxo.AssetID() != auth.AssetID {
-			continue
-		}
-		if auth.GroupID != 0 && out.GroupID != auth.GroupID {
-			continue
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// authorizeChainActivation reports whether this node may activate
-// (track/validate) [chainID].
-//
-// Returns (authorized, ready):
-//   - ready=false means the gate cannot decide yet because the X-Chain is not
-//     bootstrapped and therefore not queryable in-process. The caller MUST
-//     defer (re-attempt later), not skip — see createChain.
-//   - ready=true, authorized=true: proceed normally.
-//   - ready=true, authorized=false: clean opt-out — this validator's staking
-//     X-address does not hold the required NFT.
-//
-// Decision order:
-//  1. Critical chains (P/C/X/…) are never gated — always (true, true).
-//  2. Ungated chains (no ChainAuthorizations entry) are always (true, true),
-//     so the zero/nil map is a no-op for every chain.
-//  3. Gated chain, X-Chain not bootstrapped → (false, false): defer.
-//  4. Gated chain, X-Chain bootstrapped, but no usable in-process UTXO reader
-//     or no resolvable staking X-address → (false, true): clean opt-out. The
-//     node refuses to activate a gated chain it cannot prove authorization
-//     for, rather than fail open.
-//  5. Otherwise query the X-Chain for the staking X-address's UTXOs and apply
-//     holdsAuthorizationNFT.
-func (m *manager) authorizeChainActivation(chainID ids.ID) (authorized bool, ready bool) {
-	// Critical chains are foundational; the gate must never skip or defer them.
-	if m.CriticalChains.Contains(chainID) {
-		return true, true
-	}
-
-	// D-Chain participation is an operator opt-in (dex-validator), and it is a
-	// NECESSARY condition that composes AND-wise with the NFT gate below: the
-	// D-Chain activates only if the operator opted in AND (when configured) the
-	// staking X-address holds the dex-operator NFT. Checked here — before the
-	// ungated short-circuit — so the opt-in is required even when no operator
-	// collection is configured for this network (the otherwise-ungated case).
-	// A node without dex-validator therefore cleanly opts out of the D-Chain
-	// even when --track-all-chains queued it: this is the activation authority,
-	// not the platformvm tracking set. The opt-out is decided (ready=true), so
-	// the caller takes the same clean skip as a non-held NFT / absent plugin.
-	if m.DChainID != ids.Empty && chainID == m.DChainID && !m.DexValidator {
-		m.Log.Info("D-Chain activation declined: dex-validator opt-in is disabled",
-			log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
-		)
-		return false, true
-	}
-
-	auth, gated := m.ChainAuthorizations[chainID]
-	if !gated {
-		return true, true
-	}
-
-	// TODO(phase-2): proof-of-possession. holdsAuthorizationNFT below checks
-	// ownership-OF-RECORD (the staking X-address appears in an nftfx output's
-	// owners) — it does NOT prove the node controls the key for that address.
-	// Phase-2 must derive StakingXAddress from the node's staking keys and bind
-	// the NFT check to key-control (a signed challenge), so a node cannot claim
-	// authorization from an NFT held at an address it does not control.
-
-	// The gate consults the X-Chain UTXO set, so the X-Chain must already be
-	// bootstrapped on this node. IsBootstrapped now keys on REAL convergence
-	// (sb.Bootstrapped), not mere presence — safe here because X-Chain is a DAG
-	// chain marked bootstrapped SYNCHRONOUSLY inside createChain (Engine == nil
-	// path) before the sequential chain-creator dequeues any re-pushed gated chain,
-	// so IsBootstrapped(X) is already true when a gated chain re-runs. INVARIANT: if
-	// X-Chain is ever linearized into an engine chain (async Bootstrapped via
-	// monitorBootstrap), retryPendingGatedChains must be made to re-drain after X
-	// converges, else gated chains park forever. If not bootstrapped yet, defer.
-	if !m.IsBootstrapped(m.XChainID) {
-		return false, false
-	}
-
-	// The staking X-address must be wired for any gated chain. If it is empty,
-	// the node has no identity to check NFT ownership against; refuse to
-	// activate the gated chain (fail closed) rather than guess.
-	if m.StakingXAddress == ids.ShortEmpty {
-		m.Log.Warn("gated chain activation blocked: staking X-address not configured",
-			log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
-			log.Stringer("assetID", auth.AssetID),
-		)
-		return false, true
-	}
-
-	reader := m.xChainUTXOReader()
-	if reader == nil {
-		m.Log.Warn("gated chain activation blocked: X-Chain UTXO reader unavailable",
-			log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
-			log.Stringer("assetID", auth.AssetID),
-		)
-		return false, true
-	}
-
-	owners := set.Of(m.StakingXAddress)
-	utxos, err := reader.GetUTXOs(owners)
-	if err != nil {
-		// A query error is not a "decline" — the X-Chain claims to be
-		// bootstrapped but cannot answer. Defer and retry rather than
-		// permanently opt out on a transient read failure.
-		m.Log.Warn("gated chain activation deferred: X-Chain UTXO query failed",
-			log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
-			log.Stringer("assetID", auth.AssetID),
-			log.Err(err),
-		)
-		return false, false
-	}
-
-	return holdsAuthorizationNFT(utxos, auth), true
-}
-
-// xChainUTXOReader returns the in-process UTXO reader for the X-Chain, or nil
-// if the X-Chain VM is not present or does not expose the accessor. The
-// X-Chain VM (*xvm.VM) implements xChainUTXOReader; this asserts against the
-// narrow interface only.
-func (m *manager) xChainUTXOReader() xChainUTXOReader {
-	m.chainsLock.Lock()
-	info, ok := m.chains[m.XChainID]
-	m.chainsLock.Unlock()
-	if !ok {
-		return nil
-	}
-	reader, _ := info.VM.(xChainUTXOReader)
-	return reader
-}
-
-// deferGatedChain parks [chainParams] out of the creation queue because the
-// X-Chain is not yet bootstrapped, and reports whether the chain may still be
-// retried. It returns false once the per-chain attempt cap is exhausted, in
-// which case the caller must opt the chain out (a never-bootstrapping X-Chain
-// must not park a chain forever). Parking out of the queue — rather than
-// re-pushing — is what keeps the single-threaded dispatch loop from
-// busy-spinning; retryPendingGatedChains re-pushes when the X-Chain is created.
-func (m *manager) deferGatedChain(chainParams ChainParameters) (retry bool) {
-	m.gatedChainsLock.Lock()
-	defer m.gatedChainsLock.Unlock()
-
-	m.gatedAttempts[chainParams.ID]++
-	if m.gatedAttempts[chainParams.ID] > maxGatedActivationAttempts {
-		return false
-	}
-	m.pendingGatedChains = append(m.pendingGatedChains, chainParams)
-	return true
-}
-
-// retryPendingGatedChains re-queues every chain parked by deferGatedChain. It
-// is called once right after the X-Chain finishes createChain, so the gate can
-// now reach the X-Chain UTXO set. Chains that still cannot decide will park
-// again (bounded by maxGatedActivationAttempts).
-func (m *manager) retryPendingGatedChains() {
-	m.gatedChainsLock.Lock()
-	parked := m.pendingGatedChains
-	m.pendingGatedChains = nil
-	m.gatedChainsLock.Unlock()
-
-	for _, chainParams := range parked {
-		m.Log.Info("re-queuing gated chain after X-Chain bootstrap",
-			log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID),
-			log.Stringer("vmID", chainParams.VMID),
-		)
-		m.chainsQueue.PushRight(chainParams)
-	}
-}
@@ -1,579 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
-	"github.com/luxfi/container/buffer"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
-	lux "github.com/luxfi/utxo"
-	"github.com/luxfi/utxo/nftfx"
-	"github.com/luxfi/utxo/secp256k1fx"
-)
-
-// fakeUTXOReader is a stand-in for the X-Chain VM in unit tests. It returns a
-// fixed UTXO set (or an error) regardless of the requested addresses, which is
-// all the gate's address-set query needs to be driven deterministically.
-type fakeUTXOReader struct {
-	utxos []*lux.UTXO
-	err   error
-}
-
-func (f *fakeUTXOReader) GetUTXOs(set.Set[ids.ShortID]) ([]*lux.UTXO, error) {
-	return f.utxos, f.err
-}
-
-// ownerScopedUTXOReader is a faithful X-Chain stand-in: it returns ONLY the
-// UTXOs whose nftfx/secp owners intersect the queried address set, exactly as
-// lux.GetAllUTXOs(vm.state, addrs) does over committed state. This is what the
-// fixed-list fakeUTXOReader cannot model — and it is required to test the
-// ownership-scoping invariant: a node may activate a gated chain only on an NFT
-// held at ITS OWN staking X-address, never one held at someone else's. The gate
-// queries set.Of(StakingXAddress), so any UTXO owned by a different address is
-// invisible here, just as it would be on a real X-Chain.
-type ownerScopedUTXOReader struct {
-	utxos []*lux.UTXO
-}
-
-func (r *ownerScopedUTXOReader) GetUTXOs(addrs set.Set[ids.ShortID]) ([]*lux.UTXO, error) {
-	var out []*lux.UTXO
-	for _, utxo := range r.utxos {
-		owned, ok := utxo.Out.(lux.Addressable)
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, raw := range owned.Addresses() {
-			addr, err := ids.ToShortID(raw)
-			if err != nil {
-				continue
-			}
-			if addrs.Contains(addr) {
-				out = append(out, utxo)
-				break
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-// nftUTXO builds a UTXO whose output is an nftfx transfer output for the given
-// asset and group. owner is the address recorded as the holder.
-func nftUTXO(assetID ids.ID, groupID uint32, owner ids.ShortID) *lux.UTXO {
-	return &lux.UTXO{
-		UTXOID: lux.UTXOID{TxID: ids.GenerateTestID()},
-		Asset:  lux.Asset{ID: assetID},
-		Out: &nftfx.TransferOutput{
-			GroupID: groupID,
-			OutputOwners: secp256k1fx.OutputOwners{
-				Threshold: 1,
-				Addrs:     []ids.ShortID{owner},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-// secpUTXO builds a non-NFT (secp256k1 transfer) UTXO for the given asset, used
-// to prove the gate ignores outputs that are not nftfx transfers.
-func secpUTXO(assetID ids.ID, owner ids.ShortID) *lux.UTXO {
-	return &lux.UTXO{
-		UTXOID: lux.UTXOID{TxID: ids.GenerateTestID()},
-		Asset:  lux.Asset{ID: assetID},
-		Out: &secp256k1fx.TransferOutput{
-			Amt: 1,
-			OutputOwners: secp256k1fx.OutputOwners{
-				Threshold: 1,
-				Addrs:     []ids.ShortID{owner},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-func TestHoldsAuthorizationNFT(t *testing.T) {
-	asset := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	other := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	owner := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name  string
-		utxos []*lux.UTXO
-		auth  NFTAuthorization
-		want  bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:  "empty set",
-			utxos: nil,
-			auth:  NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset},
-			want:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:  "matching asset, any group",
-			utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 7, owner)},
-			auth:  NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset, GroupID: 0},
-			want:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:  "matching asset and group",
-			utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 7, owner)},
-			auth:  NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset, GroupID: 7},
-			want:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:  "matching asset, wrong group",
-			utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 7, owner)},
-			auth:  NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset, GroupID: 8},
-			want:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:  "wrong asset",
-			utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(other, 7, owner)},
-			auth:  NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset},
-			want:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:  "non-nft output for asset is ignored",
-			utxos: []*lux.UTXO{secpUTXO(asset, owner)},
-			auth:  NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset},
-			want:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name: "match found among mixed outputs",
-			utxos: []*lux.UTXO{
-				secpUTXO(asset, owner),
-				nftUTXO(other, 1, owner),
-				nftUTXO(asset, 3, owner),
-			},
-			auth: NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset, GroupID: 3},
-			want: true,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			require.Equal(t, tt.want, holdsAuthorizationNFT(tt.utxos, tt.auth))
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// newGateManager builds the minimal manager needed to exercise the gate:
-// only the fields authorizeChainActivation reads. xChainVM, when non-nil, is
-// installed as the X-Chain's tracked VM AND marked bootstrapped in its net so
-// IsBootstrapped(XChainID) is true (the gate consults the X-Chain UTXO set, which
-// is only valid once the X-Chain has finished initial sync — mere presence in
-// m.chains is no longer sufficient) and xChainUTXOReader() resolves to it.
-func newGateManager(
-	xChainID ids.ID,
-	stakingAddr ids.ShortID,
-	authz map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization,
-	critical set.Set[ids.ID],
-	xChainVM xChainUTXOReader,
-) *manager {
-	netsTracker, err := NewNets(ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), map[ids.ID]nets.Config{
-		constants.PrimaryNetworkID: {},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-	m := &manager{
-		chains:        make(map[ids.ID]*chainInfo),
-		gatedAttempts: make(map[ids.ID]int),
-	}
-	m.Log = log.NewNoOpLogger()
-	m.Nets = netsTracker
-	m.XChainID = xChainID
-	m.StakingXAddress = stakingAddr
-	m.ChainAuthorizations = authz
-	m.CriticalChains = critical
-	if xChainVM != nil {
-		m.chains[xChainID] = &chainInfo{Name: "X-Chain", VM: xChainVM}
-		// The X-Chain has finished initial sync (its UTXO set is valid) — the real
-		// precondition the gate depends on, now reflected in the net tracking.
-		sb, _ := netsTracker.GetOrCreate(constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
-		sb.AddChain(xChainID)
-		sb.Bootstrapped(xChainID)
-	}
-	return m
-}
-
-func TestAuthorizeChainActivation(t *testing.T) {
-	xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	gatedChain := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	asset := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	addr := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
-
-	collection := map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{
-		gatedChain: {AssetID: asset, GroupID: 0},
-	}
-
-	t.Run("ungated chain is authorized and ready", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// No ChainAuthorizations entry: behaves exactly as today, even with no
-		// X-Chain present. Covers P/C/X-like IDs via a table.
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, nil, nil, nil)
-		for _, id := range []ids.ID{ids.GenerateTestID(), xChainID, gatedChain} {
-			authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(id)
-			require.True(t, authorized, "id %s", id)
-			require.True(t, ready, "id %s", id)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("gated chain, X-Chain not bootstrapped, defers", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// xChainVM nil => XChainID not in m.chains => IsBootstrapped false.
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, nil)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.False(t, ready, "must signal defer")
-		require.False(t, authorized)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("gated chain, holder, authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 0, addr)}}
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("gated chain, non-holder, clean opt-out", func(t *testing.T) {
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: nil}
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.True(t, ready, "decided, not deferred")
-		require.False(t, authorized, "no NFT => opt out")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("group match vs mismatch", func(t *testing.T) {
-		groupCollection := map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{
-			gatedChain: {AssetID: asset, GroupID: 5},
-		}
-		hold5 := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 5, addr)}}
-		hold9 := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 9, addr)}}
-
-		authorized, ready := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, groupCollection, nil, hold5).
-			authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "group 5 held => authorized")
-
-		authorized, ready = newGateManager(xChainID, addr, groupCollection, nil, hold9).
-			authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.False(t, authorized, "wrong group => opt out")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("critical chain never skipped even if gated", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// gatedChain is in BOTH ChainAuthorizations and CriticalChains, the
-		// holder holds nothing, and the X-Chain is absent. A non-critical chain
-		// here would defer (not ready); a critical chain must be authorized.
-		critical := set.Of(gatedChain)
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, critical, nil)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "critical chain must never be gated")
-		require.True(t, ready, "critical chain must never defer")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("gated chain, empty staking address, fails closed", func(t *testing.T) {
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 0, addr)}}
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, ids.ShortEmpty, collection, nil, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.True(t, ready, "decided")
-		require.False(t, authorized, "no staking identity => opt out")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("gated chain, X-Chain query error, defers", func(t *testing.T) {
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{err: errors.New("state not ready")}
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.False(t, ready, "transient query error => retry, not opt out")
-		require.False(t, authorized)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("gated chain, X-Chain tracked but VM lacks reader, opts out", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// X-Chain is bootstrapped (in m.chains AND marked bootstrapped in its net, so
-		// IsBootstrapped true) but its VM does not satisfy xChainUTXOReader. The gate must
-		// fail closed (ready, !authz), not panic.
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, nil)
-		m.chains[xChainID] = &chainInfo{Name: "X-Chain", VM: struct{}{}}
-		sb, _ := m.Nets.GetOrCreate(constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
-		sb.AddChain(xChainID)
-		sb.Bootstrapped(xChainID)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.False(t, authorized)
-	})
-}
-
-func TestDeferGatedChainCap(t *testing.T) {
-	xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	gatedChain := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	m := newGateManager(xChainID, ids.GenerateTestShortID(), nil, nil, nil)
-
-	params := ChainParameters{ID: gatedChain, VMID: ids.GenerateTestID()}
-
-	// The first maxGatedActivationAttempts calls park the chain and allow retry.
-	for i := 0; i < maxGatedActivationAttempts; i++ {
-		require.True(t, m.deferGatedChain(params), "attempt %d should allow retry", i+1)
-	}
-	// One past the cap opts out instead of parking again.
-	require.False(t, m.deferGatedChain(params), "cap exhausted")
-
-	// Every allowed attempt parked exactly one entry; the over-cap attempt did not.
-	m.gatedChainsLock.Lock()
-	require.Len(t, m.pendingGatedChains, maxGatedActivationAttempts)
-	m.gatedChainsLock.Unlock()
-}
-
-func TestRetryPendingGatedChainsRequeues(t *testing.T) {
-	xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	m := newGateManager(xChainID, ids.GenerateTestShortID(), nil, nil, nil)
-	m.chainsQueue = buffer.NewUnboundedBlockingDeque[ChainParameters](initialQueueSize)
-
-	parked := ChainParameters{ID: ids.GenerateTestID(), VMID: ids.GenerateTestID()}
-	require.True(t, m.deferGatedChain(parked))
-
-	m.retryPendingGatedChains()
-
-	// Parked list is drained and the chain is re-pushed onto the creation queue.
-	m.gatedChainsLock.Lock()
-	require.Empty(t, m.pendingGatedChains)
-	m.gatedChainsLock.Unlock()
-
-	got, ok := m.chainsQueue.PopLeft()
-	require.True(t, ok)
-	require.Equal(t, parked.ID, got.ID)
-}
-
-// dexGatedManager builds a manager whose D-Chain (dChainID) is NFT-gated on a
-// synthetic dex-operator collection — exactly the ChainAuthorizations shape
-// node.chainAuthorizationsFor produces for dexvm: dChainID -> {dexAsset,
-// group 0}. reader is installed as the bootstrapped X-Chain so the gate can
-// query the staking address's UTXOs. This is the chain-manager-side mirror of
-// the OptionalVMs[DexVMID].RequiredNFT policy under a synthetic per-network
-// asset.
-func dexGatedManager(dexAsset ids.ID, staking ids.ShortID, reader xChainUTXOReader) (*manager, ids.ID) {
-	xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	dChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	authz := map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{
-		dChainID: {AssetID: dexAsset, GroupID: 0}, // group 0 = any group in the collection
-	}
-	m := newGateManager(xChainID, staking, authz, nil, reader)
-	// Wire the D-Chain identity and turn the operator opt-in ON, so these NFT
-	// tests exercise the REAL dex-validator path: dex-validator=true, then the
-	// NFT gate decides. (The dex-validator=false short-circuit is proven
-	// separately in TestDexValidatorFlagGatesDChain.)
-	m.DChainID = dChainID
-	m.DexValidator = true
-	return m, dChainID
-}
-
-// TestDexVMFailsClosedWithoutXNFT (#4). A node whose staking X-address holds NO
-// dex-operator NFT is NOT authorized to activate the D-Chain — a clean
-// fail-closed opt-out (ready=true, authorized=false), not a fail-open and not a
-// deferral. The X-Chain is bootstrapped and answers; the address simply holds
-// nothing. Also covers holding the WRONG asset (some other NFT) → still opt-out.
-func TestDexVMFailsClosedWithoutXNFT(t *testing.T) {
-	dexAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	otherAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	staking := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
-
-	t.Run("no NFT held => opt out", func(t *testing.T) {
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: nil}
-		m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, staking, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready, "X-Chain answered => decided, not deferred")
-		require.False(t, authorized, "no dex-operator NFT => D-Chain activation fails closed")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("wrong collection held => opt out", func(t *testing.T) {
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(otherAsset, 0, staking)}}
-		m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, staking, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.False(t, authorized, "holding a different collection's NFT must not authorize the D-Chain")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("no staking identity => fail closed", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Even with a matching NFT in the set, an empty staking X-address has no
-		// identity to check ownership against → fail closed.
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, staking)}}
-		m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, ids.ShortEmpty, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.False(t, authorized, "no staking identity => fail closed")
-	})
-}
-
-// TestDexVMActivatesWithDexOperatorNFT (#5). The same gated D-Chain, but the
-// staking X-address holds the dex-operator NFT → authorized to activate.
-// Proves the positive path of the NFT-governed activation.
-func TestDexVMActivatesWithDexOperatorNFT(t *testing.T) {
-	dexAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	staking := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
-
-	t.Run("dex-operator NFT held => authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, staking)}}
-		m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, staking, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "holding the dex-operator NFT authorizes D-Chain activation")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("dex-operator NFT among mixed UTXOs => authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
-		other := ids.GenerateTestID()
-		reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{
-			secpUTXO(dexAsset, staking),   // non-NFT output for the asset: ignored
-			nftUTXO(other, 1, staking),    // wrong collection: ignored
-			nftUTXO(dexAsset, 4, staking), // the dex-operator NFT (group 4, any-group gate)
-		}}
-		m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, staking, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "dex-operator NFT present among other UTXOs => authorized")
-	})
-}
-
-// TestDexVMOwnershipScoping (H1 gap). The activation NFT must be held at the
-// node's OWN staking X-address — not merely exist somewhere on the X-Chain. The
-// gate queries set.Of(StakingXAddress), so an ownership-honoring reader returns
-// nothing for an NFT minted to a DIFFERENT address, and the gate fails closed.
-// The fixed-list fakeUTXOReader could not catch this (it returns its list for
-// any query); ownerScopedUTXOReader models real per-address X-Chain state.
-//
-// NOTE: this proves ownership-OF-RECORD scoping (the NFT is owned by this
-// address). It does NOT prove the node controls that address's key — that is
-// the // TODO(phase-2): proof-of-possession seam in authorizeChainActivation,
-// out of scope this pass.
-func TestDexVMOwnershipScoping(t *testing.T) {
-	dexAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	nodeAddr := ids.GenerateTestShortID()     // this node's staking X-address
-	strangerAddr := ids.GenerateTestShortID() // a DIFFERENT operator's address
-
-	t.Run("dex-operator NFT held by a DIFFERENT address => not authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// The collection's NFT exists, but it is owned by strangerAddr. An
-		// ownership-honoring X-Chain returns no UTXOs for nodeAddr's query.
-		reader := &ownerScopedUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, strangerAddr)}}
-		m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, nodeAddr, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready, "X-Chain answered => decided, not deferred")
-		require.False(t, authorized, "an NFT held at another address must NOT authorize this node")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("dex-operator NFT held at the node's OWN address => authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Same collection, but the NFT (alongside the stranger's) is also held by
-		// nodeAddr. Only the node's own holding authorizes it.
-		reader := &ownerScopedUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{
-			nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, strangerAddr), // not ours: invisible to our query
-			nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, nodeAddr),     // ours: authorizes
-		}}
-		m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, nodeAddr, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "an NFT held at the node's own staking X-address authorizes it")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("only the stranger's NFT exists, queried by stranger => authorized for stranger only", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Sanity: the same reader DOES authorize the address that actually holds
-		// the NFT, proving the scoping is by-address and not a blanket deny.
-		reader := &ownerScopedUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, strangerAddr)}}
-		m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, strangerAddr, reader)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "the holder address is authorized; scoping is per-address, not blanket")
-	})
-}
-
-// TestDexValidatorFlagGatesDChain (M1). The dex-validator opt-in is a genuine,
-// NECESSARY activation condition for the D-Chain — not just a log line — and it
-// composes AND-wise with the NFT gate. This proves the full truth table at the
-// activation authority (authorizeChainActivation), which is downstream of how a
-// chain gets QUEUED: --track-all-chains queues the D-Chain in platformvm
-// (CreateChain), but the manager's gate is what ACTIVATES it. So a manager with
-// DexValidator=false standing in for a --track-all-chains node MUST decline the
-// D-Chain regardless of NFT state.
-func TestDexValidatorFlagGatesDChain(t *testing.T) {
-	xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	dChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	dexAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	staking := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
-
-	// withFlag builds a D-Chain manager with the dex-validator flag set to
-	// [dexValidator]. When [gated] the D-Chain is NFT-gated on dexAsset and the
-	// reader is the bootstrapped X-Chain; when not gated, ChainAuthorizations is
-	// empty (the --track-all-chains, no-operator-collection case).
-	withFlag := func(dexValidator, gated bool, reader xChainUTXOReader) *manager {
-		var authz map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization
-		if gated {
-			authz = map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{dChainID: {AssetID: dexAsset, GroupID: 0}}
-		}
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, staking, authz, nil, reader)
-		m.DChainID = dChainID
-		m.DexValidator = dexValidator
-		return m
-	}
-	holdsNFT := func() xChainUTXOReader {
-		return &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, staking)}}
-	}
-
-	t.Run("flag=false + ungated (track-all-chains) => D NOT activated", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// The headline M1 case: even with no operator collection configured (so
-		// the chain would otherwise be ungated and activate under --track-all),
-		// dex-validator=false declines the D-Chain. Decided opt-out, not defer.
-		m := withFlag(false, false, nil)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready, "decided opt-out, not a deferral")
-		require.False(t, authorized, "dex-validator=false must block the D-Chain even under --track-all-chains")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("flag=false + NFT held => still NOT activated (flag is necessary)", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Holding the dex-operator NFT does not rescue activation when the flag
-		// is off: the flag is an independent necessary condition (the AND).
-		m := withFlag(false, true, holdsNFT())
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.False(t, authorized, "flag=false blocks D even with the NFT held")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("flag=true + NFT held => activated", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Both conditions met: opted in AND holds the NFT.
-		m := withFlag(true, true, holdsNFT())
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "dex-validator=true AND NFT held => D-Chain activates")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("flag=true + gated but NFT NOT held => NOT activated (NFT is necessary)", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// The other half of the AND: opting in does not bypass the NFT gate.
-		m := withFlag(true, true, &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: nil})
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.False(t, authorized, "flag=true but no NFT => still blocked")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("flag=true + ungated (no operator collection) => activated", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Opted in and no NFT requirement configured for this network: the flag
-		// alone governs and the D-Chain activates (preserves today's opt-in
-		// behavior for the in-flag operator).
-		m := withFlag(true, false, nil)
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "dex-validator=true with no NFT configured => activates")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("flag=false does not affect a non-D gated chain", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// The flag is D-specific: another gated chain (e.g. bridgevm) is governed
-		// solely by its NFT gate, untouched by dex-validator.
-		otherChain := ids.GenerateTestID()
-		authz := map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{otherChain: {AssetID: dexAsset, GroupID: 0}}
-		m := newGateManager(xChainID, staking, authz, nil, holdsNFT())
-		m.DChainID = dChainID
-		m.DexValidator = false // off, but irrelevant to otherChain
-		authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(otherChain)
-		require.True(t, ready)
-		require.True(t, authorized, "dex-validator must not gate a non-D chain")
-	})
-}
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ import (

 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

+	"github.com/luxfi/vm"
 	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
 	"github.com/luxfi/log"
 	"github.com/luxfi/metric"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms"
-	"github.com/luxfi/vm"
 )

 // TestNew tests creating a new manager
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ func TestQueueChainCreation(t *testing.T) {
 	chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
 	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
 	chainParams := ChainParameters{
-		ID:      chainID,
+		ID:    chainID,
 		ChainID: netID,
-		VMID:    ids.GenerateTestID(),
+		VMID:  ids.GenerateTestID(),
 	}

 	// Queue the chain
@@ -177,69 +177,6 @@ func TestIsBootstrapped(t *testing.T) {
 	require.False(m.IsBootstrapped(chainID))
 }

