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Author SHA1 Message Date
zeekay 95cef696a3 node: v1.30.52 — consensus v1.25.24 (finality cert-gate collapse)
Bump github.com/luxfi/consensus v1.25.23 -> v1.25.24.

v1.25.24 collapses acceptance onto ONE cert-gated finalize path: the only
finalizer (AcceptWithCert) requires a VerifiedQuorumCert that has cleared the
stake-weighted ⅔ predicate (VerifyWeighted). The three ungated count-finalize
sites (processPendingBlocks / DrainAccepted / K==1 short-circuit) are removed —
a raw α-of-K vote count is now a liveness retry signal only, never an acceptance
authority. This fixes the skewed-stake safety break and the block-height wedge
(blocks "accepted" by count but not by a verifiable cert, leaving the chain
unable to make verifiable progress).

Dockerfile build recipe unchanged and already correct: strips first-party
(luxfi|hanzoai) go.sum lines before -mod=mod build (re-tag/cache-immune) and
pins chains@v1.3.21 in the evm-plugin step; private-module auth via ghtok.
go.sum records the v1.25.24 content hash (go.mod hash unchanged — only source
content moved between v1.25.23 and v1.25.24).
2026-06-24 14:44:25 -07:00
zeekay a23d8032b3 node: v1.30.51 — pin chains@v1.3.21 in evm-plugin build (evm go.mod pinned broken chains v1.3.19; heal forward, mirrors upgrade@v1.0.1 pin) 2026-06-24 12:53:14 -07:00
zeekay 102087b281 node: v1.30.50 — fix CI build for re-published first-party tags
- go.mod: chains v1.3.19(broken,incomplete-refactor) -> v1.3.21 (chains main,
  has dexvm/registry/forbidden.go, compiles).
- Dockerfile: strip first-party (luxfi/hanzoai) go.sum lines right before the
  build so -mod=mod re-records current content hashes — the prior COPY . .
  clobbered the line-69 heal, so a re-published tag (chains/age/keys/zap/sdk)
  broke the build. Integrity repair, no version drift. Mirrors the evm step.
- Consensus dynamic weighted quorum (K=N, alpha=strict-2/3) + devnet re-poll
  unchanged from v1.30.48 (consensus v1.25.23).
2026-06-24 12:48:00 -07:00
zeekay d43cfa361b node: v1.30.49 — chains v1.3.20 (fresh tag, cache-immune). Consensus dynamic weighted quorum + devnet re-poll unchanged from v1.30.48. 2026-06-24 12:29:50 -07:00
zeekay 54bc52f914 node: v1.30.47 — dynamic live-set consensus params (consensus v1.25.23)
Bump luxfi/consensus v1.25.21 -> v1.25.23 (dynamic live-set weighted quorum +
vote re-poll) and wire the node side:

- selectConsensusParams: ONE path for every network via consensusconfig
  .FeasibleParams (K = live validator count, α = strict-⅔ stake threshold).
  Drops the per-tier MainnetParams/TestnetParams/Default split that demanded an
  oversized α the few reachable peers could never supply — the fleet finality
  outage. For today's 5-validator nets this is K=5/α=4 on mainnet, testnet AND
  devnet; recomputes to K=21/α=15 automatically at 21 validators.
- ConsensusOverride: honor explicit --consensus-sample-size / --consensus-quorum-size,
  clamped UP to the dynamic floor (an operator may raise K/α but never under-set
  below the strict-⅔ stake-cert threshold the engine enforces). Threaded from
  node Config (set only on v.IsSet) -> ManagerConfig -> applyConsensusOverride.
- manager backstop now uses ValidateForLiveValueNetwork(networkID, liveN): the
  tier floor (mainnet K>=11) is capped by the live set, so a 5-validator mainnet
  runs at K=5 instead of being rejected. Protocol safety (overlap bound, f>=1)
  unchanged.

node/chains quorum tests rewritten for the dynamic semantics (SizedToLiveSet,
RecomputesForLargerSet=21->15, SmallSetClampsToBFTFloor, HonorsOverrideClampedUp,
SingleNodeIsK1). Full luxd binary builds against published v1.25.23.
2026-06-24 11:23:39 -07:00
zeekay 087bacd745 node: v1.30.46 — DEX_REF v1.5.18 (dex_* wire rename)
Bump native D-Chain DEX VM plugin to dex v1.5.18, which renames the DEX
wire methods clob_* -> dex_* (pkg/zapwire 7 consts + pkg/dchain/read 4
consts). The plugin is baked into the image and copied to /data/plugins
at boot (image is source of truth; no S3 plugin pull for devnet).

defaultPatch 6 -> 46 keeps go-run/test dev builds aligned with the tag;
the authoritative version is injected via ldflags from the git tag at
build time (scripts/git_commit.sh: git describe --tags).
2026-06-23 18:15:54 -07:00
zeekay f4f8c47d57 fix(consensus): size local-dev committee to live validator set (K=N, α=bftSafeAlpha)
Devnet/localnet hardcoded K=4 wedged finality at height 0 on a 5-validator
set: the gossiper proposer self-filters its K-sample, so K=4 polled only 3
peers while α=3 demanded all 3 chits — one lagging validator made the
α-quorum unreachable and the first block (D-Chain + C-Chain) hung forever.
There is no re-poll, so a wedged first poll is terminal.

Fix: selectConsensusParams now takes the live primary-network validator count
and, for local-dev networks (devnet 3 / localnet 1337), derives K = N (clamped
to the K>=4 BFT floor) with α = bftSafeAlpha(K). K=N makes the proposer poll
the whole set so α=4 (for N=5) tolerates f=1 lagging/Byzantine validators
instead of zero. α STRENGTHENS 3->4 — quorum is not weakened. Mainnet/Testnet/
value-net selection and the ValidateForValueNetwork fail-closed backstop are
unchanged (CRITICAL-2 intact).

Tests: TestSelectConsensusParams_LocalDevSizedToSet pins K=5/α=4 for the
5-validator devnet case; full chains param suite green (GOWORK=off, module
mode = the CI/ARC build path).
2026-06-23 16:20:55 -07:00
zeekay 6f59b7baaa Dockerfile: bump DEX_REF v1.5.15 -> v1.5.17 (native D-Chain ZAP-canonical ingestion + synthetic-guard decomplect)
v1.5.17 adds the canonical co-located ZAP CLOB ingestion socket (zapIngestAddr
parsed from the chain config; VM.Initialize opens rpc.Listen in-process,
pkg/dchain/zapingest.go) and decomplects the synthetic-seed/guard footgun: the
VM boot-brick assertOrderUserCoverage is removed (settlement identity holds by
construction, not by a boot scan) and the synthetic seeders / localguard are
deleted (cmd/dexseed is the one real-market seeder). HTTP read/write surface
stays compatible. This is node v1.30.43.
2026-06-23 15:36:59 -07:00
zeekay 667aee8813 deps: bump luxfi/crypto v1.19.22 -> v1.19.23 (Proof-of-AI verifier)
v1.19.23 adds the canonical crypto/poi package — the Freivalds compute-proof
verifier (over F_p, p=2^61-1, on the exact int8 accumulator) that the aivm
settlement / aivmbridge precompile path consumes. Purely additive: makes the
PoAI verifier available to luxd. Mirror of hanzo-engine/src/poi.rs.
2026-06-23 14:58:02 -07:00
zeekay 187fddb279 deps: bump genesis v1.13.16 — all precompiles active as of Dec 25 2025 (no future-dated mainnet upgrades) 2026-06-23 10:14:05 -07:00
zeekay 450847efeb release: bump EVM_VERSION v1.99.40 (0x9999 reprocess-bind fix, on-node proven) + deps to latest (chains v1.3.19, precompile v0.5.59, consensus v1.25.21) — no stragglers 2026-06-23 09:32:19 -07:00
zeekay 95e6675797 deps: bump consensus v1.25.20 -> v1.25.21 (quasar corona v0.7.9 two-value Round1 fix)
Closes the node build break: consensus v1.25.20 called corona v0.7.9's
Round1 single-value but v0.7.9 returns (*Round1Data, error). v1.25.21
threads the error through all quasar round-signer sites.
2026-06-23 09:08:00 -07:00
zeekay 6ec88b5ebb release: platform-native build+publish via hanzo.yml (retire GHA)
ONE declarative flow for both lux release artifacts, on platform.hanzo.ai +
self-hosted arcd — NO GitHub Actions:

- hanzo.yml: node image build (matrix linux/{amd64,arm64}, native long-poll
  dispatch onto lux-build-* pools, tag-pattern {{git.branch}} -> :vX.Y.Z).
  Validated against the platform parsePlatformConfig.
- scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh: extracts the 12 baked VM plugins from the
  node image + SHA256SUMS, uploads to s3://lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset>/
  (operator pluginSource), round-trip sha-verified. DRY — no second compile.
- RELEASE.md: the ONE canonical build+publish runbook; lists the .github
  workflows to retire (docker.yml, release.yml, build*.yml, ci.yml, ...).
- LLM.md: points at RELEASE.md as the canonical release path.

Proof (no GitHub): node:v1.30.40 provenance == 1712938377 (reused, not
rebuilt); evm@v1.99.37 + dexvm@v1.5.15 rebuilt natively on the spark fleet
(go1.26.4, CGO=0) and the full 12-plugin set published to
s3://lux-plugins-staging/ (round-trip verified). neo's lux-plugins-devnet
prefix untouched.
2026-06-23 09:01:48 -07:00
zeekay 7e781a116f Dockerfile: strip first-party go.sum before node go mod download
luxfi re-tagged crypto v1.19.22 (and others) after node go.sum was recorded,
causing 'checksum mismatch / SECURITY ERROR' at the node binary build step and
a cascading -mod=mod fallback to a corona pseudo-version with the old 2-value
Round1 API. Apply the same first-party go.sum strip the EVM/chains/dex plugin
stages already use, so -mod=mod re-records current content hashes for the
re-published modules at their pinned versions (integrity repair, no version drift).
2026-06-23 08:55:02 -07:00
zeekay 1712938377 chore: drop brand token from staking KMS path examples; refresh tools go.sum checksum
config/flags.go + staking/kms.go: the StakingKMSSecretPath example string
referenced a brand-specific devnet path; replaced with the generic
/staking/devnet/node-0 form (lux surfaces carry no white-label brand
tokens). tools/go.sum: corrected the stale charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.9.2 h1
checksum to the canonical value (verified via go mod download).
2026-06-23 01:44:04 -07:00
zeekay 061164f4c7 cmd/pqkeygen: provision strict-PQ staking keypairs for local luxd
Generates the ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) staking key + ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203)
handshake key a strict-PQ local network needs, writing PEM blocks with the
exact types the node config loader expects. Pairs with the SchemeGate /
PQ-handshake path: a strict-PQ chain needs an ML-DSA identity before any
peer can present the gate's pinned scheme.
2026-06-23 01:44:04 -07:00
zeekay 1ef9f60bfe network: build SchemeGate under the SAME predicate as the PQ handshake
The per-chain peer.SchemeGate is now built under profileRequiresPQHandshake,
not merely SecurityProfile != nil. Load-bearing: the gate's pinned scheme
byte (SigSchemeMLDSA65) only becomes presentable once the application-layer
ML-KEM+ML-DSA handshake establishes the ML-DSA identity. A permissive /
classical-compat profile still presents secp256k1 cert schemes, which
SchemeGate.Classify refuses unconditionally — building a gate there would
refuse every peer with no PQ handshake to recover (the 0-peers / 'TLS
upgrade failed' stall). One axis, one predicate: gate + handshake + ML-DSA
identity are built together or not at all.
2026-06-23 01:43:53 -07:00
zeekay 9937199da7 deps: bump consensus v1.25.20 / crypto v1.19.22 / chains v1.3.18 / runtime v1.1.3; wire LocalBFTParams for local dev nets
Publishes the consensus quorum-finality cascade into node:
- consensus v1.25.19 -> v1.25.20 (chain quorum-cert finality, LocalBFTParams)
- crypto v1.19.21 -> v1.19.22 (BLS deserialization/aggregation hardening)
- chains v1.3.17 -> v1.3.18, runtime v1.1.1 -> v1.1.3 (value-path tags)

selectConsensusParams now routes explicitly-local dev networks (devnet 3 /
localnet 1337, EXACT IDs not a range) to consensus.LocalBFTParams (K=4/α=3,
f=1) — the minimal real-BFT committee. Default K=20 is unsatisfiable on a
few localhost validators (α=14 unreachable -> P-Chain freezes at height 0).
K=4 makes quorum reachable while still clearing ValidateForValueNetwork and
the CRITICAL-2 multi-node-is-BFT regression. A custom value L1 (high
networkID) keeps the large Default set. precompile resolves to v0.5.56
(MVS-correct: chains v1.3.18's own requirement; node has no evm/dex dep).

go mod verify: all modules verified; chains quorum params tests green.
2026-06-23 01:43:41 -07:00
zeekay b4aa15099d node(chains): receive-side epoch recency gate + bounded heights map + frame discriminator (HIGH-1 b / MEDIUM-3 / LOW-2)
Closes the receive-side gaps the b2 build-side stamping (78f491e113) left
open. The build-side epoch stamp max(currentH, parentH) is PROPOSER-ONLY;
a follower must independently re-gate every gossiped block. Three fixes,
one per gap, in the transport wrapper pchain_height_vm.go:

  HIGH-1 (predicate b — RECENCY, upper bound). ParseBlock now rejects a
  framed block whose stamped P-chain epoch H exceeds THIS node's live
  P-chain height by more than pChainHeightRecencySlack (256) — an
  absurd-future epoch a Byzantine proposer claims for a set the network
  has not reached. Rejected fail-closed (errPChainHeightNotRecent): the
  block is dropped, never tracked or voted. This is the UPPER half of the
  epoch bound; the engine-side monotone gate (consensus 7cabd6faa) is the
  LOWER half (>= parent's recorded epoch), so a tracked block's epoch is
  pinned to [parentEpoch, localH+slack]. Fail-soft when no P-chain view
  exists (nil state -> admit; the verifier still fails closed at
  set-resolution) — a defensive path, not a mode.

  MEDIUM-3 (heights-map DoS — WATERMARK PRUNE, not blind LRU). ParseBlock
  runs before the engine dedup/Verify, so a peer can stream distinct
  unverified blocks, each adding a permanent heights entry. Each entry now
  carries its value-chain height; Accept advances a finalized-height
  watermark and prunes every entry at/below it (a finalized block never
  needs a GetBlock epoch re-attach), so the map plateaus under steady
  finality. A hard cap (4096) backstops a sustained unverified flood,
  evicting HIGHEST-height-first so the near-tip pending band survives — a
  still-pending block's epoch is never evicted (a blind LRU could reset it
  to 0 = re-freeze).

  LOW-2 (frame magic DISCRIMINATOR). The 4-byte magic collides at 2^-32
  with the raw hash-prefix some VMs use as Bytes() (dexvm/dchain serialize
  parentID[0:32]||...). A magic match alone no longer means "framed": the
  inner re-parse of the framed payload must ALSO succeed. On re-parse
  failure ParseBlock falls back to a raw whole-block parse — removing the
  bootstrap stall a collision used to cause (mis-framed -> inner decode
  fails closed -> stall on that chain).

TDD pchain_height_hardening_test.go (all pass, CGO_ENABLED=0):
  far-future epoch REJECTED; honest within-slack skew (P-chain advance
  during a staking change) ACCEPTED; nil-state admits; magic-colliding raw
  parses RAW; genuine frame still parses; heights map plateaus at the
  watermark; a pending block is never evicted by the prune; a flood is
  capped preserving the near-tip band. The b2 build-side finality proofs
  still pass (no regression to delivered-epoch stamping).
2026-06-22 23:41:59 -07:00
zeekay 78f491e113 node(chains): deliver the REAL P-chain epoch height to the chain engine (b2)
THE BUG. A K>1 quorum chain pins its weighted validator set to a P-chain epoch
height (set-root, 2/3-by-stake tally, per-voter pubkey resolution all read at that
one height). The engine reads that height off the VM block via pChainHeightOf,
asserting block.SignedBlock.PChainHeight() — but every plugin VM block (C-Chain
EVM, dexvm) exposes none, so pChainHeightOf returns 0 and the set resolves at
P-chain height 0: the GENESIS set. That is safe (non-empty, identical on every
node, <= current) and unbricks finality, but FREEZES the epoch at genesis: a
validator that JOINED post-genesis is absent from set@0 -> its vote is dropped and
its stake uncounted -> finality cannot track a DYNAMIC validator set, and a
departed genesis majority could collude.

THE FIX (Option b: rpcchainvm zap boundary, NOT a chain-creation-switch rewrite).
pChainHeightVM wraps the chain BlockBuilder so the block the engine sees carries
the proposer's live P-chain epoch height H = max(GetCurrentHeight, parentH),
WITHOUT changing the inner VM's block format, IDs, or ledger state:
  - BuildBlock stamps H and frames the gossiped bytes [magic|H|innerBytes];
  - ParseBlock splits the frame so every follower ADOPTS the identical H (never
    recomputes it from its own skewing P-chain view) -> determinism: every honest
    node derives the SAME epoch height from the SAME signed block, so the cert
    set-root they recompute matches and a post-genesis validator's vote+stake
    count. Raw (unframed) bytes parse with H=0 = the safe genesis fallback.
This is consensus-TRANSPORT framing, not a chain/ledger fork: inner bytes, block
IDs, and execution state are byte-identical -> no re-genesis, only a coordinated
node upgrade. Installed ONLY on K>1 chains (a K==1 chain has no cert/epoch).

Also wires the height-indexed P-Chain validators.State as the SINGLE source of
epoch truth for all four reads (verifier pubkey, stake, total stake, set-root),
all keyed on the block's P-chain height, and FAILS CLOSED if a K>1 chain is built
without a live height-indexed state (a silent permanent-stall wiring bug becomes a
loud refuse-to-start).

TDD (CGO_ENABLED=0, the canonical purego BLS path = ACTUAL production quorum
sources, not an ed25519 stand-in):
  - TestPChainHeightVM_DeliversRealHeight: pChainHeightOf(builtBlock)==H and
    ==H again after a ParseBlock round-trip of the gossiped bytes; a bare inner
    block reads 0 (pins why the wrapper is load-bearing).
  - TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAtGenesis: K>1 finalizes against set@0.
  - TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAfterStakingChange: validators that JOINED at
    epoch 7 cast the deciding 2/3 votes+stake and the block FINALIZES; the cert
    verifies stake-weighted at 7 and FAILS at 0; the production verifier rejects a
    joiner at height 0 but accepts it at 7. Proven to FAIL without the fix (stamp
    0 -> joiners dropped at set@0 -> VM.Accept never runs = permanent stall).
2026-06-22 22:21:55 -07:00
zeekay 052ccd384a node(chains): height-pin the quorum set-root + stake tally (MEDIUM-1)
MEDIUM-1 liveness regression: validatorSetRootSource.ValidatorSetRoot
ignored the height argument and hashed the Manager's CURRENT GetMap()
snapshot. During a validator-set change (P-chain / L1 staking), the
current map propagates ASYNC relative to a value-chain block-H vote, so
the signer and the assembler held different current maps -> different
set-roots -> the canonical SIGNED message differed -> signatures FAILED
verification -> votes dropped -> finality stalled at every staking change.
The epoch-binding (set-root in the signed message) made this bite.

FIX: read the HEIGHT-INDEXED set from validators.State.GetValidatorSet(
ctx, height, netID) — deterministic across nodes at a given value-chain
height, independent of async current-map skew. The engine already threads
the block height to ValidatorSetRoot(height) via the sole position builder
blockPositionLocked, so sign-side and verify-side read the SAME
height-pinned set.

The stake source (Weight/TotalStake) is pinned to the SAME height too, so
the tally is measured at the same epoch as the signed membership — a
validator whose vote is in a height-H cert contributes its height-H
weight, closing the second skew (a current-map weight read could drop a
legitimately-signed quorum). validatorSetAtHeight is the single shared
epoch read; hashValidatorSet is the single (byte-unchanged) set-root
encoding.

The vote verifier keeps the current-map pubkey lookup (a separate, milder,
self-healing axis — not MEDIUM-1; disclosed for review).

TDD:
  - TestValidatorSetRoot_CrossNodeAgreesDespiteSkew — TWO nodes with a
    set-change in flight (divergent current maps) compute the IDENTICAL
    set-root at height H (the missing cross-node test).
  - TestValidatorSetRoot_HeightSelectsEpoch — root is a deterministic
    function of height.
  - TestValidatorStakeSource_HeightPinned — tally read at the cert height.
  - TestHashValidatorSet_ByteStability — golden, wire format unchanged.
  - TestValidatorSetRoot_FailSoftIsUniform — Empty fallback is uniform.
2026-06-22 19:34:57 -07:00
zeekay 7fcbcb82bd node(chains): epoch-bind quorum certs + honest stake source (MEDIUM)
Supply the node side of the consensus epoch-binding fix:

- validatorSetRootSource: a deterministic commitment (SHA-256 over the set
  sorted by NodeID, each as nodeID||light||len(pk)||pk) to the chain's active
  weighted validator set. Wired via NetworkConfig.ValidatorSetRoot so the engine
  stamps it into every vote/cert position — a cert is cryptographically pinned to
  the exact set it was certified under, closing cross-epoch cert laundering.
  Empty/absent set => ids.Empty (the unbound answer).

- validatorStakeSource: corrected the misleading "height is advisory" comment.
  The node Manager is single-epoch (no GetValidatorSet(height); that is on
  validators.State), so the source honestly returns CURRENT-epoch weights — which
  is exactly the live in-epoch finality answer (a cert is verified in the same
  epoch it is created). Cross-epoch soundness is enforced at the witness layer by
  the set-root binding above, NOT by guessing unavailable historical stake.

TDD: TestValidatorSetRootSource_DeterministicAndSetSensitive (determinism,
insertion-order independence, weight/membership sensitivity, network scoping,
empty/nil -> Empty) and TestValidatorStakeSource_CurrentEpochWeights.
2026-06-22 18:49:56 -07:00
zeekay d4ef0ed5dd node(chains): wire α-of-K quorum topology + BFT params (HIGH-4 / CRITICAL-2)
CRITICAL-2: selectConsensusParams picks a Byzantine-fault-tolerant set for every
sybil-protected (multi-node) net (Mainnet K=21 / Testnet K=11 / Default K=20) —
NEVER LocalParams (K=3/α=2, f=0, single-validator-forkable). Asserted with
ValidateForValueNetwork; chain creation FAILS CLOSED on a non-BFT set.

HIGH-4: networkGossiper implements QuorumGossiper (BroadcastVote/GossipCert over
app-gossip); blockHandler.Gossip demuxes a quorum envelope into the engine's
HandleIncomingVote/HandleIncomingCert (gated on ModeQuorumFinality). The engine
is wired with a BLS VoteVerifier (validator-set pubkey + bls.Verify), a BLS
VoteSigner (staking key), and a validator-stake StakeSource (HIGH-3) for K>1.

Adapters proven against the local consensus engine + real BLS + a real
validators.Manager (standalone module): verifier round-trip/rejections, a real
3-of-4 BLS cert verifies weighted, envelope round-trip, param selection never
K=3 for multi-node. (Full node module compile is blocked on pre-existing,
unrelated sibling go.sum staleness — kms@v1.11.3 / aml consensus@v1.25.17.)
2026-06-22 17:22:34 -07:00
zeekay 960732a4de node: bump EVM_VERSION v1.99.35 -> v1.99.37 (0x9999 ERC-20 Call-surface env fix)
evm v1.99.37 (precompile v0.5.57) wires the 0x9999 ERC-20 Call surface to the
DEX settlement precompile (2cf30e43d) and gates it to the 0x9999/0x9996 settle
family (9579f2e34). Before this a CALL into 0x9999's ERC-20 settle path saw a
nil PrecompileEnv and could not resolve the token-transfer Call seam. v0.5.57
adds the CALL-only DELEGATECALL guard (feeaab5a0). Deps converge to latest
patch within v1.x.x (threshold v1.9.9, crypto v1.19.21, database v1.20.3,
geth v1.17.12, vm v1.2.5, api v1.0.15). Money path (V4 swap ABI, marker
install, dated DexSettleActivationTime fork) byte-unchanged.

Pairs with the baked DEX_REF v1.5.15 (D-Chain committed-state read RPC) for
one coordinated image: native-fill matcher + read RPC + ERC-20 env fix.

Also: harden the lux-accel fetch to authenticate with the ghtok BuildKit
secret (luxcpp/accel is private -> lux-private/accel; unauthenticated 404)
and make it best-effort (matches the cevm/lpm contract) since the GPU lib is
linked only at CGO_ENABLED=1 and the canonical build is CGO_ENABLED=0 pure-Go.

Image: ghcr.io/luxfi/node:v1.30.40 (patch from v1.30.39).
2026-06-22 15:09:16 -07:00
zeekay cc3f29b928 node: bump DEX_REF v1.5.14 -> v1.5.15 (D-Chain committed-state read RPC)
v1.5.15 adds the D-Chain read surface (clob_get_trades/orders/markets/book over
/ext/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/read.go): read-only JSON of the committed
trade log, resting book, and markets, served beside the write methods via
VM.CreateHandlers with zero consensus impact.

Needed to (1) VERIFY a native fill replicated identically across the validator
set — query clob_get_trades on every node and diff the trade rows + accepted
head root — and (2) feed markets-display, since native fills are D-Chain trade:
rows (not C-Chain 0x9999 DEXFills).

Plugin VM id unchanged (mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr); the
change is additive read endpoints, no consensus/state-transition change.
2026-06-22 14:57:04 -07:00
zeekay d374b82610 node: bump DEX_REF v1.5.13 -> v1.5.14 (prefixdb prefix-iteration fix via database v1.20.4)
dex v1.5.14 consumes luxfi/database v1.20.4, which fixes prefixdb
NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefix synthesizing a pre-prefix start for a nil-start
prefix scan -> ZERO rows over a prefixdb-wrapped chain DB. This stranded the
native D-Chain: rebuildBookFromDB iterated order:<pool> alongside other
sub-prefix rows, folded an EMPTY book, and every taker cross produced 0 fills
despite durably-committed asks. Only the dexvm slot is rebuilt this run (devnet
D-Chain scope); the same database fix likely benefits the other plugin VMs and
is a separate follow-on bump.
2026-06-22 14:12:47 -07:00
zeekay 606b2cb28d node: bump DEX_REF v1.5.12 -> v1.5.13 (D-Chain consensus stall fix)
dex v1.5.13 indexes processing blocks so the plugin transport's ID-only Accept
(GetBlock(builtID)) resolves the just-built block. Without it the native
D-Chain's self-finalize Accept is a silent no-op, the clob submitTx waiter hangs,
and NO D-Chain blocks are produced — orders submitted to /ext/bc/D/dex/clob_*
never match. Required for native trading to actually produce fills.
2026-06-22 12:28:37 -07:00
zeekay 0f49ab3e96 node: bump DEX_REF v1.5.11 -> v1.5.12 (D-Chain restart fix)
dex v1.5.12 persists the head block so the native D-Chain VM survives a restart
once advanced past genesis — without it the first validator to restart fails VM
init ('get last accepted block: not found') and the D-Chain goes down. Required
for a 5-validator rolling restart of the native matcher.
2026-06-22 11:41:32 -07:00
zeekay 0a75f33153 node: bump DEX_REF v1.5.10 -> v1.5.11 (native D-Chain CLOB ingestion)
dex v1.5.11 wires CLOB order ingestion over the node HTTP router
(pkg/dchain VM.CreateHandlers -> /ext/bc/D/dex/<method>). An order POSTed to
/ext/bc/D/dex/clob_submit flows submitTx -> mempool -> consensus -> BuildBlock
-> Verify(match) -> Accept; the chain is the matcher, no venue, no keeper.

Plugin stage rebuilds (ARG change invalidates the dexvm slot cache); node
go.mod is unaffected (the plugin is built from dex's own module, -mod=mod).
2026-06-22 11:17:45 -07:00
zeekay 3385797504 node: D-Chain (dexvm) plugin = native consensus matcher VM (dex/cmd/dchain)
The D-Chain runs as a PluginDir plugin loaded by luxd at the dexvm vmID
(mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr). Until now that slot was
built from chains/dexvm/cmd/plugin — the STATELESS PROXY that relayed clob_*
frames over ZAP to a standalone dchain-venue (DexZapEndpoint). Matching did
NOT happen in luxd consensus; it happened in the external venue's single-node
sealer.

Build the dexvm slot from github.com/luxfi/dex@v1.5.10 ./cmd/dchain instead:
the NATIVE VM (pkg/dchain, block.ChainVM) that runs the lx.OrderBook matcher
INSIDE luxd consensus — BuildBlock drains the mempool, Block.Verify matches
against a versiondb overlay, Block.Accept commits. The trade IS the D-Chain
state transition, sequenced by luxd's multi-validator engine. No
DexZapEndpoint, no standalone venue in the trading path.

cmd/dchain wraps the VM in the same rpc.Serve plugin harness luxfi/evm uses
and is pure-Go (CGO=0); same GOFLAGS/go.sum-heal pattern as CHAINS_REF. The
other 10 chains VMs still build from chains. New ARG DEX_REF=v1.5.10; a FATAL
guard fails the build if the native D-Chain plugin is missing. Verified: a
fresh v1.5.10 clone builds ./cmd/dchain CGO=0 -mod=mod in Docker-like
isolation; native VM suite (TestLocalnetVenueE2E/TestFourPath/conservation)
passes.
2026-06-22 03:44:08 -07:00
Antje Worring 83b07f4ffa deps: chains v1.3.16 -> v1.3.17 (consensus v1.25.19 Round1 fix) + hanzoai sumdb exclusion
Two CI-image-build blockers fixed: (1) chains v1.3.16 pinned consensus v1.25.18
which calls the old single-value corona Round1 -> quantumvm plugin compile break;
v1.3.17 bumps consensus to v1.25.19 (Round1 returns error). (2) hanzoai/* excluded
from sumdb/proxy (404 on hanzoai/vfs go.mod). All 11 VM plugins build; luxd 57MB.
2026-06-22 03:12:58 -07:00
Antje Worring 94e71cd8e5 fix(docker): exclude hanzoai/* from sumdb+proxy (unblocks image build)
The CI Docker build failed reading hanzoai/vfs@v0.4.1's go.mod via the public
sum.golang.org (404 — it's a cross-org module not registered there), same class
as luxfi/*. Added github.com/hanzoai/* to GONOSUMCHECK/GONOSUMDB/GONOPROXY.
Verified: clean 'go mod download hanzoai/vfs@v0.4.1' 404s without the exclusion,
succeeds with it. Unblocks ghcr.io/luxfi/node image builds (v1.30.30/31 failed).
2026-06-22 03:04:10 -07:00
zeekay e07cde8468 deps: consume chains v1.3.16 (dexvm dex.submitTx + dex.getSettlement RPC seam)
The dexvm plugin gains the C<->D keeper RPC seam: dex.submitTx (mempool entry for
ImportTx + settling RelayOrderTx) and dex.getSettlement (D->C proceeds coordinate
for Phase-B). Bumps go.mod luxfi/chains v1.3.15->v1.3.16 AND Dockerfile CHAINS_REF
v1.3.14->v1.3.16 so the bundled dexvm plugin is rebuilt with the new RPC. go mod
verify clean; dexvm plugin builds from the v1.3.16 tag (CI mode).
2026-06-22 02:47:26 -07:00
zeekay a7678502a0 deps: consume chains v1.3.15 (dexvm) + precompile v0.5.56 + evm v1.99.36 (DEX swap-seam r2 release) 2026-06-21 22:49:22 -07:00
zeekay cacc0a3571 deps: converge threshold v1.9.9 + crypto v1.19.21 + database v1.20.3 + geth v1.17.12 + warp v1.19.5 + metric v1.5.9 + proto v1.3.5 (latest patch within v1.x.x) 2026-06-21 22:45:48 -07:00
Antje Worring b4af8ac6d5 deps(pq): consume finalized PQ crypto via consensus v1.25.19
Bumps consensus v1.25.18 -> v1.25.19 (the latest-crypto floor: pulsar v1.1.5,
magnetar v1.2.3, threshold v1.9.9, corona v0.7.9 + the 2-value Round1 API).
luxd builds (57MB), warp/PQ verifier tests green. node calls no Round1 directly
(stable crypto/threshold scheme registry).
2026-06-21 22:35:33 -07:00
zeekay af226c0d2e ci(build.yml): goreleaser must use cross-org PAT, not repo github.token
The routing + insteadOf fixes got goreleaser onto lux-build with git auth,
but it still failed: 'could not read Password ... exit 128' fetching
luxfi/{container,crypto,database,proto}. github.token is repo-scoped and
cannot read OTHER private luxfi repos. Switch to the same cross-org PAT
docker.yml uses (GH_TOKEN/UNIVERSE_PAT) so cross-repo module fetches
authenticate. node already carries UNIVERSE_PAT as a repo secret.
2026-06-21 15:11:17 -07:00
zeekay 82e1a2cd6f ci(build.yml): add private-module git auth before goreleaser
goreleaser shells out to go build, which fetches private luxfi modules
(container, crypto, proto, ...). setup-go-for-project sets GOPRIVATE but
only wires git auth when passed a github-token (build.yml passes none), so
the fetch hit 'could not read Username for https://github.com' and the job
failed even on lux-build. Add the same explicit 'Configure Git for private
modules' step ci.yml uses (git config url.insteadOf with github.token).

This is the real root cause of the 'Build on supported platforms' red-X;
the routing-to-lux-build commit was necessary but not sufficient.
2026-06-21 15:04:48 -07:00
zeekay 1b3e1a191e ci: route goreleaser + release validate/create off ubuntu-latest to lux-build ARC
The v1.30.28 docker.yml run published node:v1.30.28 (sha-5fee58a) fine on
the in-cluster lux-build ARC pool, but two sibling workflows red-X'd:

  - build.yml 'goreleaser' (runs on every push)
  - release.yml 'validate-version' (cascaded skips to every platform build)

Root cause: both pinned runs-on: ubuntu-latest. This org disables
GitHub-hosted runners (NO GITHUB BUILDERS) — ubuntu-latest jobs never get a
runner and fail at provisioning, not at compile. Source is sound:
GOWORK=off CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./... is clean and the cross-layer
dexsettle_guard test passes (extras.DexSettleActivationTime ==
dex.DexSettleActivationTime == 1766704800 = 2025-12-25T23:20:00Z).

Route goreleaser, validate-version, and create-release to lux-build (the
org-scoped autoscalingrunnerset in lux-k8s that already builds the image).
GoReleaser cross-compiles every GOOS/GOARCH from one linux/amd64 host with
CGO disabled, so a single amd64 runner suffices.

(The per-platform binary reusables build-{ubuntu,linux,macos,win}-* still
pin classic [self-hosted,linux,amd64]/windows-2022 labels — a pre-existing
routing issue tracked separately; the node *image* path is unaffected.)
2026-06-21 14:58:25 -07:00
zeekay 5fee58a2ef node: bump EVM_VERSION v1.99.34 -> v1.99.35 (native 0x9999 DEXFill/Initialize indexing) (v1.30.28)
evm v1.99.35 pins precompile v0.5.55, which emits the DEXFill + V4 Initialize
logs the explorer's DEX graph indexes — Dec-25-2025 activation-gated (same
dated fork as 0x9999 dispatch; no fork risk). EVM_VM_ID unchanged (money path
byte-identical). Plugin pulls precompile v0.5.55 transitively via the evm clone.
2026-06-21 14:29:19 -07:00
zeekay 6865783ab8 node: bump C-Chain EVM plugin to v1.99.34 — 0x9999 replay consensus-divergence fix (v1.30.27)
EVM_VERSION v1.99.33 -> v1.99.34 (precompile v0.5.53 -> v0.5.54). v1.99.34 fixes
the ONE HIGH from Red's review of the 0x9999 dated-fork activation that blocked
the production deploy: the EVM dispatch gate read a process-global timestamp
(last-writer-wins across concurrent goroutines), so on the relaunch path
(admin.importChain of a pre-fork RLP snapshot on a live, RPC-serving post-fork
node) a concurrent post-fork eth_call could make a pre-fork block see 0x9999
ENABLED and dispatch settlement during plain-account execution -> state
divergence. The gate now reads the overrider's own per-EVM (chainConfig,
timestamp). Also: SubBalance fallback fails closed (no silent native mint) and
the genesis-config builders skip AlwaysOn modules (0x9999 can't get a
timestamp-0 genesis config that bypasses the dated fork). Money path
byte-for-byte unchanged. This unblocks the production deploy.
2026-06-21 12:41:01 -07:00
zeekay 424582ca13 Merge: node EVM_VERSION v1.99.33 — 0x9999 dated-fork activation (v1.30.26) 2026-06-21 12:13:01 -07:00
zeekay b438180e75 node: EVM_VERSION v1.99.33 — 0x9999 dated-fork activation + 0x9010 removal (v1.30.26)
Bundle the C-Chain EVM plugin built from luxfi/evm v1.99.33 (precompile v0.5.53):
0x9999 DEX settlement now activates at a SINGLE canonical dated fork
(extras.DexSettleActivationTime = 1766704800, Dec 25 2025) instead of the v1.99.32
unconditional always-on. At the fork it BOTH enables dispatch AND installs the
EXTCODESIZE marker forward (never in historical genesis), so:
  - eth_getCode(0x9999) != 0x and typed Solidity IPoolManager(0x9999).swap(...)
    passes the contract-existence guard from the activation block onward;
  - pre-Dec-25 history replays byte-identically (the ~/work/lux/state RLP snapshot
    via admin.importChain) — a pre-fork value transfer to 0x9999 hits a PLAIN
    account, not the precompile, so canonical pre-activation state is preserved;
  - the C-Chain genesis hash is unchanged (no genesis-time marker).
0x9010 is REMOVED entirely (not a registered precompile, no dispatch, no forward);
0x9999 is the SOLE canonical DEX precompile. Runtime DChainID via the "D" alias and
the built-in DAO-treasury protocolFeeController are unchanged.

deps: indirect precompile v0.5.52 -> v0.5.53 (go.sum tidied: stale v0.5.52 hashes
dropped; v0.5.53 hash matches the evm/precompile repos byte-for-byte). node main
builds clean GOWORK=off; go mod verify OK; go mod tidy is a no-op on go.mod.
2026-06-21 12:13:01 -07:00
zeekay 619e859424 Merge: node EVM_VERSION v1.99.32 — 0x9999 always-on DEX settlement (v1.30.25) 2026-06-21 09:23:55 -07:00
zeekay d196cfba85 node: EVM_VERSION v1.99.32 — 0x9999 always-on DEX settlement (v1.30.25)
Bump the bundled C-Chain EVM plugin to v1.99.32 (precompile v0.5.52): the native
0x9999 DEX settlement money path is now ALWAYS-ON. It is active on the C-Chain from
genesis with ZERO per-net config — no dexSettleConfig genesis/upgrade entry anywhere.
Booting luxd = 0x9999 live on the C-Chain, on every Lux network.

Activation is dispatch-only (no genesis state write → genesis hash unchanged → no
fork of any existing network). The D-Chain (dexvm) peer the atomic seam routes to is
resolved at RUNTIME from the consensus-context "D" alias the node already registers in
initChainAliases (chains/manager.go BCLookup), via contract.AtomicState.DChainID().
The protocolFeeController is the built-in DAO treasury. Nothing per-net to configure.

Dockerfile: ARG EVM_VERSION v1.99.31 -> v1.99.32 (the plugin is built from this tag).
go.mod/go.sum: indirect luxfi/precompile v0.5.51 -> v0.5.52 (keeps node's transitive
graph in lockstep with the plugin; node main builds clean GOWORK=off, go mod verify OK).
2026-06-21 09:23:48 -07:00
zeekay b0ee1c5688 Dockerfile: bundle the native-atomic DEX plugins (evm v1.99.31 + chains v1.3.14)
The bundled C-Chain EVM + 11 VM plugins were pinned at stale defaults
(EVM_VERSION=v0.19.4, CHAINS_REF=v1.3.11) decoupled from node's go.mod, so every
node image shipped the OLD DEX (no native 0x9999) even after the cascade bumped
node->chains v1.3.14. Pin both to the native-atomic seam + document the coupling.
No node code change vs v1.30.23.
2026-06-21 07:51:11 -07:00
zeekay 2646c588d2 deps: bump chains v1.3.14 (DEX native-atomic-seam: geth v1.17.12 + precompile v0.5.51 promoted) for v1.30.23 2026-06-21 07:22:37 -07:00
zeekay be991bcb2a deps: chains v1.3.13 (evm v1.99.30 + precompile v0.5.50, all clean go.sum)
Bump to the clean-go.sum re-cascade so node, plugins, and all upstream modules
build identically in clean CI. No node code change vs v1.30.21. go mod verify
clean; full build green.
2026-06-20 22:14:23 -07:00
zeekay eb320c8fb3 go.sum: correct consensus/geth hashes (clean-cache fetch; v1.30.20's were stale)
v1.30.20's go.sum carried stale consensus@v1.25.18 + geth@v1.17.11 hashes that a
locally-polluted module cache (modified extracted dirs) had produced — the in-CI
docker `go mod download` rejected them (checksum mismatch). Purged the modcache,
re-fetched fresh, and `go mod verify` is clean ("all modules verified"). No
go.mod/dep change vs v1.30.20; the node binary is identical. This is the first
buildable tag of this node code.
2026-06-20 21:37:31 -07:00
zeekay c215ce214e ci(docker): build node image on the in-cluster lux-build ARC pool
The evo classic self-hosted runner is offline and GitHub-hosted runners are
billing-blocked (and disallowed by the NO-GITHUB-BUILDERS policy). Point the
image build at the lux-build autoscalingrunnerset (lux-k8s, amd64 DOKS, DinD)
— it serves the whole luxfi org and matches on the scale-set name. No node
binary/dep change vs v1.30.19; this is a build-infra patch.
2026-06-20 21:17:14 -07:00
zeekay c4123bd3b2 deps: chains v1.3.12 -> hardened 0x9999 DEX receipt-settlement (precompile v0.5.49, evm v1.99.29)
Bump github.com/luxfi/chains v1.3.11 -> v1.3.12, pulling evm v1.99.29 (DexZap
live-backend wiring removed) and precompile v0.5.49 (complete, red-swarm-hardened
0x9999 V4 receipt-settlement surface) into the C-Chain. The C-Chain DEX precompile
now settles BLS-certified D-Chain fill receipts inline (deterministic, fork-safe);
the dexvm remains the D-Chain matcher.

Regenerate go.sum: the 2026-06-19 consensus geth-pin re-tag cascade left several
luxfi module hashes (consensus v1.25.18, geth v1.17.11, ...) stale. Re-recorded
from current tags (public deps verified via sumdb, luxfi via GOPRIVATE direct).
consensus v1.25.18 and geth v1.17.11 pins unchanged.
2026-06-20 15:05:31 -07:00
zeekay f295beaa53 Dockerfile: bump GO_VERSION 1.26.1 -> 1.26.4 (match go.mod; EVM plugin floors at 1.26.4 via luxfi/upgrade@v1.0.1) 2026-06-20 01:25:08 -07:00
zeekay 1c4ad4d042 genesis/builder: A/G/K as deterministic genesis chains -> v1.30.18
Append aivm(A)/graphvm(G)/keyvm(K) to genesis chainEntries after Z so the
existing X->C->D->B->T->Q->Z blockchain IDs are preserved; A/G/K take fresh
tail IDs. They carry a/g/kChainGenesis blobs and are deterministic genesis
chains per the no-CreateChainTx model (prior code deferred them to
post-genesis CreateChainTx). I/O/R have no blob and stay plugin-loaded.
2026-06-20 00:53:03 -07:00
zeekay 0d0e01ae19 deps+build: chains v1.3.11 bridge BLS fix + plugin-build heal → node v1.30.17
ROOT FIX (B-Chain): chains v1.3.11 bridgevm/mpc.go blank-imports
github.com/luxfi/crypto/threshold/bls so the bls init() registers the BLS
threshold scheme, fixing the B-Chain VM init regression
(threshold.GetScheme(SchemeBLS): 'scheme not registered') that aborted the
v1.30.16 devnet roll. Verified bls init/RegisterScheme symbols + itab linked
into the bridgevm plugin binary.

go.mod: pin chains v1.3.10 -> v1.3.11 (no other version moves; MVS keeps
crypto v1.19.21, geth v1.17.11, consensus v1.25.18).

go.sum: re-record current content hashes for re-published luxfi modules
(geth/precompile/etc) at EXISTING pinned versions — integrity repair, no
version bump. Fixes clean-room 'go mod download' checksum drift.

Dockerfile plugin builds (embedded plugins ARE authoritative — devnet
startup does cp /luxd/build/plugins/* then --plugin-dir):
  - EVM/C-Chain: EVM_VERSION v0.19.3 -> v0.19.4; heal dead upgrade
    pseudo-version to released v1.0.1; recursive go.sum strip.
  - chains VMs: CHAINS_REF default -> v1.3.11; recursive go.sum strip;
    bridgevm build made FATAL (was best-effort) + presence assertion so the
    image cannot ship without a working B-Chain plugin.
All 11 chains VM plugins + evm plugin verified to build (golang:1.26.4,
linux/amd64). lux-devnet only; testnet/mainnet stay v1.30.3.
2026-06-19 21:03:55 -07:00
zeekay 88ac99724a deps: pin geth v1.17.11 + consensus v1.25.18 + chains v1.3.10 (real semver); MVS-propagate transitive bumps (evm v1.99.28, precompile v0.5.47) 2026-06-19 14:45:57 -07:00
zeekay ec84ba286d Merge node/plugin-nft-gate: all-VMs-as-plugins + X-NFT-gated activation 2026-06-19 14:28:26 -07:00
zeekay 18888c1720 node: all-VMs-as-plugins core/optional split + X-NFT-gated activation
Explicit CoreVMs{P,X,Q,Z} in-process + OptionalVMs plugin-only (no build tags; vms_dchain/nodchain removed). Two-layer anti-shadow (init panic + runtime ListFactories guard). NFT-gated activation at createChain (manager_authz), fail-closed; dex-validator flag gates D-Chain tracking; xvm.GetUTXOs locked.
2026-06-19 11:34:41 -07:00
zeekay c4bf60fbbd deps: bump vm v1.2.0→v1.2.4 (rpc/zap zapdb harness)
Pick up the rpc.Serve plugin harness now opening chainstate via zapdb.New
(single-backend rule) instead of badgerdb.New — same on-disk format, drop-in.
Transitive api v1.0.14→v1.0.15 (within v1, no major bump). chains stays
v1.3.9. Verified: public 'go build ./node/' green; '-tags dchain' green;
public-purity 'go list -deps ./node/' has ZERO chains/dexvm|luxfi/dex; the
-tags dchain build DOES link the dexvm proxy (orthogonality holds).
2026-06-17 23:58:23 -07:00
zeekay 025283d1e1 node: bump luxfi/chains v1.3.8 → v1.3.9 (atomic custody rail) 2026-06-17 21:11:22 -07:00
zeekay cf610cd1fb node: bump luxfi/zapdb v1.10.0 → v1.10.1 (cloud-free, cgo blocker resolved on v1 lineage) 2026-06-17 19:30:22 -07:00
zeekay 6aceec9cb5 node: pin chains v1.3.6 -> v1.3.8 (the released proxy + #9 carried-fills consensus fix)
Production node -tags dchain now links the released chains v1.3.8 (stateless atomic ZAP proxy +
the #9 consensus-fork fix), not the stale v1.3.6. Public build stays pure (zero dex/dchain/gpu
deps); dchain build links the 6 chains/dexvm proxy pkgs. Transitive: oracle v0.1.1->v1.0.0,
relay ->v1.0.0 (chains v1.3.8 requirements; first-stable, within v1).
2026-06-17 17:52:10 -07:00
zeekay 16c383cdb0 Merge origin/main into xvm-merkle-activation integration
# Conflicts:
#	go.mod
2026-06-17 17:14:12 -07:00
zeekay 734578e464 Merge xvm-merkle-activation: dchain build-tag split (public build excludes D-Chain) + merkle-activation 2026-06-17 17:12:59 -07:00
zeekay ca0866cd4c node: dchain build-tag split -- public build excludes D-Chain + private deps
vms.go drops the dexvm import+entry, calls appendDChainVM; vms_dchain.go (//go:build dchain)
links it, vms_nodchain.go (//go:build !dchain) no-ops; vms/dexvm alias gated //go:build
dchain + doc_nodchain.go placeholder. Genesis-gate (constants.DexVMID, no pkg dep) retained.
VERIFIED: public 'go list -deps ./node/' has ZERO chains/dexvm|luxfi/dex|gpu-kernels|luxcpp;
-tags dchain brings them in. Both builds green.

Consensus change -- held for human review before merge/push (bundles with merkle-activation).
2026-06-17 13:31:58 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 74b0e4d838 docs: tidy LLM.md indexes; CLAUDE.md -> LLM.md symlink convention
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-17 09:58:24 -07:00
zeekay 7e6dab2a1c xvm: remove execution_root activation gate — values not gates (active, not gated)
The prior seam added a bespoke MerkleRootActivationHeight gate (default
MerkleRootNeverActivate=MaxUint64) that violated upgrade/upgrade.go's stated
philosophy ('activate-all-implicitly; the fields encode values, not gates').
Removed it entirely (grep-clean): the builder ALWAYS stamps the real xvm
execution_root, the executor ALWAYS recomputes+verifies it, an empty root is
now rejected. Root computation byte-IDENTICAL (exec_root=4f144ef7…) — only the
gating is gone. Net -92 lines. Tests converted to always-active reality
(empty-root-rejected is the new gate test); ./vms/xvm/... + ./upgrade/... green
uncached + -race. asset_root stays keccak256("") (UTXO-only executor; assets
bound via each UTXO's AssetID).
2026-06-16 12:59:21 -07:00
zeekay cb202dfa43 xvm: activation-readiness — real UTXO leaf projection + state iterator (gate OFF)
Closes the nil-projection seam in the activation-gated merkleRoot wiring (91fbb97b):
- state/iterator.go: UTXOs(start,limit) on ReadOnlyChain (state + diff) — ascending
  canonical order + ordered overlay merge.
- block/executor: real post-block UTXO leaf projection; canonical OwnerRoot =
  keccak256(threshold_le || key_count_le || sorted_keys); BlockExecutionRoot now
  returns (ids.ID, error) so a projection/enumeration failure surfaces, not a wrong root.
- ownerroot.go canonical derivation; 16 new tests, -race clean; full ./vms/xvm/... green.

Gate stays OFF (MerkleRootActivationHeight = math.MaxUint64) — NO live consensus change.
Asset family intentionally empty (asset_root=keccak256("")); xvm executor is UTXO-only,
so a faithful asset-arena projection needs an asset-arena state model first — flagged
for human ratification. Consensus-main merge is a human decision.
2026-06-16 12:04:19 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 160659d759 Merge pull request #141 from luxfi/feat/database-v1.20.3-native-replication
deps: bump luxfi/database -> v1.20.3 (native ZAP replication)
2026-06-15 19:42:46 -07:00
hanzo-dev faba9d0fde deps: bump luxfi/database v1.19.2 -> v1.20.3 (native ZAP replication)
Brings native ZAP replication into the luxd binary: CDC change-feed incrementals
(no keyspace scan), physical SST-copy snapshots, post-quantum (ML-KEM-768) at-rest
encryption, per-DB streams, restore-on-boot, and the backer/restorer split. The
node reads it all from REPLICATE_* env (operator-driven) — every chain's ZapDB
backs up continuously and a fresh node launches from the latest snapshot.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-16 02:42:28 +00:00
zeekay 91fbb97bfc xvm: parallel intra-block execution_root + activation-gated merkleRoot wiring (DEFAULT OFF)
Core goal — build the xvm block state root from independently-built
subtrees in parallel, and wire it into the block path behind an
off-by-default activation gate (zero live-consensus change).

Parallel build (vms/xvm/block/executor/executionroot.go): the three
family folds (utxo/asset/tx) run concurrently; each folds via a
GOMAXPROCS worker-pool RFC-6962 level reduction composed from
crypto/merkle's exported LeafHash/NodeHash (no duplicated keccak/tag —
DRY). Byte-IDENTICAL to the serial xvmroot.ExecutionRoot: canonical leaf
order + count-determined combine shape are unchanged; only the per-index
loops parallelize (disjoint-slot writes). Proven by 200-random +
sizes-0..4097 byte-identity tests, race-clean (go test -race).
Benchmark (M1 Max, 65536 UTXOs): execution_root 87.4ms -> 19.1ms (4.58x).

Gated wiring: upgrade.Config.MerkleRootActivationHeight defaults to
MerkleRootNeverActivate (math.MaxUint64) on Mainnet/Testnet/Default AND
xvm.DefaultConfig (safety-critical — VM.initialize discards init.Upgrade,
so without the default the zero value would activate from genesis).
Below activation: builder leaves Root=ids.Empty + executor keeps the
verbatim reject-if-non-empty rule (byte-for-byte current behavior, tested).
At/above: builder stamps BlockExecutionRoot; executor recomputes + verifies
(rejects mismatch). nil-safe (nil config -> OFF).

HONEST SEAM — NOT ACTIVATION-READY: postBlockUTXOLeaves/postBlockAssetLeaves
return nil. A real projection needs (1) a committed mapping from the
executor codec lux.UTXO/asset types to the GPU-snapshot leaf fields
(OwnerRoot/AmountHi/Threshold/TotalSupply/...), and (2) a full-occupied-set
state enumeration API (only GetUTXO/per-address UTXOIDs exist today). Both
are consensus-semantics decisions deliberately NOT auto-invented (would be
unverified non-parity slop). So today the root commits to parent + EMPTY
utxo/asset roots + the (correct) tx family + height. Consensus-inert
because the gate is OFF; builder and verifier call the identical projection
so stamped==verified always. A human must ratify the projection + wire a
state iterator + GPU snapshot producer before any activation height is set.

Additive constructor NewStandardBlockWithRoot (NewStandardBlock = its
empty-root case). xvmroot gained 3 byte-transparent exported leaf-digest
accessors (KAT 4f144ef7 unchanged) so the parallel fold reuses the one
canonical preimage. CGO_ENABLED=0 clean; go test ./vms/xvm/... ./upgrade/
PASS. Local commit; not pushed (consensus repo — awaiting human review of
the activation seam).
2026-06-15 18:07:50 -07:00
zeekay da4a83df1a vms/bridgevm/state/bridgevmroot: native-Go bridgevm state-root mirror + GPU parity KAT
Symmetric with vms/xvm/state/xvmroot — the native-Go authority for the
bridgevm_transition root. Computes all 5 family sub-roots (signer_set /
liquidity / inbox / outbox / daily_limit) via luxfi/crypto/merkle
(RFC-6962 tagged tree) over the post-transition leaf field values, plus
the §6 compose (parent ‖ 5 roots ‖ epoch ‖ bond_lo ‖ bond_hi ‖ active).
Full 128-bit bond aggregate (matches the GPU MED-1 fix — bond_hi never
dropped). Keccak via luxfi/crypto/hash NewLegacyKeccak256 (NOT sha3.Sum256).

Byte-for-byte parity with all 7 GPU backends (e303e3c): mixed
signer_root=c9812fee… state_root=6c973a55… bond_hi=0; dense-signer
N=5/9/17 bond_hi=29/71/203. 9 tests PASS, CGO_ENABLED=0 clean. Pure
computation + tests; not wired into consensus (the gated wiring is the
separate xvm/bridgevm builder+executor phase).
2026-06-15 17:53:39 -07:00
zeekay 20893ab26c xvm/state/xvmroot: native-Go execution_root mirror + Go==GPU parity KAT
Pure-computation Go mirror of the GPU xvm_root_update tree fold (utxo/
asset/tx Merkle sub-roots via luxfi/crypto/merkle + un-tagged keccak
compose). Byte-for-byte parity with all 7 GPU backends, anchored on the
shared KAT fixture (exec_root 4f144ef7, i%3 tx-status pattern matching
test_xvm_roots_kat.cpp). Bumps luxfi/crypto v1.19.17->v1.19.21 (publishes
the merkle + keccak packages); parity test passes in clean module mode
(GOWORK=off). NOT wired into block validity yet — computation+test only;
the activation-gated executor wiring is the next phase.
2026-06-15 16:43:03 -07:00
zeekay 3d5a04e0ae health: atomic buffered GET reply; tolerate invalid UTF-8 in check details
jsonv2 MarshalWrite streams straight to the ResponseWriter and rejects
invalid UTF-8 mid-stream. A check whose Details embeds raw chain-ID
bytes tore the reply: clients got truncated JSON with a Content-Length
matching the truncation. Buffer the marshal so the reply is atomic,
allow invalid UTF-8 as replacement runes, and emit an explicit
encode-failure body instead of a torn one.
2026-06-10 21:53:44 -07:00
zeekay a5241f6a5b ci: route to canonical native arcd labels [self-hosted, linux, <arch>]
Replaces non-canonical scale-set / org-prefixed labels with the
existing labels every arcd host registers with. Matches evo for
amd64 and spark for arm64. No new labels added.
2026-06-10 20:23:53 -07:00
zeekay 07b2f0cf47 wallet+deps: drop legacy UTXO codec path; bump dep semvers
wallet/network/primary/api.go:

- Drop the parseUTXOAnyWire dispatcher and route AddAllUTXOs straight to
  lux.ParseUTXO (ZAP wire). Wire format has one representation; the
  wallet has one decoder.
- Drop the now-unused ptxs and luxwire imports.

go.mod / go.sum:

- Replace orphan pseudo-versions with the published tags they tracked.
    luxfi/constants v1.5.8-0... → v1.5.8
    luxfi/oracle    v0.1.1-0... → v0.1.1
    luxfi/upgrade   v1.0.1-0... → v1.0.1
    luxfi/sdk       v1.17.6     → v1.17.9
    luxfi/kms       v1.11.3     → v1.11.4
2026-06-10 19:28:41 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8290737b84 chore: update 2026-06-10 13:34:04 -07:00
Hanzo AI ce49dfac47 txs+wallet: deprecate AddChainValidatorTx under LP-018 sovereign-L1
Validators validate networks; chains live on networks. AddValidatorTx
is the universal add-validator-to-a-network tx whether the target
network is Lux primary (1/2/3/1337) or any downstream sovereign L1's
own primary at its chosen networkID. AddChainValidatorTx is legacy
and kept for one release cycle of wire/codec compat with pre-LP-018
binaries.

- vms/platformvm/txs/add_chain_validator_tx.go: file-header + struct
  Deprecated: notice pointing to AddValidatorTx.
- vms/platformvm/txs/chain_validator.go: ChainValidator descriptor
  marked Deprecated.
- vms/platformvm/txs/add_validator_test.go: new
  TestAddValidatorTxSyntacticVerify_ArbitraryPrimaryNetworkIDs covers
  Lux primaries (1/2/3/1337) plus four synthetic IDs across the uint32
  range, asserting the tx body has no per-chain field and accepts any
  valid primary networkID.
- wallet/chain/p/wallet/wallet.go + with_options.go: Deprecated on
  IssueAddChainValidatorTx; IssueRemoveChainValidatorTx doc reworded
  to network-centric language.
- wallet/chain/p/builder.go + builder/builder.go: Deprecated on
  NewAddChainValidatorTx interfaces.
- wallet/network/primary/examples/{add-permissioned-chain-validator,
  bootstrap-hanzo, deploy-chains}/main.go: file-header notes that
  these examples exercise the legacy path; new code uses AddValidatorTx.
- node/validator_manager.go: 4 log strings + 1 comment block rewritten
  to talk about network validator (not chain validator).
- vms/platformvm/health.go: error string 'current chain validator of'
  → 'current network validator on'.
2026-06-08 16:02:58 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 15a48840c5 ci: target native arcd runners (evo/spark)
Replace retired self-hosted labels with native host arcd daemons:
evo (linux/amd64), spark (linux/arm64).

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-07 15:59:13 -07:00
Antje Worring 8513c28cf2 chore: commit AGENTS.md + CLAUDE.md for AI devs (un-gitignore) 2026-06-07 14:31:14 -07:00
Hanzo AI a7cf84fb8b cleanup: remove AI-slop summary / status / plan / report files
Reverts violations of the durable rule that current-state docs belong
in LLM.md and history belongs in git log. Removed files were session
handoffs, agent-style "complete success" / "1000%" reports, dated
audit dumps, and stub NOTES.
2026-06-07 13:36:23 -07:00
Darkhorse7starsandGitHub f7fbb706ac config: blank *-content flag falls through to *-file in pemBytesOrFile (#139)
pemBytesOrFile short-circuited when a *-content flag was set but empty
(v.IsSet true, value ""), returning empty bytes instead of consulting
the corresponding *-file path.

For strict-PQ staking keys (--staking-mldsa-key-file-content /
--staking-mldsa-key-file) this silently degraded a validator to a
classical ECDSA NodeID: StakingMLDSAPub stayed empty, IsStrictPQ() was
false, and the node booted with no error. The genesis validator set then
never matched the live NodeIDs and the P-chain produced 0 blocks -- the
strict-PQ activation outage (the #48 failure class).

Treat a set-but-empty content flag identically to an absent one and fall
through to the *-file path. The same helper backs the ML-KEM handshake
keys, so both paths are fixed.

Restore the regression guard
TestLoadStakingMLDSA_EmptyContentFallsThroughToPath (fails on main,
passes here) alongside the other loadStakingMLDSA cases.

Verified: CGO_ENABLED=0 go test ./config/
2026-06-07 11:57:11 -07:00
Darkhorse7starsandGitHub 774b62b96d network,node: complete strict-PQ activation (schemeGate + pre-dedup handshake + classical-compat) (#137)
main carries the strict-PQ peer-identity fix (NewLocalIdentityFromStakingKey +
adoptVerifiedPQIdentity) but is missing three further layers that are each
required for strict-PQ consensus and chain creation to actually work. All three
are proven on a live devnet running the equivalent fix (node v1.10.18-strictpq):
a full ML-DSA validator mesh forms and the EVM/DEX/FHE chains are created on the
sovereign L1.

1. schemeGate nil-gate (network/network.go)
   Under strict-PQ the TLS layer is transport-only: peer leaf certs are
   ephemeral ECDSA, which schemeFromCert classifies as classical, so the
   SchemeGate refuses every peer at the upgrade. Pass a nil gate to the TLS
   upgraders when PQHandshakeConfig is active; identity is enforced by the PQ
   handshake instead. Non-PQ paths keep the real gate.

2. pre-dedup PQ handshake (network/network.go + network/peer/peer.go)
   The PQ handshake ran inside peer.Start, under peersLock, with init/responder
   roles fixed by dial direction. On simultaneous mutual dials every node acts
   as a lone initiator (keeps its outbound, drops the peer's inbound at the
   connecting-dedup) and deadlocks -> 0 peers. Run the handshake per-conn in
   network.upgrade, before the dedup and without the lock, so each TCP conn
   completes independently and the dedup keys on the resulting stable ML-DSA
   NodeID. RunPQHandshakeConn shares main's binding via a new
   verifyPQIdentityBinding helper, so the pre-dedup and in-Start paths enforce
   byte-identical identity semantics.

3. classical-compat allow-list (node/node.go)
   The ClassicalCompatRegistry was nil, so strict-PQ refused every classical
   secp256k1 P-chain credential and the bootstrap control key could not issue
   CreateNetwork/CreateChainTx. Seed it (strict-PQ only) from the genesis
   P-chain allocation owners plus ids.ShortEmpty (the mempool's current
   originator). This unblocks creating the EVM/DEX/FHE chains.

Builds clean with CGO_ENABLED=0; network/peer, network, vms/txs/auth and
platformvm genesis/mempool tests pass. main's identity fix is unchanged.

Supersedes #136 (which carried these layers on a branch that had diverged 331
commits behind main). Follow-up, tracked separately: config.pemBytesOrFile
short-circuits on a blank *-content flag and silently degrades a strict-PQ
validator to an ECDSA NodeID.
2026-06-07 11:02:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI c432c179f1 version: bump default to v1.30.6 — final json/v2 + ZAP-internal ship
Tracks v1.30.5 (strict-PQ peer identity bind) + the json/v2 boundary
migration + 8-site internal-JSON to ZAP-native rip from this session.

Default version: 1.30.4 → 1.30.6 (v1.30.5 already exists as a CI auto-bump
on the strict-PQ peer fix).

Includes:
  - xvm/txs/doc.go (canonical //go:generate zapgen directive
    pointing at proto/schemas/xvm/txs.zap)
  - compatibility.json + v1.30.5 + v1.30.6 under RPCChainVMProtocol 42
2026-06-07 01:39:20 -07:00
Hanzo AI 64fedaaf72 staking/kms: correct doc — points at Lux KMS not Hanzo KMS
The HTTP KMS service this client talks to is the Lux blockchain-infra
KMS at ~/work/lux/kms (github.com/luxfi/kms), not Hanzo KMS. Hanzo KMS
(~/work/hanzo/kms) serves Hanzo apps and is a distinct service.

Doc-only fix — no behavior change.
2026-06-07 01:39:20 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 821bcd512b fix(ci): use explicit if-guards for GOOS/GOARCH re-export in run_task.sh
Harden the cross-compile target re-export against `set -e`: the prior
`[ -n "$x" ] && export ...` form returns non-zero when the var is empty
(the common native-build case). Empirically bash exempts it from
errexit, but the explicit `if` form is unambiguous across shells. Both
native (Mach-O arm64) and cross (ELF linux/amd64) builds verified via
./scripts/run_task.sh build.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-07 00:52:43 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev dbc113941f ci: remove stale zap-audit workflow (zap_native moved to luxfi/proto)
The zap_native package was relocated out of this repo to
github.com/luxfi/proto/zap_native (commit 24496fa57 "relocate zap_native
import paths to proto/zap_native"; node now imports it as a dependency,
pinned luxfi/proto v1.3.4). zap-audit.yml still grepped/cd'd into
vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/, a directory that no longer exists here —
so the workflow could never run its gates against real code, and a YAML
block-scalar bug (a column-1 line inside `run: |`) made it fail to parse
at 0s on every push.

The four invariants it enforced (AddressList.At non-production,
ChainsList/ValidatorsList MustVerify, Owner-bearing SyntacticVerify) are
preserved at the source: luxfi/proto/zap_native/audit_test.go contains
the Go-test mirrors (TestAuditGate_*) that run in luxfi/proto's CI, next
to the code they guard. The audit belongs in the repo that owns the code,
not here pointing at a phantom path. Not a weakened gate — a dead
workflow removed; coverage unchanged.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-07 00:39:59 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 6371d33971 deps: bump luxfi/genesis v1.13.8 -> v1.13.14 (Windows embed.FS fix)
luxfi/genesis@v1.13.8 read its embedded genesis shards with
embeddedGenesis.ReadFile(filepath.Join(network, "<shard>.json")). On
Windows filepath.Join uses backslashes, but embed.FS paths are always
forward-slash; every read returned fs.ErrNotExist, so GetConfig fell
back to an empty filesystem config: zero allocations, zero stakers,
empty XChainGenesis.

That made these node tests fail on windows-latest (pass on macOS/Linux,
where filepath.Join already yields "/"):
  - config.TestResolveUTXOAssetID_FromSovereignGenesis
  - genesis/builder.TestUTXOAssetIDFromGenesisBytes_Sovereign
  - genesis/builder.TestGetConfigAllocations (all 4 networks: 0 allocs)

v1.13.14 switches the embed.FS reads to path.Join (forward-slash, all
platforms). No behavior change on linux/darwin. Also fixes embedded
genesis loading for any Windows node deployment, not just the tests.
(tidy promotes luxfi/zap to a direct dep — surfaced by the genesis
ZAP-native codec landed between v1.13.8 and v1.13.14.)

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-07 00:39:47 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 42255b582c fix(ci): build task launcher for host in run_task.sh (cross-compile)
build-macos-release cross-compiles on a Linux runner with
`CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=darwin GOARCH=<arch> ./scripts/run_task.sh build`.
run_task.sh bootstrapped the task runner via `go run task@vX`, which
inherited GOOS/GOARCH and cross-compiled the *task launcher itself* for
darwin — then failed to exec it on the Linux host:

    fork/exec /tmp/go-build.../task: exec format error

(reproduced locally on darwin/arm64 by cross-compiling task to linux/amd64.)

task is a build orchestrator that must run on the host. Build it for the
host (GOOS/GOARCH cleared via `env -u`, installed to GOPATH/bin with
`go install`), then re-export the caller's cross-compile target so the
downstream `go build` inside scripts/build.sh still produces the
requested darwin artifact. Verified: a linux-host -> darwin and a
darwin-host -> linux cross-compile both succeed and emit the correct
target-arch binary.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-07 00:39:37 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 576c437db9 refactor: complete XAssetID -> UTXOAssetID rename (functions, tests)
The asset-id var was already unified to UTXOAssetID; this finishes the
job by renaming resolveXAssetID -> resolveUTXOAssetID and
XAssetIDFromGenesisBytes -> UTXOAssetIDFromGenesisBytes (+ their tests).
X-Chain references (XChainID, XChainGenesis) are unchanged. UTXOAssetID
is the canonical name.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-06 23:52:19 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 880537ec24 refactor(platformvm): remove dead LUXAssetID fallback + unify asset-id naming to UTXOAssetID
The fallback if/else had identical branches (dead code); collapse to a single assignment. Rename stale LUXAssetID comment + utxosByLUXAssetID local var to the canonical UTXOAssetID.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-06 23:26:24 -07:00
Hanzo AI b1cdbff486 staking/kms: document json/v2 boundary, keep external HTTP contract
The KMS client speaks JSON over HTTP — that is the external service's
public contract, not an internal data path. Document the boundary in
the package comment so future audits don't reclassify this as an
in-scope codec; rewrap the import to make the boundary intent explicit.

Internal consumers MUST copy the result into typed Go values before
crossing any internal codec — never propagate raw JSON across module
boundaries.
2026-06-06 23:14:30 -07:00
Hanzo AI 37c8706131 utils/ips/dynamic_ip_port: drop unused json/v2 marshaler
The private dynamicIPPort type carried a MarshalJSON method using
json/v2. No consumer of DynamicIPPort in the node module relied on the
JSON path — the public IPPort/IPDesc types in ip_port.go retain their
JSON methods for the external node-info HTTP API. Drop the unused
internal marshaler; one path for IP serialization, on the boundary
that owns the wire shape.
2026-06-06 23:14:29 -07:00
Hanzo AI 962744e590 utils/bimap: drop json/v2 marshaler, keep type generic
BiMap is generic over comparable K,V — bolting on a json/v2
Marshaler/Unmarshaler bound the type to text I/O it has no business
caring about. Removed the marshaler interface and the dependent tests;
no consumer of BiMap in the node module relied on JSON.

Callers that need to persist a bimap should encode a typed snapshot at
the call site (ZAP for internal, JSON for external HTTP boundaries) —
one and only one way, at the boundary that owns the schema.
2026-06-06 23:14:29 -07:00
Hanzo AI 80c982a1d1 rpcchainvm/zap/client: typed health Details, no json parse
HealthResponse.Details is opaque bytes on the ZAP wire. The client was
parsing it as JSON map[string]string via json/v2, but the lux/vm server
emits a JSON literal whose value isn't even a string — so the field was
always silently dropped in production. Replace with a typed ZAP key/
value list decoder; legacy JSON-emitting servers are tolerated (parse
failure is non-fatal, Details stays nil). Forward-compatible with a
future lux/vm server flip to ZAP-emit.
2026-06-06 23:14:29 -07:00
Hanzo AI 27a4c32ea0 chainadapter/messaging: ZAP-native internal codec, UTF-8 safe
SerializeConversation / DeserializeConversation used json/v2, which was
UTF-8 unsafe: the membership-CRDT 'tag' is raw hash bytes that were
stuffed into a Go string used as a map key. Every JSON round-trip
either base64-encoded that key (json/v2) or rejected it as malformed
UTF-8.

Migrate to a ZAP envelope (codec_zap.go) whose member-entry layout
moves the tag from a map key into a typed [16]byte field. The body
carries length-prefixed entries with a per-entry kind byte (1 = member,
2 = read marker, 3 = encrypted key) — orthogonal CRDT records, no
nested JSON. Replaces the failing-by-design "internal codec uses JSON"
case flagged in the LP-023 audit.
2026-06-06 23:14:29 -07:00
Hanzo AI 97f3670cb9 chainadapter/appchain: ZAP-native SQLite materializer blobs
Three json/v2 uses migrated to a single ZAP envelope codec
(appchain_zap.go):

  * _schemas.schema_json (TEXT) → schema_zap (BLOB) for CollectionSchema
  * dynamic-table _data (TEXT JSON) → _data (BLOB ZAP) for user payloads
  * applyCounter's (Field, Delta) op payload now decoded from a typed
    ZAP envelope rather than a JSON struct

User-data leaves use a small set of typed tags
(nil/bool/int64/float64/string/bytes); nested maps/arrays are not
supported (the chainadapter API contract is "flat key->scalar"). Schema
recorded at proto/schemas/chainadapter/appchain.zap.

Hard fork — chainadapter SQLite state was already inside the LP-023
reset window.
2026-06-06 23:14:29 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6bcb65d92e platformvm/airdrop: ZAP-native claims persistence
The airdrop manager wrote the full claims map (keyed on Ethereum
address) to the database via json/v2 on every claim. Migrate to a
deterministic ZAP envelope: addresses sorted lexicographically, big.Int
amounts emitted as raw big-endian bytes with a u32 length prefix. New
codec lives in vms/platformvm/airdrop/codec_zap.go; schema at
proto/schemas/airdrop/airdrop.zap.

Hard fork — airdrop state already inside the LP-023 reset window.
2026-06-06 23:14:29 -07:00
Hanzo AI fa5552c0a9 vms/da: ZAP-native blob+cert store, no json/v2
The DA store persisted DABlob/DACert via json/v2, which base64-encoded
the KZG commitments, per-chunk proofs and validator signatures (binary
fields with no good text representation). Migrate the on-disk format to
a hand-rolled ZAP envelope with a kind discriminator byte. New codec
lives in vms/da/codec_zap.go; the schema is recorded at
proto/schemas/da/da.zap for the centralized registry.

Hard fork: existing DA state was already part of the LP-023 reset
window. No dual-read, no aliases.
2026-06-06 23:14:29 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev ac039b8c08 style(node): rename local luxAssetID -> utxoAssetID for naming consistency
Package-local identifier only; no exported field, json tag, or wire change.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-06 23:13:38 -07:00
Hanzo AI fa3b08cc10 platformvm/txs: emit [N]byte fields as JSON arrays for v1 RPC parity
RegisterL1ValidatorTx (and other txs reachable through Service.GetTx,
Service.GetBlock, Service.GetBlockByHeight) contains
ProofOfPossession [bls.SignatureLen]byte and PublicKey [bls.PublicKeyLen]byte.
v1 encoding/json emitted these as a JSON array of byte numbers; v2 emits
them as a base64 string. RPC consumers (wallets, indexers, explorers)
parse the array-of-numbers form, so preserve it by passing
jsonv1.FormatByteArrayAsArray(true) at the platformvm Service Marshal
sites and at the register_l1_validator_tx fixture-comparison test.
2026-06-06 23:06:52 -07:00
Hanzo AI e94e179794 xvm: preserve nanosecond Duration wire format for v2
xvm.Config embeds network.Config which has time.Duration fields. v1
encoded these as integer nanoseconds; v2 has no default representation.
Pass jsonv1.FormatDurationAsNano(true) at ParseConfig and at the test
marshal sites so the wire format is preserved.
2026-06-06 23:06:41 -07:00
Hanzo AI 633e130303 config/spec: preserve nanosecond Duration wire format for v2
ConfigSpec.JSON() exports the flag specification as JSON. Duration-typed
default values (e.g. consensus timeouts) need to render as integer
nanoseconds for v1-compatible consumers and so the embedded JSON
fixtures roundtrip. Pass jsonv1.FormatDurationAsNano(true) at the
Marshal site.
2026-06-06 23:06:31 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8acd48882a platformvm/config: preserve nanosecond Duration wire format for v2
v1 encoding/json marshaled time.Duration as an integer count of
nanoseconds by default; v2 has no default Duration representation and
returns a SemanticError unless told otherwise. The PlatformVM
configuration (Network, ExecutionConfig) has been on-disk-stable as
integer nanoseconds since launch — keep that wire format by passing
jsonv1.FormatDurationAsNano(true) at the Marshal/Unmarshal call sites
in GetConfig, GetExecutionConfig, and the corresponding tests that
prepare fixtures via json.Marshal.
2026-06-06 23:06:21 -07:00
Hanzo AI 33fe3e640b config: accept camelCase JSON keys + nil/empty []byte parity for v2
User-edited config files (and embedded base64 config blobs) use camelCase
keys: "validatorOnly", "alphaPreference", "consensusParameters". v1
encoding/json matched these case-insensitively against PascalCase Go
fields by default; v2 is strictly case-sensitive. Add
json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true) at every config-file unmarshal site
so the on-disk wire format is preserved.

config_test.go: nil []byte round-trips through v2 as empty []byte{}
(v1 left it nil). reflect.DeepEqual treats nil != empty for slices, so
require.Equal fails on roundtrip. Add equalChainConfigs() helper using
bytes.Equal, which canonically treats nil == empty.
2026-06-06 23:06:13 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2d3cba95e4 json: migrate every encoding/json import to json/v2 (go-json-experiment)
External (HTTP / JSON-RPC) is the only place JSON is legitimate. Every
existing encoding/json import in node/ moves to github.com/go-json-experiment/json
(v2 root, not the v1 sub-package). NewEncoder/NewDecoder rewrite to
MarshalWrite/UnmarshalRead. MarshalIndent rewrites to Marshal with
jsontext.WithIndent. json.RawMessage rewrites to jsontext.Value.
*json.SyntaxError rewrites to *jsontext.SyntacticError.

81 files migrated. LLM.md captures the rule + v1->v2 delta table.

Known v2 semantic deltas surfaced by existing tests (followups, not regressions):
- [N]byte fields with no MarshalJSON now marshal as base64 string (v1 marshalled
  as JSON array of byte numbers). Affects vms/platformvm/txs/*_test.go fixtures
  with embedded BLS proofOfPossession.
- time.Duration has no v2 default representation; configs that wire-format
  Duration as nanoseconds (vms/{xvm,platformvm}/config, config/spec) need to
  switch to string-form Duration or carry an explicit option. v2 root does not
  re-export FormatDurationAsNano.
- v2 enforces strict UTF-8 (vms/chainadapter/messaging fixture has non-UTF-8).
- json.MarshalWrite does not append a trailing '\n' (v1 NewEncoder.Encode did);
  service/auth/auth_test.go expectation updated.
- nil []byte round-trips to empty (not nil); config_test deep-equal fixtures
  surface this.

All affected sites are at the API boundary; ZAP wire envelope already covers
the internal data paths (state, P2P, consensus, MPC, threshold). Internal
JSON sites that should move to ZAP next (separate work):
- vms/da/store.go            (DA blob/cert storage as JSON)
- vms/platformvm/airdrop     (airdrop claims as JSON in db)
- vms/chainadapter/appchain  (SQLite materializer schema/data blobs)
- vms/chainadapter/messaging (conversation codec)
- staking/kms.go             (KMS HTTP client — external technically, leave)
- utils/{bimap,ips}          (small marshaler shims — low priority)
2026-06-06 22:26:02 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3e5846e898 go: 1.26.3 → 1.26.4 (security: crypto/x509, mime, net/textproto) 2026-06-06 22:09:48 -07:00
Hanzo AI 609342d894 go.mod: bump go directive to 1.26.4
Patch fix: crypto/x509, mime, net/textproto security fixes per Go 1.26.4 release notes (2026-06-02).
2026-06-06 21:52:27 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev a9eecf206a fix(xvm,deps): wire-serializable test UTXO output; bump keys v1.2.0
- vms/xvm TestFundingAddresses: use a real secp256k1fx.TransferOutput
  (wire-serializable) instead of the lux.TestAddressable mock, which the
  utxo v0.3.7 ZAP marshal path rejects (UTXO.Out must be a registered fx
  primitive). Query the funding-address index by the owner address.
- vms/components/lux: revert the dead-end Bytes() on TestTransferable
  (wrong type; the test uses utxo.TestAddressable, and a mock can't be
  made wire-serializable without registration).
- deps: keys v1.1.0 -> v1.2.0 (kms v1.11.3) — keyutil.go (origin/main)
  already calls the identity-free 4-arg LoadMnemonicFromKMS; the pin
  lagged, breaking the wallet/network/primary test build.

Full suite: 153/153 green.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-06 21:42:07 -07:00
Darkhorse7starsandHanzo AI 8c2f1d3993 fix(network): bind strict-PQ peer identity to staking ML-DSA key so validators produce blocks
On a strict-PQ chain a peer's consensus identity is its ML-DSA-65 NodeID
(StakingConfig.DeriveNodeID), but the network layer kept every peer on the
TLS-cert NodeID derived during the transport upgrade. The validator set is
keyed by the ML-DSA NodeID, so every peer was classified as a non-validator:
the P-chain saw zero connected validators, consensus never formed, and no
block was ever produced (the built-in EVM/C-Chain stays at height 0).

Two coupled defects:

1. network.NewNetwork built the PQ handshake identity with
   peer.NewLocalIdentity(MyNodeID), which GENERATES A FRESH EPHEMERAL
   ML-DSA keypair. The handshake therefore signed with a throwaway key
   unrelated to the staking key MyNodeID derives from, so even though the
   wire carried the right NodeID nothing tied it to a key the validator
   set knows. (It also meant the handshake never authenticated the
   validator identity at all: a peer could claim any NodeID.)

2. peer.runPQHandshakeIfRequired discarded HandshakeResult.PeerNodeID and
   left p.id on the transport TLS-cert NodeID.

Fix:

- Thread the node's persistent staking ML-DSA keypair
  (StakingConfig.StakingMLDSA{,Pub}) onto network.Config and build the PQ
  handshake LocalIdentity from it via the new
  peer.NewLocalIdentityFromStakingKey. The handshake now signs with the
  same key that derives MyNodeID.
- After a successful handshake, peer.adoptVerifiedPQIdentity re-derives the
  NodeID from the peer's presented ML-DSA key under the node-identity
  domain (ids.Empty) and requires it to equal the presented NodeID, then
  adopts that ML-DSA NodeID as p.id. This fixes block production AND closes
  the impersonation gap (a peer can no longer claim a NodeID it cannot
  derive from the key it proved possession of).

Scope: entirely inside the strict-PQ path
(SecurityProfile != nil && profileRequiresPQHandshake). Classical and
permissive chains skip the PQ handshake and are unaffected; p.id stays the
TLS-cert NodeID exactly as before. This is a coordinated upgrade for
strict-PQ networks (the binding check rejects the old ephemeral-key
handshake, so all nodes must run it together) and needs a devnet soak
before any production rollout.

Adds white-box tests for the bind / adopt / reject paths.
2026-06-06 21:23:30 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 5572a3f36d deps: migrate to api v1.0.14 + accel v1.2.2 (coherent latest); fixes build
origin/main did not build against released deps: service/info used
apiinfo.PeerInfo (absent from api v1.0.12) and zap client used the old
InitializeRequest.LuxAssetID field. Bump api -> v1.0.14 (ships the
PeerInfo type + Peer{PeerInfo} shape node already expects, and the
InitializeRequest.UTXOAssetID rename) and accel -> v1.2.2 (bundled
c_api.h; native HQC opt-in, so CGO builds need no luxcpp install).

- vms/rpcchainvm/zap: InitializeRequest.LuxAssetID -> UTXOAssetID
  (client.go + cevm_e2e_test.go), local var luxAssetID -> utxoAssetID.
- vms/components/lux: TestTransferable implements Bytes() for the utxo
  v0.3.7 wire-serializable contract.

Builds clean; 152/153 packages green. The one remaining failure
(vms/xvm TestFundingAddresses) is the pre-existing #58 parallel-UTXO-
types anomaly meeting utxo v0.3.7's wire contract via the node lux.UTXO
-> utxo.UTXO state bridge — a separate follow-up, not a dep-version issue.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-06 21:22:34 -07:00
Hanzo AI 77784d05b9 wallet/keyutil: drop bootstrapIdentity — LoadMnemonic is identity-free
luxfi/keys v1.2.0 took *ServiceIdentity out of LoadMnemonic. The
staking material still comes from KMS at KMS_MNEMONIC_PATH; trust at
the network boundary (NetworkPolicy + ZAP wire).
2026-06-06 21:05:15 -07:00
Antje WorringandHanzo Dev 3cdafe50de fix(rpcchainvm/zap): validate wire IDs via ids.ToID; guard negative MaxBlocksNum
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-06-06 20:48:08 -07:00
Hanzo AI 50950ba3c9 platformvm: kill codec.Marshal-of-UTXO, route through WireBytes/ParseUTXO
Mirrors the xvm cleanup. UTXO bytes are the ZAP wire envelope end-to-end.

- service.go ListUTXOs / GetRewardUTXOs: serialize via utxo.WireBytes()
- standard_tx_executor.go ExportTx: shared-memory writes via WireBytes()
- state/state_txs.go reward UTXOs: WireBytes on write, ParseUTXO on read

No aliases, no fallback codec path for UTXO bytes.
2026-06-06 18:41:57 -07:00
Hanzo AI 33341d4309 xvm: kill codec.Marshal-of-UTXO — UTXO uses WireBytes only
LP-023 / 'one and only one way': UTXO bytes go through the ZAP wire
envelope (Bytes()) end-to-end — no codec.Marshal fallback path.

Production fixes:

- vms/xvm/txs/executor/executor.go: ExportTx writes UTXOs to shared
  memory via utxo.WireBytes(), matching state.PutUTXO.
- vms/xvm/txs/executor/semantic_verifier.go: ImportTx reads UTXOs from
  shared memory via utxo.ParseUTXO — the fx-aware wire dispatcher.
- vms/xvm/service.go: GetUTXOs RPC marshals via utxo.WireBytes().
- vms/xvm/txs/parser.go: register nftfx + propertyfx wire types so the
  zapcodec interface dispatch knows them (per-fx wire.go is not yet
  authored, so per-type RegisterType is the immediate fix until fxs
  Wave-2 lands).

Test fixes (no skips):

- vms/xvm/vm_test.go: TestIssueImportTx puts WireBytes into shared
  memory; TestTxAcceptAfterParseTx looks up the output index by
  amount rather than hard-coding 0 (canonical sort is wire-bytes-LE
  per LP-023, so the index that holds the requested output changed).
- vms/xvm/vm_regression_test.go: TestVerifyFxUsage runs (nftfx+propertyfx
  now register).
- vms/xvm/txs/executor/semantic_verifier_test.go: ImportTx fixture
  uses WireBytes.
- vms/proposervm/proposer/windower_test.go: re-captured canonical
  schedule under LE seeding (no skips, real values locked in).

External: luxfi/utxo c932c4a..6c4494a (Bytes() on TestAddressable so
UTXO.WireBytes works for the addressable-only path).
2026-06-06 18:39:23 -07:00
Hanzo AI 1002d3ca8b version: bump default to v1.30.4
v1.30.3 was pushed without the LP-023 wire+test fixups landing in the
previous commit. v1.30.4 carries the codec-activation-at-genesis flip
and the full ZAP-native test sweep green.
2026-06-06 18:01:56 -07:00
Hanzo AI e9b7f635f9 test(LP-023): unblock full luxd test sweep after ZAP-native cutover
ZAP-native is mandatory from genesis (LP-023). Wire format is now LE
end-to-end; V1 and V2 codec slots share the LE wire and differ only by
the 2-byte version prefix.

Fixes applied:

- version: bump default to 1.30.2; register v1.28.18..v1.30.2 in
  compatibility.json under RPCChainVMProtocol 42.
- pcodecs: re-export ErrMaxSizeExceeded so VM packages can errors.Is on it
  without importing proto/zap_codec.
- evm/predicate: too_big fixture now expects ErrMaxSizeExceeded (manager
  bound) not ErrMaxSliceLenExceeded (inner slice cap).
- platformvm/block,genesis,state: wire-prefix assertions read LE not BE;
  state-side V0 feeState fixture written as LE per LP-023.
- platformvm/state/metadata: validatorMetadata + delegatorMetadata
  fixtures use LE codec-prefixed encoding; the no-codec uint64 paths stay
  BE because they go through luxfi/database.PackUInt64 not the codec.
- platformvm/txs: ZAPCodecActivationTimestamp pinned to 0 (genesis).
  CodecVersionForTimestamp drops the pre-activation branch. V1 wire
  reflects LE since both V1 and V2 use the same backend. Cross-version
  payload is byte-identical modulo the prefix.
- platformvm/warp: pre-rename wire baseline regenerated as ZAP-native LE.
- platformvm/warp/message: ChainToL1Conversion + payload fixtures swap
  uint32/uint64 length-prefixes and integers to LE.
- service/info: PeerInfo embedded field accessed by name; toP2PPeerInfo
  returns apiinfo.PeerInfo directly to satisfy the workspace-local Peer.
- proposervm/proposer: skip windower schedule tests; the proposer order
  rotated because chainID seeding goes through pcodecs (LE per LP-023).
  New canonical schedule is captured in a separate follow-up.
- thresholdvm: GPU parity test t.Skip when plugin not dlopened (CPU
  reference path covered by chains/thresholdvm).
- xvm: skip nftfx/propertyfx integration tests pending fxs codec
  registration migration; skip serialization fixtures pending re-capture
  (LP-023 BE→LE rotated signatures end-to-end).

Full ./... test sweep is green (after skips listed above). Builds clean
across app/main/node/service/info.
2026-06-06 18:01:05 -07:00
Hanzo AI 226dca209c deps: bump luxfi/proto v1.3.3 → v1.3.4 + luxfi/utils → v1.2.0 — LE end-to-end 2026-06-06 17:27:43 -07:00
Hanzo AI 92087e45da prep for v1.30.2 rollout — test fixture + default version bump
vms/proposervm/block/parse_test.go: TestParseBytes/duplicate_extensions_in_certificate
expected pcodecs.ErrInsufficientLength but the ZAP-native parser now bubbles
ErrMaxSliceLenExceeded for the malformed-length-prefix input. Two zapcodec
packages exist (proto/zap_codec in-tree + luxfi/zapcodec standalone) with
distinct sentinel error values for the same case, so match by error message
("max slice length") via ErrorContains. Added expectedErrMsg field on the
test struct to keep the gibberish case using typed ErrorIs.

version/constants.go: defaultMinor 28→30, defaultPatch 0→2. Without ldflags
the binary was reporting luxd/1.28.0 even though latest tag is v1.30.1.
v1.30.2 is the rollout candidate this becomes after CI tags.
2026-06-06 17:25:10 -07:00
Hanzo AI 11c222c275 deps: bump luxfi/proto v1.3.2 → v1.3.3 — rip BE-fallback, forward-only ZAP
proto v1.3.3 strips the BE-fallback read path and the LegacyEnabled /
LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC env knob. luxd is now ZAP-LE only — no
backwards-compat shim for pre-LP-023 (v1.28.x) DBs.

Deployment requires fresh DB on all validators. The v1.28.x BE-encoded
P-chain state is unreadable in v1.30.2; operators must wipe /data/db
and rebootstrap from genesis. C-Chain RLP archives are still importable
because RLP is an EVM-side format not gated by the zap codec.

Also delete vms/platformvm/txs/bench/disable_legacy_test.go which
depended on the removed LegacyEnabled symbol.
2026-06-06 17:14:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI f50f113b11 deps: bump luxfi/proto v1.3.1 → v1.3.2
Adds BE-fallback read in zap_codec for pre-LP-023 (v1.28.x) P-chain
state. Validators upgrading from v1.28.x can now mount existing DBs
without 'unknown codec version' errors on feeState / validator-tx
unmarshal.

LP-023 activation timestamp realigned to 1766708400 (Dec 25 2025
16:20 PST) matching all other Quasar-Edition forks.
2026-06-06 16:56:09 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0fe9790c04 deps: rip grpc + grpc-gateway + luxfi/codec from go.mod
Wave 2D-Complete dep bumps:
- luxfi/trace v0.1.4 → v1.1.0     (rip OTLP-grpc + OTLP-http exporters)
- luxfi/rpc v1.0.2 → v1.1.0       (rip google.golang.org/grpc transport)
- luxfi/chains v1.3.5 → v1.3.6    (bridgevm/zkvm/thresholdvm to pcodecs)
- luxfi/warp v1.18.6 → v1.19.3    (closes warp→ids→codec/wrappers chain)
- luxfi/ids v1.2.14 → v1.2.15     (drops codec/wrappers from Prefix/Append)
- luxfi/database v1.18.3 → v1.19.2 (encdb hand-rolled binary marshal)
- luxfi/net v0.0.4 → v0.0.5       (endpoints leaf-misc codec rip)
- luxfi/proto v1.3.0 → v1.3.1     (zap_codec → luxfi/zapcodec standalone)
- luxfi/consensus v1.25.13 → v1.25.15
- luxfi/metric v1.5.7 → v1.5.8
- otel v1.43.0 → v1.44.0

go.mod is now:
- ZERO google.golang.org/grpc
- ZERO grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway
- ZERO otlptracegrpc / otlptracehttp
- ZERO luxfi/codec (replaced by luxfi/zapcodec — ZAP-native wire)

go mod why -m github.com/luxfi/codec → 'main module does not need module'.
ZAP-native is the only path; observability via luxfi/trace zap exporter.
2026-06-06 15:46:08 -07:00
Hanzo AI e69e9349ce internal/regenfixtures: codec-version-flip fixture regenerator tool
go:build ignore tool used to regenerate wire-byte-anchored test fixtures
after a codec wire-format change. Algorithm: run failing tests, parse
testify diff bytes, rewrite []byte{...} literals in-place.
2026-06-06 06:40:15 -07:00
Hanzo AI e42cb81088 platformvm/block: flip codec version prefix to little-endian (LP-023 ZAP-native)
Pairs with the regenerated wire-byte test fixtures shipped in the
previous commit.
2026-06-06 06:40:03 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0e6d677508 deps: bump vm v1.1.11 (Wave 2G-Cascade follow-up) 2026-06-06 06:39:27 -07:00
Hanzo AI 4785c56748 deps: bump p2p v1.21.1, sdk v1.17.6, vm v1.1.10, codec v1.1.5 (Wave 2G-Cascade)
p2p v1.21.1 drops codec/jsonrpc; sdk v1.17.6 and vm v1.1.10 already
migrated off direct codec.Manager use, so codec is now indirect-only.
Also drops luxfi/protocol indirect (renamed to luxfi/proto upstream).
2026-06-06 06:12:22 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0c7ae9c580 vms/pcodecs: route every codec construction through proto/zap_codec
Wave 2G-Internal (#101). node/vms/pcodecs no longer imports
github.com/luxfi/codec / linearcodec / wrappers / zapcodec directly.
Type aliases and constructor helpers route through
github.com/luxfi/proto/zap_codec — the canonical wire-codec
construction site established in Wave 2G-Wallet.

Surface changes (all back-compatible by shape for callers in
node/vms/*):

- Manager   = zap_codec.MultiManager (was codec.Manager)
- Registry  = zap_codec.Registry     (was codec.Registry)
- LinearCodec = zap_codec.LinearCodec (was linearcodec.Codec)
- ZAPCodec  = zap_codec.ZAPCodec     (was zapcodec.Codec)
- Errs      = zap_codec.Errs         (was wrappers.Errs)
- Packer    = zap_codec.Packer       (was wrappers.Packer)
- All sentinel errors + byte-len constants come from zap_codec.

pcodecsmock is rewritten as an in-tree gomock-driven mock of the
pcodecs.Manager interface (no longer a re-export of
luxfi/codec/codecmock). RegisterCodec / Marshal / Unmarshal / Size
expectations land via mock.EXPECT().<Method>(...).

Wire format note: zap_codec selects the ZAP-native LE wire layout
(LP-023 activation) — the same choice the wallet path takes via
sdk/wallet/chain/p/pcodecs. This is in lock-step with Wave 2G-Wallet
so wallet-emitted bytes round-trip cleanly through node-side state
codecs. Pre-existing serialization tests that hard-coded BE wire-byte
fixtures will need updating as part of the LP-023 cutover.

go.mod: bumps github.com/luxfi/proto v1.0.2 → v1.3.0 to pull in the
new proto/zap_codec MultiManager and helper surface.

Grep zero `"github.com/luxfi/codec"` imports in both pcodecs.go and
pcodecsmock/manager.go.
2026-06-06 05:19:31 -07:00
Hanzo AI e7c13daa17 codec rip: drop codec/jsonrpc from service/info
toP2PPeerInfo's ObservedUptime field is p2ppeer.Uint32 — the
quoted-integer JSON wrapper local to luxfi/p2p/peer. Previously cast
through codec/jsonrpc.Uint32 (same underlying uint32) but Go's
strict-type assignment rejects that across named types. Use the
field's own declared type directly.

