- vms/thresholdvm/ → vms/mpcvm/ (dir + inner files + package decl).
- node/vms.go optional-VM registry: drop ThresholdVMID row, add
MPCVMID and FHEVMID rows (matching the new split).
- genesis/builder/registry.go: T-Chain entry → M-Chain (MPCVMID) +
F-Chain (FHEVMID); registry_test.go parity assertions updated.
- genesis/builder/builder.go: TChainAliases → MChainAliases +
FChainAliases; ThresholdVMID switch case split to MPCVMID / FHEVMID;
optIn chain slice uses config.MChainGenesis + config.FChainGenesis
(T-Chain slot retired).
- LLM.md: point at LP-0130 as canonical topology + fee spec; correct
the quantumvm posture to service-only per LP-0130 §6 (Q-Chain has
no user-payable blockspace).
Build + vet clean on chains/mpcvm/... + node/{vms/mpcvm,genesis,node}/...
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
9.2 KiB
Security
Reporting Vulnerabilities
Report security issues to security@lux.network. Do not open public issues for vulnerabilities.
- Provide a description, reproduction steps, and affected components.
- We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours.
- We will provide an initial assessment within 7 business days.
- We coordinate disclosure timelines with the reporter.
If the vulnerability affects production funds or consensus safety, we treat it as P0 and begin remediation immediately.
Cryptographic Primitives
Production implementations live in lux/crypto/ and lux/lattice/. Formal verification proofs for each primitive are in lux/papers/proofs/.
Signatures
| Primitive | Standard | Implementation | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| BLS12-381 | draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature | crypto/bls/ |
Validator consensus, warp message aggregation |
| ECDSA secp256k1 | SEC 2 | crypto/secp256k1/ |
EVM transaction signing, C-Chain |
| ECDSA secp256r1 | FIPS 186-5 | crypto/secp256r1/ |
WebAuthn, hardware key support |
| ML-DSA-65 | FIPS 204 | crypto/mldsa/ |
Post-quantum validator identity |
| SLH-DSA | FIPS 205 | crypto/slhdsa/ |
Hash-based PQ fallback signatures |
| Falcon-512/1024 | NIST Round 3 | crypto/pq/ |
EVM precompile PQ signatures (ETHFALCON) |
| Corona | Internal | lux/lattice/ |
Lattice-based threshold signatures for anonymous validator participation |
Key Encapsulation
| Primitive | Standard | Implementation | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| ML-KEM-768 | FIPS 203 | crypto/mlkem/ |
Post-quantum key exchange, encrypted P2P handshake |
| HPKE | RFC 9180 | crypto/hpke/ |
Hybrid public key encryption |
Symmetric and AEAD
| Primitive | Standard | Implementation | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 | RFC 8439 | crypto/aead/ |
Authenticated encryption for P2P transport |
| AES-256-GCM | NIST SP 800-38D | crypto/aead/ |
Alternative AEAD for hardware-accelerated paths |
Key Derivation and Hashing
| Primitive | Standard | Implementation | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argon2id | RFC 9106 | crypto/kdf/ |
Password hashing, key stretching |
| HKDF-SHA256 | RFC 5869 | crypto/kdf/ |
Key derivation from shared secrets |
| Keccak-256 | FIPS 202 | crypto/keccak.go |
EVM address derivation, state hashing |
| BLAKE2b | RFC 7693 | crypto/blake2b/ |
Non-EVM hashing, content addressing |
| Poseidon2 | ZK-friendly | crypto/hash/ |
Zero-knowledge circuit hashing (Z-Chain) |
Threshold and MPC
| Primitive | Protocol | Implementation | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| FROST | Komlo-Goldberg 2020 | crypto/threshold/ |
Threshold Schnorr signatures for bridge custody |
| CGGMP21 | Canetti et al. 2021 | crypto/cggmp21/ |
Threshold ECDSA for multi-chain custody |
| LSS | Shamir + live resharing | crypto/secret/ |
Dynamic secret sharing with participant rotation |
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
| Primitive | Scheme | Implementation | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| TFHE | Torus FHE | crypto/ + precompiles |
Encrypted smart contract computation |
| CKKS | Approximate arithmetic | crypto/ |
Privacy-preserving ML inference |
Network Security
P2P Transport
- All peer connections use mutual TLS 1.3.
- Post-quantum handshake option via ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid key exchange (
crypto/kem/). - Peer identity bound to staking key (BLS public key for validators, secp256k1 for API nodes).
- Eclipse resistance via peer discovery protocol with formal proof (
papers/proofs/proof-network-peer-discovery.tex).
Consensus Transport
- ZAP binary wire protocol (
papers/lux-zap-wire-protocol.tex) for consensus messages. - Zero-allocation serialization path -- no GC pressure under load.
- Warp messaging for cross-chain: BLS aggregate signatures verified on-chain (
papers/lux-warp-messaging.tex).
Validator Security
- Zero-trust validator architecture (
papers/lux-zero-trust-validators.tex). - HSM boundary design for validator keys (
papers/lux-hsm-boundary.tex). - Hybrid certificate chains with PQ trust anchors (
papers/lux-hybrid-certificates.tex). - Reproducible builds with content-addressed attestation (
papers/lux-reproducible-builds.tex).