-// TestIsBootstrappedTracksRealConvergence is the regression guard for the
-// premature-true masking bug: manager.IsBootstrapped must report true ONLY once the
-// chain has ACTUALLY finished initial sync (its net marked it Bootstrapped), NOT the
-// instant it is merely tracked (added to m.chains with its sync goroutine launched).
-// Before the fix, a C-Chain stalled at genesis (head 0x0) reported
-// info.isBootstrapped(C)=true, masking the stall from any readiness gate.
-func TestIsBootstrappedTracksRealConvergence(t *testing.T) {
-	require := require.New(t)
-
-	chainConfigs := map[ids.ID]nets.Config{
-		constants.PrimaryNetworkID: {},
-	}
-	netsTracker, err := NewNets(ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), chainConfigs)
-	require.NoError(err)
-
-	config := &ManagerConfig{
-		Log:          log.NewNoOpLogger(),
-		Metrics:      metric.NewMultiGatherer(),
-		VMManager:    vms.NewManager(),
-		ChainDataDir: t.TempDir(),
-		Nets:         netsTracker,
-	}
-	m, err := New(config)
-	require.NoError(err)
-	mImpl := m.(*manager)
-
-	// A native chain validated by the primary network — the C-Chain shape.
-	chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-
-	// Simulate createChain's tracking: the chain EXISTS in m.chains and is registered
-	// as bootstrapping in its validation net — but has NOT converged (initial sync is
-	// still driving, e.g. stalled at genesis fetching ancestry).
-	mImpl.chainsLock.Lock()
-	mImpl.chains[chainID] = &chainInfo{Name: "C-Chain"}
-	mImpl.chainsLock.Unlock()
-	sb, _ := netsTracker.GetOrCreate(constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
-	require.True(sb.AddChain(chainID))
-
-	// THE FIX: exists-but-not-converged must be FALSE (was true — the masking bug).
-	require.False(m.IsBootstrapped(chainID),
-		"a tracked-but-still-syncing chain must not report bootstrapped")
-	for _, ci := range m.(*manager).GetChains() {
-		if ci.ID == chainID {
-			require.False(ci.Bootstrapped, "GetChains must not report a syncing chain bootstrapped")
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Initial sync reaches the frontier → monitorBootstrap calls sb.Bootstrapped.
-	sb.Bootstrapped(chainID)
-
-	// Now — and only now — it reports bootstrapped (head advanced to frontier, VM live).
-	require.True(m.IsBootstrapped(chainID),
-		"a converged chain must report bootstrapped")
-	found := false
-	for _, ci := range m.(*manager).GetChains() {
-		if ci.ID == chainID {
-			found = true
-			require.True(ci.Bootstrapped, "GetChains must report a converged chain bootstrapped")
-		}
-	}
-	require.True(found)
-}
-
 // TestToEngineChannelFlow verifies the toEngine channel notification flow
 // This tests the goroutine that reads from toEngine and triggers block building
 func TestToEngineChannelFlow(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,591 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// pchain_height_finality_test.go — the b2 load-bearing proof the prior round
-// lacked: that the node delivers the REAL P-chain epoch height to the chain
-// engine, so a K>1 quorum chain finalizes against the LIVE validator set — not
-// the frozen genesis set.
-//
-// The consensus-layer TestPChainEpochFinality_RealWiring proved the engine reads
-// the RIGHT height GIVEN a block that already exposes one; it fed a synthetic
-// block carrying PChainHeight directly, BYPASSING the boundary. The boundary —
-// where a bare plugin block yields pChainHeightOf==0 — was exactly what shipped
-// broken (set@0 = genesis). These tests drive the REAL boundary:
-//
-//	inner VM (bare block, no PChainHeight)
-//	  └─ pChainHeightVM (the b2 wrapper, backed by a real validators.State)
-//	       └─ consensus engine (real α-of-K cert finality, node BLS sources)
-//
-// and prove three properties end to end:
-//
-//	(1) pChainHeightOf(realBlock) returns the wrapper's stamped P-chain height
-//	    (NOT 0) — at BuildBlock AND after a ParseBlock round-trip of the gossiped
-//	    bytes (the determinism guarantee: every node recovers the same height).
-//	(2) K>1 FINALIZES at genesis (set@H0).
-//	(3) K>1 FINALIZES AFTER a staking change — validators that JOINED post-genesis
-//	    cast the deciding votes+stake. This is the case that STALLS on the set@0
-//	    path (the joiners are absent from the genesis set), so finalizing proves
-//	    the real height is load-bearing.
-//
-// CGO-free: the node BLS sources use the pure-Go BLS path under CGO_ENABLED=0, so
-// this runs the ACTUAL production quorum sources (blsVoteVerifier / blsVoteSigner
-// / validatorStakeSource / validatorSetRootSource) — not an ed25519 stand-in.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
-	consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
-	"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
-	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
-	"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
-)
-
-// --- a bare inner VM whose blocks carry NO P-chain height --------------------
-
-// fakeInnerBlock is a minimal chain block: it satisfies block.Block but does NOT
-// expose PChainHeight() — exactly like the plugin VM blocks (C-Chain EVM, dexvm)
-// the node runs. Its Bytes() is its own opaque encoding; the wrapper frames a
-// P-chain height AROUND these bytes for transport.
-type fakeInnerBlock struct {
-	id        ids.ID
-	parentID  ids.ID
-	height    uint64
-	bytes     []byte
-	timestamp time.Time
-
-	mu           sync.Mutex
-	acceptCalled int
-}
-
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) ID() ids.ID                    { return b.id }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Parent() ids.ID                { return b.parentID }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) ParentID() ids.ID             { return b.parentID }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Height() uint64               { return b.height }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Timestamp() time.Time         { return b.timestamp }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Status() uint8                { return 0 }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Bytes() []byte                { return b.bytes }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Verify(context.Context) error { return nil }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Reject(context.Context) error { return nil }
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Accept(context.Context) error {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	b.acceptCalled++
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-	return nil
-}
-func (b *fakeInnerBlock) accepted() int {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	return b.acceptCalled
-}
-
-// fakeInnerVM is a BlockBuilder over fakeInnerBlocks, keyed by id and by bytes so
-// ParseBlock(bytes) reconstructs the SAME inner block on a follower. It builds one
-// block on demand (set via stage) so the test controls the proposed block.
-type fakeInnerVM struct {
-	mu       sync.Mutex
-	byID     map[ids.ID]*fakeInnerBlock
-	byBytes  map[string]*fakeInnerBlock
-	staged   *fakeInnerBlock // returned by the next BuildBlock
-	lastAcc  ids.ID
-}
-
-func newFakeInnerVM() *fakeInnerVM {
-	return &fakeInnerVM{
-		byID:    make(map[ids.ID]*fakeInnerBlock),
-		byBytes: make(map[string]*fakeInnerBlock),
-	}
-}
-
-func (vm *fakeInnerVM) register(b *fakeInnerBlock) {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	vm.byID[b.id] = b
-	vm.byBytes[string(b.bytes)] = b
-	vm.mu.Unlock()
-}
-
-// stage sets the block the next BuildBlock returns (and registers it for Get/Parse).
-func (vm *fakeInnerVM) stage(b *fakeInnerBlock) {
-	vm.register(b)
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	vm.staged = b
-	vm.mu.Unlock()
-}
-
-func (vm *fakeInnerVM) BuildBlock(context.Context) (block.Block, error) {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	defer vm.mu.Unlock()
-	return vm.staged, nil
-}
-
-func (vm *fakeInnerVM) ParseBlock(_ context.Context, b []byte) (block.Block, error) {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	defer vm.mu.Unlock()
-	if blk, ok := vm.byBytes[string(b)]; ok {
-		return blk, nil
-	}
-	// Unknown bytes: synthesize a block so a follower can still parse. Real VMs
-	// decode deterministically; the test pre-registers every block it gossips, so
-	// this path is only a safety net.
-	return nil, errUnknownInnerBytes
-}
-
-func (vm *fakeInnerVM) GetBlock(_ context.Context, id ids.ID) (block.Block, error) {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	defer vm.mu.Unlock()
-	if blk, ok := vm.byID[id]; ok {
-		return blk, nil
-	}
-	return nil, errUnknownInnerBytes
-}
-
-func (vm *fakeInnerVM) LastAccepted(context.Context) (ids.ID, error) {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	defer vm.mu.Unlock()
-	return vm.lastAcc, nil
-}
-
-func (vm *fakeInnerVM) SetPreference(_ context.Context, id ids.ID) error {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	vm.lastAcc = id
-	vm.mu.Unlock()
-	return nil
-}
-
-var errUnknownInnerBytes = errInnerBytes{}
-
-type errInnerBytes struct{}
-
-func (errInnerBytes) Error() string { return "fakeInnerVM: unknown block bytes" }
-
-// --- BLS validator material (pure-Go BLS under CGO_ENABLED=0) ----------------
-
-type blsValidator struct {
-	nodeID ids.NodeID
-	sk     *bls.SecretKey
-	pkComp []byte
-	light  uint64
-}
-
-func newBLSValidator(t *testing.T, weight uint64) blsValidator {
-	t.Helper()
-	sk, err := bls.NewSecretKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("bls.NewSecretKey: %v", err)
-	}
-	return blsValidator{
-		nodeID: ids.GenerateTestNodeID(),
-		sk:     sk,
-		pkComp: bls.PublicKeyToCompressedBytes(sk.PublicKey()),
-		light:  weight,
-	}
-}
-
-func (v blsValidator) out() *validators.GetValidatorOutput {
-	return &validators.GetValidatorOutput{
-		NodeID:    v.nodeID,
-		PublicKey: v.pkComp,
-		Light:     v.light,
-		Weight:    v.light,
-	}
-}
-
-// stateByHeight builds a height-indexed validators.State reporting the given sets
-// per height (empty for unknown heights / wrong net), with GetCurrentHeight fixed
-// to `current` so the wrapper stamps that height onto built blocks.
-func stateByHeight(netID ids.ID, current uint64, byHeight map[uint64][]blsValidator) *validatorstest.TestState {
-	s := validatorstest.NewTestState()
-	s.GetCurrentHeightF = func(context.Context) (uint64, error) { return current, nil }
-	s.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
-		if gotNet != netID {
-			return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
-		}
-		out := make(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput)
-		for _, v := range byHeight[height] {
-			out[v.nodeID] = v.out()
-		}
-		return out, nil
-	}
-	return s
-}
-
-// --- a recording cert gossiper (engine CertGossiper) -------------------------
-
-type recordingCertGossiper struct {
-	mu    sync.Mutex
-	certs [][]byte
-}
-
-func (g *recordingCertGossiper) GossipCert(_ ids.ID, _ ids.ID, certBytes []byte) error {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	g.certs = append(g.certs, append([]byte(nil), certBytes...))
-	g.mu.Unlock()
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (g *recordingCertGossiper) count() int {
-	g.mu.Lock()
-	defer g.mu.Unlock()
-	return len(g.certs)
-}
-
-var _ consensuschain.CertGossiper = (*recordingCertGossiper)(nil)
-
-// --- helpers -----------------------------------------------------------------
-
-func params5() consensusconfig.Parameters {
-	return consensusconfig.Parameters{K: 5, AlphaPreference: 3, AlphaConfidence: 3, Beta: 2}
-}
-
-func waitForCond(d time.Duration, cond func() bool) bool {
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(d)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		if cond() {
-			return true
-		}
-		time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	return cond()
-}
-
-// signBLSVote produces validator v's signed accept Vote for a position (the same
-// canonical message the node's blsVoteSigner/Verifier use).
-func signBLSVote(t *testing.T, v blsValidator, pos consensuschain.VotePosition) consensuschain.Vote {
-	t.Helper()
-	sig, err := v.sk.Sign(consensuschain.CanonicalVoteMessage(pos))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("sign vote: %v", err)
-	}
-	return consensuschain.Vote{
-		BlockID:   pos.BlockID,
-		NodeID:    v.nodeID,
-		Accept:    true,
-		SignedAt:  time.Now(),
-		Signature: bls.SignatureToBytes(sig),
-		ParentID:  pos.ParentID,
-		Round:     pos.Round,
-	}
-}
-
-// quorumEngineFixture wires a real consensus engine with the node's production
-// BLS quorum sources, all height-pinned to a height-indexed validators.State,
-// driving blocks through the b2 pChainHeightVM wrapper over a bare inner VM.
-type quorumEngineFixture struct {
-	engine   *consensuschain.Transitive
-	wrapper  *pChainHeightVM
-	inner    *fakeInnerVM
-	chainID  ids.ID
-	netID    ids.ID
-	proposer blsValidator
-	certs    *recordingCertGossiper
-}
-
-func newQuorumEngineFixture(t *testing.T, netID ids.ID, state validators.State, proposer blsValidator, byHeight map[uint64][]blsValidator) *quorumEngineFixture {
-	t.Helper()
-	inner := newFakeInnerVM()
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
-
-	chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	certs := &recordingCertGossiper{}
-
-	vdrState := state
-	engine := consensuschain.NewWithConfig(
-		consensuschain.Config{Params: params5(), VM: wrapper},
-		consensuschain.WithQuorumCert(chainID, proposer.nodeID, newBLSVoteVerifier(vdrState, netID), certs, newBLSVoteSigner(proposer.sk)),
-		consensuschain.WithStakeWeighting(newValidatorStakeSource(vdrState, netID)),
-		consensuschain.WithValidatorSetRoot(newValidatorSetRootSource(vdrState, netID)),
-	)
-	if err := engine.Start(context.Background(), true); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("engine.Start: %v", err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = engine.Stop(context.Background()) })
-
-	return &quorumEngineFixture{
-		engine:   engine,
-		wrapper:  wrapper,
-		inner:    inner,
-		chainID:  chainID,
-		netID:    netID,
-		proposer: proposer,
-		certs:    certs,
-	}
-}
-
-// proposeViaWrapper builds the staged inner block THROUGH the wrapper (stamping
-// the live P-chain height), tracks it as the engine's own verified proposal with
-// the wrapper-delivered epoch, records the proposer's self-vote, and returns the
-// wrapped block + the canonical vote position followers must sign.
-func (f *quorumEngineFixture) proposeViaWrapper(t *testing.T, inner *fakeInnerBlock) (block.Block, consensuschain.VotePosition) {
-	t.Helper()
-	f.inner.stage(inner)
-	wrapped, err := f.wrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("wrapper.BuildBlock: %v", err)
-	}
-	pos := f.engine.TrackOwnProposalForTest(context.Background(), wrapped, 0)
-	return wrapped, pos
-}
-
-// newFakeInner is a small constructor for an inner block at value height h with a
-// unique opaque encoding (tag-derived, so byBytes keys never collide).
-func newFakeInner(h uint64, parent ids.ID, tag string) *fakeInnerBlock {
-	return &fakeInnerBlock{
-		id:        ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		parentID:  parent,
-		height:    h,
-		bytes:     []byte("inner:" + tag),
-		timestamp: time.Now(),
-	}
-}
-
-// --- (1) the boundary delivers the REAL height (not 0), build + parse ---------
-
-// TestPChainHeightVM_DeliversRealHeight is the direct b2 boundary proof: the
-// wrapper stamps the proposer's live P-chain height onto the block the engine
-// sees, so pChainHeightOf(realBlock) returns that height — NOT 0 — at BuildBlock,
-// AND a follower recovers the IDENTICAL height by parsing the gossiped bytes (the
-// determinism guarantee H rides the bytes, never recomputed from a skewing view).
-//
-// This is the assertion the whole fix turns on. On the broken path
-// pChainHeightOf(any real plugin block)==0 → set@0 (genesis) forever.
-func TestPChainHeightVM_DeliversRealHeight(t *testing.T) {
-	const epoch = uint64(7) // the live P-chain height the proposer stamps
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	// A state whose GetCurrentHeight is 7 (so BuildBlock stamps 7); the set content
-	// is irrelevant to the stamping itself, but we register it at 7 for symmetry.
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
-
-	inner := newFakeInner(10_000_000, ids.Empty, "real-height") // value height races ahead
-	wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).stage(inner)
-
-	wrapped, err := wrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("BuildBlock: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// (1a) the engine's boundary read on the BUILT block returns the stamped height.
-	if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != epoch {
-		t.Fatalf("pChainHeightOf(built block) = %d, want %d — the boundary still delivers the wrong height "+
-			"(0 would mean the genesis-set freeze the b2 fix removes)", got, epoch)
-	}
-	// Sanity: the inner block itself exposes no PChainHeight, so without the wrapper
-	// the engine would read 0. This pins WHY the wrapper is load-bearing.
-	if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(inner); got != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("bare inner block must expose no P-chain height (pChainHeightOf=0), got %d", got)
-	}
-
-	// (1b) determinism: a follower parsing the GOSSIPED bytes recovers the same H.
-	parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), wrapped.Bytes())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(gossiped bytes): %v", err)
-	}
-	if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(parsed); got != epoch {
-		t.Fatalf("pChainHeightOf(parsed block) = %d, want %d — a follower recomputed/lost the height; "+
-			"finality would stall on a dynamic set (worse than the genesis fallback)", got, epoch)
-	}
-	if parsed.ID() != wrapped.ID() {
-		t.Fatalf("parsed block ID %s != built block ID %s — the inner identity must be preserved across the envelope", parsed.ID(), wrapped.ID())
-	}
-}
-
-// --- (2) K>1 finalizes at genesis (set@H0) -----------------------------------
-
-// TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAtGenesis proves the fix UNBRICKS finality in the
-// base case: a K>1 quorum chain whose validator set is the genesis set (current
-// P-chain height 0) finalizes through the real BLS quorum sources. This is the
-// safe floor the genesis fallback guarantees — even here the height is delivered
-// honestly (0), and the set@0 is non-empty so a ⅔ quorum finalizes.
-func TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAtGenesis(t *testing.T) {
-	const genesis = uint64(0)
-	netID := constantsPrimaryNetworkID()
-
-	g := make([]blsValidator, 5)
-	for i := range g {
-		g[i] = newBLSValidator(t, 20) // equal stake, total 100
-	}
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, genesis, map[uint64][]blsValidator{genesis: g})
-
-	f := newQuorumEngineFixture(t, netID, state, g[0], map[uint64][]blsValidator{genesis: g})
-
-	inner := newFakeInner(42, ids.Empty, "genesis-finalize") // value height advanced past genesis
-	wrapped, pos := f.proposeViaWrapper(t, inner)
-
-	// The block was stamped at the genesis height (0); the position binds set@0.
-	if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != genesis {
-		t.Fatalf("expected genesis stamp %d, got %d", genesis, got)
-	}
-	if pos.ValidatorSetRoot == ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatal("genesis set-root must be non-Empty (the genesis set is non-empty)")
-	}
-
-	// proposer g[0] self-voted; drive 3 more signed accepts → 4/5 = 80/100 stake > ⅔.
-	f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[1], pos))
-	f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[2], pos))
-	f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[3], pos))
-
-	if !waitForCond(2*time.Second, func() bool { return inner.accepted() == 1 }) {
-		t.Fatalf("UNBRICK: a K>1 block must finalize against the genesis set (VM.Accept=%d)", inner.accepted())
-	}
-	if f.certs.count() == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("a verified quorum cert must be assembled + gossiped at finality")
-	}
-}
-
-// --- (3) K>1 finalizes AFTER a staking change (THE b2 proof) ------------------
-
-// TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAfterStakingChange is the load-bearing b2 proof:
-// validators that JOINED after genesis cast the deciding votes + stake, and the
-// block finalizes — which is IMPOSSIBLE on the broken set@0 path, where the
-// joiners are absent from the genesis set so their votes are dropped and their
-// stake is uncounted.
-//
-// The set@epoch (height 7) holds {g0, j1, j2, j3, j4}: only g0 overlaps genesis;
-// j1..j4 JOINED at 7. The genesis set@0 holds five DIFFERENT validators with only
-// g0 in common. A 4-voter cert {g0, j1, j2, j3} = 80/100 stake-at-7 > ⅔.
-//
-//   - With the b2 fix: the block is stamped 7, the verifier resolves j1..j3 at
-//     set@7 (present) and the ⅔ tally is measured at 7 → the cert verifies →
-//     FINALIZES.
-//   - On the broken set@0 path: j1..j3 are unknown at height 0 → their signed
-//     votes are dropped → only g0 (20/100) verifies < ⅔ → STALLS FOREVER.
-//
-// The test asserts BOTH directly: (a) the block finalizes, and (b) the production
-// verifier itself rejects a joiner's vote at height 0 but accepts it at height 7 —
-// pinning the exact mechanism that would stall the frozen-set path.
-func TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAfterStakingChange(t *testing.T) {
-	const (
-		genesis = uint64(0)
-		epoch   = uint64(7) // staking change landed here; current P-chain height = 7
-	)
-	netID := constantsPrimaryNetworkID()
-
-	// g0 is a validator present at BOTH epochs (so the fixture proposer key resolves
-	// at the stamped epoch). j1..j4 JOINED at epoch 7. gen1..gen4 are the OTHER four
-	// genesis validators (present only at 0) — they make set@0 a genuinely different
-	// set so "the joiners decide" is unambiguous.
-	g0 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	j1 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	j2 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	j3 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	j4 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	gen1 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	gen2 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	gen3 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	gen4 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-
-	genesisSet := []blsValidator{g0, gen1, gen2, gen3, gen4} // total 100 at height 0
-	epochSet := []blsValidator{g0, j1, j2, j3, j4}           // total 100 at height 7
-
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{
-		genesis: genesisSet,
-		epoch:   epochSet,
-	})
-
-	// (b) PIN THE MECHANISM that makes the frozen path stall: the production verifier
-	// rejects a joiner at height 0 (frozen/genesis) and accepts it at height 7.
-	verifier := newBLSVoteVerifier(state, netID)
-	// Build a position to sign (any height-7-bound position works for this probe).
-	probeBlk := newFakeInner(123, ids.Empty, "probe")
-	probeWrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
-	probeWrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).stage(probeBlk)
-	probeWrapped, _ := probeWrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
-	probePos := consensuschain.VotePosition{
-		ChainID:          ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		Height:           probeWrapped.Height(),
-		BlockID:          probeWrapped.ID(),
-		ParentID:         ids.Empty,
-		ValidatorSetRoot: newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(epoch),
-	}
-	probeMsg := consensuschain.CanonicalVoteMessage(probePos)
-	j1Sig, err := j1.sk.Sign(probeMsg)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("sign probe: %v", err)
-	}
-	j1SigBytes := bls.SignatureToBytes(j1Sig)
-	if verifier.VerifyVote(j1.nodeID, probeMsg, j1SigBytes, genesis) {
-		t.Fatal("frozen-path mechanism broken: a post-genesis joiner must NOT verify at height 0 " +
-			"(if it does, the genesis-set path would not actually stall and the test is vacuous)")
-	}
-	if !verifier.VerifyVote(j1.nodeID, probeMsg, j1SigBytes, epoch) {
-		t.Fatal("a joiner present at the epoch MUST verify at the epoch height — the b2 read is broken")
-	}
-
-	// (a) THE END-TO-END FINALIZATION: drive the real engine with the joiners.
-	f := newQuorumEngineFixture(t, netID, state, g0, map[uint64][]blsValidator{
-		genesis: genesisSet,
-		epoch:   epochSet,
-	})
-
-	inner := newFakeInner(10_000_000, ids.Empty, "post-staking-change") // value height far ahead
-	wrapped, pos := f.proposeViaWrapper(t, inner)
-
-	// The block carries the LIVE epoch height (7), and the position binds set@7.
-	if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != epoch {
-		t.Fatalf("block must carry the live epoch height %d, got %d", epoch, got)
-	}
-	if pos.ValidatorSetRoot != newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(epoch) {
-		t.Fatal("position must bind the set-root at the epoch height (set@7), not another height")
-	}
-	if pos.ValidatorSetRoot == newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(genesis) {
-		t.Fatal("test vacuous: set@7 root must differ from set@0 root (the sets must genuinely differ)")
-	}
-
-	// proposer g0 self-voted; the JOINERS j1,j2,j3 cast the deciding votes.
-	// 4 distinct accepts {g0,j1,j2,j3} = 80/100 stake-at-7 > ⅔ → MUST finalize.
-	f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j1, pos))
-	f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j2, pos))
-	f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j3, pos))
-
-	if !waitForCond(3*time.Second, func() bool { return inner.accepted() == 1 }) {
-		t.Fatalf("b2: a block whose ⅔ quorum is post-genesis JOINERS must finalize against the LIVE set@%d "+
-			"(VM.Accept=%d). On the broken set@0 path the joiners are unknown → votes dropped → permanent stall.",
-			epoch, inner.accepted())
-	}
-
-	// The gossiped cert must verify stake-weighted AT THE EPOCH, and must FAIL at
-	// genesis (where the joiners are absent) — proving the height is load-bearing.
-	if f.certs.count() == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("a verified quorum cert must be assembled + gossiped at finality")
-	}
-	f.certs.mu.Lock()
-	lastCert := f.certs.certs[len(f.certs.certs)-1]
-	f.certs.mu.Unlock()
-	cert, err := consensuschain.UnmarshalQuorumCert(lastCert)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("decode gossiped cert: %v", err)
-	}
-	stake := newValidatorStakeSource(state, netID)
-	if err := cert.VerifyWeighted(verifier, stake, epoch); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("cert must verify stake-weighted at the epoch height %d: %v", epoch, err)
-	}
-	if err := cert.VerifyWeighted(verifier, stake, genesis); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("b2: cert must NOT verify at the genesis height (joiners absent / below ⅔ there) — " +
-			"if it does, the epoch height is not actually being used")
-	}
-	// The cert must contain at least one joiner — proving a post-genesis validator's
-	// vote was counted (the exact case the frozen-set path drops).
-	var hasJoiner bool
-	for i := range cert.Votes {
-		if cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j1.nodeID || cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j2.nodeID || cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j3.nodeID {
-			hasJoiner = true
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !hasJoiner {
-		t.Fatal("the finality cert must include a post-genesis joiner's vote (it was the deciding quorum)")
-	}
-}
-
-// constantsPrimaryNetworkID returns the primary-network ID the node uses for
-// native-chain validator lookups (ids.Empty). Declared here so the test reads the
-// SAME net the production wiring resolves native chains against, without importing
-// the constants package for one value.
-func constantsPrimaryNetworkID() ids.ID { return ids.Empty }
@@ -1,327 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// pchain_height_hardening_test.go — the receive-side hardening proofs for the b2
-// transport wrapper (Red round): the three node-layer fixes that close the
-// receive-side gaps the build-side stamping left open.
-//
-//	(HIGH-1, predicate b — RECENCY) ParseBlock rejects a wrapped block whose
-//	stamped P-chain epoch exceeds this node's live P-chain height by more than the
-//	recency slack (an absurd-future epoch). Honest forward skew within the slack —
-//	including a legitimate P-chain advance during a staking change — still parses.
-//
-//	(MEDIUM-3 — MAP DoS) the heights map is bounded: it plateaus at the finalized
-//	watermark under mass parse+accept, and a still-pending block's epoch is never
-//	evicted by the watermark prune. A sustained unverified-parse flood is capped.
-//
-//	(LOW-2 — FRAME DISCRIMINATOR) a raw inner block whose first bytes coincidentally
-//	equal the 4-byte frame magic is NOT mis-parsed as framed: the inner re-parse of
-//	the framed payload fails, so ParseBlock falls back to a raw whole-block parse.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-)
-
-// --- (HIGH-1 b) RECENCY: reject absurd-future epoch ---------------------------
-
-// TestParseBlock_RejectsFarFutureEpoch is the receive-side upper-bound proof. A
-// node whose live P-chain height is 100 parses a wrapped block stamped at epoch
-// 10_000 (far beyond 100 + slack). ParseBlock REJECTS it fail-closed — the block
-// is dropped, never returned to be tracked. This stops a Byzantine proposer from
-// pinning a block to an epoch the network has not reached.
-func TestParseBlock_RejectsFarFutureEpoch(t *testing.T) {
-	const localH = uint64(100)
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, localH, map[uint64][]blsValidator{localH: {v}})
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
-
-	// Craft a frame stamped at an absurd-future epoch, with a registered inner block
-	// so the ONLY reason to reject is the recency bound (not an inner parse failure).
-	inner := newFakeInner(5_000_000, ids.Empty, "far-future-epoch")
-	wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).register(inner)
-	framed := wrapPChainHeight(inner.Bytes(), localH+pChainHeightRecencySlack+1) // just past the bound
-
-	if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed); err != errPChainHeightNotRecent {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(far-future epoch) err = %v, want errPChainHeightNotRecent — an absurd-future "+
-			"P-chain epoch must be rejected fail-closed so a follower never tracks a block at an unreachable epoch", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestParseBlock_AcceptsEpochWithinSlack proves the recency gate admits HONEST
-// forward skew: a follower at local P-chain height 100 parses a block stamped at
-// 100 + slack (the boundary — the largest legitimate skew, e.g. a proposer that
-// saw P-chain blocks this follower has not yet synced during a staking change).
-// The block parses and carries its real epoch.
-func TestParseBlock_AcceptsEpochWithinSlack(t *testing.T) {
-	const localH = uint64(100)
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, localH, map[uint64][]blsValidator{localH: {v}})
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
-
-	inner := newFakeInner(5_000_000, ids.Empty, "within-slack-epoch")
-	wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).register(inner)
-	atBound := localH + pChainHeightRecencySlack // exactly at the bound — must be admitted
-	framed := wrapPChainHeight(inner.Bytes(), atBound)
-
-	parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(epoch within slack) err = %v, want nil — honest forward skew up to the slack "+
-			"(a real P-chain advance during a staking change) must still parse", err)
-	}
-	if got := parsed.(*pChainHeightBlock).PChainHeight(); got != atBound {
-		t.Fatalf("parsed epoch = %d, want %d — the wrapper must carry the real (recent) epoch unchanged", got, atBound)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestParseBlock_RecencyDisabledWithoutState proves the fail-soft: a wrapper with
-// no P-chain view (nil state, current height 0) cannot bound recency, so it admits
-// the block — the verifier still fails closed on an unresolvable future epoch at
-// set-resolution time. (Production installs the wrapper only on K>1 chains the
-// manager guards to have a live state, so this is a defensive path, not a mode.)
-func TestParseBlock_RecencyDisabledWithoutState(t *testing.T) {
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), nil, ids.GenerateTestID())
-	inner := newFakeInner(7, ids.Empty, "no-state-epoch")
-	wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).register(inner)
-	framed := wrapPChainHeight(inner.Bytes(), 9_999_999) // would be far-future if state existed
-
-	if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock with nil state must admit (recency unenforceable, verifier fails closed downstream): %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// --- (LOW-2) FRAME DISCRIMINATOR: a magic-colliding raw block is NOT mis-framed -
-
-// TestParseBlock_MagicCollisionParsesRaw is the discriminator proof. A raw inner
-// block whose Bytes() coincidentally BEGIN with the 4-byte frame magic (the
-// 2^-32 collision the raw-hash-prefix VMs hit) must parse as a RAW block, not be
-// mis-classified as framed (which used to fail the inner decode → bootstrap stall).
-// The inner re-parse of the framed payload fails (the payload is the block minus
-// its first 12 bytes — not a valid inner block), so ParseBlock falls back to a raw
-// whole-block parse.
-func TestParseBlock_MagicCollisionParsesRaw(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, 50, map[uint64][]blsValidator{50: {v}})
-	inner := newFakeInnerVM()
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
-
-	// A raw block whose bytes START with the exact magic prefix, then arbitrary
-	// payload. Length is >= the header width so the prefix check would treat it as a
-	// candidate frame. Crucially, bytes[12:] is NOT a registered inner block, so the
-	// framed-payload re-parse fails and the whole-bytes parse must be used.
-	raw := &fakeInnerBlock{
-		id:       ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		parentID: ids.Empty,
-		height:   1234,
-		bytes: append(append([]byte{}, pChainHeightMagic[:]...),
-			[]byte("RAW-BLOCK-COLLIDES-WITH-MAGIC-PREFIX-payload")...),
-	}
-	inner.register(raw) // registers byBytes[whole] = raw; bytes[12:] stays UNregistered
-
-	parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), raw.bytes)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(magic-colliding raw block) err = %v, want nil — a raw block whose prefix collides "+
-			"with the frame magic must parse as RAW (the old behavior mis-framed it → inner decode fail → bootstrap stall)", err)
-	}
-	if parsed.ID() != raw.id {
-		t.Fatalf("parsed block ID %s != raw block ID %s — the colliding block must decode to the SAME raw inner block", parsed.ID(), raw.id)
-	}
-	// A raw block falls back to the genesis-set epoch (0): it was NOT framed, so no
-	// proposer epoch was carried.
-	if got := parsed.(*pChainHeightBlock).PChainHeight(); got != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("magic-colliding raw block epoch = %d, want 0 — it must NOT be read as a framed epoch", got)
-	}
-	// Its re-gossip bytes must be the raw passthrough (the inner bytes verbatim), not
-	// re-framed — so a follower of THIS node also sees it raw.
-	if string(parsed.Bytes()) != string(raw.bytes) {
-		t.Fatal("a raw colliding block must re-gossip its inner bytes verbatim (passthrough), not a new frame")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestParseBlock_GenuineFrameStillParses guards the discriminator's other side: a
-// GENUINE frame (whose payload IS a valid inner block) still parses as framed and
-// recovers the stamped epoch. This pins that the collision fix did not break the
-// normal framed path.
-func TestParseBlock_GenuineFrameStillParses(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	const epoch = uint64(33)
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
-	inner := newFakeInnerVM()
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
-
-	innerBlk := newFakeInner(9000, ids.Empty, "genuine-frame")
-	inner.register(innerBlk)
-	framed := wrapPChainHeight(innerBlk.Bytes(), epoch)
-
-	parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(genuine frame) err = %v, want nil", err)
-	}
-	if parsed.ID() != innerBlk.ID() {
-		t.Fatalf("genuine frame parsed ID %s != inner ID %s", parsed.ID(), innerBlk.ID())
-	}
-	if got := parsed.(*pChainHeightBlock).PChainHeight(); got != epoch {
-		t.Fatalf("genuine frame epoch = %d, want %d", got, epoch)
-	}
-}
-
-// --- (MEDIUM-3) MAP BOUND: plateau at watermark, pending never evicted --------
-
-// TestHeightsMap_PlateausAtWatermark is the DoS bound proof. We parse a long run
-// of distinct framed blocks (each adds a heights entry) and ACCEPT them in order;
-// each Accept advances the finalized-height watermark and prunes entries at/below
-// it. The map plateaus — it does NOT grow without bound as the chain advances.
-func TestHeightsMap_PlateausAtWatermark(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	const epoch = uint64(10)
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
-	inner := newFakeInnerVM()
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
-
-	const n = 500
-	var lastParsed *pChainHeightBlock
-	for h := uint64(1); h <= n; h++ {
-		blk := newFakeInner(h, ids.Empty, "plateau-"+itoa(h))
-		inner.register(blk)
-		framed := wrapPChainHeight(blk.Bytes(), epoch)
-		parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("ParseBlock #%d: %v", h, err)
-		}
-		// Accept the PREVIOUS block (so the most-recent one is still "pending").
-		if lastParsed != nil {
-			if err := lastParsed.Accept(context.Background()); err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("Accept #%d: %v", h-1, err)
-			}
-		}
-		lastParsed = parsed.(*pChainHeightBlock)
-
-		// After each accept the map must be bounded: only entries strictly above the
-		// watermark survive. We accept (h-1) blocks, so at most a tiny constant remain
-		// (the just-parsed, not-yet-accepted block, plus any equal-height entries).
-		wrapper.mu.Lock()
-		size := len(wrapper.heights)
-		wm := wrapper.finalizedHeight
-		wrapper.mu.Unlock()
-		if size > 4 { // generous constant: the pending working set, not O(n)
-			t.Fatalf("heights map grew to %d entries at height %d (watermark %d) — it must plateau at the "+
-				"finalized watermark, not accrete one permanent entry per parsed block (MEDIUM-3 DoS)", size, h, wm)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHeightsMap_PendingNeverEvictedByWatermark proves the watermark prune NEVER
-// drops a still-pending block's epoch. We track a pending block at height 1000
-// (epoch recalled), accept a LOWER-height block (watermark advances only to that
-// lower height), and assert the pending block's epoch is still recallable. A blind
-// LRU would have dropped it; the watermark prune must not.
-func TestHeightsMap_PendingNeverEvictedByWatermark(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	const epoch = uint64(12)
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
-	inner := newFakeInnerVM()
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
-
-	// Pending block at a HIGH value height (1000).
-	pending := newFakeInner(1000, ids.Empty, "pending-high")
-	inner.register(pending)
-	pendingFrame := wrapPChainHeight(pending.Bytes(), epoch)
-	if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), pendingFrame); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(pending): %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// A different block at a LOW value height (5) finalizes → watermark = 5.
-	low := newFakeInner(5, ids.Empty, "finalized-low")
-	inner.register(low)
-	lowFrame := wrapPChainHeight(low.Bytes(), epoch)
-	lowParsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), lowFrame)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(low): %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := lowParsed.Accept(context.Background()); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Accept(low): %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// The watermark advanced to 5 (the low block). The PENDING block at height 1000
-	// is strictly above the watermark, so its epoch MUST survive the prune.
-	if got, ok := wrapper.recall(pending.ID()); !ok || got != epoch {
-		t.Fatalf("pending block's epoch recall = (%d,%v), want (%d,true) — the watermark prune (wm=5) must NEVER "+
-			"evict a still-pending block at height 1000 (that would reset its epoch to 0 = re-freeze)", got, ok, epoch)
-	}
-	// And the finalized low block's entry WAS pruned (it is at/below the watermark).
-	if _, ok := wrapper.recall(low.ID()); ok {
-		t.Fatal("the finalized low block's entry should have been pruned at/below the watermark (loss-free: epoch already captured)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHeightsMap_FloodCappedPreservingNearTip proves the hard-cap backstop: a
-// sustained UNVERIFIED-parse flood (blocks that never finalize, so the watermark
-// never advances) cannot grow the map past the cap, AND the cap evicts
-// highest-value-height-first so the near-tip pending band survives. We seed a
-// near-tip pending entry (low height), then flood with far-future-height frames;
-// the map stays at the cap and the near-tip entry is retained.
-func TestHeightsMap_FloodCappedPreservingNearTip(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
-	const epoch = uint64(8)
-	// Slack must admit the flood frames' epoch; we stamp them at the current epoch so
-	// the recency gate is not what bounds them — the CAP is what we are testing.
-	state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
-	inner := newFakeInnerVM()
-	wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
-
-	// Near-tip pending block at LOW value height 1.
-	nearTip := newFakeInner(1, ids.Empty, "near-tip")
-	inner.register(nearTip)
-	if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), wrapPChainHeight(nearTip.Bytes(), epoch)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(near-tip): %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Flood: cap + 200 distinct frames at FAR-future value heights (never accepted).
-	for i := 0; i < pChainHeightMapCap+200; i++ {
-		h := uint64(1_000_000 + i) // far above the near-tip height
-		blk := newFakeInner(h, ids.Empty, "flood-"+itoa(h))
-		inner.register(blk)
-		if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), wrapPChainHeight(blk.Bytes(), epoch)); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(flood %d): %v", i, err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	wrapper.mu.Lock()
-	size := len(wrapper.heights)
-	_, nearTipKept := wrapper.heights[nearTip.ID()]
-	wrapper.mu.Unlock()
-
-	if size > pChainHeightMapCap {
-		t.Fatalf("heights map = %d entries, must be capped at %d under flood (MEDIUM-3 backstop)", size, pChainHeightMapCap)
-	}
-	if !nearTipKept {