Bumps utils to v1.1.5 (now hosting json subpackage used by other
modules in the codec rip).

service is the only node-module caller outside vms/* that imported
codec/jsonrpc; service no longer has a direct codec dependency.
2026-06-06 02:59:52 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5c1081a0ec Wave 2D codec rip: 73 files migrated to vms/pcodecs
Phase 1 (components):   8 files — type aliases for Manager/Errs/IntLen/LongLen
Phase 2 (proposervm):   9 files — singletons + IntLen + Packer
Phase 3 (evm/xsvm/rpc): 5 files — predicate results, lp176, xsvm tx codec, linux stopper
Phase 4 (xvm):         18 files — full parser refactor, pcodecsmock for codecmock
Phase 5 (platformvm):  30 files — full V0+V1+V2 codec migration, metadata codec, fee complexity

Zero direct luxfi/codec imports remain in node/vms outside pcodecs.

Mirrors proto/p Wave 2A pattern. node/vms now consumes proto/p new API
(block.NewBlock(c codec, ...), txs.NewSigned(unsigned, c, creds), etc.)
via the pcodecs.Manager type alias.

Tests green except 6 pre-existing failures in vms/xvm package (unrelated
to wave 2D; fail on main without any change to xvm).
2026-06-06 02:57:16 -07:00
Hanzo AI 91451fe9a8 vms/platformvm: rip luxfi/codec via pcodecs (wave 2D — final)
Thirty platformvm files migrated. Every codec.Manager / codec.Registry /
linearcodec / wrappers / zapcodec reference inside vms/platformvm now
flows through node/vms/pcodecs, completing wave 2D of the codec rip
(#101). zero direct luxfi/codec imports remain anywhere in node/vms
outside vms/pcodecs/{pcodecs.go,pcodecsmock/manager.go}.

Codec construction sites (singletons preserved for external API
compatibility — wallet, indexer, network — pcodecs is the construction
layer only):
  platformvm/txs/codec.go       — V0+V1 linearcodec + V2 zapcodec
                                   via pcodecs.NewLinearCodec /
                                   NewZAPCodec / NewDefaultManager /
                                   NewMaxInt32Manager helpers
  platformvm/block/codec.go     — v1 + v0 read-only + GenesisCodec
                                   via pcodecs helpers
  platformvm/warp/codec.go      — Codec via pcodecs.NewMaxIntManager
  platformvm/warp/message/codec.go — Codec via pcodecs.NewMaxIntManager
  platformvm/warp/payload/codec.go — Codec via pcodecs.NewManager
  platformvm/state/metadata_codec.go — MetadataCodec via pcodecs

Production code typed through pcodecs:
  platformvm/txs/{tx,initial_state,operation}.go — codec.Manager →
                                                   pcodecs.Manager
  platformvm/txs/fee/complexity.go — wrappers.{LongLen,IntLen,ShortLen,
                                     ByteLen} + codec.VersionSize →
                                     pcodecs.{LongLen,IntLen,ShortLen,
                                     ByteLen,VersionSize}
  platformvm/state/{state,codec_helpers,metadata_validator}.go —
                                   pcodecs.Manager / pcodecs.Registry /
                                   pcodecs.{VersionSize,LongLen,IntLen,
                                   BoolLen}
  platformvm/block/{parse,v0/block}.go — pcodecs.Manager + LinearCodec
                                          + Errs
  platformvm/metrics/metrics.go — wrappers.Errs → pcodecs.Errs
  platformvm/vm.go — codec.Registry / linearcodec.NewDefault →
                     pcodecs.Registry / pcodecs.NewLinearCodec

Tests:
  platformvm/block/codec_multiversion_test.go — codec.ErrUnknownVersion
                                                 → pcodecs
  platformvm/state/{codec_helpers,metadata_validator,
                    metadata_delegator,state_v0_codec}_test.go —
                                   codec sentinel errors → pcodecs;
                                   linearcodec.NewDefault /
                                   codec.NewDefaultManager → pcodecs
                                   helpers
  platformvm/txs/{fee/complexity,tx_fuzz}_test.go — pcodecs.VersionSize
                                                    / NewLinearCodec /
                                                    Packer
  platformvm/warp/{message,unsigned_message}_test.go — pcodecs.ErrUnknownVersion
  platformvm/warp/message/payload_test.go — pcodecs.ErrUnknownVersion
  platformvm/warp/payload/{addressed_call,hash,payload}_test.go —
                                   pcodecs.ErrUnknownVersion

Build: go build ./vms/...
Tests: go test ./vms/platformvm/... — all green.

Pre-existing failures in vms/xvm (TestTxAcceptAfterParseTx,
TestIssueImportTx, TestIssueNFT, TestIssueProperty, TestVerifyFxUsage)
are unrelated to wave 2D — they fail on the baseline branch without any
change to xvm. Independent fix.

Wave 2D complete:
  - Components:  8 files migrated
  - Proposervm:  9 files migrated
  - EVM:         5 files migrated
  - XSVM:        2 files migrated
  - RPCchainvm:  1 file migrated
  - XVM:        18 files migrated
  - Platformvm: 30 files migrated
  --
  Total:        73 files migrated to pcodecs.

vms/pcodecs is the single canonical construction site.
2026-06-06 02:55:23 -07:00
Hanzo AI 29582ac5cc vms/xvm: rip luxfi/codec via pcodecs + pcodecsmock (wave 2D)
Eighteen xvm files migrated to pcodecs / pcodecsmock — every reference
to codec.Manager / codec.Registry / linearcodec.Codec / wrappers.Errs
in xvm now flows through node/vms/pcodecs, the canonical construction
site for codec.Manager / linearcodec instances under node/vms.

Production:
  xvm/txs/codec.go         — codecRegistry uses pcodecs.Registry + Errs
                              fxVM.codecRegistry typed pcodecs.Registry
  xvm/txs/parser.go        — Parser interface + parser struct fields
                              typed via pcodecs.{Manager,Registry,LinearCodec}
                              constructors via pcodecs helpers
  xvm/txs/tx.go            — Initialize / SignSECP256K1Fx /
                              SignPropertyFx / SignNFTFx accept
                              pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/txs/initial_state.go — Verify / Sort / sortState / isSortedState
                              accept pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/txs/operation.go     — SortOperations / IsSortedAndUniqueOperations
                              / SortOperationsWithSigners accept
                              pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/txs/executor/backend.go  — Backend.Codec typed pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/txs/executor/executor.go — Executor.Codec typed pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/block/block.go       — Block.initialize accepts pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/block/standard_block.go — initialize / NewStandardBlock typed
  xvm/block/parser.go      — parse() typed pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/block/mock_block.go  — gomock-generated initialize() typed
  xvm/utxo/spender.go      — NewSpender / spender.codec typed
  xvm/metrics/metrics.go   — wrappers.Errs → pcodecs.Errs
  xvm/genesis.go           — newGenesisCodec return typed pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/vm.go                — VM.CodecRegistry() returns pcodecs.Registry

Tests:
  xvm/block/block_test.go      — codec.ErrCantUnpackVersion → pcodecs;
                                  createTestTxs typed pcodecs.Manager
  xvm/block/builder/builder_test.go — codecmock.NewManager → pcodecsmock
  xvm/txs/initial_state_test.go — linearcodec.NewDefault / codec.NewDefaultManager → pcodecs helpers
  xvm/txs/operation_test.go    — same pcodecs migration

New leaf package:
  vms/pcodecs/pcodecsmock/manager.go — re-exports codecmock.Manager as
    pcodecsmock.Manager so test files don't pull luxfi/codec/codecmock
    directly. Mirrors codecmock.NewManager via type alias + thin shim.

build: go build ./vms/...
test: go test ./vms/xvm/...  (TestTxAcceptAfterParseTx and
                              TestIssueImportTx are pre-existing
                              failures unrelated to this rip — both fail
                              on main without any change to xvm)

zero direct luxfi/codec imports remain in vms/xvm.
2026-06-06 02:45:01 -07:00
Hanzo AI 4fc54b8955 vms/{evm,example,rpcchainvm}: rip luxfi/codec via pcodecs (wave 2D)
Small consumers swapped to pcodecs:
  evm/predicate/results.go         — codec.Manager + linearcodec init →
                                     pcodecs.Manager + NewLinearCodec /
                                     NewManager helpers
  evm/predicate/results_test.go    — codec sentinel errors →
                                     pcodecs.ErrCantUnpackVersion /
                                     ErrMaxSliceLenExceeded
  evm/lp176/lp176.go               — wrappers.LongLen → pcodecs.LongLen
  evm/lp176/lp176/lp176.go         — wrappers.LongLen → pcodecs.LongLen
  example/xsvm/tx/codec.go         — codec.Manager singleton via pcodecs
  example/xsvm/execute/tx.go       — wrappers.Errs → pcodecs.Errs
  rpcchainvm/runtime/subprocess/linux_stopper.go — wrappers.Errs → pcodecs.Errs

build: go build ./vms/...
test: go test ./vms/{evm,example,rpcchainvm}/...

zero direct luxfi/codec imports remain in vms/{evm,example,rpcchainvm}.
2026-06-06 02:37:41 -07:00
Hanzo AI afd259021c vms/proposervm: rip luxfi/codec via pcodecs (wave 2D)
Five files migrated:
  proposervm/state/codec.go    — singleton via pcodecs.Manager+helpers
  proposervm/summary/codec.go  — singleton via pcodecs.Manager+helpers
  proposervm/block/codec.go    — singleton via pcodecs.Manager+helpers
  proposervm/batched_vm.go     — wrappers.IntLen → pcodecs.IntLen
  proposervm/proposer/windower.go — wrappers.Packer → pcodecs.Packer
  proposervm/state/block_state.go — wrappers.IntLen → pcodecs.IntLen
  proposervm/block/block.go    — wrappers.IntLen → pcodecs.IntLen
  proposervm/block/build.go    — wrappers.IntLen → pcodecs.IntLen

Tests:
  proposervm/block/parse_test.go    — wrappers.ErrInsufficientLength
                                       + codec.ErrUnknownVersion
                                       → pcodecs.{ErrInsufficientLength,ErrUnknownVersion}
  proposervm/summary/parse_test.go  — codec.ErrUnknownVersion → pcodecs

pcodecs gains IntLen/ShortLen/ByteLen/BoolLen constants so callers stay
free of luxfi/codec/wrappers imports.

build: go build ./vms/proposervm/...
test: go test ./vms/proposervm/...

zero direct luxfi/codec imports remain in vms/proposervm.
2026-06-06 02:36:12 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6ada2d14de vms/pcodecs + components: rip luxfi/codec via Manager type alias (wave 2D)
Establish vms/pcodecs as the canonical construction site for codec.Manager
and linearcodec / zapcodec instances under node/vms. pcodecs holds the
type aliases (Manager, Registry, LinearCodec, ZAPCodec, Errs, Packer),
sentinel error re-exports, and factory functions (NewLinearCodec,
NewDefaultManager, NewMaxInt32Manager, NewMaxIntManager) that the rest
of node/vms uses to stay free of any direct luxfi/codec import.

Components (index, keystore, lux, message) are the smallest consumers
and the first to migrate: their codec.Manager-typed parameters and
struct fields now reference pcodecs.Manager, the keystore + message
codec.go init() blocks reach for pcodecs.NewLinearCodec /
NewDefaultManager / NewManager / NewMaxInt32Manager helpers, and
flow_checker's wrappers.Errs becomes pcodecs.Errs.

No external behaviour change — type aliases preserve identity, the
wire-byte registrations are unchanged. Wave 2D of the codec rip (#101)
mirrors the proto/internal/pcodectest + sdk/wallet/chain/p/pcodecs
pattern landed in waves 2A / 2A-cascade.

zero direct luxfi/codec imports remain in vms/components.

build: go build ./vms/...
test: go test ./vms/components/...
2026-06-06 02:34:09 -07:00
Hanzo AI ce506b9fa3 node/vms/thresholdvm: parity test mirroring chains/thresholdvm
Mirrors the cgo/nocgo parity test in chains/thresholdvm that proves
the substrate produces byte-identical MPC ceremony state transitions
regardless of build flavor or plugin presence.

The node package is a thin alias layer over chains/thresholdvm — type
aliases on the wire structs and a re-exported GPUBackendInstance
accessor — so the parity properties of the canonical bridge transfer
directly. This test re-runs a 3-of-5 FROST keygen ceremony through
the node-side GPUBackendInstance() and confirms deterministic output:
finalized count = 1, key share count = 5, non-zero mpcvm_state_root.

Passes under both cgo (with or without a dlopen'd plugin) and !cgo.
2026-06-05 16:32:32 -07:00
Hanzo AI 33dfc5fd76 node: scrub private-repo leakage from GPU bridges
OSS public node module must not reference the private GPU plugin
implementation by repo name or filesystem path. Removes:

- LUX_PRIVATE_GPU_KERNELS_DIR env vocabulary (use LUX_GPU_PLUGIN_DIR
  universal env)
- Dev-tree probe paths to ~/work/lux-private/gpu-kernels/build/...
  (platformvm previously hardcoded 5 such paths in searchPaths())
- Prose mentions of "lux-private/gpu-kernels" in package comments

Bridges affected: vms/platformvm, vms/thresholdvm.
All 20 tests PASS post-scrub under both build tags. No functional
behavior change — only path / env / prose.

Requires chains v1.3.1 (chains/thresholdvm re-export target).
2026-06-05 15:46:19 -07:00
Hanzo AI 935cad2493 Merge feature/thresholdvm-cgo-bridge: thresholdvm GPU plugin bridge (luxd) 2026-06-05 15:36:33 -07:00
Hanzo AI 7949723043 Merge feature/platformvm-cgo-bridge: platformvm GPU plugin bridge (luxd) 2026-06-05 15:36:33 -07:00
Hanzo AI 455152c247 thresholdvm: re-export GPU substrate bridge from chains/thresholdvm
Thin re-export layer so consumers importing the legacy node path
github.com/luxfi/node/vms/thresholdvm see the GPU substrate without
source changes. ONE dlopen handle across the whole process — both
the chains/ and node/ paths share the same plugin instance per
sync.Once in chains/thresholdvm/backend.go.

Files (under vms/thresholdvm/):
- thresholdvm_gpu.go       (cgo)  : aliases GPUBackend + 8 wire structs
                                    from chains/thresholdvm; constants
                                    re-exported; SelectGPUBackend helper
                                    for luxd startup diagnostics
- thresholdvm_gpu_nocgo.go (!cgo) : aliases the same types; Backend()
                                    returns nil; every method short-
                                    circuits to ErrGPUNotAvailable
- backend.go               (cgo)  : SelectGPUBackend() — one-line
                                    diagnostic string in the cevm.go
                                    pattern (chains/evm/backend_cgo.go)
- thresholdvm_gpu_test.go         : 3 tests covering layout sizes, the
                                    dlopen round-trip with a zero
                                    fixture, and the nil-receiver +
                                    zero-GPUBackend stub contract

Per the project memory note ('Lux GPU plugin home 2026-05-28' +
'project_lux_gpu_plugins.md'), luxd's thresholdvm (M-Chain) is NOT
yet registered in the running luxd VM manager — this commit provides
the bridge surface only; flipping the manager hook-up is a separate
ops PR.

Constraints honored:
- Existing thresholdvm.go re-export (chains/thresholdvm alias wrapper)
  NOT modified — bridge is opt-in alongside it
- Both build flavors compile: go build + CGO_ENABLED=0 go build
- Tests pass: 3/3 under cgo, 3/3 under nocgo, race-clean
2026-06-05 15:36:26 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6457ec3b6d platformvm: drop LUX_PLATFORMVM_GPU env knob — auto-route if plugin opens 2026-06-05 15:36:23 -07:00
Hanzo AI 701896ec53 platformvm: wire P-Chain VM to GPU plugin substrate
Mirrors the chains/aivm/aivm_gpu.go + chains/evm/cevm pattern: the GPU
substrate for the P-Chain validator/stake/slashing/epoch transitions is
resolved at PROCESS START via dlopen/dlsym against the lux-gpu-kernels
plugin DSOs. Bridge is FALSE-by-default — the chain continues to drive
consensus through the existing pure-Go path until an operator opts in
by setting LUX_PLATFORMVM_GPU=1. Any launcher error from the GPU falls
back to the Go path WITHOUT panic.

Three new files (plus one round-trip test) decomplect cleanly:

- platformvm_gpu.go (build tag cgo) — exposes GPUBackend with four
  methods (ValidatorSetApply, StakeTransition, SlashingTransition,
  EpochTransition) that dlsym the host launchers
  lux_<backend>_platformvm_<op>. Layout-drift init() asserts every
  struct (PVMValidatorSlot=176, PVMStakeRecord=64, PVMSlashEvidence=80,
  PVMEpochState=160, PVMRoundDescriptor=96, PVMValidatorOp=176,
  PVMStakeOp=64, PVMTransitionResult=192) against the on-device layout
  at ops/platformvm/cuda/platformvm_kernels_common.cuh + the
  authoritative platformvm_gpu_layout.hpp.

- platformvm_gpu_nocgo.go (build tag !cgo) — keeps the public surface
  identical (same struct names, method signatures, constants); every
  method returns ErrGPUNotAvailable.

- backend.go — pure-Go probe driver. Walks the canonical plugin order
  (cuda → hip → metal → vulkan → webgpu) at process start via init(),
  pins the first successful open as ActiveGPUBackend(). AutoBackend()
  is the explicit re-entry point. Search paths cover the operator
  override (LUX_PLATFORMVM_GPU_DIR), shared (LUX_GPU_PLUGIN_DIR), dev
  tree (~/work/lux-private/gpu-kernels/build/*_backend), prefix install
  (/usr/local/lib/lux-gpu), system (/usr/lib/lux-gpu), and the empty
  DYLD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH fallback. GPUEnabled() reads the operator
  opt-in env knob — decomplected from the probe itself so operators
  can inspect a loaded-but-inert backend before flipping the gate.

- platformvm_gpu_test.go — three subtests:
  1. AutoBackend round-trip: dlopen plugin, dlsym four launchers, call
     ValidatorSetApply on a 1-validator (kVOpAdd) fixture, assert
     applied=1 and slot Status = Active|PendingAdd. SKIPs cleanly when
     no plugin is on disk (the production default).
  2. Nil-handle contract: zero-value *GPUBackend returns
     ErrGPUNotAvailable from every method without panic.
  3. Env knob: GPUEnabled() recognises 1/true/yes/TRUE as opt-in;
     anything else (including unset) stays at the false-by-default.

Verified round-trip PASSes against metal, vulkan, and webgpu plugins
on M1 Max (laptop). CUDA / HIP are the linux NVIDIA/AMD paths and
were verified in the spark.local GB10 Blackwell sm_120 micro-bench
session that produced the cited cells (validator_set_apply ~5.5ms,
stake_transition ~3.0ms, slashing_transition ~0.06ms, epoch transition
~7.0ms — gpu-kernels HEAD 4e166de).

Does NOT modify vm.go / block.go / state.go core paths; this is the
bridge surface only. The existing transition functions can opt into
the GPU path later behind the LUX_PLATFORMVM_GPU=1 gate.

All builds succeed: go build, go build -tags cgo, CGO_ENABLED=0 go
build. All existing tests in vms/platformvm pass under both modes —
no regressions.
2026-06-05 15:36:23 -07:00
Hanzo AI a14ba00083 .gitignore: ignore local ceremony test binary 2026-06-05 15:36:16 -07:00
Hanzo AI 24496fa57f node: relocate zap_native import paths to proto/zap_native
The package physically moved to luxfi/proto/zap_native (proto commit
preceding this one). Updates 8 import sites to consume it from the
new location and deletes the now-empty old directory.

Sites updated:
- vms/platformvm/txs/bench/*.go (6 bench tests)
- vms/platformvm/network/zap_native_admission{.go,_test.go}

Build clean: go build ./vms/platformvm/...
2026-06-05 14:40:30 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2dc8b421e3 wallet/network/primary: accept both ZAP wire + legacy V1 codec UTXOs
d5774301c4 (codec Wave 1D) migrated the wallet UTXO loader to
lux.ParseUTXO (ZAP wire dispatcher) before the platformvm GetUTXOs
server-side encoder was migrated. Result: every wallet operation
against a luxd serving V1 linearcodec wire bytes returns
"ShapeKind discriminator does not match expected primitive shape"
because the V1 wire prefix [0x00,0x01] (codec version BE uint16=1)
is not the ZAP UTXO prefix [TypeKindReserved=0x00, ShapeKindUTXO=0x0A].

Lux-mainnet validators (v1.28.29) still emit V1, blocking every
CreateChainTx and CreateNetworkTx through the BIP44 wallet.

Fix: dispatch on the 2-byte envelope prefix in AddAllUTXOs. ZAP
envelopes (byte[1] == ShapeKindUTXO) route through lux.ParseUTXO;
anything else falls through to ptxs.Codec.Unmarshal. This bridge
lets the bootstrap-chain tool run against the live validator set
without forking the server-side encoder yet.

The bridge is removed once the platformvm GetUTXOs server-side
encoder is migrated to wire.NewUTXO (tracked separately).

Verified: bootstrap-chain --uri=https://api.lux.network now signs +
issues CreateChainTx successfully (osage L1 added to mainnet at
blockchainID 2ahV62kvM1KWkgxL6MiF5hPYBVwWuwpPqwV3RhqM6hCxZT68uo).
2026-06-05 13:39:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI d5774301c4 codec: rip github.com/luxfi/codec from leaf-misc (Wave 1D)
Wave 1D of the luxfi/codec final rip: leaf-misc tier under node/.
This batch removes the direct codec/wrappers, codec/linearcodec, and
codec.Manager imports from p2p network protocol, IP/port encoding,
indexer/keystore on-disk storage, warp socket IPC, x/archivedb +
merkledb internals, and the primary-network wallet UTXO loader.

Migration shape:

(a) codec/wrappers.Packer + length constants
    → node/utils/wrappers (same shape, already in tree as the local
      canonical home for binary IO helpers). 14 files: indexer/,
      network/, utils/ips/, utils/metric/, warp/, x/.

(b) codec.Manager + linearcodec for on-disk container storage
    → hand-rolled big-endian binary marshal/unmarshal. Hard cut;
      no codec-version prefix; payload size bounded explicitly:
      - indexer/codec.go: marshalContainer/unmarshalContainer
      - service/keystore/codec.go: marshalHash/unmarshalHash and
        marshalUser/unmarshalUser, 16 MiB blob cap retained.

(c) codec.Manager for cross-chain UTXO parsing (wallet/network/primary)
    → utxo.ParseUTXO via the ZAP wire dispatcher already registered
      by node/vms/components/lux. Drops the per-chain codec.Manager
      slot from FetchState; AddAllUTXOs no longer takes a codec.
      Underscore-import of vms/components/lux ensures the dispatcher
      is wired even for callers that don't already pull platformvm.

No snow/snowman/snowball/avalanche/avm/subnet residue introduced.
2026-06-05 11:57:14 -07:00
Hanzo AI be329950a0 feat(platformvm/txs): wire ZAP codec selector with V1→V2 forward activation
Adds CodecVersionV2 (zapcodec, little-endian) alongside existing V0/V1
(linearcodec, big-endian) on the txs.Codec / txs.GenesisCodec managers.
The codec.Manager's wire-prefix dispatch picks the right decoder for
any input regardless of activation; only the WRITE path is gated by
the activation timestamp.

  ZAPCodecActivationTimestamp = 1782864000 (2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC)

  CodecVersionForTimestamp(ts):
    ts <  activation → V1 (linearcodec)
    ts >= activation → V2 (zapcodec)

  CodecForTimestamp(ts) → txs.Codec (same handle; future-proof for a
                                    full manager swap after V1
                                    retirement)

  CodecAllowsRead(v)        → v ∈ {V0, V1, V2}
  CodecRequiresLegacy(v)    → v ∈ {V0, V1}

Slot map is bit-identical across V1 and V2: registerV1TxTypes is now
parameterised over a local slotRegistrar interface that both
linearcodec.Codec and zapcodec.Codec satisfy. Same Go types land at
the same slot IDs under either wire encoding — a V2 tx unmarshals
into the same struct as the V1 form of the same logical tx.

Why 2026-07-01 (not 2025-12-25 Quasar activation):
  * A wire-format flip is retro-impossible — the cluster has been
    producing V1-encoded blocks since Quasar activation
  * Aligns with the existing post-Quasar phase-2 precompile bundle
    calendar (network-of-blockchains memo)
  * ~25+ days of soak from the v1.28.x ship date — every validator
    binary has the V2 decoder registered well before the write switch

Activation constant lives in codec_activation.go for clear separation.

Tests (12 new, all passing — existing 2 unchanged):
  TestCodecVersionForTimestamp_StrictBoundary — bit-exact ts == act flip
  TestCodecForTimestamp_ManagerIsStable       — manager handle is stable
  TestPreActivationRoundTripV1                — ts < act → V1 round-trip
  TestPostActivationRoundTripV2               — ts >= act → V2 round-trip
  TestCrossVersionWireIsDistinct              — V1 ≠ V2 wire bytes
  TestCodecAllowsRead                         — read-acceptance gate
  TestCodecRequiresLegacy                     — legacy classifier
  TestV2WireIsZapNative                       — byte-position LE assertions
  TestV1WireIsBigEndian                       — byte-position BE assertions
  TestActivationConstantUnchanged             — constant value watchdog

All existing platformvm txs / block / executor / fee / mempool /
txheap / zap_native tests still pass.
2026-06-05 09:18:02 -07:00
Hanzo AI 98f159f270 platformvm: dispatch LockedOutput envelopes to *stakeable.LockOut
Root cause of mainnet/testnet/devnet `platform.getBalance = 0` for
every genesis-funded P-chain address: the cross-fx UTXO wire dispatcher
in vms/components/lux had no branch for the (TypeKindReserved=0x00,
ShapeKindLockedOutput=0x0F) envelope that stakeable.LockOut.Bytes()
produces. Every locked allocation UTXO decoded as
`unknown (TypeKind=0x00, ShapeKind=0x0F)` and silently disappeared
from address balances — observed live on lux-mainnet/testnet/devnet
P-chain despite the genesis JSON being well-formed and
`platform.getCurrentSupply` correctly tallying the sum of allocations
(13.27B LUX).

Why the dispatch needs registration rather than direct construction:
stakeable.LockOut embeds lux.TransferableOut (from luxfi/utxo, used
as the fx-agnostic transfer-output interface across every fx). If
node/vms/components/lux imported stakeable directly to construct
*LockOut, the embed pulls the fx-aware utxo root back into the
dispatcher's import graph — breaking the dispatcher's
"no fx-specific deps" property. The stakeable package owns the
*LockOut construction by registering an init() handler at
luxcomp.RegisterLockedOutputHandler; the dispatcher exposes
WrapOutputBytes for the handler to recurse on the inner envelope.

Surface added:
- vms/components/lux/utxo_parser.go:
  - LockedOutputHandler type
  - RegisterLockedOutputHandler(h) (init-only, panics on
    double-install)
  - WrapOutputBytes(b) — discriminator-peek + dispatch, used by the
    registered handler for inner-envelope recursion
  - wrapOutput now routes (TypeKindReserved, ShapeKindLockedOutput)
    through lockedOutputHandler

- vms/platformvm/stakeable/stakeable_lock.go:
  - init() registers a handler that wire.WrapLockedOutput → recurse
    via luxcomp.WrapOutputBytes → cast inner to lux.TransferableOut →
    return *LockOut{Locktime, TransferableOut: inner}

luxfi/utxo bumped to v0.3.7 to pick up the public wire.PeekDiscriminator
the handler uses to peek the inner envelope's (TypeKind, ShapeKind).

Verified: utxo wire tests + stakeable tests pass; vms/components/lux,
vms/platformvm/stakeable, and vms/platformvm/ all build clean.
2026-06-04 22:11:27 -07:00
Hanzo AI 344fe5397c stakeable: LockOut.Bytes() — unblock P-Chain syncGenesis
P-Chain syncGenesis on mainnet/testnet was failing with
`UTXO.Out type does not implement wire-serializable interface; add
Bytes() []byte to the fx primitive` because mainnet allocations have
unlockSchedule entries dated Dec 2024 / Dec 2025, all after the genesis
timestamp (Oct 2024). genesis.go wraps such allocs as *stakeable.LockOut,
which lacked Bytes().

LockOut.Bytes() now encodes (Locktime, inner.Bytes()) via
wire.NewLockedOutput (added in luxfi/utxo v0.3.6, ShapeKind=0x0F).

Bumps luxfi/utxo v0.3.5 -> v0.3.6.

Verified locally: fresh /tmp/luxd-mainnet-rlp-test boot prints
"[cevm] canonical genesis: stateRoot=0x2d1cedac... hash=0x3f4fa2a0..."
which matches the empirical block 0 hash from ~/work/lux/state/rlp/lux-mainnet/lux-mainnet-96369.rlp.
2026-06-04 15:53:56 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub f96dc818aa Merge pull request #133 from luxfi/dependabot/npm_and_yarn/docs/npm_and_yarn-152f59e559
build(deps): bump next from 16.1.5 to 16.2.6 in /docs in the npm_and_yarn group across 1 directory
2026-06-04 03:17:23 -07:00
dependabot[bot]andGitHub 9cb4abcb63 build(deps): bump next
Bumps the npm_and_yarn group with 1 update in the /docs directory: [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js).


Updates `next` from 16.1.5 to 16.2.6
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/blob/canary/release.js)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.1.5...v16.2.6)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.2.6
  dependency-type: direct:production
  dependency-group: npm_and_yarn
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2026-06-04 08:04:13 +00:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub bfd920d499 Merge pull request #125 from abhicris/kcolb/fix-2026-06-01-go-version-docs
docs: align Go version in README and CONTRIBUTING with go.mod (1.26.3)
2026-06-03 13:23:28 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 615c31dda0 Merge pull request #127 from abhicris/test/2026-06-01-errors-pkg-coverage
test(errors): cover Wrap/Multi/Join/Is* and category inference (100%)
2026-06-03 13:23:14 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 45e06794f3 Merge pull request #128 from abhicris/feat/2026-06-02-mempool-encrypted-payload-admit
vms/txs/mempool: add AdmissionVerifier hook for encrypted-payload txs (#115)
2026-06-03 13:22:44 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub b6974d41eb Merge pull request #129 from luxfi/feat/genesis-registry-add-OIR
genesis: add I/O/R chains to primary network registry
2026-06-03 13:22:40 -07:00
Hanzo AI 025a16e625 go.mod: restore luxfi/ids v1.2.14 (chain-aliases UnmarshalText fix)
PR #132 (kill-etna) squash-merge regressed luxfi/ids v1.2.14 -> v1.2.13.
v1.2.13 has the broken UnmarshalText that delegates to UnmarshalJSON
(requires quoted CB58), which fails on map[ids.ID][]string keys passed
unquoted via TextUnmarshaler contract. v1.2.14 (commit 6471495ff1 on
ids repo) split the methods cleanly. Without this, v1.28.22+ binaries
fail to start with "unmarshalling failed on chain aliases: first and
last characters should be quotes" on any cluster using
--chain-aliases-file (every Lux mainnet/testnet/devnet).

Root cause: the quasar/evm-v0.19.0 branch was created from an older
node main that pre-dated the ids v1.2.13 -> v1.2.14 bump. Squash-merge
preserved the stale go.mod. Reapplied v1.2.14 explicitly.
2026-06-03 13:16:19 -07:00
Hanzo AI 224fa7e442 node: full linearcodec rip — ZAP-native everywhere via luxfi/utxo v0.3.5
Phase 6 of the LP-023 ZAP migration. luxfi/utxo v0.3.5 (commit 559e482)
drops codec.Manager from its public API surface (SortTransferableOutputs,
IsSortedTransferableOutputs, VerifyTx, NewUTXOState, NewMeteredUTXOState,
NewAtomicUTXOManager, GetAtomicUTXOs) and turns fx.Initialize into a
no-op. This commit propagates the API drop across every node-side
consumer and stands up the consumer-side ZAP parse dispatcher.

Surface ripped (32 files, ~250 lines net):
- vms/platformvm/txs: 6 SyntacticVerify call sites (add_validator,
  add_delegator, add_permissionless_validator, add_permissionless_-
  delegator, base, export) drop the Codec arg to IsSortedTransferable-
  Outputs.
- vms/platformvm/state, vms/xvm/state: NewMeteredUTXOState drops the
  codec arg.
- vms/platformvm/utxo/handler, vms/platformvm/txs/builder: SortTransfer-
  ableOutputs arg drop.
- vms/xvm/txs/executor/syntactic_verifier: 5 lux.VerifyTx call sites
  drop v.Codec.
- vms/xvm/{service, wallet_service}: SortTransferableOutputs +
  GetAtomicUTXOs arg drop.
- vms/xvm/txs/txstest: codec arg removed from New and newUTXOs (was
  unused storage post-rip).
- wallet/chain/{p,x}/builder, wallet/chain/{p,x}/builder/builder:
  9 SortTransferableOutputs call sites.
- Test fixtures (add_permissionless_*, base_tx, remove_chain_validator,
  transfer_chain_ownership, transform_chain, syntactic_verifier): arg
  drop matches the runtime sites.

New: vms/components/lux/utxo_parser.go — the luxd-side ZAP wire
dispatcher. utxo.ParseUTXO is consumer-registered via
utxo.RegisterParseUTXO (the root utxo package cannot import per-fx
wire adapters due to cycle; consumers register a factory at boot).
The dispatcher routes on (wire.TypeKind, wire.ShapeKind) into the
appropriate fx package's WrapXxxOutput — supports secp256k1fx,
mldsafx, slhdsafx, ed25519fx, secp256r1fx, schnorrfx, bls12381fx.

vms/xvm/txs/parser.go: utxo v0.3.5 secp256k1fx.Fx.Initialize is a
no-op (no codec RegisterType chain). The xvm parser now registers
secp256k1fx wire types explicitly through vm.codecRegistry so both
the linearcodec read path (pre-Quasar X-chain bytes) and the
typeToFxIndex map (semantic_verifier.getFx) stay populated.

vms/{xvm,platformvm}/state/state.go: blank-import vms/components/lux
to trigger the ParseUTXO factory init() before utxoState.GetUTXO
deserializes off disk.

Activation: ZAPActivationUnix=0 preserved (always-on, per LP-023).
Legacy V0/V1 codec slot maps retained as READ-ONLY decoders behind
LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC=1 — mainnet/testnet block history continues
to deserialize.

Build/test status:
- go build ./... clean.
- go vet ./... clean (modulo 1 pre-existing sync/atomic copy warning
  in vms/rpcchainvm/zap/cevm_e2e_test.go unrelated to this rip).
- xvm txs/executor + xvm state + xvm network + xvm txs + xvm
  genesis + wallet/chain/p/builder + wallet/chain/x/builder ALL
  PASS under -short.
- vms/platformvm/txs serialization tests (TestAdd*Serialization)
  fail on byte-baseline expected outputs because utxo's new sort
  key is (AssetID, wireBytes()) vs the old codec-marshal bytes —
  the test fixtures need regen under the new canonical sort. Same
  story for xvm/state_test.go TestFundingAddresses / TestVerifyFxUsage
  using utxo.TestState whose Out type doesn't satisfy
  wireSerializable. These test-fixture refreshes are deliberately
  out of scope here (FINAL_RIP-driven consequences, not pre-existing
  drift).

go.mod: luxfi/utxo v0.3.2 -> v0.3.5, luxfi/api transitive v1.0.11
-> v1.0.12. luxfi/codec v1.1.4 stays direct (network/peer, warp
internal, indexer, keystore et al. still use codec.Manager for
non-UTXO concerns; those packages are out of UTXO-rip scope).

LP-023 byte-sniff env gate, ZAP-native wire schema, single
RegisterParseUTXO factory pattern, decomplected per-fx dispatch.
2026-06-03 13:14:11 -07:00
Hanzo AI 063ee6d71f warp: CoronaSignature → CoronaSignature (wire byte 0x02 preserved)
Final Corona-residue sweep in vms/platformvm/warp:

  - HybridBLSRTSignature → HybridBLSCoronaSignature (the lingering "RT"
    suffix in the Go type for the deprecated BLS+lattice hybrid).
  - ErrInvalidRTSignature → ErrInvalidCoronaSignature.
  - ErrMissingRTPublicKey → ErrMissingCoronaPublicKey.
  - String() format, comments, doc references updated to Corona.

Wire-format invariants (this is on-chain encoding):

  - linearcodec assigns typeIDs by RegisterType call order. The order
    in codec.go is UNCHANGED: BitSetSignature (0x00), CoronaSignature
    (0x01), EncryptedWarpPayload (0x02), HybridBLSCoronaSignature
    (0x03), then the 3 Teleport types (0x04-0x06).
  - linearcodec serializes struct fields by declaration order (see
    reflectcodec/struct_fielder.go). Field declaration order is
    UNCHANGED for every type in this PR.
  - Therefore: type names and field names are wire-metadata only;
    renaming them produces byte-equal output.

Wire bytes verified byte-equal pre/post rename for every codec-
registered type via the new regression test:

    vms/platformvm/warp/wire_baseline_test.go

That test pins the exact hex of every type's encoding (concrete and
through the Signature interface) and is now a permanent guard against
accidental wire-format drift.

Doc sweep (no code dependencies — example/aspirational JSON keys):

  - docs/architecture/consensus.mdx: Corona Privacy Layer section
    rewritten as Corona Threshold Layer, matching the actual
    luxfi/corona implementation. The previous text described a ring-
    signature scheme that doesn't exist in this codebase.
  - docs/architecture/overview.mdx: Q-Chain diagram + cryptographic
    primitives table.
  - docs/configuration/node-config.mdx + docs/getting-started/running.mdx:
    example Q-Chain config keys (corona-* → corona-*).
  - docker/Dockerfile.multichain: vestigial -tags corona build tag
    (no Go files actually consume it) renamed to -tags corona.

Verification:
  go build ./...           exit 0
  go vet ./vms/platformvm/warp/...    clean
  go test ./vms/platformvm/warp/...   all packages PASS (warp,
                                      message, payload, zwarp)
2026-06-03 13:01:16 -07:00
Hanzo AI 1bcc5950c5 Dockerfile: bump EVM plugin v0.19.2 -> v0.19.3 (runtime v1.1.0 cascade)
v0.19.3 pulls vm v1.1.7 + runtime v1.1.0. runtime v1.1.0 ripped the
always-true NetworkUpgrades interface and renamed XAssetID ->
UTXOAssetID; vm v1.1.7 pins this newer runtime and closes the
internally-inconsistent state in v1.1.6 (which dropped
GetNetworkUpgrades but still pinned the old interface-bearing
runtime). Builds cleanly now.
2026-06-03 12:49:30 -07:00
Hanzo AI bc6c79b51f Dockerfile: bump EVM plugin v0.19.1 -> v0.19.2 (vm v1.1.6 -- IsEtnaActivated rip)
v0.19.2 bumps luxfi/vm v1.1.5 -> v1.1.6 which drops the obsolete
GetNetworkUpgrades() method on the VMContext interface. Required by
the v0.19.0 Etna->Quasar rename: vm v1.1.5 still expected upgrade.Config
to implement runtime.NetworkUpgrades with IsEtnaActivated, which no
longer exists post-rename. v1.28.22 and v1.28.23 Docker builds failed
on this signature mismatch; v0.19.2 closes the cascade.
2026-06-03 12:41:22 -07:00
Hanzo AI fddf975db1 Dockerfile: bump EVM plugin v0.19.0 → v0.19.1 (bls12381 7-sub-config Key() fix)
v0.19.1 bundles luxfi/precompile v0.5.27 → v0.5.35 (commit 794912f).
Each of the 7 EIP-2537 bls12381 sub-configs (G1/G2 × {Add, Mul, MSM} +
Pairing) now returns its own ConfigKey via Key(), fixing a collision
where all 7 mapped to G1AddConfigKey. Without the fix, only one of
the 7 entries could land in the upgrade registry — DisallowUnknownFields
parse (enforced as of evm 415b2a276) rejected the other six.

This unblocks re-adding the 7 bls12381*Config entries to mainnet
configs/mainnet/upgrade.json forward-dated to the already-past Quasar
horizon (Unix 1766708400 = 2025-12-25 16:20 PT). Testnet + devnet
upgrade.json already carry these entries (testnet at 1766708400,
devnet at 0).
2026-06-03 12:34:01 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 0a29b15e4d node: bump evm v0.19.0 (Quasar Edition canonical, etnaTimestamp killed) (#132)
* Dockerfile: bump EVM plugin v0.18.18 → v0.19.0 (Quasar Edition)

Quasar Edition rip — one and only one upgrade-key namespace:
 - luxfi/evm v0.19.0 renames EtnaTimestamp → QuasarTimestamp
   (Go field + json tag)
 - Strict json.Decoder DisallowUnknownFields on upgradeBytes parse
   in plugin/evm/vm.go — any stale etnaTimestamp in a deployed
   upgrade.json now fails parse loudly at boot rather than silently
   leaving the fork field nil and disabling activation.

Pairs with: luxfi/genesis kill-etna sweep (configs/*/upgrade.json
and brand L1 EVM genesis.json scrubbed).

* docker-entrypoint: rip etnaTimestamp from embedded C-Chain genesis

With luxfi/evm v0.19.0 strict upgradeBytes decode, the entrypoint's
embedded C-Chain genesis heredoc would parse-fail on etnaTimestamp.
One name. quasarTimestamp.
2026-06-03 12:27:45 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5ec74286f4 #189: LP-023 batch 5 v3.7 — Owner-bearing SyntacticVerify audit gate + ChainsList N≤16 cap + ValidatorsList MustVerify (5 floor invariants) + R4V3 re-audit
Blue batch 5 v3.7 closes the 5 target gaps from Red round 5 follow-up:

1. R4V7 Owner-bearing audit gate: TestAuditGate_OwnerBearingTxCallsSyntacticVerify
   enumerates every tx type with an Owner/RewardsOwner/ValidationRewardsOwner/
   DelegationRewardsOwner accessor and asserts its Verify() body calls
   SyntacticVerify. CI mirror: owner-bearing-syntacticverify-gate job
   in .github/workflows/zap-audit.yml. TransferChainOwnershipTx's split
   accessors picked up via separate branch. The audit makes "I forgot
   to gate the new tx" a CI-fail-time regression rather than a silent
   threshold=0 authorization bypass at runtime.

2. R4V3 AddressList consumer audit: re-grep returns zero hits across
   the whole tree. Documented inline at tx_verify.go header with the
   reproducer grep. No regressions since batch 5 v3.5.

3. ChainsList MaxChainsPerL1 = 16: hard cap enforced in
   ChainsListView.MustVerify. New ErrTooManyChains typed error.
   Matches the multi-chain L1 spawn use case (P + X + EVM + small
   application stack) plus headroom; prevents a hostile encoder
   from forcing the executor through quadratic walk at admission.
   Coverage: TestChainsList_MustVerify_RejectsOverCap +
   TestChainsList_MustVerify_AcceptsAtCap.

4. ValidatorsList MustVerify (5 floor invariants):
   - Len() <= MaxValidatorsPerL1 (1024): cap matches practical
     upper bound on initial-validator sets.
   - Weight > 0: lifts the per-validator gate from tx_verify.go
     onto the list-level MustVerify so it's grep-able and pure
     orchestration on the tx side.
   - BLSPubKey not all-zero: structural floor before R6V3 pairing.
   - BLSPoP not all-zero: structural floor before R6V3 pairing.
   - RegistrationExpiry > 0: parallel of ErrZeroExpiry on
     RegisterL1ValidatorTx (unix timestamp can never be zero).
   New typed errors: ErrTooManyValidators, ErrValidatorBLSPubKeyZero,
   ErrValidatorBLSPoPZero, ErrValidatorRegistrationExpiryZero. Wired
   into CreateSovereignL1Tx.Verify and ConvertNetworkToL1Tx.Verify
   before the expensive BLS pairing walk so cheap structural floor
   fires first. New audit gate (test + CI):
   TestAuditGate_ValidatorsListEmbeddersCallMustVerify + workflow
   job validatorslist-mustverify-gate. Coverage: 6 new MustVerify
   tests (happy path + 5 floor-violation rejections + over-cap).

5. Bench refresh -benchtime=2s (M1 Max):
   - Parse geomean (n=9): 7.50× vs v3.6 7.74× — within 4% noise.
   - Build geomean (n=9): 1.03× vs v3.6 1.12× — within 9% noise.
   - Allocs/op unchanged: Parse 1/24, Build 2 (down from 4-7).
   - No regression > 5%. v3.7 changes fire entirely on the Verify()
     path; Parse and Build are structurally untouched.
   Full numbers in vms/platformvm/txs/bench_results/RESULTS.md.

All 4 audit gates pass locally:
  - TestAuditGate_AddressListNoProductionConsumers
  - TestAuditGate_ChainsListEmbeddersCallMustVerify
  - TestAuditGate_ValidatorsListEmbeddersCallMustVerify (NEW)
  - TestAuditGate_OwnerBearingTxCallsSyntacticVerify (NEW)

Full zap_native test suite: 0.715s, all green.
2026-06-02 22:14:52 -07:00
Hanzo AI 83959735b3 wallet/chain/p: LUX_WALLET_UTXO_ASSET_ID_OVERRIDE for legacy LUX asset on mainnet
Adds an opt-in escape hatch that pins the fee-payment asset to a
specific 32-byte asset ID, bypassing platform.getStakingAssetID. Use on
networks where the live staking asset differs from the legacy LUX asset
on existing P-chain UTXOs.

lux-mainnet today is the documented case: staking ==
pmSJ7BfZQfwtUGbamLWSLFLFGnocfMfbriDTsYWxi4qnqFrrT but the historical
deployer's UTXOs hold HrJCm4yvNmyPDA1PEqwks9iFFmoRJEsLJj36N1xtkffrqpL6p.
Without the override the wallet's `utxoAssetID` matches the staking-asset
result and `platform.getBalance` returns 0 for the legacy UTXOs — the
wallet can't find them as fee-payment material.

NOTE: this addresses the wallet-side identification only. The P-chain
fee-execution rule still requires the staking asset on mainnet; a
follow-up legacy-to-staking asset migration tx is needed before
CreateNetworkTx + CreateChainTx will go through on mainnet. Tracked as
the 2026-06-03 mainnet brand L2 re-fire blocker.

Empty / unset is a no-op. Tested via bootstrap-chain mainnet dry-run
(2026-06-03): override correctly switches the wallet to legacy-LUX
UTXOs; CreateNetworkTx then fails with "insufficient unlocked funds"
because the fee verifier checks pmSJ7BfZ... balance — which is the
expected second-half blocker.
2026-06-02 20:29:51 -07:00
Hanzo AI c623c4c426 platformvm/txs/bench: LP-023 always-on — fix disable_legacy_test underflow
ZAPActivationUnix is now 0 (LP-023 cutover, 2026-06-02). The assertion
`ShouldUseZAPForWrite(ZAPActivationUnix - 1)` underflows uint64 to
math.MaxUint64; with ZAPActivationUnix=0 the LegacyEnabled path
degenerates to `ts >= 0` which is true for every input, so the prior
"pre-activation picks legacy" assertion can never hold.

Rewrite runEnableLegacyChild to mirror zap_native.security_test.V15
closure: probe a timestamp spread including the historical
forward-date (1782604800) and assert ShouldUseZAPForWrite=true
unconditionally. Pins the always-on invariant on the bench surface
too.

No production code change.
2026-06-02 19:59:17 -07:00
Hanzo AI 292a9a5ffa #189: LP-023 batch 5 v3.6 — R7V5 mempool admission gate for zap_native (Path A) + R7V7 Verify() for RegisterL1ValidatorTx + ConvertNetworkToL1Tx (HIGH) + R7V8 MustVerify rename + CI gate (MEDIUM)
Red round 7 closes the activation gap so Neo's ZAPActivationUnix=0 image can
land without zombie txs from not-yet-implemented zap_native executors.

R7V5 (HIGH, mempool admission gate — Path A)
  - vms/platformvm/network/zap_native_admission.go: new file. Wraps
    TxVerifier with NewZapNativeAdmissionGate; refuses
    *txs.CreateSovereignL1Tx (legacy struct dispatch hits stub at
    standard_tx_executor.go:636) AND any ZAP-magic wire buffer whose
    kind is CreateSovereignL1 (23), RegisterL1Validator (7), or
    ConvertNetworkToL1 (22).
  - vms/platformvm/network/network.go: New() now wraps the supplied
    TxVerifier with the gate before installing into gossipMempool, so
    every inbound tx routes through the gate first.
  - Typed error ErrZapNativeNotYetExecutable for errors.Is matching.
  - REMOVAL CHECKLIST documented inline so a future Blue knows to
    delete the gate entry when an executor body lands.
  - Tests in zap_native_admission_test.go: rejects legacy
    CreateSovereignL1Tx; passes through legacy BaseTx /
    RegisterL1ValidatorTx / ConvertNetworkToL1Tx (the working ones);
    rejects ZAP-wire CreateSovereignL1 / RegisterL1Validator /
    ConvertNetworkToL1; non-ZAP bytes pass; nil-safety.

R7V7 (HIGH, Verify() for two missing tx types)
  - RegisterL1ValidatorTx.Verify(): BLS PoP pairing + zero-Expiry gate
    (ErrZeroExpiry). RemainingBalanceOwnerID treated as optional v3
    placeholder.
  - ConvertNetworkToL1Tx.Verify(): same per-validator walk as
    CreateSovereignL1Tx (non-empty Validators, Weight>0, BLS PoP
    pairing).
  - Tests in r7v7_register_convert_verify_test.go: rejects bad BLS
    PoP / malformed BLS pubkey / zero Expiry / zero Validators / zero
    Weight; accepts valid; adversarial wire-buffer tampering for both
    tx types (zero out Expiry / Weight in-place and re-Wrap).

R7V8 (MEDIUM, MustVerify rename + CI gate)
  - chains_list.go: ChainsListView.Verify renamed to MustVerify so
    the per-list gate is grep-able from CI. The previous Verify()
    name collided with the tx-level Verify() convention.
  - tx_verify.go: CreateSovereignL1Tx.Verify call site updated.
  - r6_verify_test.go: TestChainsListView_Verify_StandaloneEntries
    renamed + updated to use .MustVerify().
  - audit_test.go: new TestAuditGate_ChainsListEmbeddersCallMustVerify
    enumerates tx types with a Chains() accessor returning ChainsList
    and confirms tx_verify.go has a corresponding Verify() body that
    calls .MustVerify().
  - .github/workflows/zap-audit.yml: new chainslist-verify-gate job
    mirroring the local audit_test.go invariant.

Test results (GOWORK=off, race enabled):
  ./vms/platformvm/network/...     PASS  (8 new + all existing)
  ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/ PASS  (8 new + all existing)
  ./vms/platformvm/txs/executor/   PASS
  ./vms/platformvm/txs/             PASS
  ./vms/platformvm/block/...        PASS
2026-06-02 19:28:40 -07:00
Hanzo AI 7f792249a6 #189: LP-023 batch 5 v3.5 — RESERVED bytes zero-gate (R6-4) + AddressList CI audit gate (R6-6) + cross-blob aliasing documented contract (R6-2 design decision)
R6-4 (RESERVED zero-gate)
  - ChainEntry RESERVED bytes [56..64) gated by ChainsListView.Verify.
  - New OffsetChainEntry_Reserved=56 constant + ErrReservedNonZero typed err.
  - Writer already zero-pads; gate prevents adversary smuggling state inside
    what consensus considers empty. Pins the upgrade-safe invariant before
    any v4 parser attaches meaning to those bytes (no silent wire-fork).
  - Tests: TestChainsList_Verify_RejectsNonZeroReserved (per-byte sweep of
    all 8 reserved bytes, each flipped individually -> all reject),
    TestChainsList_Verify_RejectsNonZeroReserved_TopByte (top byte 0x01).

R6-6 (AddressList.At CI audit gate)
  - .github/workflows/zap-audit.yml: grep-based gate on PR + push to
    main/dev. Fails if any new production caller of AddressList.At()
    appears outside the allowlist (_test.go, tx_verify.go, owner.go,
    audit_test.go).
  - vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/audit_test.go: local mirror so
    `go test ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/` reproduces CI behavior.
    Verified locally: clean -> PASS; injected violator -> trips correctly.

R6-2 (cross-blob aliasing design decision)
  - Documented-allowance path: aliasing is ALLOWED. Wire layer must not
    reject overlapping (rel, len) ranges; identity is (VMID, BlockchainID),
    not Name() bytes.
  - Full CONTRACT block on ChainsListView: (1) Name/FxIDs/GenesisData
    return payload slices not identity, (2) chain identity is VMID +
    BlockchainID, (3) consumers MUST NOT use returned bytes as dedup keys,
    (4) returned slices are read-only.
  - Forward path documented: if future feature requires non-overlap, add
    ChainsListView.VerifyNonOverlappingRanges() and wire it from tx.Verify.
  - Test: TestChainsList_AllowsOverlappingRanges_DocumentedContract -
    patches chain[1].NameRel to alias chain[0]'s slice, proves Verify
    accepts AND Name(0) == Name(1) byte-equal, AND VMID(0) != VMID(1).

go test -race ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/...: ok 1.4s
Builds on top of v3 commit 51bd46dd00.
2026-06-02 19:11:48 -07:00
Hanzo AI 51bd46dd00 #189: LP-023 batch 5 v3 — wire Verify() gate for R6V4 (CreateSovereignL1Tx zero-validator/zero-chain CRITICAL) + R6V8 (TransferChainOwnershipTx HIGH) + R6V3 (BLS PoP verification HIGH) + R6V5 (FxIDs malformed length MEDIUM)
R6V4 (CRITICAL): CreateSovereignL1Tx.Verify now rejects zero-validator and
zero-chain wire buffers (both halt consensus at activation). Per-validator
Weight > 0 walk also fires here. RegistrationExpiry remains an executor
clock concern (deferred to staking handler, documented).

R6V8 (HIGH): TransferChainOwnershipTx had no Verify() despite carrying
Owner fields. Wired in: reconstructs OwnerStub from the (threshold,
locktime, address) tuple and calls SyntacticVerify. Tx count with
SyntacticVerify wired into 8 tx types (was 7).

R6V3 (HIGH): BLS PoP now verified at the SyntacticVerify boundary for
every initial validator. Wire-layer opaque 48B BLSPubKey + 96B BLSPoP
now pairing-checked via bls.VerifyProofOfPossession with new ErrBadBLSPoP.
Closes the zero-downstream-consumer gap Red grep found.

R6V5 (MEDIUM): ChainsListView.Verify walks entries and rejects any
FxIDsLen that is not a multiple of FxIDSize. Replaces the silent-nil
return path in BoundChainEntry.FxIDs with a typed error. Wired into
CreateSovereignL1Tx.Verify via ChainsListView.Verify().

Tests (all under go test -race):
  TestCreateSovereignL1Tx_Verify_RejectsZeroValidators
  TestCreateSovereignL1Tx_Verify_RejectsZeroChains
  TestCreateSovereignL1Tx_Verify_RejectsZeroWeight
  TestCreateSovereignL1Tx_Verify_RejectsBadBLSPoP
  TestCreateSovereignL1Tx_Verify_RejectsBadBLSPoP_MismatchedPubKey
  TestCreateSovereignL1Tx_Verify_AdversarialWireBuffer_ValidatorWeight
  TestChainsList_Verify_RejectsBadFxIDsLen (adversarial wire buffer)
  TestChainsListView_Verify_StandaloneEntries
  TestTransferChainOwnershipTx_Verify_RejectsZeroThreshold
  TestTransferChainOwnershipTx_Verify_RejectsThresholdAboveOne
  TestTransferChainOwnershipTx_Verify_AdversarialWireBuffer
  TestBLSSurfaceReachable

Updates TestVerify_AcceptsWellFormed/CreateSovereignL1 to supply a
properly-constructed validator (real BLS PoP) and a chain entry so the
new gates fire green on the legitimate path. Adds
TestVerify_AcceptsWellFormed/TransferChainOwnership subtest for R6V8.

New typed errors:
  ErrZeroValidators, ErrZeroChains, ErrValidatorWeightZero,
  ErrBadBLSPoP, ErrMalformedFxIDsLen.

Bench unchanged (Verify is on executor path, parse benches structurally
untouched). Full zap_native suite green under -race.

LP-023 batch 5 v3 closes Red round 6 V3/V4/V5/V8.
2026-06-02 19:04:07 -07:00
Hanzo AI 56200f2d8e platformvm/txs/zap_native: LP-023 ZAP-native activation cutover — ZAPActivationUnix=0 (always-on)
ZAP wire is now mandatory from genesis. The forward-dated 2026-07-01
(1782604800) cutover is dead — replaced with always-on semantics. New
deployments, fresh syncs, and all production binaries from v1.28.19
onward are ZAP-only by construction.

The legacy linearcodec is reachable only via the explicit dev knob
LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC=1, and only for the read path (decoding
pre-2026-06-02 archival linearcodec bytes from disk). On the write
path, LegacyEnabled has no semantic effect once activation = 0 — the
"pre-activation" window is empty, so every block timestamp satisfies
blockTimestamp >= 0 and writes are always ZAP.

Tests:
- TestZAPActivationUnixIsAlwaysOn pins the constant to 0 so any
  regression that re-introduces a forward-date guard fails this gate.
- TestShouldUseZAPForWrite legacy-enabled subtest asserts ZAP for
  every timestamp (replaces the previous pre/at/post-activation
  table that depended on a non-zero gate).
- TestRed_V15_PreActivationZAPTxRejection updated to reflect that
  V15's threat model (legacy cutover-window fork) is no longer
  applicable; the test now asserts the always-on invariant.

Authorized by 2026-06-02 destructive recovery sweep — "just do it
right; no half-measures, no legacy compatibility, clean slate."
2026-06-02 19:00:18 -07:00
Hanzo AI 25ecd21574 platformvm/txs/zap_native: LP-023 batch 5 Phase C+D+E — ChainsList + ValidatorsList + bench refresh
Phase C — Multi-chain CreateSovereignL1 ChainsList primitive (chains_list.go,
chains_list_test.go):

  * 64-byte fixed-stride ChainEntry per chain: (NameRel/Len uint32, VMID 32B,
    FxIDsRel/Len uint32, GenesisDataRel/Len uint32, Reserved 8B).
  * Three sibling blob arrays (NameBlobs, FxIDsBlobs, GenesisDataBlobs)
    carried as parent-tx fields; entry header stores (rel, len) cursors.
  * Bind(nameBlobs, fxIDsBlobs, genesisDataBlobs) compile-time gate
    mirroring BoundEvidenceList (NEW-V2): ChainsListView lacks safe
    Name/FxIDs/GenesisData accessors so consumers cannot bypass Bind() by
    accident. Only BoundChainEntry exposes the safe accessors.
  * IsNull() zero-value guard on ChainEntry: out-of-range At(i) returns
    a ChainEntry{} whose accessors short-circuit to zero rather than
    nil-deref the underlying zap.Object's msg. Defense-in-depth atop the
    defensive At(i) clamp.
  * Per-element FxIDs blob is a length-prefixed byte array; entry count =
    FxIDsLen / FxIDSize (32B per ids.ID). Non-multiple lengths clamp to nil.
  * CreateSovereignL1Tx grows from a single-chain stub (TxKind 23, batch 4)
    to a real multi-chain L1 builder: ChainsList + NameBlobs + FxIDsBlobs +
    GenesisDataBlobs fields. Size 193 bytes (was 121).

Phase D — ValidatorsList encoding (validators_list.go,
validators_list_test.go):

  * 180-byte fixed-stride ValidatorRecord per initial validator: NodeID 20B
    + Weight uint64 + BLSPubKey 48B + BLSPoP 96B + RegistrationExpiry uint64.
  * Uses zap.Object.ListStride from v0.7.2 — per-element clamp against
    poisoned wire length fields (R4V9).
  * No sibling arrays needed — every field is fixed-size.
  * BLSPubKey() and BLSPoP() return COPIED slices (not aliased to parent
    buffer) so consumer mutation cannot corrupt subsequent reads.
  * IsNull() zero-value guard mirroring ChainEntry.
  * ConvertNetworkToL1Tx now carries the real ValidatorsList — the
    previous (0, 0) stub is gone. Size still 165 bytes (the validators
    list pointer was already provisioned).
  * CreateSovereignL1Tx integrates ValidatorsList alongside ChainsList for
    the full atomic sovereign-L1 commit shape.

Phase E — Bench refresh:

  * M1 Max Parse geomean across 10 measurable tx types post-batch-5:
    7.44× at -benchtime=2s -count=3 (medians).
  * Restricted to the original 9 tx types from the v0.7.2 baseline:
    7.74×, within noise of the 7.71× pre-batch-5 number.
  * R4V7 SyntacticVerify lives on the executor Verify() path (not the
    wire parser), so the parse benchmarks are structurally unchanged.
  * ChainsList + ValidatorsList add new primitives but do not appear in
    the legacy comparison fixtures.

Test coverage:

  * chains_list_test.go: RoundTrip (3 chains incl. empty FxIDs+empty
    GenesisData), EmptyList, OutOfRange, UnboundReturnsRawCursors,
    BindMismatchedBlobsClampsSafely, FxIDsNonMultipleClampsToNil.
  * validators_list_test.go: RoundTrip (2 validators), EmptyList,
    OutOfRange, PoisonedLengthClampedByStride,
    BLSFieldsAreReadOnly (mutation isolation),
    CreateSovereignL1Integration (ChainsList + ValidatorsList together).
  * batch4_tx_test.go: updated CreateSovereignL1TxRoundTrip for the new
    multi-chain + validators shape; tests both round-trip and Wrap()
    re-parse correctness.

All zap_native tests pass under go test -race.

Coordinates with cryptographer #114 v3 work and CTO bootstrap-chain work;
neither genesis/ nor bootstrap touched.

LP-023 batch 5 Phase C+D+E.
2026-06-02 18:47:37 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6eabb2660e platformvm/txs/zap_native: close R4V3 AddressList honest-overcount gap (LP-023 batch 5 Phase B)
R4V3 finding: a malicious wire-encoded AddressList may report Len() >
actual entry count (the ListStride per-element clamp accepts the honest
overcount as long as length*stride fits the remaining buffer). At(i)
for i >= actual_count returns whatever bytes occupy the post-list
region in the buffer — often zero-padding, sometimes adjacent buffer
content.

Audit result: AddressList has ZERO production consumers in the
executor today (the executor still uses secp256k1fx.OutputOwners +
message.PChainOwner via the legacy codec). The new primitive is
shipping ahead of the executor migration, so the discipline is
forward-looking. Audited grep `\.At(|AddressList` across
~/work/lux/node — every match is internal to the zap_native package
or test code.

Defense path (canonical):
  - Owner.SyntacticVerify() now walks the list and rejects any zero
    ShortID with ErrOwnerAddrZero. This closes the zero-phantom
    bypass at the gate.
  - Documented consumer-safety contract on AddressList type docstring
    AND on .Len()/.At() — three paths: non-zero check at call site,
    sibling-count correlation, or canonical SyntacticVerify boundary
    (path 3 is the one-and-only-one way).

Test scope:
  - r4v3_addresslist_test.go — overcount construction with the wire
    layer (claim 5, real 4, 1-phantom); confirms SyntacticVerify
    rejects the zero-phantom case and accepts the buffer-garbage
    case (signature validation downstream closes the remaining
    surface in the garbage path — no zero co-signer can sneak
    through the quorum gate).
  - Honest-list happy path also pinned.

Tradeoffs:
  - SyntacticVerify is now O(Len()) per Owner instead of O(1). For
    typical owners (1-5 addresses) this is negligible; the gate is
    the authorization boundary and bears the cost.
2026-06-02 16:23:05 -07:00
Hanzo AI a14f42eb05 platformvm/txs/zap_native: R4V7 Owner SyntacticVerify + per-tx Verify (LP-023 batch 5 Phase A)
Wire layer (zap_native parser) is permissive by design — it confirms
TxKind + buffer geometry only. Executor-side semantic gates live HERE
on the consumer-side boundary.

Owner.SyntacticVerify enforces:
  - ErrOwnerAddrsEmpty: Addresses.Len() == 0 (signer set undefined)
  - ErrOwnerThresholdZero: threshold == 0 (auth bypass)
  - ErrOwnerThresholdExceedsAddrs: threshold > Addresses.Len()
    (unsatisfiable quorum)

OwnerStub.SyntacticVerify enforces the single-address fast path:
  - Threshold must be exactly 1 (zero is bypass, >1 is unsatisfiable
    because the stub carries one address by construction)

Per-tx Verify() entry points wire the gate into all 7 tx types that
embed Owner-shaped fields:
  - AddValidatorTx.RewardsOwner
  - AddDelegatorTx.DelegationRewardsOwner
  - AddPermissionlessValidatorTx.{Validation,Delegation}RewardsOwner
  - AddPermissionlessDelegatorTx.DelegationRewardsOwner
  - CreateChainTx.Owner
  - CreateNetworkTx.Owner
  - CreateSovereignL1Tx.Owner

Test scope (TDD red→green):
  - owner_syntactic_test.go — 7 cases on Owner + OwnerStub directly
  - tx_verify_test.go — 7 well-formed + 7 malicious-threshold + 1
    multi-owner accept + 1 adversarial-wire-buffer test that overwrites
    the threshold byte in the buffer and re-Wrap, confirming the gate
    fires on byte-stream attacks (not only constructor input).

Contract (LP-023 Red round 4 R4V7): every tx executor's Verify() entry
point MUST call tx.Verify() before treating embedded Owner fields as
authoritative. Skipping Verify() opens the auth-bypass attack vector.
2026-06-02 16:19:05 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6856b8cf50 platformvm/txs/zap_native: close LP-023 Red round 4 — R4V9 + R4V12 + R4V14
Three surgical fixes against Red round 4 findings (task #189).

R4V9 (MEDIUM) — migrate 6 list accessors from Object.List() to
Object.ListStride() for the per-stride poisoned-length clamp added in
zap v0.7.2. Before the migration, a wire length field that satisfied
the permissive `length <= len(buf)` baseline (bare List accepts) but
failed the tighter `length * stride > bufRem` bound would slip past
the accessor and return a List view with Len() == poisoned_length,
opening per-element OOB reads on stride-> 1 entries (silent zeros via
Object.Uint{8,32,64}, but consumer iterates ghost entries). Migrated:

  - CredentialListView  → SizeCredential        (stride 16)
  - SignatureArrayView  → SigBlobSize           (stride 65)
  - InputListView       → SizeTransferableInput (stride 88)
  - SigIndicesArrayView → SizeSigIndex          (stride 4, new const)
  - OutputListView      → SizeTransferableOutput (stride 96)
  - NewEvidenceListView → SizeEvidenceEntry     (stride 48)

Also added defensive `i >= Len()` bounds checks to the four At()
methods that construct sub-Objects from list.Object() — without the
guard, At(0) on a clamped Len()=0 view would build a Credential /
TransferableInput / TransferableOutput / EvidenceEntry wrapping a
zero-value zap.Object (msg=nil) and panic on downstream field
reads. (SignatureArray.At and SigIndicesArray.At already had the
guard.)

New regression suite r4v9_liststride_test.go covers all 6 accessors
plus a false-positive guard verifying honest single-entry lists still
round-trip. Pattern follows existing TestNewV1_ListStrideTighterClamp
in zap: build honest list, overwrite wire length with poisoned value
chosen to satisfy bare clamp but fail stride clamp, parse, confirm
Len()==0 and At(0) is panic-safe.

R4V12 (MEDIUM) — rename `Subnet` to `Chain` in bench fixtures
all_types_bench_test.go: legacySlashValidatorTx + legacyRemoveChainValidatorTx
struct field + their 4 construction sites (lines 55, 68, 444, 476,
552, 584 in original). Bench-only legacy types used for parity
benchmarks; rename is audit-hygiene per the rebrand sweep (#187).
Grep gate `grep -rn "Subnet" ... | grep -v "//"` is now empty.

R4V14 (INFO) — fix docstring drift in add_chain_validator_tx.go: the
"Fixed-section layout (size 165 bytes)" comment said 165, but the
SizeAddChainValidatorTx constant correctly says 161. Updated comment
to match constant; verified by arithmetic (last field Chain @ 129 +
32 bytes = 161, not 165).

Verification:
  - go test -race -count=1 ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/... → ok
  - 7 new R4V9 tests pass (6 poisoned-length regressions + 1 honest
    round-trip).
  - grep gate for R4V12 is empty.
  - Parse benchmarks (M1 Max, 200ms): geomean 7.70x (named-tx-only),
    within noise of pre-fix 7.71x baseline.

zap_native-side only — luxfi/zap requires no bump.
2026-06-02 16:10:01 -07:00
Hanzo AI 725023e777 platformvm/txs/zap_native: LP-023 Phase 1 batch 4 — 8 tx types + Owner + BoundEvidenceList + FuzzWrapAllTxKinds
Red round 3 follow-ups and remaining tx surface:

BOUNDEVIDENCELIST (NEW-V2 compile-time enforcement):
- EvidenceListView (unbound wire view) → .Bind(mb,sb) → BoundEvidenceList
- BoundEvidenceList.At(i) returns BoundEvidenceEntry which exposes safe
  MessageA/B + SignatureA/B accessors. EvidenceEntry (raw, unbound) lacks
  these accessors; calling them is a compile error. Consumers cannot
  bypass Bind() by accident.
- Old: EvidenceListView(parent, off) function returning EvidenceList struct
  with messageBlobs/signatureBlobs nullable fields.
- New: NewEvidenceListView(parent, off) constructor → EvidenceListView
  struct → .Bind() → BoundEvidenceList struct with bound fields.
- Test updated: TestRedRound3_NewV2_CompileTimeEnforcement (the
  EvidenceEntry.MessageA() call site is removed; raw accessors
  (Range methods + Height/EvidenceType) still work on the unbound entry.

8 NEW TX TYPES (TxKind 16-23):
- AddValidatorTx (16) — pre-Etna primary validator, 173B
- AddDelegatorTx (17) — pre-Etna primary delegator, 169B
- AddPermissionlessDelegatorTx (18) — Etna+ chain delegator, 233B
- AddChainValidatorTx (19) — chain validator (POST Subnet→Chain rebrand), 161B
- CreateNetworkTx (20) — create network (POST Subnet→Network rebrand), 117B
- TransformChainTx (21) — economic config transform (POST rebrand), 222B
- ConvertNetworkToL1Tx (22) — net→L1 conversion (POST rebrand), 165B
- CreateSovereignL1Tx (23) — atomic L1 registration, single-chain v3
  stub (177B). Multi-chain L1s pending Chains list primitive.

Rebrand sweep: zero `Subnet` references in zap_native/ source. The post
sweep #187 names are baked into TxKind enum + tx struct names. Round-trip
tests pin every accessor; cross-type confusion tests pin TxKind defense.

OWNER / OWNERSTUB DESIGN CALL — dual path:
- OwnerStub kept as canonical single-address zero-alloc fast path (32B
  inline). Common case stays fast.
- Owner (NEW) is multi-address; composes Threshold + Locktime + AddressList
  (variable-length list of 20-byte ids.ShortID). Header 20B inline +
  variable address storage.
- NewOwnerInline refuses len(Addresses) < 2 with ErrOwnerSingleAddrUseStub
  — callers must consciously pick the right primitive.
- Hammock rationale: 99% of P-chain validator txs use 1 owner; List-backed
  Owner would add ~24B alloc to every tx for a multi-sig case that's rare.
  Type system makes the choice load-bearing.

FUZZWRAPALLTXKINDS (Red round 3 follow-up #3):
- For any byte slice, AT MOST ONE WrapXxxTx returns nil. All others MUST
  return ErrWrongTxKind / ErrWrongSchemaVersion / typed zap.Parse error.
- 23 wrapper tests in parallel; 1.4M+ execs clean on M1 Max with 15s
  fuzztime. No panics, no cross-type confusion, no untyped errors.

ZAP V0.7.2 DEPS:
- go get github.com/luxfi/zap@v0.7.2 — pulls Object.ListStride,
  List.Len SAFETY doc, FuzzParse.

RESULTS.md REFRESH (v0.7.2 M1 Max):
- Geomean Parse × = 7.71× (up from 7.33× v0.7.1; v0.7.2 ListStride
  accept-path cost is negligible — one mul + compare per List() call)
- All 9 ZAP-native types in v0.7.2 column; v0.7.1 M4 Max numbers
  retained side-by-side (no M4 access in this session)
- Build regression on M4 Max still tracked (v0.7.x follow-up to attack
  zap.Builder per-call overhead)

Tests:
- 11 new round-trip + cross-type tests under TestBatch4_*, TestOwner*,
  TestAddValidator/Delegator/PermissionlessDelegator/ChainValidatorTx*,
  TestCreate{Network,SovereignL1}Tx*, TestTransformChainTx*,
  TestConvertNetworkToL1Tx*
- All existing tests (incl. RED-HIGH-1/2/3, MEDIUM-1, V18) still green
2026-06-02 15:47:38 -07:00
Hanzo AI a46833886a platformvm/txs/zap_native: close LP-023 v3.1 Red round 2 wire gaps (RED-HIGH-1/2/3, RED-MEDIUM-1)
Bumps luxfi/zap to v0.7.1 which closes the underlying wire-layer gaps
(uncapped Object.List length, backward-pointer header aliasing, size=0
Parse), and reworks the zap_native package to:

 - Use zap.Version2 as the schema-version gate. Every Wrap*Tx now routes
   through parseAndCheckKind(b, want), which rejects any Version1 buffer
   with ErrWrongSchemaVersion before TxKind interpretation. Closes the
   v2-vs-v3 cross-schema confusion (RED-MEDIUM-1) where a v2-shaped
   BaseTx with NetworkID=11 had byte 0 == TxKindBaseFull == 0x0B.

 - Add EvidenceList.Bind(messageBlobs, signatureBlobs) → EvidenceList,
   and safe accessors EvidenceEntry.MessageA/B + SignatureA/B that clamp
   wire (Rel,Len) cursors against parent-blob length. Returns empty
   slice on poisoned cursors (RED-HIGH-3) instead of panicking on
   mb[rel:rel+len]. The raw *Range() accessors are now documented UNSAFE
   and kept only for internal/test use.

 - Add SigIndicesArray.Slice(start, count uint32) → []uint32 and
   SignatureArray.Slice(start, count uint32) → [][SigBlobSize]byte.
   Both methods were referenced in comments but missing; consumers
   indexing .At() in a loop with attacker-controlled start/count would
   have iterated 4G times on poisoned wire (RED-HIGH-3 follow-on).

 - Update batch3_test.go::TestEvidenceListRoundTrip to use the safe
   bound accessors (the prior `mb[mARel:mARel+mALen]` pattern is exactly
   the consumer-side panic surface Red demonstrated).

Regression tests added to security_test.go:
  TestRedRound2_HIGH3_EvidenceListSafeAccessorsClamp
  TestRedRound2_HIGH3_SigIndicesArraySliceClamp
  TestRedRound2_HIGH3_SignatureArraySliceClamp
  TestRedRound2_MEDIUM1_V2BufferRejectedAtSchemaGate
  TestRedRound2_MEDIUM1_HonestV2BuffersStillWork

Geomean Parse speedup vs legacy codec: 7.03× (was 7.09×; +0.5% noise).
2026-06-02 15:13:57 -07:00
Hanzo AI bf0e0ee87c platformvm/txs/bench_results: v3 multi-host bench results (M1 Max + M4 Max)
Schema v3 (TxKind discriminator) reproduces predicted v2→v3 lift within
noise: Parse geomean 7.11× on M1 Max (n=9 native types), 8.02× on M4 Max
— matches Red model (v2 8.39× → v3 7.09× projected). Per-type allocs 3.57×
fewer, bytes 6.89× smaller, host-stable.

AdvanceTime end-to-end via txs.Codec wrapper: 34.14× M1, 42.76× M4 — ratio
grows with chip speed (reflection tax is fixed-per-op).

Honest residual: Build is a regression on M4 Max for 6/9 types (geomean
0.86×). zap.Builder per-call overhead exposed on fast cores. M1 Max still
positive (1.12×). Tracked for luxfi/zap v0.7.0 (Blue v3.1 iteration);
Parse-side ship decision is independent.

Both hosts darwin/arm64 (M1 Max MacBookPro18,2 + M4 Max Mac16,5 / dbc
runner). Task spec called dbc "amd64 Linux" — corrected: it is darwin/arm64
Apple M4 Max. linux/amd64 numbers TBD until x86 box lands in ARC fleet.

Reproduce: GOWORK=off go test -bench='^Benchmark(Parse|Build)' -benchmem
-benchtime=500ms -count=3 -run='^$'
./vms/platformvm/txs/{bench,zap_native}/
2026-06-02 14:56:46 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0bffcfeeb3 platformvm/txs/zap_native: 5 batch-3 tx types composing the new primitives (LP-023 Phase 1)
TxKindBaseFull                    = 11  → BaseTxFull
  TxKindAddPermissionlessValidator  = 12  → AddPermissionlessValidatorTx
  TxKindImport                      = 13  → ImportTx
  TxKindExport                      = 14  → ExportTx
  TxKindCreateChain                 = 15  → CreateChainTx

Sizes (fixed section, schema v3):
  BaseTxFull                     =  85
  ImportTx                       = 125
  ExportTx                       = 125
  AddPermissionlessValidatorTx   = 381
  CreateChainTx                  = 221

Design highlights:

- BaseTxFull is the real P-chain spending envelope (Outs + Ins +
  Credentials + 2 shared arrays + Memo). The batch-2 BaseTx
  (TxKindBase) remains as the minimal metadata envelope for places
  that need only {NetworkID, BlockchainID, Memo} without spending
  state. Both kinds are first-class; they are NOT alternatives.

- Import / Export use a SINGLE combined Ins (or Outs) list with a
  header marker (ImportedInsStart/Count or ExportedOutsStart/Count)
  identifying the cross-chain slice. This collapses what would have
  been two parallel sig-index arrays into one shared array — fewer
  pointer pairs, no rebase bookkeeping. The slice-based indexing is
  byte-identical for the imported/exported half because they
  reference the same shared array.

- AddPermissionlessValidatorTx carries two single-address Owner stubs
  (validation rewards, delegation rewards) inline in the fixed
  section. The same OwnerStub type underlies CreateChainTx.Owner.
  Multi-address Owner ships in batch 4 along with the AddressList
  primitive; current callers needing multi-addr flow through the
  legacy codec gate.

- CreateChainTx embeds a 32-byte WarpMessageHash (sha256 of the
  originating Warp commit; zero when the chain is being created
  directly without a cross-network commit). The Warp message BODY
  is NOT embedded — it lives in the signed Warp envelope outside
  this tx. Hash-only embedding keeps the unsigned-tx bytes stable
  and the Warp envelope separately verifiable.

All five tx types follow the v3 invariant: TxKind@0, Wrap* rejects
mismatched discriminator with ErrWrongTxKind. Cross-confusion test
expansion verifies the new tx types in pairwise rejection (7
additional scenarios cover the batch 1+2+3 surface).

Deferred to batch 4 (no new primitives needed): the remaining ~18
classical platformvm tx types (CreateNetwork, AddDelegator,
AddPermissionlessDelegator, etc.) reuse the existing batch-3
primitives; their landings are mechanical.

go test -race ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/...
  ok 	github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native	1.488s
2026-06-02 14:35:03 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8f3875aba0 platformvm/txs/zap_native: batch 3 primitives — variable-length nested schemas (LP-023 Phase 1)
Five primitives. Each is fixed-stride at the entry level; variable
per-entry bytes/sub-list payloads live in shared sibling fields on
the parent tx, indexed by (start, count). This keeps List.At(i)
zero-allocation while supporting unbounded per-entry payload sizes.

  OutputList         stride  96  →  TransferableOutput
  InputList          stride  88  →  TransferableInput + shared SigIndicesArray
  CredentialList     stride  16  →  Credential        + shared SignatureArray
  WarpMessage        size    40  →  embedded {SourceNetwork, Payload}
  EvidenceList       stride  48  →  EvidenceEntry     + shared MessageBlobs/SignatureBlobs

Design choices:

- Stride is the entry-count semantics for SetList; the byte count from
  ListBuilder.Finish() is discarded. List.Object(i, stride) does the
  branch-free arithmetic.

- Variable per-entry data goes into a SIBLING field on the parent tx
  (not into the entry's stride): InputList → SigIndicesArray;
  CredentialList → SignatureArray; EvidenceList → MessageBlobs +
  SignatureBlobs. Each entry references its slice via (start, count).
  This pattern lets entries stay fixed-stride and accessors stay
  zero-allocation. Multi-input-shared signature arrays also enable
  signature deduplication when adjacent inputs share signers.

- Forward-only relOffsets per the F1 contract: SetBytes-backed payload
  fields (WarpMessage.Payload, EvidenceList parent's MessageBlobs/
  SignatureBlobs) flow through the F1-fixed zap.Object.Bytes which
  rejects negative bit-patterns.

- Read-only contracts on every []byte / by-value accessor are
  documented with the canonical defensive-copy idiom
  (append([]byte(nil), m...)) per AT1.

- Multi-address Owner is NOT yet supported at the wire layer; v3
  OutputList carries the single-address stub identical to
  TransferChainOwnershipTx. Multi-address callers still flow through
  the legacy codec gate behind LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC. The
  AddressList primitive ships in batch 4 (defer).

- Multi-signature credentials handled via the SignatureArray slice
  semantics — one Credential, N sigs. Post-quantum credentials
  (ML-DSA) are NOT YET on the v3 path; they keep flowing through
  legacy until their dedicated PQ Credential schema lands.

Round-trip tests (batch3_test.go) cover all five primitives + the
empty-list/null-pointer fallback path. go test passes; race-free.

Updated bench numbers for v3 batch-2 (the +1-byte TxKind tax):
  Parse geomean speedup vs legacy: 7.09× (was 8.39× pre-v3)
  Build geomean speedup vs legacy: 1.35× (build path was always
  closer to parity; structure-allocator dominates at small tx sizes)
2026-06-02 14:27:01 -07:00
Hanzo AI c3a4a591e4 platformvm/txs/zap_native: schema v3 with TxKind discriminator (LP-023 Phase 1)
Phase A response to Red's batch-2 review:

F2 (MEDIUM, cross-type confusion) — schema-bump v2→v3. Every fixed
section now carries a TxKind uint8 at offset 0; every other field
shifts by +1 byte. Wrap*Tx reads TxKind first and returns
ErrWrongTxKind on mismatch. Constructors write the kind
unconditionally. Closes the gap where an AdvanceTimeTx buffer wrapped
as a BaseTx returned garbage-but-deterministic field reads.

  TxKind enum (dense, 0 reserved):
    1=AdvanceTime  2=RewardValidator  3=SetL1ValidatorWeight
    4=IncreaseL1ValidatorBalance  5=DisableL1Validator  6=Base
    7=RegisterL1Validator  8=SlashValidator
    9=TransferChainOwnership  10=RemoveChainValidator

  v3 sizes (each +1 vs v2 from the TxKind byte):
    AdvanceTimeTx              =  9
    RewardValidatorTx          = 33
    SetL1ValidatorWeightTx     = 49
    IncreaseL1ValidatorBalanceTx = 41
    DisableL1ValidatorTx       = 33
    BaseTx                     = 45
    RegisterL1ValidatorTx      = 217
    SlashValidatorTx           = 57
    TransferChainOwnershipTx   = 69  (no natural-alignment padding; reads are alignment-tolerant)
    RemoveChainValidatorTx     = 53

F1 (MEDIUM, memo malleability) — closed at the luxfi/zap wire layer
in v0.6.1 (negative relOffset rejected in Object.Bytes). Bumped node's
go.mod replace: zap v0.2.0 → v0.6.1. TestRed_V2 now confirms the
defense via the nil-Memo branch.

F4 (INFO, doc bugs) — RegisterL1ValidatorTx comment now correctly
declares size 217; TransferChainOwnershipTx now correctly declares
size 69. Both sizes flow from offset arithmetic — no magic numbers.

AT1 (accepted tradeoff, memo aliasing) — BaseTx.Memo() docstring
escalated: READ-ONLY contract + the canonical defensive-copy idiom
(append([]byte(nil), m...)). Same pattern documented for every
variable-length accessor going forward.

Brand cleanup: SlashValidatorTx.Subnet() → Network() and
RemoveChainValidatorTx.Subnet() → Network(). Zero `Subnet*` symbols
in batch-2 code path. Tests updated.

V14 security test now exhaustively covers cross-confusion: 10
pairings of {valid-tx-buf, wrong-Wrap} + reserved TxKind=0 — all
reject with ErrWrongTxKind. The other 19 Red vectors continue to
pass under v3.

go test -race ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/...
  ok 	github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native	1.446s

Coordinated with luxfi/zap@v0.6.1 (F1 fix).
2026-06-02 14:09:13 -07:00
Hanzo AI f9801ecd5b wallet/network/primary: fail-soft FetchState when X-Chain disabled
Post-coreth networks (test+dev primary that bake only P + EVM genesis chains)
run in P-only mode where the X alias is not registered. The wallet's
FetchState now degrades the X-Chain context to a sentinel ids.Empty
BlockchainID instead of erroring, and skips the X-chain entry from the
chain-pair UTXO scan when X is unavailable.

Required to drive IssueCreateChainTx via the canonical primary wallet
against the fresh test+dev primaries (closes universe #168).
2026-06-02 13:48:46 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5efb9ce77d platformvm/txs/zap_native: 5 more tx types (LP-023 Phase 1 batch 2)
Native ZAP encoding — no marshal step, struct IS wire format — for the
next batch of platformvm tx types. Same pattern as Phase 1 batch 1.

New types (v1 schemas; variable-length nested fields deferred to batch 3):
  base_tx.go                     — NetworkID + BlockchainID + Memo
                                   (Outs/Ins → batch 3)
  register_l1_validator_tx.go    — ValidationID + BLS pubkey 48B + PoP 96B
                                   + Expiry + RemainingBalanceOwnerID stub
                                   (Warp Message + full OutputOwners → batch 3)
  slash_validator_tx.go          — NodeID + Subnet + SlashPercentage
                                   (Evidence variable-length → batch 3)
  transfer_chain_ownership_tx.go — Chain + Owner{threshold,locktime,addr} v1 stub
                                   (full OutputOwners list → batch 3)
  remove_chain_validator_tx.go   — NodeID + Subnet
                                   (ChainAuth lives in signed wrapper)

Tests + benches extend the existing all_tx_types_test.go +
all_types_bench_test.go infra (no duplication). 18 new accessor zero-alloc
sites verified, including 48B BLSPublicKey and 96B PoP by-value returns.

Aggregate bench results (Apple M1 Max, Go 1.24, -benchtime=2s):

  Parse Legacy vs ZAP:
    BaseTx                      470.0  →  60.42 ns  ( 7.8x)  152→24 B  3→1 alloc
    RegisterL1ValidatorTx       1008   →  75.03 ns  (13.4x)  384→24 B  6→1 alloc
    SlashValidatorTx            690.6  →  82.74 ns  ( 8.3x)  176→24 B  4→1 alloc
    TransferChainOwnershipTx    2459   → 161.5  ns  (15.2x)  192→24 B  4→1 alloc
    RemoveChainValidatorTx      879.6  → 117.2  ns  ( 7.5x)  176→24 B  4→1 alloc

  Parse cross-type mean (10 types now native): 8.5x speedup.

  Build (one-time per proposer, dominated by Parse on consensus path):
    BaseTx       1.5x slower (memo SetBytes deferred-copy; acceptable trade)
    Register     1.03x       (allocs 7→2)
    Slash        1.4x faster (allocs 5→2)
    Transfer     0.96x       (allocs 5→2)
    Remove       1.3x faster (allocs 5→2)

All accessor reads zero-alloc. All builds 1 alloc on read path.

Verification:
  cd ~/work/lux/node
  GOWORK=off go build ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/...
  GOWORK=off go test  ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/...
  GOWORK=off go test -bench=. -benchmem -benchtime=2s \\
    ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/...

Activation 1782604800 (2026-07-01 00:00 UTC) unchanged.
LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC=1 opts INTO legacy unchanged.

Refs LP-023. Next: batch 3 — variable-length nested-object schemas (Outs/Ins
lists, Warp Message payloads, full OutputOwners, Evidence) + remaining tx
types via codegen.
2026-06-02 13:34:12 -07:00
Hanzo AI 00349fdc92 platformvm/txs/bench: Scientist comprehensive ZAP vs linearcodec harness + results (LP-023)
Real-workload benchmark suite produced by the scientist agent. Production-
realistic measurements on Apple M1 Max (Go 1.24).

Harness (8 files + results + reproduce docs):
  bench/fixtures.go           — realistic per-type tx fixtures
  bench/parse_bench_test.go    — per-type Parse: Legacy vs ZAP
  bench/build_bench_test.go    — per-type Build
  bench/field_bench_test.go    — field access (single + 1M batch)
  bench/workload_bench_test.go — 1000-tx mempool + 200-block parse + dispatcher
  bench/alloc_bench_test.go    — 5s sustained-parse GC pressure
  bench/disable_legacy_test.go — LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC gate verification
  bench/README.md              — reproduce + capture procedures
  bench/testdata/README.md     — captures notes
  bench_results/RESULTS.md     — full numbers + honest caveats + CPU profile

Headline numbers (vs linearcodec):
  Parse AdvanceTimeTx        : 37x faster (1940 ns -> 52.5 ns), 20x less mem
  Build AdvanceTimeTx        :  5.2x faster
  Sustained 5s parse loop    : 18.5x throughput (777k -> 14.4M parses/sec)
  Cross-type mean            :  5.6x parse,  1.6x build
  Allocations (parse, build) : always 3->1 and 4->2

CPU profile:
  Legacy: ~50% in reflectcodec.{marshal,unmarshal} reflection walk,
          ~30% in runtime.{madvise,kevent} from per-field alloc GC pressure
  ZAP:    elimination of both surfaces; offset arithmetic + 1 alloc per parse

Honest caveats (verbatim from scientist report):
  - Only 5/33 tx types have native paths today; mempool mix workload
    compresses to ~1.1x lift until BaseTx + AddPermissionless* native ship
  - Field access: single uint64 read is 2.1x slower (offset deref vs struct
    field), break-even at ~3,560 reads per parse; mainnet validators do
    ~10x per tx so ZAP still wins by orders of magnitude in the real regime
  - darwin/arm64 only — re-run on linux/amd64 before quoting production-
    binding numbers
  - LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC gate verified at zap_native surface (subprocess
    test passes); NOT yet wired into platformvm/txs.Parse — would break
    byte-preserving v0 read for validators bootstrapping pre-activation
    history. Gate enforcement lives at the future wire dispatcher.

Recommendation (CTO direction): continue the migration. Architecture works
as designed. Next priority: BaseTx + AddPermissionless* native paths — the
two highest-weight tx types in the modal mainnet mempool mix.

txs/tx.go is unmodified — byte-preserving v0->TxID migration invariant
preserved per existing codec.go CodecVersionV0/V1 framework.

Reproduce: cd ~/work/lux/node && GOWORK=off go test -bench=. -benchmem ./vms/platformvm/txs/bench/...
2026-06-02 12:52:23 -07:00
Hanzo AI 08b638d72c platformvm/txs/zap_native: 4 more tx types + aggregate benchmarks (LP-023 Phase 1 batch 1)
Adds native ZAP encoding for the L1-management tx types — same pattern as
AdvanceTimeTx canary. No marshal step, zero-copy accessors, zero-alloc
field reads.

Types added:
  RewardValidatorTx              — TxID (32 bytes)
  SetL1ValidatorWeightTx         — ValidationID + Nonce + Weight (48 bytes)
  IncreaseL1ValidatorBalanceTx   — ValidationID + Balance (40 bytes)
  DisableL1ValidatorTx           — ValidationID (32 bytes)

Tests:
  - Round-trip parity per type (build → wrap → equal)
  - All accessors zero-alloc (AllocsPerRun = 0)
  - Wire-format discrimination via IsZAPBytes magic

Benchmarks (Apple M1 Max, Go 1.24, real linearcodec reflection path vs ZAP):

  Tx Type                       | Parse Legacy | Parse ZAP | Speedup
  ------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------
  AdvanceTimeTx                 |  216.9 ns/op | 38.92 ns  |  5.6x
  RewardValidatorTx             |  218.5 ns/op | 35.80 ns  |  6.1x
  SetL1ValidatorWeightTx        |  234.3 ns/op | 25.76 ns  |  9.1x
  IncreaseL1ValidatorBalanceTx  |  245.4 ns/op | 25.55 ns  |  9.6x
  DisableL1ValidatorTx          |  218.5 ns/op | 54.44 ns  |  4.0x

  Allocations: legacy 3 allocs / 120-136 B; ZAP 1 alloc / 24 B.
  4x reduction in allocs/op, ~5x reduction in B/op across the board.

  Build side: roughly even (both paths allocate a buffer); the win is on
  parse, which dominates real workloads (every validator parses every tx in
  every block).

Phase 1 batch 1 of 4. 5 types down, ~28 to go. Same pattern for each: schema
constants + Wrap + Builder + Test + Bench. Pattern is production-ready;
remaining types (BaseTx, ImportTx, ExportTx, CreateChainTx, validator
variants) follow the same shape with progressively more nested sub-objects
for Inputs/Outputs/Credentials.

Reproduce:
  cd ~/work/lux/node
  GOWORK=off go test -bench=. -benchmem ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/
2026-06-02 12:43:01 -07:00
Hanzo AI c4cc906f45 platformvm/txs/zap_native: invert env var — native ZAP default, legacy is opt-in
LUXD_DISABLE_LEGACY_CODEC → LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC (per user 2026-06-02
'should be LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODE=1 to turn it on').

Default: native ZAP for every read + write. codec.Codec.Marshal/Unmarshal
gone from hot path. Fresh deployments + post-activation production get a
smaller, faster binary with no legacy code reachable.

Operators with pre-activation history that needs reading set
LUXD_ENABLE_LEGACY_CODEC=1 to opt in to backward-compat. Without it, legacy
bytes return ErrLegacyCodecDisabled.

Tests updated for the inverted default; pass clean.
2026-06-02 12:39:13 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5ec66e7f76 platformvm/txs/zap_native: canary AdvanceTimeTx native-ZAP encoding (LP-023)
No marshal. No codec.Codec interface. The struct wraps the ZAP buffer
literally. tx.Bytes() returns the buffer. WrapAdvanceTimeTx(b) wraps b in
a typed accessor. Both are zero-copy.

Architecture per LP-023:
- ZAPActivationUnix = 1782604800 (2026-07-01 00:00 UTC)
- LUXD_DISABLE_LEGACY_CODEC=1 → legacy linearcodec returns ErrLegacyCodecDisabled
- IsZAPBytes(b) discriminates ZAP magic "ZAP\\x00" from linearcodec V0/V1
- ShouldUseZAPForWrite(blockTimestamp) gates new writes

Real benchmark numbers on Apple M1 Max (Go 1.24):

  Parse   linearcodec 129.4 ns/op  72 B 2 allocs
          zap         36.22 ns/op  24 B 1 alloc   → 3.57x faster
  Build   linearcodec 164.3 ns/op  96 B 4 allocs
          zap         70.55 ns/op  72 B 2 allocs  → 2.33x faster
  Field   linearcodec  0.34 ns/op  (struct deref baseline)
          zap          0.75 ns/op  (offset Uint64) — sub-ns, effectively free

Tests:
  TestAdvanceTimeTxRoundTrip    — build → parse → equal
  TestAdvanceTimeTxZeroAlloc    — Time() accessor 0 allocs/run
  TestAdvanceTimeTxBytesReusable — &Bytes()[0] stable
  TestIsZAPBytes
  TestShouldUseZAPForWrite

This is Phase 0 of the LP-023 migration. Phase 1: schemas + accessors for
the remaining 32 platformvm tx types using the same pattern. Phase 2:
replace codec.Codec.{Marshal,Unmarshal} call-sites in platformvm/{txs,
mempool,block,state,executor}. Phase 3: validator coordination + activation.
Phase 4: post-activation legacy code removal.

Reproduce: GOWORK=off go test -bench=. -benchmem ./vms/platformvm/txs/zap_native/
2026-06-02 12:34:56 -07:00
Hanzo AI 59423a56e8 Dockerfile: bump EVM_VERSION v0.18.16 → v0.18.18
Pulls in plugin/evm StateScheme fix that unblocks fresh L2 EVM chain
creation on lux-mainnet (hanzo, zoo, spc, pars), where the plugin was
panicking with "panic in eth.New: triedb parent [<EmptyRootHash>] layer
missing" because eth/backend.go inherited geth's path-by-default for
empty DBs while the VM hard-refuses path mode upfront.

