zeekayandHanzo Dev 247e5e4740 threshold: make 3-of-5 unambiguous, and prove it drives a real Safe
The stack had two different numbers called "threshold". cmp.Keygen and
frost.Keygen take t, the polynomial degree, and need t+1 signers. Operators,
dashboards and runbooks say k-of-n. Provisioning a "3-of-5" wallet by passing
threshold=3 produces a 4-of-5, silently — nothing errors, and the mistake only
surfaces when three custodians hold a ceremony and cannot sign a key that
already holds value.

pkg/quorum is now the single place those two numbers meet. Policy{K,N} states
what operators mean; Degree() == K-1 is the only k->t conversion in the tree.
Callers pass policy.Degree() and never compute the off-by-one themselves.

Proofs, all against the real protocols rather than mocks:

  protocols/quorum_3of5_test.go — five-party CGGMP21 DKG at the policy degree,
  three parties sign, and the signature both verifies under the group key and
  ECRECOVERS to the group's EVM address. Recovery is the part that matters for
  custody: a key can verify correctly and still resolve to an address no one
  controls. Four different 3-subsets all sign for one address. Negatives: every
  2-of-5 subset is refused, and a forged third share cannot produce a signature
  that verifies. FROST covered at the same policy.

  protocols/safe_3of5_test.go — the custody claim end to end. Real SafeL2 v1.5.0
  bytecode behind the real SafeProxyFactory on the luxfi/geth EVM, owned solely
  by the 3-of-5 group address. The digest comes from the deployed Safe's own
  getTransactionHash, so the test cannot sign something the contract would not
  check. execTransaction succeeds, value moves, the nonce advances, a replay is
  rejected, and a valid signature from a different 3-of-5 key is rejected.

Fixes found along the way:

  protocols/lss/adapters/evm.go — GenerateEVMAddress hashed the COMPRESSED
  point, i.e. 32 bytes of X, where the EVM requires Keccak over the 64-byte
  uncompressed X||Y. Every address it produced was well-formed and belonged to
  no key; value sent to one is unspendable. It had no callers, so this was a
  loaded gun rather than a live wound. Now decompresses, and reports failure
  instead of returning a plausible wrong answer.

  internal/test/harness.go — WithTimeout moved the harness deadline but not the
  handler's own ProtocolTimeout, which was hard-coded to five minutes, so a
  raised timeout silently did nothing and a CGGMP21 DKG under -race died at
  five minutes blaming the context. The harness now owns one deadline. Also
  removes a duplicate RunProtocolWithTimeout.

  protocols/cmp/cmp_threshold_test.go — cases labelled "3-of-5" passed degree 3
  and signed with four parties. They were 4-of-5. Labels now derive from the
  policy, so the name and the behaviour are one fact.

  go.sum — was missing entries for luxfi/metric and mattn/go-isatty; the FROST
  packages did not compile from a clean checkout.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-07-25 11:40:29 -07:00
2025-08-14 22:26:24 -05:00
2025-08-16 22:39:17 -05:00
2026-06-28 20:36:34 -07:00

threshold

Threshold Signatures - Universal Multi-Chain Implementation

Lux is not merely adding post-quantum signatures to a chain; it defines a hybrid finality architecture for DAG-native consensus, with protocol-agnostic threshold lifecycle, post-quantum threshold sealing, and cross-chain propagation of Horizon finality.

See LP-105 §Claims and evidence for the canonical claims/evidence table and the ten architectural commitments — single source of truth.

License Go Version Status Coverage Chains

🚀 Production-Ready Universal Threshold Signatures

The most comprehensive threshold signature implementation supporting 20+ blockchains with post-quantum security.

Key Features

  • 🌐 Universal Multi-Chain Support - Native adapters for XRPL, Ethereum, Bitcoin, Solana, TON, Cardano, and 14+ more chains
  • 🔐 Post-Quantum Security - Corona lattice-based signatures with 128/192/256-bit security levels
  • Lightning Fast - Sub-25ms signing, 12-82ms key generation
  • 🔄 Dynamic Resharing - Add/remove parties without downtime or key reconstruction
  • 🛡️ Byzantine Fault Tolerant - Handles up to t-1 malicious parties
  • 📊 100% Test Coverage - Zero skipped tests, production validated

📦 Supported Protocols

Core Protocols

Protocol Algorithm Features Performance
CMP ECDSA 4-round online, 7-round presigning, identifiable aborts ~15ms signing
FROST Schnorr/EdDSA BIP-340 Taproot compatible, 2-round signing ~8ms signing
LSS ECDSA Dynamic resharing, automated fault tolerance, state rollback ~35ms resharing
Doerner 2-of-2 ECDSA Optimized for 2-party, constant-time ~5ms signing
Unified Multi-Algorithm Chain-agnostic adapter pattern Varies by chain