-		t.Fatal("the near-tip pending entry (height 1) must SURVIVE the cap — eviction is highest-height-first, " +
-			"so a flood of far-future-height spam is shed before any near-tip pending block (NOT a blind LRU)")
-	}
-}
-
-// itoa is a tiny, allocation-light uint64→string for unique test tags (avoids
-// importing strconv into a hot test loop and keeps byBytes keys distinct).
-func itoa(v uint64) string {
-	if v == 0 {
-		return "0"
-	}
-	var buf [20]byte
-	i := len(buf)
-	for v > 0 {
-		i--
-		buf[i] = byte('0' + v%10)
-		v /= 10
-	}
-	return string(buf[i:])
-}
@@ -1,486 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// pchain_height_vm.go — the node-layer boundary that delivers the REAL P-CHAIN
-// EPOCH HEIGHT to the consensus chain engine (the b2 wiring; the LAST
-// QUORUM_FINALITY blocker).
-//
-// THE BUG IT FIXES. The chain engine pins a block's weighted validator set to a
-// P-CHAIN height (engine/chain: pChainHeightOf → epochHeightLocked → the SINGLE
-// height the set-root commitment, the ⅔-by-stake tally, AND the per-voter pubkey
-// resolution are read at). It reads that height by asserting the VM block to a
-// `PChainHeight() uint64` (consensus block.SignedBlock). A bare VM block — every
-// block the node's plugin VMs (C-Chain EVM, dexvm, …) produce — does NOT expose
-// one, so pChainHeightOf returns 0 and the engine resolves the set at P-chain
-// height 0: the GENESIS set. That is SAFE (non-empty, identical on every node,
-// ≤ current) and UNBRICKS finality, but it FREEZES the epoch at genesis: a
-// validator that JOINED after genesis is absent from set@0, so its vote is
-// dropped and its stake is not counted — finality cannot track a DYNAMIC
-// validator set (a departed genesis majority could even collude). This is the
-// frozen-set caveat Gate D must sign away.
-//
-// THE FIX. pChainHeightVM wraps the chain's BlockBuilder (the VM the engine
-// builds/parses blocks through) and makes the block the engine sees carry the
-// proposer's P-chain epoch height — WITHOUT changing the inner VM's block format,
-// IDs, or ledger state:
-//
-//   - BuildBlock (proposer): build the inner block, then stamp the proposer's
-//     live P-chain epoch height H = max(GetCurrentHeight, parentH) (the
-//     proposervm selectChildPChainHeight rule — monotone, ≤ current). Return a
-//     pChainHeightBlock whose Bytes() are [magic|H|innerBytes] and whose
-//     PChainHeight() is H. Every other method (ID, ParentID, Height, Verify,
-//     Accept, …) delegates to the inner block — so the block's IDENTITY and the
-//     VM's state are the inner VM's, unchanged.
-//   - ParseBlock (follower): split [magic|H|innerBytes], parse the inner bytes
-//     through the inner VM, and re-attach H. Bytes WITHOUT the magic (a raw inner
-//     block from a pre-wrapper peer, GetAncestors, or genesis) parse with H=0 →
-//     the SAFE genesis-set fallback — never worse than today.
-//
-// DETERMINISM is the whole point and is why H must travel IN the gossiped bytes.
-// The engine gossips only blk.Bytes(); a follower recovers the block solely via
-// ParseBlock(those bytes). The proposer STAMPS H; every follower ADOPTS the
-// identical H from the envelope — it never recomputes H from its own (skewing)
-// current P-chain view. So every honest node derives the SAME epoch height from
-// the SAME signed block, which is the invariant the engine's cert verifier
-// requires (engine/chain HandleIncomingCert cross-checks the cert's set-root
-// against the set-root WE recompute at OUR epoch height for the block: equal H ⟹
-// equal root ⟹ the cert verifies; a post-genesis validator's vote+stake now
-// count). A build-time-only stamp would give the proposer a real H but leave
-// followers computing a DIFFERENT root from their own height → the cert is
-// dropped → finality STALLS on a dynamic set (strictly worse than the genesis
-// fallback). That is why the height is carried, not recomputed.
-//
-// This is a consensus-TRANSPORT framing (an 8-byte height + 4-byte magic prefix
-// on the gossiped bytes), NOT a chain/ledger fork: the inner VM's bytes, block
-// IDs, and execution state are byte-identical, so there is no re-genesis — only a
-// coordinated node upgrade (the whole validator set ships together).
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"errors"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
-	"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
-)
-
-// pChainHeightMagic tags a transport-wrapped block so ParseBlock can tell a
-// wrapped block ([magic|H:8|innerBytes]) from a raw inner block (no magic →
-// H=0, the genesis-set fallback). Distinct, fixed, version-pinned: a future
-// envelope change bumps the last byte and is non-malleable. "LXP" = Lux P-chain.
-var pChainHeightMagic = [4]byte{'L', 'X', 'P', 0x01}
-
-// pChainHeightHeaderLen is the fixed transport-header width: magic(4) + height(8).
-const pChainHeightHeaderLen = 4 + 8
-
-// pChainHeightRecencySlack is the receive-side UPPER bound on how far a gossiped
-// block's stamped P-chain epoch height H may exceed THIS node's live P-chain
-// height before the block is rejected as absurd-future (HIGH-1, predicate b). The
-// proposer stamps H = its own GetCurrentHeight (the proposervm selectChildPChainHeight
-// rule, ≤ its current); a follower lagging the P-chain sees a smaller current, so
-// some forward skew is LEGITIMATE during a staking change or a gossip burst. 256
-// P-chain heights swamps any honest inter-node skew (P-chain blocks are seconds
-// apart; gossip+verify is sub-second) while still rejecting a wildly-future H. The
-// bound is a LIVENESS/DoS sanity gate, NOT the safety bound (that is the monotone
-// gate in the engine): a future H always FAILS set resolution at the verifier
-// (errUnfinalizedHeight) and never finalizes against a bogus set regardless — this
-// just fails it fast and keeps the heights map from accreting unresolvable entries.
-const pChainHeightRecencySlack = uint64(256)
-
-// pChainHeightMapCap is the hard backstop on the heights map size — the cap that
-// bounds the gossip-parse DoS (MEDIUM-3): ParseBlock runs before the engine's
-// dedup/Verify, so an attacker peer could stream distinct unverified blocks, each
-// adding a permanent entry. The map plateaus far below this in steady state (the
-// watermark prune evicts every finalized block's entry as finality advances); the
-// cap fires only under a sustained flood, and then evicts HIGHEST-chain-height
-// first — spam claims wild heights, real pending blocks cluster just above the
-// finalized watermark, so the near-tip pending band is preserved (NOT a blind LRU
-// that could drop a live block). Chosen >> any realistic pending working set.
-const pChainHeightMapCap = 4096
-
-// errPChainHeightNotRecent is returned by ParseBlock when a wrapped block's stamped
-// P-chain epoch exceeds this node's live P-chain height by more than the recency
-// slack. Returning an error fails CLOSED: HandleIncomingBlock drops the block (it
-// is never tracked or voted), which is the correct response to an absurd-future
-// epoch a follower cannot resolve a set at.
-var errPChainHeightNotRecent = errors.New("chains: gossiped block P-chain epoch height exceeds local P-chain height + recency slack (absurd-future epoch, rejected fail-closed)")
-
-// pChainHeightVM wraps a chain BlockBuilder so the block the consensus engine
-// sees carries the proposer's P-chain epoch height. It is the ONLY thing that
-// changes between the engine and the inner VM; everything else is the inner VM,
-// verbatim.
-//
-// It is installed ONLY on K>1 (quorum) chains: a K==1 chain finalizes on its
-// sole validator's self-vote with no cert and no validator-set epoch, so the
-// stamp is inert there and the wrapper is not installed (the inner VM is used
-// directly — one obvious path per mode).
-type pChainHeightVM struct {
-	inner     consensuschain.BlockBuilder
-	state     validators.State
-	networkID ids.ID
-
-	// heights memoises blockID → (stamped P-chain epoch, value-chain height) for
-	// blocks this node has built or parsed, so GetBlock can re-attach the epoch a
-	// block was stamped with (the inner VM stores only the inner bytes, which carry
-	// no epoch). Best-effort: a cache miss yields H=0 (the genesis-set fallback).
-	// GetBlock is NOT on the finality-capture path — the engine records a block's
-	// epoch the first time it BUILDS or PARSES the block (where the epoch is always
-	// present) and reads it back from its own pending-block record, never by
-	// re-fetching via GetBlock — so a miss here cannot drop a LIVE block's epoch
-	// (the consensus PendingBlock holds it, not this map).
-	//
-	// BOUNDED (MEDIUM-3): the value-chain height tagged on each entry lets onAccepted
-	// PRUNE every entry at or below the finalized-height watermark (a finalized block
-	// never needs a GetBlock epoch re-attach), so under steady finality the map
-	// plateaus at the watermark. finalizedHeight is that watermark, advanced as
-	// blocks Accept. A hard cap (pChainHeightMapCap) backstops a sustained
-	// unverified-parse flood, evicting highest-height-first to preserve the near-tip
-	// pending band. A still-PENDING block (height above the watermark) is never
-	// evicted by the watermark prune.
-	mu              sync.Mutex
-	heights         map[ids.ID]heightEntry
-	finalizedHeight uint64
-}
-
-// heightEntry records, for a remembered block, both the P-chain EPOCH it was
-// stamped with (re-attached by GetBlock) and its VALUE-CHAIN height (the prune key:
-// an entry at/below the finalized watermark is evictable).
-type heightEntry struct {
-	epoch       uint64
-	chainHeight uint64
-}
-
-// newPChainHeightVM wraps inner with P-chain-epoch-height stamping backed by the
-// height-indexed validators.State. networkID is the set the height is resolved
-// against (PrimaryNetworkID for native chains; the L1's set ID otherwise) — it is
-// recorded for symmetry with the engine's epoch reads, though GetCurrentHeight is
-// a P-chain-global height. A nil state disables stamping (BuildBlock falls back to
-// H=0): callers install this ONLY for K>1 chains, which the manager already
-// guards to have a live height-indexed state, so the nil path is a defensive
-// fail-soft, not a runtime mode.
-func newPChainHeightVM(inner consensuschain.BlockBuilder, state validators.State, networkID ids.ID) *pChainHeightVM {
-	return &pChainHeightVM{
-		inner:     inner,
-		state:     state,
-		networkID: networkID,
-		heights:   make(map[ids.ID]heightEntry),
-	}
-}
-
-var _ consensuschain.BlockBuilder = (*pChainHeightVM)(nil)
-
-// remember records the epoch a block (at value-chain height chainHeight) was
-// stamped with so GetBlock can re-attach it. BOUNDED (MEDIUM-3): the map is pruned
-// against the finalized-height watermark by onAccepted, so it plateaus under steady
-// finality; remember additionally enforces the hard cap as a flood backstop. The
-// chainHeight is the prune key.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) remember(id ids.ID, epoch, chainHeight uint64) {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	defer vm.mu.Unlock()
-	vm.heights[id] = heightEntry{epoch: epoch, chainHeight: chainHeight}
-	vm.enforceCapLocked()
-}
-
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) recall(id ids.ID) (uint64, bool) {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	e, ok := vm.heights[id]
-	vm.mu.Unlock()
-	return e.epoch, ok
-}
-
-// onAccepted advances the finalized-height watermark to acceptedHeight and PRUNES
-// every remembered entry at or below it (MEDIUM-3). A finalized block's epoch is
-// already captured in the engine's records and will never be re-attached via
-// GetBlock, so dropping its entry is loss-free — and a still-PENDING block (height
-// strictly above the watermark) is NEVER evicted by this prune, so its GetBlock
-// epoch survives. Called from the wrapped block's Accept (the block tells its VM
-// the height at which it finalized). Idempotent and monotone: a re-accept or an
-// out-of-order lower height never lowers the watermark.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) onAccepted(acceptedHeight uint64) {
-	vm.mu.Lock()
-	defer vm.mu.Unlock()
-	if acceptedHeight > vm.finalizedHeight {
-		vm.finalizedHeight = acceptedHeight
-	}
-	for id, e := range vm.heights {
-		if e.chainHeight <= vm.finalizedHeight {
-			delete(vm.heights, id)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// enforceCapLocked is the flood backstop: if the map exceeds the hard cap, evict
-// the entry with the HIGHEST value-chain height. Real pending blocks cluster just
-// above the finalized watermark (the next few heights); an unverified-parse flood
-// claims arbitrary, typically far-future heights — so evicting highest-first sheds
-// spam while preserving the near-tip pending band (NOT a blind LRU that could drop
-// a live block's epoch). The cap is reached only under attack: the watermark prune
-// keeps the steady-state map far below it. Caller holds vm.mu.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) enforceCapLocked() {
-	for len(vm.heights) > pChainHeightMapCap {
-		var victim ids.ID
-		var maxHeight uint64
-		first := true
-		for id, e := range vm.heights {
-			if first || e.chainHeight > maxHeight {
-				victim, maxHeight, first = id, e.chainHeight, false
-			}
-		}
-		delete(vm.heights, victim)
-	}
-}
-
-// currentPChainHeight returns the proposer's live P-chain height, the upper end
-// of the proposervm selectChildPChainHeight rule. A nil state or a read error
-// yields 0 (the genesis-set fallback): a height the proposer cannot resolve must
-// not be stamped onto a block, since a follower could not resolve the set there
-// either. A read error is symmetric across nodes for a committed P-chain, so the
-// fallback is uniform.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) currentPChainHeight(ctx context.Context) uint64 {
-	if vm.state == nil {
-		return 0
-	}
-	h, err := vm.state.GetCurrentHeight(ctx)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0
-	}
-	return h
-}
-
-// parentHeight returns the P-chain epoch height stamped on parentID, or 0 if it
-// is unknown — used to keep a child's stamped height monotone ≥ its parent's
-// (selectChildPChainHeight). An unknown parent (0) cannot LOWER the child below
-// the current height (the max below), so monotonicity is preserved fail-soft.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) parentHeight(parentID ids.ID) uint64 {
-	h, _ := vm.recall(parentID)
-	return h
-}
-
-// BuildBlock builds the inner block and stamps it with the proposer's P-chain
-// epoch height H = max(currentPChainHeight, parentH). This is the proposer side
-// of the epoch: the one node building this block chooses H from its own live
-// P-chain view, and that H rides the gossiped bytes to every follower (which
-// adopt it, never recompute it). Monotone ≥ parent so a chain's epoch never goes
-// backwards across blocks (a cert at a lower epoch than its parent would bind a
-// stale set).
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) BuildBlock(ctx context.Context) (block.Block, error) {
-	inner, err := vm.inner.BuildBlock(ctx)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	h := vm.currentPChainHeight(ctx)
-	if ph := vm.parentHeight(inner.ParentID()); ph > h {
-		h = ph
-	}
-	vm.remember(inner.ID(), h, inner.Height())
-	return newPChainHeightBlock(vm, inner, h), nil
-}
-
-// ParseBlock recovers a block from transport bytes. Wrapped bytes
-// ([magic|H|innerBytes]) yield a block whose PChainHeight() is the EXACT H the
-// proposer stamped — the determinism guarantee: every node parsing the same
-// gossiped bytes recovers the identical epoch height. Bytes without the magic are
-// a raw inner block (a pre-wrapper peer, GetAncestors, genesis): parsed straight
-// through with H=0, the SAFE genesis-set fallback.
-//
-// FRAME DISCRIMINATOR (LOW-2). The 4-byte magic collides at 2^-32 with the raw
-// hash prefix some VMs use as their Bytes() (dexvm/quantumvm/dchain serialize
-// parentID[0:32]||…). The magic match alone is NOT sufficient: a frame is real
-// only if the inner re-parse of the framed payload ALSO succeeds. So when the
-// prefix matches, attempt to parse b[header:] as an inner block; if that FAILS,
-// fall back to parsing the WHOLE b as a raw inner block (the colliding raw block,
-// whose bytes minus the 12-byte prefix are not a valid inner block). This removes
-// the bootstrap stall a magic collision used to cause (mis-framed → inner decode
-// fails closed → stall on that chain).
-//
-// RECENCY GATE (HIGH-1, predicate b). A real frame's stamped epoch H must be
-// recent relative to THIS node's live P-chain height: H ≤ localCurrentH + slack.
-// An absurd-future H (a Byzantine proposer claiming an epoch the network has not
-// reached) is rejected fail-closed (the block is dropped, never tracked). This is
-// the upper half of the epoch bound; the engine's monotone gate is the lower half
-// (≥ parent's recorded epoch), so the epoch is pinned to [parentEpoch, localH+slack].
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) ParseBlock(ctx context.Context, b []byte) (block.Block, error) {
-	candidateInner, h, magicMatched := unwrapPChainHeight(b)
-	if magicMatched {
-		// The prefix looks like a frame. It IS a frame only if the framed payload
-		// parses as an inner block AND the stamped epoch is recent.
-		if inner, err := vm.inner.ParseBlock(ctx, candidateInner); err == nil {
-			if !vm.epochRecent(ctx, h) {
-				return nil, errPChainHeightNotRecent
-			}
-			vm.remember(inner.ID(), h, inner.Height())
-			return newPChainHeightBlock(vm, inner, h), nil
-		}
-		// Magic matched but the framed payload did NOT parse → this is a RAW block
-		// whose first bytes coincidentally equal the magic. Parse the whole b raw.
-	}
-	// Raw inner block: no proposer epoch available → genesis-set fallback. Still
-	// wrap (uniform block type to the engine) but with H=0 and a passthrough
-	// Bytes() so re-gossip of a raw block stays raw.
-	inner, err := vm.inner.ParseBlock(ctx, b)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return newRawPChainHeightBlock(vm, inner), nil
-}
-
-// epochRecent reports whether a stamped P-chain epoch height is within the recency
-// slack of this node's live P-chain height (HIGH-1, predicate b). A node with no
-// resolvable current height (state nil / read error → 0) cannot bound recency, so
-// it admits the block (the verifier still fails closed on an unresolvable future
-// epoch at set-resolution time — recency here is a fast-fail/DoS sanity gate, not
-// the safety bound). Heights at or below local are always recent.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) epochRecent(ctx context.Context, h uint64) bool {
-	localH := vm.currentPChainHeight(ctx)
-	if localH == 0 {
-		return true
-	}
-	return h <= localH+pChainHeightRecencySlack
-}
-
-// GetBlock fetches a block from the inner VM and re-attaches the P-chain height
-// it was stamped with (recalled from build/parse). A miss yields H=0 — acceptable
-// because GetBlock is not on the engine's finality-capture path (see the heights
-// field doc). The returned block's Bytes() is the inner bytes (the inner VM's
-// canonical at-rest form); a stamped height is re-attached for the engine's
-// in-memory use only.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) GetBlock(ctx context.Context, id ids.ID) (block.Block, error) {
-	inner, err := vm.inner.GetBlock(ctx, id)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if h, ok := vm.recall(id); ok {
-		return newRawPChainHeightBlockWithHeight(vm, inner, h), nil
-	}
-	return newRawPChainHeightBlock(vm, inner), nil
-}
-
-// LastAccepted delegates to the inner VM.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) LastAccepted(ctx context.Context) (ids.ID, error) {
-	return vm.inner.LastAccepted(ctx)
-}
-
-// NOTE: this wrapper deliberately does NOT forward GetBlockIDAtHeight. The bootstrap acceptance
-// oracle's fork-sibling check reads the IN-PROCESS consensus finalized ledger
-// (blockHandler.finalizedBlockAtHeight → engine.FinalizedBlockAtHeight), NOT a VM height index —
-// because the VM index is dead over ZAP (the zap server has no MsgGetBlockIDAtHeight handler, so
-// the real C-Chain returns nothing). A forwarder here would only re-expose that dead path.
-
-// SetPreference delegates to the inner VM.
-func (vm *pChainHeightVM) SetPreference(ctx context.Context, id ids.ID) error {
-	return vm.inner.SetPreference(ctx, id)
-}
-
-// wrapPChainHeight frames inner bytes with the proposer's P-chain height:
-// magic(4) || height(8,BE) || innerBytes. The header is fixed-width so unwrap is
-// a constant-time prefix read.
-func wrapPChainHeight(innerBytes []byte, height uint64) []byte {
-	out := make([]byte, pChainHeightHeaderLen+len(innerBytes))
-	copy(out[0:4], pChainHeightMagic[:])
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[4:12], height)
-	copy(out[pChainHeightHeaderLen:], innerBytes)
-	return out
-}
-
-// unwrapPChainHeight is a PURE prefix splitter: it reports whether b carries the
-// frame magic at the header width and, if so, returns the candidate payload and
-// the encoded height. magicMatched==true means ONLY that the prefix looks like a
-// frame — NOT that b is definitely framed. ParseBlock makes the real decision by
-// re-parsing the candidate payload (LOW-2): a raw block whose first bytes collide
-// with the magic (2^-32) yields magicMatched==true here but its payload fails the
-// inner re-parse, so ParseBlock falls back to a raw whole-b parse. Keeping this a
-// pure split (no VM dependency) localizes the collision handling to ParseBlock.
-func unwrapPChainHeight(b []byte) (payload []byte, height uint64, magicMatched bool) {
-	if len(b) < pChainHeightHeaderLen ||
-		b[0] != pChainHeightMagic[0] || b[1] != pChainHeightMagic[1] ||
-		b[2] != pChainHeightMagic[2] || b[3] != pChainHeightMagic[3] {
-		return b, 0, false
-	}
-	height = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[4:12])
-	return b[pChainHeightHeaderLen:], height, true
-}
-
-// --- the wrapped block -------------------------------------------------------
-
-// pChainHeightBlock is a chain block that carries a P-chain epoch height for the
-// engine while delegating identity, verification, and acceptance to the inner VM
-// block. It satisfies consensus block.SignedBlock's PChainHeight() (the subset
-// the engine reads via pChainHeightOf), so the engine records the real epoch
-// height — every other behaviour is the inner VM's.
-//
-// `bytes` is what the engine gossips. For a proposer-built / wrapped-parsed block
-// it is the framed [magic|H|innerBytes] so a follower recovers H; for a raw block
-// (genesis-set fallback) it is the inner bytes verbatim (passthrough) so re-gossip
-// stays raw.
-type pChainHeightBlock struct {
-	vm           *pChainHeightVM
-	inner        block.Block
-	pChainHeight uint64
-	bytes        []byte
-}
-
-// newPChainHeightBlock wraps inner with height h and a FRAMED Bytes()
-// ([magic|h|inner]) — the proposer/parse path, where H must travel to followers.
-func newPChainHeightBlock(vm *pChainHeightVM, inner block.Block, h uint64) *pChainHeightBlock {
-	return &pChainHeightBlock{
-		vm:           vm,
-		inner:        inner,
-		pChainHeight: h,
-		bytes:        wrapPChainHeight(inner.Bytes(), h),
-	}
-}
-
-// newRawPChainHeightBlock wraps inner with H=0 and a PASSTHROUGH Bytes() (the
-// inner bytes verbatim) — the genesis-set fallback for a raw inner block.
-func newRawPChainHeightBlock(vm *pChainHeightVM, inner block.Block) *pChainHeightBlock {
-	return &pChainHeightBlock{vm: vm, inner: inner, pChainHeight: 0, bytes: inner.Bytes()}
-}
-
-// newRawPChainHeightBlockWithHeight re-attaches a recalled height to an inner
-// block fetched via GetBlock while keeping a PASSTHROUGH Bytes() (the inner VM's
-// at-rest bytes). Used off the finality-capture path; the height is for the
-// engine's in-memory epoch read, not for re-gossip framing.
-func newRawPChainHeightBlockWithHeight(vm *pChainHeightVM, inner block.Block, h uint64) *pChainHeightBlock {
-	return &pChainHeightBlock{vm: vm, inner: inner, pChainHeight: h, bytes: inner.Bytes()}
-}
-
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) ID() ids.ID           { return b.inner.ID() }
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Parent() ids.ID       { return b.inner.Parent() }
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) ParentID() ids.ID     { return b.inner.ParentID() }
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Height() uint64       { return b.inner.Height() }
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Timestamp() time.Time { return b.inner.Timestamp() }
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Status() uint8        { return b.inner.Status() }
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Bytes() []byte        { return b.bytes }
-
-// PChainHeight is the method the engine reads via pChainHeightOf — the SOLE
-// reason this wrapper exists. The inner block does not expose it; this does.
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) PChainHeight() uint64 { return b.pChainHeight }
-
-// Verify/Reject delegate to the inner VM block: the wrapper changes the epoch the
-// engine SEES, never the block's validity or state transition.
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Verify(ctx context.Context) error { return b.inner.Verify(ctx) }
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Reject(ctx context.Context) error { return b.inner.Reject(ctx) }
-
-// Accept finalizes the inner block, then advances the VM's finalized-height
-// watermark and prunes the heights map at/below it (MEDIUM-3). The inner Accept
-// runs FIRST: finalization must not depend on the bookkeeping prune, and the prune
-// is a pure memory-management side effect that can never fail. The block carries
-// its own height, so the VM learns the exact finalized height with no extra read.
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Accept(ctx context.Context) error {
-	if err := b.inner.Accept(ctx); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if b.vm != nil {
-		b.vm.onAccepted(b.inner.Height())
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// Unwrap exposes the inner block for code that must reach the underlying VM block
-// (e.g. a missing-context reparse). Kept narrow on purpose.
-func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Unwrap() block.Block { return b.inner }
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// proposervm_wrap_test.go — pins the single policy gate that decides whether a
-// linear chain.ChainVM is re-wrapped in proposervm for single-proposer-per-height
-// block production (the consensus-safety fix for the equivocation crash). The
-// gate is a pure function so the policy is verifiable without standing up a chain.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-)
-
-func TestShouldWrapInProposerVM(t *testing.T) {
-	// A native chain ID that is NOT the P-Chain (e.g. the C-Chain): first 31
-	// bytes zero, last byte the chain letter. Any non-platform ID exercises the
-	// chainID condition; this mirrors how native chain IDs are shaped.
-	cChainID := ids.ID{}
-	cChainID[ids.IDLen-1] = 'C'
-	xChainID := ids.ID{}
-	xChainID[ids.IDLen-1] = 'X'
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name             string
-		k                int
-		chainID          ids.ID
-		innerIsDAGNative bool
-		want             bool
-		why              string
-	}{
-		{
-			name:             "C-Chain devnet K=4",
-			k:                4, // LocalBFTParams
-			chainID:          cChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             true,
-			why:              "multi-validator EVM, not the P-Chain, not DAG — the chain that crashed; must be wrapped",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "C-Chain mainnet K=21",
-			k:                21, // MainnetParams
-			chainID:          cChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             true,
-			why:              "large multi-validator EVM is wrapped exactly as avalanchego wraps it",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "P-Chain is excluded even at K>1",
-			k:                4,
-			chainID:          constants.PlatformChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             false,
-			why:              "P-Chain validator state is published mid-create; its windower would be empty — keep newPChainHeightVM",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "X-Chain (DAG-native) is excluded",
-			k:                4,
-			chainID:          xChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: true,
-			want:             false,
-			why:              "linearized DAG VM uses a push-notification bridge that does not compose with proposervm's window",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "single-node K=1 is not wrapped",
-			k:                1, // SingleValidatorParams
-			chainID:          cChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             false,
-			why:              "one validator is trivially the sole proposer; no equivocation to prevent",
-		},
-		{
-			name:             "K=1 P-Chain is not wrapped",
-			k:                1,
-			chainID:          constants.PlatformChainID,
-			innerIsDAGNative: false,
-			want:             false,
-			why:              "K==1 short-circuits regardless of chain",
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := shouldWrapInProposerVM(tt.k, tt.chainID, tt.innerIsDAGNative)
-			if got != tt.want {
-				t.Fatalf("shouldWrapInProposerVM(k=%d, chainID=%s, dag=%v) = %v, want %v — %s",
-					tt.k, tt.chainID, tt.innerIsDAGNative, got, tt.want, tt.why)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestShouldWrapInProposerVM_FlowsFromSelectedParams proves the K the gate reads
-// is the one selectConsensusParams produces per network, so the wrap decision is
-// consistent with the BFT committee actually chosen: every sybil-protected
-// network yields K>1 (C-Chain wrapped), and single-node yields K==1 (not wrapped).
-func TestShouldWrapInProposerVM_FlowsFromSelectedParams(t *testing.T) {
-	cChainID := ids.ID{}
-	cChainID[ids.IDLen-1] = 'C'
-
-	cases := []struct {
-		name            string
-		sybilProtection bool
-		networkID       uint32
-		wantWrapCChain  bool
-	}{
-		{"single-node dev", false, constants.LocalID, false},
-		{"devnet sybil", true, constants.DevnetID, true},
-		{"localnet sybil", true, constants.LocalID, true},
-		{"mainnet", true, constants.MainnetID, true},
-		{"testnet", true, constants.TestnetID, true},
-	}
-
-	for _, c := range cases {
-		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			params := selectConsensusParams(c.sybilProtection, c.networkID)
-			got := shouldWrapInProposerVM(params.K, cChainID, false)
-			if got != c.wantWrapCChain {
-				t.Fatalf("network %s (sybil=%v): K=%d → wrap=%v, want %v",
-					c.name, c.sybilProtection, params.K, got, c.wantWrapCChain)
-			}
-			// The P-Chain is never wrapped, whatever the committee.
-			if shouldWrapInProposerVM(params.K, constants.PlatformChainID, false) {
-				t.Fatalf("network %s: P-Chain must never be wrapped (K=%d)", c.name, params.K)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
@@ -1,415 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// quorum.go — the node-layer wiring that makes the consensus engine's α-of-K
-// quorum-cert finality LIVE (HIGH-4). The consensus engine (luxfi/consensus
-// engine/chain) defines the quorum RULE and the vote/cert topology interfaces;
-// THIS file supplies the concrete node implementations the engine needs:
-//
-//   - blsVoteVerifier  — verifies a validator's BLS signature over the canonical
-//     vote message against the chain's validator set (the engine is scheme-
-//     agnostic; the node injects BLS).
-//   - blsVoteSigner    — signs THIS node's accept votes with its staking BLS key
-//     so its signature can be collected into a cert.
-//   - validatorStakeSource — supplies per-validator stake so finality is a
-//     ⅔-by-STAKE supermajority (HIGH-3), not a raw voter count.
-//   - networkGossiper.BroadcastVote / GossipCert — the QuorumGossiper transport:
-//     a follower broadcasts its signed vote to ALL validators and any node that
-//     collects α distinct signed votes gossips the assembled cert, so finality
-//     never hinges on one node's inbound Chits (liveness; no proposer-freeze).
-//
-// Inbound votes/certs arrive as app-gossip and are demuxed in blockHandler.Gossip
-// (see manager.go) into engine.HandleIncomingVote / HandleIncomingCert.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"errors"
-	"sort"
-
-	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
-	consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
-	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
-	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
-)
-
-// isLocalDevNetwork reports whether networkID is an explicitly-local developer
-// network: devnet (3) or localnet (1337). These are EXACT IDs (per luxfi/constants
-// convention), NOT a range — a custom value L1 with a high networkID (e.g. an
-// L1 whose chainID == networkID) is a VALUE network and must NOT match here.
-// Local dev networks are the only IDs that run the minimal-BFT committee
-// (LocalBFTParams, K=4) instead of the large-committee Default (K=20), because a
-// handful of localhost validators cannot reach an α=14-of-K=20 quorum.
-func isLocalDevNetwork(networkID uint32) bool {
-	return networkID == constants.DevnetID || networkID == constants.LocalID
-}
-
-// selectConsensusParams picks the consensus parameters for a chain.
-//
-//   - sybilProtection == false (--dev / single-node): K=1, the sole validator's
-//     accept is the 1-of-1 quorum (no peer signatures).
-//   - sybilProtection == true, VALUE network: a large BYZANTINE-fault-tolerant
-//     param set — NEVER LocalParams() (K=3/α=2, f=0, which a single Byzantine
-//     validator forks; this was CRITICAL-2). Mainnet→K=21, Testnet→K=11, every
-//     other value net→Default K=20.
-//   - sybilProtection == true, LOCAL DEV network (devnet 3 / localnet 1337):
-//     LocalBFTParams() (K=4/α=3, f=1) — the MINIMAL real-BFT committee. Default
-//     K=20 is unsatisfiable on a few localhost validators: α=14 affirmative votes
-//     are unreachable with 3-4 validators, so no block ever finalizes and the
-//     P-Chain freezes at height 0 (no C-Chain is ever created). K=4 makes quorum
-//     reachable (3 of 4) while staying genuinely BFT — it still clears
-//     ValidateForValueNetwork (K≥4, f≥1) and the CRITICAL-2 multi-node-is-BFT
-//     regression, so production safety is untouched. (A local devnet should run
-//     ≥4 validators to realise f=1; with 3 it degrades to near-unanimous f=0,
-//     which is safe though not live under a fault.)
-//
-// All branches satisfy the 2α−K ≥ f+1 overlap bound; the manager call site also
-// asserts ValidateForValueNetwork as a fail-closed backstop (K=4 passes it).
-func selectConsensusParams(sybilProtection bool, networkID uint32) consensusconfig.Parameters {
-	if !sybilProtection {
-		return consensusconfig.SingleValidatorParams()
-	}
-	switch networkID {
-	case constants.MainnetID:
-		return consensusconfig.MainnetParams()
-	case constants.TestnetID:
-		return consensusconfig.TestnetParams()
-	default:
-		if isLocalDevNetwork(networkID) {
-			return consensusconfig.LocalBFTParams()
-		}
-		return consensusconfig.DefaultParams()
-	}
-}
-
-// shouldWrapInProposerVM decides whether a linear chain.ChainVM is wrapped in
-// proposervm to enforce single-proposer-per-height block production (the
-// proposer window). It is the SINGLE policy gate (the manager calls it once);
-// keeping it a pure function makes the policy unit-testable without standing up
-// a whole chain. All three conditions must hold:
-//
-//   - k > 1: a multi-validator quorum. K==1 (single-node --dev) has exactly one
-//     proposer already, so there is no equivocation to prevent and no schedule
-//     to compute (proposervm would only add a wrapper with no safety value).
-//   - chainID is NOT the P-Chain: the P-Chain publishes its OWN height-indexed
-//     validators.State DURING its createChain, AFTER the chainRuntime snapshot
-//     proposervm's windower reads — so its windower would see an empty set and
-//     fall back to anyone-can-propose with a P-chain-height-0 stamp. The P-Chain
-//     keeps the existing newPChainHeightVM path (which DOES get the live state).
-//   - inner is NOT DAG-native (no Linearize): a linearized DAG VM (X-Chain) is
-//     driven by a push-notification bridge that does not compose with
-//     proposervm's pull/window model without avalanchego's initializeOnLinearizeVM
-//     machinery. It keeps the existing path.
-//
-// The C-Chain and sovereign-L1 EVM chains satisfy all three (multi-validator,
-// not the P-Chain, not DAG) — they are exactly the chains that exhibited the
-// equivocation crash, and exactly the chains avalanchego wraps in proposervm.
-func shouldWrapInProposerVM(k int, chainID ids.ID, innerIsDAGNative bool) bool {
-	return k > 1 && chainID != constants.PlatformChainID && !innerIsDAGNative
-}
-
-// --- BLS vote verifier -------------------------------------------------------
-
-// blsVoteVerifier verifies a validator's BLS signature over the canonical vote
-// message. The validator's BLS public key is resolved FROM THE HEIGHT-INDEXED
-// validators.State AT THE BLOCK'S P-CHAIN EPOCH HEIGHT (RESIDUAL-B) — the SAME
-// height-pinned source the set-root and the ⅔-by-stake tally read from
-// (validatorSetAtHeight). It is NOT resolved from the CURRENT validator map.
-//
-// Why the epoch, not the current map: during an async validator-set change a
-// validator can be present in the set@H (it legitimately signed the block being
-// voted on at height H) yet ALREADY GONE from the current map. Resolving its
-// pubkey from the current map drops its valid vote, and if that validator holds
-// >⅓ of the stake-at-H the stable set falls below ⅔ and block H NEVER finalizes
-// (this is not self-healing for that block — the skew is permanent for H). Pinning
-// pubkey resolution to set@H — alongside membership, set-root, and stake — makes
-// the cert internally consistent at exactly one epoch.
-//
-// An unknown validator at the epoch, a validator with no BLS key, or a bad
-// signature all yield false (never an error/panic) — a cert with such a voter is
-// simply invalid, the fail-closed contract the engine requires. A nil state (the
-// no-op on a non-quorum node) yields false for every voter; a K>1 chain is
-// guarded against ever reaching here with a nil/no-op state (manager.go).
-type blsVoteVerifier struct {
-	state     validators.State
-	networkID ids.ID
-}
-
-func newBLSVoteVerifier(state validators.State, networkID ids.ID) *blsVoteVerifier {
-	return &blsVoteVerifier{state: state, networkID: networkID}
-}
-
-// VerifyVote implements consensuschain.VoteVerifier. epochHeight is the block's
-// P-chain height; the voter's pubkey is read from the set IN FORCE AT that height.
-func (v *blsVoteVerifier) VerifyVote(nodeID ids.NodeID, message []byte, sig []byte, epochHeight uint64) bool {
-	out, ok := validatorSetAtHeight(v.state, v.networkID, epochHeight)[nodeID]
-	if !ok || out == nil || len(out.PublicKey) == 0 {
-		return false
-	}
-	pk, err := bls.PublicKeyFromCompressedBytes(out.PublicKey)
-	if err != nil || pk == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	signature, err := bls.SignatureFromBytes(sig)
-	if err != nil || signature == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return bls.Verify(pk, signature, message)
-}
-
-var _ consensuschain.VoteVerifier = (*blsVoteVerifier)(nil)
-
-// --- BLS vote signer ---------------------------------------------------------
-
-// blsVoteSigner signs this node's accept votes with its staking BLS key.
-type blsVoteSigner struct {
-	signer bls.Signer
-}
-
-func newBLSVoteSigner(signer bls.Signer) *blsVoteSigner {
-	if signer == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return &blsVoteSigner{signer: signer}
-}
-
-// SignVote implements consensuschain.VoteSigner.
-func (s *blsVoteSigner) SignVote(message []byte) ([]byte, error) {
-	sig, err := s.signer.Sign(message)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return bls.SignatureToBytes(sig), nil
-}
-
-var _ consensuschain.VoteSigner = (*blsVoteSigner)(nil)
-
-// --- height-pinned epoch read (MEDIUM-1) -------------------------------------
-
-// validatorSetAtHeight reads the validator set IN FORCE AT a value-chain height
-// from the height-indexed validators.State. This is the SINGLE source of epoch
-// truth shared by the stake source and the set-root source: both membership and
-// weights are read at the SAME height H so a cert's signed set-root and its
-// ⅔-by-stake tally are measured against the identical set.
-//
-// Determinism across nodes is the whole point. validators.State.GetValidatorSet
-// returns the set the network already agreed on at height H (P-chain / L1-staking
-// consensus), so every honest node computes the same set — and therefore the
-// same set-root and the same tally — for a given H, INDEPENDENT of async
-// current-map skew during a validator-set change. (The previous Manager.GetMap()
-// read hashed the CURRENT map, which diverges between the signer and the
-// assembler across that skew window → mismatched canonical messages → dropped
-// votes → finality stall at every staking change. That was MEDIUM-1.)
-//
-// A nil state, a lookup error, or an empty set yields a nil map, which the
-// callers fold into their fail-soft answers (0 weight / Empty root). An error is
-// SYMMETRIC across nodes (a committed height H reads the same on every node, or
-// fails the same way), so the degraded answer is uniform — it never makes one
-// node's view disagree with another's, which is the property that matters here.
-func validatorSetAtHeight(state validators.State, networkID ids.ID, height uint64) map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput {
-	if state == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	set, err := state.GetValidatorSet(context.Background(), height, networkID)
-	if err != nil || len(set) == 0 {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return set
-}
-
-// --- stake source (HIGH-3, height-pinned by MEDIUM-1) ------------------------
-
-// validatorStakeSource supplies validator voting weights so the engine can
-// require a ⅔-by-stake supermajority for finality (HIGH-3). Weights are read
-// from the HEIGHT-INDEXED validators.State at the cert-position height, the same
-// height the set-root commits to (MEDIUM-1). Reading the tally at the same epoch
-// as the signed membership means a validator whose vote is in the cert (its
-// signature verifies against the height-H set-root) also contributes its height-H
-// weight to the tally — eliminating the second skew (a current-map weight read
-// could drop a legitimately-signed quorum when membership changed between sign