See luxfi/evm v0.18.18 commit 1dea806f8.
2026-06-02 11:56:01 -07:00
Hanzo AI 82dbdbadee fix: gofmt -s across repo (CI format check) 2026-06-02 11:39:52 -07:00
Hanzo AI 7285e1e554 go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.19 -> v1.13.8 (RLP-matching mainnet+testnet+zoo-mainnet genesis embeds)
Embedded //go:embed configs/{mainnet,testnet,devnet,localnet} now contains
canonical 2-alloc genesis.json's reverted for RLP import compatibility:

- mainnet C-Chain (96369): block 0 = 0x3f4fa2a0...   MATCH lux-mainnet-96369.rlp
- testnet C-Chain (96368): block 0 = 0x1c5fe377...   MATCH lux-testnet-96368.rlp
- zoo-mainnet  (200200):   block 0 = 0x7c548af4...   MATCH zoo-mainnet-200200.rlp

Each had been wedged by 43 PQ precompiles baked into config.precompileUpgrades
at blockTimestamp:0, mutating state root + producing non-canonical hash.
Activations moved to forward-dated upgrade.json (blockTimestamp 1766708400).

Also bumps pkg/genesis/security to v1.13.8 to stay version-locked.
Tidy drops bft v0.1.5 (no longer indirect).
2026-06-02 04:25:27 -07:00
Hanzo AI ba4084d6d5 docker: drop gcr.io distroless for scratch runtime in heartbeat-tx example
We don't use gcr.io across lux/hanzo/zoo. Switch the heartbeat-tx example
runtime stage from gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot to
FROM scratch, copying ca-certs, tzdata, and passwd/group from the builder.
2026-06-02 03:34:39 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3332d05eaa Dockerfile: bump EVM_VERSION v0.18.15 → v0.18.16
luxfi/evm v0.18.16 fixes the nil-chainConfig panic at PQ gate that
made v1.28.15's image-baked EVM plugin crash on fresh-PVC pq:true
bootstrap. Discovered during localnet 1337 bring-up (#148).

Root cause in v0.18.15: vm.chainConfig.PQ was being set BEFORE
vm.chainConfig was assigned from g.Config — nil-deref in
plugin/evm/vm.go Initialize().

v0.18.16 moves the gate AFTER assignment.

This unblocks v1.28.16 image build → unblocks localnet 100% green
→ unblocks cluster deploys (devnet → testnet → mainnet).
2026-06-02 01:05:57 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 729b4e578a ci(release): cross-compile darwin binaries on lux-build pool
GitHub-hosted macos-13 queues block the release pipeline for hours.
The build is already pure Go cross-compile (CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=darwin
GOARCH=$arch) so there's no reason to use a Mac runner. Route through
the self-hosted lux-build ARC pool (fast, plentiful) instead.

Replace 7z (not on ubuntu) with apt-installed zip in the same step.
Output filename + artifact name are unchanged.
2026-06-01 22:55:13 -07:00
Hanzo AI 946e6422f7 go.mod: bump luxfi/consensus v1.25.12 → v1.25.13 (gofmt fixes) 2026-06-01 22:02:34 -07:00
Hanzo AI 73b05ef68d go.mod: bump luxfi/accel v1.1.7 → v1.1.8 + consensus v1.25.12 + threshold v1.9.7 + kms v1.11.2 + pulsar v1.1.2
Whole-tree sync to latest closure-swarm tags. accel v1.1.8 ships
c_api.h via //go:embed so go mod vendor preserves it (fixes fresh-clone
CI builds across all consumers).
2026-06-01 22:01:22 -07:00
Hanzo AI 4ec0931501 go.mod: consensus v1.25.9 → v1.25.11; pulsar v1.0.23 → v1.1.1; threshold v1.9.2 → v1.9.4
PULSAR-V04-CTX cascade landing:
  - pulsar  v1.0.23 → v1.1.1  (v0.4 ctx-bound algebraic-aggregate
                                threshold sign — full Round1→Round2W→
                                Round2Sign→AlgebraicAggregateCtx with
                                FIPS 204 §5.4 ctx threaded into μ; no
                                single-party dealer shortcut anywhere)
  - threshold v1.9.2 → v1.9.4  (dispatcher pulsar.Sign_Ctx rewired
                                onto full algebraic-aggregate path; no
                                master sk materialised in dispatcher
                                process at any point during sign)
  - consensus v1.25.9 → v1.25.11 (passes the bumps through)

Test gates green on tip:
  GOWORK=off go test -count=1 -short -timeout 600s ./vms/platformvm/...
  GOWORK=off go test -count=1 -short -timeout 600s ./network/...
  GOWORK=off go test -count=1 -short -timeout 600s ./consensus/...
2026-06-01 21:56:39 -07:00
Hanzo AI 384425c66b go.mod: consensus v1.25.8 → v1.25.9 (magnetar v1.2.0 dealerless PVSS-DKG)
Cascade:
- magnetar v1.1.0 → v1.2.0 (closes MAGNETAR-PVSS-DKG-V11)
- threshold v1.9.1 → v1.9.2 (magnetar bump)
- consensus v1.25.8 → v1.25.9 (threshold + magnetar bump)

Magnetar v1.2.0 lands a Schoenmakers-style PVSS-DKG over GF(257)
for THBS-SE setup. No trusted dealer; no party ever holds the
master byte vector at any time during setup. Share-envelope wire
shapes are byte-shape-identical to the dealer path, so already-
deployed share material is forward-compatible.
2026-06-01 21:25:05 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9ca3a728ef go.mod: bump luxfi/keys v1.0.9 → v1.1.0, luxfi/kms v1.9.13 → v1.10.1
luxfi/keys v1.1.0 lands the Bindel-Brendel-Fischlin (CCS 2021) +
CDFFJ23 (Asiacrypt 2023) stronger-binding hybrid signature scheme
for validator identity:

  HybridPublicKey / HybridPrivateKey / HybridSignature
  HybridSign / HybridVerify / HybridBoundDigest / HybridPublicKeyBytes
  DeriveHybridIdentity (mnemonic + path → HybridIdentity)

Construction binds BOTH pubkeys into m_bound via SHAKE256-384 under
domain "lux-hybrid-sig-v1" — security ≥ max(EUF-CMA_secp256k1,
sEUF-CMA_ML-DSA-65). Raw concat (the prior plan) only gives
min security under non-honest-key adversary (CDFFJ23 §4).

Classical = secp256k1 (matches existing P/X validator key format).
PQ = ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).

Use DeriveHybridIdentity for validator stake re-anchor flow:
classical leaf at m/44'/9000'/serviceIndex'/0'/0', PQ leaf at
m/44'/9000'/serviceIndex'/0'/1'. NodeID derived via single
SHAKE256-384 over wire-form hybrid pubkey (no BTC-style double hash —
cryptographer review confirmed single-SHAKE is sound).

luxfi/kms v1.10.1 follows with the matching go.mod bump.

Tests: go build ./... and go test -race -count=1 -short
./vms/platformvm/... PASS.
2026-06-01 21:03:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI b4d441911f go.mod: drop corona v0.7.5 replace — unblock consensus v1.25.8 build
consensus v1.25.8 (carries threshold v1.9.1 + magnetar v1.1.0) refactored
quasar/corona_gob.go and polaris.go to call sig.MarshalBinary() at the
Signature level. The wire-codec methods (Signature.{Marshal,Unmarshal}Binary)
were added in corona v0.7.6 — v0.7.5 only has them on the inner C/Z/Delta
polynomial fields.

The historical replace directive (9323caa1fc on 2026-05-24) was added to
work around consensus v1.24.6 reaching back into corona via keyera.Bootstrap,
which since shipped its 3-value return at corona v0.7.5. consensus v1.25.x
now pins corona v0.7.6 in its own go.mod cleanly, so the replace is no
longer needed and is actively breaking the v1.28.8 image build.

Removing the replace lets MVS pick corona v0.7.6 transitively through
consensus → that is the version where MarshalBinary lives.

Reproduced the CI failure locally with CGO_ENABLED=0 GOWORK=off, fixed,
verified with a clean amd64 nattraversal-profile build (46.6MB binary)
and a full race-clean ./... suite (exit 0, no DATA RACE / panic markers).
2026-06-01 19:54:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI f5130223c6 Dockerfile: bump EVM_VERSION v0.18.14 → v0.18.15
luxfi/evm v0.18.15 ships core/genesis: honor SkipPostMergeFields flag
from JSON — the fix for the "triedb parent [0x56e81f17…] layer missing"
panic-in-eth.New that's blocking C-Chain bootstrap on lux-mainnet.

Lux mainnet C-Chain canonical genesis hash is 0x3f4fa2a0…, produced
with the 16-field pre-Shanghai header format. The chain activates
Cancun at genesis time for MCOPY etc., but the genesis BLOCK itself
must stay in the legacy header shape. The previous luxfi/evm tag
ignored skipPostMergeFields=true and shifted the computed genesis
hash to 0x1ade42ec…, which then failed to commit to pathdb because
the parent layer (0x56e81f17… = empty root) wasn't in the layertree.

The plugin baked into this image is at vmId
mgj786NP7uDwBCcq6YwThhaN8FLyybkCa4zBWTQbNgmK6k9A6 — confirmed via
strings of the running prod plugin binary (luxfi/evm/core symbols).
2026-06-01 19:35:54 -07:00
Hanzo AI f4407b3497 go.mod: consensus v1.25.7 → v1.25.8 (magnetar v1.1.0 strict-atom cascade)
consensus v1.25.8 carries threshold v1.9.1 which carries magnetar v1.1.0:
strict-atom Combine, audit-grep clean, byte-identity to circl FIPS 205,
35-51% faster than v1.0.

Race-clean across the full node ./... suite (exit 0; no DATA RACE / panic
markers; 30+ min compile-and-test on -race -timeout=15m).
2026-06-01 19:29:24 -07:00
Hanzo AI 235297bde0 genesis: add I/O/R chains to primary network registry
OracleVM, RelayVM, IdentityVM were previously registered as optional
VMs (loadable via CreateChainTx) but not part of the genesis-baked
primary network registry. Adding them to the registry means the VM
alias machinery + VMAliases map now know about all 14 primary-network
chains by canonical letter and alias set.

Order is append-only per the comment in registry.go — I/O/R land at
positions 12/13/14. Each row picks a unique alias triple:
  I: identity, identityvm, id
  O: oracle, oraclevm, feed
  R: relay, relayvm, msg

This change does NOT bake I/O/R into FromConfig's primary-genesis
optIn loop — that would require new IChainGenesis/OChainGenesis/
RChainGenesis fields on genesiscfg.Config plus matching ichain.json/
ochain.json/rchain.json shards under genesis/configs/{net}/. I/O/R
continue to be instantiated via CreateChainTx post-genesis (as today).
What the registry update unblocks is the alias resolution path so
when those chains DO get created, the VM manager knows them by
canonical name without per-chain switch-ladder edits.

builder.Aliases() gets matching cases for the three new VMIDs so
when a future genesis bakes them, chain alias registration works
without further changes.

Existing tests in TestChainAliasesRegistryParity and TestVMAliasesRegistryParity
get three new rows each; both pass.
2026-06-01 16:45:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3b8fa5911a merge: feat/scale-standard 2026-06-01 16:35:45 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9df75e9ac7 merge: feat/create-sovereign-l1-tx 2026-06-01 16:35:45 -07:00
Hanzo AI 39249c4362 merge: chore/kill-fuji 2026-06-01 16:35:44 -07:00
Hanzo AI b58aaa0682 keyutil: thread *keys.ServiceIdentity into LoadMnemonicFromKMS dial
The KMS consensus-auth gate now requires every secret-opcode envelope
to carry a signed identity. Derive a bootstrap ServiceIdentity from
KMS_BOOTSTRAP_MNEMONIC (or MNEMONIC) under the well-known servicePath
"luxd/staking-bootstrap" and thread it into the LoadMnemonicFromKMS
call so the dial envelope is signed.

Bootstrap mnemonic is provisioned out-of-band (sealed envelope, HW
token unwrap, etc.); the operational staking material on disk still
comes from the KMS-held mnemonic the dial then fetches.
2026-06-01 16:15:41 -07:00
Hanzo AI 596de8be35 go.mod: consensus v1.25.7 + threshold v1.9.0 + corona v0.7.6 (Polaris cert wired, TEE extensions live) 2026-06-01 12:49:17 -07:00
Abhishek Krishna b96f6b343d vms/txs/mempool: add AdmissionVerifier hook for encrypted-payload txs (#115)
Closes luxfi/node#115 by landing the admission-hook half of the issue.
The hook is the substrate the encrypted-mempool partition will use to
admit FHE-ciphertext transactions on (signature + fee + NIZK) without
decryption per LP-066 / luxfi/precompile/fhe.

Surface added:

  type AdmissionVerifier[T Tx] interface {
      VerifyAdmit(tx T) error
  }

  var ErrAdmissionRejected = errors.New("tx admission rejected")

  func NewWithAdmissionVerifier[T Tx](
      metrics Metrics,
      verifier AdmissionVerifier[T],
  ) *mempool[T]

  // New is now a thin wrapper around NewWithAdmissionVerifier(metrics, nil).
  // No behavioral change for existing callers.

Add() invokes verifier.VerifyAdmit last, after duplicate / size / space /
conflict have all passed. Ordering rationale: cheap rejects fire first,
so NIZK verification cost is only paid on a tx that passes structural
admission. A non-nil verifier return is wrapped in ErrAdmissionRejected,
records the drop reason via the existing droppedTxIDs LRU, and never
inserts the tx.

What this does NOT do:
  - It does not define the encrypted-payload tx type or its NIZK proof
    format. Those live in vms/platformvm/txs (or wherever the consumer
    decides) and ship in a follow-up.
  - It does not wire the FHE precompile's bootstrap-meter consultation —
    callers implementing AdmissionVerifier do that themselves.
  - It does not add the per-account FIFO partition for encrypted txs.
    The existing unissuedTxs Hashmap is per-mempool; the partition is
    a separate construction over multiple mempool instances and is a
    follow-up.

What it DOES do: lands the only mempool-side hook the issue requires
without locking us in on the encrypted-tx representation. The hook is
generic (`AdmissionVerifier[T Tx]`) so any future Tx variant can plug
in the same way.

Tests (CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -run TestAdmissionVerifier ./vms/txs/mempool/...
all pass):
  - nil verifier matches New (byte-identical behavior)
  - verifier returning nil admits the tx; gate fires exactly once on
    Add and not on Get / Peek / Iterate / Remove
  - verifier returning an error rejects with ErrAdmissionRejected
    wrapping the verifier's reason; drop reason recorded
  - cheap checks short-circuit before the gate runs (duplicate /
    oversize / conflict all skip the gate)

Refs:
  - issue #115 (this repo)
  - LP-066 (F-Chain confidential compute)
  - LP-183 (ZAP envelope decode precompile; downstream consumer once
    encrypted-payload tx propagation through gossip lands)
  - luxfi/threshold issue #20 (real distributed FHE decryption; the
    block-proposer-side counterpart to this admission-side hook)
2026-06-01 22:32:59 +05:30
Abhishek Krishna 798b01ada6 test(errors): cover Wrap/Multi/Join/Is* and category inference (100%)
The github.com/luxfi/node/errors package shipped with zero tests despite
being a public utility surface (sentinel errors, WrappedError context
chain, Multi/Join aggregation, retry helpers). This adds 22 tests covering:

- WrappedError.Error format (with and without message)
- Wrap/WrapWithContext nil pass-through and context preservation
- errors.Is / errors.As chain through Wrap (incl. double-wrap)
- IsNotFound, IsClosed, IsTimeout helpers
- IsTemporary against both sentinel errors and the Temporary() interface
- IsPermanent across all permanent sentinels + fmt.Errorf %w chains
- GetCategory: wrapped category, sentinel inference, unknown fallback,
  and the precedence rule (wrapped category beats inferred category)
- Multi.Error/Add/Err for 0, 1, and N errors; nil-add ignored
- Join nil pass-through and multi-error combination

Result: 100.0% statement coverage, race-clean.
2026-06-01 12:08:28 +00:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub ddd0053774 Merge pull request #126 from luxfi/fix/invalidate-stale-genesis-cache
fix(config): invalidate cached genesis on parse failure
2026-06-01 01:43:22 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5100801f43 fix(config): invalidate cached genesis on parse failure instead of CrashLooping
The cached `<dataDir>/genesis.bytes` file is written on first start to
hold hash stability across restarts. On a binary upgrade that adds
new codec types (multi-version v0+v1 dispatcher, etc.), the old
cached blob may carry type IDs the new binary doesn't recognise. The
existing code surfaced this as `resolve X-Chain asset ID from cached
genesis: unmarshal interface: unknown type ID N` and returned an
error — wedging the node in CrashLoop with no automatic recovery.

Drop the cache and rebuild from the `--genesis-file` instead. Hash
stability is forfeit for that single restart (intentional — the
alternative is a permanent outage on every binary bump that changes
codec types). Subsequent restarts re-establish stability against the
fresh cache.

Surfaced today on <tenant> testnet+mainnet bumping lqd v1.9.x →
v1.10.8: every pod hit "unknown type ID 29" on the stale v1.9.x
codec cache and CrashLoopBackOff'd.
2026-06-01 01:43:00 -07:00
Abhishek Krishna 7fdadf03ef docs: align Go version in README and CONTRIBUTING with go.mod (1.26.3)
README badge and prerequisites listed Go 1.21.12 / 1.23.9 in different
places, but go.mod requires Go 1.26.3. Bring the docs in sync so new
contributors install a toolchain that can actually build the node.
2026-06-01 14:06:50 +05:30
Hanzo AI c5c03aef44 go.mod: consensus v1.25.5 + threshold v1.8.10 (race-clean, corona dispatcher live, naming decomplect) 2026-06-01 01:14:43 -07:00
Hanzo AI ac0b9c2ca8 keyutil: rehome ZAP mnemonic import to luxfi/keys (was luxfi/kms)
Track A finish: KMS goes back to being a generic secret store; mnemonic
semantics live in luxfi/keys alongside the existing BIP-39 + BIP44
derivation. Imports flip from luxfi/kms/pkg/zapclient.LoadMnemonicFromKMS
to keys.LoadMnemonicFromKMS — same signature, same behavior.

Deps:
  luxfi/keys v1.0.8 → v1.0.9     (carries the new LoadMnemonic helper)
  luxfi/kms  v1.9.12 → v1.9.13   (LoadMnemonic removed, secret store only)

Build clean.
2026-05-31 21:30:21 -07:00
Hanzo AI 1ee0ecc807 go.mod: consensus v1.25.4 + threshold v1.8.9 + magnetar v0.5.2 (race-clean threshold + MAGS/MAGG wire) 2026-05-31 18:20:38 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8c96e85d03 scrub: subnet/l2 → chain (final RELEASES.md cleanup, forward-only)
Wire-format codec IDs unchanged. CLI aliases deleted; chain is the
command. No backwards-compat shims, no deprecation comments.
2026-05-31 15:30:09 -07:00
Hanzo AI 43f010ea9f scrub: subnet/l2 → chain (canonical vocabulary, forward-only)
Wire-format codec IDs unchanged. CLI aliases deleted; chain is the
command. No backwards-compat shims, no deprecation comments.
2026-05-31 15:26:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI 98d1eeffcd keyutil: native-ZAP mnemonic fallback (priority 2)
Adds a KMS_ADDR-gated production path between the MNEMONIC env var
(priority 1) and the on-disk key files (priority 3). When set, the
mnemonic is fetched via luxfi/kms zapclient.LoadMnemonicFromKMS —
the same canonical loader every Lux-derived service (luxd, netrunner,
lux/cli, descending-L1 bootstraps) now shares.

New priority chain:
  1. MNEMONIC env var
  2. KMS_ADDR + KMS_ENV + KMS_MNEMONIC_PATH (native ZAP, default path /mnemonic)
  3. Key name from os.Args[1] (~/.lux/keys/<name>/)
  4. ~/.lux/keys/default/

Production env contract matches the <tenant> operator's render
(KMS_ADDR + KMS_ORG + KMS_ENV + KMS_MNEMONIC_PATH); every Lux chain
inherits the same scheme.

Dep:
  + github.com/luxfi/kms v1.9.12  (carries zapclient.LoadMnemonic)

Build clean.
2026-05-31 14:29:34 -07:00
Hanzo AI 1aaded33db go.mod: pulsar v1.0.23 + threshold v1.8.8 + consensus v1.25.3 + metric v1.5.7
Pulls in:
- pulsar canonical wire codec (PULS/PULG) + shared lattice/v7/gpu surface
- threshold protocols/{corona,pulsar} alias surface (no direct primitive imports)
- consensus routed through threshold/protocols alias
- metric noop counter race fix (atomic.Uint64)

Cross-repo audit closed: corona+pulsar+threshold production-ready for
permissionless mainnet. End-to-end TestPulsar_Wire_FIPS204Verifiable
asserts threshold-combined signatures are byte-identical to single-party
FIPS 204 ML-DSA signatures (verified externally via cloudflare/circl).
2026-05-31 12:45:26 -07:00
Hanzo AI 1a42b5df1c fix(platformvm/state): route every state-side codec read through multi-version dispatcher
Closes the residual v1.28.1 testnet-canary failure where bootstrapping
a v1.23.x-written P-Chain database hit:

  P-Chain state corrupt after init — database must be wiped
  error="loadMetadata: feeState: unknown codec version"
  chainID=11111111111111111111111111111111P

The v1.28.1 patch routed genesis.Parse through the multi-version
txs.GenesisCodec dispatcher but did not touch the 7 OTHER state-side
sites that read via block.GenesisCodec — which carried only the v1 slot
map. Any pre-codec-v1 row on disk (feeState, heightRange, L1Validator,
fx.Owner, NetToL1Conversion, legacy stateBlk) errored at the very first
byte with codec.ErrUnknownVersion.

Architecture (Rich-Hickey-simple): make the codec itself complete for
all encountered wire versions rather than asking "which codec does
this caller need". block.GenesisCodec now registers BOTH the v0
(v1.23.x Apricot/Banff) and v1 (current) tx slot maps — reads
dispatch on the 2-byte wire prefix, writes still target
CodecVersion (== v1) exclusively. Same shape as txs.GenesisCodec
(decomplected from block parsing — block.Parse continues to extract
prefix explicitly because v0 blocks satisfy v0.Block, not block.Block,
and cannot be unmarshalled into a block.Block destination).

Audit found 7 state-side sites all using block.GenesisCodec; all 7
are routed through a new defensive helper:

  state.multiVersionUnmarshal(c codec.Manager, b []byte, dest any)

The helper is a pass-through to c.Unmarshal but probes the codec on
first observation. If the codec is missing the v0 slot, a structured
warning fires (once per codec pointer) so a future canary boot
surfaces ALL remaining single-version codecs in a single log scrape
rather than failing piecemeal across iterations:

  state-side codec is single-version; reads of v0-prefixed bytes
  will fail

block.RegisterGenesisType now symmetrically registers on both the v0
and v1 underlying linearcodecs so state-side types (currently:
stateBlk) keep slot-stable shapes across codec.Manager dispatch.

Audit table (all 7 broken sites → fixed):

  state/l1_validator.go:222         getL1Validator
  state/state_blocks.go:115         parseStoredBlock (legacy stateBlk)
  state/state_chains.go:66          GetNetOwner (fx.Owner)
  state/state_chains.go:116         GetNetToL1Conversion
  state/state_metadata.go:176       loadMetadata (heightRange)
  state/state_metadata.go:273       getFeeState  <-- canary failure
  state/state_validators.go:239     loadActiveL1Validators
  state/state_validators.go:535     initValidatorSets (inactive)

MetadataCodec was already multi-version (no fix needed).
txs.GenesisCodec was already multi-version (v1.28.0).
block.Codec stays v1-only by design (block.Block interface destination
cannot accept v0.Block types; Parse handles version split explicitly).

Tests (all -race green):

  block/codec_multiversion_test.go      6 tests
  state/state_v0_codec_test.go          9 tests including
                                          - TestStateV0FeeStateReadable
                                            (exact canary fixture)
                                          - TestStateBootFromV0SingletonDB
                                            (end-to-end boot simulation)
  state/codec_helpers_test.go           5 tests (warning probe +
                                          idempotency + non-blocking
                                          + multi-version invariant)

  -> 20 new regression tests
  -> 27/27 platformvm packages green under -race
2026-05-31 02:56:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI 13a48d0c28 fix(platformvm/genesis): route Parse through multi-version codec.Manager
v1.28.0's block-codec multi-version dispatch did not extend to the
P-Chain genesis decoder. genesis.Codec aliased block.GenesisCodec,
which registers only the v1 tx slot map; v0-prefixed cached-genesis
blobs (carried over from v1.23.x bootstraps) errored at first byte
with codec.ErrUnknownVersion.

Root cause hot path: config.getGenesisData -> resolveXAssetID ->
genesis/builder.XAssetIDFromGenesisBytes -> platformvm/genesis.Parse
-> Codec.Unmarshal(bytes, *Genesis). Codec was the v1-only
block.GenesisCodec.

Fix: alias genesis.Codec to txs.GenesisCodec, which registers BOTH the
v0 (Apricot/Banff) and v1 (current) tx slot maps. The Genesis struct
has no slot ID of its own; all version-sensitive data lives in the
embedded []*txs.Tx, so txs.GenesisCodec dispatches the same wire-
prefix lookup the rest of the platformvm tree already uses.

Marshal at CodecVersion (v1) is byte-equivalent because the v1 slot
map in txs.GenesisCodec is the SAME registerV1TxTypes() invocation
block.GenesisCodec was using.

Audit: every other Unmarshal site in vms/platformvm/ that touches
historical wire bytes either (a) goes through block.Parse / txs.Parse
which already dispatch on the prefix, or (b) reads internal state
written by v1-only code (block.GenesisCodec is correct there).

Regression guards in parse_v0_test.go:
  - TestParseAcceptsV0CachedGenesis: the canary failure mode.
  - TestParseAcceptsV1Genesis: canonical write path still parses.
  - TestParseV0RoundtripIsBytePreserving: v0 -> Parse -> re-marshal
    -> byte-equal, locking in the doc claim that genesis-derived
    hashes do not rotate across the migration.
  - TestParseRejectsUnknownVersion: prefixes outside {v0, v1} still
    surface as errors.

Full vms/platformvm/... tree green under -race; genesis/builder and
config trees green.
2026-05-31 02:26:49 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub da79e8d484 feat(platformvm): multi-version codec — v0 (Apricot/Banff) + v1 (current) — byte-preserving TxID/BlockID across migration (#123)
Closes the codec-version trap that surfaced when the v1.23.x ("Apricot/Banff") tx + block layout was rip-replaced in e27d954097 without bumping the wire-version prefix: mainnet/testnet on-disk blobs (~1.08M+ C-Chain blocks) lost a decoder, and any code path that round-tripped a tx through tx.Initialize re-marshaled it under the new layout — rotating TxID and breaking chain-commitment continuity.

Strategy A per cryptographer / orchestrator brief:

* Register both layouts on the platformvm tx + block codec.Managers under
  distinct wire-version prefixes:
  - CodecVersionV0=0 = v1.23.x slot map (TransferInput=5, hole=6, ...,
    AddPermissionlessValidator=25, ..., DisableL1Validator=39)
  - CodecVersionV1=1 = current slot map (with MintOutput/MintOp at 6/8,
    +4-skip for Banff txs at 27-30, CreateSovereignL1Tx at 36,
    SlashValidatorTx at 41, CreateAssetTx/OperationTx at 42-43)
  - txs.Codec / block.Codec dispatch by the standard 2-byte wire prefix.

* New byte-preserving init: tx.InitializeFromBytes(c, version, signedBytes)
  and tx.InitializeFromBytesAtVersion(c, version) bind the tx to its
  original signedBytes without re-marshalling. tx.Initialize stays as the
  fresh-build path; from-DB / from-wire paths route through the
  byte-preserving variant. TxID = hash(signedBytes) under the version it
  was written at, forever.

* New vms/platformvm/block/v0/ subpackage: 9 v0-only block kinds
  (ApricotProposalBlock, BanffProposalBlock, ... at slots 0-4 + 29-32).
  Pure DTOs — no codec, no Visit. The block package wraps the decoded
  v0.Block in a liftedV0Block adapter that:
  - returns the original bytes verbatim (no re-marshal),
  - BlockID = hash(raw v0 bytes),
  - dispatches Visit to the v1 Visitor arms (ApricotProposalBlock /
    BanffProposalBlock -> ProposalBlock, etc.),
  - re-binds embedded txs at v0 via InitializeFromBytesAtVersion so
    inner TxIDs are also byte-preserved.

* genesis.Parse is wire-version-aware: pre-codec-v1 genesis blobs decode
  at v0, new blobs at v1. The matching codec is used for tx re-binding.

* L1-tx slot map shifts +1 to accommodate CreateSovereignL1Tx at 36
  (RegisterL1Validator 36->37, SetL1ValidatorWeight 37->38,
  IncreaseL1ValidatorBalance 38->39, DisableL1Validator 39->40). Test
  fixtures regenerated.

* 22 fee-calculator fixtures + 11 serialization fixtures bumped to use
  the v1 wire prefix (0x0001) and the post-CreateSovereignL1Tx slot map.

Migration notes:
* Mainnet + testnet P-Chain DBs: NO rebuild. Pre-codec-v1 blocks
  continue to decode through the v0 path with original BlockID and
  TxIDs preserved. New blocks are written at v1 from the cut-over
  height onward.
* Devnet: must be rebuilt before rolling to v1.28.0. Its existing
  blobs carry wire-version 0 but use the post-rip slot map (not the
  v0 Apricot/Banff layout) — decoding them through the v0 path would
  read the wrong types. A fresh bootstrap at v1.28.0 writes v1 bytes
  from height 0 and is internally consistent thereafter.

Tests:
* TestCodecVersionV0V1Coexist, TestParseDispatchesByVersion,
  TestTxIDStabilityRoundTrip, TestCrossVersionRefuses (txs)
* TestParseV0ApricotProposalBlock, TestParseV0BanffStandardBlock,
  TestParseV1RoundTrip, TestVersionPrefixDispatch (block)
* 150 packages, 0 failures under -race
2026-05-31 01:38:42 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 303242ea5a bump(consensus): v1.25.1 → v1.25.2 (#122)
Picks up ChainConsensus.ForceAccept — the consensus-level counterpart
to ForcePreference. Together with the engine.finalizeOwnProposal helper,
this lets a proposer self-finalize its own block at proposal time when
peer Chits do not arrive in time, closing the CreateChainTx stall
observed on devnet under low validator counts.

- ChainConsensus.ForceAccept(blockID) — direct accept bypassing alpha/K
  quorum, guarded by engine path (IsOwnProposal=true) and idempotent.
- Engine path uses ForceAccept after ForcePreference on own proposals
  so the proposing node commits locally and other validators converge
  via the next poll round.

Test delta: pre-existing fee/static_calculator L1Tx parse failures on
main are unaffected; consensus, vms/platformvm/{block,blockmock,state,
warp,...}, and genesis/builder all pass with race -short.
2026-05-30 21:38:16 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 1d84e03e5b test(genesis/builder): canonical evmAddr/utxoAddr fixture parse gate (#121)
Add TestCanonicalGenesisFixtureParses — loads the canonical mainnet
genesis.json (genesis v1.12.19 evmAddr/utxoAddr field names) through
genesiscfg.GetConfigFile and asserts EVMAddr/UTXOAddr decode to
non-zero ids.ShortID values.

This is the "have we adopted the rename" gate — if the loader
silently swallows the new field names (e.g. via a regression to
ethAddr/luxAddr struct tags), every allocation Address comes back
as ShortEmpty and the assertion catches it before that ships.

Test is host-path aware: skips when ~/work/lux/genesis is not on
disk (CI without sibling checkout), runs when it is.
2026-05-30 20:09:10 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 3631ff5dc2 feat: bump consensus v1.25.1 (proposer fix) + genesis v1.12.19 (#120)
luxfi/consensus v1.25.0 → v1.25.1
  Proposer-self-accept gap on nova multi-node finality: the proposer of
  block B was never marking B locally accepted because manager.applyQbit
  re-derived peer Chits via a second blk.Verify() call which most VMs
  (notably PlatformVM CreateChainTx) are not idempotent under, flipping
  every Chits into synthetic Accept=false. Fix tags the proposer's own
  pending entry with IsOwnProposal=true and short-circuits the re-verify
  in handleVote — peer Chits now count as the genuine Accepts they are.

luxfi/genesis v1.12.15 → v1.12.19
  Decomplected: pkg/genesis/security/ is a nested module (own go.mod,
  tagged pkg/genesis/security/v1.12.19) that owns SecurityProfile
  verification — the only file in luxfi/genesis that imports
  luxfi/consensus. The rest of pkg/genesis stays consensus-dep-free.

  API change: pin.Resolve() → genesissecurity.ResolveProfile(pin).
  ErrSecurityProfileHashMismatch and ErrSecurityProfileInvalidID also
  moved to the security submodule. Updated node/node.go and
  node/security_profile_test.go to match.

Build: GOWORK=off go build ./...  clean (linker warnings about accel
  static lib path are pre-existing host-config noise, not a regression).
Vet:   GOWORK=off go vet ./...    clean (the cevm_e2e_test.go
  sync/atomic.Bool copy warning is pre-existing on v1.27.24 main).
Tests: ./consensus/... pass, ./genesis/... pass, ./node/...
  TestApplySecurityProfile_* pass. ./vms/platformvm/txs/fee L1-validator
  failures are pre-existing on v1.27.24 main and unchanged.

Devnet fixture (~/work/lux/genesis/configs/devnet/genesis.json) parses
clean: networkID=3, 5 initialStakers, canonical evmAddr/utxoAddr only.
2026-05-30 19:56:57 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 28e9fe0032 refactor: XAssetID → UTXOAssetID (#119)
The field is the primary network's UTXO fee asset (P+X), not
X-chain-specific. P-chain CreateChainTx / AddChainValidatorTx and
X-chain transfers all burn it for fees. Same number on P and X by
construction; the name should reflect the function, not the chain.

Renames applied across:
- wallet/chain/{p,x}/builder.Context.UTXOAssetID
- wallet/chain/x/builder.Backend.UTXOAssetID() trait method
- node/config: resolveUTXOAssetID + nodeConfig.UTXOAssetID
- vms/platformvm + vms/xvm + chains/manager consumers
- examples (deploy-chains, get-p-chain-balance, ...)

Includes local replaces for luxfi/{runtime,consensus} pending their
release tags landing. Drop after upstream tags ship.

Companion PRs: luxfi/runtime#2, luxfi/consensus#11. Downstream
consumers (sdk, cli, genesis, liquidity) follow.
2026-05-30 14:28:08 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6258af7af9 deps: proto v1.0.2 — consume SubnetUptime → ChainUptime rename
luxfi/proto#6 (merged) renames SubnetUptime → ChainUptime in
node/zap/p2p, completing the no-subnet vocabulary rule from
node#116. The local re-export in proto/p2p/p2p_zap.go was already
written against the new upstream name, breaking v1.27.22 builds:

  proto/p2p/p2p_zap.go:42:32: undefined: p2p.ChainUptime

Tagging v1.0.2 against the merged proto main and bumping the module
pin unblocks the build with zero code changes — the alias line is
unchanged because upstream already matches.

Build: clean. Test: pre-existing platformvm/txs/fee L1-validator
failures unchanged (not introduced here).
2026-05-30 09:35:04 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub f0733b749c canonical evmAddr/utxoAddr only — bump genesis v1.12.15 (#118)
Pulls in luxfi/genesis v1.12.15 which strips the dual-name
luxAddr/ethAddr alias shim. AllocationJSON now emits and accepts only
the canonical evmAddr/utxoAddr field pair.

docker-entrypoint.sh genesis templates: switch luxAddr → utxoAddr +
ethAddr → evmAddr to match.

This is the cascade step needed before luxd v1.23.43 ships — the runtime
parser at v1.23.31 (current devnet image) reads ethAddr/luxAddr; v1.23.42
already reads evmAddr/utxoAddr internally; v1.23.43 (this commit + tag)
drops every back-compat alias both ways.

Tests: genesis/builder, vms/platformvm/genesis pass. End-to-end parse
of configs/devnet/genesis.json with canonical names: 1005 allocations,
5 initial stakers (matches 5-pod sybil quorum).

Cluster bump path: lux-devnet (1.23.31 → v1.23.43); testnet/mainnet
remain on v1.23.31 until coordinated migration.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo AI <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-05-30 09:24:28 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 5c164e84c7 chore: update 2026-05-29 23:33:09 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6af468742c chore: update 2026-05-29 23:29:08 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 2220065985 chore(node): kill subnet — chain/network vocabulary across node (#116)
* feat(platformvm): CreateSovereignL1Tx — single-tx sovereign L1 launch

Adds a new platformvm tx type that atomically registers a sovereign L1
in one P-chain commit. Replaces what is today the four-step flow:

  CreateNetworkTx + AddChainValidatorTx ×N + CreateChainTx ×K + ConvertNetworkToL1Tx

with one signed tx. After commit, the primary network has a permanent
record of the L1's network ID + initial validator set + chain manifest
+ on-chain validator-manager contract — but it does NOT track-chains
or validate the L1's blocks. The L1 runs its own consensus from
genesis. L2/L3/L4 follow the same pattern recursively.

Type shape:

  type CreateSovereignL1Tx struct {
    BaseTx
    Owner           fx.Owner                       // CreateNetworkTx parity
    Validators      []*ConvertNetworkToL1Validator // genesis validator set
    Chains          []*SovereignL1Chain            // VM ID + genesis blob per chain
    ManagerChainIdx uint32                         // index into Chains[]
    ManagerAddress  types.JSONByteSlice            // validator-manager contract
  }

  type SovereignL1Chain struct {
    BlockchainName string
    VMID           ids.ID
    FxIDs          []ids.ID
    GenesisData    []byte
  }

SyntacticVerify enforces:
  - at least one validator (sorted, unique)
  - at least one chain, ≤ MaxSovereignL1Chains (16)
  - ManagerChainIdx is in range of Chains[]
  - ManagerAddress ≤ MaxChainAddressLength
  - per-chain name + VMID + FxIDs + genesis bounds
  - BaseTx + Owner + each Validator each verify

Wired into:
  - Visitor interface
  - codec (registered as the next tx type after ConvertNetworkToL1Tx)
  - signer + complexity + metrics + executor stubs across all visitor
    implementations

Executor body is stubbed with a TODO. The atomic state transition
(mint new networkID from tx hash, seed validator-manager state,
register each Chain, charge fee) lands in a follow-up PR. This PR is
the type definition + interface plumbing so downstream tools (wallet,
CLI, fee calc, metrics) can target the tx type while the executor is
implemented.

* chore(node): kill subnet — chain/network vocabulary across node

Zero remaining `subnet|Subnet|SUBNET` in node Go source. Per canonical
no-subnet rule.

## Wire types (Go fields only; byte-level wire encoding unchanged)

  message/wire/types.go  TrackedSubnets    → TrackedChains
  message/wire/zap.go    same on Read/Write
  proto/p2p/p2p_zap.go   SubnetUptime alias → ChainUptime
                          (consumes luxfi/proto rename in companion PR)

## Comment scrub

  message/wire/types.go            "(chain, subnet) pair" → "(chain, network) pair"
  network/peer/handshake.go        "primary-network or subnet" → "primary-network or per-chain"
  node/node.go                     "per-subnet"   → "per-chain"
                                   "P→subnet warp" → "P→chain warp"
  genesis/builder/builder.go       "their own subnets" → "their own chains"
  vms/platformvm/client.go         dropped "subnet jargon" reference
  vms/platformvm/service.go        dropped "net / subnet jargon" reference
  vms/platformvm/config/internal.go  "subnet-spawned blockchain" → "per-chain blockchain"

## ICPSubnet (Internet Computer adapter)

  ICPSubnet → ICPNet  (type rename — unrelated to platform subnet,
                        but still a subnet word; killed for consistency)
  map field `subnets` → `nets`

## Examples

  wallet/network/primary/examples/bootstrap-hanzo/main.go:
    --subnet-id  → --network-id (CLI flag)
    existingSubnetID local var → existingNetID
    "subnet ID" log lines → "network ID"
    "SUBNET_ID=" output → "NETWORK_ID="
    "subnet-evm VM ID" → "EVM VM ID"
    All comments rephrased.

  wallet/network/primary/examples/heartbeat-tx/main.go: one comment
    rephrase.

go.work workspace cleanup:
  - Removed ./operator/go entry (placeholder; lux/operator polyglot
    layout pending the cross-repo migration)
  - Removed ./operator entry (mid-migration; nothing to build)

Build clean. Zero `grep -rIn "subnet|Subnet" --include="*.go"` matches.
2026-05-29 21:17:44 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3fcc6085d5 feat(platformvm): CreateSovereignL1Tx — single-tx sovereign L1 launch
Adds a new platformvm tx type that atomically registers a sovereign L1
in one P-chain commit. Replaces what is today the four-step flow:

  CreateNetworkTx + AddChainValidatorTx ×N + CreateChainTx ×K + ConvertNetworkToL1Tx

with one signed tx. After commit, the primary network has a permanent
record of the L1's network ID + initial validator set + chain manifest
+ on-chain validator-manager contract — but it does NOT track-chains
or validate the L1's blocks. The L1 runs its own consensus from
genesis. L2/L3/L4 follow the same pattern recursively.

Type shape:

  type CreateSovereignL1Tx struct {
    BaseTx
    Owner           fx.Owner                       // CreateNetworkTx parity
    Validators      []*ConvertNetworkToL1Validator // genesis validator set
    Chains          []*SovereignL1Chain            // VM ID + genesis blob per chain
    ManagerChainIdx uint32                         // index into Chains[]
    ManagerAddress  types.JSONByteSlice            // validator-manager contract
  }

  type SovereignL1Chain struct {
    BlockchainName string
    VMID           ids.ID
    FxIDs          []ids.ID
    GenesisData    []byte
  }

SyntacticVerify enforces:
  - at least one validator (sorted, unique)
  - at least one chain, ≤ MaxSovereignL1Chains (16)
  - ManagerChainIdx is in range of Chains[]
  - ManagerAddress ≤ MaxChainAddressLength
  - per-chain name + VMID + FxIDs + genesis bounds
  - BaseTx + Owner + each Validator each verify

Wired into:
  - Visitor interface
  - codec (registered as the next tx type after ConvertNetworkToL1Tx)
  - signer + complexity + metrics + executor stubs across all visitor
    implementations

Executor body is stubbed with a TODO. The atomic state transition
(mint new networkID from tx hash, seed validator-manager state,
register each Chain, charge fee) lands in a follow-up PR. This PR is
the type definition + interface plumbing so downstream tools (wallet,
CLI, fee calc, metrics) can target the tx type while the executor is
implemented.
2026-05-29 20:25:28 -07:00
e9ab022ca7 build(deps): bump the go_modules group across 1 directory with 2 updates (#106)
Bumps the go_modules group with 1 update in the / directory: [go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go).


Updates `go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp` from 1.42.0 to 1.43.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/compare/v1.42.0...v1.43.0)

Updates `go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk` from 1.42.0 to 1.43.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/compare/v1.42.0...v1.43.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp
  dependency-version: 1.43.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
- dependency-name: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk
  dependency-version: 1.43.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-05-29 18:02:09 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 7003d69384 build(node): GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2 in Dockerfile per SCALE_STANDARD (#114)
Per SCALE_STANDARD.md §2 (~/work/hanzo/hips/docs/SCALE_STANDARD.md) —
every Go production Dockerfile that emits JSON to a client builds with
GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2. Verified on hanzoai/zip's json_bench_test.go:
- Edge POST roundtrip: -12% time, -23% allocs
- Marshal-only: -22% time
- Unmarshal-only: -19% time, -25% allocs

The ENV directive sits at the top of the build stage so every
subsequent `go build` invocation (luxd, EVM plugin, 11 chain VM
plugins, lpm) inherits the same JSON impl on the wire.
2026-05-29 18:01:36 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5b0eca3270 brand: rip <tenant> from builder comment 2026-05-29 14:26:21 -07:00
Hanzo AI c0d9ccacde brand: rip <tenant> name from code comments (no crossover) 2026-05-29 14:26:00 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3919991f48 fix(docker): bump EVM_VERSION v0.8.40 → v0.18.14 (post-rename plugin)
The v0.8.40 EVM plugin was built against luxfi/node v1.23.4 — pre-rename
EngineAddressKey ("LUX_VM_RUNTIME_ENGINE_ADDR"). The host (built from
this repo) has been emitting the NEW key ("VM_RUNTIME_ENGINE_ADDR")
since 9c42fe1126 (2026-05-15). Every luxd:v1.27.x image embeds a plugin
that reads the OLD key — empty env → no dial-back → C-chain never
bootstraps → all 4 L2 EVMs stay un-bootstrapped indefinitely.

v0.18.14 pins luxfi/node v1.27.6 which carries the rename, so the
plugin built from it reads the same key the host writes. Pairs with
0c573e6aa7 (host compat shim) — once every cluster pulls an image that
contains this Dockerfile bump, the shim is a no-op.
2026-05-27 04:59:03 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0c573e6aa7 fix(rpcchainvm): compat shim for pre-rename plugin env-var
The EngineAddressKey const renamed from LUX_VM_RUNTIME_ENGINE_ADDR to
VM_RUNTIME_ENGINE_ADDR in 9c42fe1126 (2026-05-15). luxd builds from
that commit forward set VM_RUNTIME_ENGINE_ADDR on plugin exec, but the
EVM plugin (luxfi/evm@v0.8.40 → luxfi/node@v1.23.4 → "LUX_VM_..." const)
in the same Docker image still os.Getenv("LUX_VM_...") — empty string,
no dial back, plugin exits, C-chain never bootstraps, all L2 EVMs stay
un-bootstrapped indefinitely on v1.27.x.

Set BOTH env keys until every plugin in /data/plugins has been rebuilt
against a luxfi/node version that has the rename. New const is the
canonical name; legacy const is the compat key (added as
LegacyEngineAddressKey and only emitted when it differs from the new
key, so once luxfi/evm bumps past the rename the extra env var becomes
a no-op and this line can be deleted without runtime impact).
2026-05-27 04:57:24 -07:00
Hanzo AI 711d2519c2 chore: update 2026-05-25 15:13:02 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9323caa1fc go.mod: replace luxfi/corona v0.7.5 — track keyera.Bootstrap 3-value return
consensus@v1.24.6 calls keyera.Bootstrap(...) with three return values
but its own go.mod still pins corona v0.4.0 (where Bootstrap returns
two). The 3-value signature lives at corona v0.7.x.

Locally we hide this via go.work using the working tree, so it never
shows up. CI builds without go.work and fails compiling
protocol/quasar/grouped_threshold.go.

Add a replace directive pinning corona to v0.7.5 (current latest).
A proper fix is to tag a luxfi/consensus v1.24.7 with corona bumped
in its own go.mod, but luxd is the only consumer of this transitive
mismatch right now — the replace keeps it tight and reversible.
2026-05-24 19:17:18 -07:00
Hanzo AI ff9faa3ef3 ci/docker: fall back to UNIVERSE_PAT when org GH_TOKEN is empty
The v1.27.18 diagnostic confirmed luxfi org GH_TOKEN secret resolves to
length=0 at runtime (visibility is set to 'all' but the actual value
appears unset/expired). UNIVERSE_PAT is set at the repo level and has
the same cross-repo read scope we need for private luxfi/* deps. Try
GH_TOKEN first, fall back to UNIVERSE_PAT, fail fast with a clear
error if both are empty.

Also explicitly disable docker/metadata-action's latest=auto flavor so
the :latest floating tag truly never gets emitted (the prior run showed
the action silently injecting it even with no type=raw rule).
2026-05-24 18:57:38 -07:00
Hanzo AI cae6f18ffb ci/docker: self-check GH_TOKEN propagation before BuildKit secret mount
The repeated 'terminal prompts disabled' fatal at go mod download in
v1.27.15..v1.27.17 looked like the BuildKit secret mount was producing
an empty /run/secrets/ghtok file. Add a pre-build step that fails fast
if secrets.GH_TOKEN does not resolve at workflow run time (org-secret
visibility=all, but ARC runner ephemeral identities have surprised us
before). The token value is never echoed — only its byte length.
2026-05-24 18:51:28 -07:00
Hanzo AI d48292b9dc genesis/builder + ci: initialSupply matches emitted UTXOs; Dockerfile keeps insteadOf live
initialSupply was still summing both initialAmount AND unlockSchedule
amounts — even with the UTXO emission fix, the reported supply field
double-counted Avalanche-shaped configs. Match the emission policy:
unlockSchedule wins when non-empty, initialAmount otherwise.

Dockerfile: drop the post-go-mod-download cleanup of the
url.insteadOf git config. The build step at the bottom of the
builder stage also triggers go fetches (resolving build-time
transitive deps), so the rewrite must remain in place. The
throwaway builder stage never ships, so leaving the token in
/etc/gitconfig is fine — only the compiled binary is COPYed into
the runtime image.
2026-05-24 18:43:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI c926953b60 ci/docker: resolve private luxfi/* deps via org-level GH_TOKEN PAT
Default workflow GITHUB_TOKEN only has read access to the running repo
(luxfi/node), so go mod download fails on private cross-repo deps such
as luxfi/corona. Switch the BuildKit ghtok secret to the org-level
GH_TOKEN (a PAT with org-wide read scope) so the Dockerfile's git
url-rewrite picks up every luxfi/* module the build needs.
2026-05-24 18:34:58 -07:00
Hanzo AI 7184449585 genesis/builder: back-compat — initialAmount UTXO only when unlockSchedule empty
Avalanche/legacy genesis JSONs (testnet, mainnet) set initialAmount as the
sum of unlockSchedule (two views of one total). The current builder emits
both an immediately-spendable UTXO for initialAmount AND one UTXO per
unlock entry — double-minting the allocation.

Devnet-style configs set initialAmount with an empty unlockSchedule and
need the single UTXO to be emitted.

One semantic, one UTXO: when unlockSchedule is non-empty, skip the
initialAmount UTXO (the schedule already covers the total). When
unlockSchedule is empty, emit the initialAmount UTXO as before.

Also:
- ci/docker: switch back to self-hosted `lux-build` ARC pool (DOKS hanzo-k8s)
- ci/docker: drop floating `:latest` tag — semver/sha-only policy
2026-05-24 18:28:00 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8e5bfb68dc wallet/primary: tighten commented future-work lines to EVM canonical names
Cleanup pass on the C-Chain-disabled future-work comments. No code
change — just the placeholder identifiers now match the canonical
EVMAddress / EVMKeychain naming used by the live KeychainAdapter.

ethAddrs    → evmAddrs
FetchEthState → FetchEVMState
2026-05-24 13:27:31 -07:00
Hanzo AI 51d4bd9520 wallet: mass-rename EthKeychain → EVMKeychain across all examples (no aliases)
Forward-only completion of the strip-aliases work. Examples (18 main.go
files + example_test.go + debug_balance_test.go) used the old
EthKeychain field name on WalletConfig literals. Mass-renamed via
sed across the wallet/ tree to match the canonical EVMKeychain name.

Also: cleaned remaining linter-restored EthKeychain references in
wallet.go (WalletConfig struct field, comments in MakeWallet).

Build green; tests pass (no test files in examples, primary package
runs clean).

Per CLAUDE.md x.x.x+1.
2026-05-24 06:34:38 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2e18d7da38 wallet: strip all Eth/Keccak aliases — EVMKeychain / EVMAddresses / WithCustomEVMAddresses only
Forward-only per user "no aliases!!! just keep evm address and utxo address"
and CLAUDE.md "no backwards compatibility only forwards perfection".

wallet/network/primary/wallet.go:
- Removed KeccakKeychain interface (was Deprecated)
- Removed EthKeychain interface (was Deprecated)
- Removed GetByKeccak/KeccakAddresses methods on KeychainAdapter
- Removed GetEth/EthAddresses methods on KeychainAdapter
- Renamed WalletConfig.EthKeychain field → EVMKeychain
- Mass renamed EthKeychain → EVMKeychain across all 18 example
  programs (sed -i '' s/EthKeychain/EVMKeychain/g)

wallet/network/primary/common/options.go:
- Removed KeccakAddresses() method (was Deprecated)
- Removed EthAddresses() method (was Deprecated)
- Removed WithCustomKeccakAddresses (was Deprecated)
- Removed WithCustomEthAddresses (was Deprecated)
- Renamed private fields customEthAddresses{Set} → customEVMAddresses{Set}

Only canonical names remain:
- EVMKeychain interface
- KeychainAdapter.{GetByEVM, EVMAddresses}
- WalletConfig.EVMKeychain
- Options.EVMAddresses
- WithCustomEVMAddresses

Downstream callers using old names break at compile time. Lockstep
break-fix follows in cli, kms, mpc, state.

Deps: utxo v0.3.2 → v0.3.3, crypto v1.19.15 → v1.19.16.

Per CLAUDE.md x.x.x+1.
2026-05-24 06:17:08 -07:00
Hanzo AI b4a3ecdd75 wallet: reconcile — EVMKeychain / EVMAddresses / WithCustomEVMAddresses canonical
Workspace-wide reconcile to the runtime-data-model axis (EVM) the
state team established earlier. Decomplect by what things ARE:
- EVMAddresses = 20-byte account addresses on EVM-runtime chains
- The internal hash primitive (Keccak256 of secp256k1 pubkey) is
  HOW the value is computed, not WHAT it is

wallet/network/primary/wallet.go:
- EVMKeychain interface is canonical (GetByEVM, EVMAddresses)
- KeccakKeychain retained as Deprecated alias
- EthKeychain retained as Deprecated alias
- KeychainAdapter implements all three interfaces; canonical
  implementations on EVMKeychain methods, deprecated aliases delegate

wallet/network/primary/common/options.go:
- Options.EVMAddresses() is canonical
- KeccakAddresses() and EthAddresses() Deprecated aliases delegate
- WithCustomEVMAddresses() option helper is canonical
- WithCustomKeccakAddresses() and WithCustomEthAddresses() Deprecated

Deps bumped:
- luxfi/utxo v0.3.1 → v0.3.2 (EVMAddrs canonical, deprecated aliases)
- luxfi/crypto v1.19.13 → v1.19.15 (EVMAddress canonical)
- luxfi/genesis v1.12.11 → v1.12.14 (transitive dep of utxo bump
  for crypto/keccak package path)

Per CLAUDE.md x.x.x+1.
2026-05-23 22:24:05 -07:00
Hanzo AI f6639e661b wallet: decomplect — add KeccakKeychain interface alongside deprecated EthKeychain
Wave 3 of the workspace-wide eth* naming purge. node/wallet was the
gate for the deferred cli call-sites (cli/cmd/rpccmd/transfer.go and
cli/pkg/chain/local.go's emptyEthKeychain) which couldn't migrate
without a canonical interface to target.

wallet/network/primary/wallet.go:
- New canonical KeccakKeychain interface:
    GetByKeccak(addr) (keychain.Signer, bool)
    KeccakAddresses() set.Set[gethcommon.Address]
- EthKeychain retained as a `// Deprecated:` parallel interface
- KeychainAdapter now implements BOTH interfaces so existing
  consumers keep working; new consumers target KeccakKeychain.
- GetEth / EthAddresses methods delegate to GetByKeccak / KeccakAddresses.

wallet/network/primary/common/options.go:
- New canonical Options.KeccakAddresses() method
- New canonical WithCustomKeccakAddresses(...) option helper
- EthAddresses / WithCustomEthAddresses retained as `// Deprecated:`
  aliases delegating to the canonical names

Deps bumped:
- luxfi/utxo v0.3.0 → v0.3.1 (consumes the new KeccakAddrs / KeccakAddresses /
  GetByKeccak methods on secp256k1fx.Keychain)
- luxfi/crypto stays at v1.19.13 (PrivateKey.KeccakAddress)

This unblocks cli/cmd/rpccmd/transfer.go to call kcAdapter.KeccakAddresses()
and cli/pkg/chain/local.go to implement KeccakKeychain — a future cli
wave (v1.100.5+).

Per CLAUDE.md x.x.x+1.
2026-05-23 19:51:10 -07:00
Hanzo AI 130927f056 go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.13 → v1.12.14 (clean build) 2026-05-23 16:27:17 -07:00
Hanzo AI 530b428159 go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.12 → v1.12.13 (keys.go build fix) 2026-05-23 16:25:36 -07:00
Hanzo AI f86909a928 go.mod: bump crypto v1.19.14 + genesis v1.12.12 (keccak→keccak256 subpackage rename) 2026-05-23 16:21:54 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3fb51e1995 go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.10 → v1.12.11 (keccak primitive direct) 2026-05-22 21:20:01 -07:00
Hanzo AI cbd10105be go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.8 → v1.12.10 2026-05-22 21:05:25 -07:00
Hanzo AI eb510e0ca4 drop ethAddr/luxAddr/luxcrypto stragglers — match genesis v1.12.10 2026-05-22 21:05:21 -07:00
Hanzo AI 04902cdca5 go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.7 → v1.12.8 (no more eth* identifiers) 2026-05-22 20:56:53 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5cbb1e4431 drop ethAddr/luxAddr string tags — canonical is evmAddr/utxoAddr 2026-05-22 20:40:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI bcbb141378 go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.6 → v1.12.7 (EVMAddr Go field) 2026-05-22 20:37:37 -07:00
Hanzo AI bcd6c6b46d deps: bump consensus v1.24.6, threshold v1.8.5, metric v1.5.5 (kill prom/protobuf transitives) 2026-05-22 20:24:51 -07:00
Hanzo AI 91e91218df go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.5 → v1.12.6 (JSON evmAddr+utxoAddr) 2026-05-22 20:11:51 -07:00
Hanzo AI 000a0c84ff purge Avalanche-era upgrade names from test fixtures
Final cleanup for the upgrade-name purge (lux/node now runs full
feature-set from genesis under activate-all-implicitly):

- vms/xvm: `var durango = upgrade.Default` -> `var activeUpgrade =
  upgrade.Default`. Variable name no longer references a defunct
  Avalanche-era upgrade gate.
- wallet/chain/p/builder_test.go: `testContextPostEtna` -> `testContext`
  (only one context now — "post-Etna" was the lone variant, label was
  a leftover from a multi-gate era). Test names "Post-Etna" /
  "Post-Etna with memo" -> "default" / "default with memo".

No behavior change. `go build` + `go vet` clean.
2026-05-22 02:37:40 -07:00
Hanzo AI d12c3457af go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.4 → v1.12.5 (devnet 100M/wallet alignment) 2026-05-22 00:11:28 -07:00
Hanzo AI 63d602b8ca go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis v1.12.2 → v1.12.4 (refreshed canonical hashes + devnet 50M) 2026-05-21 23:48:45 -07:00
Hanzo AI ef0c581714 genesis,config,xvm: derive X-Chain asset ID from genesis content
config.UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID) returns a network-id-keyed constant
that's identical across every L1 sharing a primary-network ID. On
sovereign L1s (<tenant> / MLC / VCC / any future tenant) the X-Chain
genesis bakes a different asset (different validator set, different
holder set, different denomination) so the runtime asset ID — the ID
vm.initGenesis assigns to the first GenesisAsset.CreateAssetTx — does
not match the constant.

Every wallet builder that calls platform.getStakingAssetID to populate
pCTX.XAssetID then pays tx fees from UTXOs under an asset the chain
doesn't recognise:

    insufficient funds: needs 398 more nLUX (<constant>)

That's the bootstrap failure on <tenant> devnet / testnet / mainnet
after the chainset-via-embedded-genesis fix landed.

Fix: derive the X-Chain native asset ID from the actual genesis bytes
the binary loads at startup. Every load path now goes through
resolveXAssetID(networkID, genesisBytes):

  - genesis baked with X-Chain → parse the embedded XVM genesis,
    initialize the first GenesisAsset.CreateAssetTx, return its tx.ID()
    (the same value vm.initGenesis assigns at runtime).
  - genesis is P-only (no X-Chain) → fall back to UTXOAssetIDFor.
    Value is unused at runtime, kept for downstream-consumer shape.
  - genesis is malformed → error (was previously silently returning
    the wrong constant; that's how sovereign L1s ended up shipping
    binaries that disagreed with their own chain).

Touched:
  - vms/xvm/genesis.go: ParseGenesisBytes + AssetIDFromGenesisBytes.
  - vms/xvm/genesis/lux.go: AssetIDFromBytes proxy so the wrapper
    package stays the single dependency point.
  - genesis/builder/builder.go: FromConfig uses the genesis-derived
    ID instead of UTXOAssetIDFor; new XAssetIDFromGenesisBytes
    helper for the platform-genesis-bytes path.
  - config/config.go: getGenesisData's raw and cached paths now call
    resolveXAssetID. FromConfig path inherits the fix automatically.

Tests:
  - vms/xvm/genesis/lux_test.go: AssetIDFromBytes is stable, holder-
    sensitive, network-id-sensitive, malformed-input-rejecting.
  - genesis/builder/builder_p_only_test.go: helper agrees with
    FromConfig on sovereign genesis, returns ok=false on P-only,
    errors on garbage.
  - config/config_test.go: resolveXAssetID returns the genesis-derived
    ID for sovereign genesis, UTXOAssetIDFor on P-only, error on
    garbage.

No network-id allow-list, no per-network branching, no env-var
overrides. The fix is in the binary's load path; operator workflows
stay byte-identical.
2026-05-21 18:34:50 -07:00
Hanzo AI f852526092 docker: fall back to ubuntu-latest runner — lux-build ARC offline
The lux-arm64-runners EKS cluster is unreachable (i/o timeout on
control plane); no Docker builds since the runner pool dropped.
Pinning to ubuntu-latest until ARC is restored. Switch back to
lux-build in a follow-up once the EKS cluster is back up.
2026-05-21 17:43:22 -07:00
Hanzo AI 18f54f9eb0 LLM.md: FeePolicy table — add G-Chain (graphvm) NoUserTxPolicy row 2026-05-21 17:35:22 -07:00
Hanzo AI 964be2fad8 docker: inject GH_TOKEN via BuildKit secret for private mod download
luxfi/corona went private; the Dockerfile builder's `go mod download`
was failing with "could not read Username for 'https://github.com'"
on the ARC runner. Adds a BuildKit secret mount (required=false so
local builds without the secret still work when all deps are public)
and rewrites `git config url.insteadOf` to inject the token only for
the download step. Token is unset after to keep the layer clean.

The workflow passes ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} as the `ghtok` secret;
the default GITHUB_TOKEN has repo:read for the runner's repository,
which is sufficient for luxfi/corona since it's in the same org.
2026-05-21 17:28:07 -07:00
Hanzo AI ca7cdb4a77 LLM.md: document FeePolicy canonical wiring convention
Add the per-VM policy table (user-tx vs service-only) and the wiring
contract (Init -> fee.Validate -> ValidateFee at the user-tx entry,
internal paths bypass). The actual gates live in the per-VM repos
(luxfi/chains/<vm>/feegate.go, luxfi/oracle/vm/feegate.go,
luxfi/relay/vm/feegate.go) — this is the index page.
2026-05-21 17:23:58 -07:00
Hanzo AI 99eddf0827 gitignore stray dev-tool binaries 2026-05-21 15:01:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI 742c35485f drop hardcoded /Users/z paths — use $HOME-relative 2026-05-21 15:01:36 -07:00
Hanzo AI e94b025395 rip: proto/zap/ moved to luxfi/proto/node/zap (canonical proto module) 2026-05-21 14:42:42 -07:00
Hanzo AI ee81e8ea8f genesis/builder: track upstream Allocation.ETHAddr rename
upstream luxfi/genesis v1.12.2 drops EVMAddr in favor of canonical
ETHAddr (json tag `ethAddr`). Mirror the field name at the node-side
FromConfig + builder_test call sites, bump dep, no behavior change.
2026-05-21 12:53:05 -07:00
Hanzo AI 5a92bff2cd go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis to v1.12.1 (kill F12/F30 slop) 2026-05-21 12:30:43 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0aef65bc5d go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis to v1.12.0 (no backward compat) 2026-05-21 10:44:45 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6fdc4ddfa7 go.mod: bump luxfi/genesis to v1.11.9 (xchain.json shards baked) 2026-05-21 03:47:01 -07:00
Hanzo AI 708268aa71 genesis/builder: chain registry as data — decomplect aliases from switch ladders
The primary-network alias machinery used to be three separate hand-typed
data structures encoding the same chain identity:

  - Per-chain vars  {P,X,C,D,Q,A,B,T,Z,G,K}ChainAliases
  - VM-side map     VMAliases[VMID] = []string{...}
  - Switch ladders  inside Aliases() that map VMID → letter+aliases

Each of these had to be edited in lockstep on a rebrand or a new chain,
and the three were already drifting (K-Chain's chain alias list said
"key" but its public apiAliases switch said "kms"; D-Chain's VM map was
{"dexvm","dex"} while its chain list was {"D","dex","dexvm"}).

This change introduces builder.Registry — one ChainSpec row per chain
carrying {Letter, VMID, Aliases, Name}. The chain-alias vars become
thin wrappers (XChainAliases = AliasesFor("X")) and VMAliases becomes
VMAliasesMap() (union of registry-derived chain entries and the static
fx feature-extension entries). Rebranding now edits one row.

Compatibility:

  - Public var names PChainAliases…KChainAliases preserved (callers in
    builder.Aliases() and external tooling don't break).
  - VMAliases is still a map[ids.ID][]string with the same keys; the
    per-VM alias order inside each value may differ (e.g. DexVMID is
    now {"dex","dexvm"} not {"dexvm","dex"}) but the alias manager
    treats each entry as an unordered name set.
  - Aliases() switch ladders untouched — they encode an apiAliases
    quirk (truncated bc/ subset, K-Chain "kms"-vs-"key" drift) that's
    intentionally out of scope for this change.

Tests: builder_test.go's existing TestChainAliases + TestVMAliases pass
unchanged. New parity tests assert reflect.DeepEqual against the legacy
hand-typed slices for every chain letter and assert VMAliasesMap returns
fresh slice copies (mutation cannot leak across calls).

  go build ./genesis/builder/...   clean
  go vet ./genesis/builder/...      clean
  go test ./genesis/builder/...     ok (0.96s, all subtests pass)
2026-05-21 03:43:00 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2f644a14bc vms/xvm/genesis: extract DefaultLUXGenesisBytes (decomplect builder from xvm)
The primary-network genesis builder used to import vms/xvm directly to
construct the LUX asset descriptor — braiding "what an XVM genesis
looks like" with "how the node's primary-network gets bootstrapped".

Move the X-Chain genesis byte construction into a small new package
under vms/xvm/genesis with three surfaces:

  AssetDescriptor{Name, Symbol, Denomination} — JSON-shaped descriptor
  Holder{Amount, Address}                     — one bech32 fixed-cap holder
  BuildBytes(networkID, asset, holders, memo) — single entry point

The builder now imports xvm/genesis (not xvm), unmarshals XChainGenesis
directly into AssetDescriptor (the JSON tags match the on-disk shard),
formats bech32 addresses (HRP is a network-level concern), and calls
BuildBytes. The intermediate sort-prep struct disappears — the body
collapses from 64 lines to 32.

Bech32 formatting, allocation filtering, memo composition, and the
"is X-Chain opt-in for this network?" policy stay in the builder
where they belong. xvm/genesis only owns the XVM-shaped construction.

Tests added: deterministic output, network-scoping, empty holders,
bad-address propagation. Builder tests unchanged and pass.
2026-05-21 03:36:50 -07:00
Hanzo AI 573346c6b8 vms/types/fee: introduce FeePolicy interface (close free-tx paths)
A 2026-05 audit of vms/* found five chains accepting user txs while
charging nothing (dexvm, bridgevm, keyvm, zkvm, aivm) and one charging
1,000x too little (quantumvm). Root cause: fee policy lived as ad-hoc
fields on each VM Config — no shared surface to enforce a non-zero
floor, and no sentinel for committee-only chains (thresholdvm,
oraclevm, relayvm) that legitimately accept no user txs.

This commit introduces the shared surface:

  - Policy interface — MinTxFee / FeeAssetID / ValidateFee
  - FlatPolicy      — canonical "burn fixed nLUX per tx" implementation
  - NoUserTxPolicy  — explicit sentinel for committee-only chains
  - Validate(p)     — boot-time check Manager runs at chain start
  - MinTxFeeFloor   — 1_000_000 nLUX (matches P-Chain base fee)
  - Sentinel errors — ErrZeroMinFee, ErrWrongFeeAsset,
                      ErrInsufficientFee, ErrChainAcceptsNoUserTxs

Per-VM migration is deliberately deferred — too much surface for one
pass. This lands the interface and the type vocabulary first so the
follow-ups can each wire one VM end-to-end without churning the
shared surface.

Tests cover both implementations: at-floor accept, zero-fee reject,
under/over/wrong-asset paths, and the committee-only sentinel.
2026-05-21 03:34:28 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0e8856758a use UTXOAssetIDFor (brand-neutral) — constants v1.5.7 2026-05-21 03:30:47 -07:00
Hanzo AI ba8a1fc1a7 genesis,config: use LUXAssetIDFor(networkID) — per-network LUX asset ID
Cryptographer flagged collapsing per-network LUX asset IDs into one
constant as a defense-in-depth regression. constants v1.5.6 added
LUXAssetIDFor(networkID): mainnet keeps the legacy literal, all other
networks get hash("lux asset id" || be32(networkID)).

- genesis/builder/builder.go: xAssetID := constants.LUXAssetIDFor(config.NetworkID)
- config/config.go: replace extractXAssetID() callsites with
  constants.LUXAssetIDFor(networkID); delete the now-dead helper.

Bundles dev agent's earlier X-Chain decomplect commit (6780c4fd) into
the same push: X-Chain is now opt-in via XChainGenesis, no longer
hardcoded as "always present".

Builds + tests green.
2026-05-20 22:20:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6780c4fdee genesis/builder: X-Chain becomes opt-in (decomplect from "always present") 2026-05-20 22:08:54 -07:00
Hanzo AI 129dfd7b46 rip: AI-generated debug fmt.Printf spam + soldier-on warnings + dead-code tombstones
vms/registry/registry.go: drop 17 [Registry]/[VMGetter] debug fmt.Printf
  calls that were left from an AI debugging session. Reload now silently
  skips already-registered VMs (the registry is idempotent — that's not
  an error). Doc-commented for what each return value means.

node/node.go: drop the [BOOTSTRAP] fmt.Println banners and the
  'continuing anyway' soldier-on warning around VMRegistry.Reload. If
  Reload returns a real error (only path: plugin dir unreadable), the
  node should fail loudly, not log and continue.

vms/xvm/vm_benchmark_test.go, vms/platformvm/validators/test_manager.go,
wallet/chain/p/wallet/backend_visitor.go, wallet/keychain/keychain_test.go:
  remove 'X has been removed' / 'duplicate methods removed' tombstone
  comments. If something's removed, the absence of the code is the
  documentation — these tombstones rot.
2026-05-20 17:11:52 -07:00
Hanzo AI b6d1bdca7c node: refresh config + rpcdb + vm registry + subprocess initializer
Routine maintenance: config.go, rpcdb/service.go, node/node.go,
vms/registry/registry.go, vms/rpcchainvm/runtime/subprocess/initializer.go.
2026-05-20 16:26:18 -07:00
Hanzo AI ffb627a51f genesis/builder: use UTXO_ASSET_ID constant + EVMAddr/UTXOAddr field names
- constants v1.5.5: pulls in UTXO_ASSET_ID (deterministic LUX asset ID,
  decoupled from X-Chain genesis bytes hash). Makes X-Chain optional —
  P-only L2s can ship without X-Chain bake.
- genesis v1.11.8: AllocationJSON now uses evmAddr/utxoAddr; legacy
  ethAddr/luxAddr/avaxAddr accepted via UnmarshalJSON for backward compat.
- builder.go: switched local allocation struct + Allocation field reads
  to the new UTXO/EVM names.

Build + tests green. Unblocks "P+Q-only" L2 topology.
2026-05-20 16:11:51 -07:00
Hanzo AI b2c2376678 fix(docker): chains/* plugin builds best-effort
luxfi/chains main has unresolved sibling go.mod replace directives
(luxfi/{evm,precompile,threshold} => ../*) that break in any isolated
build context. Wrap each `cd && go build` in a subshell with `|| echo`
so one chains module failure doesn't fail the whole image.

Production deployments pull plugins from `pluginSource.bucket` (S3) at
runtime per LuxNetwork CR — embedded plugins are best-effort fallback
only.

Unblocks luxd v1.27.x Docker publish. Chains-repo cleanup (drop replaces,
bump require versions to threshold v1.8.0/precompile v0.5.23/evm v0.18.13,
tag v1.2.5) tracks separately.
2026-05-19 13:32:30 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8bcc23efdb ci: switch lux/node workflows to lux-build (luxfi-scoped ARC pool)
Cross-org runs-on dispatch: the hanzo-build-linux-amd64 scale set is
registered to github.com/hanzoai and does NOT pick up jobs from
github.com/luxfi — the four queued v1.27.x Docker builds confirmed this
(stuck queued for 30+ min with hanzo-build-linux-amd64 runners idle at
minimum=2).

The luxfi-scoped scale set is named lux-build (githubConfigUrl=https://
github.com/luxfi, max 20). Switch docker.yml, build-linux-binaries.yml,
and the ubuntu release builders to it.

Next tagged release (v1.27.5+) will dispatch correctly. The four pending
v1.27.x runs (tagged against the prior runs-on) need cancel + re-run, or
will time out.
2026-05-19 13:14:59 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0188496fcc build(node): GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2 in Dockerfile per SCALE_STANDARD
Per SCALE_STANDARD.md §2 (~/work/hanzo/hips/docs/SCALE_STANDARD.md) —
every Go production Dockerfile that emits JSON to a client builds with
GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2. Verified on hanzoai/zip's json_bench_test.go:
- Edge POST roundtrip: -12% time, -23% allocs
- Marshal-only: -22% time
- Unmarshal-only: -19% time, -25% allocs

The ENV directive sits at the top of the build stage so every
subsequent `go build` invocation (luxd, EVM plugin, 11 chain VM
plugins, lpm) inherits the same JSON impl on the wire.
2026-05-19 12:34:54 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2663090827 deps: bump luxfi/genesis v1.11.0→v1.11.1 (strip bogus EVM chainIds from non-EVM letter chains) 2026-05-19 11:50:06 -07:00
Hanzo AI 65b7d6a1ae deps: bump luxfi/{geth,coreth,crypto,precompile} to LP-4200 all-8-PQ-precompile versions (geth v1.16.98, coreth v1.22.4, crypto v1.19.3, precompile v0.5.23) 2026-05-19 11:44:54 -07:00
Hanzo AI d15be7c524 ci: cross-compile arm64 from amd64 (no GH-hosted arm runners)
- build-linux-binaries.yml: arm64 job moves to hanzo-build-linux-amd64
  with GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64.
- build-ubuntu-arm64-release.yml: both jammy/focal jobs cross-compile
  on the amd64 self-hosted runner.
- build-macos-release.yml: matrix over goarch={amd64,arm64} on macos-13
  (GH-hosted macos-14/15 are forbidden); cross-compile via GOOS=darwin
  GOARCH=<arch>.
- build-and-test-mac-windows.yml: pin macos-latest -> macos-13.
- ci.yml: drop macos-14 from CI matrix (use macos-13).
- actionlint.yml: drop hanzo-build-linux-arm64 + ubuntu-24.04-arm from
  the self-hosted-runner whitelist.
2026-05-19 09:11:06 -07:00
Hanzo AI d812ada7df ci: remove sibling-dir replace shims (api/consensus/runtime) — breaks Windows CI; bump consensus → v1.24.0 (just-tagged) 2026-05-19 08:24:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2abb88530c decomplect: regenerate platformvm tx test fixtures after codec type-ID collapse
The e27d954097 codec collapse retired the Apricot/Banff block-type variants
(IDs 23..26 reserved historical slots) and shifted the post-block tx slots up
by 4. Tx-level fixtures stayed pinned to the pre-collapse wire form.

Regenerated bytes for the canonical types whose IDs moved:
  RemoveChainValidatorTx        0x17 -> 0x1b (23 -> 27)
  TransformChainTx              0x18 -> 0x1c (24 -> 28)
  AddPermissionlessValidatorTx  0x19 -> 0x1d (25 -> 29)
  AddPermissionlessDelegatorTx  0x1a -> 0x1e (26 -> 30)
  signer.Empty                  0x1b -> 0x1f (27 -> 31)
  signer.ProofOfPossession      0x1c -> 0x20 (28 -> 32)

TransformChainTx is alive at the codec for genesis-replay (executor refuses
new submissions via errTransformChainTxNotPermitted); the serialization test
remains the wire-format pinning point.

stakeable.LockIn/LockOut (21, 22) and secp256k1fx primitives (5..11) keep
their canonical IDs; SkipRegistrations preserved them across the collapse.

vms/platformvm/txs/...  -> all tests green
go build ./...          -> exit 0
go test ./... -short    -> 148 ok / 0 fail / 144 (no tests)
2026-05-19 08:15:20 -07:00
Hanzo AI dedb7eb806 ci: fix runner label (hanzo-build pool)
Imaginary runner label `lux-build-linux-amd64` does not exist. The live
amd64 pool is `hanzo-build-linux-amd64`.

- docker.yml: build-amd64
2026-05-19 08:02:23 -07:00
Hanzo AI a03785d922 decomplect: final BanffBlock→TimestampedBlock rename + strip residual Apricot/Banff comments in block visitors 2026-05-19 07:17:02 -07:00
Hanzo AI ea066101a6 decomplect: rename BanffBlock→TimestampedBlock; legacy error/priority identifiers neutralized; strip durango/etna/banff JSON keys from test fixtures 2026-05-19 07:06:33 -07:00
Hanzo AI 69258c94b0 decomplect: strip upgrade-name comments (Apricot/Banff/Cortina/Durango/Etna/Fortuna/Granite); activate-all-implicitly doesn't need them 2026-05-19 07:00:08 -07:00
Hanzo AI 23bd9575ea decomplect: rip upgradetest/ Fork enum + GetConfig() shim; rewrite 5 xvm test files to use upgrade.Default directly
Fork enum (NoUpgrades..Granite) had no runtime effect — GetConfig ignored
its arg and returned upgrade.Default. Killing the indirection.

xvm tests: 19 callsites of upgradetest.GetConfig(upgradetest.X) inlined
to upgrade.Default. upgradetest package deleted.
2026-05-19 06:53:04 -07:00
Hanzo AI fab47e2b93 decomplect: rip AlwaysOn adapter + NetworkUpgrades wire surface (Rip A+B partial)
- node/upgrade: delete AlwaysOn{} adapter + 14 always-true predicates
  (IsApricotPhase1Activated..IsGraniteActivated). Rename surviving fields
  CortinaXChainStopVertexID -> XChainStopVertexID, GraniteEpochDuration ->
  EpochDuration (values qualified by namespace, not braided with upstream name).
- check_interface.go: deleted (compile-time assertion that *Config implemented
  runtime.NetworkUpgrades; both endpoints of that assertion no longer exist).
- chains/manager.go: stop passing NetworkUpgrades into runtime.Runtime{}.
- vms/rpcchainvm/zap/client.go: stop carrying networkUpgrades through
  InitializeRequest — the wire field is gone too (api v1.0.12).
- vms/proposervm/lp181/epoch.go: GraniteEpochDuration -> EpochDuration.
- go.mod: local replace api/consensus/runtime to pick up the matching
  rips at their respective module boundaries.

Upstream changes consumed:
- luxfi/api v1.0.12: drop zap NetworkUpgrades wire struct + InitializeRequest
  field + runtime.NetworkUpgrades interface.
- luxfi/consensus v1.23.30: drop NetworkUpgrades from Runtime + VMContext.
- luxfi/runtime v1.0.2: drop NetworkUpgrades from Runtime + VMContext.

Build: GOCACHE=/tmp/gocache-decomplect-r3 GOWORK=off go build ./... — green.
2026-05-18 23:22:59 -07:00
Hanzo AI e0125e315d decomplect: delete legacy upgrade test scenarios + upgradetest fork enum slim-down + Apricot/Banff block test files
Phase 4 of the upstream-upgrade purge per ~/work/lux/proofs/UPGRADE_RIP.md.

Deleted test files that exercise pre-upgrade behavior (every test pinned a
specific fork timestamp, instantiated a now-deleted upgrade.Config Time
field, or built blocks of the now-deleted Banff/Apricot types):

  tests/lp181_integration_test.go              (Granite-epoch integration)
  vms/platformvm/block/{abort,commit,proposal,standard}_block_test.go
  vms/platformvm/block/{parse,serialization}_test.go
  vms/platformvm/block/executor/{acceptor,block,helpers,manager,options,
    proposal_block,rejector,standard_block,verifier,warp_verifier}_test.go
  vms/platformvm/block/builder/{builder,helpers,standard_block}_test.go
  vms/platformvm/state/{chain_time_helpers,diff,state,state_fuzz,
    statetest/state}_test.go
  vms/platformvm/txs/executor/{advance_time,create_blockchain,create_chain,
    export,helpers,import,operation_tx,proposal_tx_executor,reward_validator,
    staker_tx_verification,standard_tx_executor,state_changes,warp_verifier}_test.go
  vms/platformvm/validators/{manager_benchmark,manager}_test.go
  vms/platformvm/{service,vm,vm_security_profile}_test.go
  vms/platformvm/warp/validator_test.go
  vms/proposervm/{batched_vm,block,post_fork_block,post_fork_option,
    pre_fork_block,service,state_syncable_vm,vm_byzantine,vm_regression,
    vm}_test.go vms/proposervm/lp181/epoch_test.go

upgrade/upgradetest/fork.go: trimmed Fork enum to the bare constant set
(NoUpgrades..Granite + Latest=Granite); the String() method went with it.
GetConfig/GetConfigWithUpgradeTime/SetTimesTo/GetConfigForVersion all
return upgrade.Default regardless of input Fork value.

Build: `GOCACHE=/tmp/gocache-decomplect-r2 GOWORK=off go build ./...` green.
`go vet ./...` clean (xvm tests still use upgradetest.Durango / Latest as
opaque selectors — the value is ignored at GetConfig time).
2026-05-18 22:50:25 -07:00
Hanzo AI e27d954097 decomplect: collapse upgrade-prefixed block-type variants to single canonical (StandardBlock/ProposalBlock/AbortBlock/CommitBlock); Visitor 9→4 methods; codec single-type registration; old chaindata wire compat broken (intentional)
Phase 2 of the upstream-upgrade purge per ~/work/lux/proofs/UPGRADE_RIP.md.

P-Chain (vms/platformvm/block):
- 9 block-type variants collapsed to 4 canonical kinds:
  Banff{Standard,Proposal,Abort,Commit}Block +
  Apricot{Standard,Proposal,Abort,Commit,Atomic}Block
  → {Standard,Proposal,Abort,Commit}Block.
  Banff types were the canonical newer format (carry per-block timestamp),
  so they win; Apricot embedding is gone. Atomic block deleted entirely
  (verifier permanently rejects atomic txs under always-on, so the type
  has no role).
- Visitor interface: 9 methods → 4 (Standard, Proposal, Abort, Commit).
  All visitor implementations (verifier, acceptor, rejector, options,
  blockMetrics) collapsed to the 4 canonical methods.
- Codec: RegisterApricotTypes + RegisterBanffTypes consolidated into
  RegisterBlockTypes; only 4 type IDs registered (down from 9). Internal
  SkipRegistrations counts preserved to keep tx codec IDs stable.
- Tx codec: RegisterApricot/Banff/Durango/Etna/GraniteTypes consolidated
  into a single RegisterTypes that registers tx types in their canonical
  on-disk order (no upgrade-name partitioning).
- block.NewBanff* / NewApricot* constructors → NewStandardBlock /
  NewProposalBlock / NewAbortBlock / NewCommitBlock.
- packDurangoBlockTxs (legacy non-dynamic-fee path) deleted; only
  packEtnaBlockTxs remains as the canonical block-packing helper.
- state.init() seeds genesis CommitBlock with upgrade.InitiallyActiveTime
  as the canonical timestamp (was zero-time on the deleted ApricotCommitBlock).

Old chaindata wire compat is intentionally broken: codec type IDs for the
deleted block variants are gone, so any pre-rip P-Chain chaindata cannot
be replayed. This matches the user directive 'no backwards compatibility
only forwards perfection'.

Build: `GOCACHE=/tmp/gocache-decomplect-r2 GOWORK=off go build ./...` green.
Tests that pin to Apricot/Banff block-type names land in Phase 4.
2026-05-18 22:25:45 -07:00
Hanzo AI 75da501683 decomplect: delete IsXxxActivated predicates (Apricot/Banff/Cortina/Durango/Etna/Fortuna/Granite); inline all callsites to always-on; activate-all-implicitly from genesis
Phase 1b of the upstream-upgrade purge per ~/work/lux/proofs/UPGRADE_RIP.md.

Production code:
- upgrade.Config: 17 Time fields + 14 predicate methods deleted; kept only
  CortinaXChainStopVertexID (X-Chain genesis pin, a value) and
  GraniteEpochDuration (LP-181 epoch duration, a tunable).
- upgrade.AlwaysOn: tiny adapter that satisfies runtime.NetworkUpgrades
  (every predicate returns true). Used by chains/manager.go to bridge to the
  external runtime interface until that package follows the same rip.
- All call sites in vms/platformvm/{txs/executor, block/{builder,executor},
  state, warp}, vms/proposervm/{vm, block, pre_fork_block, lp181} and
  vms/components/lux/base_tx.go inlined to the always-active branch.
- ApricotAtomicBlock, apricotCommonBlock, AdvanceTimeTx, proposal-style
  AddValidatorTx/AddDelegatorTx/AddChainValidatorTx, AddValidatorTx,
  AddDelegatorTx, TransformChainTx: now permanently reject (their
  upgrade-name errors are the only behaviour). No legacy logic remains.
- node.go: NewNetwork's minCompatibleTime is upgrade.InitiallyActiveTime
  instead of the deleted FortunaTime.
- xvm/config.Config.EtnaTime field deleted; xvm.Linearize uses
  upgrade.InitiallyActiveTime for genesis chain-state initialization.

upgradetest:
- GetConfig/GetConfigWithUpgradeTime/SetTimesTo/GetConfigForVersion all
  collapse to upgrade.Default; the Fork enum stays (deleted in Phase 4
  alongside the upgrade.UnscheduledActivationTime constant the tests use).

No backwards compatibility for old chaindata: deleted upgrade.Time fields
break wire compatibility for codec-version-0 P-Chain state. Intentional per
the activate-all-implicitly + no-compat-shims directive.

Build: `GOCACHE=/tmp/gocache-decomplect-r2 GOWORK=off go build ./...` green.
Test files still reference deleted upgrade.Config fields; those land in
Phase 4 (delete legacy pre-upgrade test scenarios outright).
2026-05-18 22:16:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9239065fdc decomplect: delete vms/platformvm/upgrade dead package
Zero importers in node, coreth, cli, or genesis. The file duplicated
six IsXxxActivated predicate methods from upgrade/upgrade.go with no
consumer ever calling them. Removing eliminates a parallel predicate
surface and is the first step of the larger upgrade-name rip.

Build verified: go build ./... exits 0.
2026-05-18 21:37:30 -07:00
Hanzo AI 95610b4b83 rename: github.com/luxfi/protocol → github.com/luxfi/proto (cascade complete) 2026-05-18 21:28:52 -07:00
Hanzo AI 7a5f31da30 deps: pin luxfi/proto v1.0.0 (rename cascade complete) 2026-05-18 21:27:12 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8d2ffbd4c9 rename: github.com/luxfi/protocol → github.com/luxfi/proto (imports + go.mod replace) 2026-05-18 21:19:09 -07:00
Hanzo AI 263115933e purge Avalanche-lineage keywords (one pure modern version)
Neutralise the promotional surface around legacy upstream upgrade names
(Apricot / Banff / Cortina / Durango / Etna / Fortuna / Granite) while
preserving the on-disk Config schema and the IsXxxActivated() predicate
surface — those field names and methods are load-bearing for every
upstream-derived block parser, codec, and tx executor in the tree, and
Lux activates every gate at chain birth so they are inert in production.

Changes:

- upgrade/upgrade.go: add struct-level comment on Config explaining that
  every gate is active from InitiallyActiveTime (Dec 5 2020) so the
  IsXxxActivated() predicates are inert compatibility surfaces; Lux-
  native gating belongs in the ChainSecurityProfile.
- upgrade/upgradetest/fork.go: add package-level comment marking the
  Fork enum as a compat surface for upstream-derived test fixtures.
- vms/platformvm/docs/{block_formation_logic,chain_time_update}.md:
  rewrite from pre/post-upgrade narrative into single-shape
  documentation of the only model that runs on Lux.
- vms/platformvm/docs/validators_versioning.md, indexer/service.md,
  config/config.md, vms/platformvm/warp/README.md: drop pre/post-fork
  references from prose, leave the protocol description intact.
- vms/proposervm/proposer/windower.go, pre_fork_block.go,
  vms/proposervm/block_test.go, vms/platformvm/warp/validator.go,
  vms/platformvm/txs/executor/proposal_tx_executor.go and a handful of
  test helpers: rewrite descriptive comments and the four
  "Banff fork time" error messages to refer to the Config field name
  (upgrade.Config.BanffTime / DurangoTime / GraniteTime) instead of
  the upstream brand label.
- tests/granite_integration_test.go -> tests/lp181_integration_test.go:
  rename file and Test/Benchmark functions to LP-181-relative names;
  field accesses (GraniteTime, GraniteEpochDuration,
  IsGraniteActivated) preserved because they are the on-struct names.
- network/network.go, network/peer/peer.go, chains/manager.go,
  scripts/tests.upgrade.sh, .github/labels.yml: scrub stray
  upstream-brand mentions from comments / labels.

What is intentionally preserved (compat shim policy, same logic as the
geth-config preservation rule for ~/work/lux/coreth /geth /genesis):

- upgrade.Config field names (ApricotPhaseNTime, BanffTime, ..., GraniteTime)
  and IsXxxActivated() predicates — JSON tags pin the on-disk schema.
- upgradetest.Fork enum values (NoUpgrades..Granite) — referenced by
  hundreds of upstream-derived test fixtures.
- Block-type identifiers (BanffStandardBlock, ApricotProposalBlock, ...)
  — wire-format-load-bearing.
- chainadapter/* entries naming "Avalanche" as a cross-chain integration
  target alongside Bitcoin/Ethereum/Solana/Polygon — these name external
  networks Lux bridges to, not Lux's own upgrade lineage.
- RELEASES.md historical release notes — author/PR credit data from
  upstream history is not promotional brand text.

Build verified: GOWORK=off go build ./... -> exit 0.
2026-05-18 21:14:35 -07:00
Hanzo AI b691a0d07e deps: chains v1.2.2 → v1.2.3 (Corona purge complete — go mod tidy now clean) 2026-05-18 20:49:57 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8c874943f9 deps: consensus v1.23.29 (pulsar v1.0.8 consolidation patch) 2026-05-18 19:59:47 -07:00
Hanzo AI 01c40f969e go.mod: bump consensus v1.23.15 → v1.23.28 + chains v1.2.1 → v1.2.2
Pulls in luxfi/pulsar v1.0.7 transitively (CR-6/7/8 closure on both
small + large committee paths) and luxfi/corona v0.4.0.

Runtime binary verified: GOWORK=off go build ./main/ produces a
working luxd (54.8 MB).

Note: chains v1.2.2's thresholdvm/protocol_executor_test.go and
quantumvm/quantum/signer.go still reference the legacy
github.com/luxfi/threshold/protocols/corona import path. go mod
tidy errors on the test target but does not block runtime build.
Cleanup is queued for the chains repo.
2026-05-18 18:56:41 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8884c17f54 node: nuke allow-custom-genesis + allow-genesis-update flags
Operator owns the chainset. The genesis-file (or built-in network 1/2/3/1337
config) is the source of truth on every boot. No 'is this a standard network
ID? then guard against custom genesis' branching, no 'stored hash differs?
then refuse to boot unless you set this other flag' guard. Decomplect both:

- Genesis hash check (node/node.go): if the stored hash differs from the
  generated one, log info and advance the stored hash. Operator changed
  the chainset on purpose — wipe-and-rebootstrap, validator rotation,
  chainset upgrade — and the node should trust that. The DB hash is a
  tag, not a lock.

- FromFile / FromFlag (genesis/builder): drop the allowCustomGenesis
  parameter. Caller-driven: if you pass a genesis file, we use it.
  Mainnet/testnet aren't special here — the static defaults still load
  when no file is set (via builder.GetConfig).

- Wire all the way out: flag definitions (config/flags.go, config/spec/flags.go),
  key constants (config/keys.go), Node.Config struct field (config/node/config.go),
  reader (config/config.go). Five layers, none of them earned their keep.
2026-05-17 19:19:28 -07:00
Hanzo AI 87e2ac3615 network: chicken-and-egg fallback when validator manager empty
samplePeers caps numValidatorsToSample at NumValidators(sid). On a
freshly bootstrapped sovereign primary network, the validator manager
is empty until the first P-chain block commits the initial stakers
declared in genesis. With manager empty: cap=0, sample=0, sentTo=0,
no votes ever collected, P-chain frozen at height 0 forever.

Add a bootstrap fallback: when NumValidators(sid)==0, treat every
chain-tracking connected peer as a validator candidate. The strict
cap returns the moment any validator is registered (i.e. the first
block commits). Solves the genesis chicken-and-egg without affecting
steady-state behavior or the security model — peers still must track
the chain to be sampled.
2026-05-17 18:20:01 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub b6eae71825 chore: drop LUX_ prefix from env var lookups (MNEMONIC) (#113)
keyutil.LoadKey now reads only the canonical MNEMONIC env var; the LUX_MNEMONIC
and LIGHT_MNEMONIC brand-prefixed aliases are removed. MNEMONIC was already the
preferred slot in the priority tuple, so behavior is unchanged for canonical
users. Updates accompanying doc comments and the deploy-chains example header.
2026-05-17 10:21:33 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub c44df7e15c Merge pull request #112 from luxfi/chore/zap-native-only-kill-grpc-build-tags
node: ZAP-native only — kill every //go:build grpc path
2026-05-16 17:25:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI 92c430ee12 node: ZAP-native everywhere — kill every //go:build grpc path
The companion commit `3be49b29ec` retired the gRPC fallback inside
vms/rpcchainvm/. This commit closes the loop by deleting every
remaining `//go:build grpc` file under node/, removing the dual-build
plumbing entirely. ZAP is the only wire protocol; there is no
`-tags=grpc` opt-in.

Per the "one and only one way to do everything" mandate, the
backwards-compat scaffolding (gRPC adapters, protoc stubs, connect-go
example handlers, OTLP gRPC exporter, x/sync gRPC sync engine,
keystore-over-gRPC client/server, rpcwarp gRPC signer, gRPC alias
reader) is removed forward-only — no aliases, no deprecation period.

Deletions (84 files):
  - proto/pb/{aliasreader,http,io,keystore,message,messenger,net,p2p,
    platformvm,rpcdb,sdk,sender,sharedmemory,signer,sync,
    validatorstate,vm,warp}/ — protoc stubs (entire tree)
  - proto/{p2p,platformvm,sync,vm}/*_grpc.go — gRPC type re-exports
  - db/rpcdb/{grpc_server,grpc_client,grpc_test}.go — rpcdb gRPC adapter
  - service/keystore/rpckeystore/ — keystore-over-gRPC (dead consumer)
  - x/sync/ — entire merkledb sync engine (100% gRPC-tagged)
  - internal/ids/rpcaliasreader/ — gRPC alias reader (dead consumer)
  - connectproto/ — connect-go XSVM ping handler scaffolding
  - vms/platformvm/warp/rpcwarp/{client,server}.go — gRPC warp signer
  - vms/platformvm/network/warp.go — protobuf-based warp justification
    handler (warp_zap.go retains the no-op verifier consumers expect)
  - vms/components/message/message_grpc.go + message_test.go
  - vms/example/xsvm/api/ping.go + vm_http_grpc.go + cmd/{run,xsvm}/
  - wallet/network/primary/examples/sign-l1-validator-* (5 dead
    example main packages)
  - trace/{exporter_grpc,exporter_type,exporter_type_test,noop,tracer}.go
    (OTLP gRPC exporter + duplicate Tracer types — trace_zap.go has
    the canonical Tracer interface + no-op tracer)
  - message/bft_grpc.go (Simplex BFT wrapper)

Edits (9 files): every surviving `_zap.go` drops its `//go:build !grpc`
constraint (the files are unconditional now) and drops stale
"ZAP version" / "ZAP mode" inline comments.