Key Management
Validator Keys
- BLS signing keys stored in HSM (PKCS#11) or secure enclave where available.
- Threshold key generation via DKG -- no single party holds the full key.
- Key rotation via live secret resharing (LSS protocol) without chain downtime.
HD Wallets
- BIP-32/44 hierarchical deterministic derivation.
- secp256k1 and secp256r1 key paths.
- Hardware wallet integration (Ledger, Trezor) for end-user keys.
MPC Custody (M-Chain)
- FROST t-of-n for Schnorr/Taproot custody.
- CGGMP21 t-of-n for ECDSA custody (Ethereum, Bitcoin legacy).
- Session lifecycle management with NATS transport.
- Formal proofs:
papers/proofs/proof-crypto-frost.tex,papers/proofs/proof-crypto-cggmp21.tex.
Bridge Custody
- Teleport bridge uses MPC group keys -- no single custodian.
- Per-chain governance: each chain's bridge parameters are sovereign.
- Configurable key rotation delay.
- Formal proof:
papers/proofs/proof-bridge-teleport.tex.
Audit History
Round 1 -- December 2025 (Component Audits)
3 targeted audits covering DexVM, oracle protocol, and perpetuals contracts:
| Report | Scope |
|---|---|
audits/2025-12-11-dexvm-audit.md |
DEX VM code review |
audits/2025-12-11-oracle-audit.md |
Oracle and price feed implementation |
audits/2025-12-11-perpetuals-audit.md |
Perpetuals and derivatives contracts |
Round 2 -- December 2025 (Full Ecosystem)
12 component audits covering the entire node implementation. Compiled from commit 66d514d2b7.
| Report | Scope |
|---|---|
audits/2025-12-30-architecture-review.md |
Full architecture review |
audits/2025-12-30-consensus-audit.md |
Consensus layer (Quasar, including Nova linear and Nebula DAG modes) |
audits/2025-12-30-contracts-audit.md |
Smart contract security |
audits/2025-12-30-crypto-audit.md |
Cryptography stack (BLS, PQ, MPC) |
audits/2025-12-30-database-audit.md |
Storage layer |
audits/2025-12-30-dexvm-audit.md |
DexVM (D-Chain) |
audits/2025-12-30-network-audit.md |
Network layer and P2P |
audits/2025-12-30-oracle-protocol-audit.md |
Oracle and attestation protocol |
audits/2025-12-30-other-vms-audit.md |
Secondary VMs |
audits/2025-12-30-platformvm-audit.md |
PlatformVM (P-Chain) |
audits/2025-12-30-proposervm-evm-audit.md |
ProposerVM and EVM integration |
audits/2025-12-30-mpcvm-audit.md |
ThresholdVM (T-Chain) |
audits/2025-12-30-warp-audit.md |
Warp cross-chain messaging |
audits/2025-12-30-zkvm-audit.md |
ZKVM (Z-Chain) |
Summary report: security/2025-12-30-final-security-analysis.md
Status report: security/2025-12-30-FINAL-STATUS.md
164 total findings (17 critical, 42 high, 58 medium, 47 low). Identified development placeholders (XOR stubs, length-only verification) in advanced features not yet in production. Core chains (P-Chain, X-Chain, C-Chain) passed clean.
Round 3 -- January/March 2026 (Smart Contracts)
Two focused audits on the Solidity contract stack:
| Report | Scope |
|---|---|
audits/standard-2026-01-30/ |
@luxfi/standard contract suite -- 832 tests, 105 fuzz tests |
audits/2026-03-25-comprehensive-security-audit.md |
lux/standard v1.6.5, lux/liquid v1.1.0, liquidity/contracts |
The March 2026 comprehensive audit used red/blue adversarial methodology with Foundry, Slither, Semgrep, Aderyn, Halmos (symbolic execution), and Lean 4 (theorem proving).
Results: 15 critical, 13 high, 10 medium, 3 low -- all remediated. 1,383 tests passing. 48 Halmos symbolic proofs + 33 Lean 4 theorems + 33 Foundry invariant tests.
Post-remediation risk: LOW. CI enforces Slither (fail-on: medium), Semgrep, Aderyn, and forge fmt on every push to main.
Current Status
All critical and high findings from the contract audits are resolved. The December 2025 node audit identified development stubs in post-quantum and zero-knowledge subsystems that are not deployed to production; these are tracked and being replaced with real implementations as each subsystem matures.
Formal Verification
50 mechanized proofs in papers/proofs/, covering:
- Consensus: safety, liveness, BFT thresholds, finality composition, validator economics
- Cryptography: BLS aggregation, FROST unforgeability, CGGMP21 UC-security, ML-DSA, ML-KEM, SLH-DSA, Corona, TFHE, CKKS, Verkle commitments, hybrid signatures, threshold composition, linear secret sharing
- DeFi: AMM invariants, order book correctness, flash loan safety, router correctness, governance, fee models
- Bridge: Teleport protocol, warp message security/delivery/ordering
- Network: peer discovery and eclipse resistance
- Build: reproducibility, attestation, coeffect algebra, cross-ecosystem verification
- Trust: authority lattice, vouch model, revocation
See papers/INDEX.md for the full list.
Bug Bounty
If you discover a vulnerability, contact security@lux.network. We will work with you on responsible disclosure and appropriate recognition.
Lux Industries -- security@lux.network