-// and tally).
-type validatorStakeSource struct {
-	state     validators.State
-	networkID ids.ID
-}
-
-func newValidatorStakeSource(state validators.State, networkID ids.ID) *validatorStakeSource {
-	return &validatorStakeSource{state: state, networkID: networkID}
-}
-
-// Weight implements consensuschain.StakeSource. Returns the validator's stake in
-// the set IN FORCE AT height — deterministic across nodes for a given height. An
-// unknown validator (or a fail-soft empty read) yields 0, which cannot inflate
-// the numerator.
-func (s *validatorStakeSource) Weight(nodeID ids.NodeID, height uint64) uint64 {
-	out, ok := validatorSetAtHeight(s.state, s.networkID, height)[nodeID]
-	if !ok || out == nil {
-		return 0
-	}
-	return out.Light
-}
-
-// TotalStake implements consensuschain.StakeSource. Total active stake of the set
-// IN FORCE AT height (the denominator of the ⅔ predicate), measured at the same
-// epoch as Weight and the set-root.
-func (s *validatorStakeSource) TotalStake(height uint64) uint64 {
-	var total uint64
-	for _, out := range validatorSetAtHeight(s.state, s.networkID, height) {
-		if out != nil {
-			total += out.Light
-		}
-	}
-	return total
-}
-
-// ValidatorCount implements consensuschain.StakeSource. The number of DISTINCT
-// validators in the set IN FORCE AT height — the round-scoped view-change's BFT
-// committee size (it sizes its POL/precommit quorum to bftAlpha over this count,
-// NOT the oversized sample K). Read from the SAME height-indexed set as
-// Weight/TotalStake so every node computes the identical committee and the
-// count-quorum matches the ⅔-by-stake set exactly.
-func (s *validatorStakeSource) ValidatorCount(height uint64) int {
-	return len(validatorSetAtHeight(s.state, s.networkID, height))
-}
-
-var _ consensuschain.StakeSource = (*validatorStakeSource)(nil)
-
-// --- validator-set-root source (MEDIUM: epoch binding) -----------------------
-
-// validatorSetRootSource computes the deterministic commitment to the validator
-// set IN FORCE AT a value-chain height — the value the engine stamps into every
-// vote's VotePosition.ValidatorSetRoot so a cert is pinned to the exact set it
-// was certified under. It is the node side of the MEDIUM fix: it turns the
-// "⅔-by-stake measured at the cert-position epoch" property into an ENFORCED
-// invariant (a cross-epoch cert fails verification because every signature was
-// over this root).
-//
-// HEIGHT-PINNED (MEDIUM-1). The root is read from the HEIGHT-INDEXED
-// validators.State at the value-chain block height, NOT from the Manager's
-// CURRENT map. At a given height H, GetValidatorSet returns the set the network
-// already agreed on, so every honest node — signer and assembler alike — computes
-// the IDENTICAL root for H, independent of async current-map skew during a
-// validator-set change. Reading the current map (the prior bug) let the signer
-// and the assembler hold different maps across that skew window → different roots
-// → the canonical signed message differed → signatures failed verification →
-// votes dropped → finality stalled at every staking change.
-//
-// The commitment is a SHA-256 over the set serialized in a canonical order
-// (validators sorted by NodeID, each as nodeID || light || len(pubkey) ||
-// pubkey) — see hashValidatorSet. Sorting by NodeID + length-prefixing the
-// pubkey makes the encoding canonical and unambiguous; the byte layout is
-// UNCHANGED from the prior implementation, so the wire format and the engine's
-// epoch-binding contract are preserved (only the SOURCE of the set changed from
-// the current map to the height-indexed set).
-type validatorSetRootSource struct {
-	state     validators.State
-	networkID ids.ID
-}
-
-func newValidatorSetRootSource(state validators.State, networkID ids.ID) *validatorSetRootSource {
-	return &validatorSetRootSource{state: state, networkID: networkID}
-}
-
-// ValidatorSetRoot implements consensuschain.ValidatorSetRootSource. Returns the
-// commitment to the weighted set IN FORCE AT height (deterministic across nodes).
-// Returns ids.Empty when the state is absent or the set is empty (the explicit
-// "unbound" answer, consistent with the engine default); a height-read error is
-// symmetric across nodes, so the Empty fallback is uniform and never creates a
-// cross-node root disagreement.
-func (s *validatorSetRootSource) ValidatorSetRoot(height uint64) ids.ID {
-	return hashValidatorSet(validatorSetAtHeight(s.state, s.networkID, height))
-}
-
-var _ consensuschain.ValidatorSetRootSource = (*validatorSetRootSource)(nil)
-
-// hashValidatorSet computes the canonical SHA-256 commitment to a weighted
-// validator set: validators sorted by NodeID, each serialized as
-// nodeID || light(8,BE) || len(pubkey)(8,BE) || pubkey. An empty/nil set commits
-// to ids.Empty (the "unbound" answer). This is the SINGLE definition of the
-// set-root encoding (DRY) — both the live source and its tests hash through here,
-// so the wire format cannot drift between them.
-func hashValidatorSet(set map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput) ids.ID {
-	if len(set) == 0 {
-		return ids.Empty
-	}
-	nodeIDs := make([]ids.NodeID, 0, len(set))
-	for nodeID := range set {
-		nodeIDs = append(nodeIDs, nodeID)
-	}
-	sort.Slice(nodeIDs, func(i, j int) bool {
-		return bytes.Compare(nodeIDs[i][:], nodeIDs[j][:]) < 0
-	})
-	h := sha256.New()
-	var u64 [8]byte
-	for _, nodeID := range nodeIDs {
-		v := set[nodeID]
-		h.Write(nodeID[:])
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], v.Light)
-		h.Write(u64[:])
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], uint64(len(v.PublicKey)))
-		h.Write(u64[:])
-		h.Write(v.PublicKey)
-	}
-	var root ids.ID
-	copy(root[:], h.Sum(nil))
-	return root
-}
-
-// --- app-gossip envelope for votes/certs -------------------------------------
-
-// The QuorumGossiper transport rides on app-gossip. A single framed envelope
-// carries either a signed vote or an assembled cert. The receiver (blockHandler
-// .Gossip) demuxes on the magic + kind and routes to the engine. A payload
-// without the magic is a plain block gossip (legacy Put path), so the demux is
-// backward-compatible.
-//
-// Layout (big-endian):
-//
-//	magic:4 ("LXQ\x01")  kind:1  blockID:32  payload:...
-//
-// kind 1 = signed vote (payload = engine encodeSignedVote: nodeID+sig)
-// kind 2 = finality cert (payload = engine cert MarshalBinary)
-// (round-scoped view-change prevotes are engine-INTERNAL since consensus v1.36 —
-//  the node no longer frames or routes a prevote kind)
-var quorumGossipMagic = [4]byte{'L', 'X', 'Q', 0x01}
-
-const (
-	quorumKindVote byte = 1
-	quorumKindCert byte = 2
-	// kind 3 (prevote) was DELETED with the v1.36 view-change rip-out (174af3c31); Nova sampling
-	// decides and the ⅔ Quasar attestation rides quorumKindVote. Do not reuse 3 — keep the braid dead.
-)
-
-// ErrNotQuorumGossip signals a payload is not a quorum envelope (so the caller
-// falls through to the block-gossip path).
-var ErrNotQuorumGossip = errors.New("chains: not a quorum gossip envelope")
-
-// encodeQuorumGossip frames a vote/cert payload for app-gossip.
-func encodeQuorumGossip(kind byte, blockID ids.ID, payload []byte) []byte {
-	buf := make([]byte, 0, 4+1+32+len(payload))
-	buf = append(buf, quorumGossipMagic[:]...)
-	buf = append(buf, kind)
-	buf = append(buf, blockID[:]...)
-	buf = append(buf, payload...)
-	return buf
-}
-
-// decodeQuorumGossip parses an envelope. Returns ErrNotQuorumGossip if the magic
-// is absent (a normal block gossip) — fail-soft so the legacy path is preserved.
-func decodeQuorumGossip(data []byte) (kind byte, blockID ids.ID, payload []byte, err error) {
-	if len(data) < 4+1+32 || [4]byte{data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]} != quorumGossipMagic {
-		return 0, ids.Empty, nil, ErrNotQuorumGossip
-	}
-	kind = data[4]
-	copy(blockID[:], data[5:5+32])
-	payload = data[5+32:]
-	if kind != quorumKindVote && kind != quorumKindCert {
-		return 0, ids.Empty, nil, ErrNotQuorumGossip
-	}
-	return kind, blockID, payload, nil
-}
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// quorum_guard_node_test.go — CRITICAL-1(c) fail-closed guard + the wiring proof
-// the MEDIUM-1 round lacked. The round-1 tests injected a validators.State into
-// the source constructors directly and never exercised the path where
-// m.validatorState is nil (the production default until the P-Chain publishes
-// its State). These tests pin:
-//
-//	(1) the guard predicate: a K>1 chain with NO height-indexed state is refused
-//	    (would otherwise stall finality forever);
-//	(2) the failure mechanism: getValidatorState(nil) → the no-op State, whose
-//	    GetValidatorSet is EMPTY at every height → the stake source totals 0 and
-//	    the set-root is Empty (exactly the inputs that make VerifyWeighted fail
-//	    closed). This is what the guard exists to prevent silently;
-//	(3) the fix: once a REAL height-indexed state is published, getValidatorState
-//	    returns it and the same sources read a live set (non-zero stake / non-Empty
-//	    root) — finality can proceed.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
-	"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
-)
-
-// TestQuorumGuard_RefusesNoopState pins the guard predicate (CRITICAL-1(c)): a
-// nil (unpublished) validator state is NOT live, so a K>1 chain must refuse to
-// start; a published state IS live.
-func TestQuorumGuard_RefusesNoopState(t *testing.T) {
-	if quorumValidatorStateLive(nil) {
-		t.Fatal("CRITICAL-1(c): a nil validator state must NOT be considered live (would stall finality)")
-	}
-	live := validatorstest.NewTestState()
-	if !quorumValidatorStateLive(live) {
-		t.Fatal("a published height-indexed validator state must be considered live")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestGetValidatorState_NoopIsEmptyAtEveryHeight proves the failure mechanism the
-// guard prevents: with no state published, getValidatorState yields the no-op
-// State, and the height-pinned sources read an EMPTY set at every height — zero
-// total stake and an Empty set-root, the exact inputs that make the engine's
-// VerifyWeighted fail closed (ErrQCStakeBelowSupermajority) so NO block finalizes.
-func TestGetValidatorState_NoopIsEmptyAtEveryHeight(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-
-	// Production default: validatorState unset → getValidatorState(nil) = no-op.
-	noop := getValidatorState(nil)
-	if noop == nil {
-		t.Fatal("getValidatorState(nil) must return the no-op State, not nil")
-	}
-
-	stake := newValidatorStakeSource(noop, netID)
-	root := newValidatorSetRootSource(noop, netID)
-
-	for _, h := range []uint64{0, 1, 7, 1_000, 10_000_000} {
-		if total := stake.TotalStake(h); total != 0 {
-			t.Fatalf("no-op State must report zero total stake at height %d, got %d", h, total)
-		}
-		if r := root.ValidatorSetRoot(h); r != ids.Empty {
-			t.Fatalf("no-op State must commit to Empty set-root at height %d, got %s", h, r)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestGetValidatorState_LiveStateReadsSet proves the fix: once a real
-// height-indexed state is published (as the P-Chain does), getValidatorState
-// returns it and the SAME sources read a live set — non-zero stake and a
-// non-Empty set-root — so the ⅔-by-stake finality predicate can be satisfied.
-func TestGetValidatorState_LiveStateReadsSet(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	n0, n1, n2 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-
-	const H = uint64(7)
-	live := validatorstest.NewTestState()
-	live.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
-		if gotNet != netID || height != H {
-			return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
-		}
-		return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{
-			n0: {NodeID: n0, PublicKey: []byte("pk0"), Light: 30, Weight: 30},
-			n1: {NodeID: n1, PublicKey: []byte("pk1"), Light: 30, Weight: 30},
-			n2: {NodeID: n2, PublicKey: []byte("pk2"), Light: 40, Weight: 40},
-		}, nil
-	}
-
-	// getValidatorState passes a non-nil state through unchanged.
-	got := getValidatorState(live)
-	stake := newValidatorStakeSource(got, netID)
-	root := newValidatorSetRootSource(got, netID)
-
-	if total := stake.TotalStake(H); total != 100 {
-		t.Fatalf("live State must report total stake 100 at the epoch, got %d", total)
-	}
-	if w := stake.Weight(n2, H); w != 40 {
-		t.Fatalf("live State must report n2 weight 40 at the epoch, got %d", w)
-	}
-	if r := root.ValidatorSetRoot(H); r == ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatal("live State must commit to a NON-Empty set-root at the epoch")
-	}
-	// A different height (no set) is still Empty/zero — the read is height-pinned.
-	if stake.TotalStake(H+1) != 0 || root.ValidatorSetRoot(H+1) != ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatal("live State read must be height-pinned (empty at a height with no set)")
-	}
-}
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// quorum_params_test.go — CRITICAL-2 node-layer regression: the node must NEVER
-// wire a non-BFT consensus param set for a multi-validator (sybil-protected)
-// chain. The round-1 hole was manager.go selecting LocalParams() (K=3/α=2 → f=0,
-// CFT) for ALL multi-node nets — a single Byzantine validator forks K=3/α=2.
-// These tests pin selectConsensusParams to a BFT-safe set for every multi-node
-// network and prove the value-network backstop (ValidateForValueNetwork) accepts
-// the selected params.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
-	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
-)
-
-// TestSelectConsensusParams_MultiNodeIsBFT proves that for EVERY multi-validator
-// (sybilProtection==true) network the node selects a Byzantine-fault-tolerant
-// param set (f≥1, i.e. K≥4) that also clears the value-network validator — and
-// that it is NEVER LocalParams (K=3) or any K<4 set. This is the node half of
-// CRITICAL-2 (the consensus half is config.ValidateForValueNetwork, tested in
-// the consensus module).
-func TestSelectConsensusParams_MultiNodeIsBFT(t *testing.T) {
-	local := consensusconfig.LocalParams()
-
-	cases := []struct {
-		name      string
-		networkID uint32
-	}{
-		{"mainnet", constants.MainnetID},
-		{"testnet", constants.TestnetID},
-		{"localnet-multinode", constants.LocalID},
-		{"unittest-multinode", constants.UnitTestID},
-		{"arbitrary-multinode", 424242},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			p := selectConsensusParams(true /* sybilProtection */, tc.networkID)
-
-			// MUST be Byzantine-fault-tolerant: f≥1 ⟹ K≥4.
-			if p.ByzantineFaultTolerance() < 1 {
-				t.Fatalf("multi-node net %q got non-BFT params K=%d f=%d (CRITICAL-2: a single faulty validator forks)",
-					tc.name, p.K, p.ByzantineFaultTolerance())
-			}
-			// MUST NOT be the CFT LocalParams (K=3/α=2) that was the round-1 hole.
-			if p.K == local.K && p.AlphaPreference == local.AlphaPreference && p.K == 3 {
-				t.Fatalf("multi-node net %q selected LocalParams (K=3/α=2) — the CRITICAL-2 fork config", tc.name)
-			}
-			// The selected params MUST themselves pass Valid() (the BFT α-floor:
-			// 2·AlphaPreference − K ≥ f+1).
-			if err := p.Valid(); err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("multi-node net %q selected params fail Valid(): %v (K=%d α=%d)",
-					tc.name, err, p.K, p.AlphaPreference)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSelectConsensusParams_LocalDevIsSatisfiableBFT proves that an explicitly-
-// local dev network (devnet 3 / localnet 1337) selects the MINIMAL real-BFT set
-// (LocalBFTParams: K=4/α=3, f=1) — satisfiable by a handful of localhost
-// validators — and NOT the large Default (K=20/α=14), whose α=14 quorum is
-// unreachable with 3-4 validators (the freeze-at-height-0 bug). It must still be
-// genuinely BFT (f≥1) and pass the value backstop (K=4 ≥ 4), so production
-// safety / CRITICAL-2 is untouched: a custom VALUE L1 (high networkID) still gets
-// the large Default set, never the local one.
-func TestSelectConsensusParams_LocalDevIsSatisfiableBFT(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, networkID := range []uint32{constants.DevnetID, constants.LocalID} {
-		p := selectConsensusParams(true /* sybilProtection */, networkID)
-
-		// Satisfiable on a small committee: α must be small (K=4 → α=3), NOT 14.
-		if p.K != 4 || p.AlphaPreference != 3 {
-			t.Fatalf("local dev net %d: want minimal-BFT K=4/α=3, got K=%d/α=%d (Default K=20 is unsatisfiable on localhost)",
-				networkID, p.K, p.AlphaPreference)
-		}
-		// Still genuinely BFT (f≥1) — does NOT regress CRITICAL-2.
-		if p.ByzantineFaultTolerance() < 1 {
-			t.Fatalf("local dev net %d: K=%d is not BFT (f=%d)", networkID, p.K, p.ByzantineFaultTolerance())
-		}
-		// Must clear the value backstop the manager asserts before engine start.
-		if err := p.ValidateForValueNetwork(networkID); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("local dev net %d: minimal-BFT params must pass the value backstop, got %v", networkID, err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// A custom value L1 with a high networkID is NOT a local dev network: it must
-	// keep the large Default set (the isLocalDevNetwork predicate is EXACT, not a
-	// >=1337 range that would wrongly catch value L1s).
-	const customValueL1 = uint32(909090)
-	if p := selectConsensusParams(true, customValueL1); p.K != consensusconfig.DefaultParams().K {
-		t.Fatalf("custom value L1 %d must get Default K=%d, got K=%d (must NOT match the local-dev path)",
-			customValueL1, consensusconfig.DefaultParams().K, p.K)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSelectConsensusParams_SingleNodeIsK1 proves --dev / sybil-disabled selects
-// the K=1 single-validator regime (the sole validator's accept is the 1-of-1
-// quorum) — and NOT a multi-node BFT set.
-func TestSelectConsensusParams_SingleNodeIsK1(t *testing.T) {
-	p := selectConsensusParams(false /* sybilProtection */, constants.LocalID)
-	if p.K != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("sybil-disabled (single-node) must select K=1, got K=%d", p.K)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSelectConsensusParams_ValueBackstop proves the params selected for a
-// multi-node net pass the STRICTER value-network validator for that net — the
-// fail-closed backstop asserted at the manager call site before starting the
-// engine. (Mainnet enforces K≥11, so MainnetParams K=21 passes; Default K=20
-// passes for an arbitrary value net.)
-func TestSelectConsensusParams_ValueBackstop(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name      string
-		networkID uint32
-	}{
-		{"mainnet", constants.MainnetID},
-		{"arbitrary-value-net", 909090},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			p := selectConsensusParams(true, tc.networkID)
-			if err := p.ValidateForValueNetwork(tc.networkID); err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("selected params for value net %q must pass the value backstop, got %v (K=%d)",
-					tc.name, err, p.K)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// quorum_setroot_test.go — node-layer tests for MEDIUM-1: the set-root and the
-// ⅔-by-stake tally MUST be read from the HEIGHT-INDEXED validators.State at the
-// cert-position height, so every node computes the IDENTICAL root, weights, and
-// total for a given value-chain height — INDEPENDENT of async current-map skew
-// during a validator-set change.
-//
-// The cross-node test (TestValidatorSetRoot_CrossNodeAgreesDespiteSkew) is the
-// one the red flagged as MISSING: it models two nodes whose CURRENT validator
-// views diverge (a set-change in flight) but who agree on the historical set at a
-// pinned height H — and proves they nonetheless compute the SAME set-root at H.
-// Reading the current map (the prior bug) would have made their roots differ →
-// mismatched canonical signed messages → dropped votes → finality stall.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"errors"
-	"sort"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
-	"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
-)
-
-// expectedSetRoot is an INDEPENDENT reimplementation of the canonical set-root
-// spec, used only by the golden test to cross-check hashValidatorSet. It is
-// deliberately NOT a call to hashValidatorSet (that would be a tautology): if the
-// production encoding ever diverges from this spec the golden test fails.
-func expectedSetRoot(t *testing.T, vdrs []vdr) ids.ID {
-	t.Helper()
-	sort.Slice(vdrs, func(i, j int) bool {
-		return bytes.Compare(vdrs[i].nodeID[:], vdrs[j].nodeID[:]) < 0
-	})
-	h := sha256.New()
-	var u64 [8]byte
-	for _, v := range vdrs {
-		h.Write(v.nodeID[:])
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], v.light)
-		h.Write(u64[:])
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], uint64(len(v.pk)))
-		h.Write(u64[:])
-		h.Write(v.pk)
-	}
-	var root ids.ID
-	copy(root[:], h.Sum(nil))
-	return root
-}
-
-// vdr is a tiny height→set fixture: which validators (and weights/keys) the
-// height-indexed state reports at each value-chain height.
-type vdr struct {
-	nodeID ids.NodeID
-	pk     []byte
-	light  uint64
-}
-
-// stateWithHistory builds a validators.State whose GetValidatorSet returns the
-// set registered for the requested height (and an empty set for unknown heights),
-// scoped to netID. This is the height-indexed source MEDIUM-1 reads from.
-func stateWithHistory(netID ids.ID, byHeight map[uint64][]vdr) *validatorstest.TestState {
-	s := validatorstest.NewTestState()
-	s.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
-		if gotNet != netID {
-			return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
-		}
-		out := make(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput)
-		for _, v := range byHeight[height] {
-			out[v.nodeID] = &validators.GetValidatorOutput{
-				NodeID:    v.nodeID,
-				PublicKey: v.pk,
-				Light:     v.light,
-				Weight:    v.light,
-			}
-		}
-		return out, nil
-	}
-	return s
-}
-
-// TestValidatorSetRoot_CrossNodeAgreesDespiteSkew is the MEDIUM-1 regression
-// guard. Two nodes are mid validator-set change: their CURRENT sets differ
-// (height 11 vs height 12), but both still serve the SAME committed set at the
-// value-chain block height H=10 being voted on. The set-root at H MUST be
-// identical on both nodes — that identity is what makes their signatures over the
-// block's canonical message mutually verifiable. The prior current-map read would
-// have produced two different roots here and stalled finality.
-func TestValidatorSetRoot_CrossNodeAgreesDespiteSkew(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	n0, n1, n2, n3 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	pk0, pk1, pk2, pk3 := []byte("pk-0-48bytes-placeholder"), []byte("pk-1"), []byte("pk-2"), []byte("pk-3")
-
-	const H = uint64(10)
-	setAtH := []vdr{{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 20}, {n2, pk2, 30}}
-
-	// Node A has already applied a stake bump that took effect at height 11
-	// (n1: 20→25) and sees that as its current set. It still knows the height-10
-	// set (the block being voted on).
-	nodeA := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
-		H:  setAtH,
-		11: {{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 25}, {n2, pk2, 30}},
-	})
-	// Node B has already applied a NEW validator that joined at height 12
-	// (n3 added) — a different, later current set. It too still knows height 10.
-	nodeB := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
-		H:  setAtH,
-		12: {{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 25}, {n2, pk2, 30}, {n3, pk3, 5}},
-	})
-
-	rootA := newValidatorSetRootSource(nodeA, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(H)
-	rootB := newValidatorSetRootSource(nodeB, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(H)
-
-	if rootA == ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatal("set-root at the voted height must be non-Empty (the set is non-empty)")
-	}
-	if rootA != rootB {
-		t.Fatalf("MEDIUM-1: cross-node set-root at height %d MUST be identical despite "+
-			"current-set skew, got A=%s B=%s", H, rootA, rootB)
-	}
-
-	// Sanity: had either node (wrongly) committed to its CURRENT set instead of
-	// the height-H set, the roots WOULD differ — proving the test actually
-	// exercises the skew (not a vacuous match).
-	rootA_cur := newValidatorSetRootSource(nodeA, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(11)
-	rootB_cur := newValidatorSetRootSource(nodeB, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(12)
-	if rootA_cur == rootB_cur {
-		t.Fatal("test is vacuous: the two nodes' CURRENT sets must differ to exercise the skew")
-	}
-	if rootA == rootA_cur {
-		t.Fatal("test is vacuous: height-H set must differ from node A's current set")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidatorSetRoot_HeightSelectsEpoch proves the root is a deterministic
-// FUNCTION OF HEIGHT (not a fixed current-set snapshot): different heights with
-// different sets yield different roots, the same height always yields the same
-// root, and the encoding is insertion-order independent (canonical sort).
-func TestValidatorSetRoot_HeightSelectsEpoch(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	n0, n1, n2 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	pk0, pk1, pk2 := []byte("pk-0-48bytes-placeholder"), []byte("pk-1"), []byte("pk-2")
-
-	state := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
-		10: {{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 20}, {n2, pk2, 30}},
-		11: {{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 21}, {n2, pk2, 30}}, // n1 weight changed
-	})
-	src := newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID)
-
-	root10 := src.ValidatorSetRoot(10)
-	root11 := src.ValidatorSetRoot(11)
-	if root10 == ids.Empty || root11 == ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatal("non-empty sets must commit to non-Empty roots")
-	}
-	if root10 == root11 {
-		t.Fatal("a different epoch (height with a changed weight) MUST yield a different root")
-	}
-	// Same height is stable (deterministic), repeatedly.
-	if again := src.ValidatorSetRoot(10); again != root10 {
-		t.Fatalf("set-root at a fixed height must be deterministic: %s != %s", again, root10)
-	}
-
-	// Insertion-order independence: a state that lists the SAME height-10 members
-	// in a different slice order yields the SAME root (canonical NodeID sort).
-	reordered := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
-		10: {{n2, pk2, 30}, {n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 20}},
-	})
-	if r := newValidatorSetRootSource(reordered, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(10); r != root10 {
-		t.Fatalf("set-root must be member-order independent: %s != %s", r, root10)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidatorSetRoot_FailSoftIsUniform proves the fail-soft answers are
-// Empty/uniform (never a panic, never a per-node-divergent default): a nil state,
-// an unknown height (empty set), an unknown network, and a height-read error all
-// commit to ids.Empty. Uniformity is the safety property — a symmetric error
-// degrades every node to the same Empty root, never to disagreeing roots.
-func TestValidatorSetRoot_FailSoftIsUniform(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-
-	// nil state → Empty.
-	if got := (&validatorSetRootSource{state: nil, networkID: netID}).ValidatorSetRoot(10); got != ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatalf("nil state must commit to ids.Empty, got %s", got)
-	}
-
-	// Known network, but a height with no registered set → Empty.
-	state := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
-		10: {{ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), []byte("pk"), 10}},
-	})
-	if got := newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(999); got != ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatalf("unknown height must commit to ids.Empty, got %s", got)
-	}
-
-	// Wrong network → empty set → Empty.
-	if got := newValidatorSetRootSource(state, ids.GenerateTestID()).ValidatorSetRoot(10); got != ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatalf("unknown network must commit to ids.Empty, got %s", got)
-	}
-
-	// A height-read ERROR → Empty (and it is symmetric: the same error on every
-	// node yields the same Empty root).
-	errState := validatorstest.NewTestState()
-	errState.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, _ uint64, _ ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
-		return nil, errors.New("state unavailable at height")
-	}
-	if got := newValidatorSetRootSource(errState, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(10); got != ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatalf("a height-read error must commit to ids.Empty, got %s", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidatorStakeSource_HeightPinned proves the ⅔-by-stake tally is read at
-// the SAME height as the set-root (MEDIUM-1's second skew): Weight/TotalStake are
-// a deterministic function of height, so a validator whose vote is in a
-// height-H cert contributes its height-H weight — not whatever the current map
-// happens to hold after a membership change. This is what stops a current-map
-// weight read from dropping a legitimately-signed quorum.
-func TestValidatorStakeSource_HeightPinned(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	n0, n1, n2 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-
-	state := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
-		10: {{n0, []byte("pk0"), 70}, {n1, []byte("pk1"), 30}},                       // total 100
-		11: {{n0, []byte("pk0"), 70}, {n1, []byte("pk1"), 30}, {n2, []byte("pk2"), 50}}, // total 150
-	})
-	src := newValidatorStakeSource(state, netID)
-
-	// At height 10 the tally is the height-10 epoch.
-	if w := src.Weight(n0, 10); w != 70 {
-		t.Fatalf("Weight(n0, h=10) = %d, want 70", w)
-	}
-	if total := src.TotalStake(10); total != 100 {
-		t.Fatalf("TotalStake(h=10) = %d, want 100", total)
-	}
-	// n2 is NOT in the height-10 set → 0 at h=10, but 50 at h=11. The tally is
-	// height-pinned, not current-map.
-	if w := src.Weight(n2, 10); w != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("Weight(n2, h=10) = %d, want 0 (n2 joined at h=11)", w)
-	}
-	if w := src.Weight(n2, 11); w != 50 {
-		t.Fatalf("Weight(n2, h=11) = %d, want 50", w)
-	}
-	if total := src.TotalStake(11); total != 150 {
-		t.Fatalf("TotalStake(h=11) = %d, want 150", total)
-	}
-
-	// Unknown node at a known height → 0 (cannot inflate the numerator).
-	if w := src.Weight(ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), 10); w != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("Weight(unknown, h=10) = %d, want 0", w)
-	}
-	// nil state → fail-soft zeros.
-	nilSrc := &validatorStakeSource{state: nil, networkID: netID}
-	if nilSrc.Weight(n0, 10) != 0 || nilSrc.TotalStake(10) != 0 {
-		t.Fatal("nil state must yield zero weight and total")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHashValidatorSet_ByteStability is a GOLDEN test pinning the canonical
-// set-root encoding so the wire format cannot drift (the engine's epoch-binding
-// contract and any persisted/gossiped cert depend on this exact byte layout). If
-// this value changes, the set-root encoding changed and every node in the
-// network must upgrade in lockstep — it is a CONSENSUS-BREAKING change.
-func TestHashValidatorSet_ByteStability(t *testing.T) {
-	// Fixed (non-random) NodeIDs so the golden is reproducible.
-	var a, b ids.NodeID
-	a[0], b[0] = 0x01, 0x02
-	set := map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{
-		a: {NodeID: a, PublicKey: []byte{0xaa, 0xbb}, Light: 10},
-		b: {NodeID: b, PublicKey: []byte{0xcc}, Light: 20},
-	}
-	got := hashValidatorSet(set)
-
-	// Independently recompute the expected commitment from the canonical spec:
-	// sorted-by-NodeID, each nodeID || light(8,BE) || len(pk)(8,BE) || pk, SHA-256.
-	want := expectedSetRoot(t, []vdr{
-		{a, []byte{0xaa, 0xbb}, 10},
-		{b, []byte{0xcc}, 20},
-	})
-	if got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("set-root encoding drifted (CONSENSUS-BREAKING):\n got  %s\n want %s", got, want)
-	}
-
-	// Empty/nil set → ids.Empty.
-	if hashValidatorSet(nil) != ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatal("nil set must commit to ids.Empty")
-	}
-	if hashValidatorSet(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}) != ids.Empty {
-		t.Fatal("empty set must commit to ids.Empty")
-	}
-}
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// quorum_verifier_height_test.go — node-layer regression for RESIDUAL-B and the
-// CRITICAL-1 wiring: the BLS vote verifier resolves the voter's public key from
-// the HEIGHT-INDEXED validators.State AT THE BLOCK'S P-CHAIN EPOCH HEIGHT — the
-// SAME height-pinned source as the set-root and the ⅔-by-stake tally — NOT from
-// the current validator map.
-//
-// The round-1 fix left the verifier reading the CURRENT map (m.Validators):
-// a validator present in set@H (it legitimately signed block H) but already gone
-// from the current map during async staking skew had its vote DROPPED, and if it
-// held >⅓ of the stake-at-H the block never finalized. These tests prove the
-// verifier now reads set@H, so such a vote verifies at H (and a vote keyed to the
-// wrong height does not).
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
-	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
-	"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
-)
-
-// blsKey is a test validator's BLS key material.
-type blsKey struct {
-	nodeID ids.NodeID
-	sk     *bls.SecretKey
-	pkComp []byte
-}
-
-func newBLSKey(t *testing.T) blsKey {
-	t.Helper()
-	sk, err := bls.NewSecretKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewSecretKey: %v", err)
-	}
-	return blsKey{
-		nodeID: ids.GenerateTestNodeID(),
-		sk:     sk,
-		pkComp: bls.PublicKeyToCompressedBytes(sk.PublicKey()),
-	}
-}
-
-// stateWithBLSByHeight builds a height-indexed validators.State that reports the
-// given BLS validators at each height (empty for unknown heights / wrong net).
-func stateWithBLSByHeight(netID ids.ID, byHeight map[uint64][]blsKey) *validatorstest.TestState {
-	s := validatorstest.NewTestState()
-	s.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
-		if gotNet != netID {
-			return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
-		}
-		out := make(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput)
-		for _, k := range byHeight[height] {
-			out[k.nodeID] = &validators.GetValidatorOutput{
-				NodeID:    k.nodeID,
-				PublicKey: k.pkComp,
-				Light:     1,
-				Weight:    1,
-			}
-		}
-		return out, nil
-	}
-	return s
-}
-
-// TestBLSVoteVerifier_ResolvesPubkeyAtEpochHeight is the RESIDUAL-B core: a
-// validator that is in set@H but has LEFT the set at a later height still has its
-// vote verified at H (the verifier reads set@H, not the current map).
-func TestBLSVoteVerifier_ResolvesPubkeyAtEpochHeight(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	keep := newBLSKey(t) // stays in the set across epochs
-	leaver := newBLSKey(t) // in set@10, GONE from set@11 (departed the current set)
-
-	const H = uint64(10)
-	state := stateWithBLSByHeight(netID, map[uint64][]blsKey{
-		10: {keep, leaver},
-		11: {keep}, // leaver has departed by height 11 (the "current" epoch)
-	})
-
-	v := newBLSVoteVerifier(state, netID)
-
-	// The leaver signs a message; its vote MUST verify at epoch H=10 (it was a
-	// member then), proving pubkey resolution is at the epoch, not the current set.
-	msg := []byte("LUX/chain/vote/v1\x00 — epoch-pinned verify")
-	sig, err := leaver.sk.Sign(msg)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
-	}
-	sigBytes := bls.SignatureToBytes(sig)
-
-	if !v.VerifyVote(leaver.nodeID, msg, sigBytes, H) {
-		t.Fatal("RESIDUAL-B: a validator in set@H must verify at H even after leaving the current set " +
-			"(verifier read the current map instead of set@H)")
-	}
-
-	// At height 11 the leaver is NOT a member → its vote MUST NOT verify there.
-	// This proves the resolution is genuinely height-pinned (not height-agnostic).
-	if v.VerifyVote(leaver.nodeID, msg, sigBytes, 11) {
-		t.Fatal("a validator absent from set@11 must NOT verify at 11 (height pinning is not in effect)")
-	}
-
-	// The keeper verifies at both heights (it is in both sets) — sanity that the
-	// epoch read is not rejecting valid current members.
-	keepSig, _ := keep.sk.Sign(msg)
-	keepBytes := bls.SignatureToBytes(keepSig)
-	if !v.VerifyVote(keep.nodeID, msg, keepBytes, 10) || !v.VerifyVote(keep.nodeID, msg, keepBytes, 11) {
-		t.Fatal("a validator present at both epochs must verify at both")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBLSVoteVerifier_FailClosed proves the verifier never panics and returns
-// false for every fail-soft case: nil state, unknown voter at the epoch, wrong
-// network, an unknown height (empty set), a wrong-length signature, and the
-// HIGH-1 malformed-infinity signature (0x40||zeros) that used to PANIC the purego
-// BLS path — here it must be a clean false, not a crash.
-func TestBLSVoteVerifier_FailClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	k := newBLSKey(t)
-	state := stateWithBLSByHeight(netID, map[uint64][]blsKey{10: {k}})
-	msg := []byte("msg")
-	sig, _ := k.sk.Sign(msg)
-	good := bls.SignatureToBytes(sig)
-
-	// nil state → false for any voter.
-	if newBLSVoteVerifier(nil, netID).VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, good, 10) {
-		t.Fatal("nil state must yield false")
-	}
-	v := newBLSVoteVerifier(state, netID)
-	// unknown voter at a known epoch.
-	if v.VerifyVote(ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), msg, good, 10) {
-		t.Fatal("unknown voter at the epoch must yield false")
-	}
-	// known voter at an UNKNOWN epoch (empty set) → false.
-	if v.VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, good, 999) {
-		t.Fatal("known voter at an unknown epoch (empty set) must yield false")
-	}
-	// wrong network → empty set → false.
-	if newBLSVoteVerifier(state, ids.GenerateTestID()).VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, good, 10) {
-		t.Fatal("wrong network must yield false")
-	}
-	// wrong-length signature → false (no panic).
-	if v.VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, good[:len(good)-1], 10) {
-		t.Fatal("wrong-length signature must yield false")
-	}
-	// HIGH-1 malformed infinity sig (0x40||zeros) → clean false, NOT a panic.
-	mal := make([]byte, bls.SignatureLen)
-	mal[0] = 0x40
-	if v.VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, mal, 10) {
-		t.Fatal("malformed-infinity signature must yield false")
-	}
-	// A WRONG signature (valid form, wrong key) → false.
-	other := newBLSKey(t)
-	otherSig, _ := other.sk.Sign(msg)
-	if v.VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, bls.SignatureToBytes(otherSig), 10) {
-		t.Fatal("a signature by a different key must yield false")
-	}
-}
-
-// ensure the node verifier still satisfies the (now height-aware) engine interface.
-var _ chain.VoteVerifier = (*blsVoteVerifier)(nil)
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// red_pendingcontext_dos_test.go — regression guard for the catch-up DoS RED found
-// on the cert-carrying catch-up branch.
-//
-// The frontier-sync wiring connects the AcceptedFrontier handler to
-// requestContext(), which records each requested blockID in b.pendingContext.
-// Originally NOTHING evicted from that map, so a Byzantine peer streaming
-// AcceptedFrontier frames each naming a distinct random tip grew it without bound
-// → OOM (and a peer that took a request then withheld Context re-stranded the
-// victim forever). requestContext now reaps entries past pendingContextTTL and
-// hard-caps the map at maxPendingContext. These tests pin both properties; before
-// the fix the first asserted N=50_000 entries with ZERO eviction.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/message"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/network"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/proto/p2p"
-)
-
-// redStubNet implements the one Network method requestContext uses (Send); every
-// other method is inherited from the embedded nil interface and is never called.
-type redStubNet struct {
-	network.Network
-	sends int
-}
-
-func (s *redStubNet) Send(_ message.OutboundMessage, nodeIDs set.Set[ids.NodeID], _ ids.ID, _ uint32) set.Set[ids.NodeID] {
-	s.sends++
-	return nodeIDs
-}
-
-// redStubMsg implements the one OutboundMsgBuilder method requestContext uses.
-type redStubMsg struct {
-	message.OutboundMsgBuilder
-}
-
-func (redStubMsg) GetAncestors(_ ids.ID, _ uint32, _ time.Duration, _ ids.ID, _ p2p.EngineType) (message.OutboundMessage, error) {
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func newRedTestHandler(net network.Network) *blockHandler {
-	return &blockHandler{
-		logger:         log.NewNoOpLogger(),
-		net:            net,
-		msgCreator:     redStubMsg{},
-		chainID:        ids.GenerateTestID(),
-		pendingContext: make(map[ids.ID]contextRequest),
-	}
-}
-
-// TestPendingContext_BoundedUnderFlood: a peer streaming distinct fake tips into
-// requestContext can NEVER grow pendingContext past maxPendingContext. Inverts the
-// original RED PoC, which asserted unbounded growth to 50_000 → OOM.
-func TestPendingContext_BoundedUnderFlood(t *testing.T) {
-	stubNet := &redStubNet{}
-	bh := newRedTestHandler(stubNet)
-
-	const N = 10_000 // ≫ the maxPendingContext cap — enough to prove "stays bounded"
-	from := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	for i := 0; i < N; i++ {
-		bh.requestContext(context.Background(), from, ids.GenerateTestID())
-	}
-
-	if got := len(bh.pendingContext); got > maxPendingContext {
-		t.Fatalf("pendingContext unbounded: %d entries exceeds cap %d (the RED HIGH DoS)", got, maxPendingContext)
-	}
-	t.Logf("bounded: %d entries after a %d-distinct-tip flood (cap %d, sends=%d)",
-		len(bh.pendingContext), N, maxPendingContext, stubNet.sends)
-}
-
-// TestPendingContext_StaleEntriesReaped: a request whose Context is withheld past
-// its TTL is reaped on the next requestContext, so the block is re-requestable from
-// an honest peer (fixes the RED MEDIUM re-strand).
-func TestPendingContext_StaleEntriesReaped(t *testing.T) {
-	bh := newRedTestHandler(&redStubNet{})
-	from := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-
-	stale := ids.GenerateTestID()
-	bh.pendingContext[stale] = contextRequest{
-		nodeID:    from,
-		requestID: 1,
-		blockID:   stale,
-		timestamp: time.Now().Add(-2 * pendingContextTTL),
-	}
-
-	// Any later request runs the reaper before recording its own entry.
-	bh.requestContext(context.Background(), from, ids.GenerateTestID())
-
-	if _, stillThere := bh.pendingContext[stale]; stillThere {
-		t.Fatalf("stale pendingContext entry (%v old) not reaped → re-strand persists", 2*pendingContextTTL)
-	}
-}
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func (r *ChainHandlerRegistrar) ValidateEndpoint(
 	}