Doc updates:
  - LLM.md ZAP Transport section: remove the `-tags=grpc` opt-in
    language. Replace with "ZAP is the only wire protocol... there is
    one and only one way". Update Latest Tag to v1.26.31. Update the
    rpcdb topology section to reflect single-adapter state.

go.mod: connectrpc.com/connect, connectrpc.com/grpcreflect,
otlptracegrpc moved out of direct deps. google.golang.org/grpc +
protobuf demoted to indirect (still pulled transitively via luxfi/dex).

Verified:
  - `go build ./...` (default, no tags) clean
  - `go test ./db/rpcdb/... ./trace/... ./message/... ./vms/rpcchainvm/...
    ./vms/components/message/... ./vms/platformvm/network/...
    ./vms/example/xsvm/... ./service/keystore/... ./proto/...` clean
  - `grep -rln '//go:build grpc' --include='*.go' node/` returns zero
  - `grep -rln '//go:build !grpc' --include='*.go' node/` returns zero
  - `grep -rln 'google.golang.org/grpc' --include='*.go' node/` returns
    zero (only transitive deps remain in go.sum)

Pre-existing TestGraniteNetworkIDConfiguration failure in tests/ is
unrelated — fails on the parent commit too (verified via stash).
2026-05-16 17:23:26 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3be49b29ec rpcchainvm: zap-native only — delete every grpc-tagged path
The VM<->Node RPC plane is ZAP. Period. The dual-transport apparatus
(TransportConfig, NewFactoryWithTransport, Transport enum,
UsesGRPC/UsesZAP, factory_grpc.go vs factory_zap.go stub) only
existed to switch between ZAP and a grpc fallback that the codebase
no longer ships. Per the "one and only one way" / "no backwards
compatibility, only forwards perfection" mandate, the choice is
collapsed and every grpc-tagged file under vms/rpcchainvm is removed.

Deletions (36 files, ~4.3K lines):
  - factory_grpc.go, factory_zap.go, transport.go (the dual-transport
    routing + Transport enum)
  - vm.go, vm_client.go, vm_server.go, block_adapter.go, *_test.go
    (the grpc VMClient/Server + tests)
  - gruntime/, gvalidators/, messenger/, rpchttp/ (every subdir was
    100% //go:build grpc)
  - sender/client.go, sender/server.go (grpc Sender wire impls;
    sender.go + zap_client.go + zap_server.go stay)
  - runtime/subprocess/runtime_grpc.go (the gRPC subprocess.Bootstrap;
    runtime_zap.go is now the only Bootstrap)
  - vms/platformvm/warp/rpcwarp/signer_test.go (orphan grpc test that
    relied on the deleted proto/pb/warp)

Edits:
  - vms/rpcchainvm/factory.go: drop transportConfig field, drop
    NewFactoryWithTransport, drop the UsesGRPC() routing — there is
    one path, it constructs a ZAP listener, dials the subprocess
    over ZAP, returns the ZAP client. No branching.
  - vms/rpcchainvm/runtime/subprocess/runtime_zap.go: drop the
    `//go:build !grpc` tag (no grpc counterpart to gate against
    anymore) and rewrite the Bootstrap doc-comment.

go mod tidy result:
  - direct dep `google.golang.org/grpc` demoted to `// indirect`
    (still pulled transitively via luxfi/dex)
  - direct dep `github.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-prometheus`
    removed entirely

Verified:
  - `go build ./...` (default, no tags) clean
  - `go test -count=1 ./vms/rpcchainvm/...` clean
  - grep -rln 'google.golang.org/grpc' --include='*.go' under node/
    returns zero (the only google.golang.org/grpc strings left are
    in go.mod/go.sum/README/RELEASES/ci.yml/proto/Dockerfile)
  - grep 'grpc.Dial|NewServer|NewClient' in rpcchainvm returns zero
2026-05-16 17:11:31 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 0486947913 Merge pull request #111 from luxfi/chore/gitignore-cleanup-and-tag-refresh
chore: drop stale db* gitignore + refresh LLM/CLAUDE Latest Tag
2026-05-16 16:48:07 -07:00
hanzo-dev 105fd207c0 .gitignore + docs: drop stale db* rule; refresh Latest Tag to v1.26.28
The bare `db*` .gitignore rule was overly broad — it matched the canonical
node/db/rpcdb/ source directory (consolidated in v1.26.28). Previous PRs
needed `git add -f` to land files there. No code references in-repo ./db/
runtime path; runtime DB lives under ~/.lux/ per the canonical operator
convention.

LLM.md + CLAUDE.md updated to reflect actual current main tag.
2026-05-16 16:47:41 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub e1550aaea6 chore: bump Go toolchain to 1.26.3 (#110)
Pin Go version to 1.26.3 across go.mod, CI workflows, and Dockerfiles
for canonical alignment with the rest of the luxfi/* stack.
2026-05-16 16:46:20 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 25adc9c75c rpcdb: consolidate into node/db/rpcdb, drop luxfi/proto dep (#109)
Part A — swap Layer-B wire-types path:
  github.com/luxfi/proto/rpcdb → github.com/luxfi/protocol/rpcdb (v0.0.5)
Drops the require/replace dance against the local-only luxfi/proto module
from node/go.mod. luxfi/protocol is the canonical home for wire types and
service specs in the Lux ecosystem.

Part B — fold node/internal/database/rpcdb into node/db/rpcdb:
  Both packages were grpc-tagged gRPC adapters against the same
  rpcdbpb.DatabaseClient/Server. The internal one (db_client.go/db_server.go)
  predated the Layer A/B/C decomplect; the db/rpcdb one (grpc_server.go +
  zap_server.go) is the canonical Layer-C home with one Service and one
  transport adapter per wire format.

  New grpc_client.go in db/rpcdb mirrors the deleted internal db_client.go
  using the same Layer-B Error codes (via codeToErr), behind the `grpc`
  build tag — symmetric with grpc_server.go.

  Updated service/keystore/rpckeystore/client.go to import the canonical
  db/rpcdb.NewGRPCClient instead of internal/database/rpcdb.NewClient.

  internal/database/rpcdb/ deleted in its entirety. One canonical rpcdb
  home; no dual-shim, no deprecation period.

Default-tag build is clean. The pre-existing -tags=grpc breakage in
node/proto/pb/rpcdb (protoc-generated stub) is orthogonal and was already
broken on main before this change — it affects the legacy and the new
adapter identically because both reference the same rpcdbpb symbols.
2026-05-16 16:35:56 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub 09dffe5430 deps: luxfi/api v1.0.10 -> v1.0.11 (#108)
Picks up ConsensusInfo.Corona -> ConsensusInfo.Corona rename so the
service_test.go typecheck (TestGetNodeVersionConsensusRoundtrip) compiles.

Unblocks dependabot #106 and the siblings that piled up behind the
threshold/corona/consensus/mpc cascade.
2026-05-16 16:29:55 -07:00
df173e4263 build(deps): bump peter-evans/repository-dispatch from 3 to 4 (#103)
Bumps [peter-evans/repository-dispatch](https://github.com/peter-evans/repository-dispatch) from 3 to 4.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/peter-evans/repository-dispatch/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/peter-evans/repository-dispatch/compare/v3...v4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: peter-evans/repository-dispatch
  dependency-version: '4'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-05-16 16:17:30 -07:00
Hanzo DevandGitHub b561269ef8 Merge pull request #107 from luxfi/licensing/canonical-pointer
docs: add LICENSING.md pointer to canonical Lux IP strategy
2026-05-15 16:34:50 -07:00
Hanzo Dev 20506a5950 docs: add LICENSING.md pointing at canonical Lux IP strategy
Single LICENSING.md file referencing the canonical three-tier IP and
licensing strategy at github.com/luxfi/.github/blob/main/profile/README.md.

LICENSE file is unchanged; this only adds a navigational pointer.
2026-05-15 16:34:43 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0ebfa14b6d rpcdb: decomplect into Layer A/B/C topology
Layer A — wire framing: github.com/luxfi/api/zap (unchanged)
Layer B — service spec: github.com/luxfi/proto/rpcdb (transport-agnostic
   data carriers, was node/proto/zap/rpcdb)
Layer C — service impl + transports: node/db/rpcdb/
   - service.go      transport-neutral Service wrapping database.Database
   - zap_server.go   ZAP transport adapter (default; used by cevm)
   - grpc_server.go  gRPC transport adapter (-tags=grpc)

One Service. Many transport adapters. Adding a transport is a new
adapter file wrapping *Service; storage logic stays in service.go.

Removed (-1390 LOC of duplicate/dead code):
 - node/proto/zap/rpcdb/rpcdb.go (moved to luxfi/proto/rpcdb)
 - node/proto/rpcdb/rpcdb_zap.go (dead HandlerRegistry path, no callers)
 - node/proto/rpcdb/rpcdb_grpc.go (duplicated gRPC server, replaced by
   node/db/rpcdb/grpc_server.go)
 - node/db/rpcdb/db.go (re-export shim, replaced by Service)

Consumers updated to import the canonical adapter at node/db/rpcdb:
 - vms/rpcchainvm/zap/client.go
 - vms/rpcchainvm/zap/client_dbserver_test.go
 - vms/rpcchainvm/zap/cevm_e2e_test.go

go.mod: add `replace github.com/luxfi/proto => ../proto` for in-tree
  development of the central wire-types module.

Tests: db/rpcdb (3/3) + rpcchainvm/zap (4/4 incl. cevm cross-process
e2e — KP_META written via ZAP db channel, no fallback to local zapdb).
2026-05-15 15:47:44 -07:00
Hanzo AI f97f552e87 rpcchainvm/zap: spawn ZAP rpcdb server in Initialize, populate DBServerAddr
Closes the "dbServerAddr empty under ZAP" gap from the cevm v0.48.0
premortem. The gRPC client (vm/rpc/vm_client.go:201) spawns a gRPC
dbserver and threads its addr through InitializeRequest. The ZAP
client did neither — VM plugins received empty addr and either
fabricated a local file backend or crashed.

Changes:
* `Client.Initialize` now calls `startDBServer(init.DB)` BEFORE
  sending the wire request, mirroring the gRPC pattern.
* Spawned listener serves `vm/proto/rpcdb.NewZAPServer(init.DB)` —
  a default-build (no `grpc` tag) ZAP-native rpcdb server.
* `InitializeRequest.DBServerAddr` is populated with the new
  listener's `host:port`. Plugins (cevm) read this off the wire
  and dial back to do all database I/O over ZAP.
* Lifetime: server bound to Client; `Shutdown` calls
  `stopDBServer` which cancels ctx, then closes the listener.
* `Close()` deliberately does NOT call zapwire.Server.Close because
  upstream Server races with in-flight Accept (nils its conns map
  mid-Serve). Listener close + ctx cancel is sufficient.

Tests:
* `TestInitialize_DBServerAddrPopulated` — regression guard:
  DBServerAddr non-empty, host:port, dial-able.
* `TestInitialize_DBServerActuallyServesRpcdb` — round-trip Put/Get
  via the spawned db server's wire interface; data lands in memdb.
* `TestCEvm_DialsZAPdbServer` — TRUE cross-process E2E. Spawns
  the cevm binary at the canonical plugin path with VM_TRANSPORT=zap,
  serves a ZAP rpcdb-backed memdb on a fresh port, ships the addr
  via Initialize. cevm dials it (logged at "[cevm] zapdb: connected
  to luxd db listener at 127.0.0.1:NNN"), persists genesis meta
  (KP_META key 0x03, 72 bytes), and the local-file fallback at
  `cevm-zapdb.bin` is NOT created — proving RemoteZapDB was the
  active backend.
2026-05-15 15:06:07 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2bde2c707f chore: bump precompile v0.5.16 -> v0.5.17, node v1.22.78 -> v1.22.79 2026-05-15 12:16:02 -07:00
Hanzo AI 913acca108 chore(brand): drop LUX_ env-var prefixes (LUX_PATH, LUX_KMS_*, LUX_CGO, LUX_PRIVATE_KEY, LUX_AUTOMINE_*)
- scripts/* + .github/actions/* + .github/workflows/*: LUX_PATH ->
  NODE_PATH, LUX_VERSION -> NODE_VERSION.
- Dockerfile: LUX_CGO -> CGO_ENABLED (matches Go convention).
- staking/kms.go: LUX_KMS_ENDPOINT/PATH/TOKEN -> KMS_ENDPOINT/PATH/TOKEN.
- deploy-subnets.sh: LUX_PRIVATE_KEY -> PRIVATE_KEY.
- config/config.go: drop LUX_AUTOMINE_CCHAIN_GENESIS_PATH env override;
  downstream networks ship their own platform-genesis bundle instead.
2026-05-15 12:15:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI 50b27dbf94 refactor(pq): strict-PQ forward-only, drop transition window + classical-compat
- Remove ActivationHeight migration window from SchemeGate; the gate
  refuses non-PQ NodeIDScheme bytes at every height.
- Remove LUX_CLASSICAL_COMPAT_UNSAFE operator escape hatch; classical
  staker.crt/key flags retained only for legacy no-profile chains.
- Rename profile from LUX_STRICT_E2E_PQ to STRICT_E2E_PQ (brand sweep).
- Update LLM.md to reflect forward-only PQ policy.
2026-05-15 12:15:42 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2f9ef85652 feat(platformvm): P-only mode + native CreateAssetTx/OperationTx
- X-Chain (XVM) and C-Chain (EVM) become opt-in at genesis; missing
  XVMID/EVMID chains in genesis no longer fatal at node init.
- CreateAssetTx and OperationTx ported from XVM into platformvm/txs so
  asset issuance and UTXO mint ops live on the P-Chain in P-only mode.
- Cross-chain P->X->C flows replaced by direct P->subnet warp transfers.
- Signer visitor + backend visitor wired for the new tx types.
- LUX_MIGRATE_CCHAIN and LUX_CHAIN_ID_MAPPING_C migration env vars
  dropped (one-time recovery paths, no longer needed).
2026-05-15 12:15:31 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9c42fe1126 refactor: rename g* grpc packages to rpc* (galiasreader, gkeystore, gwarp, ghttp) 2026-05-15 12:15:14 -07:00
Hanzo AI e42b295617 ci: skip buf-lint when no .proto files present (ZAP-native default) 2026-05-13 13:45:20 -07:00
Hanzo AI d7312ad8a9 go.sum: tidy after crypto v1.19.0 — add luxfi/crypto/ipa entries
luxfi/crypto v1.19.0 dropped the inline ipa/ dir and now requires
github.com/luxfi/crypto/ipa as a separate module. The transitive
chain (crypto → crypto/ipa/bandersnatch/{fp,fr,common/parallel}) was
missing from go.sum, breaking goreleaser's go build.
2026-05-13 13:32:27 -07:00
Hanzo AI c827de99a7 deps: bump luxfi/crypto v1.19.0 — canonical luxfi/crypto/ipa 2026-05-13 11:55:49 -07:00
Hanzo AI 24aaa598c5 go.mod: bump protocol v0.0.4 + sdk v1.16.60 2026-05-13 00:21:23 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3d5466eef4 go.mod: bump go directive to 1.26.3 (security advisory) 2026-05-12 20:55:01 -07:00
Hanzo AI b5a2a8d3db go.mod: bump warp v1.18.5 → v1.18.6 (pq.Mode decomplection)
warp v1.18.6 ships the canonical pq.Mode integration —
EnvelopeV2 implements pq.PQEvidencer, LanesForMode(pq.Mode, ...)
replaces the old local profile-enum dispatch, and
pq.ErrClassicalAuthForbidden is the single sentinel across the
stack. Pull luxfi/pq v1.0.3 transitively so any node-side gate
that compares against the canonical sentinel just works.

No source changes needed at this layer; the bump is dep hygiene.
2026-05-12 20:07:09 -07:00
Hanzo AI b5a4fc3f1f ci/Docker: pass LUX_CGO=0 — the runtime image doesn't ship luxcpp .so libs, so CGO=1 segfaults on early init 2026-05-12 14:50:42 -07:00
Hanzo AI 90738f212a genesis/builder: collapse opt-in chains to one table-driven loop
The builder had two inconsistent groups of chains: Q and Z hardcoded as
MANDATORY (no opt-in gate), C/D/B/T as four near-identical conditional
blocks. Three problems with that:
  * Q/Z silently baked into every primary genesis — a downstream that
    only needs P+X (<tenant> etc.) couldn't keep them out without an
    env-knob hack.
  * Adding a new primary-network chain meant copy-pasting the
    if-block. Four chains = four near-identical conditionals.
  * The "mandatory" tag was historical — Q-Chain and Z-Chain are
    perfectly fine to instantiate via CreateChainTx post-genesis, just
    like C-Chain. The mandatory tag was an artifact of an old bring-up
    order, not a protocol requirement.

Now: P and X are mandatory (P implicit, X anchors fees + staking).
Every other primary-network chain lives in a single table:

	optIn := []struct{ genesisData string; vmID ids.ID; name string }{
		{config.CChainGenesis, constants.EVMID,        "C-Chain"},
		{config.DChainGenesis, constants.DexVMID,      "D-Chain"},
		{config.BChainGenesis, constants.BridgeVMID,   "B-Chain"},
		{config.TChainGenesis, constants.ThresholdVMID,"T-Chain"},
		{config.QChainGenesis, constants.QuantumVMID,  "Q-Chain"},
		{config.ZChainGenesis, constants.ZKVMID,       "Z-Chain"},
	}

Adding a chain is one row. Removing one is one row. The data drives the
shape — no env knob, no per-chain conditional, no compile-time flag.

Pairs with the genesis-configs companion commit that deleted
LUX_DISABLE_*CHAIN env knobs and loadSpecialtyChainGenesis. Operators
who want a subset of chains ship a config tree with only the shards
they need. Runtime tracking remains separate via luxd's --track-chains.
2026-05-12 13:49:03 -07:00
Hanzo AI 50b4002e51 go.mod: drop ../corona local replace, pin corona v0.3.0 (so Docker build sees pkg) 2026-05-12 12:18:12 -07:00
Hanzo AI 15ab4dbd47 ci: inline Docker build, drop cross-org reusable workflow call
The startup_failure on every recent Docker run is the org-level "Allow
actions and reusable workflows from luxfi" policy at GitHub
actively rejecting cross-org `uses: hanzoai/.github/.../docker-build.yml`
calls. Without admin access to the luxfi org settings, the cross-org
path is unfixable from the agent side.

This rewrite inlines the build (single linux/amd64 leg via
docker/build-push-action@v6) so the workflow runs entirely inside
luxfi/node and only depends on:
  - the lux-build-linux-amd64 self-hosted ARC runner (already live
    on hanzo-k8s actions-runner-system; v0.2.0, listener 6d+ uptime)
  - actions/checkout@v4, docker/{setup-buildx,login,metadata,
    build-push}-action — all approved per default policy
  - secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN (auto-injected; no `secrets: inherit` needed)
  - secrets.UNIVERSE_PAT for the notify-universe handoff (existing
    repo secret; same as before).

Build is currently amd64-only since the arm64 ARC runner is paused on
DOKS (per consensus/CLAUDE.md memory). Adding arm64 is a one-line
matrix expansion once arm64 runners come online.
2026-05-12 12:13:51 -07:00
Hanzo AI bdf3c5d00e ci: revert runner labels back to lux-build-linux-* (correct for luxfi org) 2026-05-12 12:09:36 -07:00
Hanzo AI dadaad8a22 ci: fix Docker workflow runner labels (lux-build-linux-* → hanzo-build-linux-*) 2026-05-12 12:05:32 -07:00
Hanzo AI eea02da21a node: align with crypto v1.18.6 (SchemeCorona → SchemeCorona) 2026-05-12 10:23:43 -07:00
Hanzo AI 476c6dd12a node: bump validators to v1.2.0 (CoronaPubKey) 2026-05-12 09:58:04 -07:00
Hanzo AI 35d48b9d1c node: kill all remaining Corona identifiers across consensus, vms, wallet
Final identifier purge for the node repo. After this commit zero
'Corona' / 'CORONA' references remain in any Go file.

  consensus/quasar:
    CoronaWork/Valid/Time/SizeMismatch  → CoronaWork/Valid/Time/SizeMismatch
    SignatureTypeCorona                 → SignatureTypeCorona
    CoronaConfig/Stats/Signature        → CoronaConfig/Stats/Signature
    NewCoronaSignature                  → NewCoronaSignature
    CoronaRound1/Round2/RoundData       → CoronaRound1/Round2/RoundData
    CoronaGroupKey/KeyShare/Coordinator → CoronaGroupKey/KeyShare/Coordinator
    CoronaLatency/Parties/Threshold     → CoronaLatency/Parties/Threshold
    ConnectCorona/InitializeCorona    → ConnectCorona/InitializeCorona
    ErrCoronaNotConnected/Failed        → ErrCoronaNotConnected/Failed
    CoronaSigners/Stats                 → CoronaSigners/Stats
    GetCorona()                         → GetCorona()
    {gpu,cpu}CoronaVerify               → {gpu,cpu}CoronaVerify
    set/teardown test helpers + dozens of compound identifiers all renamed

  vms/platformvm:
    SigTypeCorona   → SigTypeCorona

  wallet/keychain:
    KeyTypeCorona   → KeyTypeRingSig   (this is the LSAG ring-sig key
                                          kind — descriptive, not lemur-named)
    AddCorona       → AddRingSig
    Test*Corona*    → Test*RingSig*

Parallel Ring+Module Double-Lattice PQ posture intact: Corona
(Ring-LWE) + Pulsar (Module-LWE) supported in parallel as
independent threshold finality kernels.

Tests: consensus/quasar 45s, wallet/keychain 3.5s — both green.
2026-05-12 09:54:58 -07:00
Hanzo AI be24ff49f0 node: wire StakingConfig.DeriveNodeID at lqd boot
CTO swarm audit found the strict-PQ NodeID seam was exposed but
not called: node/node.go:132 still derived the validator's
NodeID via ids.NodeIDFromCert(stakingCert) unconditionally, even
on chains where StakingConfig.StakingMLDSAPub was populated.

The seam StakingConfig.DeriveNodeID(chainID) shipped in
6357802b7d dispatches per the strict-PQ pivot — when
StakingMLDSAPub is non-empty, NodeID derives from the ML-DSA-65
public key via SHAKE256-384("NODE_ID_V1" || chainID || 0x42 ||
pubKey)[:20] under ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65. Classical-compat
chains fall through to ids.NodeIDFromCert via the same seam.

This commit routes node.go's boot path through the seam.
chainID is ids.Empty — the primary-network chain id, encoded as
"11111111111111111111111111111111LpoYY" in cb58. Per-subnet
chain ids are bound at chain-creation time and don't affect the
validator's primary identity.

After this, a strict-PQ lqd binary started with
--staking-mldsa-key-file pointing at a valid ML-DSA-65 keypair
produces a NodeID derived from the post-quantum public key — the
piece that closes the validator-identity strict-PQ gate at the
ONE callsite that matters.

Closes the "lqd boot bypasses DeriveNodeID" finding from the
CTO swarm audit.
2026-05-12 09:46:53 -07:00
Hanzo AI 8b8280c1e7 vms/chainadapter: namespaced chain IDs + seeded registry (unblocks T-Chain)
Renames the package-level ChainID constants from ChainPolkadot / ChainPolygon
/ ChainBSC / ChainRipple / ChainStellar / ChainTron / etc. to namespaced
private identifiers (idPolkadot, idPolygon, ...) and exposes them through
a seeded registry instead. Single source of truth for which non-Lux chains
the adapter knows about.

New files:
  - chain_ids.go: private id<Chain> constants + their public surface
  - chains_registry.go: registry that maps idX → adapter implementations
  - chains_seed.go: bootstrap-time population
  - registry_full_test.go: pin the seeded mapping

Existing adapters (bitcoin, cosmos, ethereum, polkadot, polygon, bsc,
ripple, solana, stellar, tron) now reference id<Chain> directly. Public
chain-ID iteration is via registry.AllChainIDs() rather than a
copy-paste enum.

No external behavior change: the wire bytes are the same; this is a
package-local refactor that lets T-Chain (teleportvm, LP-6332) plug
adapters in/out without recompiling the adapter package.
2026-05-11 23:57:51 -07:00
Hanzo AI e0ebfac9d3 network/peer: PQ handshake + SchemeGate + signed-IP MLDSA sig (CR-3, CR-5, CR-9)
Closes three audit blockers in one coherent batch — all of them gate
the inbound-peer pipeline on a strict-PQ chain so a classical (Ed25519/
secp256k1) peer cannot finish a handshake against a PQ-pinned node.

CR-3 (SchemeGate at TLS upgrade)
  - upgrader pulls the leaf TLS pubkey type at handshake completion and
    derives a NodeIDScheme byte (0x42 for ML-DSA-65, 0x90 for classical
    Ed25519, 0x91 for ECDSA-P256). The chain's
    ChainSecurityProfile.AcceptsValidatorScheme() refuses the inbound
    NodeID when scheme bytes don't align with the chain's pinned
    SigSchemeID — even before any application bytes are read.
  - Refusal is a typed error (ErrSchemeMismatch) attributed in metrics
    against the family so the dashboard distinguishes "wrong scheme" from
    "TLS broke" from "tracked-net mismatch".

CR-5 (PQ-only handshake handoff)
  - peer.Start now runs runPQHandshakeIfRequired before any classical
    handshake message is exchanged. Under a strict-PQ profile, a
    cleartext-TLS path is refused; the runtime expects a peer that has
    already presented an ML-DSA-65 leaf cert AND knows how to drive the
    PQ session-binding step. Test coverage in upgrader_strict_pq_test.go.

CR-9 (signed-IP MLDSA carrier)
  - SignedIP wire-format gains an MLDSASignature []byte field. Encoded
    append-only on the gossip wire (Reader.HasMore() guards the new
    field) so legacy peers that never set it remain decodable. New
    SignPQ() helper produces the signature; VerifyUnderProfile() refuses
    classical-only IPs on strict-PQ chains; pq_frame.go gives
    fuzz-friendly canonical encoding.
  - proto/zap/p2p: Handshake gains IpMldsaSig []byte; codec ships the
    bytes through the existing builder + unmarshal paths.
  - message.OutboundMsgBuilder.Handshake takes ipMLDSASig []byte —
    every existing caller in node + tests now threads it through.

Wiring
  - n.Config.NetworkConfig.SecurityProfile is set from
    n.securityProfile at initNetworking time; nil on legacy networks
    preserves the classical-permissive path.
  - upgrader / peer / ip_signer read the profile, not a global, so
    multi-chain hosts get the right gate per chain.

Tests: network/peer/{ip_pq_test.go, ip_pq_wire_test.go,
upgrader_strict_pq_test.go} pin the gates; go test
./network/peer/ -count=1 -short passes (6.5s).

Module bumps:
  - github.com/luxfi/geth v1.16.91 (MLDSATxType + per-chain PQ gate)
2026-05-11 23:57:09 -07:00
Hanzo AI abc8a0856f LLM.md: document --import-chain-data bridge + post-E2E-PQ state
- Config bridge at node/config/config.go injects --import-chain-data into
  ChainConfigs["C"]; EVM plugin reads it post-initializeChain() and runs
  importBlocksFromFile (same code path as admin_importChain RPC).
- macOS gatekeeper SIGKILL gotcha after cp of luxd or plugin binaries;
  codesign --force --sign - is the fix.
- Profile gate is consulted at four wire-level boundaries (peer handshake,
  mempool, validator scheme, EVM contract auth) and pinned from genesis.
2026-05-11 22:37:51 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2c49007406 config: register strict-PQ flags in addNodeFlags (pflag binding) 2026-05-11 21:43:27 -07:00
Hanzo AI 06a47b11b5 node: bump consensus → v1.23.15 (NewBFT engine factory)
Picks up the fourth consensus engine factory (NewBFT) alongside
NewChain / NewDAG / NewPQ. Adapter wraps luxfi/bft v0.1.5 as a
consensus.Engine; orthogonal to profile selection and threshold
kernel choice.
2026-05-11 21:03:56 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0af39d7d40 node: bump consensus v1.23.14 + threshold v1.6.8 (corona/pulsar split)
Pulls in:
  github.com/luxfi/pulsar v1.0.0  (Module-LWE — was pulsar-m)
  github.com/luxfi/corona v0.2.0  (Ring-LWE — was the old pulsar)

The old luxfi/pulsar-m module is gone. luxfi/pulsar now hosts the
Module-LWE library (Class N1 byte-equal to FIPS 204), and luxfi/corona
hosts the Ring-LWE library. Both consumed via consensus/protocol/quasar
as parallel kernels selected per-chain by FinalitySchemeID.
2026-05-11 19:30:22 -07:00
Hanzo AI 182401b3be service/security: update test assertions to STRICT (was STRICT_PQ)
Matches consensus v1.23.11 ProfileName rename: profile-name strings
dropped the trailing _PQ suffix because the canonical spectrum
(permissive/strict/fips) cuts across more than the PQ axis.
2026-05-11 18:59:33 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6357802b7d config: strict-PQ identity flags + StakingConfig.DeriveNodeID seam
Adds the strict-PQ identity surface to node config:

  --staking-mldsa-key-file              ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) signing key
  --staking-mldsa-key-file-content      base64 PEM, content variant
  --staking-mldsa-pub-key-file          ML-DSA-65 public key
  --staking-mldsa-pub-key-file-content
  --handshake-mlkem-key-file            ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) KEM secret
  --handshake-mlkem-key-file-content
  --handshake-mlkem-pub-key-file        ML-KEM-768 peer-facing pubkey
  --handshake-mlkem-pub-key-file-content

All eight default to /data/staking/{mldsa,mlkem}.{key,pub} matching
the layout <tenant>/cli `liquid key gen` writes — operators wire
the init container and lqd reads the files with zero extra config.

StakingConfig grows four fields (StakingMLDSA + StakingMLDSAPub +
HandshakeMLKEMPriv + HandshakeMLKEMPub) plus path fields for log
context. config.getStakingConfig now resolves them via the same
content-or-file precedence the TLS/signer loaders already use.

Key invariants enforced at config load:

  - Both private and public key must be present, or neither
    (no asymmetric "have signing key, missing pub" state).
  - Public key on disk must match the key derivable from the
    private key (catches misnamed file swap; would otherwise
    point NodeID at a key the validator can't sign for).
  - PEM block type matches exactly (refuses a private-key PEM
    fed where a public-key PEM is expected).

NodeID derivation pivot — single seam, no scattered branches:

  StakingConfig.IsStrictPQ()      → len(StakingMLDSAPub) > 0
  StakingConfig.DeriveNodeID(chainID)
    strict-PQ:    SHAKE256-384("LUX_NODE_ID_V1"||chainID||0x42||pub)[:20]
                  via ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65.DeriveMLDSA
    classical:    ids.NodeIDFromCert(StakingTLSCert.Leaf)
  StakingConfig.DeriveTypedNodeID(chainID)
    same dispatch, returns wire-canonical TypedNodeID with the
    scheme byte travelling alongside the 20-byte NodeID.

Callsites that currently call ids.NodeIDFromCert directly are now
bypassing the strict-PQ pivot; migrating them to DeriveNodeID /
DeriveTypedNodeID is the follow-up workstream (the pivot itself
is non-breaking — classical chains continue to route through
NodeIDFromCert via the seam).

Requires luxfi/ids v1.2.10+ for NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65 / DeriveMLDSA.
2026-05-11 17:47:38 -07:00
Hanzo AI 4dd4910bf3 node: drop Quasar/Annulus/Lux from profile identifiers
Mirror of consensus/config rename:
  ProfileLuxStrictPQ   -> ProfileStrictPQ
  ProfileLuxPermissive -> ProfilePermissive
  ProfileLuxFIPS       -> ProfileFIPS
  LuxStrictPQ()        -> StrictPQ() constructor
  LuxPermissive()      -> Permissive()

Updates across chains, network/peer (handshake + scheme_gate), node init,
service/security (metrics + types), and platformvm/xvm profile tests.
Wire-string assertions updated to drop LUX_ prefix (e.g. "STRICT_PQ").
2026-05-11 16:51:03 -07:00
Hanzo AI 766e8b2010 node/version: bump to v1.26.13 + register in RPCChainVMProtocol map
Carries the namespace rename (lux→security) on /ext/security and the
F118 chain-manager profile-pin stamping landed in v1.26.12. Patch bump
only — no schema or behavior change beyond the rename of the
JSON-RPC namespace and REST sidecar path on the security service.

compatibility.json: add v1.26.12 + v1.26.13 to RPCChainVMProtocol 42
so TestCurrentRPCChainVMCompatible passes (the previous bump to
v1.26.12 left the map at v1.23.25).
2026-05-11 10:05:05 -07:00
Hanzo AI 77010b6652 node/service/security: rename namespace lux→security, drop /v1/ from REST paths
The security service was registered at /ext/lux exposing
lux_securityProfile / lux_blockSecurity, with REST sidecars at
/ext/lux/v1/security/profile and /ext/lux/v1/security/block/{n}.
This drifted from the convention used by every other extension
endpoint (/ext/admin, /ext/health, /ext/info, /ext/metrics):

  - the /ext/ namespace name MUST describe the surface, not the
    network; "lux" on a Lux chain is tautological
  - the lux_ JSON-RPC method prefix duplicates the namespace metadata
  - the /v1/ in the middle of /ext/lux/v1/security/ is double versioning;
    /ext/ is already extension-scoped and the namespace itself is
    the version axis

New surface:
  POST /ext/security                  (JSON-RPC, security namespace)
    methods: securityProfile, blockSecurity
  GET  /ext/security/profile          (REST sidecar)
  GET  /ext/security/block/{n}        (REST sidecar)

- service/security/service.go: RegisterService("security"); REST mux
  routes /profile + /block/ relative to the handler root (full paths
  /ext/security/profile + /ext/security/block/{n}).
- service/security/types.go: doc comments name the new surface.
- service/security/service_test.go: test names drop _lux_ infix; REST
  test hits /profile and a new TestREST_blockSecurity_GET covers the
  /block/{n} sidecar end-to-end on httptest.NewServer.
- node/node.go: APIServer.AddRoute base "security" (was "lux") and the
  init doc comment lists the three endpoints.

All 10 tests pass (env GOWORK=off go test ./service/security/...).
2026-05-11 10:03:51 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9759c2e253 node+chains: stamp ChainSecurityProfile pin into C-Chain plugin config (closes F118)
Companion to coreth: c84950de4. The chain manager now forwards the
chain-wide ChainSecurityProfile resolved at node bootstrap (F102)
into the C-Chain (coreth) plugin Initialize payload by stamping a
profileID + profileHashHex pin into the JSON config bytes that
already cross the rpcchainvm boundary.

- chains/manager.go adds ManagerConfig.SecurityProfile and an
  injectSecurityProfileConfig pass (mirror of injectAutominingConfig)
  that runs only on EVMID and is a no-op when the profile is nil.

- node/node.go threads n.securityProfile into chains.ManagerConfig.

- version/constants.go patch-bumps to 1.26.12.

Four F118 tests in chains/security_profile_f118_test.go:
- StampsCChainOnly — pin appears in EVMID config, not in other VMs.
- NoOpWhenProfileNil — classical-compat path passes through.
- MergesExistingConfig — automining + skip-block-fee survive.
- RoundTripsAcrossPluginBoundary — the wire form decodes cleanly
  into the coreth-side LuxSecurityProfilePin struct shape, with the
  hash decoding to a full 48 bytes (SHA3-384 width).

go.mod bumps consensus v1.23.5 → v1.23.9 to pick up the F113
checkpoint+Merkle SHA3-384 widening.
2026-05-11 10:01:28 -07:00
Hanzo AI 05b139aadc node/network/kem: canonical KEM scheme numbering via config.KeyExchangeID (Bug 3)
Before: network/kem/scheme.go declared its own KeyExchangeID with values
ML-KEM-768 = 0x62, ML-KEM-1024 = 0x63, plus P-256 / P-384 / X25519
forbidden markers at 0xF0..0xF2. Disjoint from consensus/config's
0x01/0x02/0x90 canonical block.

After: kem.KeyExchangeID is a type alias of config.KeyExchangeID. The
canonical bytes (0x01 = ML-KEM-768, 0x02 = ML-KEM-1024, 0x90 =
X25519Unsafe) are re-exported. SharedSecretBits and NISTCategory move
from methods to free functions (methods on aliased types must live in
the type's home package).

Dropped: KeyExchangeMLKEM512 (NIST Cat 1, below strict-PQ floor),
KeyExchangeP256Unsafe + KeyExchangeP384Unsafe (collapsed onto the single
X25519Unsafe classical marker that config exposes). No production
caller referenced any of these.

Wire-format change on the peer handshake KEMScheme byte: 0x62/0x63
→ 0x01/0x02. Forward-only; the prior numbering was never released to
any live network.

New test: TestKEMSchemeIDs_AllUseCanonicalNumbering pins
kem.KeyExchange{MLKEM768,MLKEM1024,X25519Unsafe,None} byte-identical to
config.KeyExchange{MLKEM768,MLKEM1024,X25519Unsafe,Invalid}.
2026-05-11 09:29:42 -07:00
Hanzo AI d86c155eb1 node/network/peer: F103 — document hybrid vs pure ML-KEM-768 decision
The TLS handshake pins CurvePreferences = [tls.X25519MLKEM768], the
IANA-registered hybrid (curve ID 0x11ec). The chain-wide
ChainSecurityProfile pins KeyExchangeMLKEM768 — the post-quantum
component that MUST be present on the wire — and the hybrid satisfies
this because it CONTAINS ML-KEM-768.

The hybrid is strictly stronger than pure ML-KEM-768 (an attacker must
break BOTH X25519 AND ML-KEM-768 to derive the session key). Real-world
TLS 1.3 stacks implement the hybrid today; pure ML-KEM-768 at the TLS
layer is not yet a deployable target.

ForbidClassicalKEM continues to refuse a pure-classical curve at the
application layer; it does NOT refuse a hybrid that includes ML-KEM-768.

Decision recorded in consensus/config commit 12d7000c.

Closes F103 (pure vs hybrid ML-KEM-768 ambiguity).
2026-05-11 09:28:35 -07:00
Hanzo AI 77fff17b01 node/service/security: lux_securityProfile RPC + Prometheus gauges
Expose the chain-wide ChainSecurityProfile to operators, dApps, and
auditors via two surfaces wired through a single boot site
(initSecurityAPI):

  - JSON-RPC under namespace "lux" at /ext/lux:
      lux_securityProfile  → ProfileReply  (full profile JSON)
      lux_blockSecurity    → BlockSecurityReply (chain-wide envelope)
  - REST sidecar at /ext/lux/v1/security/{profile,block/{n}}
  - Prometheus gauges under namespace "security" on /ext/metrics:
      security_profile_post_quantum_end_to_end{profile_id, profile_name}
      security_profile_nist_friendly{profile_id}
      security_profile_lux_canonical{profile_id}
      security_profile_unsafe_mode_enabled{profile_id}
      security_mempool_classical_credentials_total{chain}
      security_zchain_proof_lag_epochs

The reply shape is SCREAMING_SNAKE canonical names (renderName) so audit
tooling matches on stable identifiers; the underlying scheme bytes come
from consensus/config. A node booted without a SecurityProfile pin
returns ErrNoProfile (RPC) or HTTP 503 (REST) — the legacy networks
keep their classical-compat posture without forging a profile.

Closes the lux_securityProfile and profile-gauges F102 follow-ups.
2026-05-11 09:28:35 -07:00
Hanzo AI 0568d68b80 node/xvm: wire SetAuthPolicy from profile
The X-chain mempool now installs the chain-wide credential-admission
policy resolved from genesis at node bootstrap (F102 close-out). Wiring
path:

  genesis → node.SecurityProfile() → xvm.Factory.SecurityProfile
         → VM.securityProfile → vm.Initialize → xmempool.SetAuthPolicy

X-chain credentials are wrapped in fxs.FxCredential; the mempool gate
unwraps them before consulting the auth policy so the same
EnforceCredentialPolicy implementation gates both P-chain and X-chain.

Integration test exercises the full path: build VM with strict-PQ
profile, call Initialize + Linearize, then issue a tx with a wrapped
classical secp256k1 credential via IssueTxFromRPCWithoutVerification.
Observe ErrLegacyCredentialUnderStrictPQ.
2026-05-11 09:28:35 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9a6b7d2455 node/platformvm: wire SetAuthPolicy from profile (closes CPX deferred item)
The platformvm mempool now installs the chain-wide credential-admission
policy resolved from genesis at node bootstrap (F102 close-out). Wiring
path:

  genesis → node.SecurityProfile() → platformvm.config.Internal.SecurityProfile
         → vm.Initialize → pmempool.SetAuthPolicy

Strict-PQ chains refuse classical secp256k1 credentials at gossip time
via the existing auth.EnforceCredentialPolicy gate; legacy/classical-
compat networks keep admitting them unchanged (nil profile is a no-op
gate).

Integration test exercises the full end-to-end path: build VM with
SecurityProfile = LuxStrictPQ(), call Initialize, attempt to add a tx
with an unwrapped *secp256k1fx.Credential, observe
ErrLegacyCredentialUnderStrictPQ.

Closes the CPX deferred item:
"chain-builder code that constructs the mempool today does not call
 SetAuthPolicy ... follow-up that depends on plumbing the
 *config.ChainSecurityProfile from genesis into the chain builder"
2026-05-11 09:28:35 -07:00
Darkhorse7stars 61b3e380e0 ci(docker): use lux-build-* runners (cross-org from hanzoai/.github)
The reusable hanzoai/.github/docker-build.yml requires cross-org callers
to override runner labels — hanzoai org scale-sets aren't visible from
luxfi org. All v1.26.x CI runs have failed with startup_failure since
the upstream workflow added this requirement (~2026-05).

Per the reusable workflow's docstring:
  Cross-org callers (luxfi/*, zooai/*, <tenant>/*) MUST override
  these with their own org's ARC scale-set labels.

Switch to lux-build-linux-{amd64,arm64} labels which exist on the
luxfi ARC scale-set.
2026-05-11 04:32:32 -05:00
Hanzo AI 9c9e6b9e28 node+genesis: wire ChainSecurityProfile into bootstrap (closes F102)
Adds Node.SecurityProfile() getter and Node.initSecurityProfile() boot
step. New() now calls initSecurityProfile() right after
initBootstrappers() and before tracer/metrics/networking/chain init —
every downstream consumer (signer factory, peer handshake gate,
mempool, validator registry, bridge oracle) sees the resolved
*consensus/config.ChainSecurityProfile (or its absence) via the
getter at construction time.

The pin lives in genesis.Config.SecurityProfile (luxfi/genesis@v1.9.6,
which pins luxfi/consensus@v1.23.5). Resolution:
  1. genesiscfg.GetConfig(networkID) — load JSON-form genesis
  2. cfg.SecurityProfile.Resolve() — refuse mismatched pin
  3. stamp result onto n.securityProfile
  4. emit startup banner with hash, post-quantum, NIST-friendly,
     classical-SNARK, and BLS-fallback posture

A forked binary that swaps in a different canonical profile content
fails Resolve() because the live ComputeHash diverges from the
genesis-pinned hex — closes the F102 attack chain end-to-end.

Adds 5 regression tests for the load + reject paths under StrictPQ
and FIPS profiles, plus nil-pin / wrong-hash / unknown-ID rejection.

Bumps luxfi/consensus v1.23.4 → v1.23.5, luxfi/genesis pseudo →
v1.9.6, luxfi/crypto v1.18.3 → v1.18.4.
2026-05-10 21:04:28 -07:00
Hanzo AI 4c1529da2a node/vms/avm: mempool refuses classical creds under strict-PQ
Mirrors the P-chain gate (vms/platformvm/txs/mempool) onto the X-chain
(xvm) mempool. The X-chain wraps every credential in fxs.FxCredential,
so the gate unwraps the inner verify.Verifiable before handing the
slice to auth.EnforceCredentialPolicy — the policy package only sees
the canonical *secp256k1fx.Credential type.

Same opt-in shape as the P-chain wiring: SetAuthPolicy installs the
ChainSecurityProfile + ClassicalCompatRegistry; without a profile the
gate is bypassed.

Three integration tests cover: strict-PQ + no registry refuses
classical, no policy admits classical, strict-PQ + empty registry
refuses classical (the all-allow-listed contract is that the registry
names the allowed addresses; an empty registry admits nothing).
2026-05-10 20:58:31 -07:00
Hanzo AI 4a345fe8e3 node/vms/platformvm: mempool refuses classical creds under strict-PQ
Wires the canonical credential-policy gate (vms/txs/auth) into the
P-chain mempool. Adds an opt-in setter so existing callers that have
not migrated their construction path observe no behavioural change —
without SetAuthPolicy, the gate is bypassed and every tx the legacy
path accepted is still accepted.

Once a chain pins a non-nil *config.ChainSecurityProfile via
SetAuthPolicy, every Add path runs through auth.EnforceCredentialPolicy
before the underlying mempool sees the tx. A classical
secp256k1fx.Credential under RequireTypedTxAuth=true returns
auth.ErrLegacyCredentialUnderStrictPQ.

The originator is left at ids.ShortEmpty here because P-chain txs do
not bind a single canonical "from" address (the input owners can name
many keys). Chain builders that supply a ClassicalCompatRegistry whose
IsAllowed depends on tx-level context layer that resolver on top of
this gate.

Three integration tests cover: strict-PQ + no registry refuses
classical, no policy (legacy default) admits classical, classical-
compat profile admits classical. The full P-chain mempool suite
(TestBlockBuilderMaxMempoolSizeHandling et al.) is unchanged.
2026-05-10 20:58:24 -07:00
Hanzo AI 102023f249 node/vms/txs/auth: ClassicalCompatRegistry + strict-PQ mempool gate
Adds the canonical credential-policy gate that the P-chain and X-chain
mempools use to enforce a strict-PQ ChainSecurityProfile at admission
time. One package, one entry point (EnforceCredentialPolicy), one
error (ErrLegacyCredentialUnderStrictPQ).

  - ClassicalCompatRegistry: read-only allow-list interface. Names a
    bounded set of legacy operator addresses that may still post
    classical secp256k1 credentials on a chain that otherwise pins
    RequireTypedTxAuth=true. The chain's governance pathway is the
    only writer; the mempool only reads.
  - NewStaticClassicalCompatRegistry: frozen registry constructed from
    a fixed []ids.ShortID slice. Useful for tests and for genesis-
    pinned allow-lists before the governance path is online.
  - EnforceCredentialPolicy: idempotent gate, branches on
    profile.RequireTypedTxAuth:
        false → admit unconditionally (classical-compat profile)
        true  → walk creds; if any is *secp256k1fx.Credential and the
                originator is not in the registry, return
                ErrLegacyCredentialUnderStrictPQ.

10 tests cover: nil profile (ErrNilProfile, programmer error), classical
profile admits, strict-PQ admits PQ-only creds, strict-PQ refuses
classical without registry, strict-PQ refuses originator not in
registry, strict-PQ admits allow-listed originator, mixed creds with
one classical refuses, empty creds always admits (syntactic verifier's
job to require ≥1), nil-safe staticRegistry, distinguishes addresses.

Wiring into platformvm/txs/mempool and xvm/txs/mempool lands in the
follow-up commits.
2026-05-10 20:58:15 -07:00
Hanzo AI aee5923e68 node/vms/mldsafx: re-export ML-DSA feature extension
Re-exports the canonical ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) UTXO feature extension
from github.com/luxfi/utxo/mldsafx so platformvm and xvm callers depend
on a single import path:

    github.com/luxfi/node/vms/mldsafx

One feature extension, one import path. The wire types (Credential,
TransferInput/Output, MintOutput, MintOperation, OutputOwners, Input,
Fx, Factory) and the security-level constants are type aliases against
the upstream package — adding mldsafx as a node-side bridge introduces
zero runtime code.

This is the foundation the P-chain and X-chain mempool admission gates
(vms/txs/auth) and the strict-PQ tx variants build against.
2026-05-10 20:58:04 -07:00
Hanzo AI ea32845a7d node: fix go.mod/go.sum after consensus v1.23.4 retag
The prior commit referenced luxfi/consensus v1.23.3, but that tag was
already in use on the remote. Retagged the new ChainSecurityProfile
ValidatorSchemeID work as v1.23.4 and update node's go.mod/go.sum to
match. luxfi/ids v1.2.10 is unaffected.
2026-05-10 20:26:00 -07:00
Hanzo AI 3bb951e59e node: ML-DSA-65 promoted to canonical NodeID under strict-PQ
NodeIDScheme enum (MLDSA65=0x42 canonical, Secp256k1=0x90 classical-
compat-unsafe only). NodeID derivation now domain-separated via
SHAKE256-384("LUX_NODE_ID_V1" || chain_id || scheme || pubkey).

Wire encoding includes a leading scheme byte so the receiver can
verify without trusting the profile alone.

Strict-PQ profile rejects secp256k1 NodeIDs.
Classical-compat profile accepts both (transition path).

Migration: hardfork activation switches strict-PQ chains from
mixed-scheme to ML-DSA-only at a configured activation block.

network/peer/scheme_gate.go is the single primitive consumers funnel
inbound NodeIDs through: SchemeGate.Classify(nodeID, scheme, height,
site) returns a TypedNodeID once the chain policy admits the pair.
The ActivationHeight field implements the hardfork transition window;
ClassicalCompatUnsafe mirrors the operator opt-in flag (refused under
strict-PQ regardless, honoured on permissive).

Existing 20-byte ids.NodeID array stays byte-identical for storage /
map keys / codec; the scheme byte travels alongside it on the wire
via ids.TypedNodeID. Consumers of the 20-byte form (peer/upgrader,
proposervm block proposer, platformvm validator registry, mempool
sender) continue to work unchanged at the storage layer; the
SchemeGate boundary is what stamps the scheme byte and runs the
cross-axis check.

Bumps luxfi/ids v1.2.9 -> v1.2.10 (NodeIDScheme, TypedNodeID,
DeriveMLDSA, FullDigest, error surface) and luxfi/consensus
v1.23.2 -> v1.23.3 (ValidatorSchemeID accessor, AcceptsValidatorScheme,
ErrValidatorSchemeMismatch).

Tests:
- TestSchemeGate_NewSchemeGate_RejectsNilProfile
- TestSchemeGate_StrictPQ_AcceptsMatchedScheme
- TestSchemeGate_StrictPQ_PostActivation_RejectsClassical
- TestSchemeGate_StrictPQ_PreActivation_AcceptsBothSchemes
- TestSchemeGate_StrictPQ_PreActivation_RejectsClassicalAfterCutover
- TestSchemeGate_Permissive_AcceptsClassicalUnderUnsafeFlag
- TestSchemeGate_RejectsUnknownSchemeByte
- TestSchemeGate_PinsProfileScheme
- TestSchemeGate_SiteTagIncludedInError

Patch-bump: v1.26.9 -> v1.26.10.
2026-05-10 20:18:32 -07:00
Hanzo AI 517acef79b node/network: PQ peer handshake — ML-KEM-768/1024 + ML-DSA-65 identity
Replaces classical X25519/ECDH peer handshake with ML-KEM-768 (default)
and ML-KEM-1024 (high-value validator/DKG channels). Node identity is
signed with ML-DSA-65 over a TupleHash256-bound transcript.

cSHAKE256 derives the AEAD session key with customization
"LUX_NODE_AEAD_V1", binding profile_id, chain_id, both nodes' ML-DSA
public keys, and the shared KEM secret.

DKG channels in pulsar/pulsar-m force ML-KEM-1024.

Strict-PQ profile refuses peers offering X25519Unsafe KEM.

Patch-bump.
2026-05-10 20:04:26 -07:00
Hanzo AI cc856c020c platformvm: C-Chain is opt-in via --track-chains, only X-Chain is built-in
Only P-Chain (chain manager startup) and X-Chain (UTXO infra) are
required primary-network chains. C-Chain (EVM), D-Chain (DEX),
B-Chain (Bridge), T-Chain (Threshold) — and any subnet blockchain —
must be explicitly tracked via --track-chains. A validator gets exactly
the topology its operator asks for, nothing more.

Pre-fix: every primary-network blockchain in genesis was created
unconditionally because `constants.PrimaryNetworkID != tx.ChainID`
short-circuited the TrackedChains gate. <tenant> validators (no
C-Chain plugin shipped) ran into "failed to initialize VM: parsing
genesis: unexpected end of JSON input" on every health check.

Replace the primary-network bypass with a per-VM check: only
tx.VMID == constants.XVMID skips the gate. Everything else (including
C-Chain on primary network) goes through TrackedChains.
2026-05-10 15:21:36 -07:00
Hanzo AI a0d1a2bc31 chains: opt-in by plugin — drop TrackAllChains auto-true + skip missing
Two related fixes that make chain tracking explicit per-validator:

1. config/config.go: drop the silent default
   `if TrackedChains == nil { TrackAllChains = true }`. That made any
   node without an explicit --track-chains list try to spin up every
   chain in P-chain state, including ones whose VM plugin wasn't
   loaded. The setting was a footgun. Empty TrackedChains now means
   "track only P/X (built-in)". TrackAllChains stays as an explicit
   opt-in escape hatch.

2. chains/manager.go: when buildChain returns ErrNotFound (VM plugin
   not registered for this chain's vmID), treat it as the validator's
   "I don't validate this one" signal — log info, mark the slot
   bootstrapped, and return WITHOUT registering a per-chain failing
   health check. The chain stays in pending state for hot-load.
   Previously this registered a permanent 503 on /ext/health for the
   chain-alias, which made kubelet liveness probes kill any pod that
   didn't ship plugins for every chain in the primary genesis. Now
   validators participate per-plugin: load liquid-evm/dex/fhe → those
   chains validate; don't load Lux's upstream EVM plugin → C-Chain
   stays in pending without crashing the node.

Real failures (e.g. genesis decode error, db corruption) still register
the failing health check — those are operator misconfigurations, not
deliberate opt-outs.

Future: a Lux-signed featured-chains.json + --track-featured (default
true) would make this opt-in safer at scale — limits the DDoS surface
of unbounded chain creation while still letting validators earn yield
on the curated set out of the box.
2026-05-10 12:21:48 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9c95d6473a platformvm: add GetChains as canonical replacement for GetNets
Adds platform.getChains alongside platform.getNets — same wire shape
(IDs in, list of {ID, ControlKeys, Threshold} out), names that match
the user-facing concept ("chain") instead of the internal "net" /
"subnet" jargon. APIChain replaces APINet, ClientChain (alias for
ClientNet) keeps drop-in source compatibility.

Why now: GetNets was already marked deprecated via the "deprecated
API called" log line, but no canonical replacement existed — callers
had to keep calling the deprecated method. This commit lands the
replacement so the bootstrap binary's chain idempotency check
(EnsureChainNetwork → list chains, match owner set) can target the
canonical name.

GetNets stays available indefinitely for wire-protocol compatibility.
GetChains delegates to GetNets internally so the two methods can
never diverge — bug-fix one, both fix.

Test pinned in service_test.go alongside GetNets test (existing file
has //go:build skip but the test is documentation for the contract).
2026-05-09 18:08:24 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6f0cdee116 deps: bump luxfi/genesis → fe4781cd (LUX_DISABLE_CCHAIN env knob) 2026-05-09 16:28:04 -07:00
Hanzo AI 2060761d42 platformvm: gate createCChainIfNeeded on LUX_MIGRATE_CCHAIN=1
createCChainIfNeeded is the one-time recovery path for the historical
mainnet migration where post-merge geth state was imported under a fixed
blockchainID (no CreateChainTx). On every other launch the function
either silently no-ops on the missing data dir or — worse — risks
touching the filesystem before the data dir exists during a fresh
genesis. Gating it behind LUX_MIGRATE_CCHAIN=1 keeps the migration path
exactly where it belongs: opt-in, run once, never again.
2026-05-09 14:30:27 -07:00
Hanzo AI a4208faf95 zap/client: don't treat MsgResponseFlag as error flag
The wire protocol uses two flags on responses:
  MsgResponseFlag (0x80) — set on EVERY response (success or error)
  MsgErrorFlag    (0x40) — set ONLY on error responses

The transport's readLoop already converts MsgErrorFlag responses into a
non-nil err out of Conn.Call, so by the time the client checks respType
the response is guaranteed successful. Treating MsgResponseFlag as the
"is this an error?" predicate fired on every successful Initialize and
rendered the binary InitializeResponse payload (LastAcceptedID, parent,
height, bytes, timestamp) as if it were an error string, producing
"vm error: <unprintable bytes>" and crashing chain creation despite the
plugin reporting "VM initialized successfully".

Symptom in the field: lqd repeatedly logged
  failed to create chain on net 11111111111111111111111111111111LpoYY:
  failed to initialize VM: zap initialize: vm error: \x00\x00\x00 ...
while the plugin's own log read "ZAP VM initialized successfully" and
"Chain initialized successfully". Health check C reported permanent
failure, eth_getBalance returned 404, no blocks were ever produced.

Fix: drop the spurious MsgResponseFlag check and strip both flags before
comparing the message type so that any well-formed response is accepted.

Regression test in client_initialize_test.go pins both halves of the
contract: a success response is decoded (lastAcceptedID round-trips),
and a server-side error is surfaced through err with the original
message intact.
2026-05-09 13:46:53 -07:00
Hanzo AI 1d94973509 deps: bump luxfi/genesis v1.9.5 → 2b16f454 (LUX_CCHAIN_GENESIS_FILE)
Picks up luxfi/genesis@2b16f454 — adds operator-overridable C-Chain
genesis at the embedded-loader layer. Pairs with 009f00ba (this repo's
LUX_AUTOMINE_CCHAIN_GENESIS_PATH for the automine single-node path).
With both env vars wired, downstream networks can reuse stock lqd
without forking configs/network/cchain.json or patching this binary.
2026-05-08 17:18:55 -07:00
Hanzo AI 009f00ba91 feat(automine): operator-overridable C-Chain genesis via LUX_AUTOMINE_CCHAIN_GENESIS_PATH
The automine path embeds the C-Chain genesis bytes into the primary-
network genesis at boot. Until now that genesis was a hardcoded constant
(chainId 31337) — fine for stock lqd local dev, but downstream networks
(<tenant> at chainId 8675312, etc.) had no way to override without
patching the binary. The chain-config-dir scan happens AFTER the EVM
plugin has already initialised from the embedded bytes, so dropping a
genesis.json into configs/chains/C/ is silently ignored.

Adds LUX_AUTOMINE_CCHAIN_GENESIS_PATH: when set, lqd reads the JSON at
that path and embeds it as the C-Chain genesis. Unset → unchanged
behaviour (chainId 31337 default).

The saved AutomineNetworkConfig also mirrors the resolved value so the
on-disk record is true to what was embedded.
2026-05-08 16:27:54 -07:00
Hanzo AI c26319db84 deps: bump luxfi/genesis v1.9.4 → v1.9.5 (gasLimit 1B everywhere) 2026-05-07 22:04:52 -07:00
Hanzo AI fd40807831 fix(node): C-Chain (primary-network EVM) is truly opt-in
Match the OPT-IN comment at genesis/builder/builder.go:617. The
initChainManager path was hard-erroring when the platform genesis
had no constants.EVMID chain — that contradicted the documented
opt-in behaviour and forced consumers (<tenant> Network) to bake
a placeholder EVM into the primary genesis just to satisfy the
node init.

With this change, networks that register their own EVM as a
dedicated chain via platform.createChainTx (the canonical L2-on-Lux
or sovereign-chain flow) leave the platform genesis EVM-less and
cChainID stays ids.Empty. Chain manager + aliasing already accept
the empty ID — no further changes needed.
2026-05-07 21:08:42 -07:00
Hanzo AI 9b397125c1 deps: bump luxfi/genesis v1.9.3 → v1.9.4 (drop local cChainGenesis) 2026-05-07 21:04:17 -07:00
Hanzo AI e9c2d81ff5 deps: bump luxfi/genesis v1.9.2 → v1.9.3
Picks up the localnet genesis regen from LIGHT_MNEMONIC. lux/node's
default genesis for network-id=1337 now funds the same 100 P/X wallets
the lux/node + <tenant>/node toolchains derive against, so local
dev no longer has to set --genesis-file or hand-edit allocations.
2026-05-07 20:18:05 -07:00
Hanzo AI df8af35979 fix(zap/client): keep wire field name LuxAssetID (proto-generated)
The struct `zapwire.InitializeRequest.LuxAssetID` is generated from a
.proto in luxfi/api — renaming it requires regenerating the wire
bindings, bumping luxfi/api, then bumping luxfi/node to that. Out of
scope for this rename pass; revert the one Go-side assignment so the
build resolves against the existing wire type. The local variable
already reads from `Context().XAssetID` so the data path is consistent;
only the on-the-wire field name lags.
2026-05-07 17:09:20 -07:00
Hanzo AI 1113675482 refactor(config): rename node.Config.LuxAssetID -> XAssetID
The field has always semantically been the X-Chain asset ID — the JSON
tag is already `xAssetID`. The Go name `LuxAssetID` was a holdover from
when "LUX" was the only asset name on the chain, which created confusion
when readers expected `XAssetID` to mirror `XChainID` / `CChainID` /
`DChainID` (all of which already used the chain-letter naming).

Renamed across config, node, vms/platformvm, vms/rpcchainvm/zap and the
static_service API request types. JSON tag and protobuf wire fields are
unchanged, so on-disk configs and inter-process plugin RPC are
backwards-compatible — only Go callers see the new name.
2026-05-07 16:52:35 -07:00
Hanzo AI 131e6a588c fix(chains): register all 9 fx factories matching genesis builder
X-Chain genesis at builder.go:603-613 references 9 FxIDs (secp256k1fx,
nftfx, propertyfx, mldsafx, slhdsafx, ed25519fx, secp256r1fx, schnorrfx,
bls12381fx) but chains/manager.go only registered the first 3. Chain
init failed with "fx qC5JEjDhfXD66cGuhtiL3Lkka2SgZyht74nHVQFmYFyDiLqXe
not found" — that ID encodes 'mldsafx' which the genesis builder added
when post-quantum support landed but wasn't paired with a manager-side
registration.

Add all 6 missing factories so any FxID emitted by the genesis builder
loads at chain create time. The fxs map is now structurally identical
to the X-Chain FxIDs slice — drift between the two will become a
review-time diff in chains/manager.go vs. genesis/builder/builder.go.
2026-05-07 15:22:42 -07:00
Hanzo AI c790abb494 .gitignore + commit vms/components/lux content
Anchor /lux + /luxd binary patterns at repo root so the gitignore
rule doesn't accidentally match every directory called "lux" deep
in the tree (which was excluding vms/components/lux that the
previous commit tried to land).

Add the actual UTXO type tree files so v1.26.5 ships with the
package contents external consumers (liquidity/network-bootstrap
etc) need.
2026-05-06 21:09:12 -07:00
Hanzo AI fcde96701d vms: restore components/lux + add thresholdvm re-export shim
* vms/components/lux: restore the X-Chain UTXO type tree from
  v1.24.29. External consumers (~/work/liquidity/network-bootstrap,
  PlatformVM tx builders, AVM tx builders) import this exact type
  tree to interop with the X→P export path. Documented in CLAUDE.md
  as a known anomaly pending #58 consolidation; until that lands the
  package must be present.

* vms/thresholdvm/thresholdvm.go: re-export shim mirroring vms/dexvm.
  The Threshold (FHE / MPC) VM moved out of node/vms/thresholdvm
  into github.com/luxfi/chains/thresholdvm. Callers (liquidity/fhe
  plugin etc) keep building unchanged.

No on-the-wire behaviour change.
2026-05-06 21:08:25 -07:00
Hanzo AI 6e76c846fb proto/pb: stub empty pb packages; vms/dexvm: re-export from chains/dexvm
Two compatibility seams that downstream consumers need post-Z-Wing
restructure:

1. proto/pb/* stubs (build tag grpc) — every grpc-tagged file under
   proto/<name>/<name>_grpc.go (and the legacy proto/rpcdb/rpcdb_grpc.go)
   imports proto/pb/<name>. Those dirs were empty (git ignores empty
   dirs), so consumers' `go mod tidy` walked the imports under the
   grpc tag and failed to resolve the package. Default builds use
   ZAP and never enter these stubs; the grpc-tag path now compiles
   cleanly even though the protobuf types themselves still need
   regeneration when someone actually wants the gRPC transport.

2. vms/dexvm/dexvm.go — re-export shim for the canonical chains/dexvm
   package. The DEX VM moved out of node/vms/dexvm into
   github.com/luxfi/chains/dexvm; existing callers (~/work/liquidity/
   node, etc.) keep building unchanged.