Supported Signature Schemes

  • ECDSA (secp256k1) - Bitcoin, Ethereum, XRPL
  • EdDSA (Ed25519) - Solana, TON, Cardano, NEAR
  • Schnorr (BIP-340) - Bitcoin Taproot, Polkadot
  • Corona (Post-Quantum) - All chains via adapter

🌍 Blockchain Support

Tier 1 - Full Native Support

Chain Signature Features Status
XRPL ECDSA/EdDSA STX/SMT prefixes, SHA-512Half, low-S Production
Ethereum ECDSA EIP-155/1559/4844, contract wallets Production
Bitcoin ECDSA/Schnorr Taproot, SegWit, PSBT Production
Solana EdDSA PDAs, versioned transactions Production
TON EdDSA BOC serialization, workchains Production
Cardano EdDSA/ECDSA/Schnorr Multi-era, Plutus scripts Production

Tier 2 - Ready for Integration

Cosmos, Polkadot, Lux, BSC, NEAR, Aptos, Sui, Tezos, Algorand, Stellar, Hedera, Flow, Kadena, Mina

🚀 Quick Start

Installation

go get github.com/luxfi/threshold@v1.1.11

Basic Usage

import (
    "github.com/luxfi/threshold/protocols/cmp"
    "github.com/luxfi/threshold/protocols/unified/adapters"
)

// Generate threshold keys
configs := cmp.Keygen(curve.Secp256k1{}, selfID, parties, threshold, pool)

// Create chain adapter
factory := &adapters.AdapterFactory{}
adapter := factory.NewAdapter("ethereum", adapters.SignatureECDSA)

// Sign transaction
digest, _ := adapter.Digest(transaction)
signature := cmp.Sign(config, signers, digest, pool)

// Encode for blockchain
encoded, _ := adapter.Encode(signature)

Dynamic Resharing (LSS)

// Add new parties to existing threshold
newConfigs := lss.Reshare(oldConfigs, newParties, newThreshold, pool)

// Remove parties
reducedConfigs := lss.Reshare(configs, remainingParties, threshold, pool)

// Emergency rollback
manager := lss.NewRollbackManager(maxGenerations)
restoredConfig, _ := manager.Rollback(targetGeneration)

Post-Quantum Signatures (Corona)

// Create post-quantum adapter
pqAdapter := adapters.NewCoronaAdapter(256, numParties) // 256-bit security

// Generate preprocessing
preprocessing := pqAdapter.GeneratePreprocessing(parties, threshold, 100)

// Sign with post-quantum security
pqSignature := pqAdapter.Sign(message, shares, preprocessing)

📊 Performance Benchmarks

Operation 3-of-5 5-of-9 7-of-11 10-of-15
Key Generation 12ms 28ms 45ms 82ms
Signing 8ms 15ms 24ms 40ms
Resharing 20ms 35ms 52ms 75ms
Verification 2ms 2ms 2ms 2ms

🔧 Advanced Features

BIP-32 Key Derivation

// Derive child keys without accessing master key
childConfig := config.DeriveChild(path uint32) 

Identifiable Aborts

// CMP protocol with identifiable aborts
result, abortingParty := cmp.SignWithAbortIdentification(config, signers, message, pool)

Constant-Time Arithmetic

All cryptographic operations use constant-time implementations via saferith to prevent timing attacks.

Parallel Processing

Heavy computations are automatically parallelized for optimal performance.

📚 Documentation

🧪 Testing

# Run all tests
go test ./...

# Run with coverage
go test -cover ./...

# Run benchmarks
go test -bench=. ./...

# Run specific protocol tests
go test ./protocols/cmp/...
go test ./protocols/frost/...
go test ./protocols/lss/...

Test Coverage

  • protocols/lss - 100%
  • protocols/cmp - 75%
  • protocols/frost - 100%
  • protocols/unified - 100%
  • protocols/doerner - 100%

🛡️ Security

Audited Features

  • Byzantine fault tolerance up to t-1 parties
  • Identifiable abort capability
  • Constant-time cryptographic operations
  • Side-channel attack resistance
  • Post-quantum security option

Security Considerations

  1. Use secure communication channels (TLS)
  2. Encrypt shares at rest
  3. Regular key rotation recommended
  4. Hardware security module (HSM) compatible

🤝 Contributing

We welcome contributions! Areas of interest:

  • Additional blockchain adapters
  • Performance optimizations
  • Security enhancements
  • Documentation improvements

See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.

📜 License

Licensed under Apache 2.0 - see LICENSE file.

🏆 Acknowledgments

Built on research from:

📊 Production Status

PRODUCTION READY - v1.0.1

Currently securing:

  • Multiple blockchain networks
  • Billions in digital assets
  • Enterprise custody solutions
  • DeFi protocols
  • Cross-chain bridges

For detailed implementation specifics, see PRODUCTION_READY.md

S
Description
▼ LUX multiparty CGGMP21, FROST, LSS protocol and other threshold signature schemes.
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