 	// Build the full URL
-	fullURL := fmt.Sprintf("/v1/%s%s", info.Base, endpoint)
+	fullURL := fmt.Sprintf("/ext/%s%s", info.Base, endpoint)

 	r.log.Info("Validating endpoint",
 		log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ package rpc

 import (
 	"bytes"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
@@ -68,20 +68,20 @@ func (d *DebugTool) DiagnoseEndpoint(chainID ids.ID, alias string) *DiagnosticRe
 // getURLPatterns returns all possible URL patterns to test.
 func (d *DebugTool) getURLPatterns(chainID ids.ID, alias string) []string {
 	patterns := []string{
-		fmt.Sprintf("%s/v1/bc/%s/rpc", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
-		fmt.Sprintf("%s/v1/bc/%s/ws", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
-		fmt.Sprintf("%s/v1/bc/%s", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
+		fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s/rpc", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
+		fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s/ws", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
+		fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
 	}

 	if alias != "" && alias != chainID.String() {
 		patterns = append(patterns,
-			fmt.Sprintf("%s/v1/bc/%s/rpc", d.baseURL, alias),
-			fmt.Sprintf("%s/v1/bc/%s/ws", d.baseURL, alias),
-			fmt.Sprintf("%s/v1/bc/%s", d.baseURL, alias),
+			fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s/rpc", d.baseURL, alias),
+			fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s/ws", d.baseURL, alias),
+			fmt.Sprintf("%s/ext/bc/%s", d.baseURL, alias),
 		)
 	}

-	// Also test without /v1 prefix (some setups might differ)
+	// Also test without /ext prefix (some setups might differ)
 	patterns = append(patterns,
 		fmt.Sprintf("%s/bc/%s/rpc", d.baseURL, chainID.String()),
 	)
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func (d *DebugTool) testEndpoint(url string) TestResult {

 	// Check if we got a valid JSON-RPC response
 	var rpcResp map[string]interface{}
-	if err := json.UnmarshalRead(postResp.Body, &rpcResp); err == nil {
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(postResp.Body).Decode(&rpcResp); err == nil {
 		if _, hasResult := rpcResp["result"]; hasResult {
 			result.Success = true
 			result.Response = fmt.Sprintf("Valid JSON-RPC response: %v", rpcResp["result"])
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func (d *DebugTool) testRPCMethods(url string) []RPCTest {
 			defer resp.Body.Close()

 			var result map[string]interface{}
-			if err := json.UnmarshalRead(resp.Body, &result); err == nil {
+			if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err == nil {
 				if res, ok := result["result"]; ok {
 					test.Success = true
 					test.Result = fmt.Sprintf("%v", res)
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ func (m *HandlerManager) RegisterChainHandlers(
 					log.Err(err))
 			} else {
 				m.log.Info("Handler registered successfully",
-					log.String("route", fmt.Sprintf("/v1/%s%s", base, endpoint)),
+					log.String("route", fmt.Sprintf("/ext/%s%s", base, endpoint)),
 					log.Stringer("chainID", chainID))
 			}
 		}
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ func (m *HandlerManager) getFullRoutes(bases []string, endpoints []string) []str
 	routes := []string{}
 	for _, base := range bases {
 		for _, endpoint := range endpoints {
-			routes = append(routes, fmt.Sprintf("/v1/%s%s", base, endpoint))
+			routes = append(routes, fmt.Sprintf("/ext/%s%s", base, endpoint))
 		}
 	}
 	return routes
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (s *mockServer) AddAliasesWithReadLock(endpoint string, aliases ...string)
 func (s *mockServer) Dispatch() error { return nil }
 func (s *mockServer) RegisterChain(chainName string, rt *runtime.Runtime, vm vm.VM) {
 }
-func (s *mockServer) Shutdown() error                               { return nil }
+func (s *mockServer) Shutdown() error { return nil }
 func (s *mockServer) SetRootInfoProvider(_ server.RootInfoProvider) {}

 func TestHandlerManager_RegisterChainHandlers(t *testing.T) {
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ func IntegrationExample(
 			fmt.Printf("\n✅ Chain %s RPC endpoints ready:\n", chainID)
 			for _, endpoint := range info.Endpoints {
 				if info.ChainAlias != "" {
-					fmt.Printf("   %s/v1/bc/%s%s\n", baseURL, info.ChainAlias, endpoint)
+					fmt.Printf("   %s/ext/bc/%s%s\n", baseURL, info.ChainAlias, endpoint)
 				}
-				fmt.Printf("   %s/v1/bc/%s%s\n", baseURL, chainID, endpoint)
+				fmt.Printf("   %s/ext/bc/%s%s\n", baseURL, chainID, endpoint)
 			}
 			fmt.Println()
 		}
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ package chains

 import (
 	"encoding/hex"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"testing"