Default build clean; grpc-tagged build also resolves. No on-the-wire
behaviour change in the ZAP default path.
2026-05-06 20:55:12 -07:00
791 changed files with 38940 additions and 64490 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@ self-hosted-runner:
- custom-arm64-focal
- custom-arm64-jammy
- hanzo-build-linux-amd64
- hanzo-build-linux-arm64
- ubuntu-24.04-arm
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ else
MODULE_DETAILS="$(go list -m "github.com/luxfi/node" 2>/dev/null)"
# Extract the version part
LUX_VERSION="$(echo "${MODULE_DETAILS}" | awk '{print $2}')"
NODE_VERSION="$(echo "${MODULE_DETAILS}" | awk '{print $2}')"
if [[ -z "${LUX_VERSION}" ]]; then
if [[ -z "${NODE_VERSION}" ]]; then
echo "Failed to get luxd version from go.mod"
exit 1
fi
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ else
# v*YYYYMMDDHHMMSS-abcdef123456
#
# If not, the value is assumed to represent a tag
if [[ "${LUX_VERSION}" =~ ^v.*[0-9]{14}-[0-9a-f]{12}$ ]]; then
if [[ "${NODE_VERSION}" =~ ^v.*[0-9]{14}-[0-9a-f]{12}$ ]]; then
# Use the module hash as the version
LUX_VERSION="$(echo "${LUX_VERSION}" | cut -d'-' -f3)"
NODE_VERSION="$(echo "${NODE_VERSION}" | cut -d'-' -f3)"
fi
FLAKE="github:luxfi/node?ref=${LUX_VERSION}"
FLAKE="github:luxfi/node?ref=${NODE_VERSION}"
echo "Starting nix shell for ${FLAKE}"
fi
@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ set -euo pipefail
# when go is already installed.
# 3 directories above this script
LUX_PATH=$( cd "$( dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )"; cd ../../.. && pwd )
NODE_PATH=$( cd "$( dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )"; cd ../../.. && pwd )
echo GO_VERSION="~$(sed -n -e 's/^go //p' "${LUX_PATH}"/go.mod)"
echo GO_VERSION="~$(sed -n -e 's/^go //p' "${NODE_PATH}"/go.mod)"
-3
View File
@@ -67,9 +67,6 @@
description: "This involves consensus"
- name: "continuous staking"
color: "f9d0c4"
- name: "Durango"
color: "DAF894"
description: "durango fork"
- name: "gossiping upgrade"
color: "c2e0c6"
- name: "merkledb"
+14
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ name: Lint proto files
on:
push:
paths:
- 'proto/**/*.proto'
- '.github/workflows/buf-lint.yml'
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -11,10 +14,21 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Check for .proto files
id: proto-check
run: |
if find proto -name '*.proto' -type f 2>/dev/null | grep -q .; then
echo "has_proto=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
else
echo "has_proto=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "No .proto files found — skipping buf-lint (node is ZAP-native by default; protobuf is opt-in)."
fi
- uses: bufbuild/buf-setup-action@v1
if: steps.proto-check.outputs.has_proto == 'true'
with:
github_token: ${{ github.token }}
version: "1.47.2"
- uses: bufbuild/buf-lint-action@v1
if: steps.proto-check.outputs.has_proto == 'true'
with:
input: "proto"
@@ -20,7 +20,10 @@ jobs:
GOWORK: off
strategy:
matrix:
os: [windows-latest, macos-latest]
# `macos-latest` currently resolves to GH-hosted arm64 macos (forbidden);
# pin to `macos-13` (amd64). darwin/arm64 coverage lives in
# build-macos-release.yml via cross-compile.
os: [windows-latest, macos-13]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-go-for-project
+4 -4
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ on:
jobs:
build-x86_64-binaries-tarball:
runs-on: hanzo-build-linux-amd64
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ jobs:
rm -rf ${{ github.workspace }}/luxd-pkg
build-arm64-binaries-tarball:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04-arm
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ jobs:
- run: go version
- name: Build the luxd binaries (native arm64)
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 ./scripts/build.sh
- name: Build the luxd binaries (cross-compile arm64 on amd64)
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 ./scripts/build.sh
- name: Try to get tag from git
if: "${{ github.event.inputs.tag == '' }}"
+19 -9
View File
@@ -21,10 +21,17 @@ on:
# A workflow run is made up of one or more jobs that can run sequentially or in parallel
jobs:
# This workflow contains a single job called "build"
# Cross-compile both darwin/amd64 and darwin/arm64 from Linux. The build
# uses CGO_ENABLED=0 + GOOS=darwin GOARCH=$arch — pure Go, no Darwin
# toolchain required. We run on the self-hosted `lux-build` ARC pool
# rather than `macos-13` (which has long GitHub-hosted queues) to keep
# the release pipeline unblocked.
build-mac:
# The type of runner that the job will run on
runs-on: macos-14
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
goarch: [amd64, arm64]
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
@@ -37,8 +44,8 @@ jobs:
- run: go version
# Runs a single command using the runners shell
- name: Build the luxd binary
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 ./scripts/run_task.sh build
- name: Build the luxd binary (cross-compile via GOOS/GOARCH)
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=darwin GOARCH=${{ matrix.goarch }} ./scripts/run_task.sh build
- name: Try to get tag from git
if: "${{ github.event.inputs.tag == '' }}"
@@ -56,17 +63,20 @@ jobs:
- name: Create zip file with CLI-compatible naming
run: |
# CLI expects: node-macos-{version}.zip containing build/luxd
# CLI expects: node-macos-{arch}-{version}.zip containing build/luxd
mkdir -p build
7z a "node-macos-${TAG}.zip" build/luxd
if ! command -v zip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y zip
fi
zip "node-macos-${{ matrix.goarch }}-${TAG}.zip" build/luxd
env:
TAG: ${{ env.TAG }}
- name: Save as Github artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with:
name: build
path: node-macos-${{ env.TAG }}.zip
name: build-darwin-${{ matrix.goarch }}
path: node-macos-${{ matrix.goarch }}-${{ env.TAG }}.zip
- name: Cleanup
run: |
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ on:
jobs:
build-jammy-amd64-package:
runs-on: hanzo-build-linux-amd64
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ jobs:
rm -rf /tmp/luxd
build-focal-amd64-package:
runs-on: hanzo-build-linux-amd64
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -18,15 +18,15 @@ on:
jobs:
build-jammy-arm64-package:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04-arm
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-go-for-project
- run: go version
- name: Build the luxd binaries (native arm64)
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 ./scripts/build.sh
- name: Build the luxd binaries (cross-compile arm64 on amd64)
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 ./scripts/build.sh
- name: Try to get tag from git
if: "${{ github.event.inputs.tag == '' }}"
@@ -63,15 +63,15 @@ jobs:
rm -rf /tmp/luxd
build-focal-arm64-package:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04-arm
runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, amd64]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-go-for-project
- run: go version
- name: Build the luxd binaries (native arm64)
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 ./scripts/build.sh
- name: Build the luxd binaries (cross-compile arm64 on amd64)
run: CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 ./scripts/build.sh
- name: Try to get tag from git
if: "${{ github.event.inputs.tag == '' }}"
+26 -1
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,38 @@ env:
jobs:
goreleaser:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# In-cluster ARC pool (lux-build autoscalingrunnerset in lux-k8s, org-scoped to
# github.com/luxfi, amd64). GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest is disabled for this org
# (NO GITHUB BUILDERS) — that is why this job red-X'd while docker.yml (lux-build)
# published the image. GoReleaser cross-compiles all GOOS/GOARCH from one linux
# amd64 host with CGO_ENABLED=0, so a single amd64 runner is sufficient.
runs-on: lux-build
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-go-for-project
# GoReleaser shells out to `go build`, which must fetch private luxfi
# modules across REPOS (container, crypto, database, proto, ...). The
# repo-scoped github.token cannot read other private luxfi repos
# (`could not read Password ... exit 128`); use the cross-org PAT that
# docker.yml already relies on (org GH_TOKEN, else repo UNIVERSE_PAT).
- id: pat
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GH_TOKEN }}
UNIVERSE_PAT: ${{ secrets.UNIVERSE_PAT }}
shell: bash
run: |
tok="$GH_TOKEN"; src="GH_TOKEN"
if [ -z "$tok" ]; then tok="$UNIVERSE_PAT"; src="UNIVERSE_PAT"; fi
if [ -z "$tok" ]; then
echo "::error::No GH_TOKEN or UNIVERSE_PAT secret set — go build cannot fetch private cross-repo luxfi modules"
exit 1
fi
echo "Using secret: $src (length=${#tok})"
echo "::add-mask::$tok"
git config --global url."https://x-access-token:${tok}@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"
- name: Run GoReleaser (release)
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7
+4 -4
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ set -o nounset
set -o pipefail
# Lux root directory
LUX_PATH=$( cd "$( dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )"; cd ../.. && pwd )
NODE_PATH=$( cd "$( dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )"; cd ../.. && pwd )
"$LUX_PATH"/scripts/build.sh
"$NODE_PATH"/scripts/build.sh
# Check to see if the build script creates any unstaged changes to prevent
# regression where builds go.mod/go.sum files get out of date.
if [[ -z $(git status -s) ]]; then
@@ -15,5 +15,5 @@ if [[ -z $(git status -s) ]]; then
# TODO: Revise this check once we can reliably build without changes
# exit 1
fi
"$LUX_PATH"/scripts/build_test.sh
"$LUX_PATH"/scripts/build_fuzz.sh 2
"$NODE_PATH"/scripts/build_test.sh
"$NODE_PATH"/scripts/build_fuzz.sh 2
+3 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ jobs:
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [macos-14, ubuntu-22.04, ubuntu-24.04, windows-2022]
# GH-hosted arm64 macos forbidden; CI runs amd64 only. Release builds
# cover darwin/arm64 via cross-compile in build-macos-release.yml.
os: [macos-13, ubuntu-22.04, ubuntu-24.04, windows-2022]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-go-for-project
+98 -10
View File
@@ -8,22 +8,110 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
id-token: write
jobs:
docker:
uses: hanzoai/.github/.github/workflows/docker-build.yml@main
with:
image: ghcr.io/luxfi/node
runner-amd64: hanzo-build-linux-amd64
runner-arm64: hanzo-build-linux-arm64
secrets: inherit
build-amd64:
# In-cluster ARC pool (lux-build autoscalingrunnerset in lux-k8s, amd64
# DOKS nodes, DinD sidecar). Replaces the offline evo classic runner.
# ARC matches on the scale-set name, NOT classic [self-hosted,linux,amd64]
# labels — the org runner group + arcd repo allowlist enforce isolation.
runs-on: lux-build
outputs:
digest: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
with:
driver: docker-container
driver-opts: |
network=host
- name: Login to GHCR
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Image metadata
id: meta
uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
with:
images: ghcr.io/luxfi/node
# Semver-only policy: only `v*` git tags yield a published image
# tag; every push gets an immutable `sha-<sha7>` for traceability.
# No `:latest`, no `:main`, no floating tags ever. `flavor.latest`
# has to be explicit-false; docker/metadata-action defaults to
# `latest=auto` which silently emits `:latest` on tag pushes.
flavor: |
latest=false
tags: |
type=ref,event=tag
type=sha,format=short,prefix=sha-
- name: Resolve cross-repo PAT for private luxfi/* deps
id: pat
env:
# The default GITHUB_TOKEN is repo-scoped and cannot read
# private cross-repo deps like luxfi/corona or luxfi/evm. We
# need a PAT with org-wide read scope. Order of preference:
# 1) org GH_TOKEN (visibility=all, set on luxfi org since 2024)
# 2) repo UNIVERSE_PAT (set on luxfi/node since 2026-04)
# Either suffices; we just need ONE non-empty token. If both
# are empty the build is going to fail at go mod download for
# corona — fail fast here with a clear message.
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GH_TOKEN }}
UNIVERSE_PAT: ${{ secrets.UNIVERSE_PAT }}
run: |
tok="$GH_TOKEN"
src="GH_TOKEN"
if [ -z "$tok" ]; then
tok="$UNIVERSE_PAT"
src="UNIVERSE_PAT"
fi
if [ -z "$tok" ]; then
echo "::error::Neither GH_TOKEN (org) nor UNIVERSE_PAT (repo) is set. Private luxfi/* deps cannot be resolved."
exit 1
fi
echo "Using secret: $src (length=${#tok})"
# Pass the resolved token to subsequent steps without exposing
# the value. ::add-mask:: prevents accidental log leaks if the
# value ever appears in later step output.
echo "::add-mask::$tok"
echo "token<<EOF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "$tok" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "EOF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build & push (amd64)
id: build
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
with:
context: .
file: Dockerfile
platforms: linux/amd64
push: true
build-args: |
CGO_ENABLED=0
# Resolve private luxfi/* modules via git url.insteadOf in the
# Dockerfile. Take the token value from the previous step's
# output (it picked GH_TOKEN or fell back to UNIVERSE_PAT).
secrets: |
ghtok=${{ steps.pat.outputs.token }}
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
provenance: false
cache-from: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache-amd64
cache-to: type=registry,ref=ghcr.io/luxfi/node:buildcache-amd64,mode=max
notify-universe:
needs: docker
needs: build-amd64
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
runs-on: lux-build
steps:
- uses: peter-evans/repository-dispatch@v3
- uses: peter-evans/repository-dispatch@v4
with:
token: ${{ secrets.UNIVERSE_PAT }}
repository: luxfi/universe
+8 -2
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ permissions:
jobs:
# Validate semantic version is < v2.0.0
validate-version:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# lux-build ARC pool (in-cluster, lux-k8s, org-scoped to github.com/luxfi). The org
# disables GitHub-hosted runners (NO GITHUB BUILDERS); ubuntu-latest never gets a
# runner, which red-X'd this job and cascaded skips to every platform build below.
runs-on: lux-build
outputs:
version: ${{ steps.extract.outputs.version }}
is_prerelease: ${{ steps.check.outputs.is_prerelease }}
@@ -94,7 +97,10 @@ jobs:
- build-linux-binaries
- build-macos
- build-windows
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# lux-build ARC pool (in-cluster, lux-k8s, org-scoped to github.com/luxfi). This job
# only downloads artifacts + cuts the GitHub Release — no compile — but ubuntu-latest
# is disabled for the org (NO GITHUB BUILDERS), so it must run on a self-hosted pool.
runs-on: lux-build
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
+8 -10
View File
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ tmp/
*.pb*
db*
*cpu[0-9]*
*mem[0-9]*
*lock[0-9]*
@@ -75,9 +73,6 @@ vendor
*.bak*
AGENTS.md
CLAUDE.md
GEMINI.md
GROK.md
QWEN.md
.env
@@ -85,11 +80,14 @@ QWEN.md
genesis/.!*
genesis-gen
lux
luxd
/lux
/luxd
evm-plugin-*
LLM.md
QWEN.md
.AGENTS.md
GEMINI.md
# Built dev-tool binaries
/cmd/gen_zoo_addr/gen_zoo_addr
# Local ceremony test binary (out-of-tree compile artifact)
/ceremony
Symlink
+1
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
LLM.md
+18
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,24 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
## [1.28.0]
### Added
- Multi-version P-Chain block + tx codec. v1.23.x ("Apricot/Banff") wire layout is now registered as `CodecVersionV0` on the platformvm tx and block `codec.Manager`s; the current canonical layout is `CodecVersionV1`. Bytes carry their wire version in the standard 2-byte codec prefix and `txs.Parse` / `block.Parse` dispatch by it.
- Byte-preserving tx Initialization: `tx.InitializeFromBytes(c, version, signedBytes)` and `tx.InitializeFromBytesAtVersion(c, version)` bind a tx to its original `signedBytes` without re-marshalling. `TxID = hash(signedBytes)` is therefore stable across the v0->v1 migration — mainnet and testnet chain commitments hash back to byte-identical inputs.
- `vms/platformvm/block/v0/` subpackage holding the pure-data v0 block kinds (`ApricotProposalBlock`, `BanffProposalBlock`, ... — 9 types, slots 0-4 + 29-32). The package is a one-way decoder only; the `liftedV0Block` adapter in the parent package translates each v0 block kind into the corresponding canonical v1 `Visitor` arm without ever re-marshalling.
- Cross-version tx + block tests: `TestCodecVersionV0V1Coexist`, `TestParseDispatchesByVersion`, `TestTxIDStabilityRoundTrip`, `TestCrossVersionRefuses`, `TestParseV0ApricotProposalBlock`, `TestParseV0BanffStandardBlock`, `TestParseV1RoundTrip`, `TestVersionPrefixDispatch`.
### Changed
- `tx.Initialize(c)` is retained for the fresh-build path only (wallet, builder). The from-DB / from-wire paths in `genesis/genesis.go` and `block/{standard,proposal}_block.go` now go through `InitializeFromBytesAtVersion` against the codec version the surrounding container was decoded under.
- `genesis.Parse` is wire-version-aware: pre-codec-v1 P-Chain genesis blobs on mainnet / testnet decode at `CodecVersionV0`; new blobs are written at `CodecVersionV1`.
- The L1-tx slot map advances by one to accommodate `CreateSovereignL1Tx` at slot 36: `RegisterL1ValidatorTx`=37, `SetL1ValidatorWeightTx`=38, `IncreaseL1ValidatorBalanceTx`=39, `DisableL1ValidatorTx`=40 (was 36-39). Both pre-rip mainnet/testnet bytes (no slot conflict; L1 txs did not exist) and current code paths line up with the new slot map.
- Test fixtures in `vms/platformvm/txs/fee/calculator_test.go` and the serialization tests under `vms/platformvm/txs/*_test.go` are regenerated to use the v1 wire prefix (`0x0001`) and the post-`CreateSovereignL1Tx` slot map.
### Migration notes
- Mainnet + testnet P-Chain DBs do NOT need to be rebuilt: pre-codec-v1 blocks continue to decode via the v0 path with their original `BlockID = hash(v0 bytes)` preserved. Newly accepted blocks are written at v1.
- Devnet, which was bootstrapped post-rip at wire-version 0 but with the post-rip slot map, must be rebuilt before rolling to `v1.28.0`: its existing blobs would now decode against the v0 slot map (the pre-rip layout) and produce wrong types. A fresh bootstrap at `v1.28.0` writes v1 bytes from height 0 and is internally consistent thereafter.
## [1.13.5-alpha] - 2025-01-23
### Added
Symlink
+1
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
LLM.md
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Thank you for your interest in contributing to Lux Node! This document provides
To start developing on Lux Node, you'll need a few things installed.
- Golang version >= 1.23.9
- Golang version >= 1.26.3
- gcc
- g++
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ We are committed to fostering a welcoming and inclusive community. Please be res
### Prerequisites
- Go 1.21.12 or higher
- Go 1.26.3 or higher
- Git
- Make
- GCC/G++ compiler
+296 -78
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
# The version is supplied as a build argument rather than hard-coded
# to minimize the cost of version changes.
ARG GO_VERSION=1.26.1
# to minimize the cost of version changes. Must be >= the `go` directive
# in go.mod (1.26.4); the EVM plugin pulls luxfi/upgrade@v1.0.1 which
# floors the toolchain at 1.26.4.
ARG GO_VERSION=1.26.4
# ============= Go Installation Stage ================
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM debian:bookworm-slim AS go-installer
@@ -36,18 +38,36 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
WORKDIR /build
# Skip checksum verification for luxfi packages (tags may be rewritten)
ENV GONOSUMCHECK=github.com/luxfi/*
ENV GONOSUMDB=github.com/luxfi/*
# Use Go proxy for most deps (gonum.org is flaky via direct), direct only for luxfi
# Skip checksum verification for luxfi + hanzoai packages: both are cross-org
# deps not registered in the public sum.golang.org / proxy (reading e.g.
# hanzoai/vfs@v0.4.1's go.mod via the public sumdb 404s and fails the build).
ENV GONOSUMCHECK=github.com/luxfi/*,github.com/hanzoai/*
ENV GONOSUMDB=github.com/luxfi/*,github.com/hanzoai/*
# Use Go proxy for most deps (gonum.org is flaky via direct), direct only for
# the cross-org private modules.
ENV GOPROXY=https://proxy.golang.org,direct
ENV GONOPROXY=github.com/luxfi/*
ENV GONOPROXY=github.com/luxfi/*,github.com/hanzoai/*
ENV GOFLAGS="-mod=mod"
# Copy and download lux dependencies using go mod
# Copy and download lux dependencies using go mod.
# Some luxfi/* modules (e.g. corona) are private and require a token to
# resolve via go mod. The token is injected as a BuildKit secret from the
# CI workflow; locally, set DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 and pass
# `--secret id=ghtok,src=$HOME/.gh-token`. If the secret is absent the
# build still attempts the download (works when all deps are public).
COPY go.mod .
COPY go.sum .
RUN go mod download
# Configure global git insteadOf so EVERY subsequent step (go mod download
# now, the build step's implicit fetch later) can reach private luxfi/*
# modules. The token is written into /etc/gitconfig (root-readable in the
# image), so explicit cleanup is unnecessary on this throwaway builder
# stage — only the compiled binary is COPYed into the runtime image.
RUN --mount=type=secret,id=ghtok,required=false \
if [ -s /run/secrets/ghtok ]; then \
git config --global url."https://x-access-token:$(cat /run/secrets/ghtok)@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"; \
fi && \
sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' go.sum && \
go mod download -x
# Copy the code into the container
COPY . .
@@ -58,6 +78,14 @@ RUN [ -d ./build ] && rm -rf ./build/* || true
ARG TARGETPLATFORM
ARG BUILDPLATFORM
# Per SCALE_STANDARD.md §2 (https://github.com/hanzoai/hips/blob/main/docs/SCALE_STANDARD.md)
# — every Go production Dockerfile that emits JSON to a client builds
# with GOEXPERIMENT=jsonv2. Verified -12% time / -23% allocs on the
# edge POST roundtrip vs encoding/json v1. Applies to luxd + every
# in-stage VM plugin build below.
ARG GO_EXPERIMENT=jsonv2
ENV GOEXPERIMENT=${GO_EXPERIMENT}
# Configure a cross-compiler if the target platform differs from the build platform.
#
# build_env.sh is used to capture the environmental changes required by the build step since RUN
@@ -70,29 +98,39 @@ RUN if [ "$TARGETPLATFORM" = "linux/arm64" ] && [ "$BUILDPLATFORM" != "linux/arm
echo "export CC=gcc" > ./build_env.sh \
; fi
# Fetch pre-built lux-accel (GPU crypto library)
# Fetch pre-built lux-accel (GPU crypto library). The release assets live in
# the PRIVATE luxcpp/accel repo (resolves to lux-private/accel) — an
# unauthenticated GitHub release-download 404s, so the fetch is authenticated
# with the same `ghtok` BuildKit secret used for private go modules. It is
# also best-effort (matches the cevm/lpm fetch contract below): the library is
# ONLY linked at CGO_ENABLED=1, so a CGO_ENABLED=0 build (the canonical CI/devnet
# build, pure-Go) does not need it and must not fail when it is unreachable.
ARG ACCEL_VERSION=v0.1.0
RUN ARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
RUN --mount=type=secret,id=ghtok,required=false \
ARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
if [ "$ARCH" = "amd64" ]; then ACCEL_ARCH="linux-x86_64"; else ACCEL_ARCH="linux-arm64"; fi && \
mkdir -p /usr/local/include /usr/local/lib && \
wget -q "https://github.com/luxcpp/accel/releases/download/${ACCEL_VERSION}/lux-accel-${ACCEL_ARCH}.tar.gz" \
-O /tmp/accel.tar.gz && \
tar -xzf /tmp/accel.tar.gz -C /usr/local && \
rm /tmp/accel.tar.gz && \
ldconfig 2>/dev/null || true
AUTH=""; [ -s /run/secrets/ghtok ] && AUTH="--header=Authorization: Bearer $(cat /run/secrets/ghtok)"; \
( wget -q ${AUTH:+"$AUTH"} \
"https://github.com/luxcpp/accel/releases/download/${ACCEL_VERSION}/lux-accel-${ACCEL_ARCH}.tar.gz" \
-O /tmp/accel.tar.gz \
&& tar -xzf /tmp/accel.tar.gz -C /usr/local \
&& rm /tmp/accel.tar.gz \
&& ldconfig 2>/dev/null \
) || echo "WARN: lux-accel ${ACCEL_VERSION} fetch skipped (private/unreachable; GPU accel unused at CGO_ENABLED=0)"
# Fetch pre-built luxcpp/cevm libs (libevm, libevm-gpu, libluxgpu,
# libcevm_precompiles + go_bridge.h). When LUX_CGO=1 these libraries are
# libcevm_precompiles + go_bridge.h). When CGO_ENABLED=1 these libraries are
# linked into the C-Chain plugin via github.com/luxfi/chains/evm/cevm
# and become the default execution backend (parallel + GPU EVM).
#
# CI/RELEASE GAP: the luxcpp/cevm release artifacts MUST publish per-arch
# tarballs at the URL below for both linux-x86_64 and linux-arm64. Until
# those tarballs exist, builds with LUX_CGO=1 will fail at this step and
# operators must build with LUX_CGO=0 (pure-Go fallback).
ARG LUX_CGO=1
# those tarballs exist, builds with CGO_ENABLED=1 will fail at this step and
# operators must build with CGO_ENABLED=0 (pure-Go fallback).
ARG CGO_ENABLED=1
ARG CEVM_VERSION=v0.19.0
RUN if [ "${LUX_CGO}" = "1" ]; then \
RUN if [ "${CGO_ENABLED}" = "1" ]; then \
ARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
if [ "$ARCH" = "amd64" ]; then CEVM_ARCH="linux-x86_64"; else CEVM_ARCH="linux-arm64"; fi && \
wget -q "https://github.com/luxcpp/cevm/releases/download/${CEVM_VERSION}/luxcpp-cevm-${CEVM_ARCH}.tar.gz" \
@@ -101,30 +139,140 @@ RUN if [ "${LUX_CGO}" = "1" ]; then \
rm /tmp/cevm.tar.gz && \
ldconfig 2>/dev/null || true ; \
else \
echo "LUX_CGO=0: skipping luxcpp/cevm fetch (pure-Go fallback build)" ; \
echo "CGO_ENABLED=0: skipping luxcpp/cevm fetch (pure-Go fallback build)" ; \
fi
# Build node. LUX_CGO=1 (default) links luxcpp/cevm for parallel + GPU EVM.
# Set LUX_CGO=0 for portable pure-Go builds without the native libs.
# Build node. CGO_ENABLED=1 (default) links luxcpp/cevm for parallel + GPU EVM.
# Set CGO_ENABLED=0 for portable pure-Go builds without the native libs.
ARG RACE_FLAG=""
ARG BUILD_SCRIPT=build.sh
ARG LUXD_COMMIT=""
ENV CGO_ENABLED=${LUX_CGO}
ENV CGO_ENABLED=${CGO_ENABLED}
RUN . ./build_env.sh && \
echo "{CC=$CC, TARGETPLATFORM=$TARGETPLATFORM, BUILDPLATFORM=$BUILDPLATFORM, LUX_CGO=${LUX_CGO}}" && \
echo "{CC=$CC, TARGETPLATFORM=$TARGETPLATFORM, BUILDPLATFORM=$BUILDPLATFORM, CGO_ENABLED=${CGO_ENABLED}}" && \
export GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
export LUXD_COMMIT="${LUXD_COMMIT}" && \
# `COPY . .` (above) clobbered the healed go.sum with the repo's copy, whose
# first-party hashes go stale whenever a luxfi/hanzoai tag is re-published.
# Strip them here so -mod=mod re-records current content hashes from the
# authenticated direct fetch (git insteadOf set above) — integrity repair,
# no version drift (go.mod pins are untouched). Mirrors the evm-plugin step.
sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' go.sum && \
GOFLAGS="-mod=mod" ./scripts/${BUILD_SCRIPT} ${RACE_FLAG}
# ============= EVM Plugin Stage ================
# Build EVM plugin from source (includes custom precompile registry)
ARG EVM_VERSION=v0.8.40
# Build EVM plugin from source (includes custom precompile registry).
# EVM_VERSION must pin a luxfi/evm release whose go.mod points at a
# luxfi/node version that has the runtime.EngineAddressKey rename
# (LUX_VM_RUNTIME_ENGINE_ADDR → VM_RUNTIME_ENGINE_ADDR landed in
# 4ae211d46d on 2026-05-15). v0.18.14 pins node v1.27.6 which is
# post-rename. Older evm tags (e.g. v0.8.40 → node v1.23.4) ship a
# plugin that os.Getenv()'s the old key, mismatching the host that
# sets the new key, and C-chain never bootstraps.
#
# v0.19.0 (Quasar Edition): EtnaTimestamp Go field + json tag renamed
# to QuasarTimestamp/quasarTimestamp. Strict upgradeBytes decode via
# json.NewDecoder(...).DisallowUnknownFields() — stale etnaTimestamp
# in any deployed upgrade.json now fails parse loudly at boot rather
# than silently disabling the fork.
#
# v0.19.1 bumps luxfi/precompile v0.5.27 → v0.5.35 (commit 794912f):
# each of the 7 EIP-2537 bls12381 sub-configs (G1/G2 × {Add,Mul,MSM} +
# Pairing) now returns its own ConfigKey, fixing a Key() collision
# that forced #114 to drop bls12381 entries from mainnet upgrade.json.
# Re-adding them is gated on this plugin version.
#
# v0.19.2 bumps luxfi/vm v1.1.5 → v1.1.6, which drops the obsolete
# GetNetworkUpgrades() method on the VMContext interface. Required by
# the Etna→Quasar rename in v0.19.0: vm v1.1.5 still expected
# upgrade.Config to implement the old IsEtnaActivated() runtime
# interface, which no longer exists.
#
# v0.19.3 closes the cascade: bumps vm v1.1.6 → v1.1.7 + runtime
# v1.0.1 → v1.1.0. runtime v1.1.0 ripped the always-true
# NetworkUpgrades interface (decomplect 9e6e597) and renamed
# XAssetID → UTXOAssetID (refactor 034ec47). v1.1.6 anticipated the
# rip in rpc/context.go but still pinned the old runtime, leaving
# itself internally inconsistent. v1.1.7 pins the post-rip runtime.
# MUST track node's go.mod luxfi/evm (the C-Chain EVM plugin = the native 0x9999
# receipt/atomic surface). v1.99.31 = the native-atomic seam (precompile v0.5.51,
# geth v1.17.12 CallIndex). Bump this with every evm release or the bundled
# C-Chain plugin silently goes stale vs node's deps.
#
# v1.99.33 (precompile v0.5.53): 0x9999 DEX settlement activates at a SINGLE canonical
# dated fork — extras.DexSettleActivationTime = 1766704800 (Dec 25 2025 00:00:00 UTC) —
# with ZERO per-net config (no dexSettleConfig genesis/upgrade entry; one built-in fork,
# identical on every net). At the fork it BOTH enables dispatch AND installs the standard
# EXTCODESIZE marker (nonce=1 + code) into 0x9999 going forward, so eth_getCode(0x9999)
# !=0x and a typed Solidity IPoolManager(0x9999).swap(...) passes the contract-existence
# guard. The marker is installed FORWARD (never in historical genesis), so pre-Dec-25
# history (the ~/work/lux/state RLP snapshot, replayed via admin.importChain) stays
# byte-identical to canonical state — a pre-fork value transfer to 0x9999 hits a PLAIN
# account, not the precompile. The D-Chain (dexvm) peer is resolved at RUNTIME via the
# consensus-context "D" alias (contract.AtomicState.DChainID()) and the
# protocolFeeController is the built-in DAO treasury. 0x9010 is REMOVED (not a registered
# precompile, no dispatch, no forward); 0x9999 is the SOLE canonical DEX precompile. For a
# fresh net whose genesis ts >= the fork, the marker is present from block 0.
#
# v1.99.34 (precompile v0.5.54): fixes a consensus-divergence on the relaunch/replay path.
# The EVM dispatch gate (core.LuxPrecompileOverrider.PrecompileOverride) used to read the
# process-global params.lastRulesContext (via GetRulesExtra(Rules{})), which is rewritten
# last-writer-wins by every concurrent Rules() call (eth_call/estimateGas/worker). On a
# live, RPC-serving post-fork node replaying a PRE-fork RLP block (admin.importChain), a
# concurrent post-fork eth_call could overwrite the global timestamp between the verify
# goroutine's NewEVM(pre-fork block) and its tx dispatch — making the pre-fork block see
# 0x9999 ENABLED and dispatch SettleContract.Run during plain-account execution => state
# divergence / consensus split. Fix: the dispatch gate now decides from the overrider's OWN
# per-EVM fields (o.chainConfig + o.timestamp) via the pure params.GetExtrasRules, never the
# global — so every replay of a block yields the same enabled set on every validator. Also:
# the registry stateDBBridge.SubBalance fallback now FAILS CLOSED (panic → reverted call)
# instead of returning a zero "previous balance" without debiting (silent native mint); and
# the genesis-config builders (SetAllGenesisPrecompiles/AllGenesisPrecompiles) skip AlwaysOn
# modules so 0x9999 can never get a timestamp-0 genesis config that bypasses the dated fork.
# The money path (V4 swap ABI, marker install, two-phase atomic settle) is byte-for-byte
# unchanged: ONLY the dispatch-path timestamp source, the SubBalance fail-mode, the genesis
# builder guard, and stale 0x9010 comments changed.
#
# v1.99.37 (precompile v0.5.57): wires the 0x9999 ERC-20 Call surface to the DEX
# settlement precompile (commit 2cf30e43d) and gates that Call surface to the DEX
# settlement family 0x9999/0x9996 (commit 9579f2e34). Before this, a CALL into
# 0x9999's ERC-20 settle path saw a nil PrecompileEnv (GetPrecompileEnv == nil) and
# could not resolve the token-transfer Call seam — the two-phase atomic settle's
# ERC-20 leg had no env to execute against. precompile v0.5.57 also adds the
# CALL-only DELEGATECALL guard (commit feeaab5a0) so the settle surface is reachable
# only via CALL (not DELEGATECALL, which would run it in the caller's context). Also
# converges deps to latest patch within v1.x.x (threshold v1.9.9, crypto v1.19.21,
# database v1.20.3, geth v1.17.12, warp v1.19.5, vm v1.2.5, api v1.0.15 — the
# UTXOAssetID rename that fixed the LuxAssetID build break) and removes the dead
# vendored dexConfig upgrade fixtures. The 0x9999 swap ABI + dated-fork activation
# (DexSettleActivationTime = 1766704800) are unchanged from v1.99.34.
#
# v1.99.40 (precompile v0.5.59, chains v1.3.19, consensus v1.25.21): the permissionless
# 0x9999 DEX value path lands end-to-end. precompile v0.5.58/59 = AssetResolver (real
# on-chain canonical resolution, NO admin allowlist), one synchronous router/book/journal,
# minOut on every route, no keeper/venue/live-ZAP/second-book; the env→Call ERC-20 vault
# seam + in-state-vault resolution make a real ERC-20 settle. evm v1.99.39 = the
# reprocess-bind fix: NewBlockChain binds the chain Runtime (networkID/C-Chain id) BEFORE
# startup reprocess, so an unclean restart after a 0x9999 swap re-executes the committed
# swap with the correct identity instead of (0, Empty) — previously that reverted the swap,
# failed ValidateState, and BRICKED the node. Proven on-node: real swap → kill -9 →
# clean reboot, state intact. v1.99.40 = v1.99.39 + deps to latest. consensus v1.25.21 =
# stake-weighted alpha-of-K quorum finality + per-height single-finalize + epoch-bound certs.
ARG EVM_VERSION=v1.99.40
ARG EVM_VM_ID=mgj786NP7uDwBCcq6YwThhaN8FLyybkCa4zBWTQbNgmK6k9A6
# the pinned evm go.mod may pin a dead luxfi/upgrade pseudo-version
# (v1.0.1-0.20260603055252-f51810805436 — commit pruned from origin). Heal it to
# the released upgrade v1.0.1 tag (semver-forward, not a downgrade). Then strip
# first-party go.sum lines so -mod=mod re-records current content hashes for the
# re-published luxfi modules at their pinned versions (integrity repair, no version drift).
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
mkdir -p /luxd/build/plugins && \
git clone --depth 1 --branch ${EVM_VERSION} https://github.com/luxfi/evm.git /tmp/evm && \
cd /tmp/evm && \
. /build/build_env.sh && \
go mod edit -require=github.com/luxfi/upgrade@v1.0.1 && \
go mod edit -require=github.com/luxfi/chains@v1.3.21 && \
find /tmp/evm -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} + && \
GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod \
go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o /luxd/build/plugins/${EVM_VM_ID} ./plugin && \
@@ -147,63 +295,107 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
# thresholdvm -> tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t
# zkvm -> vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9
ARG CHAINS_REF=main
# MUST track node's go.mod luxfi/chains (the D-Chain dexvm + 10 VM plugins).
# v1.3.14 = the native-atomic seam (rail-bound D->C atomic, LP committed-liquidity).
# Bump with every chains release or the bundled VM plugins go stale vs node's deps.
ARG CHAINS_REF=v1.3.17
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
git clone --depth 1 --branch ${CHAINS_REF} https://github.com/luxfi/chains.git /tmp/chains
git clone --depth 1 --branch ${CHAINS_REF} https://github.com/luxfi/chains.git /tmp/chains && \
find /tmp/chains -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} +
# Each VM is an independent Go module under /tmp/chains/<vm>/.
# Build each plugin binary and place it at /luxd/build/plugins/<cb58-vm-id>.
#
# The recursive go.sum strip above lets -mod=mod re-record current content hashes
# for re-published first-party modules at their pinned versions (integrity repair).
# At a tagged CHAINS_REF (v1.3.11) the sibling go.mod replace directives that
# affect `main` are absent, so every VM module builds in isolation. The bridgevm
# plugin (B-Chain) MUST build — it blank-imports crypto/threshold/bls to register
# the BLS threshold scheme; a miss reintroduces the v1.30.16 B-Chain init failure.
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
. /build/build_env.sh && \
export GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) && \
set -e && \
cd /tmp/chains/aivm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/juFxSrbCM4wszxddKepj1GWwmrn9YgN1g4n3VUWPpRo9JjERA \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/bridgevm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/dexvm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/graphvm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/nZQm4Dmg1rjX18rb8maL9gamYyXPf1xCvF7ymWzxp6a1nSQTt \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/identityvm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/oR6tnZHezwogyf9fRnomNXC9ojwCEBAU6jdUzpgy2PB1tD7fM \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/keyvm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/pJJCSV7hHYVY6TUZwR8qUPAfuhX8JLb2C1AzNSezrYNbgau8M \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/oraclevm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/quantumvm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/relayvm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/thresholdvm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t \
./cmd/plugin && \
cd /tmp/chains/zkvm && \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 \
./cmd/plugin && \
chmod +x /luxd/build/plugins/* && \
mkdir -p /luxd/build/plugins && \
( cd /tmp/chains/aivm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/juFxSrbCM4wszxddKepj1GWwmrn9YgN1g4n3VUWPpRo9JjERA ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: aivm plugin build skipped" ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/bridgevm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY ./cmd/plugin ) ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/graphvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/nZQm4Dmg1rjX18rb8maL9gamYyXPf1xCvF7ymWzxp6a1nSQTt ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: graphvm plugin build skipped" ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/identityvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/oR6tnZHezwogyf9fRnomNXC9ojwCEBAU6jdUzpgy2PB1tD7fM ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: identityvm plugin build skipped" ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/keyvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/pJJCSV7hHYVY6TUZwR8qUPAfuhX8JLb2C1AzNSezrYNbgau8M ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: keyvm plugin build skipped" ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/oraclevm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: oraclevm plugin build skipped" ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/quantumvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: quantumvm plugin build skipped" ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/relayvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: relayvm plugin build skipped" ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/thresholdvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: thresholdvm plugin build skipped" ; \
( cd /tmp/chains/zkvm && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 ./cmd/plugin ) || echo "WARN: zkvm plugin build skipped" ; \
( chmod +x /luxd/build/plugins/* 2>/dev/null || true ) && \
test -s /luxd/build/plugins/kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY \
|| { echo "FATAL: bridgevm (B-Chain) plugin missing — the v1.30.16 regression would recur"; exit 1; } && \
rm -rf /tmp/chains
# ============= Native D-Chain DEX VM Plugin Stage ================
# The D-Chain (dexvm slot, vmID mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr)
# is the NATIVE consensus matcher VM: github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/dchain implements
# block.ChainVM and runs the lx.OrderBook matcher INSIDE luxd consensus
# (Block.Verify against a versiondb overlay; Block.Accept commits) — the trade IS
# the D-Chain state transition, sequenced by luxd's multi-validator engine. This
# REPLACES the former chains/dexvm proxy (which relayed clob_* over ZAP to a
# standalone dchain-venue): there is no DexZapEndpoint and no standalone venue in
# the trading path. cmd/dchain wraps the VM in the SAME rpc.Serve plugin harness
# luxfi/evm boots through, and is pure-Go (CGO=0) — the optional GPU AMM
# accelerator in pkg/lx is a separate concern gated by its own cuda/metal tags and
# is NOT linked here. v1.5.10 is the first tag whose cmd/dchain builds CGO=0
# (drops the phantom dchain+cgo gate); v1.5.11 wires CLOB order ingestion over the
# node HTTP router (VM.CreateHandlers -> /ext/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/ingest.go)
# so an order POSTed to the node flows submitTx -> mempool -> consensus -> Verify
# (match) -> Accept; v1.5.12 persists the head block so the VM survives a restart
# once advanced past genesis (GetBlock(lastAccepted) no longer ErrNotFound);
# v1.5.13 indexes processing blocks so the plugin transport's ID-only Accept
# (GetBlock(builtID)) resolves the just-built block — without it the engine's
# self-finalize Accept is a silent no-op and the clob submitTx waiter hangs (no
# D-Chain blocks). v1.5.14 consumes luxfi/database v1.20.4, which fixes prefixdb
# returning ZERO rows for a nil-start prefix scan over a prefixdb-wrapped chain
# DB (every plugin VM via vm/rpc) — that stranded the native D-Chain order book
# (rebuildBookFromDB folded empty -> 0 fills despite committed asks). v1.5.15 adds
# the committed-state READ surface (clob_get_trades/orders/markets/book over
# /ext/bc/D/dex/<method>, pkg/dchain/read.go): read-only JSON of the durable trade
# log / resting book / markets, served beside the writes with ZERO consensus
# impact. Needed to VERIFY a fill replicated identically across validators (query
# every node, diff the trade rows + head root) and to feed markets-display (native
# fills are trade: rows). v1.5.17 makes the ZAP socket the canonical in-luxd CLOB
# ingestion: VM.Initialize parses init.Config zapIngestAddr and opens an rpc.Listen
# co-located in the luxd process (pkg/dchain/zapingest.go), so orders flow over the
# ZAP socket -> mempool -> consensus -> Verify (match) -> Accept without a standalone
# venue; the HTTP read/write surface (/ext/bc/D/dex/<method>) stays compatible. It
# also DECOMPLECTS the synthetic-seed/guard footgun (3 layers -> 0): the VM boot-brick
# assertOrderUserCoverage is removed (settlement identity now holds by construction,
# not by a boot scan that could refuse to Initialize), and the cmd/clobverify +
# cmd/fourpath-live synthetic seeders / internal/localguard are deleted (cmd/dexseed
# is the one canonical REAL-market seeder). Bump with every dex release that changes
# the VM, like CHAINS_REF for the other 10 VMs.
ARG DEX_REF=v1.5.18
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
git clone --depth 1 --branch ${DEX_REF} https://github.com/luxfi/dex.git /tmp/dex && \
find /tmp/dex -name go.sum -exec sed -i -E '/^github.com\/(luxfi|hanzoai)\//d' {} + && \
cd /tmp/dex && \
. /build/build_env.sh && \
GOARCH=$(echo ${TARGETPLATFORM} | cut -d / -f2) \
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS=-mod=mod \
go build -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr ./cmd/dchain && \
chmod +x /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr && \
test -s /luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr \
|| { echo "FATAL: native D-Chain (dexvm) plugin missing — D-Chain cannot start"; exit 1; } && \
rm -rf /tmp/dex
# lpm (Lux Plugin Manager) -- optional, skip if build fails
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
--mount=type=cache,target=/root/go/pkg/mod \
@@ -231,8 +423,34 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
# Pure Go fallbacks are used when the library is absent.
RUN ldconfig 2>/dev/null || true
# Maintain compatibility with previous images
COPY --from=builder /luxd/build /luxd/build
# Maintain compatibility with previous images.
# In the builder stage /luxd/build contains ONLY plugins/ (the luxd + lpm binaries
# live at /build/build and are COPYed separately below). The plugin set (~192MB of
# 12 VM plugins) is split across several COPY layers so each blob stays well under
# ~100MB: a single monolithic plugins layer cannot reliably complete its registry
# blob upload over a contended uplink, whereas sub-100MB layers push reliably (and
# resume independently by digest).
# plugin group 1
COPY --from=builder \
/luxd/build/plugins/mgj786NP7uDwBCcq6YwThhaN8FLyybkCa4zBWTQbNgmK6k9A6 \
/luxd/build/plugins/juFxSrbCM4wszxddKepj1GWwmrn9YgN1g4n3VUWPpRo9JjERA \
/luxd/build/plugins/kMhHABHM8j4bH94MCc4rsTNdo5E9En37MMyiujk4WdNxgXFsY \
/luxd/build/plugins/
# plugin group 2
COPY --from=builder \
/luxd/build/plugins/mDVT5EWMumBp3LCqvKwuyZQeY1VXr1jvjGNAt8nL4UFiXvqXr \
/luxd/build/plugins/nZQm4Dmg1rjX18rb8maL9gamYyXPf1xCvF7ymWzxp6a1nSQTt \
/luxd/build/plugins/oR6tnZHezwogyf9fRnomNXC9ojwCEBAU6jdUzpgy2PB1tD7fM \
/luxd/build/plugins/pJJCSV7hHYVY6TUZwR8qUPAfuhX8JLb2C1AzNSezrYNbgau8M \
/luxd/build/plugins/
# plugin group 3
COPY --from=builder \
/luxd/build/plugins/r5m1ujrmXxVcQetG3CQfuDLHp2RHKh6vCDaFgBRQfUcTZh7eS \
/luxd/build/plugins/ry9Sg8rZdT26iEKvJDmC2wkESs4SDKgZEhk5BgLSwg1EpcNug \
/luxd/build/plugins/sP6dLqrrBR9w3soP18fbJ3YzZecZdD7DDdfH2cFhhLq7Hy9bz \
/luxd/build/plugins/tGVBwRxpmD2aFdg3iYjgRvrCe8Jcmq9UNKxyHMus2NZ8WcD8t \
/luxd/build/plugins/vv3qPfyTVXZ5ArRZA9Jh4hbYDTBe43f7sgQg4CHfNg1rnnvX9 \
/luxd/build/plugins/
WORKDIR /luxd/build
# Copy the executables into the container
-694
View File
@@ -1,694 +0,0 @@
# Lux Network -- Development Timeline
> Comprehensive history of development across Hanzo AI, Lux Network, and Zoo Labs Foundation.
> All dates sourced from `git log` across 445 repositories. Fork provenance noted where applicable.
**Generated**: 2026-04-07 from live git history
---
## Summary
| Metric | Count |
|--------|-------|
| Total repositories | 445 (Hanzo 209, Lux 179, Zoo 57) |
| Total commits | 1,103,364 (Hanzo 852,218 / Lux 175,459 / Zoo 75,687) |
| Research papers (LaTeX) | 329 (Hanzo 152, Lux 136, Zoo 41) |
| Formal proofs (Lean4) | 13,160 files (Lux 6,851 / Hanzo 6,309) |
| TLA+ specifications | 4 |
| Tamarin protocol proofs | 2 |
| Halmos symbolic tests | 10 |
| Security audits | 23 reports |
| Governance proposals | 1,735 (LIPs 848, HIPs 784, ZIPs 103) |
| Patent applications | 2 portfolios (Hanzo, Zoo) |
| Years of continuous development | 12 (2014--2026) |
### Key Technologies (Original Work)
- **Quasar Consensus** -- Multi-metric BFT with FPC, Wave protocol, pipelined block production
- **Corona** -- Post-quantum signature scheme (ML-DSA + FROST hybrid)
- **LuxFHE** -- Fully homomorphic encryption engine with Go bindings, NTT SIMD acceleration
- **Lattice Cryptography** -- ML-KEM (FIPS 203), constant-time CBD sampler, CKKS/BFV schemes
- **MPC Engine** -- CGGMP21 + FROST threshold signing, WebAuthn integration
- **Jin Architecture** -- Multimodal AI (saccade JEPA, vision-language-audio)
- **Zen Model Family** -- Qwen3+ fine-tuning, refusal removal, agentic datasets
- **Hanzo Candle** -- Rust ML inference framework
- **GPU EVM** -- CUDA-accelerated opcode dispatch, GPU ecrecover, GPU state hashing
- **FHE Coprocessor** -- Encrypted smart contract execution
---
## Founder
Zach Kelling (zeekay) -- computer scientist, cryptographer, AI/ML researcher, musician, composer, architect, engineer, mathematician.
- **1983**: Born
- **1998**: Enrolled in university for Computer Science at age 15
- **Early 2000s**: Digidesign (Pro Tools) -- audio engineering, DSP, signal processing. Music composition and production.
- **2000s--2010s**: Software engineering across distributed systems, infrastructure, and early machine learning. Artist, writer, composer, architect, mathematician.
- **2008**: First open source contributions
- **2011**: GitHub activity begins (github.com/zeekay) -- Python, Vim, shell frameworks, distributed systems
- **2014**: Open-source AI/ML and commerce tooling -- the precursor work to Hanzo AI
Today: **1,239+ public repositories** across github.com/zeekay (547), github.com/hanzoai (366), github.com/luxfi (305), and additional orgs. 15+ years of continuous open source contribution.
Everything built has been open source, permissively licensed, and given to the public for free. This is not a commercial play -- it is a contribution to humanity's infrastructure.
---
## 2014--2016: Foundations
Early open-source work in commerce, automation, infrastructure, and AI/ML tooling. These repositories represent the precursor work to Hanzo AI.
### Original Hanzo Repositories
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/autogui` | 2014-07-17 | GUI automation framework |
| `hanzo/classic` | 2014-09-29 | E-commerce platform (original, 7,395 commits) |
| `hanzo/commerce` | 2014-09-29 | Commerce engine (original, 7,636 commits) |
| `hanzo/s3-cli` | 2015-01-14 | S3-compatible object storage CLI |
| `hanzo/openapi` | 2016-01-14 | API specification and documentation |
| `hanzo/tasks` | 2016-10-24 | Distributed task execution engine |
### Forked Infrastructure (upstream dates precede Hanzo)
These repositories were forked from established open-source projects. The earliest commit dates reflect upstream history, not Hanzo origination.
| Repository | Upstream | Upstream First Commit |
|------------|----------|----------------------|
| `hanzo/postgres` / `hanzo/sql` | postgres/postgres | 1996-07-09 |
| `hanzo/datastore` | ClickHouse/ClickHouse | 2008-12-01 |
| `hanzo/kv` | valkey-io/valkey | 2009-03-22 |
| `hanzo/redis` | redis/redis | 2009-03-22 |
| `hanzo/kv-go` | redis/go-redis | 2012-07-25 |
| `hanzo/pubsub-go` | nats-io/nats.go | 2012-08-15 |
| `hanzo/pubsub` | nats-io/nats-server | 2012-10-29 |
| `hanzo/storage` | minio/minio | 2014-10-30 |
| `hanzo/ingress` | (custom proxy, original) | 2015-08-28 |
| `hanzo/dns` | coredns/coredns | 2016-03-18 |
| `hanzo/golang-migrate` | golang-migrate/migrate | 2014-08-11 |
| `hanzo/dbx` | pocketbase/dbx | 2015-12-10 |
### Lux Precursor Forks
| Repository | Upstream | Upstream First Commit | Notes |
|------------|----------|----------------------|-------|
| `lux/coreth` / `lux/geth` | go-ethereum | 2013-12-26 | EVM fork, Lux-specific work begins ~2022 |
| `lux/czmq` | (ZeroMQ C bindings) | 2014-09-05 | Messaging infrastructure |
### Commit Activity
| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
|------|-------|-----|-----|
| 2014 | 14,547 | 5,405 | -- |
| 2015 | 23,098 | 9,028 | -- |
| 2016 | 17,989 | 2,681 | -- |
---
## 2017--2018: Hanzo AI Founded (Techstars '17)
Hanzo AI is accepted into Techstars 2017. Focus on AI-powered commerce, analytics, and infrastructure services.
### New Hanzo Repositories
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/datastore-go` | 2017-01-11 | Go client for analytics datastore |
| `hanzo/documentdb-go` | 2017-01-25 | Document database Go driver |
| `hanzo/docker` | 2017-07-18 | Container orchestration configs |
| `hanzo/krakend` | 2017-12-03 | API gateway (KrakenD-based) |
| `hanzo/search` | 2018-04-22 | Search engine (13,728 commits) |
| `hanzo/telemetry` | 2018-06-05 | Observability platform (8,002 commits) |
| `hanzo/rrweb` | 2018-09-30 | Session recording/replay |
### Lux Precursor Work
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `lux/zapdb` | 2017-01-26 | Key-value store (fork of Badger) |
| `lux/hid` | 2017-02-17 | Hardware device interface |
| `lux/onnx` | 2017-09-06 | Open Neural Network Exchange |
| `lux/safe` | 2017-09-27 | Multisig wallet (fork of Gnosis Safe) |
| `lux/explorer` | 2018-01-16 | Block explorer (replaced by luxfi/explorer) |
| `lux/zmq` | 2018-04-13 | ZeroMQ Go bindings |
### Zoo Precursor
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `zoo/explorer` | 2018-01-16 | Block explorer (shared with Lux) |
### Commit Activity
| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
|------|-------|-----|-----|
| 2017 | 20,219 | 3,854 | -- |
| 2018 | 24,508 | 7,427 | 3,009 |
---
## 2019--2020: Lux Network Founded
Lux Network development begins in late 2019. Core blockchain node (`luxd`) launches March 2020. JavaScript SDK, wallet, and DeFi primitives follow.
### Lux Core Chain
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `lux/assets` | 2019-08-09 | Token asset registry |
| `lux/lattice` | 2019-08-12 | Lattice-based cryptography (CKKS, BFV, BGV schemes) |
| `lux/cex` | 2019-08-16 | Exchange frontend |
| `lux/exchange-sdk` | 2019-11-08 | Exchange SDK |
| `lux/js` | 2020-01-21 | JavaScript SDK (initial pre-release) |
| `lux/node` | 2020-03-10 | Core blockchain node -- 11,623 commits |
| `lux/trace` | 2020-03-10 | Transaction tracing |
| `lux/wwallet` | 2020-07-21 | Web wallet |
| `lux/build` | 2020-11-04 | Build and release tooling |
### Hanzo Infrastructure Expansion
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/telemetry-go` | 2019-05-16 | Go telemetry client |
| `hanzo/search-go` | 2019-12-08 | Go search client |
| `hanzo/insights` | 2020-01-23 | Product analytics (35,710 commits) |
| `hanzo/posthog-python` | 2020-02-09 | Python analytics SDK |
| `hanzo/insights-node` | 2020-02-19 | Node.js analytics SDK |
| `hanzo/insights-go` | 2020-02-27 | Go analytics SDK |
| `hanzo/storage-console` | 2020-04-01 | Object storage management UI |
| `hanzo/vector` | 2020-05-30 | Log aggregation pipeline |
| `hanzo/analytics` | 2020-07-17 | Analytics engine (5,662 commits) |
| `hanzo/ingress-parser` | 2020-08-15 | Ingress log parser |
| `hanzo/livekit` | 2020-09-29 | Real-time audio/video |
| `hanzo/iam` | 2020-10-20 | Identity and access management (3,746 commits) |
### Commit Activity
| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
|------|-------|-----|-----|
| 2019 | 30,747 | 10,229 | 4,467 |
| 2020 | 46,845 | 18,333 | 1,151 |
---
## 2021--2022: Expanding the Stack
Wallet, CLI, EVM, DeFi, threshold cryptography, and the first key management systems.
### Lux Ecosystem Growth
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `lux/threshold` | 2021-02-16 | Threshold ECDSA (tECDSA) library |
| `lux/erc20-go` | 2021-05-21 | ERC-20 Go bindings |
| `lux/netrunner` | 2021-10-22 | Network testing framework (2,384 commits) |
| `lux/evm` | 2021-12-15 | Subnet EVM (1,632 commits) |
| `lux/devops` / `lux/lux-ops` | 2022-01-28 | Infrastructure automation |
| `lux/ledger` | 2022-03-14 | Ledger hardware wallet integration |
| `lux/lpm` | 2022-03-28 | Lux Plugin Manager |
| `lux/plugins-core` | 2022-03-29 | Core VM plugins |
| `lux/standard` | 2022-04-19 | Token standards |
| `lux/cli` | 2022-04-23 | Command-line interface (2,153 commits) |
| `lux/faucet` | 2022-05-12 | Testnet faucet |
| `lux/netrunner-sdk` | 2022-05-13 | Network runner SDK |
| `lux/explorer-rs` | 2022-05-20 | Rust block explorer |
| `lux/market` / `lux/marketplace` | 2022-05-31 | NFT marketplace |
| `lux/explore` | 2022-05-31 | Block explorer frontend |
| `lux/monitoring` | 2022-06-02 | Network monitoring |
| `lux/finance` | 2022-08-04 | DeFi protocols |
| `lux/teleport` | 2022-09-13 | Cross-chain teleport bridge |
| `lux/kms` | 2022-11-17 | Key management system (14,395 commits) |
### Hanzo Platform Build-Out
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/o11y` | 2021-01-03 | Observability stack |
| `hanzo/sql-vector` | 2021-04-20 | Vector search in PostgreSQL |
| `hanzo/insights-rs` | 2021-04-27 | Rust analytics SDK |
| `hanzo/treasury` | 2021-06-11 | Treasury management |
| `hanzo/team` | 2021-08-02 | Team management |
| `hanzo/docdb` | 2021-10-31 | Document database (FerretDB-based) |
| `hanzo/cloud` | 2022-03-31 | Cloud platform |
| `hanzo/faucet` | 2022-05-12 | Token faucet |
| `hanzo/mds` | 2022-05-17 | Metadata service |
| `hanzo/otel-collector` | 2022-06-11 | OpenTelemetry collector |
| `hanzo/vector-go` | 2022-06-24 | Go vector client |
| `hanzo/base` | 2022-07-07 | Application backend framework (2,287 commits) |
| `hanzo/evm` | 2022-09-19 | EVM utilities |
| `hanzo/chat` | 2022-10-20 | Real-time chat |
| `hanzo/sign` | 2022-11-14 | Document e-signing |
| `hanzo/payments` | 2022-11-16 | Payment processing |
| `hanzo/kms` | 2022-11-17 | Secret management (19,820 commits) |
### Zoo Ecosystem Begins
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `zoo/solidity` | 2021-01-09 | Smart contract library |
| `zoo/hardhat` | 2021-02-15 | Development framework |
| `zoo/node` | 2021-06-15 | Zoo blockchain node |
| `zoo/zoo-test` / `zoo/zoo-v4` / `zoo/zoo2` / `zoo/zoo3` | 2021-07-10 | Iterative protocol versions |
| `zoo/zoogov-app` | 2022-03-03 | Governance application |
| `zoo/zdk` | 2022-03-22 | Zoo Development Kit |
| `zoo/explorer-app` | 2022-05-31 | Explorer frontend |
| `zoo/CGI_Animation` | 2022-12-15 | AI-generated media |
### Commit Activity
| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
|------|-------|-----|-----|
| 2021 | 58,199 | 27,811 | 8,923 |
| 2022 | 59,535 | 20,333 | 10,029 |
---
## 2023: Post-Quantum + MPC + AI Agents
Major cryptographic research: threshold signing, MPC engines, lattice crypto. AI work accelerates with Jin architecture, ML frameworks, and computer-use agents.
### Lux Cryptography and Protocol
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `lux/sdk` | 2023-02-19 | Unified SDK (225 commits) |
| `lux/markets` | 2023-06-24 | DeFi market infrastructure |
| `lux/web` | 2023-10-13 | Lux Network website |
| `lux/wallet` | 2023-10-16 | Production wallet (1,203 commits) |
| `lux/mpc` | 2023-11-03 | MPC engine -- CGGMP21 + FROST (388 commits) |
| `lux/audits` | 2023-12-28 | Security audit reports (23 reports) |
| `lux/bridge` | 2023-12-30 | Cross-chain bridge (1,919 commits) |
### Hanzo AI Systems
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/ui` | 2023-01-24 | Shared UI component library (1,114 commits) |
| `hanzo/flow` | 2023-02-08 | AI workflow orchestration (17,390 commits) |
| `hanzo/cli` | 2023-04-03 | Developer CLI (10,596 commits) |
| `hanzo/jin` | 2023-05-15 | Multimodal AI -- saccade JEPA architecture |
| `hanzo/console` | 2023-05-18 | Admin console |
| `hanzo/dataroom` | 2023-05-27 | Secure document sharing |
| `hanzo/ml` | 2023-06-19 | Rust ML framework -- Candle (2,619 commits) |
| `hanzo/node` | 2023-06-25 | Distributed compute node (11,711 commits) |
| `hanzo/docs` | 2023-07-03 | Documentation platform |
| `hanzo/visor` / `hanzo/vm` | 2023-07-30 | Virtual machine runtime |
| `hanzo/desktop` | 2023-08-30 | Desktop application |
| `hanzo/cua` | 2023-11-03 | Computer-Use Agent (649 commits) |
### Zoo DeSci / DeAI
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `zoo/ui` | 2023-01-24 | Shared UI library |
| `zoo/zones` | 2023-02-18 | Zone management |
| `zoo/gym-v1` | 2023-04-13 | AI training gym v1 |
| `zoo/foundation` | 2023-05-08 | Zoo Labs Foundation website |
| `zoo/zooai` | 2023-05-19 | Zoo AI platform |
| `zoo/gym` | 2023-05-28 | AI training gym |
| `zoo/agent` | 2023-06-25 | AI agent framework |
| `zoo/app` | 2023-08-30 | Zoo application |
### Commit Activity
| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
|------|-------|-----|-----|
| 2023 | 99,672 | 24,417 | 13,855 |
---
## 2024: BFT Consensus + Hardware Wallets + Compute
Byzantine fault tolerance research, hardware signing, Corona post-quantum signatures, and AI model refinement.
### Lux Advanced Protocol
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `lux/chat` | 2024-04-06 | Network communication |
| `lux/kms-go` | 2024-06-05 | KMS Go SDK |
| `lux/liquid` | 2024-06-18 | Liquid staking |
| `lux/corona` | 2024-07-08 | Post-quantum signature scheme (30 commits) |
| `lux/xwallet` | 2024-07-09 | Extended wallet |
| `lux/bank` | 2024-07-09 | Banking integration |
| `lux/tokens` | 2024-07-15 | Token management |
| `lux/uni-v4-subgraph` | 2024-07-23 | Uniswap V4 subgraph |
| `lux/dwallet` | 2024-07-31 | Decentralized wallet |
| `lux/kit` | 2024-08-07 | Development toolkit |
| `lux/bft` | 2024-08-28 | BFT consensus research (140 commits) |
### Hanzo AI Platform
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/captable` | 2024-01-08 | Cap table management |
| `hanzo/runtime` | 2024-02-06 | ML inference runtime |
| `hanzo/sentry` | 2024-02-15 | Error monitoring |
| `hanzo/engine` | 2024-02-26 | Standalone AI inference engine (3,258 commits) |
| `hanzo/enso` | 2024-03-28 | Code generation |
| `hanzo/paas` / `hanzo/platform` | 2024-04-19 | Platform-as-a-Service |
| `hanzo/web` | 2024-04-29 | Web framework |
| `hanzo/remove-refusals` | 2024-05-16 | Model uncensoring -- permanent weight modification |
| `hanzo/kms-go-sdk` | 2024-06-05 | KMS Go SDK |
| `hanzo/studio-desktop` | 2024-08-12 | AI Studio desktop app |
| `hanzo/capnp-es` | 2024-08-16 | Cap'n Proto TypeScript bindings |
| `hanzo/kms-python-sdk` | 2024-08-19 | KMS Python SDK |
| `hanzo/kms-node-sdk` | 2024-08-29 | KMS Node.js SDK |
### Zoo Growth
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `zoo/game` | 2024-08-06 | AI gaming platform |
| `zoo/tools` | 2024-12-17 | Developer tooling |
### Commit Activity
| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
|------|-------|-----|-----|
| 2024 | 141,053 | 20,987 | 21,139 |
---
## 2025: FHE + Formal Verification + Production Hardening
Fully homomorphic encryption, NTT SIMD acceleration, formal proofs in Lean4/TLA+/Tamarin, 23 security audits, and the full agent SDK stack.
### Lux Cryptography and Consensus
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `lux/safe-frost` | 2025-04-11 | On-chain FROST signature verification (37 commits) |
| `lux/consensus` | 2025-07-28 | Quasar consensus -- multi-metric BFT (504 commits) |
| `lux/crypto` | 2025-07-25 | Unified crypto library -- BLS, ML-DSA, ML-KEM, secp256k1 |
| `lux/database` | 2025-07-25 | Database abstraction layer |
| `lux/ids` | 2025-07-25 | Identity and addressing |
| `lux/warp` | 2025-07-24 | Warp cross-chain messaging |
| `lux/go-bip32` / `lux/go-bip39` | 2025-07-25 | HD wallet key derivation |
| `lux/p2p` | 2025-12-04 | Peer-to-peer networking |
| `lux/cache` | 2025-12-04 | Caching layer |
| `lux/vm` | 2025-12-19 | Virtual machine framework |
| `lux/fhe` | 2025-12-28 | Fully homomorphic encryption engine (94 commits) |
| `lux/proofs` / `lux/formal` | 2025-12-25 | Formal verification: 6,851 Lean4 files, 4 TLA+ specs, 2 Tamarin proofs |
| `lux/papers` | 2025-10-28 | 136 research papers (LaTeX) |
| `lux/lips` / `lux/lps` | 2025-07-22 | Lux Improvement Proposals (848 proposals) |
### Lux Infrastructure Modules (extracted from monolith)
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `lux/timer` | 2025-12-04 | Timing utilities |
| `lux/constants` | 2025-12-04 | Network constants |
| `lux/codec` | 2025-12-04 | Serialization codec |
| `lux/upgrade` | 2025-12-04 | Network upgrade coordination |
| `lux/metric` | 2025-07-26 | Metrics collection |
| `lux/math` / `lux/mock` | 2025-08-18 | Math utilities, test mocking |
| `lux/sampler` | 2025-12-24 | Validator sampling |
| `lux/staking` | 2025-12-24 | Staking mechanics |
| `lux/keychain` | 2025-12-24 | Key management |
| `lux/config` / `lux/keys` | 2025-12-21 | Configuration, key formats |
| `lux/lamport` | 2025-12-25 | Lamport one-time signatures |
### Hanzo Agent and AI Stack
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/hanzo.ai` / `hanzo/hanzo.industries` | 2025-02-12 | Corporate websites |
| `hanzo/rules` | 2025-02-17 | AI behavior rules |
| `hanzo/operate` | 2025-03-06 | Computer operation framework |
| `hanzo/agent` | 2025-03-11 | Agent SDK |
| `hanzo/agency` | 2025-03-12 | Multi-agent orchestration |
| `hanzo/python-sdk` | 2025-03-15 | Python SDK |
| `hanzo/operative` | 2025-03-18 | Operative agent runtime |
| `hanzo/js-sdk` / `hanzo/go-sdk` | 2025-03-26 | JavaScript and Go SDKs |
| `hanzo/extension` | 2025-04-04 | Browser extension |
| `hanzo/stream` | 2024-12-16 | Real-time streaming |
| `hanzo/tools` | 2024-12-17 | Agent tool library |
| `hanzo/hanzo.sh` | 2024-11-11 | CLI installer |
| `hanzo/mcp` | 2025-07-24 | Model Context Protocol server |
| `hanzo/agents` | 2025-07-24 | Agent definitions and configs |
| `hanzo/engine` | (continued) | AI inference -- 3,258 commits |
| `hanzo/node` | (continued) | Distributed compute -- 11,711 commits |
| `hanzo/skills` | 2025-10-18 | Agent skill library |
| `hanzo/computer` | 2025-10-29 | Computer-use tools |
| `hanzo/gateway` | 2025-10-28 | API gateway |
| `hanzo/rust-sdk` | 2025-10-28 | Rust SDK |
| `hanzo/zen-agentic-dataset` | 2025-12-30 | Agentic training data |
| `hanzo/patents` | 2025-12-28 | Patent portfolio |
| `hanzo/proofs` | (2026-03-31 active) | Formal proofs: 6,309 Lean4 files |
| `hanzo/papers` | (2026-03-31 active) | 152 research papers |
| `hanzo/hips` | 2025-09-07 | Hanzo Improvement Proposals (784 proposals) |
### Zoo Labs Foundation
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `zoo/wander` | 2025-03-30 | Exploration agent |
| `zoo/nano-1` | 2025-05-23 | Nano model experiments |
| `zoo/ZIPs` | 2025-09-07 | Zoo Improvement Proposals (103 proposals) |
| `zoo/zoo-ai` | 2025-10-05 | Zoo AI platform |
| `zoo/zoo-papers-site` | 2025-10-29 | Papers website |
| `zoo/zoo.ngo` / `zoo.exchange` / `zoo.lab` / `zoo.vote` | 2025-11-02 | Foundation web properties |
| `zoo/universe` | 2025-11-02 | CI/CD and infrastructure |
| `zoo/docs` | 2025-12-14 | Documentation |
| `zoo/patents` | 2025-12-28 | Patent portfolio |
| `zoo/papers` | (2026-03-31 active) | 41 research papers |
### Security Audits (lux/audits)
| Date | Scope |
|------|-------|
| 2025-12-11 | DexVM, Oracle, Perpetuals |
| 2025-12-30 | Architecture, Consensus, Contracts, Crypto, Database, Network, Oracle, PlatformVM, ProposerVM+EVM, ThresholdVM, Warp, ZKVM, DexVM, Other VMs |
| 2026-01-30 | Standard audit (dedicated directory) |
| 2026-03-25 | Comprehensive security audit |
### Commit Activity
| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
|------|-------|-----|-----|
| 2025 | 157,036 | 19,312 | 12,520 |
---
## 2026: Launch
Production launch. Mainnet, exchanges, compliance engine, GPU-accelerated EVM, FHE coprocessor.
### Lux Production Launch
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `lux/fhe-coprocessor` | 2026-01-07 | Encrypted smart contract coprocessor |
| `lux/fpga` | 2026-01-07 | FPGA acceleration |
| `lux/tui` | 2026-01-07 | Terminal UI for node management |
| `lux/accel` | 2026-01-09 | Hardware acceleration layer |
| `lux/mlx` | 2026-01-09 | Apple MLX integration |
| `lux/benchmarks` | 2026-02-04 | Performance benchmarks |
| `lux/operator` | 2026-02-19 | Kubernetes operator |
| `lux/treasury` | 2026-03-02 | Treasury management |
| `lux/exchange-api` / `lux/exchange-proxy` | 2026-03-06 | Exchange infrastructure |
| `lux/exchange` | 2026-04-02 | DEX frontend |
| `lux/amm` | 2026-03-25 | Automated market maker |
| `lux/evmgpu` | 2026-03-29 | GPU-accelerated EVM (CUDA opcode dispatch) |
| `lux/futures` / `lux/forex` | 2026-03-30 | Derivatives and forex |
| `lux/bank-v2` | 2026-03-31 | Banking v2 |
| `lux/genesis` | 2026-04-04 | Genesis configuration and validator management |
| `lux/cevm` | 2026-04-05 | C-Chain EVM |
| `lux/gpu` | 2026-04-06 | GPU compute framework |
| `lux/sdk-rs` | 2026-04-04 | Rust SDK |
| `lux/evm-bench` | 2026-04-04 | EVM benchmarking suite |
### Hanzo Production Infrastructure
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/embeddings` | 2026-01-14 | Vector embeddings service |
| `hanzo/store-api` | 2026-01-14 | Store API |
| `hanzo/mpc` | 2026-01-24 | MPC threshold signing (36 commits) |
| `hanzo/mq` | 2026-01-19 | Message queue |
| `hanzo/contracts` | 2026-01-31 | Smart contracts |
| `hanzo/charts` | 2026-01-31 | Helm charts |
| `hanzo/hsm` | 2026-02-14 | Hardware security module integration |
| `hanzo/zen-gateway` | 2026-02-14 | AI model gateway |
| `hanzo/database` | 2026-02-14 | Database service |
| `hanzo/kms-operator` | 2026-02-15 | KMS Kubernetes operator |
| `hanzo/iam-sdk` | 2026-02-17 | IAM SDK |
| `hanzo/vault` | 2026-02-23 | Secret vault |
| `hanzo/billing` | 2026-02-23 | Billing system |
| `hanzo/orm` | 2026-02-23 | Object-relational mapping |
| `hanzo/operator` / `hanzo/hanzo-operator` | 2026-02-24 | Kubernetes operators |
| `hanzo/models` | 2026-02-26 | Model registry |
| `hanzo/ANE` | 2026-02-28 | Apple Neural Engine integration |
| `hanzo/ast` | 2026-03-02 | Abstract syntax tree tools |
| `hanzo/ledger` | 2026-03-05 | Financial ledger |
| `hanzo/tunnel` | 2026-03-11 | Secure tunneling |
| `hanzo/audit` | 2026-03-25 | Audit trail |
| `hanzo/onnxgo` | 2026-03-31 | ONNX Go runtime |
| `hanzo/proofs` | 2026-03-31 | Formal proofs |
| `hanzo/papers` | 2026-03-31 | Research papers |
### Zoo Launch
| Repository | First Commit | Description |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| `zoo/contracts` | 2026-01-31 | Smart contracts |
| `zoo/genesis` | 2026-02-13 | Genesis configuration |
| `zoo/evm` | 2026-03-30 | Zoo EVM |
| `zoo/cli` | 2026-03-30 | Zoo CLI |
| `zoo/operator` | 2026-03-30 | Kubernetes operator |
| `zoo/kms` | 2026-03-30 | Key management |
| `zoo/mpc` | 2026-03-30 | MPC engine |
| `zoo/bridge` | 2026-03-30 | Cross-chain bridge |
| `zoo/computer` | 2026-03-31 | Compute platform |
| `zoo/proofs` | 2026-03-31 | Formal proofs |
| `zoo/papers` | 2026-03-31 | Research papers |
| `zoo/formal` | 2026-04-03 | Formal verification |
| `zoo/exchange` | 2026-04-02 | DEX |
### Commit Activity (YTD through 2026-04-07)
| Year | Hanzo | Lux | Zoo |
|------|-------|-----|-----|
| 2026 | 68,379 | 4,707 | 550 |
---
## Cumulative Commit History
```
Year Hanzo Lux Zoo Total
---- ----- --- --- -----
2014 14,547 5,405 -- 19,952
2015 23,098 9,028 -- 32,126
2016 17,989 2,681 -- 20,670
2017 20,219 3,854 -- 24,073
2018 24,508 7,427 3,009 34,944
2019 30,747 10,229 4,467 45,443
2020 46,845 18,333 1,151 66,329
2021 58,199 27,811 8,923 94,933
2022 59,535 20,333 10,029 89,897
2023 99,672 24,417 13,855 137,944
2024 141,053 20,987 21,139 183,179
2025 157,036 19,312 12,520 188,868
2026 68,379 4,707 550 73,636
TOTAL 761,827 174,524 75,643 1,011,994
```
Note: Annual totals sum to ~1,012,000. The `git rev-list --count HEAD` grand total of 1,103,364 is higher because it counts all reachable commits including merge bases and upstream fork history counted once per repo.
---
## Fork Provenance
The following repositories contain upstream history from established open-source projects. Lux/Hanzo contributions are layered on top.
| Repository | Upstream Project | Upstream Origin Date | Fork Purpose |
|------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| `hanzo/sql` | PostgreSQL | 1996 | Managed PostgreSQL service |
| `hanzo/datastore` | ClickHouse | 2008 | Analytics datastore |
| `hanzo/kv` | Valkey | 2009 | Key-value cache |
| `hanzo/redis` | Redis | 2009 | Redis compatibility |
| `hanzo/kv-go` | go-redis | 2012 | Go client library |
| `hanzo/pubsub-go` | nats.go | 2012 | Go pub/sub client |
| `hanzo/pubsub` | NATS Server | 2012 | Message broker |
| `hanzo/storage` | MinIO | 2014 | S3-compatible storage |
| `hanzo/dns` | CoreDNS | 2016 | DNS service |
| `hanzo/golang-migrate` | golang-migrate | 2014 | Database migrations |
| `hanzo/dbx` | PocketBase dbx | 2015 | Database abstraction |
| `hanzo/tasks` | Temporal | 2016 | Distributed task engine |
| `lux/coreth` / `lux/geth` | go-ethereum | 2013 | EVM implementation |
| `lux/zapdb` | Badger (Dgraph) | 2017 | Embedded KV store |
| `lux/safe` | Gnosis Safe | 2017 | Multisig contracts |
| `lux/explorer` | custom | 2018 | Block explorer |
| `lux/lattice` | Lattigo (EPFL) | 2019 | Lattice cryptography |
All other repositories are original work.
---
## Research Papers by Domain
### Lux Network (136 papers)
**Consensus**: lux-consensus, lux-quasar-consensus, lux-fpc-consensus, lux-wave-protocol
**Cryptography**: lux-crypto-agility, lux-corona-pq, lux-pq-crypto-suite, lux-pq-migration, lux-ntt-transform
**FHE**: lux-fhe-smart-contracts, lux-fhe-mpc-hybrid, fhe/fhevm, fhe/fhecrdt, fhe/ml-privacy, fhe/voting
**MPC**: lux-lss-mpc, lux-mchain-mpc
**DeFi**: lux-lightspeed-dex, lux-economics, lux-tokenomics, lux-credit-lending, lux-omnichain-yield
**Infrastructure**: lux-bridge, lux-teleport-protocol, lux-teleport-architecture, lux-photon-protocol, lux-nova-protocol
**Scaling**: gpu-evm-whitepaper, evmgpu-benchmark, lux-data-availability
**Identity**: lux-achain-attestation, lux-secure-messaging, lux-zap-wire-protocol
**Governance**: lux-dao-governance-framework, lux-adoption-roadmap
**Markets**: lux-market-nft, lux-credit-protocol-spec
### Hanzo AI (152 papers)
**AI/ML**: hanzo-jin-architecture, hanzo-engine-ml, hanzo-candle, hanzo-analytics-ml, hanzo-hmm, hanzo-agent-grpo, hanzo-agent-sdk
**Infrastructure**: hanzo-aci, hanzo-base, hanzo-api-gateway, hanzo-ingress-proxy, hanzo-pubsub-events, hanzo-search
**Commerce**: crowdstart-commerce, hanzo-commerce-payments, hanzo-checkout, hanzo-ai-commerce
**Security**: hanzo-pq-crypto, hanzo-formal-verification, hanzo-harness-hacking
**Platform**: hanzo-iam-platform, hanzo-sdk-ecosystem, hanzo-mcp-server, hanzo-network-whitepaper, hanzo-tokenomics
**Communication**: hanzo-chat, hanzo-flow
**Algorithms**: algorithms/ subdirectory, defense/ subdirectory
**Models**: zen/ subdirectory (Zen model family)
**Computer Use**: hanzo-operate-computer, hanzo-operative
### Zoo Labs (41 papers)
**DeSci**: zoo-conservation-ai, zoo-habitat-modeling, zoo-satellite-ecology, zoo-wildlife-tracking, zoo-citizen-science, zoo-carbon-credits, zoo-educational-ai
**DeAI**: zoo-fhe-ai, zoo-mobile-inference, zoo-agent-nft, embedding-7680, hllm-training-free-grpo, experience-ledger-dso, beluga-l3-whitepaper
**Blockchain**: zoo-consensus, zoo-poai-consensus, zoo-quasar-benchmarks, zoo-bridge, zoo-dex, zoo-evm-l2-architecture, zoo-evm-benchmarks, zoo-gpu-evm
**Governance**: zoo-dao-governance, zoo-tokenomics, zip-002-zen-reranker
**Security**: zoo-pq-crypto, zoo-mpc-custody, zoo-key-management, zoo-fhe
**Identity**: zoo-identity-chain, zoo-experience-ledger
**Launch**: zoo-mainnet-launch-checklist
---
## Formal Verification
### Lean4 Proofs (13,160 files total)
- **Lux** (`lux/formal/lean/`, `lux/proofs/`): BFT consensus safety, bridge security, DeFi invariants, cross-chain compute, post-quantum hybrid crypto, Verkle tree, warp security, GPU scaling laws, FHE, sharia compliance
- **Hanzo** (`hanzo/proofs/lean/`): Complementary formal proofs
### TLA+ Specifications (4 specs)
- Teleport cross-chain protocol
- MPC bridge protocol state machine
### Tamarin Protocol Proofs (2 proofs)
- MPC bridge cryptographic protocol security
### Halmos Symbolic Tests (10 contracts)
- Bridge and yield vault Solidity verification
---
## Active Development (as of 2026-04-07)
Most recently committed repositories across all three organizations:
| Repository | Last Commit |
|------------|-------------|
| `lux/node` | 2026-04-07 |
| `lux/papers` | 2026-04-07 |
| `lux/netrunner` | 2026-04-07 |
| `lux/threshold` | 2026-04-07 |
| `lux/dex` | 2026-04-07 |
| `lux/formal` | 2026-04-07 |
| `lux/mpc` | 2026-04-07 |
| `hanzo/blog` | 2026-04-07 |
| `hanzo/iam` | 2026-04-07 |
| `hanzo/kms` | 2026-04-07 |
| `hanzo/papers` | 2026-04-07 |
| `hanzo/cloud` | 2026-04-07 |
| `zoo/blog` | 2026-04-07 |
| `zoo/papers` | 2026-04-07 |
| `zoo/universe` | 2026-04-07 |
+12
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Licensing
This repository is licensed under the **BSD 3-Clause License** (see
[LICENSE](LICENSE)). It belongs to the **public** tier of the Lux
three-tier IP strategy: anyone may use, fork, or redistribute it,
including for commercial purposes, subject to the BSD-3 terms.
For the canonical Lux IP and licensing strategy, see:
<https://github.com/luxfi/.github/blob/main/profile/README.md>
For commercial inquiries that go beyond BSD-3 (e.g. private moat
acceleration kernels), contact `licensing@lux.network`.
+228 -18
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# LLM.md - AI Development Guide
# AI Development Guide
This file provides guidance for AI assistants working with the Lux node codebase.
@@ -8,13 +8,146 @@ Lux blockchain node implementation - a high-performance, multi-chain blockchain
**Key Context:**
- Original Lux Network node — NOT a fork
- Latest Tag: v1.26.31
- Network ID: 96369 (Lux Mainnet), 96368 (Testnet), 96370 (Devnet)
- Go Version: 1.26.1+
- Database: ZapDB (primary, default)
## Post-E2E-PQ State (current)
Node now consumes the locked `ChainSecurityProfile` end-to-end and enforces
strict-PQ at four boundaries: peer handshake, mempool, validator scheme
selection, and EVM contract auth.
- `node/node.go:initSecurityProfile` (F102 closure) loads the chain-wide
profile from genesis at boot, hashes it, and pins it into every chain's
bootstrap. Resolved profile is what every downstream verifier consults.
- `network/peer/scheme_gate.go``SchemeGate.Classify(presented, site)`
funnels every inbound NodeID through the profile's
`AcceptsValidatorScheme`. Wire-typed NodeID (`luxfi/ids` TypedNodeID +
scheme byte) is the canonical handshake form.
- `vms/txs/auth/policy.go``ClassicalCompatRegistry` + strict-PQ
mempool gate. Both `platformvm` (P-Chain) and `avm` (X-Chain) mempools
refuse classical credentials when the resolved profile has
`ForbidECDSAContractAuth=true`.
- `vms/mldsafx/` — re-exports the consensus `mldsafx` UTXO feature
extension as the node-owned UTXO surface (ML-DSA-65 verify).
- `network/peer` PQ handshake — ML-KEM-768 / ML-KEM-1024 KEM +
ML-DSA-65 identity (`dc906d281b`).
### Recent significant commits
| SHA | Tag | Impact |
|-----|-----|--------|
| (pending) | next | LP-023 Phase 1 batch 2: 5 more native-ZAP tx types — BaseTx v1, RegisterL1ValidatorTx v1, SlashValidatorTx v1, TransferChainOwnershipTx v1, RemoveChainValidatorTx. Cross-type Parse mean speedup 8.5× over linearcodec. Variable-length nested-object schemas (Outs/Ins/full OutputOwners/Warp Message/Evidence) deferred to batch 3. |
| `e77a7ef78e` | (pre) | LP-023 Phase 1 batch 1: 4 simple tx types + bench harness. 37× Parse, 5.6× cross-type mean. |
| `9df72a6f55` | v1.26.10 | Wire ChainSecurityProfile into bootstrap (closes F102) |
| `c4af52411e` | v1.26.10 | X-Chain (avm) mempool refuses classical creds under strict-PQ |
| `a14a1601f4` | v1.26.10 | P-Chain (platformvm) mempool refuses classical creds under strict-PQ |
| `1cf0aa80ca` | v1.26.10 | ClassicalCompatRegistry + strict-PQ mempool gate |
| `a0f4f4b21c` | v1.26.10 | vms/mldsafx: re-export ML-DSA feature extension |
| `448fdeb7a1` | v1.26.10 | ML-DSA-65 promoted to canonical NodeID under strict-PQ |
| `dc906d281b` | v1.26.10 | PQ peer handshake — ML-KEM-768/1024 + ML-DSA-65 identity |
### Active versions
- Repo: `v1.26.12` (next bump: `v1.26.13`).
- Pinned: `consensus v1.23.4+` (needed `ValidatorSchemeID`),
`crypto v1.18.5`, `ids v1.2.9` (will move to v1.2.10 in next bump for
`TypedNodeID`), `genesis v1.9.6`.
### Cross-repo dependencies
- `luxfi/consensus` → profile + auth + zchain types
- `luxfi/crypto` → ML-DSA / ML-KEM / SLH-DSA primitives
- `luxfi/genesis` → genesis-pinned profile (`Resolve` at load)
- `luxfi/ids``TypedNodeID` wire form (consumed at handshake)
- `luxfi/geth` → EVM (for `vm.SetActiveSecurityProfile` install point)
### Where to look for X
- Profile resolve at boot: `node/node.go:initSecurityProfile`
- Profile RPC + REST + metrics: `service/security/`
- JSON-RPC namespace: `security` at `POST /ext/security`
(methods `securityProfile`, `blockSecurity`)
- REST sidecars: `GET /ext/security/profile`, `GET /ext/security/block/{n}`
- Prometheus gauges: `/ext/metrics` under the `security_*` family
- Peer scheme gate: `network/peer/scheme_gate.go`
- Classical-compat registry: `vms/txs/auth/policy.go`
- Mempool gate (P-Chain): `vms/platformvm/mempool/*.go`
- Mempool gate (X-Chain): `vms/avm/mempool/*.go`
- ML-DSA feature extension: `vms/mldsafx/`
### Open follow-ups
- `vms/zkvm/accel/` still soft-falls-back when CGO is disabled; Z-Chain
proof verification path needs CGO-required mode for production strict-PQ.
- `vm.SetActiveSecurityProfile` install point exists in `luxfi/geth/core/vm`
but EVM-side contract-auth refusal still needs a chain-bootstrap call
(F102 wiring closes the consensus side; geth-side hookup is the
remaining tail).
## FeePolicy — canonical user-tx fee gate
Every Lux VM that accepts user-submitted txs declares a `fee.Policy`
(package `vms/types/fee`). There is one interface and one validator —
no per-VM bespoke fee structs.
### Policy choice per VM
| VM | Chain | Posture | Policy |
|----|-------|---------|--------|
| dexvm | D-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, AssetID: UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID)}` |
| zkvm | Z-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
| aivm | A-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
| keyvm | K-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
| bridgevm | B-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
| quantumvm | Q-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
| identityvm | I-Chain | user-tx | `FlatPolicy{Fee: MinTxFeeFloor, ...}` |
| thresholdvm | M-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
| oraclevm | O-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
| relayvm | R-Chain | service-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` |
| graphvm | G-Chain | read-only | `NoUserTxPolicy{}` (GraphQL refuses `mutation`) |
| evm | C-Chain | user-tx | native EVM gas (gas * gasPrice >= 0 enforced upstream) |
| platformvm | P-Chain | user-tx | native `TxFee` field on Config |
| avm | X-Chain | user-tx | native `TxFee` field on Config |
`MinTxFeeFloor = 1 mLUX = 1_000_000 nLUX` (the same minimum the P-Chain
base fee enforces). User-facing chains MAY charge more; they MUST NOT
charge less.
### Wiring contract
1. VM struct holds `feePolicy fee.Policy` (and `networkID uint32`).
2. `Initialize` sets `feePolicy = fee.FlatPolicy{...}` (or
`fee.NoUserTxPolicy{}` for service-only) from `init.Runtime.NetworkID`
and calls `fee.Validate(vm.feePolicy)` — refuses zero-fee user-facing
chains at boot, before any block is accepted.
3. The canonical user-tx admission entry (e.g. `SubmitTx`, `IssueTx`,
`InitiateBridgeTransfer`, mutating service RPCs) calls
`policy.ValidateFee(paid, asset)` BEFORE mempool insert.
4. Consensus-internal paths (engine→VM block delivery, replay, internal
tx emission) bypass the fee gate — the policy gates only the
*user-submitted* entrypoint.
### Where the gates live
- `vms/types/fee/policy.go` — interface + FlatPolicy + NoUserTxPolicy + Validate
- `~/work/lux/chains/<vm>/feegate.go` — per-VM helper + gate method
- `~/work/lux/chains/<vm>/feegate_test.go` — RejectsZeroFee + AcceptsMinFee
- Oracle (O-Chain): `~/work/lux/oracle/vm/feegate.go` (re-exported by `~/work/lux/chains/oraclevm/`)
- Relay (R-Chain): `~/work/lux/relay/vm/feegate.go` (re-exported by `~/work/lux/chains/relayvm/`)
- Graph (G-Chain): `~/work/lux/chains/graphvm/feegate.go` (read-only; NoUserTxPolicy)
## Essential Commands
### Building
### Release & build (canonical) — via platform.hanzo.ai, NOT GitHub Actions
The ONE way to build + publish releases is **[`RELEASE.md`](./RELEASE.md)**:
platform.hanzo.ai reads [`hanzo.yml`](./hanzo.yml) on a `v*` tag push and
schedules the image build onto self-hosted **arcd** pools (`lux-build-linux-*`)
over the native long-poll fabric — no GitHub-Actions hop. ONE `Dockerfile`
build yields BOTH artifacts: the node image (`ghcr.io/luxfi/node:vX.Y.Z`, luxd
+ 12 baked VM plugins) and, via [`scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh`](./scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh),
the plugin set to `s3://lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset>/` (operator `pluginSource`).
The `.github/workflows/*` build/release workflows are retired (RELEASE.md §Retire).
### Building (local dev only)
```bash
# Build node binary
./scripts/run_task.sh build
@@ -205,20 +338,33 @@ Located in `vms/thresholdvm/fhe/`:
| Gateway | `0x0200000000000000000000000000000000000083` |
### ZAP Transport (Zero-Copy App Proto)
ZAP is the default high-performance binary wire protocol for VM<->Node communication.
gRPC support is available via build tag for testing/compatibility.
ZAP is the only wire protocol for VM<->Node communication. The gRPC
fallback (and its `-tags=grpc` opt-in) was retired in v1.26.31 along
with every `//go:build grpc` file under `node/`. There is one and only
one way to talk to a Chain VM: ZAP.
**Build Tags:**
**Build:**
```bash
go build # ZAP only (default, production)
go build -tags=grpc # gRPC support (for testing/compatibility)
go build # ZAP only — there are no build tags
```
**Key Packages:**
- `github.com/luxfi/api/zap` - Core wire protocol and message types
- `github.com/luxfi/vm/rpc/sender` - p2p.Sender over ZAP/gRPC
- `vms/rpcchainvm/sender/` - Node-side sender implementation
- `vms/platformvm/warp/zwarp/` - ZAP-based warp signing client/server
- `github.com/luxfi/api/zap` Core wire protocol and message types (Layer A)
- `github.com/luxfi/protocol/rpcdb` — rpcdb service spec / data carriers (Layer B)
- `github.com/luxfi/node/db/rpcdb` — rpcdb Service + ZAP transport adapter (Layer C)
- `vms/rpcchainvm/sender/` — Node-side `p2p.Sender` over ZAP
- `vms/rpcchainvm/zap/` — ChainVM client/server over ZAP
- `vms/platformvm/warp/zwarp/` — Warp signing over ZAP
**rpcdb Layered Topology:**
- Layer A — wire framing: `github.com/luxfi/api/zap`
- Layer B — rpcdb service spec: `github.com/luxfi/protocol/rpcdb`
- Layer C — rpcdb impl: `node/db/rpcdb/{service.go, zap_server.go}`
- `service.go` — transport-neutral `Service` wrapping `database.Database`
- `zap_server.go` — ZAP transport adapter (only adapter)
- One Service, one transport. The dual-adapter pattern stays available
for future transports (each is a new file wrapping `*Service`), but
ZAP is the only one shipping.
**Wire Protocol Format:**
```
@@ -233,11 +379,8 @@ go build -tags=grpc # gRPC support (for testing/compatibility)
**Sender Usage:**
```go
// ZAP transport (default)
// ZAP transport — the only transport
s := sender.ZAP(zapConn)
// gRPC transport (requires -tags=grpc build)
s := sender.GRPC(senderpb.NewSenderClient(grpcConn))
```
**Warp over ZAP:**
@@ -335,6 +478,32 @@ RNS transport supports hybrid post-quantum cryptography combining classical algo
- **Mixed Networks**: PQ and classical validators coexist
- **Policy Enforcement**: `requirePostQuantum: true` rejects classical peers
### SchemeGate — cross-axis NodeIDScheme enforcement
`network/peer/scheme_gate.go` (v1.26.10) is the single primitive that
turns a wire NodeID into a `(scheme, NodeID)` pair and runs the
cross-axis check against the chain's `ChainSecurityProfile`.
- `SchemeGate{Profile, ClassicalCompatUnsafe, ActivationHeight}` is the
chain-scoped policy object. One gate per chain, pinned at bootstrap.
- `Classify(nodeID, scheme, height, site) (TypedNodeID, error)` is the
single entry point. Callers pass a site tag (`"handshake"`,
`"proposer"`, `"validator"`, `"mempool-sender"`) that appears in the
refused-by error.
- Migration path: `ActivationHeight` is the block at which a strict-PQ
chain refuses any non-PQ `NodeIDScheme` byte at every height under
the forward-only PQ policy. The classical `secp256k1` (0x90) scheme is
refused at the gate; there is no transition window and no operator
classical-compat escape hatch (strict-PQ chains refuse classical at
every boundary, period).
- Typed errors: `ErrSchemeGateConfig`, `ErrSchemeGateMismatch`,
`ErrSchemeGateUnknownScheme`.
Wire form: `TypedNodeID = (NodeIDScheme byte, 20-byte NodeID)`. The
20-byte storage/map-key form stays byte-identical; the scheme byte
travels on the wire so a receiver knows which verifier to dispatch
without trusting the chain profile alone.
### Testing PQ Forward Secrecy
```bash
@@ -353,7 +522,7 @@ go test -v -run "TestHybrid" ./node/network/dialer/... -count=1
### 1. P2P Sender Interface
Node's rpcchainvm implements `p2p.Sender` (from `github.com/luxfi/p2p`) for cross-chain messaging.
The `sender` package is a gRPC implementation of `p2p.Sender`.
The `sender` package is the ZAP-native implementation of `p2p.Sender`.
### 2. Chain Tracking
Nodes don't automatically track chains. Use:
@@ -600,11 +769,52 @@ Testing conducted on a single Lux validator node (testnet mode, macOS):
**Benchmark Command:**
```bash
cd ~/work/lux/benchmarks
LUX_ENDPOINT="http://localhost:9640/ext/bc/C/rpc" \
NODE_ENDPOINT="http://localhost:9640/ext/bc/C/rpc" \
PRIVATE_KEY="<funded_key>" \
./bin/bench tps --chains=lux --duration=60s --concurrency=5
```
## JSON rule — json/v2 at HTTP boundary only; ZAP for all internal data
Encoding boundaries are one-way and explicit:
- **External (HTTP / JSON-RPC API)** — `github.com/go-json-experiment/json` (v2).
Never `encoding/json`. This covers: `service/*`, `server/*`, `pubsub/`,
`vms/platformvm/service.go`, `vms/xvm/service.go`, JSON-RPC clients
(`vms/platformvm/client_*`), CLI tools (`cmd/*`), wallet examples,
on-disk config files (read once at boot), genesis/upgrade blobs.
- **Internal (state, P2P, consensus, MPC, logs, metrics)** — ZAP wire only.
No JSON in: `network/`, `consensus/`, `snow/`, `chains/` (data-plane),
`vms/*/state/`, `vms/*/block/`, `vms/*/txs/` (struct codec), threshold
payloads, P2P message bodies, internal databases.
Migration helpers (v2 API delta vs v1):
| v1 (encoding/json) | v2 (go-json-experiment/json) |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| `json.Marshal(v)` | `json.Marshal(v)` (variadic opts; signature compat) |
| `json.MarshalIndent(v, "", " ")` | `json.Marshal(v, jsontext.WithIndent(" "))` |
| `json.Unmarshal(b, &v)` | `json.Unmarshal(b, &v)` |
| `json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)` | `json.MarshalWrite(w, v)` (no trailing `\n`) |
| `json.NewDecoder(r).Decode(&v)` | `json.UnmarshalRead(r, &v)` |
| `json.RawMessage` | `jsontext.Value` |
| `*json.SyntaxError` | `*jsontext.SyntacticError` |
v2 semantic differences worth knowing (these change wire shape):
- `[N]byte` field with no `MarshalJSON` ⇒ v2 marshals as base64 string,
v1 marshalled as JSON array of byte numbers. Add `MarshalJSON` on the
type if the array form is wanted on the wire.
- `time.Duration` ⇒ v2 default is the standard string form ("30m");
v1 marshalled as int nanoseconds. v1 sub-package
(`github.com/go-json-experiment/json/v1`) exposes `FormatDurationAsNano(true)`;
v2 root does not. Prefer the string form on new APIs.
- v2 enforces strict UTF-8; raw arbitrary bytes in JSON strings fail.
This matters for legacy P2P/internal blobs that happen to be stored
through JSON — those should already be on ZAP.
- `json.MarshalWrite` does NOT append a trailing `\n` (v1 `NewEncoder.Encode` did).
Adjust HTTP-handler test fixtures accordingly.
---
*Last Updated*: 2026-02-04
*Last Updated*: 2026-06-06
+2 -2
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
---
[![Build Status](https://github.com/luxfi/node/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/luxfi/node/actions)
[![Go Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/go-1.21.12-blue.svg)](https://golang.org/)
[![Go Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/go-1.26.3-blue.svg)](https://golang.org/)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-BSD--3--Clause-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
Node implementation for the [Lux](https://lux.network) network -
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The minimum recommended hardware specification for nodes connected to Mainnet is
If you plan to build Lux Node from source, you will also need the following software:
- [Go](https://golang.org/doc/install) version >= 1.23.9
- [Go](https://golang.org/doc/install) version >= 1.26.3
- [gcc](https://gcc.gnu.org/)
- g++
+187
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
# Lux release — build + publish via platform.hanzo.ai (the ONE canonical way)
This is the single, repeatable way to build and publish the Lux release
artifacts. It runs entirely on our own infrastructure — **the PaaS
(platform.hanzo.ai) + self-hosted arcd runners + DOKS/fleet**. There is **no
GitHub Actions build path** (the `.github/workflows/*` build/release workflows
are retired — see [§Retire](#retire-the-github-actions-build-workflows)).
## What a release produces
ONE `Dockerfile` multi-stage build (this repo) is the single source of truth.
It compiles `luxd` + all 12 VM plugins (CGO_ENABLED=0) and yields TWO
distribution surfaces:
| # | Artifact | Destination | Consumed by |
|---|----------|-------------|-------------|
| 1 | node image (luxd + 12 plugins baked at `/luxd/build/plugins/`) | `ghcr.io/luxfi/node:vX.Y.Z` | operator pod image; `startup.sh cp /luxd/build/plugins/*` |
| 2 | plugin set (the 12 VM-ID binaries + `SHA256SUMS`) | `s3://lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset>/` | operator `plugin-fetch` init container (LuxNetwork CR `pluginSource`) |
Artifact 2 is **extracted from** artifact 1 — the plugins are never compiled
twice. One build, two surfaces (DRY, orthogonal).
The plugin versions are pinned as Dockerfile build-args, kept in lockstep with
this repo's `go.mod`:
- `EVM_VERSION` (luxfi/evm — C-Chain EVM, the `0x9999` settlement surface)
- `CHAINS_REF` (luxfi/chains — the 10 non-DEX VMs incl. bridgevm)
- `DEX_REF` (luxfi/dex `cmd/dchain` — the native D-Chain DEX VM)
## The machinery
```
git tag vX.Y.Z (push)
│ GitHub App webhook ─▶ https://platform.hanzo.ai/v1/github-webhook
platform BuildScheduler ── reads hanzo.yml @ tag, validates, enqueues
│ one build_job per matrix entry
native long-poll fabric (build-queue.ts) NO GitHub Actions hop
│ arcd runner POST /v1/arcd/poll (HMAC)
arcd runner on pool lux-build-linux-<arch>
│ git checkout @ tag → docker build -f Dockerfile . → docker push
ghcr.io/luxfi/node:vX.Y.Z (artifact 1)
│ POST /v1/arcd/complete (status, image_digest)
build_job (DB, system-of-record)
```
- **PaaS**: `platform.hanzo.ai` (`~/work/hanzo/platform`,
`pkg/platform/src/services/ci/`). Owns the schema, the scheduler, the durable
`build_job` record, and the native long-poll dispatch.
- **Build muscle**: self-hosted **arcd** runner pools, `lux-build-linux-amd64`
and `lux-build-linux-arm64` (one daemon per fleet host; `spark` = linux/arm64,
amd64 via buildx). NO GitHub-hosted runners; NO GitHub Actions orchestration
on the native path.
- **Contract**: `~/work/hanzo/platform/docs/PLATFORM_CI.md`.
## Build — the one command
A release is a semver tag push. The declarative entrypoint is this repo's
[`hanzo.yml`](./hanzo.yml); the trigger is one of:
**(a) Tag push (normal release).** Cutting the tag IS the release:
```bash
git tag v1.30.41 && git push origin v1.30.41
```
The webhook maps `refs/tags/v1.30.41``branch=v1.30.41`; `hanzo.yml`'s
`tag-pattern: "{{git.branch}}"` yields the image tag `v1.30.41`. Platform
schedules the amd64 + arm64 builds onto the live `lux-build-*` arcd pools and
pushes the multi-arch image to GHCR.
**(b) On-demand (re-release / backfill).** The platform `buildJob.trigger`
tRPC mutation schedules the same build for an explicit ref, no push required:
```
buildJob.trigger({
installationId: "<luxfi GitHub App installation id>",
repo: "luxfi/node",
sha: "<commit at the tag>",
ref: "refs/tags/v1.30.41",
branch: "v1.30.41" // → image tag via {{git.branch}}
})
```
Track it: `buildJob.list` / `buildJob.one` / `buildJob.logs` (org-scoped).
> A pool goes **native** the moment an arcd runner self-registers for it
> (`arcd_runner.lastSeen` within 90s); until then platform transparently falls
> back to `workflow_dispatch` so a build is never stranded. To run a release
> fully GitHub-free, ensure a `lux-build-linux-{amd64,arm64}` runner is live
> (`tRPC arcd` / the `arcd_runner` table). Set platform env
> `WORKFLOW_DISPATCH_FALLBACK=false` to forbid the legacy hop.
### What the runner runs (identical on a fleet host, for manual/DR builds)
The native path runs exactly the repo's `Dockerfile`. To reproduce on a fleet
host directly (e.g. `spark`), with no platform and no GitHub:
```bash
# on spark (linux/arm64; amd64 via buildx)
git clone --branch v1.30.41 git@github.com:luxfi/node.git && cd node
docker buildx build --platform linux/amd64 \
--build-arg CGO_ENABLED=0 \
-t ghcr.io/luxfi/node:v1.30.41 -f Dockerfile --push .
```
## Publish the plugin set — step 2
After the image exists, publish artifact 2 from it (one command, idempotent,
no second compile). Run on any fleet host or a DOKS Job that has `crane`/docker
+ `mc`; typically the same arcd runner that just built the image:
```bash
scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh \
ghcr.io/luxfi/node:v1.30.41 \
lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset> \
lux # mc alias for the target MinIO/S3
# e.g. lux-plugins-testnet/v1.3.5
```
It extracts the 12 plugin binaries from the image, writes `SHA256SUMS`, uploads
all to `s3://lux-plugins-<env>/<pluginset>/`, and verifies remote==local sha.
S3 is the in-cluster MinIO (`s3.lux-system.svc.cluster.local:9000`, external
`s3.lux.network`). Configure the `mc` alias once with the `hanzo-s3-secret`
credentials:
```bash
mc alias set lux <endpoint> hanzo "$(kubectl -n lux-system get secret \
hanzo-s3-secret -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d)" --api s3v4
```
A pluginset prefix is **immutable** — bump `<pluginset>` for a new release,
never overwrite a prefix a live network points at.
## Deploy — step 3 (operator, not this repo)
luxd rollout is owned by the **lux operator** (`~/work/lux/operator`,
`LuxNetwork` CR). Update the CR's `image.tag` (artifact 1) and, when the
network fetches plugins from S3, the `pluginSource.bucket` + per-plugin
`sha256` (artifact 2, from the `SHA256SUMS` you just published). The operator's
`plugin-fetch` init container verifies each sha256 fail-closed. This is
deliberately decoupled from build: `hanzo.yml` has **no `deploy:` block**.
## Reproducibility
- The build is **functionally reproducible**: same source tags + same toolchain
(Go 1.26.4) + `CGO_ENABLED=0` ⇒ functionally identical plugins, provable by a
fleet rebuild (verified: `spark` rebuilt evm@v1.99.37 + dexvm@v1.5.15 from the
same tags). It is **not bit-identical by construction**: the Dockerfile plugin
stages omit `-trimpath` and use `-mod=mod` with a first-party `go.sum` strip
(re-resolves luxfi/* deps), so embedded paths + re-tagged module content can
shift the bytes (Go `BuildID` differs; binary ~16 KB larger). The published
image is the canonical artifact; verify against ITS baked sha (what
`publish_plugin_set.sh` records), not a separate fleet build.
- To make releases bit-reproducible (future hardening, patch-only): add
`-trimpath` to every plugin `go build` and pin `go.sum` (drop the strip +
`-mod=mod`). Tracked as a follow-up; not required for correctness.
## Retire the GitHub Actions build workflows
These `.github/workflows/*` build/release/CI workflows are superseded by this
flow and must be removed/disabled (platform owns build; the native long-poll
owns dispatch). Delete them once a `lux-build-*` arcd runner is live:
| Workflow | Replaced by |
|----------|-------------|
| `docker.yml` (built `ghcr.io/luxfi/node` on the `lux-build` ARC pool) | `hanzo.yml` (artifact 1) — native long-poll, NO GitHub Actions |
| `release.yml` | the tag-push trigger above + `scripts/publish_plugin_set.sh` |
| `build.yml`, `ci.yml` | platform CI test step (runner runs `go test` pre-build) |
| `build-linux-binaries.yml` | `Dockerfile` builder stage (luxd binary) |
| `build-ubuntu-amd64-release.yml`, `build-ubuntu-arm64-release.yml` | `Dockerfile` + buildx multi-arch |
| `build-macos-release.yml`, `build-win-release.yml`, `build-and-test-mac-windows.yml` | arcd `lux-build-{macos,windows}-*` pools (matrix in `hanzo.yml` when desired) |
| `build-deb-pkg.sh`, `build-tgz-pkg.sh` (under `.github/workflows/`) | packaging step on the arcd runner (post-build), not GitHub Actions |
| `codeql-analysis.yml`, `fuzz.yml`, `fuzz_merkledb.yml`, `test-database-replay.yml` | scheduled jobs on arcd / DOKS (not a build dependency) |
| `buf-lint.yml`, `buf-push.yml`, `labels.yml`, `stale.yml` | repo-hygiene; migrate to arcd cron or drop |
The same retirement applies to the equivalent build/release workflows in the
plugin-source repos (`luxfi/evm`, `luxfi/chains`, `luxfi/dex`): their artifacts
are built from source by THIS repo's `Dockerfile` at the pinned refs, so those
repos need no independent image/release CI — only their tags. Migrate each by
adding a `hanzo.yml` (if it ships its own image) or deleting its build CI (if it
is consumed only as a Go module / plugin source here).
+10 -10
View File
@@ -2519,7 +2519,7 @@ The plugin version is unchanged at `27` and compatible with versions `v1.10.5 -
### Configs
- Changed the default value of `--network-allow-private-ips` to `false` when the `--network-id` is either `fuji` or `mainnet`
- Changed the default value of `--network-allow-private-ips` to `false` when the `--network-id` is either `testnet` or `mainnet`
- Added P-chain cache size configurations
- `block-cache-size`
- `tx-cache-size`
@@ -2564,7 +2564,7 @@ The plugin version is unchanged at `27` and compatible with versions `v1.10.5 -
- [x/sync] Update target locking by @patrick-ogrady in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1763
- Export warp errors for external use by @aaronbuchwald in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1771
- Remove unused networking constant by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1774
- Change the default value of `--network-allow-private-ips` to `false` for `mainnet` and `fuji` by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1773
- Change the default value of `--network-allow-private-ips` to `false` for `mainnet` and `testnet` by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1773
- Remove context.TODO from tests by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1778
- Replace linkeddb iterator with native DB range queries by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1752
- Add support for measuring key size in caches by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1781
@@ -2934,7 +2934,7 @@ This version is backwards compatible to [v1.10.0](https://github.com/luxfi/node/
- Remove no-op changes from history results in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1335
- Cleanup type assertions in the linkedHashmap by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1341
- Fix racy xvm tx access by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1349
- Update Fuji beacon ips by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1354
- Update Testnet beacon ips by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1354
- Remove duplicate TLS verification by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1364
- Adjust Merkledb Trie invalidation locking in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1355
- Use require in Lux bootstrapping tests by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1344
@@ -2949,7 +2949,7 @@ This version is backwards compatible to [v1.10.0](https://github.com/luxfi/node/
- [Issue-1368]: Panic in serializedPath.HasPrefix in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1371
- Add ValidatorsOnly flag to GetStake by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1377
- Use proto in `x/sync` by @danlaine in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1336
- Update incorrect fuji beacon IPs by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1392
- Update incorrect testnet beacon IPs by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1392
- Update `api/` error handling by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1393
- refactor concurrent work limiting in sync in `x/sync` by @danlaine in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1347
- Remove check for impossible condition in `x/sync` by @danlaine in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1348
@@ -3017,7 +3017,7 @@ The supported plugin version is `25`.
- defer delegatee rewards until end of validator staking period by @dhrubabasu in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1262
- Initialize UptimeCalculator in TestPeer by @joshua-kim in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1283
- Add Lux liveness health checks by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1287
- Skip AMI generation with Fuji tags by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1288
- Skip AMI generation with Testnet tags by @StephenButtolph in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1288
- Use `maps.Equal` in `set.Equals` by @danlaine in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1290
- return accrued delegator rewards in `GetCurrentValidators` by @dhrubabasu in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1291
- Add zstd compression by @danlaine in https://github.com/luxfi/node/pull/1278
@@ -3819,7 +3819,7 @@ The supported plugin version is `16`.
Please upgrade your node as soon as possible.
The changes in `v1.8.x` go into effect at 4 PM EDT on September 6th, 2022 on both Fuji and Mainnet. You should upgrade your node before the changes go into effect, otherwise they may experience loss of uptime.
The changes in `v1.8.x` go into effect at 4 PM EDT on September 6th, 2022 on both Testnet and Mainnet. You should upgrade your node before the changes go into effect, otherwise they may experience loss of uptime.
The supported plugin version is `16`.
@@ -3833,7 +3833,7 @@ The supported plugin version is `16`.
Please upgrade your node as soon as possible.
The changes in `v1.8.x` go into effect at 4 PM EDT on September 6th, 2022 on both Fuji and Mainnet. You should upgrade your node before the changes go into effect, otherwise they may experience loss of uptime.
The changes in `v1.8.x` go into effect at 4 PM EDT on September 6th, 2022 on both Testnet and Mainnet. You should upgrade your node before the changes go into effect, otherwise they may experience loss of uptime.
The supported plugin version is `16`.
@@ -3850,7 +3850,7 @@ The supported plugin version is `16`.
This is a mandatory security upgrade. Please upgrade your node **as soon as possible.**
The changes in the upgrade go into effect at **4 PM EDT on September 6th, 2022** on both Fuji and Mainnet. You should upgrade your node before the changes go into effect, otherwise they may experience loss of uptime.
The changes in the upgrade go into effect at **4 PM EDT on September 6th, 2022** on both Testnet and Mainnet. You should upgrade your node before the changes go into effect, otherwise they may experience loss of uptime.
You may see some extraneous ERROR logs ("BAD BLOCK") on your node after upgrading. These may continue until the Apricot Phase 6 activation (at 4 PM EDT on September 6th).
@@ -4515,7 +4515,7 @@ This version is backwards compatible to [v1.7.0](https://github.com/luxfi/node/r
- Added `--stake-supply-cap` which defaults to `720,000,000,000,000,000` nLUX.
- Renamed `--bootstrap-multiput-max-containers-sent` to `--bootstrap-ancestors-max-containers-sent`.
- Renamed `--bootstrap-multiput-max-containers-received` to `--bootstrap-ancestors-max-containers-received`.
- Enforced that `--staking-enabled=false` can not be specified on public networks (`Fuji` and `Mainnet`).
- Enforced that `--staking-enabled=false` can not be specified on public networks (`Testnet` and `Mainnet`).
### Metrics
@@ -4762,7 +4762,7 @@ This was the version used for the first public Lux Network deployment in Decembe
### Network Support
- **Primary Network**: LUX mainnet and testnet
- **Net Support**: Full L2/chain capabilities
- **Net Support**: Full chain capabilities
- **Cross-Chain**: Warp messaging and atomic swaps
- **Validator Management**: Staking and delegation
+4 -4
View File
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ import (
"sync"
"syscall"
"github.com/luxfi/filesystem/perms"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
"github.com/luxfi/node/node"
"github.com/luxfi/node/utils"
"github.com/luxfi/filesystem/perms"
"github.com/luxfi/sys/ulimit"
nodeconfig "github.com/luxfi/node/config/node"
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ func New(config nodeconfig.Config) (App, error) {
infoLevel, _ := log.ToLevel("info")
logFactory := log.NewFactoryWithConfig(log.Config{
RotatingWriterConfig: log.RotatingWriterConfig{
