`go build ./...` failed with "missing go.sum entry for module providing
package" (ntt_simd.go) — the go.mod was out of sync with the imports, so
individual `go get`s just walk further down the chain; tidy is the fix.
Also patches the panic-driven denial of service in the AWS SDK for Go v2
EventStream decoder: eventstream v1.7.8, service/s3 v1.97.3 (minimum patched,
so the change carries the fix and nothing else).
Verified: go build ./... goes from exit 1 to exit 0.
go test ./... is 4 ok / 2 FAILING. Those 2 are not a regression here — the
packages could not compile before, so their tests never ran; repairing the
build makes pre-existing failures reachable. Stated explicitly rather than
reporting only the build fix, since a green build with red tests reads as
"done" when it is not.
Several luxfi versions carry TWO different contents across this workspace,
because published tags were moved instead of a new patch being cut:
age@v1.5.0, pq@v1.0.3, threshold@v1.9.4, zap@v0.6.0, zap@v0.8.1.
Adjudicated before editing, since "checksum mismatch / SECURITY ERROR" is also
what a real supply-chain attack looks like. It is not one here: sum.golang.org
holds the OLD hash while proxy.golang.org and a direct fetch BOTH serve the same
NEW bytes. Two independent transports agreeing means nothing is rewriting
content in flight — the tag moved at source. The sumdb entry is a fossil:
GOPRIVATE covers github.com/luxfi/* with GOSUMDB=off, so our own modules never
consult the checksum DB and a moved tag splits consumers silently.
The old bytes are served by nothing now, so a stale pin can never build.
Corrected to the only content that exists, in BOTH line forms (h1: and
/go.mod h1:) — Go reports these one at a time, so a partial fix just relocates
the error.
Deliberately no `go mod tidy`: this changes no selected version, only the
recorded hash of versions already chosen.
Verified: `go list -m all` resolves with no checksum error.
The durable fix is upstream: never move a published tag, cut x.y.z+1 instead.
Establish exactly one way to do each thing and fence off the legacy primitives:
- doc.go (new): package overview. DealerlessKeyGen is THE production keygen
(dealerless); PartialDecryptLWE/CombineLWE is THE threshold decrypt
(no-reconstruct); ShareLWESecretKey is a trusted-dealer test oracle only.
Documents the F ⊥ M boundary (this package is FHE-only; MPC signing lives in
luxfi/threshold) and the dealerless-bootstrap-key residual (homomorphic
compute), stated honestly, not faked.
- keygen.go: re-document GenerateSharedKey. It is a TRUSTED-DEALER key-COMMITMENT
VSS that shares the SHA-256 hash of the key — useful for verifiable-sharing
audit, NOT usable for threshold decryption. Marked Deprecated for the keygen
role; points to DealerlessKeyGen. Removes the misleading 'distributed key
generation … for now we generate keys and split them' framing.
- partial_decrypt.go: label ShareLWESecretKey as TRUSTED-DEALER (retained as a
KAT oracle); point to DealerlessKeyGen for production.
No behaviour change; kernel tests green.
Closes the one trustless gap in the threshold-FHE stack. partial_decrypt.go
was already NO-RECONSTRUCT (the master secret s only ever appears masked behind
c_1·s), but ShareLWESecretKey assumed a TRUSTED DEALER: one process samples the
whole FHE secret key and Shamir-splits it. That instant of single-party custody
violates the trustless-by-default law (no dealer + no-reconstruct), the same
standard Corona/Pulsar/Magnetar are held to.
DealerlessKeyGen removes the dealer. GJKR/Pedersen DKG structure specialised to
the RLWE/LWE secret, composed with the audited Lattigo multiparty CKG:
- each party samples its OWN contribution s_j; collective secret s = Σ s_j
is never formed by any party or by this package;
- collective LWE public key p = Σ(-a·s_j + e_j) = -a·s + e via lattice CKG
(dealerless, format-identical to the library's pk);
- t-of-n shares: each party coeff-wise Shamir-splits its OWN s_j; recipients
sum sub-shares to a degree-(t-1) Shamir share of s — producing exactly the
LWEShare type the proven PartialDecryptLWE/CombineLWE kernel consumes.
Per-party API (DealerlessParty.DealRound1/Aggregate, SampleDealerlessCRP,
AssembleCollectivePublicKey) for distributed deployment + a one-shot driver.
Wire types (PublicKeyShareMsg/SubShareMsg) carry only public/share data, never
a SecretKey. DRY: ShareLWESecretKey now reuses the shared dealing helpers.
Proven (dealerless_dkg_test.go, all green incl. -race, 3-of-5 PN11QP54):
- E2E trustless lane: dealerless DKG → public-key encrypt → t-of-n partial
decrypt → combine → correct plaintext (2-of-3, 3-of-5);
- below-threshold (t-1) cannot decrypt;
- no party holds s: two t-subsets reconstruct the same secret, no share == s;
- CRP deterministic per consensus seed (validators converge), seed-bound;
- transport carries no secret (reflect gate);
- no-reconstruct structural gate (go/ast) over the keygen+decrypt surface,
with a negative control proving the gate has teeth.
Scope: F-Chain confidential-DECRYPT lane (encryption key + t-of-n shares). The
dealerless FHEW bootstrap/eval key (homomorphic COMPUTE) is a separate
multiparty-FHEW protocol, documented as the residual — not faked here.
- data-seal: Verifiable Data Integrity Seal (PIP-0010/LP-0535)
FHE-encrypted tamper-proof sealing with Public/ZK/Private modes,
batch sealing, homomorphic verification
- content-provenance: AI & Media Content Provenance (PIP-0011/LP-7110)
Model manifests, output attestation via homomorphic comparison,
media derivation DAGs
- encrypted-crdt: Encrypted CRDT (PIP-0013/LP-6500)
LWW-Register with FHE values, OR-Set with tag-based add/remove,
Lamport timestamp conflict resolution, deterministic merge
- shadow-governance: Shadow Government Protocol (PIP-7010)
Anonymous ministries, encrypted voting with homomorphic tallying,
nullifier-based anti-fraud, quorum enforcement
Each example includes Solidity contracts, Hardhat tests, CLI tasks,
and README linking to corresponding PIP and LP specifications.
Six production-ready example applications demonstrating the FHE library:
- cmd/seal: document integrity sealing with encrypted verification
- cmd/vote: encrypted voting system with threshold tallying
- cmd/mediaseal: media content authentication with FHE
- cmd/provenance: AI model provenance tracking with encrypted attestation
- cmd/crdt: encrypted LWW-Register for fheCRDT architectures (LP-6500)
- cmd/stats: secure multiparty statistics over encrypted data
Also pins luxfi/mdns to v0.1.0 and excludes compiled binaries from git.
Remove all submodules and non-Go content.
JS SDKs, plugins, templates, and examples live in their own repos.
Kept:
- Go FHE library (*.go)
- cmd/, pkg/, internal/
- docs/, bin/
zeekay