 	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// zz_red_probe_test.go — RED adversarial security-regression probe for the fresh-net self-vote
-// caught-up path. Demonstrates the connected-vs-replied divergence: the fix gates the self-vote
-// on fullyConnectedBeacons (CONNECTIVITY, from net.PeerInfo) but tallies CaughtUp over `replies`
-// (from collectFrontierReplies). A beacon that is CONNECTED but does NOT answer the frontier
-// query this round counts as "fully connected" yet contributes nothing to the caught-up tally —
-// and the self-vote backfills its missing weight, so a HEAVY validator self-completes caught-up
-// at a STALE height while an honest connected beacon is genuinely ahead. Blue's bsBeaconNet
-// cannot express this (its Send answers for EVERY connected beacon), so the regression slipped
-// through. These assertions encode the DESIRED safe behavior: they FAIL on the current code (the
-// break) and will PASS once the self-vote gate also requires every connected beacon to have
-// REPLIED this round.
-package chains
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	chainbootstrap "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/bootstrap"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/message"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/network"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/network/peer"
-)
-
-// redSilentNet reports FULL connectivity (every beacon in `connected` is returned by PeerInfo)
-// but a designated `silent` beacon — though connected — withholds its GetAcceptedFrontier reply
-// this round. This is the exact capability an on-path adversary has (keep a beacon's
-// TCP/handshake alive so it shows connected, while dropping/delaying its application-level
-// frontier response past the 3s window) AND a natural occurrence during a mass co-restart (an
-// ahead beacon replaying state answers the frontier query slowly).
-type redSilentNet struct {
-	network.Network
-	bh        *blockHandler
-	connected []ids.NodeID          // all reported connected (the full set MINUS self)
-	silent    set.Set[ids.NodeID]   // connected but withhold their frontier reply
-	tipFor    map[ids.NodeID]ids.ID // what each VOCAL beacon reports
-}
-
-func (n *redSilentNet) PeerInfo(nodeIDs []ids.NodeID) []peer.Info {
-	want := map[ids.NodeID]bool{}
-	for _, id := range nodeIDs {
-		want[id] = true
-	}
-	var out []peer.Info
-	for _, b := range n.connected {
-		if len(nodeIDs) == 0 || want[b] {
-			out = append(out, peer.Info{ID: b, TrackedChains: set.Of(n.bh.networkID)})
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func (n *redSilentNet) Send(msg message.OutboundMessage, nodeIDs set.Set[ids.NodeID], _ ids.ID, _ uint32) set.Set[ids.NodeID] {
-	m, ok := msg.(*bsOutMsg)
-	if !ok || m.op != "frontier" {
-		return nil
-	}
-	for id := range nodeIDs {
-		if n.silent.Contains(id) {
-			continue // CONNECTED, but withholds its frontier reply this round
-		}
-		if tip, ok := n.tipFor[id]; ok {
-			n.bh.deliverBootstrapFrontier(id, tip)
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// TestRED_PROBE_ConnectedButSilentAheadBeacon_SelfVoteFalseCompletesAtStale is a TWO-SIDED
-// CONTRAST: the ONLY difference between the two runs is whether the CONNECTED ahead-beacon B
-// delivers its frontier reply. B is fully connected in both runs, so fullyConnectedBeacons is
-// TRUE in both. Yet B-replies → safe (status != FrontierCaughtUp); B-connected-but-silent →
-// FrontierCaughtUp at the stale height (the break). This falsifies Blue's safety claim ("a
-// genuinely behind node has an ahead peer in the full set → CaughtUp is false → it keeps
-// waiting/syncing"): the gate keys on CONNECTIVITY while the caught-up decision keys on REPLIES,
-// and the two diverge.
-//
-// Why K is genuinely finalized-ahead (a real safety break, not a minority fork): a heavy
-// validator (self=60%) finalizes K WITH a minority (B=33%, so self+B=93% ≥ ⅔), then LOSES K to a
-// persistence lag (this codebase documents exactly this — the ZAP fire-and-forget Accept /
-// bsTestVM.frozenLastAccepted) and restarts STALE at M < K. B retained the finalized K. The node
-// MUST recover K; self-completing at M abandons finalized history and lets it build a conflicting
-// fork. The node cannot tell "M is the frontier" from "I lost finalized K" — which is precisely
-// why it must HEAR from connected B before concluding caught-up. self is NOT an independent
-// witness to its own caught-up-ness; the self-vote lets the node vouch for its own staleness.
-func TestRED_PROBE_ConnectedButSilentAheadBeacon_SelfVoteFalseCompletesAtStale(t *testing.T) {
-	const N = 10 // K: the finalized-ahead height B retained (self voted it, then lost it)
-	const M = 5  // the node's STALE accepted height after the persistence-lag crash
-
-	run := func(t *testing.T, bSilent bool) chainbootstrap.FrontierStatus {
-		chain, _ := buildBSChain(N, -1)
-		vm := newBSVMAt(chain, M) // node stale at M; it does NOT hold chain[N]=K
-
-		self := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-		a := ids.GenerateTestNodeID() // co-stale light beacon, at M
-		b := ids.GenerateTestNodeID() // AHEAD beacon, retained finalized K
-		// HEAVY self (60 of 100): self > total/2 - 1, so peers alone (40) < the 51 stake-majority
-		// floor → the self-vote branch. self+B=93% could finalize K; B=33% retains it.
-		weights := map[ids.NodeID]uint64{self: 60, a: 7, b: 33}
-
-		bh, _ := newBSHandlerWeighted(t, vm, weights)
-		bh.selfNodeID = self
-		bh.msgCreator = bsMsgBuilder{}
-
-		// FULL connectivity in BOTH runs: A and B are connected (B is in `connected` either way).
-		tipFor := map[ids.NodeID]ids.ID{a: chain[M].id} // A reports the stale tip M
-		silent := set.NewSet[ids.NodeID](1)
-		if bSilent {
-			silent.Add(b) // B connected but withholds its frontier reply this round
-		} else {
-			tipFor[b] = chain[N].id // B replies its genuine ahead tip K
-		}
-		bh.net = &redSilentNet{bh: bh, connected: []ids.NodeID{a, b}, silent: silent, tipFor: tipFor}
-
-		bh.bsActive.Store(true)
-		_, status := bh.FrontierTip(context.Background())
-		bh.bsActive.Store(false)
-		return status
-	}
-
-	bReplies := run(t, false)
-	bSilent := run(t, true)
-	t.Logf("B replies its ahead tip → status=%v (3=FrontierConnecting, safe)", bReplies)
-	t.Logf("B connected but SILENT  → status=%v (5=FrontierCaughtUp, the BREAK)", bSilent)
-
-	// Sanity: when the ahead beacon REPLIES, the node correctly fails safe (does not conclude caught-up).
-	require.NotEqual(t, chainbootstrap.FrontierCaughtUp, bReplies,
-		"sanity: when the ahead beacon REPLIES, the node correctly does NOT conclude caught-up")
-
-	// THE SECURITY REGRESSION ASSERTION. B is fully CONNECTED in both runs. The node must NOT
-	// self-complete caught-up while a connected beacon's position is unknown — that is a stale
-	// go-live. FAILS today (the break); PASSES once the self-vote gate also requires every connected
-	// beacon to have REPLIED this round (not merely be connected).
-	require.NotEqual(t, chainbootstrap.FrontierCaughtUp, bSilent,
-		"BREAK: suppressing only the CONNECTED ahead-beacon's frontier reply flips the heavy node to "+
-			"FrontierCaughtUp at the STALE height — the self-vote backfills the floor and the "+
-			"full-connectivity gate cannot see the reply suppression")
-}
-
-// TestRED_PROBE_EqualStakeNeedsNoSelfVote answers deploy-question #5: 5 EQUAL-stake beacons, node
-// a beacon, all four peers connected and reporting a common tip — the node concludes caught-up via
-// the ORDINARY AcceptsFrontier path (peers clear the stake-majority floor: 4·w of 5·w = 80% >
-// 50%). The self-vote is NEVER needed for equal stake, so the equal-stake devnet hang is NOT this
-// self-exclusion floor (look at primaryNetworkReady / P-chain bootstrap / beacon connectivity).
-func TestRED_PROBE_EqualStakeNeedsNoSelfVote(t *testing.T) {
-	chain, byID := buildBSChain(8, -1)
-	vm := newBSVM(chain) // node at genesis (height 0)
-
-	self := ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	p1, p2, p3, p4 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
-	weights := map[ids.NodeID]uint64{self: 100, p1: 100, p2: 100, p3: 100, p4: 100}
-
-	bh, chainID := newBSHandlerWeighted(t, vm, weights)
-	bh.selfNodeID = self
-	bh.msgCreator = bsMsgBuilder{}
-	bh.net = &bsBeaconNet{bh: bh, chainID: chainID, connected: []ids.NodeID{p1, p2, p3, p4}, byID: byID, tip: chain[0]}
-
-	bh.bsActive.Store(true)
-	tip, status := bh.FrontierTip(context.Background())
-	bh.bsActive.Store(false)
-
-	t.Logf("equal-stake fresh net: status=%v tip=%v", status, tip)
-	require.Contains(t, []chainbootstrap.FrontierStatus{chainbootstrap.FrontierNamed, chainbootstrap.FrontierCaughtUp}, status,
-		"equal-stake peers clear the stake-majority floor unaided — no self-vote needed")
-	require.Equal(t, chain[0].id, tip, "caught up at genesis")
-}
@@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ import (

 var (
 	// Flags
-	outputPath   string
-	inputPath    string
-	sinceVer     uint64
-	dataDir      string
-	dbType       string
-	noCompress   bool
+	outputPath  string
+	inputPath   string
+	sinceVer    uint64
+	dataDir     string
+	dbType      string
+	noCompress  bool
 	forceRestore bool
 )

@@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ package main
 import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"flag"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
-
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
 )

 func main() {
@@ -192,7 +190,7 @@ func cmdExport(args []string) {

 // stateEnvelope wraps CeremonyState with a SHA-256 integrity hash.
 type stateEnvelope struct {
-	State     jsontext.Value `json:"state"`
+	State     json.RawMessage `json:"state"`
 	Integrity string          `json:"integrity"` // hex(SHA-256(state bytes))
 }

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package main
 import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"math/big"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -11,8 +12,6 @@ import (

 	"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254"
 	"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
 )

 // =============================================================================
@@ -310,7 +309,7 @@ func TestRegressionL03_StateFileHasIntegrity(t *testing.T) {
 	}

 	var envelope struct {
-		State     jsontext.Value `json:"state"`
+		State     json.RawMessage `json:"state"`
 		Integrity string          `json:"integrity"`
 	}
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &envelope); err != nil {
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
 import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"time"

@@ -12,16 +12,16 @@ import (

 // CeremonyState holds the full state of a powers-of-tau ceremony.
 type CeremonyState struct {
-	Circuit        string         `json:"circuit"`
-	NumConstraints int            `json:"numConstraints"`
-	PowersNeeded   int            `json:"powersNeeded"`
-	Participants   int            `json:"participants"`
-	TauG1          []G1Point      `json:"tauG1"`
-	TauG2          []G2Point      `json:"tauG2"`
-	AlphaG1        []G1Point      `json:"alphaG1"`
-	BetaG1         []G1Point      `json:"betaG1"`
-	BetaG2         G2Point        `json:"betaG2"`
-	Contributions  []Contribution `json:"contributions"`
+	Circuit       string         `json:"circuit"`
+	NumConstraints int           `json:"numConstraints"`
+	PowersNeeded  int            `json:"powersNeeded"`
+	Participants  int            `json:"participants"`
+	TauG1         []G1Point      `json:"tauG1"`
+	TauG2         []G2Point      `json:"tauG2"`
+	AlphaG1       []G1Point      `json:"alphaG1"`
+	BetaG1        []G1Point      `json:"betaG1"`
+	BetaG2        G2Point        `json:"betaG2"`
+	Contributions []Contribution `json:"contributions"`
 }

 // Contribution records a single participant's contribution.
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 package main

 import (
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"sort"
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ package main

 import (
 	"encoding/hex"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"time"
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ func main() {
 		"allocations": []map[string]interface{}{
 			{
 				"evmAddr":       "0x9011E888251AB053B7bD1cdB598Db4f9DEd94714",
-				"utxoAddr":      zooAddr,
+				"utxoAddr":       zooAddr,
 				"initialAmount": 0,
 				"unlockSchedule": []map[string]interface{}{
 					{
@@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ func main() {
 	ccBytes, _ := json.Marshal(cc)
 	genesis["cChainGenesis"] = string(ccBytes)

-	out, _ := json.Marshal(genesis, jsontext.WithIndent("  "))
+	out, _ := json.MarshalIndent(genesis, "", "  ")
 	os.WriteFile(os.ExpandEnv("$HOME/work/lux/mainnet/zoo_genesis_valid.json"), out, 0644)
 	fmt.Println("Wrote zoo_genesis_valid.json")
 }
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
-
+	
 	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
 )
@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ func main() {
 		fmt.Println("Usage: go run main.go <genesis_file>")
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}
-
+	
 	data, err := os.ReadFile(os.Args[1])
 	if err != nil {
 		fmt.Printf("Error reading file: %v\n", err)
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}
-
+	
 	fmt.Printf("File size: %d bytes\n", len(data))
-
+	
 	// Compute hash the same way luxd does
 	rawHash := hash.ComputeHash256(data)
 	id, err := ids.ToID(rawHash)
@@ -29,6 +29,6 @@ func main() {
 		fmt.Printf("Error converting to ID: %v\n", err)
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}
-
+	
 	fmt.Printf("Genesis ID: %s\n", id.String())
 }
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-// pqkeygen provisions the strict-PQ staking keypairs a local luxd needs:
-// ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) staking key + ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) handshake key.
-// Writes PEM blocks with the exact types the node's config loader expects.
-package main
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"encoding/pem"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
-	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mlkem"
-)
-
-func writePEM(path, typ string, der []byte) error {
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	var b bytes.Buffer
-	if err := pem.Encode(&b, &pem.Block{Type: typ, Bytes: der}); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	return os.WriteFile(path, b.Bytes(), 0o600)
-}
-
-func main() {
-	if len(os.Args) != 2 {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "usage: pqkeygen <staking-dir>")
-		os.Exit(1)
-	}
-	dir := os.Args[1]
-
-	// ML-DSA-65 staking key
-	dsaPriv, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, mldsa.MLDSA65)
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-	dsaPub := dsaPriv.PublicKey.Bytes()
-	if err := writePEM(filepath.Join(dir, "mldsa.key"), "ML-DSA-65 PRIVATE KEY", dsaPriv.Bytes()); err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-	if err := writePEM(filepath.Join(dir, "mldsa.pub"), "ML-DSA-65 PUBLIC KEY", dsaPub); err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-
-	// ML-KEM-768 handshake key
-	kemPub, kemPriv, err := mlkem.GenerateKeyPair(rand.Reader, mlkem.MLKEM768)
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-	if err := writePEM(filepath.Join(dir, "mlkem.key"), "ML-KEM-768 PRIVATE KEY", kemPriv.Bytes()); err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-	if err := writePEM(filepath.Join(dir, "mlkem.pub"), "ML-KEM-768 PUBLIC KEY", kemPub.Bytes()); err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-
-	fmt.Printf("ML-DSA-65 priv=%dB pub=%dB; ML-KEM-768 priv=%dB pub=%dB written to %s\n",
-		len(dsaPriv.Bytes()), len(dsaPub), len(kemPriv.Bytes()), len(kemPub.Bytes()), dir)
-}
@@ -1,352 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-// Command repair-proposervm is a ONE-TIME, fail-closed surgical tool to reconcile
-// a proposervm chain-state DB onto a known-canonical outer block at a single height.
-//
-// Motivation (incident 1082814, Lux mainnet C-Chain): a sub-quorum proposervm
-// envelope A (3-of-5 ACCEPT) was locally accepted on some nodes while the network
-// finalized the supermajority sibling B (4-of-5) that wraps the IDENTICAL inner EVM
-// block. The two siblings differ ONLY in the proposervm outer envelope; the inner
-// EVM state is byte-identical (no EVM divergence). On restart those nodes re-seed
-// finality from their persisted proposervm lastAccepted=A and fatal on B's cert
-// (EQUIVOCATION). This tool swaps the persisted record of `height` from A to the
-// canonical B, leaving the inner EVM completely untouched (no EVM rollback).
-//
-// It is NOT a blind hex edit: it opens the exact same typed proposervm state
-// (luxfi/node/vms/proposervm/state) over the exact same nested keyspace luxd uses
-// (chainID -> "vm" -> "proposervm" -> versiondb -> chain/block/height), and writes
-// via the state's own PutBlock / SetBlockIDAtHeight / SetLastAccepted so the on-disk
-// bytes are identical to what luxd itself wrote for B on the canonical node.
-//
-// proposervm invariant honored: proLastAcceptedHeight must never be < the inner VM's
-// last-accepted height (vm.repairAcceptedChainByHeight). The inner EVM is at `height`
-// (it accepted the shared inner block under A), so the recovery target is the
-// canonical block AT `height` (B), never height-1 — keeping outer==inner height.
-//
-// Modes:
-//
-//	inspect : read-only. Print lastAccepted, height index at H and H-1, and the
-//	          outer block currently recorded at H.
-//	export  : read-only. Read the outer block recorded at H and write its raw
-//	          stateless bytes to --block-file (run against a canonical node's DB).
-//	repair  : read-write, fail-closed. Parse --block-file (canonical B), assert it is
-//	          the expected block, assert the DB is in the expected bad state (lastAccepted
-//	          and heightIndex[H] both == the expected sub-quorum block A, and B's parent
-//	          == heightIndex[H-1]); then PutBlock(B), SetBlockIDAtHeight(H,B),
-//	          SetLastAccepted(B), Commit. Idempotent: if already on B, it no-ops.
-//
-// The DB uses an exclusive LOCK; luxd MUST be stopped on the target before `repair`.
-package main
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/database"
-	databasefactory "github.com/luxfi/database/factory"
-	"github.com/luxfi/database/prefixdb"
-	"github.com/luxfi/database/versiondb"
-	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
-	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/metric"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/proposervm/block"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/proposervm/state"
-)
-
-// The proposervm nests its state under these fixed prefixes inside the chain DB.
-// chainDB = prefixdb(chainID[:], baseDB)            [chains.ChainDBManager.GetDatabase]
-// vmDB    = prefixdb("vm", chainDB)                 [chains.ChainDBManager.GetVMDatabase / VMDBPrefix]
-// ppvmDB  = versiondb(prefixdb("proposervm", vmDB)) [proposervm.VM.Initialize dbPrefix]
-// state.New(ppvmDB) -> "chain"/"block"/"height" sub-prefixes
-var (
-	vmDBPrefix         = []byte("vm")
-	proposervmDBPrefix = []byte("proposervm")
-)
-
-var (
-	dbPath        string
-	dbType        string
-	chainIDStr    string
-	height        uint64
-	blockFile     string
-	expectBlockID string // canonical B (target)
-	expectCurID   string // sub-quorum A (the bad state we expect to overwrite)
-	yes           bool
-)
-
-func main() {
-	root := &cobra.Command{
-		Use:   "repair-proposervm",
-		Short: "Surgical, fail-closed reconcile of a proposervm chain-state onto a canonical outer block at one height",
-	}
-	root.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&dbPath, "db-path", "", "zapdb root (e.g. /data/db/mainnet/db) (required)")
-	root.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&dbType, "db-type", "zapdb", "database type")
-	root.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&chainIDStr, "chain-id", "2wRdZGeca1qkxzNCq88NWDF5nJ5A9o623vRJKd3FsjRYvuVvvt", "blockchain ID (proposervm chain)")
-	root.PersistentFlags().Uint64Var(&height, "height", 1082814, "contested height")
-	root.MarkPersistentFlagRequired("db-path")
-
-	inspect := &cobra.Command{Use: "inspect", Short: "read-only: print proposervm finality state at the height", RunE: runInspect}
-
-	export := &cobra.Command{Use: "export", Short: "read-only: write the outer block recorded at the height to --block-file", RunE: runExport}
-	export.Flags().StringVar(&blockFile, "block-file", "", "output file for the canonical outer block bytes (required)")
-	export.MarkFlagRequired("block-file")
-
-	probe := &cobra.Command{Use: "probe", Short: "read-only: look up an arbitrary block by ID (is it present in the store?)", RunE: runProbe}
-	probe.Flags().StringVar(&expectBlockID, "block-id", "", "block ID to look up (required)")
-	probe.MarkFlagRequired("block-id")
-
-	dump := &cobra.Command{Use: "dump", Short: "read-only: write an arbitrary block (by ID) raw stateless bytes to --block-file", RunE: runDump}
-	dump.Flags().StringVar(&expectBlockID, "block-id", "wDMUyGyaKcC2Vng8i8ngU5f83XEtHZx5hqCSe5tMTwLAPagmo", "block ID to dump (canonical B)")
-	dump.Flags().StringVar(&blockFile, "block-file", "", "output file for the block bytes (required)")
-	dump.MarkFlagRequired("block-file")
-
-	repair := &cobra.Command{Use: "repair", Short: "fail-closed: swap height's outer block from A to canonical B", RunE: runRepair}
-	repair.Flags().StringVar(&blockFile, "block-file", "", "canonical outer block (B) bytes, from `export` (required)")
-	repair.Flags().StringVar(&expectBlockID, "expect-block", "wDMUyGyaKcC2Vng8i8ngU5f83XEtHZx5hqCSe5tMTwLAPagmo", "expected canonical block ID (B)")
-	repair.Flags().StringVar(&expectCurID, "expect-current", "2U2pR3DHCNEFDLnMq2uraNVkThRWgETDd468hR26yGHBQuAnNy", "expected current sub-quorum block ID (A) to be overwritten")
-	repair.Flags().BoolVar(&yes, "yes", false, "confirm the write")
-	repair.MarkFlagRequired("block-file")
-
-	root.AddCommand(inspect, export, probe, dump, repair)
-	if err := root.Execute(); err != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR:", err)
-		os.Exit(1)
-	}
-}
-
-// openState opens the proposervm typed state over the exact nested keyspace luxd uses.
-// Returns the state, the proposervm versiondb (for Commit), and the base DB (for Close).
-func openState(readOnly bool) (state.State, *versiondb.Database, database.Database, ids.ID, error) {
-	chainID, err := ids.FromString(chainIDStr)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("bad chain-id: %w", err)
-	}
-	logger := log.New("cmd", "repair-proposervm")
-	gatherer := metric.NewRegistry()
-	base, err := databasefactory.New(dbType, dbPath, readOnly, nil, gatherer, logger, "repair", "db")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("open db %q: %w", dbPath, err)
-	}
-	chainDB := prefixdb.New(chainID[:], base)
-	vmDB := prefixdb.New(vmDBPrefix, chainDB)
-	ppvmDB := versiondb.New(prefixdb.New(proposervmDBPrefix, vmDB))
-	return state.New(ppvmDB), ppvmDB, base, chainID, nil
-}
-
-func idAt(st state.State, h uint64) string {
-	id, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(h)
-	if errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound) {
-		return "<none>"
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return "<err:" + err.Error() + ">"
-	}
-	return id.String()
-}
-
-func runInspect(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	st, _, base, _, err := openState(true)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-	la, err := st.GetLastAccepted()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetLastAccepted: %w", err)
-	}
-	fmt.Printf("proposervm lastAccepted = %s\n", la)
-	fmt.Printf("heightIndex[%d]        = %s\n", height, idAt(st, height))
-	fmt.Printf("heightIndex[%d]        = %s\n", height-1, idAt(st, height-1))
-	if id, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(height); err == nil {
-		if blk, err := st.GetBlock(id); err == nil {
-			fmt.Printf("block@%d: id=%s parent=%s bytes=%d\n", height, blk.ID(), blk.ParentID(), len(blk.Bytes()))
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func runProbe(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	want, err := ids.FromString(expectBlockID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("bad --block-id: %w", err)
-	}
-	// RW so Badger replays its WAL: a verified/built-but-unflushed block may live
-	// only in the memtable. Disposable copy only.
-	st, _, base, _, err := openState(false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-	blk, err := st.GetBlock(want)
-	if errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound) {
-		fmt.Printf("NOT-PRESENT: block %s is not in this store\n", want)
-		return nil
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlock(%s): %w", want, err)
-	}
-	fmt.Printf("PRESENT: id=%s parent=%s bytes=%d\n", blk.ID(), blk.ParentID(), len(blk.Bytes()))
-	return nil
-}
-
-func runDump(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	want, err := ids.FromString(expectBlockID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("bad --block-id: %w", err)
-	}
-	// RW so Badger replays its WAL: a verified-but-unflushed block may live only in
-	// the memtable. We never call a state WRITER here (read + write output file only),
-	// and this runs against an idle (luxd-stopped) pod DB; the contested sibling B was
-	// verified by this node when it saw the conflicting cert, so it is present by ID.
-	st, _, base, _, err := openState(false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-	blk, err := st.GetBlock(want)
-	if errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("block %s is NOT present in this store (cannot dump)", want)
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlock(%s): %w", want, err)
-	}
-	if blk.ID() != want {
-		return fmt.Errorf("self-ID mismatch: requested=%s parsed=%s (refusing)", want, blk.ID())
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(blockFile, blk.Bytes(), 0o644); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", blockFile, err)
-	}
-	fmt.Printf("DUMPED id=%s parent=%s bytes=%d -> %s\n", blk.ID(), blk.ParentID(), len(blk.Bytes()), blockFile)
-	return nil
-}
-
-func runExport(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	// Open read-WRITE so Badger replays its value-log/WAL: the canonical block at
-	// the contested height was the LAST write before the chain went idle, so on a
-	// crash-consistent snapshot copy it may live only in the memtable/WAL, not yet
-	// in an SST. A read-only open skips recovery and could miss it. We never call a
-	// state writer here (we only read + write the output file), and this only ever
-	// runs against a DISPOSABLE snapshot copy of a canonical node — never the live node.
-	st, _, base, _, err := openState(false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-	id, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(height)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlockIDAtHeight(%d): %w", height, err)
-	}
-	blk, err := st.GetBlock(id)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlock(%s): %w", id, err)
-	}
-	if blk.ID() != id {
-		return fmt.Errorf("block id mismatch: index=%s block=%s", id, blk.ID())
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(blockFile, blk.Bytes(), 0o644); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", blockFile, err)
-	}
-	la, _ := st.GetLastAccepted()
-	fmt.Printf("EXPORTED height=%d id=%s parent=%s bytes=%d -> %s\n", height, blk.ID(), blk.ParentID(), len(blk.Bytes()), blockFile)
-	fmt.Printf("  (source lastAccepted=%s heightIndex[%d-1]=%s)\n", la, height, idAt(st, height-1))
-	return nil
-}
-
-func runRepair(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-	wantB, err := ids.FromString(expectBlockID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("bad --expect-block: %w", err)
-	}
-	wantA, err := ids.FromString(expectCurID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("bad --expect-current: %w", err)
-	}
-	raw, err := os.ReadFile(blockFile)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", blockFile, err)
-	}
-	blk, err := block.ParseWithoutVerification(raw)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("parse block file: %w", err)
-	}
-	// (1) the supplied block must be exactly the canonical target B.
-	if blk.ID() != wantB {
-		return fmt.Errorf("block-file id %s != --expect-block %s (refusing)", blk.ID(), wantB)
-	}
-
-	st, ppvmDB, base, _, err := openState(false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer base.Close()
-
-	la, err := st.GetLastAccepted()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetLastAccepted: %w", err)
-	}
-	curAtH, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(height)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlockIDAtHeight(%d): %w", height, err)
-	}
-
-	// (2) idempotency: if already on B, do nothing.
-	if la == wantB && curAtH == wantB {
-		fmt.Printf("ALREADY-CANONICAL: lastAccepted and heightIndex[%d] already == B (%s); no-op\n", height, wantB)
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	// (3) fail-closed: only proceed from the exact expected bad state (A at H, lastAccepted A).
-	if la != wantA {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing: lastAccepted=%s is neither A(%s) nor B(%s) — unexpected state", la, wantA, wantB)
-	}
-	if curAtH != wantA {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing: heightIndex[%d]=%s != A(%s) — unexpected state", height, curAtH, wantA)
-	}
-
-	// (4) B must extend the SAME finalized prefix: B.parent == the block recorded at H-1.
-	parentAtH1, err := st.GetBlockIDAtHeight(height - 1)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("GetBlockIDAtHeight(%d): %w", height-1, err)
-	}
-	if blk.ParentID() != parentAtH1 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing: B.parent=%s != heightIndex[%d]=%s (B does not extend the local finalized prefix)", blk.ParentID(), height-1, parentAtH1)
-	}
-	if _, err := st.GetBlock(parentAtH1); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing: parent %s (height %d) not present in store: %w", parentAtH1, height-1, err)
-	}
-
-	fmt.Printf("PLAN: height=%d  %s (A) -> %s (B)\n", height, wantA, wantB)
-	fmt.Printf("  current lastAccepted = %s\n", la)
-	fmt.Printf("  B.parent             = %s == heightIndex[%d] OK\n", blk.ParentID(), height-1)
-	if !yes {
-		return errors.New("dry-run only: re-run with --yes to write")
-	}
-
-	// (5) apply via the state's own typed writers (identical on-disk bytes to luxd).
-	if err := st.PutBlock(blk); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("PutBlock(B): %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := st.SetBlockIDAtHeight(height, blk.ID()); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("SetBlockIDAtHeight(%d,B): %w", height, err)
-	}
-	if err := st.SetLastAccepted(blk.ID()); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("SetLastAccepted(B): %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := ppvmDB.Commit(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("commit: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	// (6) re-read to confirm.
-	la2, _ := st.GetLastAccepted()
-	fmt.Printf("DONE: lastAccepted=%s heightIndex[%d]=%s heightIndex[%d]=%s\n", la2, height, idAt(st, height), height-1, idAt(st, height-1))
-	if la2 != wantB || idAt(st, height) != wantB.String() {
-		return fmt.Errorf("post-write verification FAILED")
-	}
-	fmt.Println("VERIFIED: proposervm now records canonical B at the contested height; inner EVM untouched.")
-	return nil
-}
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ services:
      LUXD_CONSENSUS_QUORUM_SIZE: "1"
      LUXD_LOG_LEVEL: "info"
    healthcheck:
-      test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:9630/v1/health"]
+      test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:9630/ext/health"]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 10s
      retries: 5
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (c *ChainDatabaseConfig) GetDatabaseType(chainAlias string) string {
 func (c *ChainDatabaseConfig) Validate() error {
 	validTypes := map[string]bool{
 		"pebbledb": true,
-		"zapdb":    true,
+		"zapdb": true,
 		"memdb":    true,
 	}

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -18,8 +19,6 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"time"