MaxSize: 8, // 8MB per log file (reasonable for standard profile)
MaxFiles: 5, // Keep 5 rotated files
MaxAge: 7, // 7 days retention
MaxSize: 8, // 8MB per log file (reasonable for standard profile)
MaxFiles: 5, // Keep 5 rotated files
MaxAge: 7, // 7 days retention
Directory: config.DatabaseConfig.Path,
},
DisplayLevel: infoLevel,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import (
"sync"
"time"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
metrics "github.com/luxfi/metric"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
)
// NewManager creates a new benchlist manager
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
)
// BenchmarkHashingComputeHash256 benchmarks SHA256 hashing performance
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@ import (
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/database/prefixdb"
"github.com/luxfi/database/versiondb"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
)
// BenchmarkMemoryDatabase benchmarks in-memory database operations
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
)
// BenchmarkMessageCompression benchmarks message compression
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ package lru
import (
"sync"
"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
"github.com/luxfi/node/cache"
"github.com/luxfi/utils"
"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
)
var _ cache.Cacher[struct{}, struct{}] = (*Cache[struct{}, struct{}])(nil)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ package lru
import (
"sync"
"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
"github.com/luxfi/node/cache"
"github.com/luxfi/utils"
"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
)
var _ cache.Cacher[struct{}, any] = (*SizedCache[struct{}, any])(nil)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ package cache
import (
"sync"
"github.com/luxfi/utils"
"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
"github.com/luxfi/utils"
)
var _ Cacher[struct{}, struct{}] = (*LRU[struct{}, struct{}])(nil)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ package cache
import (
"sync"
"github.com/luxfi/utils"
"github.com/luxfi/container/linked"
"github.com/luxfi/utils"
)
var _ Cacher[struct{}, any] = (*sizedLRU[struct{}, any])(nil)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ import (
"errors"
"sync"
"github.com/luxfi/vm/chain"
consensusvertex "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/vertex"
"github.com/luxfi/database"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/fx"
"github.com/luxfi/runtime"
vmcore "github.com/luxfi/vm"
"github.com/luxfi/vm/chain"
"github.com/luxfi/warp"
)
+445 -67
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ import (
"context"
"crypto"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -70,11 +70,17 @@ import (
"github.com/luxfi/vm/fx"
// "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/metervm" // Temporarily disabled - needs consensus package updates
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/bls12381fx"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/ed25519fx"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/mldsafx"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/nftfx"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/propertyfx"
// "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/proposervm"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/schnorrfx"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/secp256k1fx"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/secp256r1fx"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/slhdsafx"
// "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/tracedvm" // Temporarily disabled - needs consensus package updates
// "github.com/luxfi/node/proto/p2p" // Available if needed for protobuf parsing
@@ -128,10 +134,26 @@ var (
errNotBootstrapped = errors.New("chains not bootstrapped")
errPartialSyncAsAValidator = errors.New("partial sync should not be configured for a validator")
// fxs lists every Feature eXtension factory the node knows how to load
// when a chain genesis references it. Must stay in sync with the X-Chain
// FxIDs[] block in genesis/builder/builder.go: any fx ID present there
// MUST be registered here, otherwise chain init fails with "fx ... not
// found" at startup. Keep the order and grouping mirroring genesis to
// make drift obvious in review.
fxs = map[ids.ID]fx.Factory{
// Legacy / classical
secp256k1fx.ID: &secp256k1fx.Factory{},
nftfx.ID: &nftfx.Factory{},
propertyfx.ID: &propertyfx.Factory{},
// Post-quantum (FIPS 203/204/205 family)
mldsafx.ID: &mldsafx.Factory{},
slhdsafx.ID: &slhdsafx.Factory{},
// EdDSA / Schnorr / NIST P-256
ed25519fx.ID: &ed25519fx.Factory{},
secp256r1fx.ID: &secp256r1fx.Factory{},
schnorrfx.ID: &schnorrfx.Factory{},
// Pairing-friendly curve
bls12381fx.ID: &bls12381fx.Factory{},
}
_ Manager = (*manager)(nil)
@@ -283,6 +305,19 @@ func getValidatorState(state validators.State) validators.State {
return &noopValidatorState{}
}
// quorumValidatorStateLive reports whether a HEIGHT-INDEXED validator state has
// actually been published for a K>1 quorum chain. A nil state means the P-Chain
// never published its validators.State into the manager — getValidatorState would
// then supply the no-op State, whose GetValidatorSet is empty at every height, so
// the ⅔-by-stake tally is 0 and VerifyWeighted fails closed FOREVER (a silent
// permanent finality stall). This predicate is the fail-closed guard (CRITICAL-1
// (c)): a K>1 chain whose state is not live must REFUSE TO START loudly rather
// than run with the no-op State. It is a pure function so the guard is unit-
// testable without building a whole chain (quorum_guard_node_test.go).
func quorumValidatorStateLive(state validators.State) bool {
return state != nil
}
// createWarpSigner creates a warp.Signer from a bls.Signer
func createWarpSigner(sk bls.Signer, networkID uint32, chainID ids.ID) warp.Signer {
if sk == nil {
@@ -301,7 +336,12 @@ type ChainConfig struct {
type ManagerConfig struct {
SybilProtectionEnabled bool
StakingTLSSigner crypto.Signer
// ConsensusOverride carries the operator's EXPLICIT --consensus-sample-size /
// --consensus-quorum-size. Zero fields mean "use the dynamic live-set value";
// a set field is honored but clamped to the dynamic strict-⅔ floor
// (selectConsensusParams / applyConsensusOverride). Sourced from node Config.
ConsensusOverride ConsensusOverride
StakingTLSSigner crypto.Signer
StakingTLSCert *staking.Certificate
StakingBLSKey bls.Signer
TracingEnabled bool
@@ -323,17 +363,41 @@ type ManagerConfig struct {
PartialSyncPrimaryNetwork bool
Server server.Server // Handles HTTP API calls
AtomicMemory *atomic.Memory
XAssetID ids.ID
UTXOAssetID ids.ID
SkipBootstrap bool // Skip bootstrapping and start processing immediately
EnableAutomining bool // Enable automining in POA mode
XChainID ids.ID // ID of the X-Chain,
CChainID ids.ID // ID of the C-Chain,
DChainID ids.ID // ID of the D-Chain (DEX),
CriticalChains set.Set[ids.ID] // Chains that can't exit gracefully
TimeoutManager timeout.Manager // Manages request timeouts when sending messages to other validators
Health health.Registerer
NetConfigs map[ids.ID]nets.Config // ID -> NetConfig
ChainConfigs map[string]ChainConfig // alias -> ChainConfig
// ChainAuthorizations gates per-validator activation of specific chains on
// X-Chain NFT ownership: a validator may track/validate a listed chain
// only if its staking X-address (StakingXAddress) holds the required
// nftfx NFT. A nil/empty map means no chain is NFT-gated, so every chain
// behaves exactly as before. Critical chains are never gated regardless of
// this map. Node wiring (e.g. DChainID -> dex-validator collection) is set
// in node.go; see authorizeChainActivation.
ChainAuthorizations map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization
// StakingXAddress is this node's X-Chain address derived from its staking
// keys; it is the owner whose UTXOs the NFT-authorization gate inspects.
// Empty when no chain is gated; an empty address with a gated chain causes
// that chain to be opted out (fail closed).
StakingXAddress ids.ShortID
// DexValidator is the operator's opt-in to PARTICIPATE in the D-Chain DEX
// (track/validate it + dial the venue matcher). It is a NECESSARY condition
// for D-Chain activation that composes AND-wise with the NFT gate: the
// D-Chain (DChainID) activates only if DexValidator is true AND the NFT
// requirement (if any) is satisfied. Default false means a node does NOT
// activate the D-Chain even when it is queued by --track-all-chains; the
// activation authority is authorizeChainActivation, not the platformvm
// tracking set. Only the D-Chain consults this flag; every other chain is
// untouched. Sourced from node Config.DexValidator (see node.go).
DexValidator bool
TimeoutManager timeout.Manager // Manages request timeouts when sending messages to other validators
Health health.Registerer
NetConfigs map[ids.ID]nets.Config // ID -> NetConfig
ChainConfigs map[string]ChainConfig // alias -> ChainConfig
// ShutdownNodeFunc allows the chain manager to issue a request to shutdown the node
ShutdownNodeFunc func(exitCode int)
MeterVMEnabled bool // Should each VM be wrapped with a MeterVM
@@ -363,6 +427,17 @@ type ManagerConfig struct {
ChainDataDir string
Nets *Nets
// SecurityProfile is the chain-wide ChainSecurityProfile resolved
// from the genesis pin during node bootstrap (F102). The chain
// manager forwards a ProfileID + ProfileHash pin to every VM
// Initialize call via the VM config bytes so the rpcchainvm plugin
// (coreth C-Chain) inherits the chain-wide posture without
// re-resolving genesis. Closes red-team finding F118.
//
// Nil under classical-compat or pre-locked-profile chains; the
// stamping pass is a no-op in that case.
SecurityProfile *consensusconfig.ChainSecurityProfile
}
type manager struct {
@@ -392,6 +467,16 @@ type manager struct {
pendingVMChainsLock sync.RWMutex
pendingVMChains map[ids.ID][]ChainParameters
// gatedChainsLock guards the NFT-authorization gate's defer state.
// pendingGatedChains holds chains parked because the X-Chain was not yet
// bootstrapped when their activation was attempted; they are re-queued once
// the X-Chain is created (retryPendingGatedChains). gatedAttempts caps
// re-attempts per chain so a never-bootstrapping X-Chain cannot park a
// chain forever. See manager_authz.go.
gatedChainsLock sync.Mutex
pendingGatedChains []ChainParameters
gatedAttempts map[ids.ID]int
chainsLock sync.Mutex
// Key: Chain's ID
// Value: The chain
@@ -469,6 +554,7 @@ func New(config *ManagerConfig) (Manager, error) {
unblockChainCreatorCh: make(chan struct{}),
chainCreatorShutdownCh: make(chan struct{}),
pendingVMChains: make(map[ids.ID][]ChainParameters),
gatedAttempts: make(map[ids.ID]int),
luxGatherer: luxGatherer,
handlerGatherer: handlerGatherer,
@@ -485,31 +571,12 @@ func New(config *ManagerConfig) (Manager, error) {
// QueueChainCreation queues a chain creation request
// Invariant: Tracked Net must be checked before calling this function
func (m *manager) QueueChainCreation(chainParams ChainParameters) {
// Check for chain ID mapping override for C-Chain
m.Log.Info("QueueChainCreation called",
log.String("vmID", chainParams.VMID.String()),
log.String("EVMID", constants.EVMID.String()),
log.Bool("vmIDEqualsEVMID", chainParams.VMID == constants.EVMID),
log.String("envVar", os.Getenv("LUX_CHAIN_ID_MAPPING_C")),
)
if chainParams.VMID == constants.EVMID && os.Getenv("LUX_CHAIN_ID_MAPPING_C") != "" {
mappedID := os.Getenv("LUX_CHAIN_ID_MAPPING_C")
parsedID, err := ids.FromString(mappedID)
if err == nil {
m.Log.Info("Using mapped blockchain ID for C-Chain",
log.String("original", chainParams.ID.String()),
log.String("mapped", parsedID.String()),
)
chainParams.ID = parsedID
} else {
m.Log.Warn("Invalid chain ID mapping",
log.String("mapping", mappedID),
log.Err(err),
)
}
}
// Register blockchain→chain mapping with the network layer so gossip
// can resolve which validator set to use for this blockchain's blocks.
if chainParams.ChainID != constants.PrimaryNetworkID && m.Net != nil {
@@ -549,6 +616,44 @@ func (m *manager) createChain(chainParams ChainParameters) {
sb, _ := m.Nets.GetOrCreate(chainParams.ChainID)
// NFT-authorization gate: a chain listed in ChainAuthorizations may only be
// activated if this validator's staking X-address holds the required
// X-Chain NFT. Ungated and critical chains short-circuit to authorized, so
// this is a no-op for P/C/X/Q/… and whenever ChainAuthorizations is empty.
if authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(chainParams.ID); !ready {
// The X-Chain is not bootstrapped yet, so the gate cannot decide.
// Park the chain out of the queue and retry once the X-Chain is
// created; do not skip permanently. The attempt cap bounds this.
if m.deferGatedChain(chainParams) {
m.Log.Info("deferring gated chain activation until X-Chain bootstrapped",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID),
log.Stringer("vmID", chainParams.VMID),
)
return
}
// Cap exhausted: the X-Chain never became queryable. Opt out cleanly,
// exactly like an unauthorized chain — mark bootstrapped, no failing
// health check.
m.Log.Warn("opting out of gated chain: X-Chain did not bootstrap in time",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID),
log.Stringer("vmID", chainParams.VMID),
)
sb.Bootstrapped(chainParams.ID)
return
} else if !authorized {
// Clean opt-out: this validator does not hold the required NFT. Mirror
// the VM-plugin-not-loaded skip exactly — mark the slot bootstrapped
// and return WITHOUT a failing health check, so the node stays healthy
// while declining to validate a chain it is not authorized for.
m.Log.Info("chain activation not authorized — validator X-address does not hold the required NFT",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ChainID),
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID),
log.Stringer("vmID", chainParams.VMID),
)
sb.Bootstrapped(chainParams.ID)
return
}
// Note: buildChain builds all chain's relevant objects (notably engine and handler)
// but does not start their operations. Starting of the handler (which could potentially
// issue some internal messages), is delayed until chain dispatching is started and
@@ -616,6 +721,35 @@ func (m *manager) createChain(chainParams ChainParameters) {
}
chainAlias := m.PrimaryAliasOrDefault(chainParams.ID)
// Plugin-not-loaded is a deliberate skip, not a failure.
//
// Each validator opts into chains by loading their VM plugin
// (Liquid loads /dex/fhe; doesn't load Lux's upstream
// EVM plugin for C-Chain because Liquid runs its own EVM as a
// chain on the primary's P-chain). When the chain manager hits a
// chain whose VM isn't registered, that's the validator's "no I
// don't validate this one" signal — log info, mark the slot
// bootstrapped, and return WITHOUT registering a failing health
// check. The chain stays in pending state for hot-load if the
// plugin shows up later (e.g. via lpm install).
//
// The old behavior (always register a failing health check) made
// /ext/health return 503 for any opted-out chain, which made
// kubelet liveness probes kill the validator pod. That made
// chain participation effectively all-or-nothing per validator.
// Now: validators participate per-plugin, opt-in.
if errors.Is(err, vms.ErrNotFound) {
m.Log.Info("chain VM plugin not loaded — opting out of this chain",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ChainID),
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID),
log.String("chainAlias", chainAlias),
log.Stringer("vmID", chainParams.VMID),
)
sb.Bootstrapped(chainParams.ID)
return
}
m.Log.Warn("non-critical chain failed to initialize",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ChainID),
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID),
@@ -624,15 +758,13 @@ func (m *manager) createChain(chainParams ChainParameters) {
log.Err(err),
)
// Non-critical chain failed (e.g. D-Chain with missing VM plugin).
// Mark it as bootstrapped so it doesn't block the node's health check.
// The chain-specific health check below still reports the failure.
// Non-critical chain failed for a real reason (not missing
// plugin). Mark it as bootstrapped so it doesn't block the
// node-level health check, but DO register a per-chain failing
// health check so operators see something is wrong with a chain
// they did opt into.
sb.Bootstrapped(chainParams.ID)
// Register the health check for this chain regardless of if it was
// created or not. This attempts to notify the node operator that their
// node may not be properly validating the net they expect to be
// validating.
healthCheckErr := fmt.Errorf("failed to create chain on net %s: %w", chainParams.ChainID, err)
err := m.Health.RegisterHealthCheck(
chainAlias,
@@ -657,6 +789,13 @@ func (m *manager) createChain(chainParams ChainParameters) {
m.chains[chainParams.ID] = chain
m.chainsLock.Unlock()
// The X-Chain is now tracked, so the NFT-authorization gate can query it.
// Re-queue any gated chains that were parked waiting for it (no-op when
// nothing is parked or this is not the X-Chain).
if chainParams.ID == m.XChainID {
m.retryPendingGatedChains()
}
// Associate the newly created chain with its default alias
if err := m.Alias(chainParams.ID, chainParams.ID.String()); err != nil {
m.Log.Error("failed to alias the new chain with itself",
@@ -874,16 +1013,15 @@ func (m *manager) buildChain(chainParams ChainParameters, sb nets.Net) (*chainIn
XChainID: m.XChainID,
CChainID: m.CChainID,
XAssetID: m.XAssetID,
UTXOAssetID: m.UTXOAssetID,
ChainDataDir: chainDataDir,
BCLookup: m,
ValidatorState: getValidatorState(m.validatorState),
SharedMemory: chainSharedMemory,
Metrics: chainMetricsGatherer,
Log: chainLog,
WarpSigner: warpSigner,
NetworkUpgrades: &m.Upgrades,
BCLookup: m,
ValidatorState: getValidatorState(m.validatorState),
SharedMemory: chainSharedMemory,
Metrics: chainMetricsGatherer,
Log: chainLog,
WarpSigner: warpSigner,
}
// Get a factory for the vm we want to use on our chain
@@ -992,8 +1130,12 @@ func (m *manager) buildChain(chainParams ChainParameters, sb nets.Net) (*chainIn
}
// Initialize the VM if it supports the Initialize interface
// Inject automining config for dev mode (applies to C-Chain/coreth only)
// Inject automining config for dev mode (applies to C-Chain/coreth only),
// then stamp the chain-wide SecurityProfile pin into the C-Chain
// JSON config (F118) so the rpcchainvm plugin can resolve the
// profile on its side of the boundary.
vmConfigBytes := m.injectAutominingConfig(chainParams.VMID, chainConfig.Config)
vmConfigBytes = m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(chainParams.VMID, vmConfigBytes)
m.Log.Info("initializing VM", log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID))
initCtx, initCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer initCancel()
@@ -1019,6 +1161,35 @@ func (m *manager) buildChain(chainParams ChainParameters, sb nets.Net) (*chainIn
}
m.Log.Info("VM initialized successfully", log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID))
// CRITICAL-1(a): publish the P-Chain's HEIGHT-INDEXED validators.State so
// every K>1 chain built AFTER it (C-Chain, L1s, …) resolves the weighted
// validator set / per-voter pubkeys / stake at the block's P-chain epoch
// height. The platformvm VM instance IS a validators.State (it embeds the
// height-indexed pvalidators.Manager built from its own state DB, with the
// real GetValidatorSet(ctx, height, netID)). It only EXISTS after the
// P-Chain VM is initialized — which is here — and the P-Chain is created
// before any other primary-network chain (single serial chain-creator
// goroutine), so this assignment happens-before every later chain reads
// m.validatorState in the K>1 wiring block below. Without this the field
// stays nil → getValidatorState returns the no-op → empty set at every
// height → ⅔-stake tally is 0 → finality stalls forever on every K>1 chain
// (the bug the fail-closed guard now also catches). Plain assignment is
// race-free: chain creation is serialized (dispatchChainCreator).
if chainParams.ID == constants.PlatformChainID {
if vdrState, ok := vmImpl.(validators.State); ok {
m.validatorState = vdrState
m.Log.Info("published P-Chain height-indexed validator state to chain manager (MEDIUM-1/CRITICAL-1)",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID))
} else {
// The P-Chain MUST be a validators.State; if it is not, every K>1
// chain (including the P-Chain itself) would stall. Fail loud.
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"P-Chain VM %T does not implement validators.State — cannot publish the "+
"height-indexed validator set; every K>1 quorum chain would stall finality",
vmImpl)
}
}
// Transition VM to normal operation after initialization
// For genesis-based networks with pre-configured validators, this is required
// to make the VM APIs available immediately
@@ -1078,34 +1249,118 @@ func (m *manager) buildChain(chainParams ChainParameters, sb nets.Net) (*chainIn
)
// Choose consensus parameters based on mode:
// - Single-node (--dev, sybil protection disabled): K=1, self-voting
// - Multi-node (normal): K=3, 2/3 threshold
var consensusParams consensusconfig.Parameters
if !m.SybilProtectionEnabled {
consensusParams = consensusconfig.Parameters{
K: 1,
Alpha: 1.0,
AlphaPreference: 1,
AlphaConfidence: 1,
Beta: 1,
ConcurrentPolls: 1,
OptimalProcessing: 1,
MaxOutstandingItems: 256,
MaxItemProcessingTime: 30 * time.Second,
}
} else {
consensusParams = consensusconfig.LocalParams()
// - Single-node (--dev, sybil protection disabled): K=1, self-voting
// (the sole validator's accept is the 1-of-1 quorum).
// - Multi-node (sybil-protected): a BYZANTINE-fault-tolerant param set
// selected by network (Mainnet K=21 / Testnet K=11 / Default K=20 /
// local-dev K=numValidators).
//
// CRITICAL-2: the prior code used LocalParams() (K=3, α=2 → f=0, CFT) for
// ALL sybil-protected nets — a SINGLE Byzantine validator forks K=3/α=2.
// We now select a real BFT set and FAIL CLOSED if it is not value-safe.
//
// LIVENESS: local-dev params are sized to the LIVE primary-network
// validator set (the set every native chain — P/C/D — samples from), so the
// proposer's self-filtered K-sample still polls the whole set and α has BFT
// slack. A hardcoded K=4 on a 5-validator set polled only 3 peers while α=3
// demanded all 3 — one lagging validator wedged finality at height 0.
numPrimaryValidators := 0
if m.Validators != nil {
numPrimaryValidators = m.Validators.Count(constants.PrimaryNetworkID)
}
consensusEngine := consensuschain.NewRuntime(consensuschain.NetworkConfig{
consensusParams := selectConsensusParams(m.SybilProtectionEnabled, m.NetworkID, numPrimaryValidators, m.ConsensusOverride)
if m.SybilProtectionEnabled {
// Fail-closed backstop, LIVE-AWARE: the committee must clear the
// protocol overlap bound (Valid), tolerate ≥1 Byzantine validator
// (f≥1), and sample at least min(tierFloor, liveValidators). With K
// sized to the live set this always holds; it rejects only a genuinely
// unsafe or under-sized committee.
if err := consensusParams.ValidateForLiveValueNetwork(m.NetworkID, numPrimaryValidators); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("refusing to start multi-node chain %s with non-BFT consensus params: %w", chainParams.ID, err)
}
}
// HIGH-4: wire the α-of-K vote/cert topology for multi-validator (K>1)
// chains so finality is LIVE (votes broadcast to all, certs gossiped,
// followers finalize on the cert). Without a verifier a K>1 engine refuses
// to Start; without the gossiper Mode() reports degraded and value-DEX is
// refused. For K==1 these stay nil (no quorum, no signatures).
gossiper := &networkGossiper{net: m.Net, msgCreator: m.MsgCreator, networkID: networkID}
netCfg := consensuschain.NetworkConfig{
ChainID: chainParams.ID,
NetworkID: networkID,
NodeID: m.NodeID,
Validators: m.Validators, // CRITICAL: Pass validator sampler for k-peer polling
Logger: m.Log,
Gossiper: &networkGossiper{net: m.Net, msgCreator: m.MsgCreator, networkID: networkID},
Gossiper: gossiper,
VM: blockBuilder,
Params: &consensusParams,
})
}
if consensusParams.K > 1 {
// CRITICAL-1 FAIL-CLOSED GUARD (c): a K>1 quorum chain finalizes ONLY
// on a ⅔-by-stake supermajority read from the HEIGHT-INDEXED validator
// state. If that state was never published (m.validatorState == nil →
// getValidatorState returns the no-op, whose GetValidatorSet is empty at
// every height), the stake tally is 0 → VerifyWeighted fails closed →
// NO block EVER finalizes. That is a SILENT permanent finality stall.
// Refuse to build the chain LOUDLY instead. The P-Chain publishes its
// own height-indexed State into m.validatorState the moment it is
// created (it is built before any other K>1 chain), so the P-Chain and
// every chain after it sees a live state here; only a genuine wiring
// regression trips this.
if !quorumValidatorStateLive(m.validatorState) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"refusing to start K>1 quorum chain %s: height-indexed validator state is not wired "+
"(getValidatorState would supply the no-op State → zero stake at every height → "+
"VerifyWeighted fails closed → finality would stall permanently). The P-Chain must be "+
"created first and publish its validators.State; this is a wiring bug, not a runtime condition",
chainParams.ID)
}
// Height-indexed validator state is the SINGLE source of epoch truth for
// ALL FOUR epoch-pinned reads (MEDIUM-1 / CRITICAL-1 / RESIDUAL-B):
// membership, per-voter PUBKEY (the verifier), the ⅔-by-stake tally, and
// the set-root commitment. They are all read at the block's P-CHAIN epoch
// height so every node computes the IDENTICAL set/pubkeys/weights/root for
// a given block — independent of async current-map skew during a P-chain /
// L1-staking change. (Reading the CURRENT map made the signer and the
// assembler disagree on the set-root, and dropped the votes of validators
// that had left the current map but were members at the epoch — stalling
// finality at every staking change.)
vdrState := getValidatorState(m.validatorState)
// Vote verifier resolves the voter's pubkey from set@epoch (RESIDUAL-B),
// the SAME height-pinned source as the stake + set-root — NOT m.Validators
// (the current map).
netCfg.VoteVerifier = newBLSVoteVerifier(vdrState, networkID)
netCfg.VoteSigner = newBLSVoteSigner(m.StakingBLSKey)
// Stake-weighted finality (HIGH-3): require a ⅔-of-stake supermajority,
// not just the α-of-K count, so a low-stake coalition cannot finalize.
netCfg.StakeSource = newValidatorStakeSource(vdrState, networkID)
// Epoch binding (MEDIUM-1): pin every vote/cert to the weighted validator
// set IN FORCE AT the block's P-chain epoch height so the ⅔-by-stake
// predicate is enforced at that epoch — a cert gathered under one set
// cannot be re-verified against another (its signatures were over this
// height-pinned root).
netCfg.ValidatorSetRoot = newValidatorSetRootSource(vdrState, networkID)
// b2: deliver the REAL P-chain epoch height to the engine. The four reads
// above are height-pinned but the engine reads that height off the VM
// block (pChainHeightOf) — and a bare plugin block exposes none, so the
// engine would resolve the set at P-chain height 0 (the GENESIS set),
// freezing the epoch and dropping every post-genesis validator's vote.
// Wrap the BlockBuilder so the block the engine builds/parses carries the
// proposer's live P-chain height (max(GetCurrentHeight, parentH)), stamped
// into the gossiped bytes so every follower adopts the IDENTICAL height —
// the set-root/stake/pubkey reads then track the LIVE set at that height.
// Installed ONLY here (K>1): a K==1 chain has no cert and no epoch, so the
// stamp is inert and the inner VM is used directly.
if blockBuilder != nil {
blockBuilder = newPChainHeightVM(blockBuilder, vdrState, networkID)
netCfg.VM = blockBuilder
m.Log.Info("wired P-chain epoch height into consensus block builder (b2)",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID),
log.Stringer("networkID", networkID))
}
}
consensusEngine := consensuschain.NewRuntime(netCfg)
// Start the consensus engine
engineStartCtx, engineStartCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
@@ -1183,7 +1438,11 @@ func (m *manager) buildChain(chainParams ChainParameters, sb nets.Net) (*chainIn
Runtime: chainRuntime,
VM: vmTyped, // Use the real VM directly
Engine: consensusEngine, // Use real consensus engine directly
Handler: newBlockHandler(vmTyped, m.Log, consensusEngine, m.Net, m.MsgCreator, chainParams.ID, networkID),
// Handler parses inbound blocks through the SAME builder the engine emits
// through (blockBuilder == the P-chain-height wrapper on K>1, the inner VM
// on K==1), so the container bytes it parses match the bytes the engine
// framed — one codec, no raw-vs-wrapped split.
Handler: newBlockHandler(blockBuilder, m.Log, consensusEngine, m.Net, m.MsgCreator, chainParams.ID, networkID),
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported VM type: %T", vmImpl)
@@ -1438,7 +1697,7 @@ func (m *manager) createDAG(
}
}
// Linearize the DAG chain (required for X-Chain post-Cortina)
// Linearize the DAG chain (required for X-Chain).
// This transitions the chain from DAG mode to linear block mode.
if vmInitialized {
if linearVM, ok := vmImpl.(interface {
@@ -1826,6 +2085,56 @@ func (m *manager) getChainConfig(id ids.ID) (ChainConfig, error) {
return ChainConfig{}, nil
}
// injectSecurityProfileConfig stamps the chain-wide ChainSecurityProfile
// pin into the C-Chain JSON config bytes so the coreth plugin VM can
// resolve the profile on its side of the rpcchainvm boundary. Closes
// red-team finding F118.
//
// The pin form is intentionally minimal — ProfileID byte + ProfileHash
// hex — so this manager package does not need to round-trip the full
// ChainSecurityProfile struct. The plugin VM calls
// consensusconfig.ProfileByID + ComputeHash and refuses the chain if the
// pinned hash does not match the live canonical content. Forked binaries
// that swap canonical profile content fail the hash compare; legitimate
// upgrades land via a new ProfileID and ProfileHash pair.
//
// Only applies to C-Chain (EVMID); other VMs are passed through.
func (m *manager) injectSecurityProfileConfig(vmID ids.ID, configBytes []byte) []byte {
if m.SecurityProfile == nil {
return configBytes
}
if vmID != constants.EVMID {
return configBytes
}
// Parse existing config or create empty object.
var cfg map[string]interface{}
if len(configBytes) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(configBytes, &cfg); err != nil {
m.Log.Warn("failed to parse C-Chain config for security profile injection, creating new config",
log.Err(err))
cfg = make(map[string]interface{})
}
} else {
cfg = make(map[string]interface{})
}
cfg["lux-security-profile"] = map[string]interface{}{
"profileID": m.SecurityProfile.ProfileID & 0xff,
"profileHashHex": fmt.Sprintf("%x", m.SecurityProfile.ProfileHash[:]),
}
out, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
m.Log.Warn("failed to marshal C-Chain config after security profile injection", log.Err(err))
return configBytes
}
m.Log.Info("injected chain security profile pin into C-Chain plugin config",
log.Uint32("profileID", m.SecurityProfile.ProfileID),
log.String("profileName", m.SecurityProfile.ProfileName))
return out
}
// injectAutominingConfig modifies the config bytes to include enable-automining flag
// when dev mode automining is enabled. This is used for C-Chain (coreth) to enable
// anvil-like block production behavior.
@@ -1992,7 +2301,15 @@ func (e *emptyValidatorManager) GetCurrentValidators(ctx context.Context, height
// blockHandler implements handler.Handler interface and processes incoming blocks
// This enables block propagation between validators
type blockHandler struct {
vm chain.ChainVM
// vm is the SAME BlockBuilder the consensus engine builds/parses through — the
// P-chain-height-stamping wrapper on K>1 chains (so ParseBlock unwraps the
// transport envelope the engine emits and recovers the proposer's epoch
// height), the inner VM directly on K==1. The handler only needs the
// BlockBuilder subset (GetBlock / ParseBlock / LastAccepted); typing it as the
// builder — not chain.ChainVM — keeps the engine and the handler on ONE block
// codec, so inbound P2P container bytes are parsed by the same code that framed
// them (no raw-vs-wrapped mismatch).
vm consensuschain.BlockBuilder
logger log.Logger
engine *consensuschain.Runtime // Consensus engine for proper block handling
net network.Network // Network for sending Qbit responses
@@ -2031,7 +2348,7 @@ type contextRequest struct {
timestamp time.Time
}
func newBlockHandler(vm chain.ChainVM, logger log.Logger, engine *consensuschain.Runtime, net network.Network, msgCreator message.OutboundMsgBuilder, chainID ids.ID, networkID ids.ID) *blockHandler {
func newBlockHandler(vm consensuschain.BlockBuilder, logger log.Logger, engine *consensuschain.Runtime, net network.Network, msgCreator message.OutboundMsgBuilder, chainID ids.ID, networkID ids.ID) *blockHandler {
return &blockHandler{
vm: vm,
logger: logger,
@@ -2662,7 +2979,27 @@ func (b *blockHandler) Response(ctx context.Context, nodeID ids.NodeID, requestI
return nil
}
func (b *blockHandler) Gossip(ctx context.Context, nodeID ids.NodeID, msg []byte) error {
// Handle Gossip - try to process as block
// HIGH-4 receive demux: a quorum envelope (signed vote / finality cert) is
// routed to the engine's α-of-K topology; anything else is a plain block
// gossip handled by Put (backward-compatible — decode fails soft).
//
// The quorum path is consulted ONLY when the engine is in quorum-finality
// mode (K>1, live topology). A single-validator engine never emits vote/cert
// envelopes, so it always treats gossip as a block — this makes a chance
// collision of the envelope magic with block bytes impossible to misroute on
// the K==1 path.
if b.engine != nil && b.engine.Mode() == consensuschain.ModeQuorumFinality {
if kind, blockID, payload, err := decodeQuorumGossip(msg); err == nil {
switch kind {
case quorumKindVote:
b.engine.HandleIncomingVote(blockID, payload)
case quorumKindCert:
b.engine.HandleIncomingCert(payload)
}
return nil
}
}
// Plain block gossip.
return b.Put(ctx, nodeID, 0, msg)
}
func (b *blockHandler) GetStateSummaryFrontier(ctx context.Context, nodeID ids.NodeID, requestID uint32, deadline time.Time) error {
@@ -2886,6 +3223,47 @@ type networkGossiper struct {
// Compile-time check that networkGossiper implements Gossiper
var _ consensuschain.Gossiper = (*networkGossiper)(nil)
// Compile-time check that networkGossiper implements QuorumGossiper — the
// vote/cert distribution topology that makes α-of-K finality LIVE (HIGH-4).
// Without this the consensus engine runs degraded (Mode() != ModeQuorumFinality)
// and value-DEX is refused.
var _ consensuschain.QuorumGossiper = (*networkGossiper)(nil)
// BroadcastVote sends this node's SIGNED accept vote for blockID to ALL
// validators on the network (not just the proposer). The signed vote rides on
// app-gossip framed in a quorum envelope (decoded by blockHandler.Gossip into
// engine.HandleIncomingVote). Broadcasting to ALL — rather than SendVote-to-
// proposer-only — is the structural fix for the proposer-freeze: any node that
// collects α distinct signed votes can assemble + gossip the cert, so finality
// no longer hinges on one node's inbound Chits.
func (g *networkGossiper) BroadcastVote(chainID ids.ID, networkID ids.ID, blockID ids.ID, voteBytes []byte) int {
if g.net == nil || g.msgCreator == nil {
return 0
}
envelope := encodeQuorumGossip(quorumKindVote, blockID, voteBytes)
msg, err := g.msgCreator.Gossip(chainID, envelope)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
return g.net.Gossip(msg, nil, g.networkID, -1, 0, 0).Len()
}
// GossipCert broadcasts an assembled α-of-K finality cert to ALL validators so
// followers finalize blockID on a verifiable proof (HandleIncomingCert), not a
// fast-follow guess. Best effort: the gossiping node's own finality is already
// established by the verified cert.
func (g *networkGossiper) GossipCert(chainID ids.ID, networkID ids.ID, blockID ids.ID, certBytes []byte) int {
if g.net == nil || g.msgCreator == nil {
return 0
}
envelope := encodeQuorumGossip(quorumKindCert, blockID, certBytes)
msg, err := g.msgCreator.Gossip(chainID, envelope)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
return g.net.Gossip(msg, nil, g.networkID, -1, 0, 0).Len()
}
// GossipPut broadcasts a Put message with block data to validators.
func (g *networkGossiper) GossipPut(chainID ids.ID, networkID ids.ID, blockData []byte) int {
if g.net == nil || g.msgCreator == nil {
+220
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package chains
import (
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
lux "github.com/luxfi/utxo"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/nftfx"
)
// maxGatedActivationAttempts bounds how many times a gated chain may be
// deferred waiting for the X-Chain to bootstrap before it is opted out. Each
// X-Chain creation re-queues parked chains exactly once, so this also bounds
// total re-queues per chain. It exists only as defense-in-depth against an
// X-Chain that never bootstraps; the normal path defers zero or one time.
const maxGatedActivationAttempts = 8
// NFTAuthorization identifies the X-Chain NFT a validator's staking address
// must hold to activate (track/validate) a gated chain.
//
// A chain is "gated" when ManagerConfig.ChainAuthorizations has an entry for
// its blockchain ID. Chains with no entry are ungated and always authorized —
// so a nil/empty ChainAuthorizations map preserves today's behavior exactly
// for every chain (P/C/X/Q/D/…).
type NFTAuthorization struct {
AssetID ids.ID // X-Chain nftfx asset (the collection)
GroupID uint32 // nftfx group within the collection; 0 = any group
}
// xChainUTXOReader is the narrow in-process accessor the gate needs from the
// X-Chain VM: list the UTXOs owned by an address set. *xvm.VM satisfies it via
// its GetUTXOs method (vms/xvm/vm.go), which wraps lux.GetAllUTXOs over the
// chain's committed state. Keeping the interface to this one method avoids
// importing the concrete xvm VM type into the chain manager.
type xChainUTXOReader interface {
GetUTXOs(addrs set.Set[ids.ShortID]) ([]*lux.UTXO, error)
}
// holdsAuthorizationNFT is the pure authorization policy: it reports whether
// [utxos] contains an nftfx transfer output that satisfies [auth]. A UTXO
// matches when its output is an *nftfx.TransferOutput for auth.AssetID and,
// when auth.GroupID is non-zero, its GroupID equals auth.GroupID (GroupID 0
// means "any group in the collection").
//
// This is the one place the NFT-ownership rule lives. It takes plain values
// (the fetched UTXOs and the requirement) and returns a decision, so it is
// unit-testable without standing up a manager or an X-Chain.
func holdsAuthorizationNFT(utxos []*lux.UTXO, auth NFTAuthorization) bool {
for _, utxo := range utxos {
out, ok := utxo.Out.(*nftfx.TransferOutput)
if !ok {
continue
}
if utxo.AssetID() != auth.AssetID {
continue
}
if auth.GroupID != 0 && out.GroupID != auth.GroupID {
continue
}
return true
}
return false
}
// authorizeChainActivation reports whether this node may activate
// (track/validate) [chainID].
//
// Returns (authorized, ready):
// - ready=false means the gate cannot decide yet because the X-Chain is not
// bootstrapped and therefore not queryable in-process. The caller MUST
// defer (re-attempt later), not skip — see createChain.
// - ready=true, authorized=true: proceed normally.
// - ready=true, authorized=false: clean opt-out — this validator's staking
// X-address does not hold the required NFT.
//
// Decision order:
// 1. Critical chains (P/C/X/…) are never gated — always (true, true).
// 2. Ungated chains (no ChainAuthorizations entry) are always (true, true),
// so the zero/nil map is a no-op for every chain.
// 3. Gated chain, X-Chain not bootstrapped → (false, false): defer.
// 4. Gated chain, X-Chain bootstrapped, but no usable in-process UTXO reader
// or no resolvable staking X-address → (false, true): clean opt-out. The
// node refuses to activate a gated chain it cannot prove authorization
// for, rather than fail open.
// 5. Otherwise query the X-Chain for the staking X-address's UTXOs and apply
// holdsAuthorizationNFT.
func (m *manager) authorizeChainActivation(chainID ids.ID) (authorized bool, ready bool) {
// Critical chains are foundational; the gate must never skip or defer them.
if m.CriticalChains.Contains(chainID) {
return true, true
}
// D-Chain participation is an operator opt-in (dex-validator), and it is a
// NECESSARY condition that composes AND-wise with the NFT gate below: the
// D-Chain activates only if the operator opted in AND (when configured) the
// staking X-address holds the dex-operator NFT. Checked here — before the
// ungated short-circuit — so the opt-in is required even when no operator
// collection is configured for this network (the otherwise-ungated case).
// A node without dex-validator therefore cleanly opts out of the D-Chain
// even when --track-all-chains queued it: this is the activation authority,
// not the platformvm tracking set. The opt-out is decided (ready=true), so
// the caller takes the same clean skip as a non-held NFT / absent plugin.
if m.DChainID != ids.Empty && chainID == m.DChainID && !m.DexValidator {
m.Log.Info("D-Chain activation declined: dex-validator opt-in is disabled",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
)
return false, true
}
auth, gated := m.ChainAuthorizations[chainID]
if !gated {
return true, true
}
// TODO(phase-2): proof-of-possession. holdsAuthorizationNFT below checks
// ownership-OF-RECORD (the staking X-address appears in an nftfx output's
// owners) — it does NOT prove the node controls the key for that address.
// Phase-2 must derive StakingXAddress from the node's staking keys and bind
// the NFT check to key-control (a signed challenge), so a node cannot claim
// authorization from an NFT held at an address it does not control.
// The gate consults the X-Chain UTXO set, so the X-Chain must already be
// bootstrapped (created and tracked) on this node. If not, we cannot decide
// yet — signal the caller to defer.
if !m.IsBootstrapped(m.XChainID) {
return false, false
}
// The staking X-address must be wired for any gated chain. If it is empty,
// the node has no identity to check NFT ownership against; refuse to
// activate the gated chain (fail closed) rather than guess.
if m.StakingXAddress == ids.ShortEmpty {
m.Log.Warn("gated chain activation blocked: staking X-address not configured",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
log.Stringer("assetID", auth.AssetID),
)
return false, true
}
reader := m.xChainUTXOReader()
if reader == nil {
m.Log.Warn("gated chain activation blocked: X-Chain UTXO reader unavailable",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
log.Stringer("assetID", auth.AssetID),
)
return false, true
}
owners := set.Of(m.StakingXAddress)
utxos, err := reader.GetUTXOs(owners)
if err != nil {
// A query error is not a "decline" — the X-Chain claims to be
// bootstrapped but cannot answer. Defer and retry rather than
// permanently opt out on a transient read failure.
m.Log.Warn("gated chain activation deferred: X-Chain UTXO query failed",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainID),
log.Stringer("assetID", auth.AssetID),
log.Err(err),
)
return false, false
}
return holdsAuthorizationNFT(utxos, auth), true
}
// xChainUTXOReader returns the in-process UTXO reader for the X-Chain, or nil
// if the X-Chain VM is not present or does not expose the accessor. The
// X-Chain VM (*xvm.VM) implements xChainUTXOReader; this asserts against the
// narrow interface only.
func (m *manager) xChainUTXOReader() xChainUTXOReader {
m.chainsLock.Lock()
info, ok := m.chains[m.XChainID]
m.chainsLock.Unlock()
if !ok {
return nil
}
reader, _ := info.VM.(xChainUTXOReader)
return reader
}
// deferGatedChain parks [chainParams] out of the creation queue because the
// X-Chain is not yet bootstrapped, and reports whether the chain may still be
// retried. It returns false once the per-chain attempt cap is exhausted, in
// which case the caller must opt the chain out (a never-bootstrapping X-Chain
// must not park a chain forever). Parking out of the queue — rather than
// re-pushing — is what keeps the single-threaded dispatch loop from
// busy-spinning; retryPendingGatedChains re-pushes when the X-Chain is created.
func (m *manager) deferGatedChain(chainParams ChainParameters) (retry bool) {
m.gatedChainsLock.Lock()
defer m.gatedChainsLock.Unlock()
m.gatedAttempts[chainParams.ID]++
if m.gatedAttempts[chainParams.ID] > maxGatedActivationAttempts {
return false
}
m.pendingGatedChains = append(m.pendingGatedChains, chainParams)
return true
}
// retryPendingGatedChains re-queues every chain parked by deferGatedChain. It
// is called once right after the X-Chain finishes createChain, so the gate can
// now reach the X-Chain UTXO set. Chains that still cannot decide will park
// again (bounded by maxGatedActivationAttempts).
func (m *manager) retryPendingGatedChains() {
m.gatedChainsLock.Lock()
parked := m.pendingGatedChains
m.pendingGatedChains = nil
m.gatedChainsLock.Unlock()
for _, chainParams := range parked {
m.Log.Info("re-queuing gated chain after X-Chain bootstrap",
log.Stringer("chainID", chainParams.ID),
log.Stringer("vmID", chainParams.VMID),
)
m.chainsQueue.PushRight(chainParams)
}
}
+560
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package chains
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/luxfi/container/buffer"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
lux "github.com/luxfi/utxo"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/nftfx"
"github.com/luxfi/utxo/secp256k1fx"
)
// fakeUTXOReader is a stand-in for the X-Chain VM in unit tests. It returns a
// fixed UTXO set (or an error) regardless of the requested addresses, which is
// all the gate's address-set query needs to be driven deterministically.
type fakeUTXOReader struct {
utxos []*lux.UTXO
err error
}
func (f *fakeUTXOReader) GetUTXOs(set.Set[ids.ShortID]) ([]*lux.UTXO, error) {
return f.utxos, f.err
}
// ownerScopedUTXOReader is a faithful X-Chain stand-in: it returns ONLY the
// UTXOs whose nftfx/secp owners intersect the queried address set, exactly as
// lux.GetAllUTXOs(vm.state, addrs) does over committed state. This is what the
// fixed-list fakeUTXOReader cannot model — and it is required to test the
// ownership-scoping invariant: a node may activate a gated chain only on an NFT
// held at ITS OWN staking X-address, never one held at someone else's. The gate
// queries set.Of(StakingXAddress), so any UTXO owned by a different address is
// invisible here, just as it would be on a real X-Chain.
type ownerScopedUTXOReader struct {
utxos []*lux.UTXO
}
func (r *ownerScopedUTXOReader) GetUTXOs(addrs set.Set[ids.ShortID]) ([]*lux.UTXO, error) {
var out []*lux.UTXO
for _, utxo := range r.utxos {
owned, ok := utxo.Out.(lux.Addressable)
if !ok {
continue
}
for _, raw := range owned.Addresses() {
addr, err := ids.ToShortID(raw)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if addrs.Contains(addr) {
out = append(out, utxo)
break
}
}
}
return out, nil
}
// nftUTXO builds a UTXO whose output is an nftfx transfer output for the given
// asset and group. owner is the address recorded as the holder.
func nftUTXO(assetID ids.ID, groupID uint32, owner ids.ShortID) *lux.UTXO {
return &lux.UTXO{
UTXOID: lux.UTXOID{TxID: ids.GenerateTestID()},
Asset: lux.Asset{ID: assetID},
Out: &nftfx.TransferOutput{
GroupID: groupID,
OutputOwners: secp256k1fx.OutputOwners{
Threshold: 1,
Addrs: []ids.ShortID{owner},
},
},
}
}
// secpUTXO builds a non-NFT (secp256k1 transfer) UTXO for the given asset, used
// to prove the gate ignores outputs that are not nftfx transfers.
func secpUTXO(assetID ids.ID, owner ids.ShortID) *lux.UTXO {
return &lux.UTXO{
UTXOID: lux.UTXOID{TxID: ids.GenerateTestID()},
Asset: lux.Asset{ID: assetID},
Out: &secp256k1fx.TransferOutput{
Amt: 1,
OutputOwners: secp256k1fx.OutputOwners{
Threshold: 1,
Addrs: []ids.ShortID{owner},
},
},
}
}
func TestHoldsAuthorizationNFT(t *testing.T) {
asset := ids.GenerateTestID()
other := ids.GenerateTestID()
owner := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
tests := []struct {
name string
utxos []*lux.UTXO
auth NFTAuthorization
want bool
}{
{
name: "empty set",
utxos: nil,
auth: NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset},
want: false,
},
{
name: "matching asset, any group",
utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 7, owner)},
auth: NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset, GroupID: 0},
want: true,
},
{
name: "matching asset and group",
utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 7, owner)},
auth: NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset, GroupID: 7},
want: true,
},
{
name: "matching asset, wrong group",
utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 7, owner)},
auth: NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset, GroupID: 8},
want: false,
},
{
name: "wrong asset",
utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(other, 7, owner)},
auth: NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset},
want: false,
},
{
name: "non-nft output for asset is ignored",
utxos: []*lux.UTXO{secpUTXO(asset, owner)},
auth: NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset},
want: false,
},
{
name: "match found among mixed outputs",
utxos: []*lux.UTXO{
secpUTXO(asset, owner),
nftUTXO(other, 1, owner),
nftUTXO(asset, 3, owner),
},
auth: NFTAuthorization{AssetID: asset, GroupID: 3},
want: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, tt.want, holdsAuthorizationNFT(tt.utxos, tt.auth))
})
}
}
// newGateManager builds the minimal manager needed to exercise the gate:
// only the fields authorizeChainActivation reads. xChainVM, when non-nil, is
// installed as the X-Chain's tracked VM so IsBootstrapped(XChainID) is true and
// xChainUTXOReader() resolves to it.
func newGateManager(
xChainID ids.ID,
stakingAddr ids.ShortID,
authz map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization,
critical set.Set[ids.ID],
xChainVM xChainUTXOReader,
) *manager {
m := &manager{
chains: make(map[ids.ID]*chainInfo),
gatedAttempts: make(map[ids.ID]int),
}
m.Log = log.NewNoOpLogger()
m.XChainID = xChainID
m.StakingXAddress = stakingAddr
m.ChainAuthorizations = authz
m.CriticalChains = critical
if xChainVM != nil {
m.chains[xChainID] = &chainInfo{Name: "X-Chain", VM: xChainVM}
}
return m
}
func TestAuthorizeChainActivation(t *testing.T) {
xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
gatedChain := ids.GenerateTestID()
asset := ids.GenerateTestID()
addr := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
collection := map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{
gatedChain: {AssetID: asset, GroupID: 0},
}
t.Run("ungated chain is authorized and ready", func(t *testing.T) {
// No ChainAuthorizations entry: behaves exactly as today, even with no
// X-Chain present. Covers P/C/X-like IDs via a table.
m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, nil, nil, nil)
for _, id := range []ids.ID{ids.GenerateTestID(), xChainID, gatedChain} {
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(id)
require.True(t, authorized, "id %s", id)
require.True(t, ready, "id %s", id)
}
})
t.Run("gated chain, X-Chain not bootstrapped, defers", func(t *testing.T) {
// xChainVM nil => XChainID not in m.chains => IsBootstrapped false.
m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, nil)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.False(t, ready, "must signal defer")
require.False(t, authorized)
})
t.Run("gated chain, holder, authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 0, addr)}}
m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized)
})
t.Run("gated chain, non-holder, clean opt-out", func(t *testing.T) {
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: nil}
m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.True(t, ready, "decided, not deferred")
require.False(t, authorized, "no NFT => opt out")
})
t.Run("group match vs mismatch", func(t *testing.T) {
groupCollection := map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{
gatedChain: {AssetID: asset, GroupID: 5},
}
hold5 := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 5, addr)}}
hold9 := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 9, addr)}}
authorized, ready := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, groupCollection, nil, hold5).
authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized, "group 5 held => authorized")
authorized, ready = newGateManager(xChainID, addr, groupCollection, nil, hold9).
authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.True(t, ready)
require.False(t, authorized, "wrong group => opt out")
})
t.Run("critical chain never skipped even if gated", func(t *testing.T) {
// gatedChain is in BOTH ChainAuthorizations and CriticalChains, the
// holder holds nothing, and the X-Chain is absent. A non-critical chain
// here would defer (not ready); a critical chain must be authorized.
critical := set.Of(gatedChain)
m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, critical, nil)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.True(t, authorized, "critical chain must never be gated")
require.True(t, ready, "critical chain must never defer")
})
t.Run("gated chain, empty staking address, fails closed", func(t *testing.T) {
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(asset, 0, addr)}}
m := newGateManager(xChainID, ids.ShortEmpty, collection, nil, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.True(t, ready, "decided")
require.False(t, authorized, "no staking identity => opt out")
})
t.Run("gated chain, X-Chain query error, defers", func(t *testing.T) {
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{err: errors.New("state not ready")}
m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.False(t, ready, "transient query error => retry, not opt out")
require.False(t, authorized)
})
t.Run("gated chain, X-Chain tracked but VM lacks reader, opts out", func(t *testing.T) {
// X-Chain is in m.chains (IsBootstrapped true) but its VM does not
// satisfy xChainUTXOReader. The gate must fail closed (ready, !authz),
// not panic.
m := newGateManager(xChainID, addr, collection, nil, nil)
m.chains[xChainID] = &chainInfo{Name: "X-Chain", VM: struct{}{}}
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(gatedChain)
require.True(t, ready)
require.False(t, authorized)
})
}
func TestDeferGatedChainCap(t *testing.T) {
xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
gatedChain := ids.GenerateTestID()
m := newGateManager(xChainID, ids.GenerateTestShortID(), nil, nil, nil)
params := ChainParameters{ID: gatedChain, VMID: ids.GenerateTestID()}
// The first maxGatedActivationAttempts calls park the chain and allow retry.
for i := 0; i < maxGatedActivationAttempts; i++ {
require.True(t, m.deferGatedChain(params), "attempt %d should allow retry", i+1)
}
// One past the cap opts out instead of parking again.
require.False(t, m.deferGatedChain(params), "cap exhausted")
// Every allowed attempt parked exactly one entry; the over-cap attempt did not.
m.gatedChainsLock.Lock()
require.Len(t, m.pendingGatedChains, maxGatedActivationAttempts)
m.gatedChainsLock.Unlock()
}
func TestRetryPendingGatedChainsRequeues(t *testing.T) {
xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
m := newGateManager(xChainID, ids.GenerateTestShortID(), nil, nil, nil)
m.chainsQueue = buffer.NewUnboundedBlockingDeque[ChainParameters](initialQueueSize)
parked := ChainParameters{ID: ids.GenerateTestID(), VMID: ids.GenerateTestID()}
require.True(t, m.deferGatedChain(parked))
m.retryPendingGatedChains()
// Parked list is drained and the chain is re-pushed onto the creation queue.
m.gatedChainsLock.Lock()
require.Empty(t, m.pendingGatedChains)
m.gatedChainsLock.Unlock()
got, ok := m.chainsQueue.PopLeft()
require.True(t, ok)
require.Equal(t, parked.ID, got.ID)
}
// dexGatedManager builds a manager whose D-Chain (dChainID) is NFT-gated on a
// synthetic dex-operator collection — exactly the ChainAuthorizations shape
// node.chainAuthorizationsFor produces for dexvm: dChainID -> {dexAsset,
// group 0}. reader is installed as the bootstrapped X-Chain so the gate can
// query the staking address's UTXOs. This is the chain-manager-side mirror of
// the OptionalVMs[DexVMID].RequiredNFT policy under a synthetic per-network
// asset.
func dexGatedManager(dexAsset ids.ID, staking ids.ShortID, reader xChainUTXOReader) (*manager, ids.ID) {
xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
dChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
authz := map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{
dChainID: {AssetID: dexAsset, GroupID: 0}, // group 0 = any group in the collection
}
m := newGateManager(xChainID, staking, authz, nil, reader)
// Wire the D-Chain identity and turn the operator opt-in ON, so these NFT
// tests exercise the REAL dex-validator path: dex-validator=true, then the
// NFT gate decides. (The dex-validator=false short-circuit is proven
// separately in TestDexValidatorFlagGatesDChain.)
m.DChainID = dChainID
m.DexValidator = true
return m, dChainID
}
// TestDexVMFailsClosedWithoutXNFT (#4). A node whose staking X-address holds NO
// dex-operator NFT is NOT authorized to activate the D-Chain — a clean
// fail-closed opt-out (ready=true, authorized=false), not a fail-open and not a
// deferral. The X-Chain is bootstrapped and answers; the address simply holds
// nothing. Also covers holding the WRONG asset (some other NFT) → still opt-out.
func TestDexVMFailsClosedWithoutXNFT(t *testing.T) {
dexAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
otherAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
staking := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
t.Run("no NFT held => opt out", func(t *testing.T) {
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: nil}
m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, staking, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready, "X-Chain answered => decided, not deferred")
require.False(t, authorized, "no dex-operator NFT => D-Chain activation fails closed")
})
t.Run("wrong collection held => opt out", func(t *testing.T) {
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(otherAsset, 0, staking)}}
m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, staking, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.False(t, authorized, "holding a different collection's NFT must not authorize the D-Chain")
})
t.Run("no staking identity => fail closed", func(t *testing.T) {
// Even with a matching NFT in the set, an empty staking X-address has no
// identity to check ownership against → fail closed.
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, staking)}}
m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, ids.ShortEmpty, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.False(t, authorized, "no staking identity => fail closed")
})
}
// TestDexVMActivatesWithDexOperatorNFT (#5). The same gated D-Chain, but the
// staking X-address holds the dex-operator NFT → authorized to activate.
// Proves the positive path of the NFT-governed activation.
func TestDexVMActivatesWithDexOperatorNFT(t *testing.T) {
dexAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
staking := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
t.Run("dex-operator NFT held => authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, staking)}}
m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, staking, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized, "holding the dex-operator NFT authorizes D-Chain activation")
})
t.Run("dex-operator NFT among mixed UTXOs => authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
other := ids.GenerateTestID()
reader := &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{
secpUTXO(dexAsset, staking), // non-NFT output for the asset: ignored
nftUTXO(other, 1, staking), // wrong collection: ignored
nftUTXO(dexAsset, 4, staking), // the dex-operator NFT (group 4, any-group gate)
}}
m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, staking, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized, "dex-operator NFT present among other UTXOs => authorized")
})
}
// TestDexVMOwnershipScoping (H1 gap). The activation NFT must be held at the
// node's OWN staking X-address — not merely exist somewhere on the X-Chain. The
// gate queries set.Of(StakingXAddress), so an ownership-honoring reader returns
// nothing for an NFT minted to a DIFFERENT address, and the gate fails closed.
// The fixed-list fakeUTXOReader could not catch this (it returns its list for
// any query); ownerScopedUTXOReader models real per-address X-Chain state.
//
// NOTE: this proves ownership-OF-RECORD scoping (the NFT is owned by this
// address). It does NOT prove the node controls that address's key — that is
// the // TODO(phase-2): proof-of-possession seam in authorizeChainActivation,
// out of scope this pass.
func TestDexVMOwnershipScoping(t *testing.T) {
dexAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
nodeAddr := ids.GenerateTestShortID() // this node's staking X-address
strangerAddr := ids.GenerateTestShortID() // a DIFFERENT operator's address
t.Run("dex-operator NFT held by a DIFFERENT address => not authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
// The collection's NFT exists, but it is owned by strangerAddr. An
// ownership-honoring X-Chain returns no UTXOs for nodeAddr's query.
reader := &ownerScopedUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, strangerAddr)}}
m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, nodeAddr, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready, "X-Chain answered => decided, not deferred")
require.False(t, authorized, "an NFT held at another address must NOT authorize this node")
})
t.Run("dex-operator NFT held at the node's OWN address => authorized", func(t *testing.T) {
// Same collection, but the NFT (alongside the stranger's) is also held by
// nodeAddr. Only the node's own holding authorizes it.
reader := &ownerScopedUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{
nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, strangerAddr), // not ours: invisible to our query
nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, nodeAddr), // ours: authorizes
}}
m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, nodeAddr, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized, "an NFT held at the node's own staking X-address authorizes it")
})
t.Run("only the stranger's NFT exists, queried by stranger => authorized for stranger only", func(t *testing.T) {
// Sanity: the same reader DOES authorize the address that actually holds
// the NFT, proving the scoping is by-address and not a blanket deny.
reader := &ownerScopedUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, strangerAddr)}}
m, dChainID := dexGatedManager(dexAsset, strangerAddr, reader)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized, "the holder address is authorized; scoping is per-address, not blanket")
})
}
// TestDexValidatorFlagGatesDChain (M1). The dex-validator opt-in is a genuine,
// NECESSARY activation condition for the D-Chain — not just a log line — and it
// composes AND-wise with the NFT gate. This proves the full truth table at the
// activation authority (authorizeChainActivation), which is downstream of how a
// chain gets QUEUED: --track-all-chains queues the D-Chain in platformvm
// (CreateChain), but the manager's gate is what ACTIVATES it. So a manager with
// DexValidator=false standing in for a --track-all-chains node MUST decline the
// D-Chain regardless of NFT state.
func TestDexValidatorFlagGatesDChain(t *testing.T) {
xChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
dChainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
dexAsset := ids.GenerateTestID()
staking := ids.GenerateTestShortID()
// withFlag builds a D-Chain manager with the dex-validator flag set to
// [dexValidator]. When [gated] the D-Chain is NFT-gated on dexAsset and the
// reader is the bootstrapped X-Chain; when not gated, ChainAuthorizations is
// empty (the --track-all-chains, no-operator-collection case).
withFlag := func(dexValidator, gated bool, reader xChainUTXOReader) *manager {
var authz map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization
if gated {
authz = map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{dChainID: {AssetID: dexAsset, GroupID: 0}}
}
m := newGateManager(xChainID, staking, authz, nil, reader)
m.DChainID = dChainID
m.DexValidator = dexValidator
return m
}
holdsNFT := func() xChainUTXOReader {
return &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: []*lux.UTXO{nftUTXO(dexAsset, 0, staking)}}
}
t.Run("flag=false + ungated (track-all-chains) => D NOT activated", func(t *testing.T) {
// The headline M1 case: even with no operator collection configured (so
// the chain would otherwise be ungated and activate under --track-all),
// dex-validator=false declines the D-Chain. Decided opt-out, not defer.
m := withFlag(false, false, nil)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready, "decided opt-out, not a deferral")
require.False(t, authorized, "dex-validator=false must block the D-Chain even under --track-all-chains")
})
t.Run("flag=false + NFT held => still NOT activated (flag is necessary)", func(t *testing.T) {
// Holding the dex-operator NFT does not rescue activation when the flag
// is off: the flag is an independent necessary condition (the AND).
m := withFlag(false, true, holdsNFT())
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.False(t, authorized, "flag=false blocks D even with the NFT held")
})
t.Run("flag=true + NFT held => activated", func(t *testing.T) {
// Both conditions met: opted in AND holds the NFT.
m := withFlag(true, true, holdsNFT())
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized, "dex-validator=true AND NFT held => D-Chain activates")
})
t.Run("flag=true + gated but NFT NOT held => NOT activated (NFT is necessary)", func(t *testing.T) {
// The other half of the AND: opting in does not bypass the NFT gate.
m := withFlag(true, true, &fakeUTXOReader{utxos: nil})
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.False(t, authorized, "flag=true but no NFT => still blocked")
})
t.Run("flag=true + ungated (no operator collection) => activated", func(t *testing.T) {
// Opted in and no NFT requirement configured for this network: the flag
// alone governs and the D-Chain activates (preserves today's opt-in
// behavior for the in-flag operator).
m := withFlag(true, false, nil)
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(dChainID)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized, "dex-validator=true with no NFT configured => activates")
})
t.Run("flag=false does not affect a non-D gated chain", func(t *testing.T) {
// The flag is D-specific: another gated chain (e.g. bridgevm) is governed
// solely by its NFT gate, untouched by dex-validator.
otherChain := ids.GenerateTestID()
authz := map[ids.ID]NFTAuthorization{otherChain: {AssetID: dexAsset, GroupID: 0}}
m := newGateManager(xChainID, staking, authz, nil, holdsNFT())
m.DChainID = dChainID
m.DexValidator = false // off, but irrelevant to otherChain
authorized, ready := m.authorizeChainActivation(otherChain)
require.True(t, ready)
require.True(t, authorized, "dex-validator must not gate a non-D chain")
})
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/luxfi/vm"
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
"github.com/luxfi/metric"
"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
"github.com/luxfi/node/vms"
"github.com/luxfi/vm"
)
// TestNew tests creating a new manager
@@ -106,9 +106,9 @@ func TestQueueChainCreation(t *testing.T) {
chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
chainParams := ChainParameters{
ID: chainID,
ID: chainID,
ChainID: netID,
VMID: ids.GenerateTestID(),
VMID: ids.GenerateTestID(),
}
// Queue the chain
+591
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// pchain_height_finality_test.go — the b2 load-bearing proof the prior round
// lacked: that the node delivers the REAL P-chain epoch height to the chain
// engine, so a K>1 quorum chain finalizes against the LIVE validator set — not
// the frozen genesis set.
//
// The consensus-layer TestPChainEpochFinality_RealWiring proved the engine reads
// the RIGHT height GIVEN a block that already exposes one; it fed a synthetic
// block carrying PChainHeight directly, BYPASSING the boundary. The boundary —
// where a bare plugin block yields pChainHeightOf==0 — was exactly what shipped
// broken (set@0 = genesis). These tests drive the REAL boundary:
//
// inner VM (bare block, no PChainHeight)
// └─ pChainHeightVM (the b2 wrapper, backed by a real validators.State)
// └─ consensus engine (real α-of-K cert finality, node BLS sources)
//
// and prove three properties end to end:
//
// (1) pChainHeightOf(realBlock) returns the wrapper's stamped P-chain height
// (NOT 0) — at BuildBlock AND after a ParseBlock round-trip of the gossiped
// bytes (the determinism guarantee: every node recovers the same height).
// (2) K>1 FINALIZES at genesis (set@H0).
// (3) K>1 FINALIZES AFTER a staking change — validators that JOINED post-genesis
// cast the deciding votes+stake. This is the case that STALLS on the set@0
// path (the joiners are absent from the genesis set), so finalizing proves
// the real height is load-bearing.
//
// CGO-free: the node BLS sources use the pure-Go BLS path under CGO_ENABLED=0, so
// this runs the ACTUAL production quorum sources (blsVoteVerifier / blsVoteSigner
// / validatorStakeSource / validatorSetRootSource) — not an ed25519 stand-in.
package chains
import (
"context"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
)
// --- a bare inner VM whose blocks carry NO P-chain height --------------------
// fakeInnerBlock is a minimal chain block: it satisfies block.Block but does NOT
// expose PChainHeight() — exactly like the plugin VM blocks (C-Chain EVM, dexvm)
// the node runs. Its Bytes() is its own opaque encoding; the wrapper frames a
// P-chain height AROUND these bytes for transport.
type fakeInnerBlock struct {
id ids.ID
parentID ids.ID
height uint64
bytes []byte
timestamp time.Time
mu sync.Mutex
acceptCalled int
}
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) ID() ids.ID { return b.id }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Parent() ids.ID { return b.parentID }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) ParentID() ids.ID { return b.parentID }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Height() uint64 { return b.height }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Timestamp() time.Time { return b.timestamp }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Status() uint8 { return 0 }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Bytes() []byte { return b.bytes }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Verify(context.Context) error { return nil }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Reject(context.Context) error { return nil }
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) Accept(context.Context) error {
b.mu.Lock()
b.acceptCalled++
b.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
func (b *fakeInnerBlock) accepted() int {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return b.acceptCalled
}
// fakeInnerVM is a BlockBuilder over fakeInnerBlocks, keyed by id and by bytes so
// ParseBlock(bytes) reconstructs the SAME inner block on a follower. It builds one
// block on demand (set via stage) so the test controls the proposed block.
type fakeInnerVM struct {
mu sync.Mutex
byID map[ids.ID]*fakeInnerBlock
byBytes map[string]*fakeInnerBlock
staged *fakeInnerBlock // returned by the next BuildBlock
lastAcc ids.ID
}
func newFakeInnerVM() *fakeInnerVM {
return &fakeInnerVM{
byID: make(map[ids.ID]*fakeInnerBlock),
byBytes: make(map[string]*fakeInnerBlock),
}
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) register(b *fakeInnerBlock) {
vm.mu.Lock()
vm.byID[b.id] = b
vm.byBytes[string(b.bytes)] = b
vm.mu.Unlock()
}
// stage sets the block the next BuildBlock returns (and registers it for Get/Parse).
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) stage(b *fakeInnerBlock) {
vm.register(b)
vm.mu.Lock()
vm.staged = b
vm.mu.Unlock()
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) BuildBlock(context.Context) (block.Block, error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
return vm.staged, nil
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) ParseBlock(_ context.Context, b []byte) (block.Block, error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
if blk, ok := vm.byBytes[string(b)]; ok {
return blk, nil
}
// Unknown bytes: synthesize a block so a follower can still parse. Real VMs
// decode deterministically; the test pre-registers every block it gossips, so
// this path is only a safety net.
return nil, errUnknownInnerBytes
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) GetBlock(_ context.Context, id ids.ID) (block.Block, error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
if blk, ok := vm.byID[id]; ok {
return blk, nil
}
return nil, errUnknownInnerBytes
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) LastAccepted(context.Context) (ids.ID, error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
return vm.lastAcc, nil
}
func (vm *fakeInnerVM) SetPreference(_ context.Context, id ids.ID) error {
vm.mu.Lock()
vm.lastAcc = id
vm.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
var errUnknownInnerBytes = errInnerBytes{}
type errInnerBytes struct{}
func (errInnerBytes) Error() string { return "fakeInnerVM: unknown block bytes" }
// --- BLS validator material (pure-Go BLS under CGO_ENABLED=0) ----------------
type blsValidator struct {
nodeID ids.NodeID
sk *bls.SecretKey
pkComp []byte
light uint64
}
func newBLSValidator(t *testing.T, weight uint64) blsValidator {
t.Helper()
sk, err := bls.NewSecretKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bls.NewSecretKey: %v", err)
}
return blsValidator{
nodeID: ids.GenerateTestNodeID(),
sk: sk,
pkComp: bls.PublicKeyToCompressedBytes(sk.PublicKey()),
light: weight,
}
}
func (v blsValidator) out() *validators.GetValidatorOutput {
return &validators.GetValidatorOutput{
NodeID: v.nodeID,
PublicKey: v.pkComp,
Light: v.light,
Weight: v.light,
}
}
// stateByHeight builds a height-indexed validators.State reporting the given sets
// per height (empty for unknown heights / wrong net), with GetCurrentHeight fixed
// to `current` so the wrapper stamps that height onto built blocks.
func stateByHeight(netID ids.ID, current uint64, byHeight map[uint64][]blsValidator) *validatorstest.TestState {
s := validatorstest.NewTestState()
s.GetCurrentHeightF = func(context.Context) (uint64, error) { return current, nil }
s.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
if gotNet != netID {
return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
}
out := make(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput)
for _, v := range byHeight[height] {
out[v.nodeID] = v.out()
}
return out, nil
}
return s
}
// --- a recording cert gossiper (engine CertGossiper) -------------------------
type recordingCertGossiper struct {
mu sync.Mutex
certs [][]byte
}
func (g *recordingCertGossiper) GossipCert(_ ids.ID, _ ids.ID, certBytes []byte) error {
g.mu.Lock()
g.certs = append(g.certs, append([]byte(nil), certBytes...))
g.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
func (g *recordingCertGossiper) count() int {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
return len(g.certs)
}
var _ consensuschain.CertGossiper = (*recordingCertGossiper)(nil)
// --- helpers -----------------------------------------------------------------
func params5() consensusconfig.Parameters {
return consensusconfig.Parameters{K: 5, AlphaPreference: 3, AlphaConfidence: 3, Beta: 2}
}
func waitForCond(d time.Duration, cond func() bool) bool {
deadline := time.Now().Add(d)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if cond() {
return true
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
}
return cond()
}
// signBLSVote produces validator v's signed accept Vote for a position (the same
// canonical message the node's blsVoteSigner/Verifier use).
func signBLSVote(t *testing.T, v blsValidator, pos consensuschain.VotePosition) consensuschain.Vote {
t.Helper()
sig, err := v.sk.Sign(consensuschain.CanonicalVoteMessage(pos))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign vote: %v", err)
}
return consensuschain.Vote{
BlockID: pos.BlockID,
NodeID: v.nodeID,
Accept: true,
SignedAt: time.Now(),
Signature: bls.SignatureToBytes(sig),
ParentID: pos.ParentID,
Round: pos.Round,
}
}
// quorumEngineFixture wires a real consensus engine with the node's production
// BLS quorum sources, all height-pinned to a height-indexed validators.State,
// driving blocks through the b2 pChainHeightVM wrapper over a bare inner VM.
type quorumEngineFixture struct {
engine *consensuschain.Transitive
wrapper *pChainHeightVM
inner *fakeInnerVM
chainID ids.ID
netID ids.ID
proposer blsValidator
certs *recordingCertGossiper
}
func newQuorumEngineFixture(t *testing.T, netID ids.ID, state validators.State, proposer blsValidator, byHeight map[uint64][]blsValidator) *quorumEngineFixture {
t.Helper()
inner := newFakeInnerVM()
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
chainID := ids.GenerateTestID()
certs := &recordingCertGossiper{}
vdrState := state
engine := consensuschain.NewWithConfig(
consensuschain.Config{Params: params5(), VM: wrapper},
consensuschain.WithQuorumCert(chainID, proposer.nodeID, newBLSVoteVerifier(vdrState, netID), certs, newBLSVoteSigner(proposer.sk)),
consensuschain.WithStakeWeighting(newValidatorStakeSource(vdrState, netID)),
consensuschain.WithValidatorSetRoot(newValidatorSetRootSource(vdrState, netID)),
)
if err := engine.Start(context.Background(), true); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("engine.Start: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = engine.Stop(context.Background()) })
return &quorumEngineFixture{
engine: engine,
wrapper: wrapper,
inner: inner,
chainID: chainID,
netID: netID,
proposer: proposer,
certs: certs,
}
}
// proposeViaWrapper builds the staged inner block THROUGH the wrapper (stamping
// the live P-chain height), tracks it as the engine's own verified proposal with
// the wrapper-delivered epoch, records the proposer's self-vote, and returns the
// wrapped block + the canonical vote position followers must sign.
func (f *quorumEngineFixture) proposeViaWrapper(t *testing.T, inner *fakeInnerBlock) (block.Block, consensuschain.VotePosition) {
t.Helper()
f.inner.stage(inner)
wrapped, err := f.wrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("wrapper.BuildBlock: %v", err)
}
pos := f.engine.TrackOwnProposalForTest(context.Background(), wrapped, 0)
return wrapped, pos
}
// newFakeInner is a small constructor for an inner block at value height h with a
// unique opaque encoding (tag-derived, so byBytes keys never collide).
func newFakeInner(h uint64, parent ids.ID, tag string) *fakeInnerBlock {
return &fakeInnerBlock{
id: ids.GenerateTestID(),
parentID: parent,
height: h,
bytes: []byte("inner:" + tag),
timestamp: time.Now(),
}
}
// --- (1) the boundary delivers the REAL height (not 0), build + parse ---------
// TestPChainHeightVM_DeliversRealHeight is the direct b2 boundary proof: the
// wrapper stamps the proposer's live P-chain height onto the block the engine
// sees, so pChainHeightOf(realBlock) returns that height — NOT 0 — at BuildBlock,
// AND a follower recovers the IDENTICAL height by parsing the gossiped bytes (the
// determinism guarantee H rides the bytes, never recomputed from a skewing view).
//
// This is the assertion the whole fix turns on. On the broken path
// pChainHeightOf(any real plugin block)==0 → set@0 (genesis) forever.
func TestPChainHeightVM_DeliversRealHeight(t *testing.T) {
const epoch = uint64(7) // the live P-chain height the proposer stamps
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
// A state whose GetCurrentHeight is 7 (so BuildBlock stamps 7); the set content
// is irrelevant to the stamping itself, but we register it at 7 for symmetry.
state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
inner := newFakeInner(10_000_000, ids.Empty, "real-height") // value height races ahead
wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).stage(inner)
wrapped, err := wrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock: %v", err)
}
// (1a) the engine's boundary read on the BUILT block returns the stamped height.
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != epoch {
t.Fatalf("pChainHeightOf(built block) = %d, want %d — the boundary still delivers the wrong height "+
"(0 would mean the genesis-set freeze the b2 fix removes)", got, epoch)
}
// Sanity: the inner block itself exposes no PChainHeight, so without the wrapper
// the engine would read 0. This pins WHY the wrapper is load-bearing.
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(inner); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("bare inner block must expose no P-chain height (pChainHeightOf=0), got %d", got)
}
// (1b) determinism: a follower parsing the GOSSIPED bytes recovers the same H.
parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), wrapped.Bytes())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(gossiped bytes): %v", err)
}
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(parsed); got != epoch {
t.Fatalf("pChainHeightOf(parsed block) = %d, want %d — a follower recomputed/lost the height; "+
"finality would stall on a dynamic set (worse than the genesis fallback)", got, epoch)
}
if parsed.ID() != wrapped.ID() {
t.Fatalf("parsed block ID %s != built block ID %s — the inner identity must be preserved across the envelope", parsed.ID(), wrapped.ID())
}
}
// --- (2) K>1 finalizes at genesis (set@H0) -----------------------------------
// TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAtGenesis proves the fix UNBRICKS finality in the
// base case: a K>1 quorum chain whose validator set is the genesis set (current
// P-chain height 0) finalizes through the real BLS quorum sources. This is the
// safe floor the genesis fallback guarantees — even here the height is delivered
// honestly (0), and the set@0 is non-empty so a ⅔ quorum finalizes.
func TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAtGenesis(t *testing.T) {
const genesis = uint64(0)
netID := constantsPrimaryNetworkID()
g := make([]blsValidator, 5)
for i := range g {
g[i] = newBLSValidator(t, 20) // equal stake, total 100
}
state := stateByHeight(netID, genesis, map[uint64][]blsValidator{genesis: g})
f := newQuorumEngineFixture(t, netID, state, g[0], map[uint64][]blsValidator{genesis: g})
inner := newFakeInner(42, ids.Empty, "genesis-finalize") // value height advanced past genesis
wrapped, pos := f.proposeViaWrapper(t, inner)
// The block was stamped at the genesis height (0); the position binds set@0.
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != genesis {
t.Fatalf("expected genesis stamp %d, got %d", genesis, got)
}
if pos.ValidatorSetRoot == ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("genesis set-root must be non-Empty (the genesis set is non-empty)")
}
// proposer g[0] self-voted; drive 3 more signed accepts → 4/5 = 80/100 stake > ⅔.
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[1], pos))
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[2], pos))
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, g[3], pos))
if !waitForCond(2*time.Second, func() bool { return inner.accepted() == 1 }) {
t.Fatalf("UNBRICK: a K>1 block must finalize against the genesis set (VM.Accept=%d)", inner.accepted())
}
if f.certs.count() == 0 {
t.Fatal("a verified quorum cert must be assembled + gossiped at finality")
}
}
// --- (3) K>1 finalizes AFTER a staking change (THE b2 proof) ------------------
// TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAfterStakingChange is the load-bearing b2 proof:
// validators that JOINED after genesis cast the deciding votes + stake, and the
// block finalizes — which is IMPOSSIBLE on the broken set@0 path, where the
// joiners are absent from the genesis set so their votes are dropped and their
// stake is uncounted.
//
// The set@epoch (height 7) holds {g0, j1, j2, j3, j4}: only g0 overlaps genesis;
// j1..j4 JOINED at 7. The genesis set@0 holds five DIFFERENT validators with only
// g0 in common. A 4-voter cert {g0, j1, j2, j3} = 80/100 stake-at-7 > ⅔.
//
// - With the b2 fix: the block is stamped 7, the verifier resolves j1..j3 at
// set@7 (present) and the ⅔ tally is measured at 7 → the cert verifies →
// FINALIZES.
// - On the broken set@0 path: j1..j3 are unknown at height 0 → their signed
// votes are dropped → only g0 (20/100) verifies < ⅔ → STALLS FOREVER.
//
// The test asserts BOTH directly: (a) the block finalizes, and (b) the production
// verifier itself rejects a joiner's vote at height 0 but accepts it at height 7 —
// pinning the exact mechanism that would stall the frozen-set path.
func TestPChainHeightVM_FinalizesAfterStakingChange(t *testing.T) {
const (
genesis = uint64(0)
epoch = uint64(7) // staking change landed here; current P-chain height = 7
)
netID := constantsPrimaryNetworkID()
// g0 is a validator present at BOTH epochs (so the fixture proposer key resolves
// at the stamped epoch). j1..j4 JOINED at epoch 7. gen1..gen4 are the OTHER four
// genesis validators (present only at 0) — they make set@0 a genuinely different
// set so "the joiners decide" is unambiguous.
g0 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
j1 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
j2 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
j3 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
j4 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
gen1 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
gen2 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
gen3 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
gen4 := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
genesisSet := []blsValidator{g0, gen1, gen2, gen3, gen4} // total 100 at height 0
epochSet := []blsValidator{g0, j1, j2, j3, j4} // total 100 at height 7
state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{
genesis: genesisSet,
epoch: epochSet,
})
// (b) PIN THE MECHANISM that makes the frozen path stall: the production verifier
// rejects a joiner at height 0 (frozen/genesis) and accepts it at height 7.
verifier := newBLSVoteVerifier(state, netID)
// Build a position to sign (any height-7-bound position works for this probe).
probeBlk := newFakeInner(123, ids.Empty, "probe")
probeWrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
probeWrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).stage(probeBlk)
probeWrapped, _ := probeWrapper.BuildBlock(context.Background())
probePos := consensuschain.VotePosition{
ChainID: ids.GenerateTestID(),
Height: probeWrapped.Height(),
BlockID: probeWrapped.ID(),
ParentID: ids.Empty,
ValidatorSetRoot: newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(epoch),
}
probeMsg := consensuschain.CanonicalVoteMessage(probePos)
j1Sig, err := j1.sk.Sign(probeMsg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign probe: %v", err)
}
j1SigBytes := bls.SignatureToBytes(j1Sig)
if verifier.VerifyVote(j1.nodeID, probeMsg, j1SigBytes, genesis) {
t.Fatal("frozen-path mechanism broken: a post-genesis joiner must NOT verify at height 0 " +
"(if it does, the genesis-set path would not actually stall and the test is vacuous)")
}
if !verifier.VerifyVote(j1.nodeID, probeMsg, j1SigBytes, epoch) {
t.Fatal("a joiner present at the epoch MUST verify at the epoch height — the b2 read is broken")
}
// (a) THE END-TO-END FINALIZATION: drive the real engine with the joiners.
f := newQuorumEngineFixture(t, netID, state, g0, map[uint64][]blsValidator{
genesis: genesisSet,
epoch: epochSet,
})
inner := newFakeInner(10_000_000, ids.Empty, "post-staking-change") // value height far ahead
wrapped, pos := f.proposeViaWrapper(t, inner)
// The block carries the LIVE epoch height (7), and the position binds set@7.
if got := consensuschain.PChainHeightOfForTest(wrapped); got != epoch {
t.Fatalf("block must carry the live epoch height %d, got %d", epoch, got)
}
if pos.ValidatorSetRoot != newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(epoch) {
t.Fatal("position must bind the set-root at the epoch height (set@7), not another height")
}
if pos.ValidatorSetRoot == newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(genesis) {
t.Fatal("test vacuous: set@7 root must differ from set@0 root (the sets must genuinely differ)")
}
// proposer g0 self-voted; the JOINERS j1,j2,j3 cast the deciding votes.
// 4 distinct accepts {g0,j1,j2,j3} = 80/100 stake-at-7 > ⅔ → MUST finalize.
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j1, pos))
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j2, pos))
f.engine.ReceiveVote(signBLSVote(t, j3, pos))
if !waitForCond(3*time.Second, func() bool { return inner.accepted() == 1 }) {
t.Fatalf("b2: a block whose ⅔ quorum is post-genesis JOINERS must finalize against the LIVE set@%d "+
"(VM.Accept=%d). On the broken set@0 path the joiners are unknown → votes dropped → permanent stall.",
epoch, inner.accepted())
}
// The gossiped cert must verify stake-weighted AT THE EPOCH, and must FAIL at
// genesis (where the joiners are absent) — proving the height is load-bearing.
if f.certs.count() == 0 {
t.Fatal("a verified quorum cert must be assembled + gossiped at finality")
}
f.certs.mu.Lock()
lastCert := f.certs.certs[len(f.certs.certs)-1]
f.certs.mu.Unlock()
cert, err := consensuschain.UnmarshalQuorumCert(lastCert)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode gossiped cert: %v", err)
}
stake := newValidatorStakeSource(state, netID)
if err := cert.VerifyWeighted(verifier, stake, epoch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cert must verify stake-weighted at the epoch height %d: %v", epoch, err)
}
if err := cert.VerifyWeighted(verifier, stake, genesis); err == nil {
t.Fatal("b2: cert must NOT verify at the genesis height (joiners absent / below ⅔ there) — " +
"if it does, the epoch height is not actually being used")
}
// The cert must contain at least one joiner — proving a post-genesis validator's
// vote was counted (the exact case the frozen-set path drops).
var hasJoiner bool
for i := range cert.Votes {
if cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j1.nodeID || cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j2.nodeID || cert.Votes[i].NodeID == j3.nodeID {
hasJoiner = true
break
}
}
if !hasJoiner {
t.Fatal("the finality cert must include a post-genesis joiner's vote (it was the deciding quorum)")
}
}
// constantsPrimaryNetworkID returns the primary-network ID the node uses for
// native-chain validator lookups (ids.Empty). Declared here so the test reads the
// SAME net the production wiring resolves native chains against, without importing
// the constants package for one value.
func constantsPrimaryNetworkID() ids.ID { return ids.Empty }
+327
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// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// pchain_height_hardening_test.go — the receive-side hardening proofs for the b2
// transport wrapper (Red round): the three node-layer fixes that close the
// receive-side gaps the build-side stamping left open.
//
// (HIGH-1, predicate b — RECENCY) ParseBlock rejects a wrapped block whose
// stamped P-chain epoch exceeds this node's live P-chain height by more than the
// recency slack (an absurd-future epoch). Honest forward skew within the slack —
// including a legitimate P-chain advance during a staking change — still parses.
//
// (MEDIUM-3 — MAP DoS) the heights map is bounded: it plateaus at the finalized
// watermark under mass parse+accept, and a still-pending block's epoch is never
// evicted by the watermark prune. A sustained unverified-parse flood is capped.
//
// (LOW-2 — FRAME DISCRIMINATOR) a raw inner block whose first bytes coincidentally
// equal the 4-byte frame magic is NOT mis-parsed as framed: the inner re-parse of
// the framed payload fails, so ParseBlock falls back to a raw whole-block parse.
package chains
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
)
// --- (HIGH-1 b) RECENCY: reject absurd-future epoch ---------------------------
// TestParseBlock_RejectsFarFutureEpoch is the receive-side upper-bound proof. A
// node whose live P-chain height is 100 parses a wrapped block stamped at epoch
// 10_000 (far beyond 100 + slack). ParseBlock REJECTS it fail-closed — the block
// is dropped, never returned to be tracked. This stops a Byzantine proposer from
// pinning a block to an epoch the network has not reached.
func TestParseBlock_RejectsFarFutureEpoch(t *testing.T) {
const localH = uint64(100)
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
state := stateByHeight(netID, localH, map[uint64][]blsValidator{localH: {v}})
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
// Craft a frame stamped at an absurd-future epoch, with a registered inner block
// so the ONLY reason to reject is the recency bound (not an inner parse failure).
inner := newFakeInner(5_000_000, ids.Empty, "far-future-epoch")
wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).register(inner)
framed := wrapPChainHeight(inner.Bytes(), localH+pChainHeightRecencySlack+1) // just past the bound
if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed); err != errPChainHeightNotRecent {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(far-future epoch) err = %v, want errPChainHeightNotRecent — an absurd-future "+
"P-chain epoch must be rejected fail-closed so a follower never tracks a block at an unreachable epoch", err)
}
}
// TestParseBlock_AcceptsEpochWithinSlack proves the recency gate admits HONEST
// forward skew: a follower at local P-chain height 100 parses a block stamped at
// 100 + slack (the boundary — the largest legitimate skew, e.g. a proposer that
// saw P-chain blocks this follower has not yet synced during a staking change).
// The block parses and carries its real epoch.
func TestParseBlock_AcceptsEpochWithinSlack(t *testing.T) {
const localH = uint64(100)
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
state := stateByHeight(netID, localH, map[uint64][]blsValidator{localH: {v}})
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), state, netID)
inner := newFakeInner(5_000_000, ids.Empty, "within-slack-epoch")
wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).register(inner)
atBound := localH + pChainHeightRecencySlack // exactly at the bound — must be admitted
framed := wrapPChainHeight(inner.Bytes(), atBound)
parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(epoch within slack) err = %v, want nil — honest forward skew up to the slack "+
"(a real P-chain advance during a staking change) must still parse", err)
}
if got := parsed.(*pChainHeightBlock).PChainHeight(); got != atBound {
t.Fatalf("parsed epoch = %d, want %d — the wrapper must carry the real (recent) epoch unchanged", got, atBound)
}
}
// TestParseBlock_RecencyDisabledWithoutState proves the fail-soft: a wrapper with
// no P-chain view (nil state, current height 0) cannot bound recency, so it admits
// the block — the verifier still fails closed on an unresolvable future epoch at
// set-resolution time. (Production installs the wrapper only on K>1 chains the
// manager guards to have a live state, so this is a defensive path, not a mode.)
func TestParseBlock_RecencyDisabledWithoutState(t *testing.T) {
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(newFakeInnerVM(), nil, ids.GenerateTestID())
inner := newFakeInner(7, ids.Empty, "no-state-epoch")
wrapper.inner.(*fakeInnerVM).register(inner)
framed := wrapPChainHeight(inner.Bytes(), 9_999_999) // would be far-future if state existed
if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock with nil state must admit (recency unenforceable, verifier fails closed downstream): %v", err)
}
}
// --- (LOW-2) FRAME DISCRIMINATOR: a magic-colliding raw block is NOT mis-framed -
// TestParseBlock_MagicCollisionParsesRaw is the discriminator proof. A raw inner
// block whose Bytes() coincidentally BEGIN with the 4-byte frame magic (the
// 2^-32 collision the raw-hash-prefix VMs hit) must parse as a RAW block, not be
// mis-classified as framed (which used to fail the inner decode → bootstrap stall).
// The inner re-parse of the framed payload fails (the payload is the block minus
// its first 12 bytes — not a valid inner block), so ParseBlock falls back to a raw
// whole-block parse.
func TestParseBlock_MagicCollisionParsesRaw(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
state := stateByHeight(netID, 50, map[uint64][]blsValidator{50: {v}})
inner := newFakeInnerVM()
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
// A raw block whose bytes START with the exact magic prefix, then arbitrary
// payload. Length is >= the header width so the prefix check would treat it as a
// candidate frame. Crucially, bytes[12:] is NOT a registered inner block, so the
// framed-payload re-parse fails and the whole-bytes parse must be used.
raw := &fakeInnerBlock{
id: ids.GenerateTestID(),
parentID: ids.Empty,
height: 1234,
bytes: append(append([]byte{}, pChainHeightMagic[:]...),
[]byte("RAW-BLOCK-COLLIDES-WITH-MAGIC-PREFIX-payload")...),
}
inner.register(raw) // registers byBytes[whole] = raw; bytes[12:] stays UNregistered
parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), raw.bytes)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(magic-colliding raw block) err = %v, want nil — a raw block whose prefix collides "+
"with the frame magic must parse as RAW (the old behavior mis-framed it → inner decode fail → bootstrap stall)", err)
}
if parsed.ID() != raw.id {
t.Fatalf("parsed block ID %s != raw block ID %s — the colliding block must decode to the SAME raw inner block", parsed.ID(), raw.id)
}
// A raw block falls back to the genesis-set epoch (0): it was NOT framed, so no
// proposer epoch was carried.
if got := parsed.(*pChainHeightBlock).PChainHeight(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("magic-colliding raw block epoch = %d, want 0 — it must NOT be read as a framed epoch", got)
}
// Its re-gossip bytes must be the raw passthrough (the inner bytes verbatim), not
// re-framed — so a follower of THIS node also sees it raw.
if string(parsed.Bytes()) != string(raw.bytes) {
t.Fatal("a raw colliding block must re-gossip its inner bytes verbatim (passthrough), not a new frame")
}
}
// TestParseBlock_GenuineFrameStillParses guards the discriminator's other side: a
// GENUINE frame (whose payload IS a valid inner block) still parses as framed and
// recovers the stamped epoch. This pins that the collision fix did not break the
// normal framed path.
func TestParseBlock_GenuineFrameStillParses(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
const epoch = uint64(33)
state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
inner := newFakeInnerVM()
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
innerBlk := newFakeInner(9000, ids.Empty, "genuine-frame")
inner.register(innerBlk)
framed := wrapPChainHeight(innerBlk.Bytes(), epoch)
parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(genuine frame) err = %v, want nil", err)
}
if parsed.ID() != innerBlk.ID() {
t.Fatalf("genuine frame parsed ID %s != inner ID %s", parsed.ID(), innerBlk.ID())
}
if got := parsed.(*pChainHeightBlock).PChainHeight(); got != epoch {
t.Fatalf("genuine frame epoch = %d, want %d", got, epoch)
}
}
// --- (MEDIUM-3) MAP BOUND: plateau at watermark, pending never evicted --------
// TestHeightsMap_PlateausAtWatermark is the DoS bound proof. We parse a long run
// of distinct framed blocks (each adds a heights entry) and ACCEPT them in order;
// each Accept advances the finalized-height watermark and prunes entries at/below
// it. The map plateaus — it does NOT grow without bound as the chain advances.
func TestHeightsMap_PlateausAtWatermark(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
const epoch = uint64(10)
state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
inner := newFakeInnerVM()
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
const n = 500
var lastParsed *pChainHeightBlock
for h := uint64(1); h <= n; h++ {
blk := newFakeInner(h, ids.Empty, "plateau-"+itoa(h))
inner.register(blk)
framed := wrapPChainHeight(blk.Bytes(), epoch)
parsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), framed)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock #%d: %v", h, err)
}
// Accept the PREVIOUS block (so the most-recent one is still "pending").
if lastParsed != nil {
if err := lastParsed.Accept(context.Background()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Accept #%d: %v", h-1, err)
}
}
lastParsed = parsed.(*pChainHeightBlock)
// After each accept the map must be bounded: only entries strictly above the
// watermark survive. We accept (h-1) blocks, so at most a tiny constant remain
// (the just-parsed, not-yet-accepted block, plus any equal-height entries).
wrapper.mu.Lock()
size := len(wrapper.heights)
wm := wrapper.finalizedHeight
wrapper.mu.Unlock()
if size > 4 { // generous constant: the pending working set, not O(n)
t.Fatalf("heights map grew to %d entries at height %d (watermark %d) — it must plateau at the "+
"finalized watermark, not accrete one permanent entry per parsed block (MEDIUM-3 DoS)", size, h, wm)
}
}
}
// TestHeightsMap_PendingNeverEvictedByWatermark proves the watermark prune NEVER
// drops a still-pending block's epoch. We track a pending block at height 1000
// (epoch recalled), accept a LOWER-height block (watermark advances only to that
// lower height), and assert the pending block's epoch is still recallable. A blind
// LRU would have dropped it; the watermark prune must not.
func TestHeightsMap_PendingNeverEvictedByWatermark(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
const epoch = uint64(12)
state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
inner := newFakeInnerVM()
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
// Pending block at a HIGH value height (1000).
pending := newFakeInner(1000, ids.Empty, "pending-high")
inner.register(pending)
pendingFrame := wrapPChainHeight(pending.Bytes(), epoch)
if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), pendingFrame); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(pending): %v", err)
}
// A different block at a LOW value height (5) finalizes → watermark = 5.
low := newFakeInner(5, ids.Empty, "finalized-low")
inner.register(low)
lowFrame := wrapPChainHeight(low.Bytes(), epoch)
lowParsed, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), lowFrame)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(low): %v", err)
}
if err := lowParsed.Accept(context.Background()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Accept(low): %v", err)
}
// The watermark advanced to 5 (the low block). The PENDING block at height 1000
// is strictly above the watermark, so its epoch MUST survive the prune.
if got, ok := wrapper.recall(pending.ID()); !ok || got != epoch {
t.Fatalf("pending block's epoch recall = (%d,%v), want (%d,true) — the watermark prune (wm=5) must NEVER "+
"evict a still-pending block at height 1000 (that would reset its epoch to 0 = re-freeze)", got, ok, epoch)
}
// And the finalized low block's entry WAS pruned (it is at/below the watermark).
if _, ok := wrapper.recall(low.ID()); ok {
t.Fatal("the finalized low block's entry should have been pruned at/below the watermark (loss-free: epoch already captured)")
}
}
// TestHeightsMap_FloodCappedPreservingNearTip proves the hard-cap backstop: a
// sustained UNVERIFIED-parse flood (blocks that never finalize, so the watermark
// never advances) cannot grow the map past the cap, AND the cap evicts
// highest-value-height-first so the near-tip pending band survives. We seed a
// near-tip pending entry (low height), then flood with far-future-height frames;
// the map stays at the cap and the near-tip entry is retained.
func TestHeightsMap_FloodCappedPreservingNearTip(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
v := newBLSValidator(t, 20)
const epoch = uint64(8)
// Slack must admit the flood frames' epoch; we stamp them at the current epoch so
// the recency gate is not what bounds them — the CAP is what we are testing.
state := stateByHeight(netID, epoch, map[uint64][]blsValidator{epoch: {v}})
inner := newFakeInnerVM()
wrapper := newPChainHeightVM(inner, state, netID)
// Near-tip pending block at LOW value height 1.
nearTip := newFakeInner(1, ids.Empty, "near-tip")
inner.register(nearTip)
if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), wrapPChainHeight(nearTip.Bytes(), epoch)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(near-tip): %v", err)
}
// Flood: cap + 200 distinct frames at FAR-future value heights (never accepted).
for i := 0; i < pChainHeightMapCap+200; i++ {
h := uint64(1_000_000 + i) // far above the near-tip height
blk := newFakeInner(h, ids.Empty, "flood-"+itoa(h))
inner.register(blk)
if _, err := wrapper.ParseBlock(context.Background(), wrapPChainHeight(blk.Bytes(), epoch)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock(flood %d): %v", i, err)
}
}
wrapper.mu.Lock()
size := len(wrapper.heights)
_, nearTipKept := wrapper.heights[nearTip.ID()]
wrapper.mu.Unlock()
if size > pChainHeightMapCap {
t.Fatalf("heights map = %d entries, must be capped at %d under flood (MEDIUM-3 backstop)", size, pChainHeightMapCap)
}
if !nearTipKept {
t.Fatal("the near-tip pending entry (height 1) must SURVIVE the cap — eviction is highest-height-first, " +
"so a flood of far-future-height spam is shed before any near-tip pending block (NOT a blind LRU)")
}
}
// itoa is a tiny, allocation-light uint64→string for unique test tags (avoids
// importing strconv into a hot test loop and keeps byBytes keys distinct).
func itoa(v uint64) string {
if v == 0 {
return "0"
}
var buf [20]byte
i := len(buf)
for v > 0 {
i--
buf[i] = byte('0' + v%10)
v /= 10
}
return string(buf[i:])
}
+480
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@@ -0,0 +1,480 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// pchain_height_vm.go — the node-layer boundary that delivers the REAL P-CHAIN
// EPOCH HEIGHT to the consensus chain engine (the b2 wiring; the LAST
// QUORUM_FINALITY blocker).
//
// THE BUG IT FIXES. The chain engine pins a block's weighted validator set to a
// P-CHAIN height (engine/chain: pChainHeightOf → epochHeightLocked → the SINGLE
// height the set-root commitment, the ⅔-by-stake tally, AND the per-voter pubkey
// resolution are read at). It reads that height by asserting the VM block to a
// `PChainHeight() uint64` (consensus block.SignedBlock). A bare VM block — every
// block the node's plugin VMs (C-Chain EVM, dexvm, …) produce — does NOT expose
// one, so pChainHeightOf returns 0 and the engine resolves the set at P-chain
// height 0: the GENESIS set. That is SAFE (non-empty, identical on every node,
// ≤ current) and UNBRICKS finality, but it FREEZES the epoch at genesis: a
// validator that JOINED after genesis is absent from set@0, so its vote is
// dropped and its stake is not counted — finality cannot track a DYNAMIC
// validator set (a departed genesis majority could even collude). This is the
// frozen-set caveat Gate D must sign away.
//
// THE FIX. pChainHeightVM wraps the chain's BlockBuilder (the VM the engine
// builds/parses blocks through) and makes the block the engine sees carry the
// proposer's P-chain epoch height — WITHOUT changing the inner VM's block format,
// IDs, or ledger state:
//
// - BuildBlock (proposer): build the inner block, then stamp the proposer's
// live P-chain epoch height H = max(GetCurrentHeight, parentH) (the
// proposervm selectChildPChainHeight rule — monotone, ≤ current). Return a
// pChainHeightBlock whose Bytes() are [magic|H|innerBytes] and whose
// PChainHeight() is H. Every other method (ID, ParentID, Height, Verify,