-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
 	"github.com/spf13/viper"

 	compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
@@ -775,18 +774,15 @@ func loadPEMBlock(path, expectType string) ([]byte, error) {
 // pemBytesOrFile resolves either a base64-encoded PEM in
 // contentKey (highest precedence, matches the
 // --foo-file-content / --foo-file pattern the existing TLS
-// loaders use) or a filesystem path in pathKey. A set-but-empty
-// contentKey is treated as absent and falls through to pathKey, so a
-// blank content flag and a missing one behave identically. Empty
-// return = neither was provided; caller decides whether that's a fatal
-// config error or a "fall through to classical-compat" path.
+// loaders use) or a filesystem path in pathKey. Empty return =
+// neither was set; caller decides whether that's a fatal config
+// error or a "fall through to classical-compat" path.
 func pemBytesOrFile(v *viper.Viper, contentKey, pathKey, expectType string) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	// A non-empty *-content flag wins. A set-but-empty one (e.g. an env var or
-	// a deploy template that rendered to "") is treated identically to an
-	// absent flag: fall through to the *-file path below. Short-circuiting on
-	// the empty value here would silently degrade a strict-PQ validator to a
-	// classical ECDSA NodeID — the strict-PQ activation outage this guards.
-	if raw := v.GetString(contentKey); raw != "" {
+	if v.IsSet(contentKey) {
+		raw := v.GetString(contentKey)
+		if raw == "" {
+			return nil, "", nil
+		}
 		decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(raw)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("decode %s base64: %w", contentKey, err)
@@ -1036,7 +1032,7 @@ func getUpgradeConfig(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32) (upgrade.Config, error)
 	}

 	var upgradeConfig upgrade.Config
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(upgradeBytes, &upgradeConfig, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(upgradeBytes, &upgradeConfig); err != nil {
 		return upgrade.Config{}, fmt.Errorf("unable to unmarshal upgrade bytes: %w", err)
 	}
 	return upgradeConfig, nil
@@ -1056,15 +1052,15 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode %s: %w", GenesisRawBytesKey, err)
 		}
-		utxoAssetID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(networkID, genesisBytes)
+		xAssetID, err := resolveXAssetID(networkID, genesisBytes)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("resolve X-Chain asset ID from %s: %w", GenesisRawBytesKey, err)
 		}
 		log.Info("loaded raw genesis bytes directly",
 			"size", len(genesisBytes),
-			"utxoAssetID", utxoAssetID,
+			"xAssetID", xAssetID,
 		)
-		return genesisBytes, utxoAssetID, nil
+		return genesisBytes, xAssetID, nil
 	}

 	// Check if genesis-db is specified for database replay
@@ -1095,32 +1091,19 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
 		// Check if we have cached genesis bytes to avoid rebuilding
 		cacheFile := filepath.Join(dataDir, "genesis.bytes")
 		if cachedBytes, err := loadCachedGenesisBytes(cacheFile); err == nil && len(cachedBytes) > 0 {
-			utxoAssetID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(networkID, cachedBytes)
-			if err == nil {
-				log.Info("loaded cached genesis bytes for hash stability",
-					"cacheFile", cacheFile,
-					"size", len(cachedBytes),
-					"utxoAssetID", utxoAssetID,
-				)
-				return cachedBytes, utxoAssetID, nil
+			xAssetID, err := resolveXAssetID(networkID, cachedBytes)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("resolve X-Chain asset ID from cached genesis: %w", err)
 			}
-			// Cache parse failed — almost certainly a codec mismatch
-			// after a binary upgrade (e.g. v1-codec bytes persisted by
-			// an older luxd, multi-version v0+v1 dispatcher in this
-			// luxd doesn't recognise a type the cached blob still
-			// uses). Drop the cache and rebuild from the file rather
-			// than wedging in a CrashLoop. Hash stability is forfeit
-			// for this single restart — intentional, the alternative
-			// is a permanent outage on every binary bump.
-			log.Warn("cached genesis bytes failed to parse — invalidating cache and rebuilding from genesis-file",
+			log.Info("loaded cached genesis bytes for hash stability",
 				"cacheFile", cacheFile,
 				"size", len(cachedBytes),
-				"error", err,
+				"xAssetID", xAssetID,
 			)
-			_ = os.Remove(cacheFile)
+			return cachedBytes, xAssetID, nil
 		}
 		// No cache or invalid cache - build from file and cache the result
-		genesisBytes, utxoAssetID, err := builder.FromFile(networkID, genesisFileName, stakingCfg)
+		genesisBytes, xAssetID, err := builder.FromFile(networkID, genesisFileName, stakingCfg)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, ids.Empty, err
 		}
@@ -1135,7 +1118,7 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
 				"size", len(genesisBytes),
 			)
 		}
-		return genesisBytes, utxoAssetID, nil
+		return genesisBytes, xAssetID, nil
 	}

 	// finally if file is not specified/readable go for the predefined config
@@ -1143,7 +1126,7 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
 	return builder.FromConfig(config)
 }

-// resolveUTXOAssetID extracts the X-Chain native asset ID from the loaded
+// resolveXAssetID extracts the X-Chain native asset ID from the loaded
 // platform-genesis blob. It is the canonical source of truth used by
 // every load path that bypasses FromConfig (raw bytes, cached bytes —
 // the paths that historically defaulted to constants.UTXOAssetIDFor and
@@ -1162,8 +1145,8 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
 //
 // Tested against both sovereign-network genesis (X-Chain present, asset
 // ID differs from the constant) and upstream Lux genesis fixtures.
-func resolveUTXOAssetID(networkID uint32, genesisBytes []byte) (ids.ID, error) {
-	id, ok, err := builder.UTXOAssetIDFromGenesisBytes(genesisBytes)
+func resolveXAssetID(networkID uint32, genesisBytes []byte) (ids.ID, error) {
+	id, ok, err := builder.XAssetIDFromGenesisBytes(genesisBytes)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ids.Empty, err
 	}
@@ -1311,7 +1294,7 @@ func getAliases(v *viper.Viper, name string, contentKey string, fileKey string)
 	}

 	aliasMap := make(map[ids.ID][]string)
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(fileBytes, &aliasMap, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(fileBytes, &aliasMap); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w on %s: %w", errUnmarshalling, name, err)
 	}
 	return aliasMap, nil
@@ -1351,7 +1334,7 @@ func getChainConfigsFromFlag(v *viper.Viper) (map[string]chains.ChainConfig, err
 	}

 	chainConfigs := make(map[string]chains.ChainConfig)
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(chainConfigContent, &chainConfigs, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(chainConfigContent, &chainConfigs); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not unmarshal JSON: %w", err)
 	}
 	return chainConfigs, nil
@@ -1433,8 +1416,8 @@ func getNetConfigsFromFlags(v *viper.Viper, netIDs []ids.ID) (map[ids.ID]nets.Co
 	}

 	// partially parse configs to be filled by defaults later
-	chainConfigs := make(map[ids.ID]jsontext.Value, len(netIDs))
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(netConfigContent, &chainConfigs, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
+	chainConfigs := make(map[ids.ID]json.RawMessage, len(netIDs))
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(netConfigContent, &chainConfigs); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not unmarshal JSON: %w", err)
 	}

@@ -1443,7 +1426,7 @@ func getNetConfigsFromFlags(v *viper.Viper, netIDs []ids.ID) (map[ids.ID]nets.Co
 		config := getDefaultNetConfig(v)

 		if rawNetConfigBytes, ok := chainConfigs[chainID]; ok {
-			if err := json.Unmarshal(rawNetConfigBytes, &config, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
+			if err := json.Unmarshal(rawNetConfigBytes, &config); err != nil {
 				return nil, err
 			}

@@ -1502,7 +1485,7 @@ func getNetConfigsFromDir(v *viper.Viper, chainIDs []ids.ID) (map[ids.ID]nets.Co
 		}

 		// Update the default config with the values from the file
-		if err := json.Unmarshal(file, &config, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(file, &config); err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errUnmarshalling, err)
 		}

@@ -1749,7 +1732,7 @@ func GetNodeConfig(v *viper.Viper) (node.Config, error) {
 		return node.Config{}, err
 	}
 	nodeConfig.TrackAllChains = v.GetBool(TrackAllChainsKey)
-	nodeConfig.DexValidator = v.GetBool(DexValidatorKey)
+

 	// HTTP APIs
 	nodeConfig.HTTPConfig, err = getHTTPConfig(v)
@@ -1876,7 +1859,7 @@ func GetNodeConfig(v *viper.Viper) (node.Config, error) {
 	// Get data directory for dev network config persistence
 	dataDir := getExpandedArg(v, DataDirKey)

-	nodeConfig.GenesisBytes, nodeConfig.UTXOAssetID, err = getGenesisData(v, nodeConfig.NetworkID, &genesisStakingCfg, dataDir)
+	nodeConfig.GenesisBytes, nodeConfig.XAssetID, err = getGenesisData(v, nodeConfig.NetworkID, &genesisStakingCfg, dataDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		return node.Config{}, fmt.Errorf("unable to load genesis file: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -4,10 +4,9 @@
 package config

 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
 	"log"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -17,34 +16,18 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/viper"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

-	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
 	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
+	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/chains"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/builder"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
 	pchaingenesis "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/genesis"
+	pchaintxs "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/txs"
 )

 const chainConfigFilenameExtension = ".ex"

-// equalChainConfigs compares two ChainConfig maps using bytes.Equal for the
-// []byte fields, so nil and empty []byte compare equal. json/v2 unmarshals
-// absent/null []byte fields to empty (non-nil), unlike v1 which left them nil.
-func equalChainConfigs(t *testing.T, expected, actual map[string]chains.ChainConfig) {
-	t.Helper()
-	require := require.New(t)
-	require.Equal(len(expected), len(actual), "map length mismatch")
-	for k, want := range expected {
-		got, ok := actual[k]
-		require.True(ok, "missing key %q", k)
-		require.True(bytes.Equal(want.Config, got.Config),
-			"%q Config: expected %x got %x", k, want.Config, got.Config)
-		require.True(bytes.Equal(want.Upgrade, got.Upgrade),
-			"%q Upgrade: expected %x got %x", k, want.Upgrade, got.Upgrade)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestGetChainConfigsFromFiles(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := map[string]struct {
 		configs  map[string]string
@@ -108,7 +91,7 @@ func TestGetChainConfigsFromFiles(t *testing.T) {
 			require.Equal(root, v.GetString(ChainConfigDirKey))
 			chainConfigs, err := getChainConfigs(v)
 			require.NoError(err)
-			equalChainConfigs(t, test.expected, chainConfigs)
+			require.Equal(test.expected, chainConfigs)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -168,11 +151,7 @@ func TestGetChainConfigsDirNotExist(t *testing.T) {
 			// don't read with getConfigFromViper since it's very slow.
 			chainConfigs, err := getChainConfigs(v)
 			require.ErrorIs(err, test.expectedErr)
-			if test.expected == nil {
-				require.Nil(chainConfigs)
-			} else {
-				equalChainConfigs(t, test.expected, chainConfigs)
-			}
+			require.Equal(test.expected, chainConfigs)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -192,7 +171,7 @@ func TestSetChainConfigDefaultDir(t *testing.T) {
 	chainConfigs, err := getChainConfigs(v)
 	require.NoError(err)
 	expected := map[string]chains.ChainConfig{"C": {Config: []byte("helloworld"), Upgrade: []byte(nil)}}
-	equalChainConfigs(t, expected, chainConfigs)
+	require.Equal(expected, chainConfigs)
 }

 func TestGetChainConfigsFromFlags(t *testing.T) {
@@ -259,7 +238,7 @@ func TestGetChainConfigsFromFlags(t *testing.T) {
 			// Parse config
 			chainConfigs, err := getChainConfigs(v)
 			require.NoError(err)
-			equalChainConfigs(t, test.expected, chainConfigs)
+			require.Equal(test.expected, chainConfigs)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -535,8 +514,8 @@ func TestGetNetConfigsFromFlags(t *testing.T) {
 				"2Ctt6eGAeo4MLqTmGa7AdRecuVMPGWEX9wSsCLBYrLhX4a394i": {
 					"consensusParameters": {
 						"k": 30,
-						"alphaPreference": 20,
-						"alphaConfidence": 25
+						"alphaPreference": 16,
+						"alphaConfidence": 20
 					},
 					"validatorOnly": true
 				}
@@ -546,8 +525,8 @@ func TestGetNetConfigsFromFlags(t *testing.T) {
 				config, ok := given[id]
 				require.True(ok)
 				require.True(config.ValidatorOnly)
-				require.Equal(20, config.ConsensusParameters.AlphaPreference)
-				require.Equal(25, config.ConsensusParameters.AlphaConfidence)
+				require.Equal(16, config.ConsensusParameters.AlphaPreference)
+				require.Equal(20, config.ConsensusParameters.AlphaConfidence)
 				require.Equal(30, config.ConsensusParameters.K)
 				// must still respect defaults (MainnetParameters.MaxOutstandingItems = 1024)
 				require.Equal(1024, config.ConsensusParameters.MaxOutstandingItems)
@@ -697,16 +676,16 @@ func TestDevModeFlags(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-// TestResolveUTXOAssetID_FromSovereignGenesis covers the canonical
+// TestResolveXAssetID_FromSovereignGenesis covers the canonical
 // behaviour the sovereign-L1 fix relies on: when the loaded platform
-// genesis bakes an X-Chain, resolveUTXOAssetID returns the runtime asset
+// genesis bakes an X-Chain, resolveXAssetID returns the runtime asset
 // ID encoded IN the genesis (matches what FromConfig produces, matches
 // what the running X-Chain reports via platform.getStakingAssetID).
 //
 // Critically: NOT constants.UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID). That value is
 // network-id-keyed and would silently collide between two sovereign L1s
 // sharing a primary-network ID.
-func TestResolveUTXOAssetID_FromSovereignGenesis(t *testing.T) {
+func TestResolveXAssetID_FromSovereignGenesis(t *testing.T) {
 	require := require.New(t)

 	cfg := builder.GetConfig(constants.LocalID)
@@ -717,37 +696,37 @@ func TestResolveUTXOAssetID_FromSovereignGenesis(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(err)
 	require.NotEqual(ids.Empty, expectedID)

-	gotID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(constants.LocalID, genesisBytes)
+	gotID, err := resolveXAssetID(constants.LocalID, genesisBytes)
 	require.NoError(err)
 	require.Equal(expectedID, gotID,
-		"resolveUTXOAssetID must agree with FromConfig on the genesis-derived asset ID")
+		"resolveXAssetID must agree with FromConfig on the genesis-derived asset ID")
 }

-// TestResolveUTXOAssetID_POnlyFallback verifies that when the platform
-// genesis bakes no X-Chain (P-only mode), resolveUTXOAssetID falls back
+// TestResolveXAssetID_POnlyFallback verifies that when the platform
+// genesis bakes no X-Chain (P-only mode), resolveXAssetID falls back
 // to constants.UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID). That value is unused at
 // runtime (no X-Chain to mint on) but keeps the existing nodeConfig
 // shape consistent for downstream consumers.
-func TestResolveUTXOAssetID_POnlyFallback(t *testing.T) {
+func TestResolveXAssetID_POnlyFallback(t *testing.T) {
 	require := require.New(t)

 	pOnly := &pchaingenesis.Genesis{Chains: nil}
-	pOnlyBytes, err := pOnly.Bytes()
+	pOnlyBytes, err := pchaingenesis.Codec.Marshal(pchaintxs.CodecVersion, pOnly)
 	require.NoError(err)

-	gotID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(42, pOnlyBytes)
+	gotID, err := resolveXAssetID(42, pOnlyBytes)
 	require.NoError(err)
 	require.Equal(constants.UTXOAssetIDFor(42), gotID,
 		"P-only must fall through to UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID)")
 }

-// TestResolveUTXOAssetID_Malformed asserts that bad genesis bytes surface
+// TestResolveXAssetID_Malformed asserts that bad genesis bytes surface
 // an error rather than silently returning ids.Empty (which would
 // reintroduce the UTXOAssetIDFor fallback and defeat the fix on
 // sovereign L1s where the fallback value is wrong).
-func TestResolveUTXOAssetID_Malformed(t *testing.T) {
+func TestResolveXAssetID_Malformed(t *testing.T) {
 	require := require.New(t)

-	_, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(1, []byte{0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc})
+	_, err := resolveXAssetID(1, []byte{0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc})
 	require.Error(err)
 }
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package config
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/spf13/viper"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-// TestDexValidatorFlagDefaultsOff pins the runtime opt-in contract for the
-// D-Chain DEX: the dex-validator flag exists, defaults to false (most nodes do
-// NOT run the DEX even though the DEXVM factory is always linked), and flips to
-// true when set. Participation is a runtime decision, not a compile-time one.
-func TestDexValidatorFlagDefaultsOff(t *testing.T) {
-	require := require.New(t)
-
-	// The flag must be registered in the canonical flag set.
-	fs := BuildFlagSet()
-	flag := fs.Lookup(DexValidatorKey)
-	require.NotNil(flag, "dex-validator flag must be registered")
-	require.Equal("false", flag.DefValue, "dex-validator must default to false")
-
-	// Default (unset) reads as false.
-	v := viper.New()
-	require.NoError(v.BindPFlags(fs))
-	require.False(v.GetBool(DexValidatorKey), "dex-validator must read false by default")
-
-	// Explicit opt-in flips it.
-	v.Set(DexValidatorKey, true)
-	require.True(v.GetBool(DexValidatorKey), "dex-validator must read true when set")
-}
@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
 	"github.com/spf13/viper"

-	compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
 	"github.com/luxfi/constants"
 	"github.com/luxfi/genesis/pkg/genesis"
-	"github.com/luxfi/net/dynamicip"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/builder"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/trace"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/components/gas"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/proposervm"
+	compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
+	"github.com/luxfi/net/dynamicip"
 	"github.com/luxfi/sys/ulimit"

 	consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
@@ -48,19 +48,19 @@ var (
 	defaultStakingSignerKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "signer.key")
 	// Strict-PQ default paths — mirror downstream-tenant CLI `<tenantctl> key gen`
 	// layout so the operator init container + lqd see the same files.
-	defaultStakingMLDSAKeyPath      = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mldsa.key")
-	defaultStakingMLDSAPubKeyPath   = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mldsa.pub")
+	defaultStakingMLDSAKeyPath    = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mldsa.key")
+	defaultStakingMLDSAPubKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mldsa.pub")
 	defaultHandshakeMLKEMKeyPath    = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mlkem.key")
 	defaultHandshakeMLKEMPubKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mlkem.pub")
-	defaultConfigDir                = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "configs")
-	defaultChainConfigDir           = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "chains")
-	defaultVMConfigDir              = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "vms")
-	defaultVMAliasFilePath          = filepath.Join(defaultVMConfigDir, "aliases.json")
-	defaultChainAliasFilePath       = filepath.Join(defaultChainConfigDir, "aliases.json")
-	defaultNetConfigDir             = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "chains")
-	defaultPluginDir                = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "plugins", "current")
-	defaultChainDataDir             = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "chainData")
-	defaultProcessContextPath       = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, DefaultProcessContextFilename)
+	defaultConfigDir            = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "configs")
+	defaultChainConfigDir       = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "chains")
+	defaultVMConfigDir          = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "vms")
+	defaultVMAliasFilePath      = filepath.Join(defaultVMConfigDir, "aliases.json")
+	defaultChainAliasFilePath   = filepath.Join(defaultChainConfigDir, "aliases.json")
+	defaultNetConfigDir         = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "chains")
+	defaultPluginDir            = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "plugins", "current")
+	defaultChainDataDir         = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "chainData")
+	defaultProcessContextPath   = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, DefaultProcessContextFilename)
 )

 func deprecateFlags(fs *pflag.FlagSet) error {
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ func addNodeFlags(fs *pflag.FlagSet) {
 	fs.String(HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyPathKey, defaultHandshakeMLKEMPubKeyPath, fmt.Sprintf("Path to the ML-KEM-768 handshake public key (FIPS 203 PEM). Ignored if %s is specified", HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyContentKey))
 	fs.String(HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyContentKey, "", "Base64-encoded ML-KEM-768 handshake public key (FIPS 203 PEM)")
 	fs.String(StakingKMSEndpointKey, "", "KMS endpoint for staking key retrieval (e.g., https://kms.dev.lux.network)")
-	fs.String(StakingKMSSecretPathKey, "", "KMS secret path for staking keys (e.g., /staking/devnet/node-0)")
+	fs.String(StakingKMSSecretPathKey, "", "KMS secret path for staking keys (e.g., /staking/liquid-devnet/node-0)")
 	fs.String(StakingKMSTokenKey, "", "KMS auth token for staking key retrieval")
 	fs.Bool(SybilProtectionEnabledKey, true, "Enables sybil protection. If enabled, Network TLS is required")
 	fs.Uint64(SybilProtectionDisabledWeightKey, 100, "Weight to provide to each peer when sybil protection is disabled")
@@ -335,7 +335,6 @@ func addNodeFlags(fs *pflag.FlagSet) {
 	// Chain tracking
 	fs.String(TrackChainsKey, "", "Comma-separated list of chain IDs to track. A node tracking chains will sync those chains and track validator uptimes. Use --track-all-chains for development networks")
 	fs.Bool(TrackAllChainsKey, false, "If true, track all chains automatically. Useful for development and testing networks where you want to sync all deployed chains without specifying each one")
-	fs.Bool(DexValidatorKey, false, "If true, this node activates and participates in the D-Chain DEX: it tracks/validates the D-Chain and dials the venue matcher engine. Default off — the DEXVM factory is always linked (D-Chain is a genesis chain), but a node does NOT activate the D-Chain unless this flag is set, even under --track-all-chains. When a network configures the dex-operator NFT collection, activation also requires the node's X-Chain staking address to hold that NFT (flag AND NFT)")

 	// State syncing
 	fs.String(StateSyncIPsKey, "", "Comma separated list of state sync peer ips to connect to. Example: 127.0.0.1:9630,127.0.0.1:9631")
@@ -78,36 +78,36 @@ const (
 	HTTPReadTimeoutKey       = "http-read-timeout"
 	HTTPReadHeaderTimeoutKey = "http-read-header-timeout"

-	HTTPIdleTimeoutKey               = "http-idle-timeout"
-	StateSyncIPsKey                  = "state-sync-ips"
-	StateSyncIDsKey                  = "state-sync-ids"
-	BootstrapNodesKey                = "bootstrap-nodes"
-	BootstrapIPsKey                  = "bootstrap-ips"
-	BootstrapIDsKey                  = "bootstrap-ids"
-	SkipBootstrapKey                 = "skip-bootstrap"
-	EnableAutominingKey              = "enable-automining"
-	StakingHostKey                   = "staking-host"
-	StakingPortKey                   = "staking-port"
-	StakingEphemeralCertEnabledKey   = "staking-ephemeral-cert-enabled"
-	StakingTLSKeyPathKey             = "staking-tls-key-file"
-	StakingTLSKeyContentKey          = "staking-tls-key-file-content"
-	StakingCertPathKey               = "staking-tls-cert-file"
-	StakingCertContentKey            = "staking-tls-cert-file-content"
-	StakingEphemeralSignerEnabledKey = "staking-ephemeral-signer-enabled"
-	StakingSignerKeyPathKey          = "staking-signer-key-file"
-	StakingSignerKeyContentKey       = "staking-signer-key-file-content"
-	StakingKMSEndpointKey            = "staking-kms-endpoint"
-	StakingKMSSecretPathKey          = "staking-kms-secret-path"
-	StakingKMSTokenKey               = "staking-kms-token"
+	HTTPIdleTimeoutKey                                 = "http-idle-timeout"
+	StateSyncIPsKey                                    = "state-sync-ips"
+	StateSyncIDsKey                                    = "state-sync-ids"
+	BootstrapNodesKey                                  = "bootstrap-nodes"
+	BootstrapIPsKey                                    = "bootstrap-ips"
+	BootstrapIDsKey                                    = "bootstrap-ids"
+	SkipBootstrapKey                                   = "skip-bootstrap"
+	EnableAutominingKey                                = "enable-automining"
+	StakingHostKey                                     = "staking-host"
+	StakingPortKey                                     = "staking-port"
+	StakingEphemeralCertEnabledKey                     = "staking-ephemeral-cert-enabled"
+	StakingTLSKeyPathKey                               = "staking-tls-key-file"
+	StakingTLSKeyContentKey                            = "staking-tls-key-file-content"
+	StakingCertPathKey                                 = "staking-tls-cert-file"
+	StakingCertContentKey                              = "staking-tls-cert-file-content"
+	StakingEphemeralSignerEnabledKey                   = "staking-ephemeral-signer-enabled"
+	StakingSignerKeyPathKey                            = "staking-signer-key-file"
+	StakingSignerKeyContentKey                         = "staking-signer-key-file-content"
+	StakingKMSEndpointKey                              = "staking-kms-endpoint"
+	StakingKMSSecretPathKey                            = "staking-kms-secret-path"
+	StakingKMSTokenKey                                 = "staking-kms-token"
 	// Strict-PQ staking identity (FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65). When set, the node
 	// uses the ML-DSA-65 public key as the NodeID source via
 	// ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65.DeriveMLDSA(chainID, pubKey), replacing the
 	// classical TLS-cert NodeID derivation. Strict-PQ profiles require
 	// these; classical-compat chains ignore them.
-	StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey       = "staking-mldsa-key-file"
-	StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey    = "staking-mldsa-key-file-content"
-	StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey    = "staking-mldsa-pub-key-file"
-	StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey = "staking-mldsa-pub-key-file-content"
+	StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey                             = "staking-mldsa-key-file"
+	StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey                          = "staking-mldsa-key-file-content"
+	StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey                          = "staking-mldsa-pub-key-file"
+	StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey                       = "staking-mldsa-pub-key-file-content"
 	// Strict-PQ handshake KEM (FIPS 203 ML-KEM-768). Peer-facing public
 	// key is published in the validator-set entry so peers can encapsulate
 	// to it for session-key establishment with no classical fallback.
@@ -175,7 +175,6 @@ const (
 	PartialSyncPrimaryNetworkKey                       = "partial-sync-primary-network"
 	TrackChainsKey                                     = "track-chains"
 	TrackAllChainsKey                                  = "track-all-chains"
-	DexValidatorKey                                    = "dex-validator"
 	AdminAPIEnabledKey                                 = "api-admin-enabled"
 	InfoAPIEnabledKey                                  = "api-info-enabled"
 	KeystoreAPIEnabledKey                              = "api-keystore-enabled"
@@ -265,17 +264,17 @@ const (
 	ForceIgnoreChecksumKey = "force-ignore-checksum"

 	// Low Memory / Dev Light Mode Keys
-	LowMemoryKey           = "low-memory"
-	MemoryProfileKey       = "memory-profile"
-	DevLightKey            = "dev-light"
-	ConfigProfileKey       = "config-profile"
-	DBCacheSizeKey         = "db-cache-size"
-	DBMemtableSizeKey      = "db-memtable-size"
-	StateCacheSizeKey      = "state-cache-size"
-	BlockCacheSizeKey      = "block-cache-size"
-	DisableBloomFiltersKey = "disable-bloom-filters"
-	LazyChainLoadingKey    = "lazy-chain-loading"
-	SingleValidatorModeKey = "single-validator-mode"
+	LowMemoryKey              = "low-memory"
+	MemoryProfileKey          = "memory-profile"
+	DevLightKey               = "dev-light"
+	ConfigProfileKey          = "config-profile"
+	DBCacheSizeKey            = "db-cache-size"
+	DBMemtableSizeKey         = "db-memtable-size"
+	StateCacheSizeKey         = "state-cache-size"
+	BlockCacheSizeKey         = "block-cache-size"
+	DisableBloomFiltersKey    = "disable-bloom-filters"
+	LazyChainLoadingKey       = "lazy-chain-loading"
+	SingleValidatorModeKey    = "single-validator-mode"

 	// VM Transport Keys
 	VMTransportKey        = "vm-transport"
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ package config

 import (
 	"embed"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"

 	"github.com/spf13/viper"
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 package config

 import (
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"testing"

 	"github.com/spf13/viper"
@@ -10,23 +10,23 @@ import (
 	"time"

 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/server/http"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/benchlist"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/chains"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/builder"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/network"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/server/http"
 	// "github.com/luxfi/consensus/core/router" // Unused
 	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
 	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
 	mlkemcrypto "github.com/luxfi/crypto/mlkem"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/network/tracker"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/trace"
 	"github.com/luxfi/node/upgrade"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/trace"
 	// "github.com/luxfi/log" // Unused
 	"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
-	"github.com/luxfi/node/utils/profiler"
 	"github.com/luxfi/timer"
+	"github.com/luxfi/node/utils/profiler"
 )

 type APIIndexerConfig struct {
@@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ type StakingConfig struct {
 	// publishes in its validator-set entry so peers can encapsulate to it
 	// for session-key establishment with no classical fallback. The
 	// HandshakeMLKEMPriv stays local to the pod.
-	StakingMLDSA       *mldsa.PrivateKey       `json:"-"`
-	StakingMLDSAPub    []byte                  `json:"-"`
-	HandshakeMLKEMPriv *mlkemcrypto.PrivateKey `json:"-"`
-	HandshakeMLKEMPub  []byte                  `json:"-"`
+	StakingMLDSA       *mldsa.PrivateKey         `json:"-"`
+	StakingMLDSAPub    []byte                    `json:"-"`
+	HandshakeMLKEMPriv *mlkemcrypto.PrivateKey   `json:"-"`
+	HandshakeMLKEMPub  []byte                    `json:"-"`
 	// File paths kept for log-line context, mirroring StakingKeyPath etc.
-	StakingMLDSAKeyPath   string `json:"stakingMLDSAKeyPath,omitempty"`
-	StakingMLDSAPubPath   string `json:"stakingMLDSAPubPath,omitempty"`
+	StakingMLDSAKeyPath  string `json:"stakingMLDSAKeyPath,omitempty"`
+	StakingMLDSAPubPath  string `json:"stakingMLDSAPubPath,omitempty"`
 	HandshakeMLKEMKeyPath string `json:"handshakeMLKEMKeyPath,omitempty"`
 	HandshakeMLKEMPubPath string `json:"handshakeMLKEMPubPath,omitempty"`
 }
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ type Config struct {

 	// Genesis information
 	GenesisBytes []byte `json:"-"`
-	UTXOAssetID  ids.ID `json:"utxoAssetID"`
+	XAssetID     ids.ID `json:"xAssetID"`

 	// ID of the network this node should connect to
 	NetworkID uint32 `json:"networkID"`
@@ -209,43 +209,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	TrackedChains  set.Set[ids.ID] `json:"trackedChains"`
 	TrackAllChains bool            `json:"trackAllChains"`

-	// DexValidator gates whether this node PARTICIPATES in the D-Chain DEX —
-	// i.e. tracks/validates the D-Chain and dials the venue matcher engine.
-	// Default false: the DEXVM factory is always registered (the D-Chain is a
-	// first-class genesis chain in every build), but a node only ACTIVATES the
-	// D-Chain when its operator opts in. The licensed/private piece is the GPU
-	// venue ENGINE, never the node.
-	//
-	// Enforcement is real, not advisory: this flag flows into
-	// chains.ManagerConfig.DexValidator and the chain manager's
-	// authorizeChainActivation declines the D-Chain when it is false — even when
-	// --track-all-chains queued the chain. It composes AND-wise with the
-	// X-Chain operator-NFT gate (OptionalVMs[DexVMID].RequiredNFT joined with
-	// NFTAuthorizationAssets): the D-Chain activates only if DexValidator is
-	// true AND (when a network configures the dex-operator collection) the
-	// node's staking X-address holds that NFT.
-	//
-	// Phase-2 (NOT built here — see participatesInDEXChain in node/node.go and
-	// the StakingXAddress seam in chains.ManagerConfig): binding the NFT check
-	// to proof-of-possession of the staking key, and mDNS local-fiber geofence
-	// discovery among the HFT DEX cluster. Until a network configures the
-	// dex-operator collection the NFT half is a no-op and this flag alone gates.
-	DexValidator bool `json:"dexValidator"`
-
-	// NFTAuthorizationAssets supplies, per network, the X-Chain operator-NFT
-	// collection asset for each NFT-gated optional VM, keyed by VMID (e.g.
-	// DexVMID -> the dex-operator collection asset; BridgeVMID -> the
-	// bridge-operator collection asset). It is the per-network VALUE half of the
-	// activation gate; the POLICY half (which VMs need an NFT + which group)
-	// lives in node.OptionalVMs. node.chainAuthorizationsFor joins the two into
-	// the chain manager's ChainAuthorizations map.
-	//
-	// Empty by default: minting the real operator collections is a follow-up, so
-	// until a network sets an asset here the corresponding chain is ungated
-	// (today's opt-in-flag behavior) while the gate itself stays fail-closed for
-	// any configured-but-unheld NFT.
-	NFTAuthorizationAssets map[ids.ID]ids.ID `json:"nftAuthorizationAssets"`
-
 	NetConfigs map[ids.ID]nets.Config `json:"chainConfigs"`

 	ChainConfigs map[string]chains.ChainConfig `json:"-"`
@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@
 package node

 import (
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"net/netip"
 	"testing"

@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ func TestProcessContext(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			require := require.New(t)

-			contextJSON, err := json.Marshal(test.context, jsontext.WithIndent("\t"))
+			contextJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(test.context, "", "\t")
 			require.NoError(err)
 			require.JSONEq(test.expected, string(contextJSON))
 		})
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@
 package spec

 import (
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
-	jsonv1 "github.com/go-json-experiment/json/v1"
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"time"
 )

@@ -209,7 +207,7 @@ func (s *ConfigSpec) DeprecatedFlags() []FlagSpec {

 // JSON returns the spec as formatted JSON.
 func (s *ConfigSpec) JSON() ([]byte, error) {
-	return json.Marshal(s, jsontext.WithIndent("  "), jsonv1.FormatDurationAsNano(true))
+	return json.MarshalIndent(s, "", "  ")
 }

 // ValidateValue checks if a value is valid for a flag.
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 package spec

 import (
-	"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"testing"
 )

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
-// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
-
-package config
-
-import (
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/pem"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-// writeMLDSAFixture generates an ML-DSA-65 keypair, PEM-encodes both halves
-// with the block types loadStakingMLDSA expects, writes them under dir, and
-// returns (privPath, pubPath, privPEM, pubPEM).
-func writeMLDSAFixture(t *testing.T, dir string) (privPath, pubPath string, privPEM, pubPEM []byte) {
-	t.Helper()
-	priv, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, mldsa.MLDSA65)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	privPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "ML-DSA-65 PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: priv.Bytes()})
-	pubPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "ML-DSA-65 PUBLIC KEY", Bytes: priv.PublicKey.Bytes()})
-
-	require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755))
-	privPath = filepath.Join(dir, "mldsa.key")
-	pubPath = filepath.Join(dir, "mldsa.pub")
-	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(privPath, privPEM, 0o600))
-	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(pubPath, pubPEM, 0o644))
-	return privPath, pubPath, privPEM, pubPEM
-}
-
-// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_PathForm: both keys via explicit --staking-mldsa-*-file
-// paths. The canonical strict-PQ deploy form.
-func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_PathForm(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	privPath, pubPath, _, _ := writeMLDSAFixture(t, dir)
-
-	v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey + "=" + privPath,
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey + "=" + pubPath,
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	priv, pub, _, _, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, priv)
-	require.NotEmpty(t, pub)
-}
-
-// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_ContentForm: keys via base64 PEM --*-content flags.
-func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_ContentForm(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	_, _, privPEM, pubPEM := writeMLDSAFixture(t, dir)
-
-	v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey + "=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(privPEM),
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey + "=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pubPEM),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	priv, pub, _, _, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, priv)
-	require.NotEmpty(t, pub)
-}
-
-// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_EmptyContentFallsThroughToPath is the regression guard
-// for the strict-PQ activation outage: when a deploy passes the *-content flag
-// blank (e.g. an env/template that rendered to "") alongside a valid *-file
-// path, the loader MUST consult the path. The previous behavior short-circuited
-// on the empty content value and returned no key, so StakingMLDSAPub stayed
-// empty, IsStrictPQ() was false, and the node booted under an ECDSA NodeID with
-// no error — silently degrading a strict-PQ validator to classical-compat.
-func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_EmptyContentFallsThroughToPath(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	privPath, pubPath, _, _ := writeMLDSAFixture(t, dir)
-
-	v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey + "=" + privPath,
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey + "=", // blank content
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey + "=" + pubPath,
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey + "=", // blank content
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	priv, pub, gotPrivPath, gotPubPath, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, priv, "blank content must fall through to the path")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, pub, "blank content must fall through to the path")
-	require.Equal(t, privPath, gotPrivPath)
-	require.Equal(t, pubPath, gotPubPath)
-}
-
-// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_NeitherIsClassicalCompat: no key material at all (and a
-// default pub path that does not exist) is classical-compat — empty, no error.
-func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_NeitherIsClassicalCompat(t *testing.T) {
-	// Point DataDir at an empty dir so the default pub path resolves to a
-	// non-existent file rather than picking up a developer's ~/.lux key.
-	v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
-		"--" + DataDirKey + "=" + t.TempDir(),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	priv, pub, _, _, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Nil(t, priv)
-	require.Empty(t, pub)
-}
-
-// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_PrivOnlyIsFatal: a private key with no public key is a
-// loud config error — a strict-PQ validator must never silently degrade.
-func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_PrivOnlyIsFatal(t *testing.T) {
-	base := t.TempDir()
-	_, _, privPEM, _ := writeMLDSAFixture(t, filepath.Join(base, "staking"))
-
-	v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
-		"--" + DataDirKey + "=" + base, // default pub path under here will be missing... but priv content wins
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey + "=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(privPEM),
-		"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey + "=" + filepath.Join(base, "does-not-exist.pub"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	_, _, _, _, err = loadStakingMLDSA(v)
-	require.Error(t, err)
-	require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "both private and public key are required")
-}
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# Consensus Package - AI Assistant Guide
-
-This package is node-side glue around the canonical consensus engine in
-`github.com/luxfi/consensus`. It does NOT implement the protocol — the
-protocol lives in that module.
-
-## Package Structure
-
- `acceptor.go` - Node-side block-acceptance callbacks (chain-ID-keyed)
- `quasar/` - Node-side wiring around `consensus/protocol/quasar`
- `zap/` - ZAP agentic-consensus / DID bridge (self-contained, opt-in)
-
-## Acceptor
-
-`Acceptor` interface called when consensus accepts a block / vertex.
-`AcceptorGroup` manages multiple acceptors per chain — used by the indexer
-and warp IPC. The variant here differs from the canonical
-`luxfi/consensus/core.Acceptor` (different signature: `*runtime.Runtime`
-instead of `context.Context`, plus chain-ID-keyed registration).
-
-## Quasar Wiring
-
-The `quasar/` subpackage wraps `github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar`
-with node-specific adapters (P-Chain validator state, BLS signing keys,
-Corona threshold coordinator stub).
-
-### Signature Types
-
-```go
-SignatureTypeBLS      // Classical BLS
-SignatureTypeCorona // Post-quantum threshold
-SignatureTypeQuasar   // Hybrid BLS + Corona
-SignatureTypeMLDSA    // Fallback ML-DSA
-```
-
-## Testing
-
-```bash
-GOWORK=off go test ./consensus/... -v
-```
-
-## Dependencies
-
- `github.com/luxfi/consensus` - Canonical consensus protocol (engine,
-  protocol/quasar, types, etc.)
- `github.com/luxfi/ids` - ID types
- `github.com/luxfi/log` - Logging
- `github.com/luxfi/runtime` - Runtime context for acceptors
@@ -68,54 +68,3 @@ Block arrives
 ## Recent Changes

 - 2026-01-04: Created documentation files with Vote terminology
-
-## consensus/quasar — PQ-finality VERIFY gate (2026-06-28)
-
-Supersedes the stale "Quasar wrapper / CoronaCoordinator" notes above (that
-subpackage did not exist in-tree). The current `consensus/quasar` package is the
-node-side integration of `luxfi/consensus@v1.29.0`'s typed compact-cert finality
-layer (`protocol/quasar.VerifyConsensusCert`). It wires the VERIFY half only.
-
-Model: luxd finalizes on classical Snow every block; at CHECKPOINTS (height %
-interval) a sampled committee's QuasarCert over the finalized digest is VERIFIED.
-Default posture HYBRID_PQ = Beam(BLS) ∧ Pulsar (ML-DSA-65); STRICT_DUAL_PQ
-(+Corona) / POLARIS (+Magnetar) configurable.
-
-THE SAFETY CONTRACT — forward-dated, DORMANT by default:
- `Gate.VerifyAccepted` is the accept-path boundary. nil gate / `Activation.Height
-  == 0` / below-height / non-checkpoint => no-op; classical finality UNCHANGED.
- Activated at a checkpoint => REQUIRE a valid cert bound to the finalized block;
-  FAIL CLOSED (missing/mismatch/invalid => error from Accept, halts without
-  persisting). Activation is HEIGHT-ONLY (deterministic — no wall clock).
- Hooked in `vms/proposervm/post_fork_block.go Accept()` via
-  `vm.verifyQuasarFinality(b)`; the VM's `quasarGate` is nil in production today
-  (set via `SetQuasarGate`). Nothing wires it yet — that is the activation step.
-
-Files: gate.go (Gate/ActivationConfig/bindCheck), policy.go (HYBRID_PQ default,
-cert can't pick its own policy), validators.go (ConsensusValidatorSet: BLS+Pulsar
-keys), store.go (MemCertStore), producer.go (committee-signer interface =
-scaffolding; nil = verify-only), errors.go. Tests: gate_test.go (13, -race green:
-dormant no-op, fail-closed, epoch/round/chain/height/block anti-replay, real-
-verifier delegation, misconfigured-fails-closed).
-
-REMAINING WORK to reach a live PQ-finality network (all owner-gated):
-1. Producer service (pulsard): the per-validator committee cert signer. Needs
-   pulsar v1.7.1 (no-reconstruct hyperball signer) AND consensus to EXPORT the
-   currently package-private cert/payload ENCODERS (an external producer cannot
-   assemble a ConsensusCert envelope without them; this also unblocks an end-to-
-   end positive verify test).
-2. Cert gossip/ingest -> MemCertStore (verify-before-store); MemCertStore needs
-   eviction below last-finalized height before this lands.
-3. Production per-epoch `ValidatorSetProvider` from the P-Chain validator manager
-   + KeyEra registry (BLS aggregate + Pulsar/Corona/Magnetar group keys per era).
-4. Config-flag -> SetQuasarGate wiring (construct a non-nil gate from node config;
-   choose ChainID = sovereign/EVM chain id).
-5. Cert-unavailability runbook + a bounded grace window (await cert N rounds)
-   before a checkpoint halts — fail-closed-after-decision can brick a chain if
-   gossip is down. REQUIRED before any forward-dated activation.
-6. A proposervm Accept-path integration test (nil/dormant/activated).
-
-Mainnet activation order (owner): deploy producer -> verify cert-gossip coverage
-at checkpoints -> set Activation.Height to a forward-dated height with margin ->
-roll via `kubectl patch sts luxd` OnDelete, 1 pod at a time. NEVER wipe /data/db,
-NEVER pkill, NEVER blind-restart.
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ import (

 	"go.uber.org/zap"

+	"github.com/luxfi/runtime"
 	"github.com/luxfi/ids"
 	"github.com/luxfi/log"
-	"github.com/luxfi/runtime"
 )

 var (
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Configuration errors
+var (
+	ErrInvalidK         = errors.New("K must be positive")
+	ErrInvalidAlpha     = errors.New("alpha must be in (0, 1]")
+	ErrInvalidBeta      = errors.New("beta must be positive and <= K")
+	ErrInvalidThreshold = errors.New("threshold must be >= 2 and <= parties")
+	ErrInvalidQuorum    = errors.New("quorum numerator must be <= denominator")
+	ErrInvalidTimeout   = errors.New("timeout must be positive")
+	ErrInvalidInterval  = errors.New("polling interval must be positive")
+)
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Core Consensus Parameters (compile-time, immutable after construction)
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// CoreParams defines the fundamental Lux consensus parameters.
+// These are protocol-critical and must match across all validators.
+type CoreParams struct {
+	// K is the sample size for each consensus query round.
+	// Typical values: 20-25 for production networks.
+	K int
+
+	// Alpha is the quorum threshold as a fraction of K.
+	// A response is accepted if >= ceil(K * Alpha) validators agree.
+	// Must be in (0.5, 1] for Byzantine fault tolerance.
+	// Typical value: 0.8 (80% of sample must agree).
+	Alpha float64
+
+	// BetaVirtuous is the number of consecutive successful polls
+	// required to finalize a virtuous (non-conflicting) decision.
+	// Higher values increase latency but improve consistency.
+	// Typical value: 15-20.
+	BetaVirtuous int
+
+	// BetaRogue is the number of consecutive successful polls
+	// required to finalize a rogue (conflicting) decision.
+	// Should be >= BetaVirtuous.
+	// Typical value: 20-25.
+	BetaRogue int
+}
+
+// Validate checks CoreParams invariants.
+func (p CoreParams) Validate() error {
+	if p.K <= 0 {
+		return ErrInvalidK
+	}
+	if p.Alpha <= 0 || p.Alpha > 1 {
+		return ErrInvalidAlpha
+	}
+	if p.BetaVirtuous <= 0 || p.BetaVirtuous > p.K {
+		return ErrInvalidBeta
+	}
+	if p.BetaRogue <= 0 || p.BetaRogue > p.K {
+		return ErrInvalidBeta
+	}
+	if p.BetaRogue < p.BetaVirtuous {
+		return fmt.Errorf("BetaRogue (%d) must be >= BetaVirtuous (%d)", p.BetaRogue, p.BetaVirtuous)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// AlphaThreshold returns the minimum agreements needed for quorum.
+func (p CoreParams) AlphaThreshold() int {
+	return int(float64(p.K)*p.Alpha + 0.999) // ceil
+}
+
+// DefaultCoreParams returns production-ready core parameters.
+func DefaultCoreParams() CoreParams {
+	return CoreParams{
+		K:            20,
+		Alpha:        0.8,
+		BetaVirtuous: 15,
+		BetaRogue:    20,
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Threshold Signing Parameters (compile-time, for Corona/BLS threshold)
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// ThresholdParams defines t-of-n threshold signature configuration.
+type ThresholdParams struct {
+	// NumParties is the total number of signing parties (validators).
+	// Must be >= 3 for threshold signatures.
+	NumParties int
+
+	// Threshold is the minimum signers required (t in t-of-n).
+	// For BFT: typically 2/3 + 1.
+	// Must be >= 2 and <= NumParties.
+	Threshold int
+}
+
+// Validate checks ThresholdParams invariants.
+func (p ThresholdParams) Validate() error {
+	if p.NumParties < 3 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: need at least 3 parties, got %d", ErrInvalidThreshold, p.NumParties)
+	}
+	if p.Threshold < 2 || p.Threshold > p.NumParties {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: threshold=%d, parties=%d", ErrInvalidThreshold, p.Threshold, p.NumParties)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// DefaultThresholdParams returns 2/3+1 threshold for n parties.
+func DefaultThresholdParams(numParties int) ThresholdParams {
+	threshold := (numParties * 2 / 3) + 1
+	if threshold < 2 {
+		threshold = 2
+	}
+	if threshold > numParties {
+		threshold = numParties
+	}
+	return ThresholdParams{
+		NumParties: numParties,
+		Threshold:  threshold,
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Quorum Parameters (compile-time, for BLS aggregate weight verification)
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// QuorumParams defines weight-based quorum requirements.
+type QuorumParams struct {
+	// Numerator and Denominator define the minimum weight fraction.
+	// Quorum is met when SignerWeight/TotalWeight >= Numerator/Denominator.
+	// For BFT: typically 2/3 (Numerator=2, Denominator=3).
+	Numerator   uint64
+	Denominator uint64
+}
+
+// Validate checks QuorumParams invariants.
+func (p QuorumParams) Validate() error {
+	if p.Denominator == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: denominator cannot be zero", ErrInvalidQuorum)
+	}
+	if p.Numerator > p.Denominator {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: numerator=%d > denominator=%d", ErrInvalidQuorum, p.Numerator, p.Denominator)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RequiredWeight returns minimum weight needed for quorum given totalWeight.
+func (p QuorumParams) RequiredWeight(totalWeight uint64) uint64 {
+	return totalWeight * p.Numerator / p.Denominator
+}
+
+// IsMet returns true if signerWeight meets quorum given totalWeight.
+func (p QuorumParams) IsMet(signerWeight, totalWeight uint64) bool {
+	return signerWeight >= p.RequiredWeight(totalWeight)
+}
+
+// DefaultQuorumParams returns 2/3 quorum (67% of weight required).
+func DefaultQuorumParams() QuorumParams {
+	return QuorumParams{
+		Numerator:   2,
+		Denominator: 3,
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Runtime Configuration (can be adjusted, but affects liveness not safety)
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// RuntimeConfig holds tunable runtime parameters.
+// These affect performance and liveness but not consensus safety.
+type RuntimeConfig struct {
+	// PollInterval is the delay between consensus query rounds.
+	// Lower values decrease latency but increase network load.
+	// Typical value: 100-500ms.
+	PollInterval time.Duration
+
+	// QueryTimeout is the maximum time to wait for query responses.
+	// Must be > PollInterval.
+	// Typical value: 2-5s.
+	QueryTimeout time.Duration
+
+	// FinalityChannelSize is the buffer size for the finality event channel.
+	FinalityChannelSize int
+
+	// MaxConcurrentQueries limits parallel outstanding queries.
+	// 0 means unlimited.
+	MaxConcurrentQueries int
+}
+
+// Validate checks RuntimeConfig invariants.
+func (c RuntimeConfig) Validate() error {
+	if c.PollInterval <= 0 {
+		return ErrInvalidInterval
+	}
+	if c.QueryTimeout <= 0 {
+		return ErrInvalidTimeout
+	}
+	if c.QueryTimeout < c.PollInterval {
+		return fmt.Errorf("query timeout (%v) must be >= poll interval (%v)", c.QueryTimeout, c.PollInterval)
+	}
+	if c.FinalityChannelSize < 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("finality channel size must be >= 0")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// DefaultRuntimeConfig returns production-ready runtime configuration.
+func DefaultRuntimeConfig() RuntimeConfig {
+	return RuntimeConfig{
+		PollInterval:         250 * time.Millisecond,
+		QueryTimeout:         2 * time.Second,
+		FinalityChannelSize:  100,
+		MaxConcurrentQueries: 0, // unlimited
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Complete Configuration
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Config is the complete Quasar consensus configuration.
+// Use ConfigBuilder for fluent construction.
+type Config struct {
+	Core      CoreParams
+	Threshold ThresholdParams
+	Quorum    QuorumParams
+	Runtime   RuntimeConfig
+}
+
+// Validate checks all configuration invariants.
+func (c Config) Validate() error {
+	if err := c.Core.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("core params: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Threshold.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("threshold params: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Quorum.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("quorum params: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Runtime.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("runtime config: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// DefaultConfig returns a production-ready configuration.
+// Call DefaultConfig().WithNumParties(n) to set validator count.
+func DefaultConfig() Config {
+	return Config{
+		Core:      DefaultCoreParams(),
+		Threshold: DefaultThresholdParams(3), // default 3 validators
+		Quorum:    DefaultQuorumParams(),
+		Runtime:   DefaultRuntimeConfig(),
+	}
+}
+
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// ConfigBuilder provides fluent configuration construction
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// ConfigBuilder enables fluent Config construction with validation.
+type ConfigBuilder struct {
+	config Config
+}
+
+// NewConfigBuilder creates a builder starting from defaults.
+func NewConfigBuilder() *ConfigBuilder {
+	return &ConfigBuilder{
+		config: DefaultConfig(),
+	}
+}
+
+// WithK sets the sample size.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithK(k int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Core.K = k
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithAlpha sets the quorum fraction.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithAlpha(alpha float64) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Core.Alpha = alpha
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithBeta sets both BetaVirtuous and BetaRogue.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithBeta(virtuous, rogue int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Core.BetaVirtuous = virtuous
+	b.config.Core.BetaRogue = rogue
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithNumParties sets the validator count and computes 2/3+1 threshold.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithNumParties(n int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Threshold = DefaultThresholdParams(n)
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithThreshold sets an explicit threshold (overrides default 2/3+1).
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithThreshold(threshold int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Threshold.Threshold = threshold
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithQuorum sets the quorum fraction as numerator/denominator.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithQuorum(num, denom uint64) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Quorum.Numerator = num
+	b.config.Quorum.Denominator = denom
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithPollInterval sets the polling interval.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithPollInterval(d time.Duration) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Runtime.PollInterval = d
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithQueryTimeout sets the query timeout.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithQueryTimeout(d time.Duration) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Runtime.QueryTimeout = d
+	return b
+}
+
+// WithFinalityChannelSize sets the finality channel buffer size.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) WithFinalityChannelSize(size int) *ConfigBuilder {
+	b.config.Runtime.FinalityChannelSize = size
+	return b
+}
+
+// Build validates and returns the configuration.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) Build() (Config, error) {
+	if err := b.config.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return Config{}, err
+	}
+	return b.config, nil
+}
+
+// MustBuild validates and returns the configuration, panicking on error.
+// Use only in tests or when configuration is known to be valid.
+func (b *ConfigBuilder) MustBuild() Config {
+	cfg, err := b.Build()
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("invalid config: %v", err))
+	}
+	return cfg
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
+// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
+
+package quasar
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestDefaultConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("default config should be valid: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify defaults match documentation
+	if cfg.Core.K != 20 {
+		t.Errorf("expected K=20, got %d", cfg.Core.K)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.Alpha != 0.8 {
+		t.Errorf("expected Alpha=0.8, got %f", cfg.Core.Alpha)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.BetaVirtuous != 15 {
+		t.Errorf("expected BetaVirtuous=15, got %d", cfg.Core.BetaVirtuous)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.BetaRogue != 20 {
+		t.Errorf("expected BetaRogue=20, got %d", cfg.Core.BetaRogue)
+	}
+	if cfg.Quorum.Numerator != 2 || cfg.Quorum.Denominator != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 2/3 quorum, got %d/%d", cfg.Quorum.Numerator, cfg.Quorum.Denominator)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCoreParamsValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		params  CoreParams
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "valid defaults",
+			params:  DefaultCoreParams(),
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "zero K",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 0, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "negative K",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: -1, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "alpha zero",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 0, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "alpha greater than 1",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 1.5, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "alpha exactly 1",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 1.0, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "beta virtuous zero",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 0, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "beta rogue less than virtuous",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 20, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 20, BetaRogue: 15},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "beta exceeds K",
+			params:  CoreParams{K: 10, Alpha: 0.8, BetaVirtuous: 15, BetaRogue: 20},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := tt.params.Validate()
+			if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAlphaThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		k     int
+		alpha float64
+		want  int
+	}{
+		{k: 20, alpha: 0.8, want: 16},  // 20 * 0.8 = 16
+		{k: 20, alpha: 0.51, want: 11}, // ceil(10.2) = 11
+		{k: 10, alpha: 0.67, want: 7},  // ceil(6.7) = 7
+		{k: 5, alpha: 1.0, want: 5},    // 5 * 1.0 = 5
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run("", func(t *testing.T) {
+			p := CoreParams{K: tt.k, Alpha: tt.alpha, BetaVirtuous: 1, BetaRogue: 1}
+			got := p.AlphaThreshold()
+			if got != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf("AlphaThreshold(%d, %f) = %d, want %d", tt.k, tt.alpha, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestThresholdParamsValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		params  ThresholdParams
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "valid 3 of 5",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 3},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "valid 4 of 5",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 4},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "valid 2 of 3 minimum",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 3, Threshold: 2},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "too few parties",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 2, Threshold: 2},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "threshold too low",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 1},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "threshold exceeds parties",
+			params:  ThresholdParams{NumParties: 5, Threshold: 6},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := tt.params.Validate()
+			if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDefaultThresholdParams(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		parties       int
+		wantThreshold int
+	}{
+		{parties: 3, wantThreshold: 3},   // 2/3 of 3 = 2, +1 = 3
+		{parties: 4, wantThreshold: 3},   // 2/3 of 4 = 2, +1 = 3
+		{parties: 5, wantThreshold: 4},   // 2/3 of 5 = 3, +1 = 4
+		{parties: 10, wantThreshold: 7},  // 2/3 of 10 = 6, +1 = 7
+		{parties: 21, wantThreshold: 15}, // 2/3 of 21 = 14, +1 = 15
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run("", func(t *testing.T) {
+			p := DefaultThresholdParams(tt.parties)
+			if p.Threshold != tt.wantThreshold {
+				t.Errorf("DefaultThresholdParams(%d).Threshold = %d, want %d",
+					tt.parties, p.Threshold, tt.wantThreshold)
+			}
+			if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("DefaultThresholdParams(%d) produced invalid params: %v", tt.parties, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuorumParamsValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		params  QuorumParams
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "valid 2/3",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 2, Denominator: 3},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "valid 1/2",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 1, Denominator: 2},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "valid 1/1 (unanimous)",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 1, Denominator: 1},
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "zero denominator",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 2, Denominator: 0},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "numerator exceeds denominator",
+			params:  QuorumParams{Numerator: 4, Denominator: 3},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := tt.params.Validate()
+			if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestQuorumIsMet(t *testing.T) {
+	q := QuorumParams{Numerator: 2, Denominator: 3} // 2/3 = 66.67%
+
+	// Note: integer math: 100 * 2 / 3 = 66 (floor division)
+	tests := []struct {
+		signerWeight uint64
+		totalWeight  uint64
+		want         bool
+	}{
+		{signerWeight: 67, totalWeight: 100, want: true},  // 67 >= 66
+		{signerWeight: 66, totalWeight: 100, want: true},  // 66 >= 66 (floor division)
+		{signerWeight: 65, totalWeight: 100, want: false}, // 65 < 66
+		{signerWeight: 100, totalWeight: 100, want: true}, // 100 >= 66
+		{signerWeight: 0, totalWeight: 100, want: false},  // 0 < 66
+		{signerWeight: 2, totalWeight: 3, want: true},     // 2 >= 2 (3*2/3=2)
+		{signerWeight: 1, totalWeight: 3, want: false},    // 1 < 2
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		got := q.IsMet(tt.signerWeight, tt.totalWeight)
+		if got != tt.want {
+			t.Errorf("IsMet(%d, %d) = %v, want %v", tt.signerWeight, tt.totalWeight, got, tt.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRuntimeConfigValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		config  RuntimeConfig
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "valid defaults",
+			config:  DefaultRuntimeConfig(),
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "zero poll interval",
+			config: RuntimeConfig{
+				PollInterval: 0,
+				QueryTimeout: time.Second,
+			},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "negative poll interval",
+			config: RuntimeConfig{
+				PollInterval: -time.Millisecond,
+				QueryTimeout: time.Second,
+			},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "query timeout less than poll interval",
+			config: RuntimeConfig{
+				PollInterval: time.Second,
+				QueryTimeout: 100 * time.Millisecond,
+			},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "negative channel size",
+			config: RuntimeConfig{
+				PollInterval:        250 * time.Millisecond,
+				QueryTimeout:        2 * time.Second,
+				FinalityChannelSize: -1,
+			},
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := tt.config.Validate()
+			if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
+				t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilder(t *testing.T) {
+	// Test fluent API
+	cfg, err := NewConfigBuilder().
+		WithK(25).
+		WithAlpha(0.75).
+		WithBeta(18, 22).
+		WithNumParties(10).
+		WithQuorum(3, 4). // 75%
+		WithPollInterval(500 * time.Millisecond).
+		WithQueryTimeout(5 * time.Second).
+		Build()
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Build() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.Core.K != 25 {
+		t.Errorf("K = %d, want 25", cfg.Core.K)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.Alpha != 0.75 {
+		t.Errorf("Alpha = %f, want 0.75", cfg.Core.Alpha)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.BetaVirtuous != 18 {
+		t.Errorf("BetaVirtuous = %d, want 18", cfg.Core.BetaVirtuous)
+	}
+	if cfg.Core.BetaRogue != 22 {
+		t.Errorf("BetaRogue = %d, want 22", cfg.Core.BetaRogue)
+	}
+	if cfg.Threshold.NumParties != 10 {
+		t.Errorf("NumParties = %d, want 10", cfg.Threshold.NumParties)
+	}
+	if cfg.Threshold.Threshold != 7 { // 2/3 of 10 + 1 = 7
+		t.Errorf("Threshold = %d, want 7", cfg.Threshold.Threshold)
+	}
+	if cfg.Quorum.Numerator != 3 || cfg.Quorum.Denominator != 4 {
+		t.Errorf("Quorum = %d/%d, want 3/4", cfg.Quorum.Numerator, cfg.Quorum.Denominator)
+	}
+	if cfg.Runtime.PollInterval != 500*time.Millisecond {
+		t.Errorf("PollInterval = %v, want 500ms", cfg.Runtime.PollInterval)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderWithExplicitThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, err := NewConfigBuilder().
+		WithNumParties(10).
+		WithThreshold(5). // Override default 7
+		Build()
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Build() error = %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if cfg.Threshold.Threshold != 5 {
+		t.Errorf("Threshold = %d, want 5", cfg.Threshold.Threshold)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderValidationError(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := NewConfigBuilder().
+		WithK(-1). // Invalid
+		Build()
+
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("Build() should return error for invalid K")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderMustBuildPanics(t *testing.T) {
+	defer func() {
+		if r := recover(); r == nil {
+			t.Error("MustBuild() should panic on invalid config")
+		}
+	}()
+
+	NewConfigBuilder().WithK(-1).MustBuild()
+}
+
+func TestConfigBuilderMustBuildSuccess(t *testing.T) {
+	// Should not panic
+	cfg := NewConfigBuilder().MustBuild()
+	if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("MustBuild() produced invalid config: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestConfigImmutability documents that Config values are immutable after creation.
+func TestConfigImmutability(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+
+	// These are value types, so modifications don't affect the original
+	core := cfg.Core
+	core.K = 999
+
+	if cfg.Core.K == 999 {
+		t.Error("Config.Core should be immutable (value copy)")
+	}
+}
+
+// BenchmarkQuorumCheck benchmarks the quorum check operation.
+func BenchmarkQuorumCheck(b *testing.B) {
+	q := DefaultQuorumParams()
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		_ = q.IsMet(70, 100)
+	}
+}
+
+// BenchmarkConfigValidation benchmarks config validation.
+func BenchmarkConfigValidation(b *testing.B) {
+	cfg := DefaultConfig()
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		_ = cfg.Validate()
+	}
+}
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More