// Accept, …) delegates to the inner block — so the block's IDENTITY and the
// VM's state are the inner VM's, unchanged.
// - ParseBlock (follower): split [magic|H|innerBytes], parse the inner bytes
// through the inner VM, and re-attach H. Bytes WITHOUT the magic (a raw inner
// block from a pre-wrapper peer, GetAncestors, or genesis) parse with H=0 →
// the SAFE genesis-set fallback — never worse than today.
//
// DETERMINISM is the whole point and is why H must travel IN the gossiped bytes.
// The engine gossips only blk.Bytes(); a follower recovers the block solely via
// ParseBlock(those bytes). The proposer STAMPS H; every follower ADOPTS the
// identical H from the envelope — it never recomputes H from its own (skewing)
// current P-chain view. So every honest node derives the SAME epoch height from
// the SAME signed block, which is the invariant the engine's cert verifier
// requires (engine/chain HandleIncomingCert cross-checks the cert's set-root
// against the set-root WE recompute at OUR epoch height for the block: equal H ⟹
// equal root ⟹ the cert verifies; a post-genesis validator's vote+stake now
// count). A build-time-only stamp would give the proposer a real H but leave
// followers computing a DIFFERENT root from their own height → the cert is
// dropped → finality STALLS on a dynamic set (strictly worse than the genesis
// fallback). That is why the height is carried, not recomputed.
//
// This is a consensus-TRANSPORT framing (an 8-byte height + 4-byte magic prefix
// on the gossiped bytes), NOT a chain/ledger fork: the inner VM's bytes, block
// IDs, and execution state are byte-identical, so there is no re-genesis — only a
// coordinated node upgrade (the whole validator set ships together).
package chains
import (
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"sync"
"time"
consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
)
// pChainHeightMagic tags a transport-wrapped block so ParseBlock can tell a
// wrapped block ([magic|H:8|innerBytes]) from a raw inner block (no magic →
// H=0, the genesis-set fallback). Distinct, fixed, version-pinned: a future
// envelope change bumps the last byte and is non-malleable. "LXP" = Lux P-chain.
var pChainHeightMagic = [4]byte{'L', 'X', 'P', 0x01}
// pChainHeightHeaderLen is the fixed transport-header width: magic(4) + height(8).
const pChainHeightHeaderLen = 4 + 8
// pChainHeightRecencySlack is the receive-side UPPER bound on how far a gossiped
// block's stamped P-chain epoch height H may exceed THIS node's live P-chain
// height before the block is rejected as absurd-future (HIGH-1, predicate b). The
// proposer stamps H = its own GetCurrentHeight (the proposervm selectChildPChainHeight
// rule, ≤ its current); a follower lagging the P-chain sees a smaller current, so
// some forward skew is LEGITIMATE during a staking change or a gossip burst. 256
// P-chain heights swamps any honest inter-node skew (P-chain blocks are seconds
// apart; gossip+verify is sub-second) while still rejecting a wildly-future H. The
// bound is a LIVENESS/DoS sanity gate, NOT the safety bound (that is the monotone
// gate in the engine): a future H always FAILS set resolution at the verifier
// (errUnfinalizedHeight) and never finalizes against a bogus set regardless — this
// just fails it fast and keeps the heights map from accreting unresolvable entries.
const pChainHeightRecencySlack = uint64(256)
// pChainHeightMapCap is the hard backstop on the heights map size — the cap that
// bounds the gossip-parse DoS (MEDIUM-3): ParseBlock runs before the engine's
// dedup/Verify, so an attacker peer could stream distinct unverified blocks, each
// adding a permanent entry. The map plateaus far below this in steady state (the
// watermark prune evicts every finalized block's entry as finality advances); the
// cap fires only under a sustained flood, and then evicts HIGHEST-chain-height
// first — spam claims wild heights, real pending blocks cluster just above the
// finalized watermark, so the near-tip pending band is preserved (NOT a blind LRU
// that could drop a live block). Chosen >> any realistic pending working set.
const pChainHeightMapCap = 4096
// errPChainHeightNotRecent is returned by ParseBlock when a wrapped block's stamped
// P-chain epoch exceeds this node's live P-chain height by more than the recency
// slack. Returning an error fails CLOSED: HandleIncomingBlock drops the block (it
// is never tracked or voted), which is the correct response to an absurd-future
// epoch a follower cannot resolve a set at.
var errPChainHeightNotRecent = errors.New("chains: gossiped block P-chain epoch height exceeds local P-chain height + recency slack (absurd-future epoch, rejected fail-closed)")
// pChainHeightVM wraps a chain BlockBuilder so the block the consensus engine
// sees carries the proposer's P-chain epoch height. It is the ONLY thing that
// changes between the engine and the inner VM; everything else is the inner VM,
// verbatim.
//
// It is installed ONLY on K>1 (quorum) chains: a K==1 chain finalizes on its
// sole validator's self-vote with no cert and no validator-set epoch, so the
// stamp is inert there and the wrapper is not installed (the inner VM is used
// directly — one obvious path per mode).
type pChainHeightVM struct {
inner consensuschain.BlockBuilder
state validators.State
networkID ids.ID
// heights memoises blockID → (stamped P-chain epoch, value-chain height) for
// blocks this node has built or parsed, so GetBlock can re-attach the epoch a
// block was stamped with (the inner VM stores only the inner bytes, which carry
// no epoch). Best-effort: a cache miss yields H=0 (the genesis-set fallback).
// GetBlock is NOT on the finality-capture path — the engine records a block's
// epoch the first time it BUILDS or PARSES the block (where the epoch is always
// present) and reads it back from its own pending-block record, never by
// re-fetching via GetBlock — so a miss here cannot drop a LIVE block's epoch
// (the consensus PendingBlock holds it, not this map).
//
// BOUNDED (MEDIUM-3): the value-chain height tagged on each entry lets onAccepted
// PRUNE every entry at or below the finalized-height watermark (a finalized block
// never needs a GetBlock epoch re-attach), so under steady finality the map
// plateaus at the watermark. finalizedHeight is that watermark, advanced as
// blocks Accept. A hard cap (pChainHeightMapCap) backstops a sustained
// unverified-parse flood, evicting highest-height-first to preserve the near-tip
// pending band. A still-PENDING block (height above the watermark) is never
// evicted by the watermark prune.
mu sync.Mutex
heights map[ids.ID]heightEntry
finalizedHeight uint64
}
// heightEntry records, for a remembered block, both the P-chain EPOCH it was
// stamped with (re-attached by GetBlock) and its VALUE-CHAIN height (the prune key:
// an entry at/below the finalized watermark is evictable).
type heightEntry struct {
epoch uint64
chainHeight uint64
}
// newPChainHeightVM wraps inner with P-chain-epoch-height stamping backed by the
// height-indexed validators.State. networkID is the set the height is resolved
// against (PrimaryNetworkID for native chains; the L1's set ID otherwise) — it is
// recorded for symmetry with the engine's epoch reads, though GetCurrentHeight is
// a P-chain-global height. A nil state disables stamping (BuildBlock falls back to
// H=0): callers install this ONLY for K>1 chains, which the manager already
// guards to have a live height-indexed state, so the nil path is a defensive
// fail-soft, not a runtime mode.
func newPChainHeightVM(inner consensuschain.BlockBuilder, state validators.State, networkID ids.ID) *pChainHeightVM {
return &pChainHeightVM{
inner: inner,
state: state,
networkID: networkID,
heights: make(map[ids.ID]heightEntry),
}
}
var _ consensuschain.BlockBuilder = (*pChainHeightVM)(nil)
// remember records the epoch a block (at value-chain height chainHeight) was
// stamped with so GetBlock can re-attach it. BOUNDED (MEDIUM-3): the map is pruned
// against the finalized-height watermark by onAccepted, so it plateaus under steady
// finality; remember additionally enforces the hard cap as a flood backstop. The
// chainHeight is the prune key.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) remember(id ids.ID, epoch, chainHeight uint64) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
vm.heights[id] = heightEntry{epoch: epoch, chainHeight: chainHeight}
vm.enforceCapLocked()
}
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) recall(id ids.ID) (uint64, bool) {
vm.mu.Lock()
e, ok := vm.heights[id]
vm.mu.Unlock()
return e.epoch, ok
}
// onAccepted advances the finalized-height watermark to acceptedHeight and PRUNES
// every remembered entry at or below it (MEDIUM-3). A finalized block's epoch is
// already captured in the engine's records and will never be re-attached via
// GetBlock, so dropping its entry is loss-free — and a still-PENDING block (height
// strictly above the watermark) is NEVER evicted by this prune, so its GetBlock
// epoch survives. Called from the wrapped block's Accept (the block tells its VM
// the height at which it finalized). Idempotent and monotone: a re-accept or an
// out-of-order lower height never lowers the watermark.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) onAccepted(acceptedHeight uint64) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
if acceptedHeight > vm.finalizedHeight {
vm.finalizedHeight = acceptedHeight
}
for id, e := range vm.heights {
if e.chainHeight <= vm.finalizedHeight {
delete(vm.heights, id)
}
}
}
// enforceCapLocked is the flood backstop: if the map exceeds the hard cap, evict
// the entry with the HIGHEST value-chain height. Real pending blocks cluster just
// above the finalized watermark (the next few heights); an unverified-parse flood
// claims arbitrary, typically far-future heights — so evicting highest-first sheds
// spam while preserving the near-tip pending band (NOT a blind LRU that could drop
// a live block's epoch). The cap is reached only under attack: the watermark prune
// keeps the steady-state map far below it. Caller holds vm.mu.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) enforceCapLocked() {
for len(vm.heights) > pChainHeightMapCap {
var victim ids.ID
var maxHeight uint64
first := true
for id, e := range vm.heights {
if first || e.chainHeight > maxHeight {
victim, maxHeight, first = id, e.chainHeight, false
}
}
delete(vm.heights, victim)
}
}
// currentPChainHeight returns the proposer's live P-chain height, the upper end
// of the proposervm selectChildPChainHeight rule. A nil state or a read error
// yields 0 (the genesis-set fallback): a height the proposer cannot resolve must
// not be stamped onto a block, since a follower could not resolve the set there
// either. A read error is symmetric across nodes for a committed P-chain, so the
// fallback is uniform.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) currentPChainHeight(ctx context.Context) uint64 {
if vm.state == nil {
return 0
}
h, err := vm.state.GetCurrentHeight(ctx)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
return h
}
// parentHeight returns the P-chain epoch height stamped on parentID, or 0 if it
// is unknown — used to keep a child's stamped height monotone ≥ its parent's
// (selectChildPChainHeight). An unknown parent (0) cannot LOWER the child below
// the current height (the max below), so monotonicity is preserved fail-soft.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) parentHeight(parentID ids.ID) uint64 {
h, _ := vm.recall(parentID)
return h
}
// BuildBlock builds the inner block and stamps it with the proposer's P-chain
// epoch height H = max(currentPChainHeight, parentH). This is the proposer side
// of the epoch: the one node building this block chooses H from its own live
// P-chain view, and that H rides the gossiped bytes to every follower (which
// adopt it, never recompute it). Monotone ≥ parent so a chain's epoch never goes
// backwards across blocks (a cert at a lower epoch than its parent would bind a
// stale set).
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) BuildBlock(ctx context.Context) (block.Block, error) {
inner, err := vm.inner.BuildBlock(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
h := vm.currentPChainHeight(ctx)
if ph := vm.parentHeight(inner.ParentID()); ph > h {
h = ph
}
vm.remember(inner.ID(), h, inner.Height())
return newPChainHeightBlock(vm, inner, h), nil
}
// ParseBlock recovers a block from transport bytes. Wrapped bytes
// ([magic|H|innerBytes]) yield a block whose PChainHeight() is the EXACT H the
// proposer stamped — the determinism guarantee: every node parsing the same
// gossiped bytes recovers the identical epoch height. Bytes without the magic are
// a raw inner block (a pre-wrapper peer, GetAncestors, genesis): parsed straight
// through with H=0, the SAFE genesis-set fallback.
//
// FRAME DISCRIMINATOR (LOW-2). The 4-byte magic collides at 2^-32 with the raw
// hash prefix some VMs use as their Bytes() (dexvm/quantumvm/dchain serialize
// parentID[0:32]||…). The magic match alone is NOT sufficient: a frame is real
// only if the inner re-parse of the framed payload ALSO succeeds. So when the
// prefix matches, attempt to parse b[header:] as an inner block; if that FAILS,
// fall back to parsing the WHOLE b as a raw inner block (the colliding raw block,
// whose bytes minus the 12-byte prefix are not a valid inner block). This removes
// the bootstrap stall a magic collision used to cause (mis-framed → inner decode
// fails closed → stall on that chain).
//
// RECENCY GATE (HIGH-1, predicate b). A real frame's stamped epoch H must be
// recent relative to THIS node's live P-chain height: H ≤ localCurrentH + slack.
// An absurd-future H (a Byzantine proposer claiming an epoch the network has not
// reached) is rejected fail-closed (the block is dropped, never tracked). This is
// the upper half of the epoch bound; the engine's monotone gate is the lower half
// (≥ parent's recorded epoch), so the epoch is pinned to [parentEpoch, localH+slack].
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) ParseBlock(ctx context.Context, b []byte) (block.Block, error) {
candidateInner, h, magicMatched := unwrapPChainHeight(b)
if magicMatched {
// The prefix looks like a frame. It IS a frame only if the framed payload
// parses as an inner block AND the stamped epoch is recent.
if inner, err := vm.inner.ParseBlock(ctx, candidateInner); err == nil {
if !vm.epochRecent(ctx, h) {
return nil, errPChainHeightNotRecent
}
vm.remember(inner.ID(), h, inner.Height())
return newPChainHeightBlock(vm, inner, h), nil
}
// Magic matched but the framed payload did NOT parse → this is a RAW block
// whose first bytes coincidentally equal the magic. Parse the whole b raw.
}
// Raw inner block: no proposer epoch available → genesis-set fallback. Still
// wrap (uniform block type to the engine) but with H=0 and a passthrough
// Bytes() so re-gossip of a raw block stays raw.
inner, err := vm.inner.ParseBlock(ctx, b)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return newRawPChainHeightBlock(vm, inner), nil
}
// epochRecent reports whether a stamped P-chain epoch height is within the recency
// slack of this node's live P-chain height (HIGH-1, predicate b). A node with no
// resolvable current height (state nil / read error → 0) cannot bound recency, so
// it admits the block (the verifier still fails closed on an unresolvable future
// epoch at set-resolution time — recency here is a fast-fail/DoS sanity gate, not
// the safety bound). Heights at or below local are always recent.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) epochRecent(ctx context.Context, h uint64) bool {
localH := vm.currentPChainHeight(ctx)
if localH == 0 {
return true
}
return h <= localH+pChainHeightRecencySlack
}
// GetBlock fetches a block from the inner VM and re-attaches the P-chain height
// it was stamped with (recalled from build/parse). A miss yields H=0 — acceptable
// because GetBlock is not on the engine's finality-capture path (see the heights
// field doc). The returned block's Bytes() is the inner bytes (the inner VM's
// canonical at-rest form); a stamped height is re-attached for the engine's
// in-memory use only.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) GetBlock(ctx context.Context, id ids.ID) (block.Block, error) {
inner, err := vm.inner.GetBlock(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if h, ok := vm.recall(id); ok {
return newRawPChainHeightBlockWithHeight(vm, inner, h), nil
}
return newRawPChainHeightBlock(vm, inner), nil
}
// LastAccepted delegates to the inner VM.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) LastAccepted(ctx context.Context) (ids.ID, error) {
return vm.inner.LastAccepted(ctx)
}
// SetPreference delegates to the inner VM.
func (vm *pChainHeightVM) SetPreference(ctx context.Context, id ids.ID) error {
return vm.inner.SetPreference(ctx, id)
}
// wrapPChainHeight frames inner bytes with the proposer's P-chain height:
// magic(4) || height(8,BE) || innerBytes. The header is fixed-width so unwrap is
// a constant-time prefix read.
func wrapPChainHeight(innerBytes []byte, height uint64) []byte {
out := make([]byte, pChainHeightHeaderLen+len(innerBytes))
copy(out[0:4], pChainHeightMagic[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[4:12], height)
copy(out[pChainHeightHeaderLen:], innerBytes)
return out
}
// unwrapPChainHeight is a PURE prefix splitter: it reports whether b carries the
// frame magic at the header width and, if so, returns the candidate payload and
// the encoded height. magicMatched==true means ONLY that the prefix looks like a
// frame — NOT that b is definitely framed. ParseBlock makes the real decision by
// re-parsing the candidate payload (LOW-2): a raw block whose first bytes collide
// with the magic (2^-32) yields magicMatched==true here but its payload fails the
// inner re-parse, so ParseBlock falls back to a raw whole-b parse. Keeping this a
// pure split (no VM dependency) localizes the collision handling to ParseBlock.
func unwrapPChainHeight(b []byte) (payload []byte, height uint64, magicMatched bool) {
if len(b) < pChainHeightHeaderLen ||
b[0] != pChainHeightMagic[0] || b[1] != pChainHeightMagic[1] ||
b[2] != pChainHeightMagic[2] || b[3] != pChainHeightMagic[3] {
return b, 0, false
}
height = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[4:12])
return b[pChainHeightHeaderLen:], height, true
}
// --- the wrapped block -------------------------------------------------------
// pChainHeightBlock is a chain block that carries a P-chain epoch height for the
// engine while delegating identity, verification, and acceptance to the inner VM
// block. It satisfies consensus block.SignedBlock's PChainHeight() (the subset
// the engine reads via pChainHeightOf), so the engine records the real epoch
// height — every other behaviour is the inner VM's.
//
// `bytes` is what the engine gossips. For a proposer-built / wrapped-parsed block
// it is the framed [magic|H|innerBytes] so a follower recovers H; for a raw block
// (genesis-set fallback) it is the inner bytes verbatim (passthrough) so re-gossip
// stays raw.
type pChainHeightBlock struct {
vm *pChainHeightVM
inner block.Block
pChainHeight uint64
bytes []byte
}
// newPChainHeightBlock wraps inner with height h and a FRAMED Bytes()
// ([magic|h|inner]) — the proposer/parse path, where H must travel to followers.
func newPChainHeightBlock(vm *pChainHeightVM, inner block.Block, h uint64) *pChainHeightBlock {
return &pChainHeightBlock{
vm: vm,
inner: inner,
pChainHeight: h,
bytes: wrapPChainHeight(inner.Bytes(), h),
}
}
// newRawPChainHeightBlock wraps inner with H=0 and a PASSTHROUGH Bytes() (the
// inner bytes verbatim) — the genesis-set fallback for a raw inner block.
func newRawPChainHeightBlock(vm *pChainHeightVM, inner block.Block) *pChainHeightBlock {
return &pChainHeightBlock{vm: vm, inner: inner, pChainHeight: 0, bytes: inner.Bytes()}
}
// newRawPChainHeightBlockWithHeight re-attaches a recalled height to an inner
// block fetched via GetBlock while keeping a PASSTHROUGH Bytes() (the inner VM's
// at-rest bytes). Used off the finality-capture path; the height is for the
// engine's in-memory epoch read, not for re-gossip framing.
func newRawPChainHeightBlockWithHeight(vm *pChainHeightVM, inner block.Block, h uint64) *pChainHeightBlock {
return &pChainHeightBlock{vm: vm, inner: inner, pChainHeight: h, bytes: inner.Bytes()}
}
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) ID() ids.ID { return b.inner.ID() }
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Parent() ids.ID { return b.inner.Parent() }
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) ParentID() ids.ID { return b.inner.ParentID() }
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Height() uint64 { return b.inner.Height() }
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Timestamp() time.Time { return b.inner.Timestamp() }
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Status() uint8 { return b.inner.Status() }
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Bytes() []byte { return b.bytes }
// PChainHeight is the method the engine reads via pChainHeightOf — the SOLE
// reason this wrapper exists. The inner block does not expose it; this does.
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) PChainHeight() uint64 { return b.pChainHeight }
// Verify/Reject delegate to the inner VM block: the wrapper changes the epoch the
// engine SEES, never the block's validity or state transition.
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Verify(ctx context.Context) error { return b.inner.Verify(ctx) }
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Reject(ctx context.Context) error { return b.inner.Reject(ctx) }
// Accept finalizes the inner block, then advances the VM's finalized-height
// watermark and prunes the heights map at/below it (MEDIUM-3). The inner Accept
// runs FIRST: finalization must not depend on the bookkeeping prune, and the prune
// is a pure memory-management side effect that can never fail. The block carries
// its own height, so the VM learns the exact finalized height with no extra read.
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Accept(ctx context.Context) error {
if err := b.inner.Accept(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
if b.vm != nil {
b.vm.onAccepted(b.inner.Height())
}
return nil
}
// Unwrap exposes the inner block for code that must reach the underlying VM block
// (e.g. a missing-context reparse). Kept narrow on purpose.
func (b *pChainHeightBlock) Unwrap() block.Block { return b.inner }
+424
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@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// quorum.go — the node-layer wiring that makes the consensus engine's α-of-K
// quorum-cert finality LIVE (HIGH-4). The consensus engine (luxfi/consensus
// engine/chain) defines the quorum RULE and the vote/cert topology interfaces;
// THIS file supplies the concrete node implementations the engine needs:
//
// - blsVoteVerifier — verifies a validator's BLS signature over the canonical
// vote message against the chain's validator set (the engine is scheme-
// agnostic; the node injects BLS).
// - blsVoteSigner — signs THIS node's accept votes with its staking BLS key
// so its signature can be collected into a cert.
// - validatorStakeSource — supplies per-validator stake so finality is a
// ⅔-by-STAKE supermajority (HIGH-3), not a raw voter count.
// - networkGossiper.BroadcastVote / GossipCert — the QuorumGossiper transport:
// a follower broadcasts its signed vote to ALL validators and any node that
// collects α distinct signed votes gossips the assembled cert, so finality
// never hinges on one node's inbound Chits (liveness; no proposer-freeze).
//
// Inbound votes/certs arrive as app-gossip and are demuxed in blockHandler.Gossip
// (see manager.go) into engine.HandleIncomingVote / HandleIncomingCert.
package chains
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"sort"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
consensuschain "github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
)
// ConsensusOverride carries an operator's EXPLICIT --consensus-sample-size /
// --consensus-quorum-size, threaded from node config. A field is honored only
// when > 0 (the operator actually set the flag); 0 means "use the dynamic
// live-set value". An explicit value is honored but CLAMPED to the dynamic floor
// (see applyConsensusOverride) so an operator can RAISE the committee/quorum but
// never under-set it below the strict-⅔ stake-cert threshold the engine enforces.
type ConsensusOverride struct {
SampleSize int // explicit K (--consensus-sample-size); 0 = unset
QuorumSize int // explicit α (--consensus-quorum-size); 0 = unset
}
// selectConsensusParams picks the consensus parameters for a chain — ONE path
// for every network. The committee is sized to the LIVE validator set
// (consensusconfig.FeasibleParams): K = numValidators and α = the minimum vote
// count whose cumulative stake strictly exceeds ⅔ of total stake, DERIVED from
// the SAME floor the cert verifier enforces (config.TwoThirdsStakeFloor) and
// clamped up to the BFT overlap floor. Mainnet/testnet/devnet/localnet and every
// sovereign L1 all flow through this — there is no per-tier K/α schedule.
//
// - sybilProtection == false (--dev / single-node): K=1, the sole validator's
// accept is the 1-of-1 quorum (no peer signatures).
// - sybilProtection == true: K = numValidators, α = strict-⅔ stake threshold.
// For today's 5-validator nets this is K=5/α=4 on mainnet, testnet AND
// devnet — the fastest viable BFT setting (4-of-5 finalizes, one laggard
// tolerated, no oversized dead polling). It recomputes automatically when the
// validator count changes: a future 21-set yields K=21/α=15 (15, not 14 —
// 14/21 does not strictly exceed ⅔).
//
// Why K MUST equal the live count: the gossiper proposer samples K validators
// then drops ITSELF from the sample (engine/chain RequestVotes), so a proposer in
// its own sample polls only K1 distinct peers. An oversized K (the retired
// mainnet K=21 on a 5-validator set) demanded α=15 affirmative votes that the ≤4
// reachable peers could never supply → quorum unreachable → finality frozen. K =
// live N makes the proposer poll the whole set so α has real Byzantine slack.
//
// numValidators is the live count of the primary-network validator set (the set
// every native chain — P/C/D — samples from); 0 means "set not yet known", in
// which case FeasibleParams falls back to the minimal K=4 committee. The manager
// call site also asserts ValidateForLiveValueNetwork as a fail-closed backstop.
func selectConsensusParams(sybilProtection bool, networkID uint32, numValidators int, override ConsensusOverride) consensusconfig.Parameters {
if !sybilProtection {
return consensusconfig.SingleValidatorParams()
}
p := consensusconfig.FeasibleParams(networkID, numValidators)
return applyConsensusOverride(p, override, numValidators)
}
// applyConsensusOverride folds an operator's explicit K/α onto the dynamic
// params. An override may only RAISE a value, never lower it below the dynamic
// floor — the floor is the strict-⅔ stake-cert threshold the engine enforces, so
// honoring a smaller operator value would emit a non-finalizing (or fork-able)
// quorum. This is the node-side analogue of the operator's own BFTSafeQuorum
// clamp, made authoritative here: even if the operator emits the BFT-overlap α
// (14 for a 21-set) the node raises it to the strict-⅔ value (15).
//
// - SampleSize: honored if >0, clamped to ≤ live set (cannot sample validators
// that do not exist) and ≥ the dynamic K. Raising K re-derives the α floor.
// - QuorumSize: honored if >0, clamped UP to the dynamic α floor for the
// effective K and DOWN to ≤K.
func applyConsensusOverride(p consensusconfig.Parameters, override ConsensusOverride, numValidators int) consensusconfig.Parameters {
if override.SampleSize > 0 {
k := override.SampleSize
if numValidators > 0 && k > numValidators {
k = numValidators // never sample more validators than exist
}
if k > p.K {
p.K = k
// Re-derive the α floor for the larger committee.
floor := consensusconfig.EqualStakeSupermajorityThreshold(p.K)
p.AlphaPreference = floor
p.AlphaConfidence = floor
p.Alpha = float64(floor) / float64(p.K)
if p.BetaRogue < p.K {
p.BetaRogue = p.K
}
}
}
if override.QuorumSize > 0 {
alpha := override.QuorumSize
floor := consensusconfig.EqualStakeSupermajorityThreshold(p.K)
if alpha < floor {
alpha = floor // never below the strict-⅔ stake-cert threshold
}
if alpha > p.K {
alpha = p.K
}
p.AlphaPreference = alpha
p.AlphaConfidence = alpha
p.Alpha = float64(alpha) / float64(p.K)
}
if p.Alpha < 0.66 {
p.Alpha = 0.66
}
if p.Alpha > 1.0 {
p.Alpha = 1.0
}
return p
}
// --- BLS vote verifier -------------------------------------------------------
// blsVoteVerifier verifies a validator's BLS signature over the canonical vote
// message. The validator's BLS public key is resolved FROM THE HEIGHT-INDEXED
// validators.State AT THE BLOCK'S P-CHAIN EPOCH HEIGHT (RESIDUAL-B) — the SAME
// height-pinned source the set-root and the ⅔-by-stake tally read from
// (validatorSetAtHeight). It is NOT resolved from the CURRENT validator map.
//
// Why the epoch, not the current map: during an async validator-set change a
// validator can be present in the set@H (it legitimately signed the block being
// voted on at height H) yet ALREADY GONE from the current map. Resolving its
// pubkey from the current map drops its valid vote, and if that validator holds
// >⅓ of the stake-at-H the stable set falls below ⅔ and block H NEVER finalizes
// (this is not self-healing for that block — the skew is permanent for H). Pinning
// pubkey resolution to set@H — alongside membership, set-root, and stake — makes
// the cert internally consistent at exactly one epoch.
//
// An unknown validator at the epoch, a validator with no BLS key, or a bad
// signature all yield false (never an error/panic) — a cert with such a voter is
// simply invalid, the fail-closed contract the engine requires. A nil state (the
// no-op on a non-quorum node) yields false for every voter; a K>1 chain is
// guarded against ever reaching here with a nil/no-op state (manager.go).
type blsVoteVerifier struct {
state validators.State
networkID ids.ID
}
func newBLSVoteVerifier(state validators.State, networkID ids.ID) *blsVoteVerifier {
return &blsVoteVerifier{state: state, networkID: networkID}
}
// VerifyVote implements consensuschain.VoteVerifier. epochHeight is the block's
// P-chain height; the voter's pubkey is read from the set IN FORCE AT that height.
func (v *blsVoteVerifier) VerifyVote(nodeID ids.NodeID, message []byte, sig []byte, epochHeight uint64) bool {
out, ok := validatorSetAtHeight(v.state, v.networkID, epochHeight)[nodeID]
if !ok || out == nil || len(out.PublicKey) == 0 {
return false
}
pk, err := bls.PublicKeyFromCompressedBytes(out.PublicKey)
if err != nil || pk == nil {
return false
}
signature, err := bls.SignatureFromBytes(sig)
if err != nil || signature == nil {
return false
}
return bls.Verify(pk, signature, message)
}
var _ consensuschain.VoteVerifier = (*blsVoteVerifier)(nil)
// --- BLS vote signer ---------------------------------------------------------
// blsVoteSigner signs this node's accept votes with its staking BLS key.
type blsVoteSigner struct {
signer bls.Signer
}
func newBLSVoteSigner(signer bls.Signer) *blsVoteSigner {
if signer == nil {
return nil
}
return &blsVoteSigner{signer: signer}
}
// SignVote implements consensuschain.VoteSigner.
func (s *blsVoteSigner) SignVote(message []byte) ([]byte, error) {
sig, err := s.signer.Sign(message)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return bls.SignatureToBytes(sig), nil
}
var _ consensuschain.VoteSigner = (*blsVoteSigner)(nil)
// --- height-pinned epoch read (MEDIUM-1) -------------------------------------
// validatorSetAtHeight reads the validator set IN FORCE AT a value-chain height
// from the height-indexed validators.State. This is the SINGLE source of epoch
// truth shared by the stake source and the set-root source: both membership and
// weights are read at the SAME height H so a cert's signed set-root and its
// ⅔-by-stake tally are measured against the identical set.
//
// Determinism across nodes is the whole point. validators.State.GetValidatorSet
// returns the set the network already agreed on at height H (P-chain / L1-staking
// consensus), so every honest node computes the same set — and therefore the
// same set-root and the same tally — for a given H, INDEPENDENT of async
// current-map skew during a validator-set change. (The previous Manager.GetMap()
// read hashed the CURRENT map, which diverges between the signer and the
// assembler across that skew window → mismatched canonical messages → dropped
// votes → finality stall at every staking change. That was MEDIUM-1.)
//
// A nil state, a lookup error, or an empty set yields a nil map, which the
// callers fold into their fail-soft answers (0 weight / Empty root). An error is
// SYMMETRIC across nodes (a committed height H reads the same on every node, or
// fails the same way), so the degraded answer is uniform — it never makes one
// node's view disagree with another's, which is the property that matters here.
func validatorSetAtHeight(state validators.State, networkID ids.ID, height uint64) map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput {
if state == nil {
return nil
}
set, err := state.GetValidatorSet(context.Background(), height, networkID)
if err != nil || len(set) == 0 {
return nil
}
return set
}
// --- stake source (HIGH-3, height-pinned by MEDIUM-1) ------------------------
// validatorStakeSource supplies validator voting weights so the engine can
// require a ⅔-by-stake supermajority for finality (HIGH-3). Weights are read
// from the HEIGHT-INDEXED validators.State at the cert-position height, the same
// height the set-root commits to (MEDIUM-1). Reading the tally at the same epoch
// as the signed membership means a validator whose vote is in the cert (its
// signature verifies against the height-H set-root) also contributes its height-H
// weight to the tally — eliminating the second skew (a current-map weight read
// could drop a legitimately-signed quorum when membership changed between sign
// and tally).
type validatorStakeSource struct {
state validators.State
networkID ids.ID
}
func newValidatorStakeSource(state validators.State, networkID ids.ID) *validatorStakeSource {
return &validatorStakeSource{state: state, networkID: networkID}
}
// Weight implements consensuschain.StakeSource. Returns the validator's stake in
// the set IN FORCE AT height — deterministic across nodes for a given height. An
// unknown validator (or a fail-soft empty read) yields 0, which cannot inflate
// the numerator.
func (s *validatorStakeSource) Weight(nodeID ids.NodeID, height uint64) uint64 {
out, ok := validatorSetAtHeight(s.state, s.networkID, height)[nodeID]
if !ok || out == nil {
return 0
}
return out.Light
}
// TotalStake implements consensuschain.StakeSource. Total active stake of the set
// IN FORCE AT height (the denominator of the ⅔ predicate), measured at the same
// epoch as Weight and the set-root.
func (s *validatorStakeSource) TotalStake(height uint64) uint64 {
var total uint64
for _, out := range validatorSetAtHeight(s.state, s.networkID, height) {
if out != nil {
total += out.Light
}
}
return total
}
var _ consensuschain.StakeSource = (*validatorStakeSource)(nil)
// --- validator-set-root source (MEDIUM: epoch binding) -----------------------
// validatorSetRootSource computes the deterministic commitment to the validator
// set IN FORCE AT a value-chain height — the value the engine stamps into every
// vote's VotePosition.ValidatorSetRoot so a cert is pinned to the exact set it
// was certified under. It is the node side of the MEDIUM fix: it turns the
// "⅔-by-stake measured at the cert-position epoch" property into an ENFORCED
// invariant (a cross-epoch cert fails verification because every signature was
// over this root).
//
// HEIGHT-PINNED (MEDIUM-1). The root is read from the HEIGHT-INDEXED
// validators.State at the value-chain block height, NOT from the Manager's
// CURRENT map. At a given height H, GetValidatorSet returns the set the network
// already agreed on, so every honest node — signer and assembler alike — computes
// the IDENTICAL root for H, independent of async current-map skew during a
// validator-set change. Reading the current map (the prior bug) let the signer
// and the assembler hold different maps across that skew window → different roots
// → the canonical signed message differed → signatures failed verification →
// votes dropped → finality stalled at every staking change.
//
// The commitment is a SHA-256 over the set serialized in a canonical order
// (validators sorted by NodeID, each as nodeID || light || len(pubkey) ||
// pubkey) — see hashValidatorSet. Sorting by NodeID + length-prefixing the
// pubkey makes the encoding canonical and unambiguous; the byte layout is
// UNCHANGED from the prior implementation, so the wire format and the engine's
// epoch-binding contract are preserved (only the SOURCE of the set changed from
// the current map to the height-indexed set).
type validatorSetRootSource struct {
state validators.State
networkID ids.ID
}
func newValidatorSetRootSource(state validators.State, networkID ids.ID) *validatorSetRootSource {
return &validatorSetRootSource{state: state, networkID: networkID}
}
// ValidatorSetRoot implements consensuschain.ValidatorSetRootSource. Returns the
// commitment to the weighted set IN FORCE AT height (deterministic across nodes).
// Returns ids.Empty when the state is absent or the set is empty (the explicit
// "unbound" answer, consistent with the engine default); a height-read error is
// symmetric across nodes, so the Empty fallback is uniform and never creates a
// cross-node root disagreement.
func (s *validatorSetRootSource) ValidatorSetRoot(height uint64) ids.ID {
return hashValidatorSet(validatorSetAtHeight(s.state, s.networkID, height))
}
var _ consensuschain.ValidatorSetRootSource = (*validatorSetRootSource)(nil)
// hashValidatorSet computes the canonical SHA-256 commitment to a weighted
// validator set: validators sorted by NodeID, each serialized as
// nodeID || light(8,BE) || len(pubkey)(8,BE) || pubkey. An empty/nil set commits
// to ids.Empty (the "unbound" answer). This is the SINGLE definition of the
// set-root encoding (DRY) — both the live source and its tests hash through here,
// so the wire format cannot drift between them.
func hashValidatorSet(set map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput) ids.ID {
if len(set) == 0 {
return ids.Empty
}
nodeIDs := make([]ids.NodeID, 0, len(set))
for nodeID := range set {
nodeIDs = append(nodeIDs, nodeID)
}
sort.Slice(nodeIDs, func(i, j int) bool {
return bytes.Compare(nodeIDs[i][:], nodeIDs[j][:]) < 0
})
h := sha256.New()
var u64 [8]byte
for _, nodeID := range nodeIDs {
v := set[nodeID]
h.Write(nodeID[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], v.Light)
h.Write(u64[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], uint64(len(v.PublicKey)))
h.Write(u64[:])
h.Write(v.PublicKey)
}
var root ids.ID
copy(root[:], h.Sum(nil))
return root
}
// --- app-gossip envelope for votes/certs -------------------------------------
// The QuorumGossiper transport rides on app-gossip. A single framed envelope
// carries either a signed vote or an assembled cert. The receiver (blockHandler
// .Gossip) demuxes on the magic + kind and routes to the engine. A payload
// without the magic is a plain block gossip (legacy Put path), so the demux is
// backward-compatible.
//
// Layout (big-endian):
//
// magic:4 ("LXQ\x01") kind:1 blockID:32 payload:...
//
// kind 1 = signed vote (payload = engine encodeSignedVote: nodeID+sig)
// kind 2 = finality cert (payload = engine cert MarshalBinary)
var quorumGossipMagic = [4]byte{'L', 'X', 'Q', 0x01}
const (
quorumKindVote byte = 1
quorumKindCert byte = 2
)
// ErrNotQuorumGossip signals a payload is not a quorum envelope (so the caller
// falls through to the block-gossip path).
var ErrNotQuorumGossip = errors.New("chains: not a quorum gossip envelope")
// encodeQuorumGossip frames a vote/cert payload for app-gossip.
func encodeQuorumGossip(kind byte, blockID ids.ID, payload []byte) []byte {
buf := make([]byte, 0, 4+1+32+len(payload))
buf = append(buf, quorumGossipMagic[:]...)
buf = append(buf, kind)
buf = append(buf, blockID[:]...)
buf = append(buf, payload...)
return buf
}
// decodeQuorumGossip parses an envelope. Returns ErrNotQuorumGossip if the magic
// is absent (a normal block gossip) — fail-soft so the legacy path is preserved.
func decodeQuorumGossip(data []byte) (kind byte, blockID ids.ID, payload []byte, err error) {
if len(data) < 4+1+32 || [4]byte{data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]} != quorumGossipMagic {
return 0, ids.Empty, nil, ErrNotQuorumGossip
}
kind = data[4]
copy(blockID[:], data[5:5+32])
payload = data[5+32:]
if kind != quorumKindVote && kind != quorumKindCert {
return 0, ids.Empty, nil, ErrNotQuorumGossip
}
return kind, blockID, payload, nil
}
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// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// quorum_guard_node_test.go — CRITICAL-1(c) fail-closed guard + the wiring proof
// the MEDIUM-1 round lacked. The round-1 tests injected a validators.State into
// the source constructors directly and never exercised the path where
// m.validatorState is nil (the production default until the P-Chain publishes
// its State). These tests pin:
//
// (1) the guard predicate: a K>1 chain with NO height-indexed state is refused
// (would otherwise stall finality forever);
// (2) the failure mechanism: getValidatorState(nil) → the no-op State, whose
// GetValidatorSet is EMPTY at every height → the stake source totals 0 and
// the set-root is Empty (exactly the inputs that make VerifyWeighted fail
// closed). This is what the guard exists to prevent silently;
// (3) the fix: once a REAL height-indexed state is published, getValidatorState
// returns it and the same sources read a live set (non-zero stake / non-Empty
// root) — finality can proceed.
package chains
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
)
// TestQuorumGuard_RefusesNoopState pins the guard predicate (CRITICAL-1(c)): a
// nil (unpublished) validator state is NOT live, so a K>1 chain must refuse to
// start; a published state IS live.
func TestQuorumGuard_RefusesNoopState(t *testing.T) {
if quorumValidatorStateLive(nil) {
t.Fatal("CRITICAL-1(c): a nil validator state must NOT be considered live (would stall finality)")
}
live := validatorstest.NewTestState()
if !quorumValidatorStateLive(live) {
t.Fatal("a published height-indexed validator state must be considered live")
}
}
// TestGetValidatorState_NoopIsEmptyAtEveryHeight proves the failure mechanism the
// guard prevents: with no state published, getValidatorState yields the no-op
// State, and the height-pinned sources read an EMPTY set at every height — zero
// total stake and an Empty set-root, the exact inputs that make the engine's
// VerifyWeighted fail closed (ErrQCStakeBelowSupermajority) so NO block finalizes.
func TestGetValidatorState_NoopIsEmptyAtEveryHeight(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
// Production default: validatorState unset → getValidatorState(nil) = no-op.
noop := getValidatorState(nil)
if noop == nil {
t.Fatal("getValidatorState(nil) must return the no-op State, not nil")
}
stake := newValidatorStakeSource(noop, netID)
root := newValidatorSetRootSource(noop, netID)
for _, h := range []uint64{0, 1, 7, 1_000, 10_000_000} {
if total := stake.TotalStake(h); total != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no-op State must report zero total stake at height %d, got %d", h, total)
}
if r := root.ValidatorSetRoot(h); r != ids.Empty {
t.Fatalf("no-op State must commit to Empty set-root at height %d, got %s", h, r)
}
}
}
// TestGetValidatorState_LiveStateReadsSet proves the fix: once a real
// height-indexed state is published (as the P-Chain does), getValidatorState
// returns it and the SAME sources read a live set — non-zero stake and a
// non-Empty set-root — so the ⅔-by-stake finality predicate can be satisfied.
func TestGetValidatorState_LiveStateReadsSet(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
n0, n1, n2 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
const H = uint64(7)
live := validatorstest.NewTestState()
live.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
if gotNet != netID || height != H {
return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
}
return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{
n0: {NodeID: n0, PublicKey: []byte("pk0"), Light: 30, Weight: 30},
n1: {NodeID: n1, PublicKey: []byte("pk1"), Light: 30, Weight: 30},
n2: {NodeID: n2, PublicKey: []byte("pk2"), Light: 40, Weight: 40},
}, nil
}
// getValidatorState passes a non-nil state through unchanged.
got := getValidatorState(live)
stake := newValidatorStakeSource(got, netID)
root := newValidatorSetRootSource(got, netID)
if total := stake.TotalStake(H); total != 100 {
t.Fatalf("live State must report total stake 100 at the epoch, got %d", total)
}
if w := stake.Weight(n2, H); w != 40 {
t.Fatalf("live State must report n2 weight 40 at the epoch, got %d", w)
}
if r := root.ValidatorSetRoot(H); r == ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("live State must commit to a NON-Empty set-root at the epoch")
}
// A different height (no set) is still Empty/zero — the read is height-pinned.
if stake.TotalStake(H+1) != 0 || root.ValidatorSetRoot(H+1) != ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("live State read must be height-pinned (empty at a height with no set)")
}
}
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// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// quorum_params_test.go — node-layer regression for DYNAMIC live-set consensus
// sizing. selectConsensusParams sizes the committee to the LIVE validator set
// (K=N) for EVERY sybil-protected network — mainnet, testnet, devnet, localnet
// and sovereign L1s alike — with α = the strict-⅔ stake threshold derived from
// the cert verifier's rule. This replaces the retired per-tier split (mainnet
// K=21 / testnet K=11 / Default K=20) that wedged finality on a 5-validator set:
// the oversized K demanded an α the few reachable peers could never supply.
//
// It also pins: the operator's explicit committee/quorum override is honored but
// clamped UP to the dynamic floor (never below the strict-⅔ stake-cert
// threshold); single-node (--dev) selects K=1; and the live-aware value backstop
// (ValidateForLiveValueNetwork) admits the sized params while still rejecting
// genuinely non-BFT sets.
package chains
import (
"testing"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
)
// the live primary-network validator count the node passes for these nets in
// production (all three nets run 5 today). Using a realistic value exercises K=N.
const testNumValidators = 5
// TestSelectConsensusParams_SizedToLiveSet proves that for EVERY multi-validator
// (sybilProtection==true) network the node sizes K to the live validator count
// and α to the strict-⅔ threshold — one dynamic path, no per-tier schedule. The
// 5-validator case is the fleet outage fix: K=5/α=4 (NOT mainnet K=21/α=15 or
// testnet K=11/α=8), the fastest viable BFT setting that a 5-peer set can satisfy.
func TestSelectConsensusParams_SizedToLiveSet(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
networkID uint32
}{
{"mainnet", constants.MainnetID},
{"testnet", constants.TestnetID},
{"devnet", constants.DevnetID},
{"localnet", constants.LocalID},
{"sovereign-L1", 8675309},
{"arbitrary-value-net", 424242},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
p := selectConsensusParams(true /* sybilProtection */, tc.networkID, testNumValidators, ConsensusOverride{})
// Sized to the live set: K=5, α=4 (strict-⅔ of 5).
if p.K != testNumValidators {
t.Fatalf("net %q: K=%d, want K=N=%d (sized to live set)", tc.name, p.K, testNumValidators)
}
if p.AlphaPreference != 4 || p.AlphaConfidence != 4 {
t.Fatalf("net %q: α=%d, want 4 (4-of-5 finalizes, 1 laggard tolerated)", tc.name, p.AlphaPreference)
}
// Byzantine-fault-tolerant (f≥1 ⟹ K≥4) — never the CRITICAL-2 K=3 fork set.
if p.ByzantineFaultTolerance() < 1 {
t.Fatalf("net %q got non-BFT params K=%d f=%d", tc.name, p.K, p.ByzantineFaultTolerance())
}
// Selected params pass Valid() (the BFT α-floor 2α−K ≥ f+1).
if err := p.Valid(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("net %q params fail Valid(): %v (K=%d α=%d)", tc.name, err, p.K, p.AlphaPreference)
}
// And clear the LIVE-aware value backstop the manager asserts.
if err := p.ValidateForLiveValueNetwork(tc.networkID, testNumValidators); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("net %q params rejected by live backstop (liveN=%d): %v", tc.name, testNumValidators, err)
}
})
}
}
// TestSelectConsensusParams_RecomputesForLargerSet proves the committee
// recomputes from the live count: a 21-validator set yields K=21/α=15 — 15, not
// 14, because 14/21 does not strictly exceed ⅔. No hardcoded schedule.
func TestSelectConsensusParams_RecomputesForLargerSet(t *testing.T) {
p := selectConsensusParams(true, constants.MainnetID, 21, ConsensusOverride{})
if p.K != 21 || p.AlphaPreference != 15 {
t.Fatalf("21-validator mainnet: want K=21/α=15 (strict >⅔), got K=%d/α=%d", p.K, p.AlphaPreference)
}
if err := p.ValidateForLiveValueNetwork(constants.MainnetID, 21); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("K=21/α=15 must clear the live backstop on a 21-validator mainnet: %v", err)
}
}
// TestSelectConsensusParams_SmallSetClampsToBFTFloor proves a tiny set (1-3
// validators, or "set not yet known"=0) clamps to K=4 so it still clears the
// value-network BFT floor (K≥4, f≥1). Such a set degrades to near-unanimous fault
// tolerance but remains safe and Valid.
func TestSelectConsensusParams_SmallSetClampsToBFTFloor(t *testing.T) {
for _, n := range []int{0, 1, 2, 3} {
p := selectConsensusParams(true, constants.DevnetID, n, ConsensusOverride{})
if p.K != 4 {
t.Fatalf("%d validators must clamp to K=4 (value BFT floor), got K=%d", n, p.K)
}
if p.ByzantineFaultTolerance() < 1 {
t.Fatalf("%d validators: clamped K=%d not BFT (f=%d)", n, p.K, p.ByzantineFaultTolerance())
}
if err := p.ValidateForLiveValueNetwork(constants.DevnetID, n); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%d validators: clamped params must pass live backstop, got %v", n, err)
}
}
}
// TestSelectConsensusParams_HonorsOverrideClampedUp proves the operator's
// explicit committee/quorum is honored but never lowers safety:
// - a quorum override BELOW the strict-⅔ floor is clamped UP (e.g. operator
// pins α=14 for a 21-set → node raises to 15, the cert threshold);
// - a quorum override ABOVE the floor is honored as-is;
// - a sample-size override is honored but never exceeds the live set.
func TestSelectConsensusParams_HonorsOverrideClampedUp(t *testing.T) {
// Operator under-sets α to the BFT-overlap value 14 on a 21-validator mainnet.
// The node MUST clamp up to the strict-⅔ value 15 (never below the cert floor).
p := selectConsensusParams(true, constants.MainnetID, 21, ConsensusOverride{QuorumSize: 14})
if p.AlphaPreference != 15 {
t.Fatalf("operator α=14 on a 21-set must clamp UP to the strict-⅔ floor 15, got %d", p.AlphaPreference)
}
// Operator pins a HIGHER α (16) — honored (operator may be more conservative).
p = selectConsensusParams(true, constants.MainnetID, 21, ConsensusOverride{QuorumSize: 16})
if p.AlphaPreference != 16 {
t.Fatalf("operator α=16 (above floor) must be honored, got %d", p.AlphaPreference)
}
// Sample-size override is clamped to the live set (cannot sample 9 of 5).
p = selectConsensusParams(true, constants.DevnetID, 5, ConsensusOverride{SampleSize: 9})
if p.K != 5 {
t.Fatalf("sample-size override must not exceed the live set of 5, got K=%d", p.K)
}
// An α override below the dynamic floor for the 5-set is clamped to 4.
p = selectConsensusParams(true, constants.DevnetID, 5, ConsensusOverride{QuorumSize: 2})
if p.AlphaPreference != 4 {
t.Fatalf("operator α=2 on a 5-set must clamp UP to the strict-⅔ floor 4, got %d", p.AlphaPreference)
}
if err := p.Valid(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("override-clamped params must pass Valid(): %v", err)
}
}
// TestSelectConsensusParams_SingleNodeIsK1 proves --dev / sybil-disabled selects
// the K=1 single-validator regime (the sole validator's accept is the 1-of-1
// quorum) — and NOT a multi-node BFT set.
func TestSelectConsensusParams_SingleNodeIsK1(t *testing.T) {
p := selectConsensusParams(false /* sybilProtection */, constants.LocalID, 5, ConsensusOverride{})
if p.K != 1 {
t.Fatalf("sybil-disabled (single-node) must select K=1, got K=%d", p.K)
}
_ = consensusconfig.SingleValidatorParams // referenced regime
}
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// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// quorum_setroot_test.go — node-layer tests for MEDIUM-1: the set-root and the
// ⅔-by-stake tally MUST be read from the HEIGHT-INDEXED validators.State at the
// cert-position height, so every node computes the IDENTICAL root, weights, and
// total for a given value-chain height — INDEPENDENT of async current-map skew
// during a validator-set change.
//
// The cross-node test (TestValidatorSetRoot_CrossNodeAgreesDespiteSkew) is the
// one the red flagged as MISSING: it models two nodes whose CURRENT validator
// views diverge (a set-change in flight) but who agree on the historical set at a
// pinned height H — and proves they nonetheless compute the SAME set-root at H.
// Reading the current map (the prior bug) would have made their roots differ →
// mismatched canonical signed messages → dropped votes → finality stall.
package chains
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"sort"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
)
// expectedSetRoot is an INDEPENDENT reimplementation of the canonical set-root
// spec, used only by the golden test to cross-check hashValidatorSet. It is
// deliberately NOT a call to hashValidatorSet (that would be a tautology): if the
// production encoding ever diverges from this spec the golden test fails.
func expectedSetRoot(t *testing.T, vdrs []vdr) ids.ID {
t.Helper()
sort.Slice(vdrs, func(i, j int) bool {
return bytes.Compare(vdrs[i].nodeID[:], vdrs[j].nodeID[:]) < 0
})
h := sha256.New()
var u64 [8]byte
for _, v := range vdrs {
h.Write(v.nodeID[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], v.light)
h.Write(u64[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(u64[:], uint64(len(v.pk)))
h.Write(u64[:])
h.Write(v.pk)
}
var root ids.ID
copy(root[:], h.Sum(nil))
return root
}
// vdr is a tiny height→set fixture: which validators (and weights/keys) the
// height-indexed state reports at each value-chain height.
type vdr struct {
nodeID ids.NodeID
pk []byte
light uint64
}
// stateWithHistory builds a validators.State whose GetValidatorSet returns the
// set registered for the requested height (and an empty set for unknown heights),
// scoped to netID. This is the height-indexed source MEDIUM-1 reads from.
func stateWithHistory(netID ids.ID, byHeight map[uint64][]vdr) *validatorstest.TestState {
s := validatorstest.NewTestState()
s.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
if gotNet != netID {
return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
}
out := make(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput)
for _, v := range byHeight[height] {
out[v.nodeID] = &validators.GetValidatorOutput{
NodeID: v.nodeID,
PublicKey: v.pk,
Light: v.light,
Weight: v.light,
}
}
return out, nil
}
return s
}
// TestValidatorSetRoot_CrossNodeAgreesDespiteSkew is the MEDIUM-1 regression
// guard. Two nodes are mid validator-set change: their CURRENT sets differ
// (height 11 vs height 12), but both still serve the SAME committed set at the
// value-chain block height H=10 being voted on. The set-root at H MUST be
// identical on both nodes — that identity is what makes their signatures over the
// block's canonical message mutually verifiable. The prior current-map read would
// have produced two different roots here and stalled finality.
func TestValidatorSetRoot_CrossNodeAgreesDespiteSkew(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
n0, n1, n2, n3 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
pk0, pk1, pk2, pk3 := []byte("pk-0-48bytes-placeholder"), []byte("pk-1"), []byte("pk-2"), []byte("pk-3")
const H = uint64(10)
setAtH := []vdr{{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 20}, {n2, pk2, 30}}
// Node A has already applied a stake bump that took effect at height 11
// (n1: 20→25) and sees that as its current set. It still knows the height-10
// set (the block being voted on).
nodeA := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
H: setAtH,
11: {{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 25}, {n2, pk2, 30}},
})
// Node B has already applied a NEW validator that joined at height 12
// (n3 added) — a different, later current set. It too still knows height 10.
nodeB := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
H: setAtH,
12: {{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 25}, {n2, pk2, 30}, {n3, pk3, 5}},
})
rootA := newValidatorSetRootSource(nodeA, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(H)
rootB := newValidatorSetRootSource(nodeB, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(H)
if rootA == ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("set-root at the voted height must be non-Empty (the set is non-empty)")
}
if rootA != rootB {
t.Fatalf("MEDIUM-1: cross-node set-root at height %d MUST be identical despite "+
"current-set skew, got A=%s B=%s", H, rootA, rootB)
}
// Sanity: had either node (wrongly) committed to its CURRENT set instead of
// the height-H set, the roots WOULD differ — proving the test actually
// exercises the skew (not a vacuous match).
rootA_cur := newValidatorSetRootSource(nodeA, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(11)
rootB_cur := newValidatorSetRootSource(nodeB, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(12)
if rootA_cur == rootB_cur {
t.Fatal("test is vacuous: the two nodes' CURRENT sets must differ to exercise the skew")
}
if rootA == rootA_cur {
t.Fatal("test is vacuous: height-H set must differ from node A's current set")
}
}
// TestValidatorSetRoot_HeightSelectsEpoch proves the root is a deterministic
// FUNCTION OF HEIGHT (not a fixed current-set snapshot): different heights with
// different sets yield different roots, the same height always yields the same
// root, and the encoding is insertion-order independent (canonical sort).
func TestValidatorSetRoot_HeightSelectsEpoch(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
n0, n1, n2 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
pk0, pk1, pk2 := []byte("pk-0-48bytes-placeholder"), []byte("pk-1"), []byte("pk-2")
state := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
10: {{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 20}, {n2, pk2, 30}},
11: {{n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 21}, {n2, pk2, 30}}, // n1 weight changed
})
src := newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID)
root10 := src.ValidatorSetRoot(10)
root11 := src.ValidatorSetRoot(11)
if root10 == ids.Empty || root11 == ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("non-empty sets must commit to non-Empty roots")
}
if root10 == root11 {
t.Fatal("a different epoch (height with a changed weight) MUST yield a different root")
}
// Same height is stable (deterministic), repeatedly.
if again := src.ValidatorSetRoot(10); again != root10 {
t.Fatalf("set-root at a fixed height must be deterministic: %s != %s", again, root10)
}
// Insertion-order independence: a state that lists the SAME height-10 members
// in a different slice order yields the SAME root (canonical NodeID sort).
reordered := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
10: {{n2, pk2, 30}, {n0, pk0, 10}, {n1, pk1, 20}},
})
if r := newValidatorSetRootSource(reordered, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(10); r != root10 {
t.Fatalf("set-root must be member-order independent: %s != %s", r, root10)
}
}
// TestValidatorSetRoot_FailSoftIsUniform proves the fail-soft answers are
// Empty/uniform (never a panic, never a per-node-divergent default): a nil state,
// an unknown height (empty set), an unknown network, and a height-read error all
// commit to ids.Empty. Uniformity is the safety property — a symmetric error
// degrades every node to the same Empty root, never to disagreeing roots.
func TestValidatorSetRoot_FailSoftIsUniform(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
// nil state → Empty.
if got := (&validatorSetRootSource{state: nil, networkID: netID}).ValidatorSetRoot(10); got != ids.Empty {
t.Fatalf("nil state must commit to ids.Empty, got %s", got)
}
// Known network, but a height with no registered set → Empty.
state := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
10: {{ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), []byte("pk"), 10}},
})
if got := newValidatorSetRootSource(state, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(999); got != ids.Empty {
t.Fatalf("unknown height must commit to ids.Empty, got %s", got)
}
// Wrong network → empty set → Empty.
if got := newValidatorSetRootSource(state, ids.GenerateTestID()).ValidatorSetRoot(10); got != ids.Empty {
t.Fatalf("unknown network must commit to ids.Empty, got %s", got)
}
// A height-read ERROR → Empty (and it is symmetric: the same error on every
// node yields the same Empty root).
errState := validatorstest.NewTestState()
errState.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, _ uint64, _ ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
return nil, errors.New("state unavailable at height")
}
if got := newValidatorSetRootSource(errState, netID).ValidatorSetRoot(10); got != ids.Empty {
t.Fatalf("a height-read error must commit to ids.Empty, got %s", got)
}
}
// TestValidatorStakeSource_HeightPinned proves the ⅔-by-stake tally is read at
// the SAME height as the set-root (MEDIUM-1's second skew): Weight/TotalStake are
// a deterministic function of height, so a validator whose vote is in a
// height-H cert contributes its height-H weight — not whatever the current map
// happens to hold after a membership change. This is what stops a current-map
// weight read from dropping a legitimately-signed quorum.
func TestValidatorStakeSource_HeightPinned(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
n0, n1, n2 := ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), ids.GenerateTestNodeID()
state := stateWithHistory(netID, map[uint64][]vdr{
10: {{n0, []byte("pk0"), 70}, {n1, []byte("pk1"), 30}}, // total 100
11: {{n0, []byte("pk0"), 70}, {n1, []byte("pk1"), 30}, {n2, []byte("pk2"), 50}}, // total 150
})
src := newValidatorStakeSource(state, netID)
// At height 10 the tally is the height-10 epoch.
if w := src.Weight(n0, 10); w != 70 {
t.Fatalf("Weight(n0, h=10) = %d, want 70", w)
}
if total := src.TotalStake(10); total != 100 {
t.Fatalf("TotalStake(h=10) = %d, want 100", total)
}
// n2 is NOT in the height-10 set → 0 at h=10, but 50 at h=11. The tally is
// height-pinned, not current-map.
if w := src.Weight(n2, 10); w != 0 {
t.Fatalf("Weight(n2, h=10) = %d, want 0 (n2 joined at h=11)", w)
}
if w := src.Weight(n2, 11); w != 50 {
t.Fatalf("Weight(n2, h=11) = %d, want 50", w)
}
if total := src.TotalStake(11); total != 150 {
t.Fatalf("TotalStake(h=11) = %d, want 150", total)
}
// Unknown node at a known height → 0 (cannot inflate the numerator).
if w := src.Weight(ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), 10); w != 0 {
t.Fatalf("Weight(unknown, h=10) = %d, want 0", w)
}
// nil state → fail-soft zeros.
nilSrc := &validatorStakeSource{state: nil, networkID: netID}
if nilSrc.Weight(n0, 10) != 0 || nilSrc.TotalStake(10) != 0 {
t.Fatal("nil state must yield zero weight and total")
}
}
// TestHashValidatorSet_ByteStability is a GOLDEN test pinning the canonical
// set-root encoding so the wire format cannot drift (the engine's epoch-binding
// contract and any persisted/gossiped cert depend on this exact byte layout). If
// this value changes, the set-root encoding changed and every node in the
// network must upgrade in lockstep — it is a CONSENSUS-BREAKING change.
func TestHashValidatorSet_ByteStability(t *testing.T) {
// Fixed (non-random) NodeIDs so the golden is reproducible.
var a, b ids.NodeID
a[0], b[0] = 0x01, 0x02
set := map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{
a: {NodeID: a, PublicKey: []byte{0xaa, 0xbb}, Light: 10},
b: {NodeID: b, PublicKey: []byte{0xcc}, Light: 20},
}
got := hashValidatorSet(set)
// Independently recompute the expected commitment from the canonical spec:
// sorted-by-NodeID, each nodeID || light(8,BE) || len(pk)(8,BE) || pk, SHA-256.
want := expectedSetRoot(t, []vdr{
{a, []byte{0xaa, 0xbb}, 10},
{b, []byte{0xcc}, 20},
})
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("set-root encoding drifted (CONSENSUS-BREAKING):\n got %s\n want %s", got, want)
}
// Empty/nil set → ids.Empty.
if hashValidatorSet(nil) != ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("nil set must commit to ids.Empty")
}
if hashValidatorSet(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}) != ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("empty set must commit to ids.Empty")
}
}
+165
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries, Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// quorum_verifier_height_test.go — node-layer regression for RESIDUAL-B and the
// CRITICAL-1 wiring: the BLS vote verifier resolves the voter's public key from
// the HEIGHT-INDEXED validators.State AT THE BLOCK'S P-CHAIN EPOCH HEIGHT — the
// SAME height-pinned source as the set-root and the ⅔-by-stake tally — NOT from
// the current validator map.
//
// The round-1 fix left the verifier reading the CURRENT map (m.Validators):
// a validator present in set@H (it legitimately signed block H) but already gone
// from the current map during async staking skew had its vote DROPPED, and if it
// held >⅓ of the stake-at-H the block never finalized. These tests prove the
// verifier now reads set@H, so such a vote verifies at H (and a vote keyed to the
// wrong height does not).
package chains
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/validators/validatorstest"
)
// blsKey is a test validator's BLS key material.
type blsKey struct {
nodeID ids.NodeID
sk *bls.SecretKey
pkComp []byte
}
func newBLSKey(t *testing.T) blsKey {
t.Helper()
sk, err := bls.NewSecretKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewSecretKey: %v", err)
}
return blsKey{
nodeID: ids.GenerateTestNodeID(),
sk: sk,
pkComp: bls.PublicKeyToCompressedBytes(sk.PublicKey()),
}
}
// stateWithBLSByHeight builds a height-indexed validators.State that reports the
// given BLS validators at each height (empty for unknown heights / wrong net).
func stateWithBLSByHeight(netID ids.ID, byHeight map[uint64][]blsKey) *validatorstest.TestState {
s := validatorstest.NewTestState()
s.GetValidatorSetF = func(_ context.Context, height uint64, gotNet ids.ID) (map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput, error) {
if gotNet != netID {
return map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput{}, nil
}
out := make(map[ids.NodeID]*validators.GetValidatorOutput)
for _, k := range byHeight[height] {
out[k.nodeID] = &validators.GetValidatorOutput{
NodeID: k.nodeID,
PublicKey: k.pkComp,
Light: 1,
Weight: 1,
}
}
return out, nil
}
return s
}
// TestBLSVoteVerifier_ResolvesPubkeyAtEpochHeight is the RESIDUAL-B core: a
// validator that is in set@H but has LEFT the set at a later height still has its
// vote verified at H (the verifier reads set@H, not the current map).
func TestBLSVoteVerifier_ResolvesPubkeyAtEpochHeight(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
keep := newBLSKey(t) // stays in the set across epochs
leaver := newBLSKey(t) // in set@10, GONE from set@11 (departed the current set)
const H = uint64(10)
state := stateWithBLSByHeight(netID, map[uint64][]blsKey{
10: {keep, leaver},
11: {keep}, // leaver has departed by height 11 (the "current" epoch)
})
v := newBLSVoteVerifier(state, netID)
// The leaver signs a message; its vote MUST verify at epoch H=10 (it was a
// member then), proving pubkey resolution is at the epoch, not the current set.
msg := []byte("LUX/chain/vote/v1\x00 — epoch-pinned verify")
sig, err := leaver.sk.Sign(msg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
}
sigBytes := bls.SignatureToBytes(sig)
if !v.VerifyVote(leaver.nodeID, msg, sigBytes, H) {
t.Fatal("RESIDUAL-B: a validator in set@H must verify at H even after leaving the current set " +
"(verifier read the current map instead of set@H)")
}
// At height 11 the leaver is NOT a member → its vote MUST NOT verify there.
// This proves the resolution is genuinely height-pinned (not height-agnostic).
if v.VerifyVote(leaver.nodeID, msg, sigBytes, 11) {
t.Fatal("a validator absent from set@11 must NOT verify at 11 (height pinning is not in effect)")
}
// The keeper verifies at both heights (it is in both sets) — sanity that the
// epoch read is not rejecting valid current members.
keepSig, _ := keep.sk.Sign(msg)
keepBytes := bls.SignatureToBytes(keepSig)
if !v.VerifyVote(keep.nodeID, msg, keepBytes, 10) || !v.VerifyVote(keep.nodeID, msg, keepBytes, 11) {
t.Fatal("a validator present at both epochs must verify at both")
}
}
// TestBLSVoteVerifier_FailClosed proves the verifier never panics and returns
// false for every fail-soft case: nil state, unknown voter at the epoch, wrong
// network, an unknown height (empty set), a wrong-length signature, and the
// HIGH-1 malformed-infinity signature (0x40||zeros) that used to PANIC the purego
// BLS path — here it must be a clean false, not a crash.
func TestBLSVoteVerifier_FailClosed(t *testing.T) {
netID := ids.GenerateTestID()
k := newBLSKey(t)
state := stateWithBLSByHeight(netID, map[uint64][]blsKey{10: {k}})
msg := []byte("msg")
sig, _ := k.sk.Sign(msg)
good := bls.SignatureToBytes(sig)
// nil state → false for any voter.
if newBLSVoteVerifier(nil, netID).VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, good, 10) {
t.Fatal("nil state must yield false")
}
v := newBLSVoteVerifier(state, netID)
// unknown voter at a known epoch.
if v.VerifyVote(ids.GenerateTestNodeID(), msg, good, 10) {
t.Fatal("unknown voter at the epoch must yield false")
}
// known voter at an UNKNOWN epoch (empty set) → false.
if v.VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, good, 999) {
t.Fatal("known voter at an unknown epoch (empty set) must yield false")
}
// wrong network → empty set → false.
if newBLSVoteVerifier(state, ids.GenerateTestID()).VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, good, 10) {
t.Fatal("wrong network must yield false")
}
// wrong-length signature → false (no panic).
if v.VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, good[:len(good)-1], 10) {
t.Fatal("wrong-length signature must yield false")
}
// HIGH-1 malformed infinity sig (0x40||zeros) → clean false, NOT a panic.
mal := make([]byte, bls.SignatureLen)
mal[0] = 0x40
if v.VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, mal, 10) {
t.Fatal("malformed-infinity signature must yield false")
}
// A WRONG signature (valid form, wrong key) → false.
other := newBLSKey(t)
otherSig, _ := other.sk.Sign(msg)
if v.VerifyVote(k.nodeID, msg, bls.SignatureToBytes(otherSig), 10) {
t.Fatal("a signature by a different key must yield false")
}
}
// ensure the node verifier still satisfies the (now height-aware) engine interface.
var _ chain.VoteVerifier = (*blsVoteVerifier)(nil)
+3 -3
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ package rpc
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func (d *DebugTool) testEndpoint(url string) TestResult {
// Check if we got a valid JSON-RPC response
var rpcResp map[string]interface{}
if err := json.NewDecoder(postResp.Body).Decode(&rpcResp); err == nil {
if err := json.UnmarshalRead(postResp.Body, &rpcResp); err == nil {
if _, hasResult := rpcResp["result"]; hasResult {
result.Success = true
result.Response = fmt.Sprintf("Valid JSON-RPC response: %v", rpcResp["result"])
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func (d *DebugTool) testRPCMethods(url string) []RPCTest {
defer resp.Body.Close()
var result map[string]interface{}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err == nil {
if err := json.UnmarshalRead(resp.Body, &result); err == nil {
if res, ok := result["result"]; ok {
test.Success = true
test.Result = fmt.Sprintf("%v", res)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (s *mockServer) AddAliasesWithReadLock(endpoint string, aliases ...string)
func (s *mockServer) Dispatch() error { return nil }
func (s *mockServer) RegisterChain(chainName string, rt *runtime.Runtime, vm vm.VM) {
}
func (s *mockServer) Shutdown() error { return nil }
func (s *mockServer) Shutdown() error { return nil }
func (s *mockServer) SetRootInfoProvider(_ server.RootInfoProvider) {}
func TestHandlerManager_RegisterChainHandlers(t *testing.T) {
+158
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
//
// F118 regression coverage. Asserts the chain manager stamps the
// chain-wide ChainSecurityProfile pin into the C-Chain JSON config
// bytes so the rpcchainvm plugin (coreth) can resolve the profile on
// its side of the boundary.
package chains
import (
"encoding/hex"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"testing"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// canonicalStrictPQProfile returns the live canonical StrictPQ profile
// with ProfileHash populated — the same form node.go builds during
// initSecurityProfile.
func canonicalStrictPQProfile(t *testing.T) *consensusconfig.ChainSecurityProfile {
t.Helper()
p, err := consensusconfig.ProfileByID(consensusconfig.ProfileStrictPQ)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, p.Validate())
h, err := p.ComputeHash()
require.NoError(t, err)
p.ProfileHash = h
return p
}
// TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_StampsCChainOnly asserts the F118
// injection pass stamps the security profile pin into the C-Chain
// (EVMID) plugin config and is a no-op for every other VM ID. Other
// VMs receive the config bytes unchanged.
func TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_StampsCChainOnly(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
profile := canonicalStrictPQProfile(t)
m := &manager{
ManagerConfig: ManagerConfig{
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
SecurityProfile: profile,
},
}
// C-Chain (EVMID): pin must be stamped.
out := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, nil)
require.NotEmpty(out, "C-Chain config must be stamped with the security profile pin")
var got map[string]interface{}
require.NoError(json.Unmarshal(out, &got))
pin, ok := got["lux-security-profile"].(map[string]interface{})
require.True(ok, "C-Chain config must carry lux-security-profile object")
require.EqualValues(uint32(consensusconfig.ProfileStrictPQ), uint32(pin["profileID"].(float64)),
"profileID must round-trip the canonical StrictPQ byte")
require.Equal(hex.EncodeToString(profile.ProfileHash[:]), pin["profileHashHex"],
"profileHashHex must round-trip the canonical 48-byte hash")
// Non-EVM VM (PlatformVMID): no-op.
original := []byte(`{"some": "config"}`)
pOut := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.PlatformVMID, original)
require.Equal(original, pOut, "non-C-Chain config must pass through unchanged")
}
// TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_NoOpWhenProfileNil asserts the F118
// injection is a no-op when SecurityProfile is nil (classical-compat
// chains, legacy networks pre-locked-profile).
func TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_NoOpWhenProfileNil(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
m := &manager{
ManagerConfig: ManagerConfig{
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
SecurityProfile: nil,
},
}
original := []byte(`{"some": "config"}`)
out := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, original)
require.Equal(original, out, "no-op pass-through under nil SecurityProfile")
out = m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, nil)
require.Empty(out, "no-op pass-through preserves nil bytes")
}
// TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_MergesExistingConfig asserts the F118
// injection preserves pre-existing C-Chain config keys (lux-strict-pq
// shim, enable-automining, etc.) while adding the new lux-security-profile
// pin alongside.
func TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_MergesExistingConfig(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
profile := canonicalStrictPQProfile(t)
m := &manager{
ManagerConfig: ManagerConfig{
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
SecurityProfile: profile,
},
}
original := []byte(`{"enable-automining": true, "skip-block-fee": true}`)
out := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, original)
var got map[string]interface{}
require.NoError(json.Unmarshal(out, &got))
require.Equal(true, got["enable-automining"], "automining flag must survive")
require.Equal(true, got["skip-block-fee"], "skip-block-fee flag must survive")
require.NotNil(got["lux-security-profile"], "security profile pin must be added")
}
// TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_RoundTripsAcrossPluginBoundary
// asserts the wire form coreth expects (security-profile pin with
// profileID + profileHashHex) matches the form the chain manager
// emits, so the rpcchainvm plugin can decode the pin via standard
// JSON unmarshalling. Closes the wire-compat axis of F118.
func TestInjectSecurityProfileConfig_RoundTripsAcrossPluginBoundary(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
profile := canonicalStrictPQProfile(t)
m := &manager{
ManagerConfig: ManagerConfig{
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
SecurityProfile: profile,
},
}
out := m.injectSecurityProfileConfig(constants.EVMID, nil)
// Mirror of plugin/evm/config.Config — locally redefined so this
// test does not import the coreth plugin tree.
type localPin struct {
ProfileID uint8 `json:"profileID"`
ProfileHashHex string `json:"profileHashHex"`
}
type localCorethConfig struct {
SecurityProfile *localPin `json:"lux-security-profile,omitempty"`
}
var cfg localCorethConfig
require.NoError(json.Unmarshal(out, &cfg))
require.NotNil(cfg.SecurityProfile, "coreth-side config struct must decode the pin")
require.Equal(uint8(consensusconfig.ProfileStrictPQ), cfg.SecurityProfile.ProfileID)
require.Equal(hex.EncodeToString(profile.ProfileHash[:]), cfg.SecurityProfile.ProfileHashHex)
// Decoded hex must be exactly 48 bytes (SHA3-384 width).
hashBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(cfg.SecurityProfile.ProfileHashHex)
require.NoError(err)
require.Len(hashBytes, 48, "wire pin must carry a 48-byte SHA3-384 ProfileHash")
// Use ids.ID directly to silence the unused import warning in case
// other tests in this file don't reach it.
_ = ids.ID{}
}
-17
View File
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
//go:build tools
// +build tools
package main
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/luxfi/node/upgrade"
"github.com/luxfi/runtime"
)
func main() {
var c *upgrade.Config = &upgrade.Config{}
var _ runtime.NetworkUpgrades = c
fmt.Println("Interface satisfied")
}
+6 -6
View File
@@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ import (
var (
// Flags
outputPath string
inputPath string
sinceVer uint64
dataDir string
dbType string
noCompress bool
outputPath string
inputPath string
sinceVer uint64
dataDir string
dbType string
noCompress bool
forceRestore bool
)
+4 -2
View File
@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ package main
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"flag"
"fmt"
"os"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
)
func main() {
@@ -190,7 +192,7 @@ func cmdExport(args []string) {
// stateEnvelope wraps CeremonyState with a SHA-256 integrity hash.
type stateEnvelope struct {
State json.RawMessage `json:"state"`
State jsontext.Value `json:"state"`
Integrity string `json:"integrity"` // hex(SHA-256(state bytes))
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package main
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"math/big"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -12,6 +11,8 @@ import (
"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254"
"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
)
// =============================================================================
@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ func TestRegressionL03_StateFileHasIntegrity(t *testing.T) {
}
var envelope struct {
State json.RawMessage `json:"state"`
State jsontext.Value `json:"state"`
Integrity string `json:"integrity"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &envelope); err != nil {
+11 -11
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"fmt"
"time"
@@ -12,16 +12,16 @@ import (
// CeremonyState holds the full state of a powers-of-tau ceremony.
type CeremonyState struct {
Circuit string `json:"circuit"`
NumConstraints int `json:"numConstraints"`
PowersNeeded int `json:"powersNeeded"`
Participants int `json:"participants"`
TauG1 []G1Point `json:"tauG1"`
TauG2 []G2Point `json:"tauG2"`
AlphaG1 []G1Point `json:"alphaG1"`
BetaG1 []G1Point `json:"betaG1"`
BetaG2 G2Point `json:"betaG2"`
Contributions []Contribution `json:"contributions"`
Circuit string `json:"circuit"`
NumConstraints int `json:"numConstraints"`
PowersNeeded int `json:"powersNeeded"`
Participants int `json:"participants"`
TauG1 []G1Point `json:"tauG1"`
TauG2 []G2Point `json:"tauG2"`
AlphaG1 []G1Point `json:"alphaG1"`
BetaG1 []G1Point `json:"betaG1"`
BetaG2 G2Point `json:"betaG2"`
Contributions []Contribution `json:"contributions"`
}
// Contribution records a single participant's contribution.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"sort"
+7 -6
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ package main
import (
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
"fmt"
"os"
"time"
@@ -28,8 +29,8 @@ func main() {
"networkID": 200200,
"allocations": []map[string]interface{}{
{
"ethAddr": "0x9011E888251AB053B7bD1cdB598Db4f9DEd94714",
"luxAddr": zooAddr,
"evmAddr": "0x9011E888251AB053B7bD1cdB598Db4f9DEd94714",
"utxoAddr": zooAddr,
"initialAmount": 0,
"unlockSchedule": []map[string]interface{}{
{
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ func main() {
}
// Load validators from Lux genesis
luxGenesis, _ := os.ReadFile("/Users/z/work/lux/mainnet/genesis_mainnet.json")
luxGenesis, _ := os.ReadFile(os.ExpandEnv("$HOME/work/lux/mainnet/genesis_mainnet.json"))
var lux map[string]interface{}
json.Unmarshal(luxGenesis, &lux)
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ func main() {
ccBytes, _ := json.Marshal(cc)
genesis["cChainGenesis"] = string(ccBytes)
out, _ := json.MarshalIndent(genesis, "", " ")
os.WriteFile("/Users/z/work/lux/mainnet/zoo_genesis_valid.json", out, 0644)
out, _ := json.Marshal(genesis, jsontext.WithIndent(" "))
os.WriteFile(os.ExpandEnv("$HOME/work/lux/mainnet/zoo_genesis_valid.json"), out, 0644)
fmt.Println("Wrote zoo_genesis_valid.json")
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
)
@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ func main() {
fmt.Println("Usage: go run main.go <genesis_file>")
os.Exit(1)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(os.Args[1])
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Error reading file: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Printf("File size: %d bytes\n", len(data))
// Compute hash the same way luxd does
rawHash := hash.ComputeHash256(data)
id, err := ids.ToID(rawHash)
@@ -29,6 +29,6 @@ func main() {
fmt.Printf("Error converting to ID: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Printf("Genesis ID: %s\n", id.String())
}
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
// pqkeygen provisions the strict-PQ staking keypairs a local luxd needs:
// ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) staking key + ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) handshake key.
// Writes PEM blocks with the exact types the node's config loader expects.
package main
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mlkem"
)
func writePEM(path, typ string, der []byte) error {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
return err
}
var b bytes.Buffer
if err := pem.Encode(&b, &pem.Block{Type: typ, Bytes: der}); err != nil {
return err
}
return os.WriteFile(path, b.Bytes(), 0o600)
}
func main() {
if len(os.Args) != 2 {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "usage: pqkeygen <staking-dir>")
os.Exit(1)
}
dir := os.Args[1]
// ML-DSA-65 staking key
dsaPriv, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, mldsa.MLDSA65)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
dsaPub := dsaPriv.PublicKey.Bytes()
if err := writePEM(filepath.Join(dir, "mldsa.key"), "ML-DSA-65 PRIVATE KEY", dsaPriv.Bytes()); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
if err := writePEM(filepath.Join(dir, "mldsa.pub"), "ML-DSA-65 PUBLIC KEY", dsaPub); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// ML-KEM-768 handshake key
kemPub, kemPriv, err := mlkem.GenerateKeyPair(rand.Reader, mlkem.MLKEM768)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
if err := writePEM(filepath.Join(dir, "mlkem.key"), "ML-KEM-768 PRIVATE KEY", kemPriv.Bytes()); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
if err := writePEM(filepath.Join(dir, "mlkem.pub"), "ML-KEM-768 PUBLIC KEY", kemPub.Bytes()); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
fmt.Printf("ML-DSA-65 priv=%dB pub=%dB; ML-KEM-768 priv=%dB pub=%dB written to %s\n",
len(dsaPriv.Bytes()), len(dsaPub), len(kemPriv.Bytes()), len(kemPub.Bytes()), dir)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (c *ChainDatabaseConfig) GetDatabaseType(chainAlias string) string {
func (c *ChainDatabaseConfig) Validate() error {
validTypes := map[string]bool{
"pebbledb": true,
"zapdb": true,
"zapdb": true,
"memdb": true,
}
+261 -384
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@
package config
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
@@ -17,6 +18,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
@@ -24,7 +27,8 @@ import (
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls/signer/localsigner"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/hash"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
mlkemcrypto "github.com/luxfi/crypto/mlkem"
"github.com/luxfi/filesystem/perms"
"github.com/luxfi/filesystem/storage"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
@@ -47,7 +51,6 @@ import (
"github.com/luxfi/node/version"
"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/components/gas"
"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/reward"
pchaintxs "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/txs"
"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/validators/fee"
"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/proposervm"
"github.com/luxfi/timer"
@@ -95,90 +98,16 @@ var (
errFileDoesNotExist = errors.New("file does not exist")
)
// AutomineNetworkConfig captures immutable network state for automine mode persistence.
// Once written to automine-network.json, this ensures the same genesis is produced
// on every restart, making C-Chain/EVM state persistence work correctly.
type AutomineNetworkConfig struct {
// Version for forward compatibility
Version int `json:"version"`
// Genesis start time - captured on first boot, reused on restart
StartTime uint64 `json:"startTime"`
// Node identity
NodeID string `json:"nodeId"`
// BLS credentials (hex-encoded)
BLSPublicKey string `json:"blsPublicKey"`
BLSPopProof string `json:"blsPopProof"`
// Computed genesis bytes and hash (for verification)
GenesisBytes []byte `json:"genesisBytes"`
GenesisHash string `json:"genesisHash"` // Actual hash of GenesisBytes
// X-Chain asset ID (LUX token ID)
XAssetID string `json:"xAssetId"`
// C-Chain genesis (stored separately for EVM immutability)
CChainGenesis string `json:"cChainGenesis"`
}
const (
devNetworkConfigVersion = 1
devNetworkConfigFilename = "automine-network.json"
)
// loadAutomineNetworkConfig attempts to load automine-network.json from the data directory.
// Returns nil if the file doesn't exist (first boot scenario).
func loadAutomineNetworkConfig(dataDir string) (*AutomineNetworkConfig, error) {
path := filepath.Join(dataDir, devNetworkConfigFilename)
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, nil // First boot - no config yet
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read dev network config: %w", err)
}
var cfg AutomineNetworkConfig
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse dev network config: %w", err)
}
if cfg.Version != devNetworkConfigVersion {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported dev network config version: %d (expected %d)", cfg.Version, devNetworkConfigVersion)
}
return &cfg, nil
}
// saveAutomineNetworkConfig atomically writes the dev network config to disk.
// Uses write-to-temp-then-rename pattern for crash safety.
func saveAutomineNetworkConfig(dataDir string, cfg *AutomineNetworkConfig) error {
path := filepath.Join(dataDir, devNetworkConfigFilename)
tempPath := path + ".tmp"
cfg.Version = devNetworkConfigVersion
data, err := json.MarshalIndent(cfg, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal dev network config: %w", err)
}
// Write to temp file
if err := os.WriteFile(tempPath, data, 0o600); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write temp dev network config: %w", err)
}
// Atomic rename
if err := os.Rename(tempPath, path); err != nil {
os.Remove(tempPath) // Clean up on failure
return fmt.Errorf("failed to rename dev network config: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// (Removed: AutomineNetworkConfig + loadAutomineNetworkConfig +
// saveAutomineNetworkConfig + automine-network.json persistence.)
//
// --automine is a *consensus-mode* flag (single-node, single-validator
// quorum), nothing more. It MUST NOT swap in a different C-Chain
// genesis or persist any "dev network config" sidecar. C-Chain
// genesis is canonical genesis — for network-id 1/2/3/1337 it's the
// embedded luxfi/genesis config, period. If the operator wants a
// custom genesis they pass --genesis-file. No backwards compatibility
// for the deleted automine-network.json sidecar.
func getConsensusConfig(v *viper.Viper) consensusconfig.Parameters {
// Start with default parameters
@@ -823,6 +752,138 @@ func getStakingSigner(v *viper.Viper) (bls.Signer, error) {
return key, nil
}
// loadPEMBlock returns the body of a single PEM block matching
// expectType. Refuses to silently consume the wrong block type so a
// misnamed file (e.g. ML-DSA private key supplied as a public-key
// path) fails loud at config-load instead of producing a NodeID under
// the wrong key.
func loadPEMBlock(path, expectType string) ([]byte, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", path, err)
}
block, _ := pem.Decode(data)
if block == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: not a PEM file", path)
}
if block.Type != expectType {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: PEM type %q is not %s", path, block.Type, expectType)
}
return block.Bytes, nil
}
// pemBytesOrFile resolves either a base64-encoded PEM in
// contentKey (highest precedence, matches the
// --foo-file-content / --foo-file pattern the existing TLS
// loaders use) or a filesystem path in pathKey. A set-but-empty
// contentKey is treated as absent and falls through to pathKey, so a
// blank content flag and a missing one behave identically. Empty
// return = neither was provided; caller decides whether that's a fatal
// config error or a "fall through to classical-compat" path.
func pemBytesOrFile(v *viper.Viper, contentKey, pathKey, expectType string) ([]byte, string, error) {
// A non-empty *-content flag wins. A set-but-empty one (e.g. an env var or
// a deploy template that rendered to "") is treated identically to an
// absent flag: fall through to the *-file path below. Short-circuiting on
// the empty value here would silently degrade a strict-PQ validator to a
// classical ECDSA NodeID — the strict-PQ activation outage this guards.
if raw := v.GetString(contentKey); raw != "" {
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(raw)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("decode %s base64: %w", contentKey, err)
}
block, _ := pem.Decode(decoded)
if block == nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%s: decoded value is not PEM", contentKey)
}
if block.Type != expectType {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%s: PEM type %q is not %s", contentKey, block.Type, expectType)
}
return block.Bytes, "<from-content>", nil
}
path := getExpandedArg(v, pathKey)
if path == "" {
return nil, "", nil
}
if _, err := os.Stat(path); errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return nil, path, nil
} else if err != nil {
return nil, path, err
}
body, err := loadPEMBlock(path, expectType)
return body, path, err
}
// loadStakingMLDSA returns the strict-PQ ML-DSA-65 keypair (if any).
// Both private and public materials are optional at the config layer
// — a missing pair means classical-compat mode. A strict-PQ chain
// profile enforces presence at the validator-set boundary.
func loadStakingMLDSA(v *viper.Viper) (*mldsa.PrivateKey, []byte, string, string, error) {
privBytes, privPath, err := pemBytesOrFile(v,
StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey, StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey, "ML-DSA-65 PRIVATE KEY")
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, privPath, "", fmt.Errorf("staking-mldsa-key: %w", err)
}
pubBytes, pubPath, err := pemBytesOrFile(v,
StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey, StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey, "ML-DSA-65 PUBLIC KEY")
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, fmt.Errorf("staking-mldsa-pub-key: %w", err)
}
if len(privBytes) == 0 && len(pubBytes) == 0 {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, nil
}
// Asymmetry is a config error: a strict-PQ chain MUST have both
// the private key (for signing) and the public key (so peers can
// verify what we signed). Refuse rather than silently degrade.
if len(privBytes) == 0 || len(pubBytes) == 0 {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, errors.New("staking-mldsa: both private and public key are required (or neither for classical-compat)")
}
priv, err := mldsa.PrivateKeyFromBytes(mldsa.MLDSA65, privBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, fmt.Errorf("parse staking-mldsa private key: %w", err)
}
// Sanity: the public key on disk must match the one derivable
// from the private key. Mismatch would point a NodeID at a
// public key the validator cannot actually sign for — silent
// authentication failure that the consensus engine would later report as
// "this validator is offline" rather than "you misconfigured
// your keys".
derivedPubBytes := priv.PublicKey.Bytes()
if !bytes.Equal(derivedPubBytes, pubBytes) {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, errors.New("staking-mldsa: public key on disk does not match the public key derived from the private key")
}
return priv, pubBytes, privPath, pubPath, nil
}
// loadHandshakeMLKEM returns the strict-PQ ML-KEM-768 KEM keypair
// (if any). Same shape + invariants as loadStakingMLDSA.
func loadHandshakeMLKEM(v *viper.Viper) (*mlkemcrypto.PrivateKey, []byte, string, string, error) {
privBytes, privPath, err := pemBytesOrFile(v,
HandshakeMLKEMKeyContentKey, HandshakeMLKEMKeyPathKey, "ML-KEM-768 PRIVATE KEY")
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, privPath, "", fmt.Errorf("handshake-mlkem-key: %w", err)
}
pubBytes, pubPath, err := pemBytesOrFile(v,
HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyContentKey, HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyPathKey, "ML-KEM-768 PUBLIC KEY")
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, fmt.Errorf("handshake-mlkem-pub-key: %w", err)
}
if len(privBytes) == 0 && len(pubBytes) == 0 {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, nil
}
if len(privBytes) == 0 || len(pubBytes) == 0 {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, errors.New("handshake-mlkem: both private and public key are required (or neither for classical-compat)")
}
priv, err := mlkemcrypto.PrivateKeyFromBytes(privBytes, mlkemcrypto.MLKEM768)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, fmt.Errorf("parse handshake-mlkem private key: %w", err)
}
derivedPubBytes := priv.PublicKey().Bytes()
if !bytes.Equal(derivedPubBytes, pubBytes) {
return nil, nil, privPath, pubPath, errors.New("handshake-mlkem: public key on disk does not match the public key derived from the private key")
}
return priv, pubBytes, privPath, pubPath, nil
}
func getStakingConfig(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32) (node.StakingConfig, error) {
config := node.StakingConfig{
SybilProtectionEnabled: v.GetBool(SybilProtectionEnabledKey),
@@ -849,6 +910,31 @@ func getStakingConfig(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32) (node.StakingConfig, err
if err != nil {
return node.StakingConfig{}, err
}
// Strict-PQ identity (FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 + FIPS 203 ML-KEM-768).
// Both pairs are optional at this layer — classical-compat chains
// run without them. Strict-PQ profile rejects a missing pair at
// the validator-set boundary; that gate lives in consensus/config
// (the profile gate that owns the strict-PQ vs classical-compat
// dispatch), not here in node-config land.
mldsaPriv, mldsaPub, mldsaPrivPath, mldsaPubPath, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
if err != nil {
return node.StakingConfig{}, err
}
config.StakingMLDSA = mldsaPriv
config.StakingMLDSAPub = mldsaPub
config.StakingMLDSAKeyPath = mldsaPrivPath
config.StakingMLDSAPubPath = mldsaPubPath
mlkemPriv, mlkemPub, mlkemPrivPath, mlkemPubPath, err := loadHandshakeMLKEM(v)
if err != nil {
return node.StakingConfig{}, err
}
config.HandshakeMLKEMPriv = mlkemPriv
config.HandshakeMLKEMPub = mlkemPub
config.HandshakeMLKEMKeyPath = mlkemPrivPath
config.HandshakeMLKEMPubPath = mlkemPubPath
if networkID != constants.MainnetID && networkID != constants.TestnetID {
config.UptimeRequirement = v.GetFloat64(UptimeRequirementKey)
config.MinValidatorStake = v.GetUint64(MinValidatorStakeKey)
@@ -950,20 +1036,17 @@ func getUpgradeConfig(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32) (upgrade.Config, error)
}
var upgradeConfig upgrade.Config
if err := json.Unmarshal(upgradeBytes, &upgradeConfig); err != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(upgradeBytes, &upgradeConfig, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
return upgrade.Config{}, fmt.Errorf("unable to unmarshal upgrade bytes: %w", err)
}
return upgradeConfig, nil
}
func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.StakingConfig, dataDir string) ([]byte, ids.ID, error) {
// Get allow-custom-genesis flag (defaults to true for development)
allowCustomGenesis := v.GetBool(AllowCustomGenesisKey)
// Handle automine mode genesis - dynamically generate genesis with the node's own credentials
if v.GetBool(DevModeKey) && !v.IsSet(GenesisFileKey) && !v.IsSet(GenesisFileContentKey) && !v.IsSet(GenesisDBKey) {
return getOrCreateAutomineGenesis(stakingCfg, dataDir)
}
// (Removed: automine-mode genesis swap.) --automine is single-node
// consensus only; it falls through to the canonical genesis loader
// below — same as a real network. C-Chain genesis comes from the
// canonical luxfi/genesis embedded config or --genesis-file. Period.
// HIGHEST PRIORITY: Raw genesis bytes - use directly without rebuilding
// This is critical for snapshot resume to avoid hash mismatch
@@ -973,16 +1056,15 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode %s: %w", GenesisRawBytesKey, err)
}
// Extract xAssetID from the X-chain genesis within the platform genesis
xAssetID, err := extractXAssetID(genesisBytes)
utxoAssetID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(networkID, genesisBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("failed to extract xAssetID from raw genesis bytes: %w", err)
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("resolve X-Chain asset ID from %s: %w", GenesisRawBytesKey, err)
}
log.Info("loaded raw genesis bytes directly",
"size", len(genesisBytes),
"xAssetID", xAssetID,
"utxoAssetID", utxoAssetID,
)
return genesisBytes, xAssetID, nil
return genesisBytes, utxoAssetID, nil
}
// Check if genesis-db is specified for database replay
@@ -1004,7 +1086,7 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
// try first loading genesis content directly from flag/env-var
if v.IsSet(GenesisFileContentKey) {
genesisData := v.GetString(GenesisFileContentKey)
return builder.FromFlag(networkID, genesisData, stakingCfg, allowCustomGenesis)
return builder.FromFlag(networkID, genesisData, stakingCfg)
}
// if content is not specified go for the file
@@ -1013,21 +1095,32 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
// Check if we have cached genesis bytes to avoid rebuilding
cacheFile := filepath.Join(dataDir, "genesis.bytes")
if cachedBytes, err := loadCachedGenesisBytes(cacheFile); err == nil && len(cachedBytes) > 0 {
xAssetID, err := extractXAssetID(cachedBytes)
if err != nil {
log.Warn("failed to extract xAssetID from cached genesis, rebuilding",
"error", err,
)
} else {
utxoAssetID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(networkID, cachedBytes)
if err == nil {
log.Info("loaded cached genesis bytes for hash stability",
"cacheFile", cacheFile,
"size", len(cachedBytes),
"utxoAssetID", utxoAssetID,
)
return cachedBytes, xAssetID, nil
return cachedBytes, utxoAssetID, nil
}
// Cache parse failed — almost certainly a codec mismatch
// after a binary upgrade (e.g. v1-codec bytes persisted by
// an older luxd, multi-version v0+v1 dispatcher in this
// luxd doesn't recognise a type the cached blob still
// uses). Drop the cache and rebuild from the file rather
// than wedging in a CrashLoop. Hash stability is forfeit
// for this single restart — intentional, the alternative
// is a permanent outage on every binary bump.
log.Warn("cached genesis bytes failed to parse — invalidating cache and rebuilding from genesis-file",
"cacheFile", cacheFile,
"size", len(cachedBytes),
"error", err,
)
_ = os.Remove(cacheFile)
}
// No cache or invalid cache - build from file and cache the result
genesisBytes, xAssetID, err := builder.FromFile(networkID, genesisFileName, stakingCfg, allowCustomGenesis)
genesisBytes, utxoAssetID, err := builder.FromFile(networkID, genesisFileName, stakingCfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, err
}
@@ -1042,7 +1135,7 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
"size", len(genesisBytes),
)
}
return genesisBytes, xAssetID, nil
return genesisBytes, utxoAssetID, nil
}
// finally if file is not specified/readable go for the predefined config
@@ -1050,248 +1143,36 @@ func getGenesisData(v *viper.Viper, networkID uint32, stakingCfg *builder.Stakin
return builder.FromConfig(config)
}
// getOrCreateAutomineGenesis handles automine mode genesis with persistence.
// On first boot: generates genesis, saves to automine-network.json, returns genesis.
// On restart: loads from automine-network.json to ensure genesis hash stability.
// Returns: (genesisBytes, xAssetID, error) - xAssetID is the LUX token asset ID
func getOrCreateAutomineGenesis(stakingCfg *builder.StakingConfig, dataDir string) ([]byte, ids.ID, error) {
// Try to load existing dev network config
devCfg, err := loadAutomineNetworkConfig(dataDir)
// resolveUTXOAssetID extracts the X-Chain native asset ID from the loaded
// platform-genesis blob. It is the canonical source of truth used by
// every load path that bypasses FromConfig (raw bytes, cached bytes —
// the paths that historically defaulted to constants.UTXOAssetIDFor and
// silently disagreed with the genesis content on sovereign L1s).
//
// Behaviour:
//
// - If the genesis bakes an X-Chain, returns the runtime asset ID
// derived from that chain's CreateAssetTx (the same value
// vm.initGenesis assigns at runtime).
// - If the genesis is P-only (no X-Chain), returns the network-id-
// keyed constant. The asset ID is unused in that mode.
// - If the genesis is unparseable or the embedded X-Chain genesis
// is malformed, returns the corresponding error — these are
// unrecoverable on a primary-network bootstrap.
//
// Tested against both sovereign-network genesis (X-Chain present, asset
// ID differs from the constant) and upstream Lux genesis fixtures.
func resolveUTXOAssetID(networkID uint32, genesisBytes []byte) (ids.ID, error) {
id, ok, err := builder.UTXOAssetIDFromGenesisBytes(genesisBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("failed to load dev network config: %w", err)
return ids.Empty, err
}
if devCfg != nil {
// Existing config found - check if credentials match
// In automine mode with ephemeral certs, credentials will change on restart.
// We log a warning but continue with the stored genesis since automine mode
// is single-node and doesn't require credential consistency.
expectedNodeID := stakingCfg.NodeID
expectedBLSPK := fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", stakingCfg.BLSPublicKey)
expectedBLSPoP := fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", stakingCfg.BLSProofOfPossession)
credentialsMismatch := false
if devCfg.NodeID != expectedNodeID {
log.Warn("automine-network.json nodeID mismatch (using stored genesis anyway for automine mode)",
"stored", devCfg.NodeID,
"current", expectedNodeID,
)
credentialsMismatch = true
}
if devCfg.BLSPublicKey != expectedBLSPK {
log.Warn("automine-network.json BLS public key mismatch (using stored genesis anyway for automine mode)")
credentialsMismatch = true
}
if devCfg.BLSPopProof != expectedBLSPoP {
log.Warn("automine-network.json BLS PoP mismatch (using stored genesis anyway for automine mode)")
credentialsMismatch = true
}
if credentialsMismatch {
log.Warn("credentials changed since first boot - for persistent staking, use --staking-ephemeral-cert-enabled=false with persistent key files")
}
// Verify the stored genesis hash matches what we'll compute from the bytes
storedHash, err := ids.FromString(devCfg.GenesisHash)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("invalid genesis hash in automine-network.json: %w", err)
}
// Compute actual hash from stored bytes to verify integrity
computedHashBytes := hash.ComputeHash256(devCfg.GenesisBytes)
computedHash, err := ids.ToID(computedHashBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert computed hash to ID: %w", err)
}
if storedHash != computedHash {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("genesis bytes corrupted: stored hash %s != computed hash %s", storedHash, computedHash)
}
// Parse stored X-Chain asset ID
xAssetID, err := ids.FromString(devCfg.XAssetID)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("invalid xAssetId in automine-network.json: %w", err)
}
log.Info("loaded dev network config",
"path", filepath.Join(dataDir, devNetworkConfigFilename),
"genesisHash", devCfg.GenesisHash,
"xAssetID", devCfg.XAssetID,
"startTime", devCfg.StartTime,
)
return devCfg.GenesisBytes, xAssetID, nil
if !ok {
return constants.UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID), nil
}
// First boot - generate new genesis with current timestamp
startTime := uint64(time.Now().Unix())
// buildAutomineGenesis returns (genesisBytes, xAssetID) - the LUX token asset ID
genesisBytes, xAssetID, err := buildAutomineGenesis(stakingCfg, startTime)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, err
}
// Compute actual genesis hash from bytes (this is what the node uses for DB validation)
genesisHashBytes := hash.ComputeHash256(genesisBytes)
genesisHash, err := ids.ToID(genesisHashBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert genesis hash to ID: %w", err)
}
// Save for future restarts
newDevCfg := &AutomineNetworkConfig{
Version: devNetworkConfigVersion,
StartTime: startTime,
NodeID: stakingCfg.NodeID,
BLSPublicKey: fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", stakingCfg.BLSPublicKey),
BLSPopProof: fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", stakingCfg.BLSProofOfPossession),
GenesisBytes: genesisBytes,
GenesisHash: genesisHash.String(),
XAssetID: xAssetID.String(),
CChainGenesis: automineCChainGenesis,
}
if err := saveAutomineNetworkConfig(dataDir, newDevCfg); err != nil {
// Log warning but don't fail - genesis is still valid
log.Warn("failed to save dev network config (persistence may not work on restart)",
"error", err,
)
} else {
log.Info("created dev network config",
"path", filepath.Join(dataDir, devNetworkConfigFilename),
"genesisHash", genesisHash.String(),
"xAssetID", xAssetID.String(),
"startTime", startTime,
)
}
return genesisBytes, xAssetID, nil
return id, nil
}
// buildAutomineGenesis creates a genesis configuration for single-node development mode.
// It uses the node's own credentials as the sole validator.
func buildAutomineGenesis(stakingCfg *builder.StakingConfig, startTime uint64) ([]byte, ids.ID, error) {
// Parse node ID from staking config
nodeID, err := ids.NodeIDFromString(stakingCfg.NodeID)
if err != nil {
return nil, ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse node ID for automine mode: %w", err)
}
// Lux Treasury address: 0x9011E888251AB053B7bD1cdB598Db4f9DEd94714
// This is derived from LUX_MNEMONIC and funded on C-Chain
var rewardAddress ids.ShortID
treasuryAddr := "9011E888251AB053B7bD1cdB598Db4f9DEd94714"
treasuryBytes, err := ids.ShortFromString(treasuryAddr)
if err == nil {
rewardAddress = treasuryBytes
} else {
// Fall back to a deterministic address derived from node ID
copy(rewardAddress[:], nodeID[:20])
}
// Create automine mode config with embedded C-Chain genesis
devCfg := builder.DevModeConfig{
NodeID: nodeID,
BLSPublicKey: fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", stakingCfg.BLSPublicKey),
BLSPopProof: fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", stakingCfg.BLSProofOfPossession),
RewardAddress: rewardAddress,
CChainGenesis: automineCChainGenesis,
StartTime: startTime, // Use provided start time for determinism
}
return builder.ForDevMode(devCfg, stakingCfg)
}
// automineCChainGenesis is the default C-Chain genesis for automine mode.
// Network ID 1337, EVM Chain ID 31337.
// Funds Lux Treasury (0x9011), light mnemonic accounts (BIP44 m/44'/9000'/0'/0/{0-4}), and Anvil/Hardhat accounts.
const automineCChainGenesis = `{
"config": {
"chainId": 31337,
"homesteadBlock": 0,
"eip150Block": 0,
"eip155Block": 0,
"eip158Block": 0,
"byzantiumBlock": 0,
"constantinopleBlock": 0,
"petersburgBlock": 0,
"istanbulBlock": 0,
"muirGlacierBlock": 0,
"berlinBlock": 0,
"londonBlock": 0,
"arrowGlacierBlock": 0,
"grayGlacierBlock": 0,
"mergeNetsplitBlock": 0,
"shanghaiTime": 0,
"cancunTime": 0,
"blobSchedule": {
"cancun": {"target": 3, "max": 6, "baseFeeUpdateFraction": 3338477}
},
"terminalTotalDifficulty": 0,
"chainEVMTimestamp": 0,
"durangoTimestamp": 0,
"etnaTimestamp": 0,
"feeConfig": {
"gasLimit": 30000000,
"targetBlockRate": 1,
"minBaseFee": 1000000000,
"targetGas": 100000000,
"baseFeeChangeDenominator": 48,
"minBlockGasCost": 0,
"maxBlockGasCost": 1000000,
"blockGasCostStep": 200000
},
"warpConfig": {
"blockTimestamp": 0,
"quorumNumerator": 67,
"requirePrimaryNetworkSigners": false
}
},
"alloc": {
"9011E888251AB053B7bD1cdB598Db4f9DEd94714": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"5369615110ca435bdf798f31c20ba6163d7b0a54": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"2e701063ccdffa2b1872c596222d8067d124d3ef": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"9030463eb1aaa563c8247468416cc0bf06347502": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"f77b06331152fd0e536de0af65688a6559c6f914": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"944fd51713652b9922690b7d06498fbf8742beac": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"f39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
},
"90F79bf6EB2c4f870365E785982E1f101E93b906": {
"balance": "0x200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
}
},
"nonce": "0x0",
"timestamp": "0x0",
"extraData": "0x",
"gasLimit": "0x1c9c380",
"difficulty": "0x0",
"mixHash": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"coinbase": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"number": "0x0",
"gasUsed": "0x0",
"parentHash": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
}`
func getTrackedChains(v *viper.Viper) (set.Set[ids.ID], error) {
trackChainsStr := v.GetString(TrackChainsKey)
@@ -1430,7 +1311,7 @@ func getAliases(v *viper.Viper, name string, contentKey string, fileKey string)
}
aliasMap := make(map[ids.ID][]string)
if err := json.Unmarshal(fileBytes, &aliasMap); err != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(fileBytes, &aliasMap, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w on %s: %w", errUnmarshalling, name, err)
}
return aliasMap, nil
@@ -1470,7 +1351,7 @@ func getChainConfigsFromFlag(v *viper.Viper) (map[string]chains.ChainConfig, err
}
chainConfigs := make(map[string]chains.ChainConfig)
if err := json.Unmarshal(chainConfigContent, &chainConfigs); err != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(chainConfigContent, &chainConfigs, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not unmarshal JSON: %w", err)
}
return chainConfigs, nil
@@ -1552,8 +1433,8 @@ func getNetConfigsFromFlags(v *viper.Viper, netIDs []ids.ID) (map[ids.ID]nets.Co
}
// partially parse configs to be filled by defaults later
chainConfigs := make(map[ids.ID]json.RawMessage, len(netIDs))
if err := json.Unmarshal(netConfigContent, &chainConfigs); err != nil {
chainConfigs := make(map[ids.ID]jsontext.Value, len(netIDs))
if err := json.Unmarshal(netConfigContent, &chainConfigs, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not unmarshal JSON: %w", err)
}
@@ -1562,7 +1443,7 @@ func getNetConfigsFromFlags(v *viper.Viper, netIDs []ids.ID) (map[ids.ID]nets.Co
config := getDefaultNetConfig(v)
if rawNetConfigBytes, ok := chainConfigs[chainID]; ok {
if err := json.Unmarshal(rawNetConfigBytes, &config); err != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(rawNetConfigBytes, &config, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -1621,7 +1502,7 @@ func getNetConfigsFromDir(v *viper.Viper, chainIDs []ids.ID) (map[ids.ID]nets.Co
}
// Update the default config with the values from the file
if err := json.Unmarshal(file, &config); err != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(file, &config, json.MatchCaseInsensitiveNames(true)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errUnmarshalling, err)
}
@@ -1808,6 +1689,17 @@ func GetNodeConfig(v *viper.Viper) (node.Config, error) {
return node.Config{}, fmt.Errorf("%s must be > 0", ConsensusAppConcurrencyKey)
}
// Explicit consensus committee/quorum overrides — captured only when the
// operator actually set the flag (IsSet), so the default path sizes K/α from
// the live validator set. A set value is honored but clamped UP to the
// dynamic strict-⅔ floor at chain creation (chains.applyConsensusOverride).
if v.IsSet(ConsensusSampleSizeKey) {
nodeConfig.ConsensusSampleSizeOverride = v.GetInt(ConsensusSampleSizeKey)
}
if v.IsSet(ConsensusQuorumSizeKey) {
nodeConfig.ConsensusQuorumSizeOverride = v.GetInt(ConsensusQuorumSizeKey)
}
nodeConfig.UseCurrentHeight = v.GetBool(ProposerVMUseCurrentHeightKey)
// Logging
@@ -1849,20 +1741,26 @@ func GetNodeConfig(v *viper.Viper) (node.Config, error) {
return node.Config{}, err
}
// Chain tracking
// Always populate TrackedChains from --track-chains flag/env, regardless of
// TrackAllChains. TrackedChains is used in peer handshake (MyChains) to tell
// peers which chains we're interested in. Without it, peers won't gossip
// chain blocks to us even if we're tracking all chains locally.
// Chain tracking — explicit per-chain opt-in. Each validator
// declares which chains it wants to validate via --track-chains
// (or the operator-emitted equivalent). TrackedChains is also used
// in the peer handshake (MyChains) so peers gossip blocks for the
// chains we asked for.
//
// TrackAllChains stays as an opt-in escape hatch only — it is NOT
// auto-enabled when TrackedChains is empty. The previous default
// (`if TrackedChains == nil { TrackAllChains = true }`) was a
// footgun: any node started without an explicit --track-chains
// list silently tried to spin up every chain in P-chain state,
// including ones whose VM plugin wasn't loaded — fataling at the
// chain manager. Empty TrackedChains now means "track only P/X
// (built-in primary chains)".
nodeConfig.TrackedChains, err = getTrackedChains(v)
if err != nil {
return node.Config{}, err
}
nodeConfig.TrackAllChains = v.GetBool(TrackAllChainsKey)
if nodeConfig.TrackedChains == nil {
nodeConfig.TrackAllChains = true
}
nodeConfig.DexValidator = v.GetBool(DexValidatorKey)
// HTTP APIs
nodeConfig.HTTPConfig, err = getHTTPConfig(v)
@@ -1989,11 +1887,10 @@ func GetNodeConfig(v *viper.Viper) (node.Config, error) {
// Get data directory for dev network config persistence
dataDir := getExpandedArg(v, DataDirKey)
nodeConfig.GenesisBytes, nodeConfig.LuxAssetID, err = getGenesisData(v, nodeConfig.NetworkID, &genesisStakingCfg, dataDir)
nodeConfig.GenesisBytes, nodeConfig.UTXOAssetID, err = getGenesisData(v, nodeConfig.NetworkID, &genesisStakingCfg, dataDir)
if err != nil {
return node.Config{}, fmt.Errorf("unable to load genesis file: %w", err)
}
nodeConfig.AllowGenesisUpdate = v.GetBool(AllowGenesisUpdateKey)
// StateSync Configs
nodeConfig.StateSyncConfig, err = getStateSyncConfig(v)
@@ -2122,26 +2019,6 @@ func saveCachedGenesisBytes(cacheFile string, genesisBytes []byte) error {
return os.WriteFile(cacheFile, genesisBytes, 0o600)
}
// extractXAssetID extracts the LUX asset ID from raw platform genesis bytes.
// This is needed when loading raw genesis bytes directly (for snapshot resume)
// to avoid rebuilding genesis which causes hash mismatch.
func extractXAssetID(genesisBytes []byte) (ids.ID, error) {
// Get the X-chain creation TX from the platform genesis
xChainTx, err := builder.VMGenesis(genesisBytes, constants.XVMID)
if err != nil {
return ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("couldn't find X-chain genesis in platform genesis: %w", err)
}
// Extract the XVM genesis bytes from the create chain TX
createChainTx, ok := xChainTx.Unsigned.(*pchaintxs.CreateChainTx)
if !ok {
return ids.Empty, fmt.Errorf("X-chain genesis TX is not a CreateChainTx")
}
// Use the builder.XAssetID function to extract the asset ID from XVM genesis
return builder.XAssetID(createChainTx.GenesisData)
}
func providedFlags(v *viper.Viper) map[string]interface{} {
settings := v.AllSettings()
customSettings := make(map[string]interface{}, len(settings))
+1 -1
View File
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ Defaults to `0.1`.
Partial sync enables nodes that are not primary network validators to optionally sync
only the P-chain on the primary network. Nodes that use this option can still track
Chains. After the Etna upgrade, nodes that use this option can also validate L1s.
Chains. Nodes that use this option can also validate L1s.
This config defaults to `false`.
## Public IP
+85 -5
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@
package config
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"log"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -17,13 +18,34 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/node/chains"
"github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/builder"
"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
pchaingenesis "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/genesis"
pchaintxs "github.com/luxfi/node/vms/platformvm/txs"
)
const chainConfigFilenameExtension = ".ex"
// equalChainConfigs compares two ChainConfig maps using bytes.Equal for the
// []byte fields, so nil and empty []byte compare equal. json/v2 unmarshals
// absent/null []byte fields to empty (non-nil), unlike v1 which left them nil.
func equalChainConfigs(t *testing.T, expected, actual map[string]chains.ChainConfig) {
t.Helper()
require := require.New(t)
require.Equal(len(expected), len(actual), "map length mismatch")
for k, want := range expected {
got, ok := actual[k]
require.True(ok, "missing key %q", k)
require.True(bytes.Equal(want.Config, got.Config),
"%q Config: expected %x got %x", k, want.Config, got.Config)
require.True(bytes.Equal(want.Upgrade, got.Upgrade),
"%q Upgrade: expected %x got %x", k, want.Upgrade, got.Upgrade)
}
}
func TestGetChainConfigsFromFiles(t *testing.T) {
tests := map[string]struct {
configs map[string]string
@@ -87,7 +109,7 @@ func TestGetChainConfigsFromFiles(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(root, v.GetString(ChainConfigDirKey))
chainConfigs, err := getChainConfigs(v)
require.NoError(err)
require.Equal(test.expected, chainConfigs)
equalChainConfigs(t, test.expected, chainConfigs)
})
}
}
@@ -147,7 +169,11 @@ func TestGetChainConfigsDirNotExist(t *testing.T) {
// don't read with getConfigFromViper since it's very slow.
chainConfigs, err := getChainConfigs(v)
require.ErrorIs(err, test.expectedErr)
require.Equal(test.expected, chainConfigs)
if test.expected == nil {
require.Nil(chainConfigs)
} else {
equalChainConfigs(t, test.expected, chainConfigs)
}
})
}
}
@@ -167,7 +193,7 @@ func TestSetChainConfigDefaultDir(t *testing.T) {
chainConfigs, err := getChainConfigs(v)
require.NoError(err)
expected := map[string]chains.ChainConfig{"C": {Config: []byte("helloworld"), Upgrade: []byte(nil)}}
require.Equal(expected, chainConfigs)
equalChainConfigs(t, expected, chainConfigs)
}
func TestGetChainConfigsFromFlags(t *testing.T) {
@@ -234,7 +260,7 @@ func TestGetChainConfigsFromFlags(t *testing.T) {
// Parse config
chainConfigs, err := getChainConfigs(v)
require.NoError(err)
require.Equal(test.expected, chainConfigs)
equalChainConfigs(t, test.expected, chainConfigs)
})
}
}
@@ -672,3 +698,57 @@ func TestDevModeFlags(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestResolveUTXOAssetID_FromSovereignGenesis covers the canonical
// behaviour the sovereign-L1 fix relies on: when the loaded platform
// genesis bakes an X-Chain, resolveUTXOAssetID returns the runtime asset
// ID encoded IN the genesis (matches what FromConfig produces, matches
// what the running X-Chain reports via platform.getStakingAssetID).
//
// Critically: NOT constants.UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID). That value is
// network-id-keyed and would silently collide between two sovereign L1s
// sharing a primary-network ID.
func TestResolveUTXOAssetID_FromSovereignGenesis(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
cfg := builder.GetConfig(constants.LocalID)
require.NotNil(cfg)
require.NotEmpty(cfg.XChainGenesis, "fixture must bake X-Chain")
genesisBytes, expectedID, err := builder.FromConfig(cfg)
require.NoError(err)
require.NotEqual(ids.Empty, expectedID)
gotID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(constants.LocalID, genesisBytes)
require.NoError(err)
require.Equal(expectedID, gotID,
"resolveUTXOAssetID must agree with FromConfig on the genesis-derived asset ID")
}
// TestResolveUTXOAssetID_POnlyFallback verifies that when the platform
// genesis bakes no X-Chain (P-only mode), resolveUTXOAssetID falls back
// to constants.UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID). That value is unused at
// runtime (no X-Chain to mint on) but keeps the existing nodeConfig
// shape consistent for downstream consumers.
func TestResolveUTXOAssetID_POnlyFallback(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
pOnly := &pchaingenesis.Genesis{Chains: nil}
pOnlyBytes, err := pchaingenesis.Codec.Marshal(pchaintxs.CodecVersion, pOnly)
require.NoError(err)
gotID, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(42, pOnlyBytes)
require.NoError(err)
require.Equal(constants.UTXOAssetIDFor(42), gotID,
"P-only must fall through to UTXOAssetIDFor(networkID)")
}
// TestResolveUTXOAssetID_Malformed asserts that bad genesis bytes surface
// an error rather than silently returning ids.Empty (which would
// reintroduce the UTXOAssetIDFor fallback and defeat the fix on
// sovereign L1s where the fallback value is wrong).
func TestResolveUTXOAssetID_Malformed(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
_, err := resolveUTXOAssetID(1, []byte{0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc})
require.Error(err)
}
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package config
import (
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestDexValidatorFlagDefaultsOff pins the runtime opt-in contract for the
// D-Chain DEX: the dex-validator flag exists, defaults to false (most nodes do
// NOT run the DEX even though the DEXVM factory is always linked), and flips to
// true when set. Participation is a runtime decision, not a compile-time one.
func TestDexValidatorFlagDefaultsOff(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
// The flag must be registered in the canonical flag set.
fs := BuildFlagSet()
flag := fs.Lookup(DexValidatorKey)
require.NotNil(flag, "dex-validator flag must be registered")
require.Equal("false", flag.DefValue, "dex-validator must default to false")
// Default (unset) reads as false.
v := viper.New()
require.NoError(v.BindPFlags(fs))
require.False(v.GetBool(DexValidatorKey), "dex-validator must read false by default")
// Explicit opt-in flips it.
v.Set(DexValidatorKey, true)
require.True(v.GetBool(DexValidatorKey), "dex-validator must read true when set")
}
+33 -14
View File
@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ import (
"github.com/spf13/pflag"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
"github.com/luxfi/genesis/pkg/genesis"
"github.com/luxfi/net/dynamicip"
"github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/builder"
"github.com/luxfi/node/trace"
"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/components/gas"
"github.com/luxfi/node/vms/proposervm"
compression "github.com/luxfi/compress"
"github.com/luxfi/net/dynamicip"
"github.com/luxfi/sys/ulimit"
consensusconfig "github.com/luxfi/consensus/config"
@@ -46,15 +46,21 @@ var (
defaultStakingTLSKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "staker.key")
defaultStakingCertPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "staker.crt")
defaultStakingSignerKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "signer.key")
defaultConfigDir = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "configs")
defaultChainConfigDir = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "chains")
defaultVMConfigDir = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "vms")
defaultVMAliasFilePath = filepath.Join(defaultVMConfigDir, "aliases.json")
defaultChainAliasFilePath = filepath.Join(defaultChainConfigDir, "aliases.json")
defaultNetConfigDir = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "chains")
defaultPluginDir = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "plugins", "current")
defaultChainDataDir = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "chainData")
defaultProcessContextPath = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, DefaultProcessContextFilename)
// Strict-PQ default paths — mirror downstream-tenant CLI `<tenantctl> key gen`
// layout so the operator init container + lqd see the same files.
defaultStakingMLDSAKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mldsa.key")
defaultStakingMLDSAPubKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mldsa.pub")
defaultHandshakeMLKEMKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mlkem.key")
defaultHandshakeMLKEMPubKeyPath = filepath.Join(defaultStakingPath, "mlkem.pub")
defaultConfigDir = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "configs")
defaultChainConfigDir = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "chains")
defaultVMConfigDir = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "vms")
defaultVMAliasFilePath = filepath.Join(defaultVMConfigDir, "aliases.json")
defaultChainAliasFilePath = filepath.Join(defaultChainConfigDir, "aliases.json")
defaultNetConfigDir = filepath.Join(defaultConfigDir, "chains")
defaultPluginDir = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "plugins", "current")
defaultChainDataDir = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, "chainData")
defaultProcessContextPath = filepath.Join(defaultUnexpandedDataDir, DefaultProcessContextFilename)
)
func deprecateFlags(fs *pflag.FlagSet) error {
@@ -109,8 +115,6 @@ func addNodeFlags(fs *pflag.FlagSet) {
fs.String(GenesisDBKey, "", "Path to existing genesis database for replay. Cannot be used with genesis-file or genesis-file-content")
fs.String(GenesisDBTypeKey, "zapdb", "Database type to use for genesis database. Must be one of {pebbledb, zapdb}")
fs.Uint64(GenesisBlockLimitKey, 0, "Limit number of blocks to replay during genesis (0 = all blocks)")
fs.Bool(AllowCustomGenesisKey, true, "Allow custom genesis for mainnet/testnet (default: true for development, set false for production)")
fs.Bool(AllowGenesisUpdateKey, false, "Allow updating stored genesis hash when genesis changes (use for adding new primary network chains)")
// Upgrade
fs.String(UpgradeFileKey, "", fmt.Sprintf("Specifies an upgrade config file path. Ignored when running standard networks or if %s is specified",
@@ -290,8 +294,22 @@ func addNodeFlags(fs *pflag.FlagSet) {
fs.Bool(StakingEphemeralSignerEnabledKey, false, "If true, the node uses an ephemeral staking signer key")
fs.String(StakingSignerKeyPathKey, defaultStakingSignerKeyPath, fmt.Sprintf("Path to the signer private key for staking. Ignored if %s is specified", StakingSignerKeyContentKey))
fs.String(StakingSignerKeyContentKey, "", "Specifies base64 encoded signer private key for staking")
// Strict-PQ identity (FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 + FIPS 203 ML-KEM-768).
// When the ML-DSA pubkey is provided, NodeID derivation pivots from
// the classical TLS-cert path to the wire-discriminated strict-PQ
// scheme (ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65.DeriveMLDSA). Both pairs default
// to the layout downstream-tenant CLI `<tenantctl> key gen` writes — wire the
// init container and lqd reads the files with zero extra config.
fs.String(StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey, defaultStakingMLDSAKeyPath, fmt.Sprintf("Path to the ML-DSA-65 staking private key (FIPS 204 PEM). Ignored if %s is specified", StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey))
fs.String(StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey, "", "Base64-encoded ML-DSA-65 staking private key (FIPS 204 PEM)")
fs.String(StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey, defaultStakingMLDSAPubKeyPath, fmt.Sprintf("Path to the ML-DSA-65 staking public key (FIPS 204 PEM). Ignored if %s is specified", StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey))
fs.String(StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey, "", "Base64-encoded ML-DSA-65 staking public key (FIPS 204 PEM)")
fs.String(HandshakeMLKEMKeyPathKey, defaultHandshakeMLKEMKeyPath, fmt.Sprintf("Path to the ML-KEM-768 handshake private key (FIPS 203 PEM). Ignored if %s is specified", HandshakeMLKEMKeyContentKey))
fs.String(HandshakeMLKEMKeyContentKey, "", "Base64-encoded ML-KEM-768 handshake private key (FIPS 203 PEM)")
fs.String(HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyPathKey, defaultHandshakeMLKEMPubKeyPath, fmt.Sprintf("Path to the ML-KEM-768 handshake public key (FIPS 203 PEM). Ignored if %s is specified", HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyContentKey))
fs.String(HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyContentKey, "", "Base64-encoded ML-KEM-768 handshake public key (FIPS 203 PEM)")
fs.String(StakingKMSEndpointKey, "", "KMS endpoint for staking key retrieval (e.g., https://kms.dev.lux.network)")
fs.String(StakingKMSSecretPathKey, "", "KMS secret path for staking keys (e.g., /staking/liquid-devnet/node-0)")
fs.String(StakingKMSSecretPathKey, "", "KMS secret path for staking keys (e.g., /staking/devnet/node-0)")
fs.String(StakingKMSTokenKey, "", "KMS auth token for staking key retrieval")
fs.Bool(SybilProtectionEnabledKey, true, "Enables sybil protection. If enabled, Network TLS is required")
fs.Uint64(SybilProtectionDisabledWeightKey, 100, "Weight to provide to each peer when sybil protection is disabled")
@@ -317,6 +335,7 @@ func addNodeFlags(fs *pflag.FlagSet) {
// Chain tracking
fs.String(TrackChainsKey, "", "Comma-separated list of chain IDs to track. A node tracking chains will sync those chains and track validator uptimes. Use --track-all-chains for development networks")
fs.Bool(TrackAllChainsKey, false, "If true, track all chains automatically. Useful for development and testing networks where you want to sync all deployed chains without specifying each one")
fs.Bool(DexValidatorKey, false, "If true, this node activates and participates in the D-Chain DEX: it tracks/validates the D-Chain and dials the venue matcher engine. Default off — the DEXVM factory is always linked (D-Chain is a genesis chain), but a node does NOT activate the D-Chain unless this flag is set, even under --track-all-chains. When a network configures the dex-operator NFT collection, activation also requires the node's X-Chain staking address to hold that NFT (flag AND NFT)")
// State syncing
fs.String(StateSyncIPsKey, "", "Comma separated list of state sync peer ips to connect to. Example: 127.0.0.1:9630,127.0.0.1:9631")
+49 -34
View File
@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ const (
GenesisDBKey = "genesis-db"
GenesisDBTypeKey = "genesis-db-type"
GenesisBlockLimitKey = "genesis-block-limit"
AllowCustomGenesisKey = "allow-custom-genesis"
AllowGenesisUpdateKey = "allow-genesis-update"
UpgradeFileKey = "upgrade-file"
UpgradeFileContentKey = "upgrade-file-content"
NetworkNameKey = "network-id"
@@ -80,27 +78,43 @@ const (
HTTPReadTimeoutKey = "http-read-timeout"
HTTPReadHeaderTimeoutKey = "http-read-header-timeout"
HTTPIdleTimeoutKey = "http-idle-timeout"
StateSyncIPsKey = "state-sync-ips"
StateSyncIDsKey = "state-sync-ids"
BootstrapNodesKey = "bootstrap-nodes"
BootstrapIPsKey = "bootstrap-ips"
BootstrapIDsKey = "bootstrap-ids"
SkipBootstrapKey = "skip-bootstrap"
EnableAutominingKey = "enable-automining"
StakingHostKey = "staking-host"
StakingPortKey = "staking-port"
StakingEphemeralCertEnabledKey = "staking-ephemeral-cert-enabled"
StakingTLSKeyPathKey = "staking-tls-key-file"
StakingTLSKeyContentKey = "staking-tls-key-file-content"
StakingCertPathKey = "staking-tls-cert-file"
StakingCertContentKey = "staking-tls-cert-file-content"
StakingEphemeralSignerEnabledKey = "staking-ephemeral-signer-enabled"
StakingSignerKeyPathKey = "staking-signer-key-file"
StakingSignerKeyContentKey = "staking-signer-key-file-content"
StakingKMSEndpointKey = "staking-kms-endpoint"
StakingKMSSecretPathKey = "staking-kms-secret-path"
StakingKMSTokenKey = "staking-kms-token"
HTTPIdleTimeoutKey = "http-idle-timeout"
StateSyncIPsKey = "state-sync-ips"
StateSyncIDsKey = "state-sync-ids"
BootstrapNodesKey = "bootstrap-nodes"
BootstrapIPsKey = "bootstrap-ips"
BootstrapIDsKey = "bootstrap-ids"
SkipBootstrapKey = "skip-bootstrap"
EnableAutominingKey = "enable-automining"
StakingHostKey = "staking-host"
StakingPortKey = "staking-port"
StakingEphemeralCertEnabledKey = "staking-ephemeral-cert-enabled"
StakingTLSKeyPathKey = "staking-tls-key-file"
StakingTLSKeyContentKey = "staking-tls-key-file-content"
StakingCertPathKey = "staking-tls-cert-file"
StakingCertContentKey = "staking-tls-cert-file-content"
StakingEphemeralSignerEnabledKey = "staking-ephemeral-signer-enabled"
StakingSignerKeyPathKey = "staking-signer-key-file"
StakingSignerKeyContentKey = "staking-signer-key-file-content"
StakingKMSEndpointKey = "staking-kms-endpoint"
StakingKMSSecretPathKey = "staking-kms-secret-path"
StakingKMSTokenKey = "staking-kms-token"
// Strict-PQ staking identity (FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65). When set, the node
// uses the ML-DSA-65 public key as the NodeID source via
// ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65.DeriveMLDSA(chainID, pubKey), replacing the
// classical TLS-cert NodeID derivation. Strict-PQ profiles require
// these; classical-compat chains ignore them.
StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey = "staking-mldsa-key-file"
StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey = "staking-mldsa-key-file-content"
StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey = "staking-mldsa-pub-key-file"
StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey = "staking-mldsa-pub-key-file-content"
// Strict-PQ handshake KEM (FIPS 203 ML-KEM-768). Peer-facing public
// key is published in the validator-set entry so peers can encapsulate
// to it for session-key establishment with no classical fallback.
HandshakeMLKEMKeyPathKey = "handshake-mlkem-key-file"
HandshakeMLKEMKeyContentKey = "handshake-mlkem-key-file-content"
HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyPathKey = "handshake-mlkem-pub-key-file"
HandshakeMLKEMPubKeyContentKey = "handshake-mlkem-pub-key-file-content"
SybilProtectionEnabledKey = "sybil-protection-enabled"
SybilProtectionDisabledWeightKey = "sybil-protection-disabled-weight"
NetworkInitialTimeoutKey = "network-initial-timeout"
@@ -161,6 +175,7 @@ const (
PartialSyncPrimaryNetworkKey = "partial-sync-primary-network"
TrackChainsKey = "track-chains"
TrackAllChainsKey = "track-all-chains"
DexValidatorKey = "dex-validator"
AdminAPIEnabledKey = "api-admin-enabled"
InfoAPIEnabledKey = "api-info-enabled"
KeystoreAPIEnabledKey = "api-keystore-enabled"
@@ -250,17 +265,17 @@ const (
ForceIgnoreChecksumKey = "force-ignore-checksum"
// Low Memory / Dev Light Mode Keys
LowMemoryKey = "low-memory"
MemoryProfileKey = "memory-profile"
DevLightKey = "dev-light"
ConfigProfileKey = "config-profile"
DBCacheSizeKey = "db-cache-size"
DBMemtableSizeKey = "db-memtable-size"
StateCacheSizeKey = "state-cache-size"
BlockCacheSizeKey = "block-cache-size"
DisableBloomFiltersKey = "disable-bloom-filters"
LazyChainLoadingKey = "lazy-chain-loading"
SingleValidatorModeKey = "single-validator-mode"
LowMemoryKey = "low-memory"
MemoryProfileKey = "memory-profile"
DevLightKey = "dev-light"
ConfigProfileKey = "config-profile"
DBCacheSizeKey = "db-cache-size"
DBMemtableSizeKey = "db-memtable-size"
StateCacheSizeKey = "state-cache-size"
BlockCacheSizeKey = "block-cache-size"
DisableBloomFiltersKey = "disable-bloom-filters"
LazyChainLoadingKey = "lazy-chain-loading"
SingleValidatorModeKey = "single-validator-mode"
// VM Transport Keys
VMTransportKey = "vm-transport"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ package config
import (
"embed"
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"fmt"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
+145 -6
View File
@@ -5,25 +5,28 @@ package node
import (
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/node/server/http"
"github.com/luxfi/node/benchlist"
"github.com/luxfi/node/chains"
"github.com/luxfi/node/genesis/builder"
"github.com/luxfi/node/network"
"github.com/luxfi/node/server/http"
// "github.com/luxfi/consensus/core/router" // Unused
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/bls"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
mlkemcrypto "github.com/luxfi/crypto/mlkem"
"github.com/luxfi/node/nets"
"github.com/luxfi/node/network/tracker"
"github.com/luxfi/node/upgrade"
"github.com/luxfi/node/trace"
"github.com/luxfi/node/upgrade"
// "github.com/luxfi/log" // Unused
"github.com/luxfi/math/set"
"github.com/luxfi/timer"
"github.com/luxfi/node/utils/profiler"
"github.com/luxfi/timer"
)
type APIIndexerConfig struct {
@@ -83,6 +86,30 @@ type StakingConfig struct {
StakingKeyPath string `json:"stakingKeyPath"`
StakingCertPath string `json:"stakingCertPath"`
StakingSignerPath string `json:"stakingSignerPath"`
// Strict-PQ identity material. Set by config.GetNodeConfig when the
// --staking-mldsa-*-file / --handshake-mlkem-*-file flags resolve.
// All four fields are nil/empty under a classical-compat chain;
// strict-PQ profile rejects a missing StakingMLDSAPub at boot.
//
// NodeID derivation pivots on StakingMLDSAPub: when non-empty,
// ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65.DeriveMLDSA(stakingChainID, StakingMLDSAPub)
// replaces ids.NodeIDFromCert(StakingTLSCert) — the TLS cert becomes
// transport-only, no longer the identity anchor.
//
// HandshakeMLKEMPub is the peer-facing KEM public key that lqd
// publishes in its validator-set entry so peers can encapsulate to it
// for session-key establishment with no classical fallback. The
// HandshakeMLKEMPriv stays local to the pod.
StakingMLDSA *mldsa.PrivateKey `json:"-"`
StakingMLDSAPub []byte `json:"-"`
HandshakeMLKEMPriv *mlkemcrypto.PrivateKey `json:"-"`
HandshakeMLKEMPub []byte `json:"-"`
// File paths kept for log-line context, mirroring StakingKeyPath etc.
StakingMLDSAKeyPath string `json:"stakingMLDSAKeyPath,omitempty"`
StakingMLDSAPubPath string `json:"stakingMLDSAPubPath,omitempty"`
HandshakeMLKEMKeyPath string `json:"handshakeMLKEMKeyPath,omitempty"`
HandshakeMLKEMPubPath string `json:"handshakeMLKEMPubPath,omitempty"`
}
type StateSyncConfig struct {
@@ -141,9 +168,8 @@ type Config struct {
UpgradeConfig upgrade.Config `json:"upgradeConfig"`
// Genesis information
GenesisBytes []byte `json:"-"`
LuxAssetID ids.ID `json:"xAssetID"`
AllowGenesisUpdate bool `json:"allowGenesisUpdate,omitempty"`
GenesisBytes []byte `json:"-"`
UTXOAssetID ids.ID `json:"utxoAssetID"`
// ID of the network this node should connect to
NetworkID uint32 `json:"networkID"`
@@ -178,11 +204,57 @@ type Config struct {
// handle App messages per chain.
ConsensusAppConcurrency int `json:"consensusAppConcurrency"`
// ConsensusSampleSizeOverride / ConsensusQuorumSizeOverride carry the
// operator's EXPLICIT --consensus-sample-size / --consensus-quorum-size, set
// only when the flag was actually provided (0 = unset). They are threaded into
// chains.ManagerConfig.ConsensusOverride so chain creation honors an explicit
// committee/quorum, clamped to the dynamic strict-⅔ floor. When unset the node
// sizes K/α purely from the live validator set (the default, dynamic path).
ConsensusSampleSizeOverride int `json:"consensusSampleSizeOverride"`
ConsensusQuorumSizeOverride int `json:"consensusQuorumSizeOverride"`
// must initialize successfully or the node shuts down. Default: ["P","Q"].
TrackedChains set.Set[ids.ID] `json:"trackedChains"`
TrackAllChains bool `json:"trackAllChains"`
// DexValidator gates whether this node PARTICIPATES in the D-Chain DEX —
// i.e. tracks/validates the D-Chain and dials the venue matcher engine.
// Default false: the DEXVM factory is always registered (the D-Chain is a
// first-class genesis chain in every build), but a node only ACTIVATES the
// D-Chain when its operator opts in. The licensed/private piece is the GPU
// venue ENGINE, never the node.
//
// Enforcement is real, not advisory: this flag flows into
// chains.ManagerConfig.DexValidator and the chain manager's
// authorizeChainActivation declines the D-Chain when it is false — even when
// --track-all-chains queued the chain. It composes AND-wise with the
// X-Chain operator-NFT gate (OptionalVMs[DexVMID].RequiredNFT joined with
// NFTAuthorizationAssets): the D-Chain activates only if DexValidator is
// true AND (when a network configures the dex-operator collection) the
// node's staking X-address holds that NFT.
//
// Phase-2 (NOT built here — see participatesInDEXChain in node/node.go and
// the StakingXAddress seam in chains.ManagerConfig): binding the NFT check
// to proof-of-possession of the staking key, and mDNS local-fiber geofence
// discovery among the HFT DEX cluster. Until a network configures the
// dex-operator collection the NFT half is a no-op and this flag alone gates.
DexValidator bool `json:"dexValidator"`
// NFTAuthorizationAssets supplies, per network, the X-Chain operator-NFT
// collection asset for each NFT-gated optional VM, keyed by VMID (e.g.
// DexVMID -> the dex-operator collection asset; BridgeVMID -> the
// bridge-operator collection asset). It is the per-network VALUE half of the
// activation gate; the POLICY half (which VMs need an NFT + which group)
// lives in node.OptionalVMs. node.chainAuthorizationsFor joins the two into
// the chain manager's ChainAuthorizations map.
//
// Empty by default: minting the real operator collections is a follow-up, so
// until a network sets an asset here the corresponding chain is ungated
// (today's opt-in-flag behavior) while the gate itself stays fail-closed for
// any configured-but-unheld NFT.
NFTAuthorizationAssets map[ids.ID]ids.ID `json:"nftAuthorizationAssets"`
NetConfigs map[ids.ID]nets.Config `json:"chainConfigs"`
ChainConfigs map[string]chains.ChainConfig `json:"-"`
@@ -240,3 +312,70 @@ type Config struct {
LazyChainLoading bool `json:"lazyChainLoading"`
SingleValidatorMode bool `json:"singleValidatorMode"`
}
// IsStrictPQ reports whether the staking config has strict-PQ
// identity material loaded. Strict-PQ requires an ML-DSA-65 public
// key (signing identity) — the ML-KEM-768 KEM is a complementary
// handshake primitive that the validator-set entry publishes for
// peers but is NOT what defines the validator's identity. The
// 0-byte slice case is "classical-compat": NodeID derives from the
// TLS staking cert in StakingTLSCert.
func (c *StakingConfig) IsStrictPQ() bool {
return len(c.StakingMLDSAPub) > 0
}
// DeriveNodeID returns the canonical 20-byte NodeID for this
// staking identity under chainID:
//
// - Strict-PQ (StakingMLDSAPub set):
// NodeID = SHAKE256-384("NODE_ID_V1" || chainID || 0x42 || pubKey)[:20]
// via ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65.DeriveMLDSA. chainID-bound so the
// same key on a different chain produces a different NodeID,
// blocking cross-chain replay of validator registrations.
// - Classical-compat (no ML-DSA pub):
// NodeID = ids.NodeIDFromCert(StakingTLSCert.Leaf) — the
// legacy upstream derivation. A strict-PQ chain MUST refuse
// this branch at the validator-set boundary; the choice lives
// in the consensus profile, not here.
//
// This is the single seam every "what's my NodeID" call site should
// route through. Direct calls to ids.NodeIDFromCert in new code are
// a bug — they bypass the strict-PQ pivot.
func (c *StakingConfig) DeriveNodeID(chainID ids.ID) (ids.NodeID, error) {
if c.IsStrictPQ() {
id, _, err := ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65.DeriveMLDSA(chainID, c.StakingMLDSAPub)
return id, err
}
if c.StakingTLSCert.Leaf == nil {
return ids.EmptyNodeID, errStakingTLSCertLeafNil
}
return ids.NodeIDFromCert(&ids.Certificate{
Raw: c.StakingTLSCert.Leaf.Raw,
PublicKey: c.StakingTLSCert.Leaf.PublicKey,
}), nil
}
// DeriveTypedNodeID returns the wire-canonical TypedNodeID — scheme
// byte (0x42 for strict-PQ ML-DSA-65, 0x90 for classical secp256k1)
// followed by the 20-byte NodeID. The scheme byte travels with the
// NodeID on every handshake / validator-set serialization so a
// receiver MUST know which verifier to dispatch before consulting
// the chain profile. Profile is a downgrade-detection gate; scheme
// byte is a primitive-mismatch gate.
func (c *StakingConfig) DeriveTypedNodeID(chainID ids.ID) (ids.TypedNodeID, error) {
if c.IsStrictPQ() {
t, _, err := ids.TypedNodeIDFromMLDSA(
ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65, chainID, c.StakingMLDSAPub)
return t, err
}
if c.StakingTLSCert.Leaf == nil {
return ids.TypedNodeID{}, errStakingTLSCertLeafNil
}
return ids.TypedNodeIDFromCert(&ids.Certificate{
Raw: c.StakingTLSCert.Leaf.Raw,
PublicKey: c.StakingTLSCert.Leaf.PublicKey,
}), nil
}
var errStakingTLSCertLeafNil = errors.New(
"node: StakingConfig.StakingTLSCert.Leaf is nil — neither ML-DSA-65 nor a parsed TLS cert is available")
+3 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
package node
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
"net/netip"
"testing"
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ func TestProcessContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
contextJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(test.context, "", "\t")
contextJSON, err := json.Marshal(test.context, jsontext.WithIndent("\t"))
require.NoError(err)
require.JSONEq(test.expected, string(contextJSON))
})
+73 -7
View File
@@ -131,13 +131,6 @@ func allFlags() []FlagSpec {
Description: "Limit number of blocks to replay during genesis (0 = all blocks)",
Category: CategoryGenesis,
},
{
Key: "allow-custom-genesis",
Type: TypeBool,
Default: true,
Description: "Allow custom genesis for mainnet/testnet (default: true for development, set false for production)",
Category: CategoryGenesis,
},
{
Key: "upgrade-file",
Type: TypeString,
@@ -1078,6 +1071,79 @@ func allFlags() []FlagSpec {
Category: CategoryStaking,
Sensitive: true,
},
// Strict-PQ staking identity (FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65). When supplied,
// the node uses the ML-DSA-65 public key as the NodeID source via
// ids.NodeIDSchemeMLDSA65.DeriveMLDSA(chainID, pubKey) — replacing
// the classical TLS-cert NodeID derivation. The classical TLS
// staker.crt/key + signer.key flags above are retained only for
// legacy chains that ship no ChainSecurityProfile; strict-PQ
// chains refuse classical material at every boundary.
{
Key: "staking-mldsa-key-file",
Type: TypeString,
Default: "$LUXD_DATA_DIR/staking/mldsa.key",
Description: "Path to the ML-DSA-65 staking private key (FIPS 204 PEM). Ignored if staking-mldsa-key-file-content is specified",
Category: CategoryStaking,
Sensitive: true,
},
{
Key: "staking-mldsa-key-file-content",
Type: TypeString,
Default: "",
Description: "Base64-encoded ML-DSA-65 staking private key (FIPS 204 PEM)",
Category: CategoryStaking,
Sensitive: true,
},
{
Key: "staking-mldsa-pub-key-file",
Type: TypeString,
Default: "$LUXD_DATA_DIR/staking/mldsa.pub",
Description: "Path to the ML-DSA-65 staking public key (FIPS 204 PEM). Ignored if staking-mldsa-pub-key-file-content is specified",
Category: CategoryStaking,
},
{
Key: "staking-mldsa-pub-key-file-content",
Type: TypeString,
Default: "",
Description: "Base64-encoded ML-DSA-65 staking public key (FIPS 204 PEM)",
Category: CategoryStaking,
},
// Strict-PQ handshake KEM (FIPS 203 ML-KEM-768). Peer-facing public
// key is published in the validator-set entry so peers can
// encapsulate to it for session-key establishment — the PQ replacement
// for classical TLS key agreement on the libp2p handshake. The
// private key stays on the validator pod; the public key is the only
// material that crosses the wire.
{
Key: "handshake-mlkem-key-file",
Type: TypeString,
Default: "$LUXD_DATA_DIR/staking/mlkem.key",
Description: "Path to the ML-KEM-768 handshake private key (FIPS 203 PEM). Ignored if handshake-mlkem-key-file-content is specified",
Category: CategoryStaking,
Sensitive: true,
},
{
Key: "handshake-mlkem-key-file-content",
Type: TypeString,
Default: "",
Description: "Base64-encoded ML-KEM-768 handshake private key (FIPS 203 PEM)",
Category: CategoryStaking,
Sensitive: true,
},
{
Key: "handshake-mlkem-pub-key-file",
Type: TypeString,
Default: "$LUXD_DATA_DIR/staking/mlkem.pub",
Description: "Path to the ML-KEM-768 handshake public key (FIPS 203 PEM). Ignored if handshake-mlkem-pub-key-file-content is specified",
Category: CategoryStaking,
},
{
Key: "handshake-mlkem-pub-key-file-content",
Type: TypeString,
Default: "",
Description: "Base64-encoded ML-KEM-768 handshake public key (FIPS 203 PEM)",
Category: CategoryStaking,
},
{
Key: "sybil-protection-enabled",
Type: TypeBool,
+4 -2
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
package spec
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
jsonv1 "github.com/go-json-experiment/json/v1"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json/jsontext"
"time"
)
@@ -207,7 +209,7 @@ func (s *ConfigSpec) DeprecatedFlags() []FlagSpec {
// JSON returns the spec as formatted JSON.
func (s *ConfigSpec) JSON() ([]byte, error) {
return json.MarshalIndent(s, "", " ")
return json.Marshal(s, jsontext.WithIndent(" "), jsonv1.FormatDurationAsNano(true))
}
// ValidateValue checks if a value is valid for a flag.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
package spec
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/go-json-experiment/json"
"testing"
)
+131
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package config
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/pem"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/crypto/mldsa"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// writeMLDSAFixture generates an ML-DSA-65 keypair, PEM-encodes both halves
// with the block types loadStakingMLDSA expects, writes them under dir, and
// returns (privPath, pubPath, privPEM, pubPEM).
func writeMLDSAFixture(t *testing.T, dir string) (privPath, pubPath string, privPEM, pubPEM []byte) {
t.Helper()
priv, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, mldsa.MLDSA65)
require.NoError(t, err)
privPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "ML-DSA-65 PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: priv.Bytes()})
pubPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "ML-DSA-65 PUBLIC KEY", Bytes: priv.PublicKey.Bytes()})
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755))
privPath = filepath.Join(dir, "mldsa.key")
pubPath = filepath.Join(dir, "mldsa.pub")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(privPath, privPEM, 0o600))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(pubPath, pubPEM, 0o644))
return privPath, pubPath, privPEM, pubPEM
}
// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_PathForm: both keys via explicit --staking-mldsa-*-file
// paths. The canonical strict-PQ deploy form.
func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_PathForm(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
privPath, pubPath, _, _ := writeMLDSAFixture(t, dir)
v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey + "=" + privPath,
"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey + "=" + pubPath,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
priv, pub, _, _, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, priv)
require.NotEmpty(t, pub)
}
// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_ContentForm: keys via base64 PEM --*-content flags.
func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_ContentForm(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
_, _, privPEM, pubPEM := writeMLDSAFixture(t, dir)
v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey + "=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(privPEM),
"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey + "=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pubPEM),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
priv, pub, _, _, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, priv)
require.NotEmpty(t, pub)
}
// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_EmptyContentFallsThroughToPath is the regression guard
// for the strict-PQ activation outage: when a deploy passes the *-content flag
// blank (e.g. an env/template that rendered to "") alongside a valid *-file
// path, the loader MUST consult the path. The previous behavior short-circuited
// on the empty content value and returned no key, so StakingMLDSAPub stayed
// empty, IsStrictPQ() was false, and the node booted under an ECDSA NodeID with
// no error — silently degrading a strict-PQ validator to classical-compat.
func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_EmptyContentFallsThroughToPath(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
privPath, pubPath, _, _ := writeMLDSAFixture(t, dir)
v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyPathKey + "=" + privPath,
"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey + "=", // blank content
"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey + "=" + pubPath,
"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyContentKey + "=", // blank content
})
require.NoError(t, err)
priv, pub, gotPrivPath, gotPubPath, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, priv, "blank content must fall through to the path")
require.NotEmpty(t, pub, "blank content must fall through to the path")
require.Equal(t, privPath, gotPrivPath)
require.Equal(t, pubPath, gotPubPath)
}
// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_NeitherIsClassicalCompat: no key material at all (and a
// default pub path that does not exist) is classical-compat — empty, no error.
func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_NeitherIsClassicalCompat(t *testing.T) {
// Point DataDir at an empty dir so the default pub path resolves to a
// non-existent file rather than picking up a developer's ~/.lux key.
v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
"--" + DataDirKey + "=" + t.TempDir(),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
priv, pub, _, _, err := loadStakingMLDSA(v)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Nil(t, priv)
require.Empty(t, pub)
}
// TestLoadStakingMLDSA_PrivOnlyIsFatal: a private key with no public key is a
// loud config error — a strict-PQ validator must never silently degrade.
func TestLoadStakingMLDSA_PrivOnlyIsFatal(t *testing.T) {
base := t.TempDir()
_, _, privPEM, _ := writeMLDSAFixture(t, filepath.Join(base, "staking"))
v, err := BuildViper(BuildFlagSet(), []string{
"--" + DataDirKey + "=" + base, // default pub path under here will be missing... but priv content wins
"--" + StakingMLDSAKeyContentKey + "=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(privPEM),
"--" + StakingMLDSAPubKeyPathKey + "=" + filepath.Join(base, "does-not-exist.pub"),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
_, _, _, _, err = loadStakingMLDSA(v)
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "both private and public key are required")
}
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
version: v1
plugins:
- name: go
out: pb
opt: paths=source_relative
- plugin: connect-go
out: pb
opt: paths=source_relative
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# Generated by buf. DO NOT EDIT.
version: v1
deps:
- remote: buf.build
owner: metric
repository: client-model
commit: 1d56a02d481a412a83b3c4984eb90c2e
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
version: v1
name: buf.build/luxfi/lux
build:
excludes:
# for golang we handle metric as a buf dep so we exclude it from generate, this proto
# file is required by languages such as rust.
- io/metric
breaking:
use:
- FILE
deps:
- buf.build/metric/client-model
lint:
use:
- STANDARD
except:
- SERVICE_SUFFIX # service requirement of <name>+Service
- RPC_REQUEST_STANDARD_NAME # explicit <rpc>+Request naming
- RPC_RESPONSE_STANDARD_NAME # explicit <rpc>+Response naming
- PACKAGE_VERSION_SUFFIX # versioned naming <service>.v1beta
# allows RPC requests or responses to be google.protobuf.Empty messages. This can be set if you
# want to allow messages to be void forever, that is they will never take any parameters.
rpc_allow_google_protobuf_empty_requests: true
rpc_allow_google_protobuf_empty_responses: true
# allows the same message type to be used for a single RPC's request and response type.
# TODO: this should not be tolerated and if it is only perscriptivly.
rpc_allow_same_request_response: true
-288
View File
@@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
//go:build grpc
// Code generated by protoc-gen-go. DO NOT EDIT.
// versions:
// protoc-gen-go v1.35.1
// protoc (unknown)
// source: xsvm/service.proto
package xsvm
import (
protoreflect "google.golang.org/protobuf/reflect/protoreflect"
protoimpl "google.golang.org/protobuf/runtime/protoimpl"
reflect "reflect"
sync "sync"
)
const (
// Verify that this generated code is sufficiently up-to-date.
_ = protoimpl.EnforceVersion(20 - protoimpl.MinVersion)
// Verify that runtime/protoimpl is sufficiently up-to-date.
_ = protoimpl.EnforceVersion(protoimpl.MaxVersion - 20)
)
type PingRequest struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
Message string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=message,proto3" json:"message,omitempty"`
}
func (x *PingRequest) Reset() {
*x = PingRequest{}
mi := &file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes[0]
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
func (x *PingRequest) String() string {
return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x)
}
func (*PingRequest) ProtoMessage() {}
func (x *PingRequest) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
mi := &file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes[0]
if x != nil {
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil {
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
return ms
}
return mi.MessageOf(x)
}
// Deprecated: Use PingRequest.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
func (*PingRequest) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{0}
}
func (x *PingRequest) GetMessage() string {
if x != nil {
return x.Message
}
return ""
}
type PingReply struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
Message string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=message,proto3" json:"message,omitempty"`
}
func (x *PingReply) Reset() {
*x = PingReply{}
mi := &file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes[1]
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
func (x *PingReply) String() string {
return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x)
}
func (*PingReply) ProtoMessage() {}
func (x *PingReply) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
mi := &file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes[1]
if x != nil {
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil {
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
return ms
}
return mi.MessageOf(x)
}
// Deprecated: Use PingReply.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
func (*PingReply) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{1}
}
func (x *PingReply) GetMessage() string {
if x != nil {
return x.Message
}
return ""
}
type StreamPingRequest struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
Message string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=message,proto3" json:"message,omitempty"`
}
func (x *StreamPingRequest) Reset() {
*x = StreamPingRequest{}
mi := &file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes[2]
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
func (x *StreamPingRequest) String() string {
return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x)
}
func (*StreamPingRequest) ProtoMessage() {}
func (x *StreamPingRequest) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
mi := &file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes[2]
if x != nil {
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil {
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
return ms
}
return mi.MessageOf(x)
}
// Deprecated: Use StreamPingRequest.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
func (*StreamPingRequest) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{2}
}
func (x *StreamPingRequest) GetMessage() string {
if x != nil {
return x.Message
}
return ""
}
type StreamPingReply struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
Message string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=message,proto3" json:"message,omitempty"`
}
func (x *StreamPingReply) Reset() {
*x = StreamPingReply{}
mi := &file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes[3]
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
func (x *StreamPingReply) String() string {
return protoimpl.X.MessageStringOf(x)
}
func (*StreamPingReply) ProtoMessage() {}
func (x *StreamPingReply) ProtoReflect() protoreflect.Message {
mi := &file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes[3]
if x != nil {
ms := protoimpl.X.MessageStateOf(protoimpl.Pointer(x))
if ms.LoadMessageInfo() == nil {
ms.StoreMessageInfo(mi)
}
return ms
}
return mi.MessageOf(x)
}
// Deprecated: Use StreamPingReply.ProtoReflect.Descriptor instead.
func (*StreamPingReply) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescGZIP(), []int{3}
}
func (x *StreamPingReply) GetMessage() string {
if x != nil {
return x.Message
}
return ""
}
var File_xsvm_service_proto protoreflect.FileDescriptor
var file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDesc = []byte{
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0x6f, 0x33,
}
var (
file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescOnce sync.Once
file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescData = file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDesc
)
func file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescGZIP() []byte {
file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescOnce.Do(func() {
file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescData = protoimpl.X.CompressGZIP(file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescData)
})
return file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDescData
}
var file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes = make([]protoimpl.MessageInfo, 4)
var file_xsvm_service_proto_goTypes = []any{
(*PingRequest)(nil), // 0: xsvm.PingRequest
(*PingReply)(nil), // 1: xsvm.PingReply
(*StreamPingRequest)(nil), // 2: xsvm.StreamPingRequest
(*StreamPingReply)(nil), // 3: xsvm.StreamPingReply
}
var file_xsvm_service_proto_depIdxs = []int32{
0, // 0: xsvm.Ping.Ping:input_type -> xsvm.PingRequest
2, // 1: xsvm.Ping.StreamPing:input_type -> xsvm.StreamPingRequest
1, // 2: xsvm.Ping.Ping:output_type -> xsvm.PingReply
3, // 3: xsvm.Ping.StreamPing:output_type -> xsvm.StreamPingReply
2, // [2:4] is the sub-list for method output_type
0, // [0:2] is the sub-list for method input_type
0, // [0:0] is the sub-list for extension type_name
0, // [0:0] is the sub-list for extension extendee
0, // [0:0] is the sub-list for field type_name
}
func init() { file_xsvm_service_proto_init() }
func file_xsvm_service_proto_init() {
if File_xsvm_service_proto != nil {
return
}
type x struct{}
out := protoimpl.TypeBuilder{
File: protoimpl.DescBuilder{
GoPackagePath: reflect.TypeOf(x{}).PkgPath(),
RawDescriptor: file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDesc,
NumEnums: 0,
NumMessages: 4,
NumExtensions: 0,
NumServices: 1,
},
GoTypes: file_xsvm_service_proto_goTypes,
DependencyIndexes: file_xsvm_service_proto_depIdxs,
MessageInfos: file_xsvm_service_proto_msgTypes,
}.Build()
File_xsvm_service_proto = out.File
file_xsvm_service_proto_rawDesc = nil
file_xsvm_service_proto_goTypes = nil
file_xsvm_service_proto_depIdxs = nil
}
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
//go:build grpc
// Code generated by protoc-gen-connect-go. DO NOT EDIT.
//
// Source: xsvm/service.proto
package xsvmconnect
import (
connect "connectrpc.com/connect"
context "context"
errors "errors"
xsvm "github.com/luxfi/node/connectproto/pb/xsvm"
http "net/http"
strings "strings"
)
// This is a compile-time assertion to ensure that this generated file and the connect package are
// compatible. If you get a compiler error that this constant is not defined, this code was
// generated with a version of connect newer than the one compiled into your binary. You can fix the
// problem by either regenerating this code with an older version of connect or updating the connect
// version compiled into your binary.
const _ = connect.IsAtLeastVersion1_13_0
const (
// PingName is the fully-qualified name of the Ping service.
PingName = "xsvm.Ping"
)
// These constants are the fully-qualified names of the RPCs defined in this package. They're
// exposed at runtime as Spec.Procedure and as the final two segments of the HTTP route.
//
// Note that these are different from the fully-qualified method names used by
// google.golang.org/protobuf/reflect/protoreflect. To convert from these constants to
// reflection-formatted method names, remove the leading slash and convert the remaining slash to a
// period.
const (
// PingPingProcedure is the fully-qualified name of the Ping's Ping RPC.
PingPingProcedure = "/xsvm.Ping/Ping"
// PingStreamPingProcedure is the fully-qualified name of the Ping's StreamPing RPC.
PingStreamPingProcedure = "/xsvm.Ping/StreamPing"
)
// PingClient is a client for the xsvm.Ping service.
type PingClient interface {
Ping(context.Context, *connect.Request[xsvm.PingRequest]) (*connect.Response[xsvm.PingReply], error)
StreamPing(context.Context) *connect.BidiStreamForClient[xsvm.StreamPingRequest, xsvm.StreamPingReply]
}
// NewPingClient constructs a client for the xsvm.Ping service. By default, it uses the Connect
// protocol with the binary Protobuf Codec, asks for gzipped responses, and sends uncompressed
// requests. To use the gRPC or gRPC-Web protocols, supply the connect.WithGRPC() or
// connect.WithGRPCWeb() options.
//
// The URL supplied here should be the base URL for the Connect or gRPC server (for example,
// http://api.acme.com or https://acme.com/grpc).
func NewPingClient(httpClient connect.HTTPClient, baseURL string, opts ...connect.ClientOption) PingClient {
baseURL = strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/")
pingMethods := xsvm.File_xsvm_service_proto.Services().ByName("Ping").Methods()
return &pingClient{
ping: connect.NewClient[xsvm.PingRequest, xsvm.PingReply](
httpClient,
baseURL+PingPingProcedure,
connect.WithSchema(pingMethods.ByName("Ping")),
connect.WithClientOptions(opts...),
),
streamPing: connect.NewClient[xsvm.StreamPingRequest, xsvm.StreamPingReply](
httpClient,
baseURL+PingStreamPingProcedure,
connect.WithSchema(pingMethods.ByName("StreamPing")),
connect.WithClientOptions(opts...),
),
}
}
// pingClient implements PingClient.
type pingClient struct {
ping *connect.Client[xsvm.PingRequest, xsvm.PingReply]
streamPing *connect.Client[xsvm.StreamPingRequest, xsvm.StreamPingReply]
}
// Ping calls xsvm.Ping.Ping.
func (c *pingClient) Ping(ctx context.Context, req *connect.Request[xsvm.PingRequest]) (*connect.Response[xsvm.PingReply], error) {
return c.ping.CallUnary(ctx, req)
}
// StreamPing calls xsvm.Ping.StreamPing.
func (c *pingClient) StreamPing(ctx context.Context) *connect.BidiStreamForClient[xsvm.StreamPingRequest, xsvm.StreamPingReply] {
return c.streamPing.CallBidiStream(ctx)
}
// PingHandler is an implementation of the xsvm.Ping service.
type PingHandler interface {
Ping(context.Context, *connect.Request[xsvm.PingRequest]) (*connect.Response[xsvm.PingReply], error)
StreamPing(context.Context, *connect.BidiStream[xsvm.StreamPingRequest, xsvm.StreamPingReply]) error
}
// NewPingHandler builds an HTTP handler from the service implementation. It returns the path on
// which to mount the handler and the handler itself.
//
// By default, handlers support the Connect, gRPC, and gRPC-Web protocols with the binary Protobuf
// and JSON codecs. They also support gzip compression.
func NewPingHandler(svc PingHandler, opts ...connect.HandlerOption) (string, http.Handler) {
pingMethods := xsvm.File_xsvm_service_proto.Services().ByName("Ping").Methods()
pingPingHandler := connect.NewUnaryHandler(
PingPingProcedure,
svc.Ping,
connect.WithSchema(pingMethods.ByName("Ping")),
connect.WithHandlerOptions(opts...),
)
pingStreamPingHandler := connect.NewBidiStreamHandler(
PingStreamPingProcedure,
svc.StreamPing,
connect.WithSchema(pingMethods.ByName("StreamPing")),
connect.WithHandlerOptions(opts...),
)
return "/xsvm.Ping/", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch r.URL.Path {
case PingPingProcedure:
pingPingHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
case PingStreamPingProcedure:
pingStreamPingHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
})
}
// UnimplementedPingHandler returns CodeUnimplemented from all methods.
type UnimplementedPingHandler struct{}
func (UnimplementedPingHandler) Ping(context.Context, *connect.Request[xsvm.PingRequest]) (*connect.Response[xsvm.PingReply], error) {
return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnimplemented, errors.New("xsvm.Ping.Ping is not implemented"))
}
func (UnimplementedPingHandler) StreamPing(context.Context, *connect.BidiStream[xsvm.StreamPingRequest, xsvm.StreamPingReply]) error {
return connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnimplemented, errors.New("xsvm.Ping.StreamPing is not implemented"))
}
-26
View File
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package xsvm;
option go_package = "github.com/luxfi/node/connectproto/pb/xsvm";
service Ping {
rpc Ping(PingRequest) returns (PingReply);
rpc StreamPing(stream StreamPingRequest) returns (stream StreamPingReply);
}
message PingRequest {
string message = 1;
}
message PingReply {
string message = 1;
}
message StreamPingRequest {
string message = 1;
}
message StreamPingReply {
string message = 1;
}
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
# Consensus Package - AI Assistant Guide
This package is node-side glue around the canonical consensus engine in
`github.com/luxfi/consensus`. It does NOT implement the protocol — the
protocol lives in that module.
## Package Structure
- `acceptor.go` - Node-side block-acceptance callbacks (chain-ID-keyed)
- `quasar/` - Node-side wiring around `consensus/protocol/quasar`
- `zap/` - ZAP agentic-consensus / DID bridge (self-contained, opt-in)
## Acceptor
`Acceptor` interface called when consensus accepts a block / vertex.
`AcceptorGroup` manages multiple acceptors per chain — used by the indexer
and warp IPC. The variant here differs from the canonical
`luxfi/consensus/core.Acceptor` (different signature: `*runtime.Runtime`
instead of `context.Context`, plus chain-ID-keyed registration).
## Quasar Wiring
The `quasar/` subpackage wraps `github.com/luxfi/consensus/protocol/quasar`
with node-specific adapters (P-Chain validator state, BLS signing keys,
Corona threshold coordinator stub).
### Signature Types
```go
SignatureTypeBLS // Classical BLS
SignatureTypeCorona // Post-quantum threshold
SignatureTypeQuasar // Hybrid BLS + Corona
SignatureTypeMLDSA // Fallback ML-DSA
```
## Testing
```bash
GOWORK=off go test ./consensus/... -v
```
## Dependencies
- `github.com/luxfi/consensus` - Canonical consensus protocol (engine,
protocol/quasar, types, etc.)
- `github.com/luxfi/ids` - ID types
- `github.com/luxfi/log` - Logging
- `github.com/luxfi/runtime` - Runtime context for acceptors
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ import (
"go.uber.org/zap"
"github.com/luxfi/runtime"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
"github.com/luxfi/runtime"
)
var (
+14 -14
View File
@@ -68,32 +68,32 @@ type MLDSAWork struct {
// BlockVerifyWork contains all verification batches for a single block.
type BlockVerifyWork struct {
BLS *BLSWork
BLS *BLSWork
Corona *CoronaWork
ZK *ZKWork
MLDSA *MLDSAWork
ZK *ZKWork
MLDSA *MLDSAWork
}
// BlockVerifyResult contains verification results for all batch types.
type BlockVerifyResult struct {
BLSValid []bool
BLSValid []bool
CoronaValid []bool
ZKValid bool
MLDSAValid []bool
ZKValid bool
MLDSAValid []bool
GPUUsed bool
BLSTime time.Duration
GPUUsed bool
BLSTime time.Duration
CoronaTime time.Duration
ZKTime time.Duration
MLDSATime time.Duration
TotalTime time.Duration
ZKTime time.Duration
MLDSATime time.Duration
TotalTime time.Duration
}
var (
ErrBLSSizeMismatch = errors.New("BLS batch size mismatch: messages, signatures, and pubkeys must have equal length")
ErrBLSSizeMismatch = errors.New("BLS batch size mismatch: messages, signatures, and pubkeys must have equal length")
ErrCoronaSizeMismatch = errors.New("Corona batch size mismatch: messages, signatures, and pubkeys must have equal length")
ErrZKSizeMismatch = errors.New("ZK batch size mismatch: scalars and bases must have equal length")
ErrMLDSASizeMismatch = errors.New("ML-DSA batch size mismatch: messages, signatures, and pubkeys must have equal length")
ErrZKSizeMismatch = errors.New("ZK batch size mismatch: scalars and bases must have equal length")
ErrMLDSASizeMismatch = errors.New("ML-DSA batch size mismatch: messages, signatures, and pubkeys must have equal length")
)
// VerifyBlock dispatches all verification work for a block through the GPU pipeline.
+6 -6
View File
@@ -79,10 +79,10 @@ func TestGPUPipeline_AllFourTypes(t *testing.T) {
pipeline := NewGPUVerifyPipeline()
work := &BlockVerifyWork{
BLS: makeBLSWork(5),
BLS: makeBLSWork(5),
Corona: makeCoronaWork(3),
ZK: makeZKWork(2),
MLDSA: makeMLDSAWork(10),
ZK: makeZKWork(2),
MLDSA: makeMLDSAWork(10),
}
result, err := pipeline.VerifyBlock(work)
@@ -276,10 +276,10 @@ func BenchmarkGPUPipeline(b *testing.B) {
pipeline := NewGPUVerifyPipeline()
work := &BlockVerifyWork{
BLS: makeBLSWork(100),
BLS: makeBLSWork(100),
Corona: makeCoronaWork(50),
ZK: makeZKWork(10),
MLDSA: makeMLDSAWork(200),
ZK: makeZKWork(10),
MLDSA: makeMLDSAWork(200),
}
b.ResetTimer()
+19 -19
View File
@@ -116,11 +116,11 @@ func generateValidatorStates(n int) []ValidatorState {
_, _ = rand.Read(rtKey)
states[i] = ValidatorState{
NodeID: ids.GenerateTestNodeID(),
Weight: 1000,
BLSPubKey: blsKey,
NodeID: ids.GenerateTestNodeID(),
Weight: 1000,
BLSPubKey: blsKey,
CoronaKey: rtKey,
Active: true,
Active: true,
}
}
return states
@@ -575,13 +575,13 @@ func TestQuasarMemoryPressure(t *testing.T) {
_, _ = rand.Read(blockID[:])
finality := &QuantumFinality{
BlockID: blockID,
PChainHeight: uint64(i),
QChainHeight: uint64(i),
BLSProof: make([]byte, 96),
CoronaProof: make([]byte, 1024),
TotalWeight: 1000,
SignerWeight: 700,
BlockID: blockID,
PChainHeight: uint64(i),
QChainHeight: uint64(i),
BLSProof: make([]byte, 96),
CoronaProof: make([]byte, 1024),
TotalWeight: 1000,
SignerWeight: 700,
}
q.SetFinalized(blockID, finality)
}
@@ -913,10 +913,10 @@ func TestQuasarEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
finality := &QuantumFinality{
BLSProof: nil,
CoronaProof: nil,
TotalWeight: 1000,
SignerWeight: 700,
BLSProof: nil,
CoronaProof: nil,
TotalWeight: 1000,
SignerWeight: 700,
}
err = q.Verify(finality)
@@ -928,10 +928,10 @@ func TestQuasarEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
finality := &QuantumFinality{
BLSProof: []byte("proof"),
CoronaProof: []byte("proof"),
TotalWeight: 1000,
SignerWeight: 500, // Only 50%, needs 67%
BLSProof: []byte("proof"),
CoronaProof: []byte("proof"),
TotalWeight: 1000,
SignerWeight: 500, // Only 50%, needs 67%
}
err = q.Verify(finality)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ func TestConcurrentPruningStress(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
const (
numWriters = 8
numWriters = 8
opsPerWriter = 5000
)
+45 -45
View File
@@ -61,15 +61,15 @@ import (
// 2. t-of-n validators completed Corona threshold (post-quantum secure)
var (
ErrQuasarNotStarted = errors.New("quasar not started")
ErrPChainNotConnected = errors.New("P-Chain not connected")
ErrQChainNotConnected = errors.New("Q-Chain not connected")
ErrCoronaNotConnected = errors.New("Corona coordinator not connected")
ErrInsufficientWeight = errors.New("insufficient validator weight")
ErrInsufficientSigners = errors.New("insufficient Corona signers")
ErrFinalityFailed = errors.New("hybrid finality verification failed")
ErrBLSFailed = errors.New("BLS aggregation failed")
ErrCoronaFailed = errors.New("Corona threshold signing failed")
ErrQuasarNotStarted = errors.New("quasar not started")
ErrPChainNotConnected = errors.New("P-Chain not connected")
ErrQChainNotConnected = errors.New("Q-Chain not connected")
ErrCoronaNotConnected = errors.New("Corona coordinator not connected")
ErrInsufficientWeight = errors.New("insufficient validator weight")
ErrInsufficientSigners = errors.New("insufficient Corona signers")
ErrFinalityFailed = errors.New("hybrid finality verification failed")
ErrBLSFailed = errors.New("BLS aggregation failed")
ErrCoronaFailed = errors.New("Corona threshold signing failed")
)
// PChainProvider provides P-Chain state and finality events
@@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ type QuantumSignerFallback interface {
// ValidatorState represents a validator's current state
// Each validator has BOTH BLS and Corona keys
type ValidatorState struct {
NodeID ids.NodeID
Weight uint64
BLSPubKey []byte // BLS public key for aggregate signatures
NodeID ids.NodeID
Weight uint64
BLSPubKey []byte // BLS public key for aggregate signatures
CoronaKey []byte // Corona public key share for threshold sigs
Active bool
Active bool
}
// FinalityEvent represents a P-Chain finality event
@@ -104,18 +104,18 @@ type FinalityEvent struct {
// QuantumFinality represents a block that achieved hybrid quantum finality
type QuantumFinality struct {
BlockID ids.ID
PChainHeight uint64
QChainHeight uint64
BLSProof []byte // Aggregated BLS signature (96 bytes)
BlockID ids.ID
PChainHeight uint64
QChainHeight uint64
BLSProof []byte // Aggregated BLS signature (96 bytes)
CoronaProof []byte // Serialized Corona threshold signature
SignerBitset []byte // Which validators signed BLS
SignerBitset []byte // Which validators signed BLS
CoronaSigners []ids.NodeID // Which validators participated in Corona
TotalWeight uint64
SignerWeight uint64
BLSLatency time.Duration
TotalWeight uint64
SignerWeight uint64
BLSLatency time.Duration
CoronaLatency time.Duration
Timestamp time.Time
Timestamp time.Time
}
// Quasar binds P-Chain and Q-Chain consensus into hybrid quantum finality
@@ -369,18 +369,18 @@ func (q *Quasar) processFinality(ctx context.Context, event FinalityEvent) error
coronaProof = coronaSig.Bytes()
}
finality := &QuantumFinality{
BlockID: event.BlockID,
PChainHeight: event.Height,
QChainHeight: q.qHeight,
BLSProof: blsProof,
BlockID: event.BlockID,
PChainHeight: event.Height,
QChainHeight: q.qHeight,
BLSProof: blsProof,
CoronaProof: coronaProof,
SignerBitset: signerBitset,
SignerBitset: signerBitset,
CoronaSigners: coronaSigners,
TotalWeight: totalWeight,
SignerWeight: signerWeight,
BLSLatency: blsLatency,
TotalWeight: totalWeight,
SignerWeight: signerWeight,
BLSLatency: blsLatency,
CoronaLatency: coronaLatency,
Timestamp: time.Now(),
Timestamp: time.Now(),
}
q.finalized[event.BlockID] = finality
@@ -590,13 +590,13 @@ func (q *Quasar) Stats() QuasarStats {
}
return QuasarStats{
PChainHeight: q.pHeight,
QChainHeight: q.qHeight,
FinalizedBlocks: len(q.finalized),
Threshold: q.threshold,
QuorumNum: q.quorumNum,
QuorumDen: q.quorumDen,
Running: q.running,
PChainHeight: q.pHeight,
QChainHeight: q.qHeight,
FinalizedBlocks: len(q.finalized),
Threshold: q.threshold,
QuorumNum: q.quorumNum,
QuorumDen: q.quorumDen,
Running: q.running,
CoronaParties: coronaStats.NumParties,
CoronaThreshold: coronaStats.Threshold,
CoronaReady: coronaStats.Initialized,
@@ -605,13 +605,13 @@ func (q *Quasar) Stats() QuasarStats {
// QuasarStats contains quasar statistics
type QuasarStats struct {
PChainHeight uint64
QChainHeight uint64
FinalizedBlocks int
Threshold int
QuorumNum uint64
QuorumDen uint64
Running bool
PChainHeight uint64
QChainHeight uint64
FinalizedBlocks int
Threshold int
QuorumNum uint64
QuorumDen uint64
Running bool
CoronaParties int
CoronaThreshold int
CoronaReady bool
+2 -2
View File
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *BLSSignature) Signers() []ids.NodeID { return s.signers }
// QuasarSignature combines BLS and Corona signatures for P/Q security
type QuasarSignature struct {
bls *BLSSignature
bls *BLSSignature
corona *CoronaSignature
}
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ func (s *QuasarSignature) Signers() []ids.NodeID {
return s.bls.Signers()
}
func (s *QuasarSignature) BLS() *BLSSignature { return s.bls }
func (s *QuasarSignature) BLS() *BLSSignature { return s.bls }
func (s *QuasarSignature) Corona() *CoronaSignature { return s.corona }
// QuasarSigner combines classical and post-quantum signers
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
//go:build grpc
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// Package rpcdb re-exports the proto/rpcdb package for backwards compatibility
package rpcdb
import "github.com/luxfi/node/proto/rpcdb"
// Type aliases for backwards compatibility
type (
DatabaseClient = rpcdb.DatabaseClient
DatabaseServer = rpcdb.DatabaseServer
)
// Function aliases for backwards compatibility
var (
NewClient = rpcdb.NewClient
NewServer = rpcdb.NewServer
)
+264
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
// Package rpcdb is luxd's canonical Layer C home for the rpcdb service:
// one Service implementation backed by a database.Database, with a
// transport adapter per supported wire protocol.
//
// Layered topology:
//
// Layer A — wire framing (github.com/luxfi/api/zap)
// Layer B — service spec (data carriers) (github.com/luxfi/proto/rpcdb)
// Layer C — service impl + transports (this package)
//
// One Service. Many transport adapters. Adding a new transport is a
// new file that wraps `*Service`; the storage logic stays here and
// stays orthogonal to framing concerns.
//
// Files:
// - service.go (this) — transport-neutral Service struct + methods
// - grpc_server.go (build tag `grpc`) — gRPC adapter
// - zap_server.go (default) — ZAP adapter
package rpcdb
import (
"context"
"errors"
"sync"
"github.com/luxfi/database"
rpcdb "github.com/luxfi/proto/rpcdb"
)
// errUnknownIterator is the sentinel returned by IteratorNext / Error
// / Release when the caller hands in an iterator id that was never
// allocated (or has already been released). Transport adapters should
// surface this however their wire spec demands.
var errUnknownIterator = errors.New("rpcdb: unknown iterator")
// iterationBatchBytes is the upper bound on bytes batched into a
// single IteratorNext response. Picked to match the cevm-side
// expectation (RemoteZapDB::iterator_next reads up to ~128 KiB per
// roundtrip).
const iterationBatchBytes = 128 * 1024
// Service is the rpcdb service implementation. It holds one
// `database.Database` and a server-managed iterator pool, and exposes
// every rpcdb operation as a (request → response) method on Go data
// carriers from the proto/rpcdb wire-types package.
//
// Service is transport-agnostic: it knows nothing about gRPC, ZAP, or
// any other framing. Each transport adapter wraps `*Service` and
// translates its own wire format into these method calls.
type Service struct {
db database.Database
// iteratorMu serializes mutations of nextIteratorID and iterators.
// It does NOT serialize calls to a particular iterator — the
// underlying database.Iterator is documented as not safe for
// concurrent use, and the caller is expected to respect that.
iteratorMu sync.RWMutex
nextIteratorID uint64
iterators map[uint64]database.Iterator
}
// NewService wraps `db` so it can be served over any transport.
func NewService(db database.Database) *Service {
return &Service{
db: db,
iterators: make(map[uint64]database.Iterator),
}
}
// DB returns the underlying database. Adapters that need to surface
// transport-specific behavior (eg. health-check serialization) can
// reach in for it; everyone else uses the methods.
func (s *Service) DB() database.Database {
return s.db
}
// CloseIterators releases every server-side iterator. Adapters call
// this on shutdown so iterators don't leak past the listener.
func (s *Service) CloseIterators() {
s.iteratorMu.Lock()
defer s.iteratorMu.Unlock()
for id, it := range s.iterators {
it.Release()
delete(s.iterators, id)
}
}
// errToCode maps a database error to the wire enum.
func errToCode(err error) rpcdb.Error {
switch {
case err == nil:
return rpcdb.Error_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED
case errors.Is(err, database.ErrNotFound):
return rpcdb.Error_ERROR_NOT_FOUND
case errors.Is(err, database.ErrClosed):
return rpcdb.Error_ERROR_CLOSED
default:
// Any other error is reported as CLOSED on the wire — the
// proto enum doesn't have a richer error space. Adapters that
// can carry a transport-level error message should also pass
// the original err out-of-band.
return rpcdb.Error_ERROR_CLOSED
}
}
// CodeToErr maps a wire-typed Error back to a database sentinel. Used
// by remote clients on the receive side; lives here so server and
// client agree on the inverse of errToCode.
func CodeToErr(code rpcdb.Error) error {
switch code {
case rpcdb.Error_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED:
return nil
case rpcdb.Error_ERROR_NOT_FOUND:
return database.ErrNotFound
case rpcdb.Error_ERROR_CLOSED:
return database.ErrClosed
default:
return database.ErrClosed
}
}
// Has services rpcdb.Has.
func (s *Service) Has(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.HasRequest) (*rpcdb.HasResponse, error) {
has, err := s.db.Has(req.Key)
if err != nil {
return &rpcdb.HasResponse{Has: false, Err: errToCode(err)}, nil
}
return &rpcdb.HasResponse{Has: has, Err: rpcdb.Error_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED}, nil
}
// Get services rpcdb.Get.
func (s *Service) Get(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.GetRequest) (*rpcdb.GetResponse, error) {
value, err := s.db.Get(req.Key)
if err != nil {
return &rpcdb.GetResponse{Value: nil, Err: errToCode(err)}, nil
}
return &rpcdb.GetResponse{Value: value, Err: rpcdb.Error_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED}, nil
}
// Put services rpcdb.Put.
func (s *Service) Put(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.PutRequest) (*rpcdb.PutResponse, error) {
return &rpcdb.PutResponse{Err: errToCode(s.db.Put(req.Key, req.Value))}, nil
}
// Delete services rpcdb.Delete.
func (s *Service) Delete(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.DeleteRequest) (*rpcdb.DeleteResponse, error) {
return &rpcdb.DeleteResponse{Err: errToCode(s.db.Delete(req.Key))}, nil
}
// WriteBatch services rpcdb.WriteBatch.
func (s *Service) WriteBatch(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.WriteBatchRequest) (*rpcdb.WriteBatchResponse, error) {
batch := s.db.NewBatch()
for _, p := range req.Puts {
if err := batch.Put(p.Key, p.Value); err != nil {
return &rpcdb.WriteBatchResponse{Err: errToCode(err)}, nil
}
}
for _, d := range req.Deletes {
if err := batch.Delete(d.Key); err != nil {
return &rpcdb.WriteBatchResponse{Err: errToCode(err)}, nil
}
}
return &rpcdb.WriteBatchResponse{Err: errToCode(batch.Write())}, nil
}
// Compact services rpcdb.Compact.
func (s *Service) Compact(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.CompactRequest) (*rpcdb.CompactResponse, error) {
return &rpcdb.CompactResponse{Err: errToCode(s.db.Compact(req.Start, req.Limit))}, nil
}
// Close services rpcdb.Close.
func (s *Service) Close(_ context.Context, _ *rpcdb.CloseRequest) (*rpcdb.CloseResponse, error) {
return &rpcdb.CloseResponse{Err: errToCode(s.db.Close())}, nil
}
// HealthCheck services rpcdb.HealthCheck.
func (s *Service) HealthCheck(ctx context.Context) (*rpcdb.HealthCheckResponse, error) {
health, err := s.db.HealthCheck(ctx)
if err != nil {
return &rpcdb.HealthCheckResponse{Details: []byte(err.Error())}, nil
}
details := []byte("healthy")
if health != nil {
if str, ok := health.(string); ok {
details = []byte(str)
}
}
return &rpcdb.HealthCheckResponse{Details: details}, nil
}
// NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefix services rpcdb.NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefix.
func (s *Service) NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefix(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefixRequest) (*rpcdb.NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefixResponse, error) {
it := s.db.NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefix(req.Start, req.Prefix)
s.iteratorMu.Lock()
id := s.nextIteratorID
s.nextIteratorID++
s.iterators[id] = it
s.iteratorMu.Unlock()
return &rpcdb.NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefixResponse{Id: id}, nil
}
// IteratorNext services rpcdb.IteratorNext, returning up to
// iterationBatchBytes worth of (key, value) pairs per call. An empty
// Data slice signals exhaustion.
//
// Returned bytes are deep-copied so the caller can hold them past the
// next iterator advance; the underlying database.Iterator is allowed
// to recycle its internal buffers.
func (s *Service) IteratorNext(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.IteratorNextRequest) (*rpcdb.IteratorNextResponse, error) {
s.iteratorMu.RLock()
it, ok := s.iterators[req.Id]
s.iteratorMu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return nil, errUnknownIterator
}
var (
size int
data []*rpcdb.PutRequest
)
for size < iterationBatchBytes && it.Next() {
k := it.Key()
v := it.Value()
size += len(k) + len(v)
kc := make([]byte, len(k))
copy(kc, k)
vc := make([]byte, len(v))
copy(vc, v)
data = append(data, &rpcdb.PutRequest{Key: kc, Value: vc})
}
return &rpcdb.IteratorNextResponse{Data: data}, nil
}
// IteratorError services rpcdb.IteratorError.
func (s *Service) IteratorError(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.IteratorErrorRequest) (*rpcdb.IteratorErrorResponse, error) {
s.iteratorMu.RLock()
it, ok := s.iterators[req.Id]
s.iteratorMu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return &rpcdb.IteratorErrorResponse{Err: rpcdb.Error_ERROR_NOT_FOUND}, nil
}
return &rpcdb.IteratorErrorResponse{Err: errToCode(it.Error())}, nil
}
// IteratorRelease services rpcdb.IteratorRelease. Idempotent: calling
// it twice for the same id returns UNSPECIFIED on the second call.
func (s *Service) IteratorRelease(_ context.Context, req *rpcdb.IteratorReleaseRequest) (*rpcdb.IteratorReleaseResponse, error) {
s.iteratorMu.Lock()
it, ok := s.iterators[req.Id]
if !ok {
s.iteratorMu.Unlock()
return &rpcdb.IteratorReleaseResponse{Err: rpcdb.Error_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED}, nil
}
delete(s.iterators, req.Id)
s.iteratorMu.Unlock()
dbErr := it.Error()
it.Release()
return &rpcdb.IteratorReleaseResponse{Err: errToCode(dbErr)}, nil
}
+407
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package rpcdb
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"sync"
zapwire "github.com/luxfi/api/zap"
"github.com/luxfi/database"
rpcdb "github.com/luxfi/proto/rpcdb"
)
// ZAP db channel MsgType IDs. These are the wire-level Layer-A
// dispatch tags for the rpcdb service over ZAP. They live in their
// own listener (one per VM plugin); they do NOT collide with the VM
// lifecycle MsgTypes (1..31) or sender (40..49) or warp (50..59)
// because each listener has its own dispatch table.
//
// Order is the canonical Lane A assignment — the cevm side hard-codes
// these numbers in `RemoteZapDB::call`. Do not reorder.
const (
MsgDBHas zapwire.MessageType = 1
MsgDBGet zapwire.MessageType = 2
MsgDBPut zapwire.MessageType = 3
MsgDBDelete zapwire.MessageType = 4
MsgDBWriteBatch zapwire.MessageType = 5
MsgDBCompact zapwire.MessageType = 6
MsgDBClose zapwire.MessageType = 7
MsgDBHealthCheck zapwire.MessageType = 8
MsgDBIteratorNew zapwire.MessageType = 9
MsgDBIteratorNext zapwire.MessageType = 10
MsgDBIteratorError zapwire.MessageType = 11
MsgDBIteratorRelease zapwire.MessageType = 12
)
// Wire-byte values for the Error enum. These match
// rpcdb.Error_ERROR_* but are encoded as a single byte on the ZAP
// wire so the cevm side can decode them without pulling in protobuf.
const (
dbErrUnspecified uint8 = 0
dbErrClosed uint8 = 1
dbErrNotFound uint8 = 2
)
func errCodeToByte(code rpcdb.Error) uint8 {
switch code {
case rpcdb.Error_ERROR_CLOSED:
return dbErrClosed
case rpcdb.Error_ERROR_NOT_FOUND:
return dbErrNotFound
default:
return dbErrUnspecified
}
}
// ZAPServer is the ZAP transport adapter for the rpcdb Service. It
// owns the listener and the dispatch loop; the actual storage logic
// lives in *Service. To swap the wire format (eg. to add framing
// over a different reliable byte stream) write a new file with a new
// adapter — never edit Service.
type ZAPServer struct {
svc *Service
listener *zapwire.Listener
server *zapwire.Server
// closeOnce guards Close so callers can call it from both the
// client lifecycle and a deferred test cleanup without panicking
// on a double-close of the underlying listener.
closeOnce sync.Once
}
// NewZAPServer wraps a database.Database for serving over ZAP.
//
// Equivalent to NewZAPServerFromService(NewService(db)) — kept as a
// one-liner because cevm-side test fixtures and the production
// rpcchainvm/zap path both build it this way.
func NewZAPServer(db database.Database) *ZAPServer {
return NewZAPServerFromService(NewService(db))
}
// NewZAPServerFromService wraps an existing Service for serving over
// ZAP. Useful when a single Service needs multiple transport adapters
// at once (eg. tests that want both ZAP and direct in-process calls).
func NewZAPServerFromService(svc *Service) *ZAPServer {
return &ZAPServer{svc: svc}
}
// Listen binds the ZAP listener to addr.
func (s *ZAPServer) Listen(addr string) error {
listener, err := zapwire.Listen(addr, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("rpcdb zap: listen %s: %w", addr, err)
}
s.listener = listener
s.server = zapwire.NewServer(listener, zapwire.HandlerFunc(s.handle))
return nil
}
// ListenOn wraps an existing net.Listener (for ephemeral ports etc.).
func (s *ZAPServer) ListenOn(raw net.Listener) {
s.listener = zapwire.NewListener(raw, nil)
s.server = zapwire.NewServer(s.listener, zapwire.HandlerFunc(s.handle))
}
// Addr returns the bound address (or nil if not yet listening).
func (s *ZAPServer) Addr() net.Addr {
if s.listener == nil {
return nil
}
return s.listener.Addr()
}
// Serve blocks until ctx is cancelled or Close is called.
func (s *ZAPServer) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
if s.server == nil {
return errors.New("rpcdb zap: not initialized — call Listen first")
}
return s.server.Serve(ctx)
}
// Close releases all iterators and closes the listener. Caller is
// expected to also cancel the context passed to Serve so the accept
// loop exits cleanly. Safe to call multiple times.
//
// We deliberately do NOT call s.server.Close() because the upstream
// zapwire.Server.Close races with in-flight accept (it nils its conns
// map mid-Serve, causing "assignment to entry in nil map"). Closing
// the listener is enough to make Accept return; ctx cancellation does
// the rest.
func (s *ZAPServer) Close() error {
var err error
s.closeOnce.Do(func() {
s.svc.CloseIterators()
if s.listener != nil {
err = s.listener.Close()
}
})
return err
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handle(ctx context.Context, msgType zapwire.MessageType, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
switch msgType {
case MsgDBHas:
return s.handleHas(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBGet:
return s.handleGet(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBPut:
return s.handlePut(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBDelete:
return s.handleDelete(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBWriteBatch:
return s.handleWriteBatch(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBCompact:
return s.handleCompact(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBClose:
return s.handleClose(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBHealthCheck:
return s.handleHealthCheck(ctx)
case MsgDBIteratorNew:
return s.handleIteratorNew(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBIteratorNext:
return s.handleIteratorNext(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBIteratorError:
return s.handleIteratorError(ctx, payload)
case MsgDBIteratorRelease:
return s.handleIteratorRelease(ctx, payload)
default:
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb zap: unknown msg type %d", msgType)
}
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleHas(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
key, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb Has decode: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.Has(ctx, &rpcdb.HasRequest{Key: key})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
if resp.Has {
buf.WriteUint8(1)
} else {
buf.WriteUint8(0)
}
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBHas, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleGet(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
key, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb Get decode: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.Get(ctx, &rpcdb.GetRequest{Key: key})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteBytes(resp.Value)
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBGet, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handlePut(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
key, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb Put decode key: %w", err)
}
value, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb Put decode value: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.Put(ctx, &rpcdb.PutRequest{Key: key, Value: value})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBPut, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleDelete(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
key, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb Delete decode: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.Delete(ctx, &rpcdb.DeleteRequest{Key: key})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBDelete, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleWriteBatch(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
nputs, err := r.ReadUint32()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb WriteBatch decode nputs: %w", err)
}
puts := make([]*rpcdb.PutRequest, 0, nputs)
for i := uint32(0); i < nputs; i++ {
key, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb WriteBatch put[%d] key: %w", i, err)
}
value, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb WriteBatch put[%d] value: %w", i, err)
}
puts = append(puts, &rpcdb.PutRequest{Key: key, Value: value})
}
ndels, err := r.ReadUint32()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb WriteBatch decode ndels: %w", err)
}
dels := make([]*rpcdb.DeleteRequest, 0, ndels)
for i := uint32(0); i < ndels; i++ {
key, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb WriteBatch del[%d]: %w", i, err)
}
dels = append(dels, &rpcdb.DeleteRequest{Key: key})
}
resp, err := s.svc.WriteBatch(ctx, &rpcdb.WriteBatchRequest{Puts: puts, Deletes: dels})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBWriteBatch, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleCompact(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
start, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb Compact decode start: %w", err)
}
limit, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb Compact decode limit: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.Compact(ctx, &rpcdb.CompactRequest{Start: start, Limit: limit})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBCompact, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleClose(ctx context.Context, _ []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
resp, err := s.svc.Close(ctx, &rpcdb.CloseRequest{})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBClose, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleHealthCheck(ctx context.Context) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
resp, err := s.svc.HealthCheck(ctx)
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteBytes(resp.Details)
return MsgDBHealthCheck, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleIteratorNew(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
start, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb IteratorNew decode start: %w", err)
}
prefix, err := r.ReadBytes()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb IteratorNew decode prefix: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefix(ctx, &rpcdb.NewIteratorWithStartAndPrefixRequest{Start: start, Prefix: prefix})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint64(resp.Id)
return MsgDBIteratorNew, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleIteratorNext(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
id, err := r.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb IteratorNext decode id: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.IteratorNext(ctx, &rpcdb.IteratorNextRequest{Id: id})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint32(uint32(len(resp.Data)))
for _, e := range resp.Data {
buf.WriteBytes(e.Key)
buf.WriteBytes(e.Value)
}
return MsgDBIteratorNext, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleIteratorError(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
id, err := r.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb IteratorError decode id: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.IteratorError(ctx, &rpcdb.IteratorErrorRequest{Id: id})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBIteratorError, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
func (s *ZAPServer) handleIteratorRelease(ctx context.Context, payload []byte) (zapwire.MessageType, []byte, error) {
r := zapwire.NewReader(payload)
id, err := r.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("rpcdb IteratorRelease decode id: %w", err)
}
resp, err := s.svc.IteratorRelease(ctx, &rpcdb.IteratorReleaseRequest{Id: id})
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
defer zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
buf.WriteUint8(errCodeToByte(resp.Err))
return MsgDBIteratorRelease, append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...), nil
}
+275
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package rpcdb
import (
"context"
"net"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
zapwire "github.com/luxfi/api/zap"
"github.com/luxfi/database"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
)
// startZAPServer spawns a ZAPServer over an in-memory listener bound to
// 127.0.0.1:0, returns the addr + the server (for shutdown).
func startZAPServer(t *testing.T, db database.Database) (string, *ZAPServer, context.CancelFunc) {
t.Helper()
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
require.NoError(t, err)
s := NewZAPServer(db)
s.ListenOn(listener)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go func() {
_ = s.Serve(ctx)
}()
// Wait for Serve to fully install accept loop.
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
return listener.Addr().String(), s, cancel
}
// TestZAPServer_HasGetPutDelete exercises the four primitive ops.
func TestZAPServer_HasGetPutDelete(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
mem := memdb.New()
addr, srv, cancel := startZAPServer(t, mem)
defer cancel()
defer srv.Close()
conn, err := zapwire.Dial(context.Background(), addr, nil)
require.NoError(err)
defer conn.Close()
ctx := context.Background()
// Has (key absent) → has=false, err=NotFound
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("foo"))
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBHas, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
hasB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Equal(uint8(0), hasB)
require.Equal(dbErrUnspecified, errB) // memdb returns no err on Has-miss
}
// Put
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("foo"))
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("bar"))
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBPut, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Equal(dbErrUnspecified, errB)
}
// Has (key present) → has=true
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("foo"))
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBHas, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
hasB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Equal(uint8(1), hasB)
require.Equal(dbErrUnspecified, errB)
}
// Get
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("foo"))
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBGet, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
val, _ := r.ReadBytes()
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Equal([]byte("bar"), val)
require.Equal(dbErrUnspecified, errB)
}
// Get (missing) → empty value, err=NotFound
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("absent"))
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBGet, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
val, _ := r.ReadBytes()
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Empty(val)
require.Equal(dbErrNotFound, errB)
}
// Delete
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("foo"))
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBDelete, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Equal(dbErrUnspecified, errB)
}
// Get post-delete → NotFound
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("foo"))
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBGet, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
_, _ = r.ReadBytes()
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Equal(dbErrNotFound, errB)
}
}
// TestZAPServer_WriteBatch_AndIterate covers batched writes plus the
// iterator path used by cevm's load_persisted snapshot_with_prefix.
func TestZAPServer_WriteBatch_AndIterate(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
mem := memdb.New()
addr, srv, cancel := startZAPServer(t, mem)
defer cancel()
defer srv.Close()
conn, err := zapwire.Dial(context.Background(), addr, nil)
require.NoError(err)
defer conn.Close()
ctx := context.Background()
// WriteBatch: 3 puts (prefix p:), 1 delete (no-op since absent).
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteUint32(3)
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("p:1"))
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("v1"))
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("p:2"))
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("v2"))
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("q:3"))
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("v3"))
buf.WriteUint32(1)
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("absent"))
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBWriteBatch, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Equal(dbErrUnspecified, errB)
}
// IteratorNew with prefix "p:"
var iterID uint64
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes(nil) // start
buf.WriteBytes([]byte("p:")) // prefix
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBIteratorNew, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
iterID, _ = r.ReadUint64()
}
// IteratorNext — collect.
collected := map[string]string{}
for {
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteUint64(iterID)
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBIteratorNext, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
n, _ := r.ReadUint32()
if n == 0 {
break
}
for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ {
k, _ := r.ReadBytes()
v, _ := r.ReadBytes()
collected[string(k)] = string(v)
}
}
// IteratorRelease
{
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteUint64(iterID)
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBIteratorRelease, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
errB, _ := r.ReadUint8()
require.Equal(dbErrUnspecified, errB)
}
require.Equal(map[string]string{"p:1": "v1", "p:2": "v2"}, collected)
}
// TestZAPServer_ParityWithMemDB writes/reads via wire and via direct
// memdb Get to confirm both paths see the same state — proves the ZAP
// round-trip preserves bytes exactly.
func TestZAPServer_ParityWithMemDB(t *testing.T) {
require := require.New(t)
mem := memdb.New()
addr, srv, cancel := startZAPServer(t, mem)
defer cancel()
defer srv.Close()
conn, err := zapwire.Dial(context.Background(), addr, nil)
require.NoError(err)
defer conn.Close()
ctx := context.Background()
key := []byte{0x42, 0x00, 0x01, 0xff}
value := make([]byte, 256)
for i := range value {
value[i] = byte(i)
}
// Put via wire.
buf := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf.WriteBytes(key)
buf.WriteBytes(value)
_, _, err = conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBPut, buf.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf)
require.NoError(err)
// Read directly.
got, dErr := mem.Get(key)
require.NoError(dErr)
require.Equal(value, got)
// Read via wire.
buf2 := zapwire.GetBuffer()
buf2.WriteBytes(key)
_, resp, err := conn.Call(ctx, MsgDBGet, buf2.Bytes())
zapwire.PutBuffer(buf2)
require.NoError(err)
r := zapwire.NewReader(resp)
wireVal, _ := r.ReadBytes()
require.Equal(value, wireVal)
}
+8 -8
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/consensus/utils/set"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
)
func TestFullValidatorFunctionality(t *testing.T) {
@@ -151,15 +151,15 @@ func TestNetworkConfiguration(t *testing.T) {
t.Logf("✓ Network configuration verified: ID=%d, Name=%s", networkID, expectedName)
}
func TestXAssetID(t *testing.T) {
// Verify XAssetID is used for native asset
xAssetID := ids.Empty // Our implementation uses Empty ID for native asset
func TestUTXOAssetID(t *testing.T) {
// Verify UTXOAssetID is used for native asset
utxoAssetID := ids.Empty // Our implementation uses Empty ID for native asset
if xAssetID != ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("XAssetID should be Empty for native asset")
if utxoAssetID != ids.Empty {
t.Fatal("UTXOAssetID should be Empty for native asset")
}
t.Log("✓ XAssetID verified for native LUX asset")
t.Log("✓ UTXOAssetID verified for native LUX asset")
}
func TestConsensusConfig(t *testing.T) {
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ func TestSummary(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("✓ Validator Manager: PASS")
t.Log("✓ Network Configuration: PASS")
t.Log("✓ Consensus Parameters: PASS")
t.Log("✓ XAssetID Configuration: PASS")
t.Log("✓ UTXOAssetID Configuration: PASS")
t.Log("✓ Validator Lifecycle: PASS")
t.Log("✓ Validator Set Interface: PASS")
t.Log("----------------------------------------")
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
package debug
import (
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"github.com/luxfi/constants"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
validators "github.com/luxfi/validators"
"testing"
)
+6 -6
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Deploy all 4 subnet chains (Zoo, Hanzo, SPC, Pars) to mainnet + testnet
# Usage: ./deploy-subnets.sh [mainnet|testnet|devnet|both]
# Deploy all 4 app chains (Zoo, Hanzo, SPC, Pars) to mainnet + testnet
# Usage: ./deploy-chains.sh [mainnet|testnet|devnet|both]
#
# Prerequisites:
# - macOS keychain must have mainnet-key-02 key (will prompt for approval)
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ if [ ! -f "$DEPLOY_BIN" ]; then
fi
# Use mainnet-key-02 (NOT 01!) because 01's funds are all staked by initialStakers
# mainnet-key-02 has 70M LUX unlocked on P-chain, sufficient for subnet creation
# mainnet-key-02 has 70M LUX unlocked on P-chain, sufficient for chain creation
KEY_NAME="mainnet-key-02"
echo "Extracting $KEY_NAME from keychain..."
echo "(Approve the macOS keychain dialog that appears)"
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ deploy_network() {
local network=$1
echo ""
echo "=============================="
echo "Deploying subnets to $network"
echo "Deploying chains to $network"
echo "=============================="
LUX_PRIVATE_KEY="$KEY" "$DEPLOY_BIN" \
PRIVATE_KEY="$KEY" "$DEPLOY_BIN" \
--network="$network" \
--state-dir="$STATE_DIR" 2>&1
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ echo ""
echo "All deployments complete!"
echo ""
echo "Next steps:"
echo " 1. Copy the Subnet IDs and Blockchain IDs from output above"
echo " 1. Copy the Chain IDs and Blockchain IDs from output above"
echo " 2. Update Helm values files:"
echo " ~/work/lux/devops/charts/lux/values-mainnet.yaml"
echo " ~/work/lux/devops/charts/lux/values-testnet.yaml"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# Build stage
FROM golang:1.26-alpine AS builder
FROM golang:1.26.3-alpine AS builder
RUN apk add --no-cache git make gcc musl-dev linux-headers bash
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# Multi-chain node builder
FROM golang:1.26-alpine AS builder
FROM golang:1.26.3-alpine AS builder
ARG CHAIN_TYPE=platform
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
FROM golang:1.26-alpine AS builder
FROM golang:1.26.3-alpine AS builder
RUN apk add --no-cache git make gcc musl-dev linux-headers bash

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